

MAURICE A. POPE: A STUDY IN MILITARY LEADERSHIP
MAURICE A. POPE: UNE ÉTUDE EN LEADERSHIP MILITAIRE

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By

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ABSTRACT

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Supervisors: Dr. Douglas E. Delaney

Dr. Norman Hillmer

This thesis analyses the military career of Maurice A. Pope, through the lens of leadership. It takes a skills and trait approach to analyse how he became a leader. Good leaders demonstrate the proper technical skills and proficiency in their line of business. They exhibit strong human skills and the ability to interact with subordinates, peers and superiors. And sound leaders possess the proper conceptual skills to probe and work with complex questions related to their organization. Pope developed those skills over time. He relied more heavily on his technical and human skills early in his career; he displayed his conceptual skills more prominently later in his military career. Influence is a critical element of leadership. It is more challenging for leaders to achieve influence when they rely primarily on their personal power to do so. Pope had to depend on his personal power for a large part of his career. His personal power came from his knowledge and experience, his ability to relate to others, and the amount of goodwill he garnered by establishing situations of trust. Trustworthiness is an important trait of leadership. Leaders must also be adaptable, composed, very professional, and have a strong sense of duty. Pope displayed all of those traits. Pope was a leader with a realist bent. He provided a voice of reason and advanced sensible solutions to policy questions. There was no place for indulgence or unrealistic expectations. Beginning in the 1930s, Pope served where military and political affairs intersected and he was very conversant in both fields. He depended on his full range of skills to become a master organizer and problem solver whose vision, expertise, and integrity won the trust of soldiers, civil servants, diplomats, and politicians alike. Although he was rarely a central decision maker, Pope wielded influence at progressively higher levels once the Second World War began: as a senior staff officer in Ottawa and with the Canadian forces in Great Britain, then as Canada's top military representative in Washington, the seat of the Anglo-American alliance, and ultimately, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King's military advisor in 1944-45. Pope went from a veteran of front-line combat in the First World War to a pivotal figure in the Canadian military effort in the Second World War, always trying to make a difference.

RÉSUMÉ

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MAURICE A. POPE : UNE ÉTUDE EN LEADERSHIP MILITAIRE

Directeurs de thèse : Douglas E. Delaney

Dr. Norman Hillmer

La présente thèse analyse la carrière militaire de Maurice A. Pope du point de vue du leadership. Elle adopte une approche basée sur les compétences et qualités personnelles pour examiner comment Pope est devenu un leader. Les meilleurs leaders démontrent les compétences techniques et la maîtrise de leur secteur d'activité, ainsi que des compétences interpersonnelles, que ce soit avec leurs subordonnés, leurs collègues, ou leurs supérieurs. Les bons leaders doivent également posséder des compétences conceptuelles afin de travailler avec des questions complexes reliées à leur organisation. Pope a développé ces compétences au cours de sa carrière militaire. Il a utilisé de façon plus marquée les compétences techniques et interpersonnelles plus tôt dans sa carrière, et les compétences conceptuelles plus tard. L'influence est un élément essentiel du leadership. L'influence peut être d'origine professionnelle ou personnelle. C'est plus difficile pour les leaders de réaliser l'influence quand ils se fient principalement sur leur pouvoir personnel. Pope a dû dépendre plus de son pouvoir personnel durant sa carrière. Il a développé son pouvoir personnel à partir de ses compétences techniques, ses fortes compétences interpersonnelles, et la bonne volonté qu'il a acquis en établissant des situations de confiance. La fiabilité est un élément important du leadership. De plus, les leaders doivent pouvoir s'adapter, démontrer du sang-froid, posséder un fort sens du devoir, ainsi qu'être professionnel. Pope a démontré toutes ces caractéristiques. Pope était un réaliste. Il a fourni une voix de raison et a recommandé des solutions judicieuses pour des questions politiques. Il n'y avait pas de question d'indulgences ou d'attentes irréalistes. À partir des années 1930, Pope a dû travailler à l'intersection des affaires militaires et politiques, et il connaissait bien les deux domaines. Il a dû se fier sur la gamme complète de ses compétences pour devenir un maître organisateur et une personne douée à résoudre des problèmes. Il a réussi à gagner la confiance des soldats, fonctionnaires, diplomates, et politiciens grâce à sa vision, son expertise, et son intégrité. Même si Pope fut rarement un décideur central, il a su utiliser son influence à des niveaux progressivement plus élevés après le début de la deuxième guerre mondiale: officier d'état-major à Ottawa, avec les forces canadiennes en Grande Bretagne, haut représentant militaire à Washington, le siège de l'alliance militaire anglo-américaine, et finalement, comme conseiller militaire pour le premier ministre William Lyon Mackenzie King en 1944-45. Pope est passé d'un vétéran des lignes de front durant la première guerre mondiale à une figure de pivot pour le Canada dans son effort militaire durant la deuxième guerre mondiale, cherchant toujours à avoir un impact.

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I would like to thank my friend Dr. David Lenarcic for reading a preliminary and much longer version of my dissertation. Dr. Lenarcic has been away from academic studies for many years. However, he has not lost his touch, judging from the helpful comments he offered. In addition, he took great interest in my project and was always very encouraging. I owe him a large debt of gratitude. I would also extend special thanks to the rest of my cheering section. They include my brother and sister and their families, as well as John Dance, Theresa Wallace, Mark and Anne Dance, Michael Jay, Donna Jay, Dave Alexander, Andrew Brown, John Lepore, Wendy Lillico, Jennifer Foster, the Camerons, the Colemans, the Keatings, and the McAleers, to name but a few. Thank you for expressing interest in my retirement project and rooting me on.

Of course, I could not have written my dissertation without access to the archives at the Canadian War Museum, Library and Archives Canada, and the Directorate of History and Heritage at National Defence Headquarters. The staffs at these institutions were always very courteous and extremely helpful.

My journey was made even more rewarding because I had the pleasure of meeting some of Pope's relatives. Special thanks go to the late Claudine Pope, Maurice Pope's daughter-in-law, who opened her house and gave me unfettered access to the many documents and letters Maurice Pope had left behind. Also very helpful were Sheila Pope, another daughter-in-law, and Nora Pope, granddaughter of Maurice Pope. They all helped in defining what kind of person Maurice Pope was.

Finally, I have to thank my family. My late mother always took great interest in my academic achievements. It is unfortunate she did not live to see the end of my project. My late son Philip may not have shared the same passion for history as his father does, but he would have been very proud. My son Patrick and daughter-in-law Cathrine always inquired about my progress. My daughter Melanie inspired me to keep going, always knowing what to say when I was casting doubt on completing my journey. Finally, I wish to thank my wife Lynn. She has been there since I started my doctorate in 2010. She knows Pope almost as well as I do.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACGS	Assistant Chief to the General Staff
AG	Adjutant General
BEF	British Expeditionary Force
CAS.	Chief of the Air Staff
CASF	Canadian Active Service Force
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff
CE	Chief Engineer
CEF	Canadian Expeditionary Force
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
CID	Committee of Imperial Defence
CJSM	Canadian Joint Staff Mission
CIGS	Chief of Imperial General Staff
CMHQ	Canadian Military Headquarters
CNS	Chief of Naval Services
COSC	Chiefs of Staff Committee
CP	Crerar Papers
CRE	Commander Royal Engineers
CWM	Canadian War Museum
DEFENSOR	NDHQ (address used in telegram)
DND	Department of National Defence
DHH	Directorate of History and Heritage
DMO&I	Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence
DOC	District Officer Commanding
DSD	Directorate of Staff Duties
GS	General Staff
GOCC	General Officer Commanding
GOC-in-C	General Officer Commander in Chief
GSO	General Staff Officer

JWAC	Canadian-American Joint War Aid Committee
LAC	Library and Archives Canada
MAB	Munitions Assignment Board
MD	Military District
MGO	Master General of the Ordnance
MSC	Militia Staff Course
NCOs	Non-Commissioned Officers
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
NPAM	Non-Permanent Active Militia
NRMA	National Resources Mobilization Act
PJBD	Permanent Joint Board on Defence
QMG	Quarter-Master General
RAF	Royal Air Force
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCE	Royal Canadian Engineers
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy
RN	Royal navy
RMC	Royal Military College
SAO	Senior Air Officer
U.K.	United Kingdom
U.S.	United States
VCGS	Vice Chief of the General Staff
WD	War Diary

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Maurice A. Pope was raised in Ottawa in a bilingual milieu (his father spoke English and his mother French) and graduated from McGill University in engineering. He joined the Canadian Expeditionary Forces in late 1914 and served over the course of the First World War as an engineer officer, brigade intelligence officer, and finally as brigade major. After the war, he worked with the Canadian Battlefield Commission for two years. After returning to Canada, he wrote and passed the exams to enter the British staff college at Camberley in 1924. By early 1926, he was back in Canada where he was posted first in Victoria, British Columbia and then Quebec City. Between 1926 and 1931, he trained Canada's part-time militia. During the 1930s, he occupied key posts at the War Office in London and at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. Between 1939 and 1945, his functions included Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London, Assistant Chief of the General Staff (ACGS) and then Vice Chief of the General Staff (VCGS) in Ottawa, member of the Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board Defence on Defence (PJBD), head of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission (CJSM) in Washington, the seat of the Anglo-American alliance, and military advisor to Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King.

Pope went from a veteran of front-line combat in the First World War to a pivotal figure in the Canadian military effort in the Second World War. For much of his career, Pope served where military and political affairs intersected and he was very conversant in both fields. He relied on his full range of skills to become a master organizer and problem solver whose vision, expertise, and integrity won the trust of soldiers, civil servants, diplomats, and politicians alike. Although he was rarely a central decision maker, Pope exerted influence while he occupied his many senior positions during the war.

Moreover, Pope was different. My dissertation will show that Pope was, like Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns, an intellectual general; however, Pope's interests were very different.¹ He wrote on issues such as Canada's relations with Great Britain and the bicultural nature of Canadian national politics, topics that concerned his military peers far less. Other Canadian generals, such as Burns and Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, were more interested in writing about concepts and tactics of modern warfare. Moreover, Pope took on unique responsibilities during the Second World War. My dissertation will show that Pope was called upon to deal with strategic -- and in some cases --exclusively political issues. Lieutenant-Generals Andrew McNaughton and Harry Crerar were engaged in issues that had political undertones, but they were generally more of an operational nature -- the control and use of the Canadian Army and the place of the Canadian commander in the allied chain of command, for example. Pope's career path was different than that of Crerar who became commander of the First Canadian Army, or Burns and Simonds who were Canadian corps commanders. I will explain why Pope was ideally suited to assume his unique functions.

Pope was not flawless and his efforts at trying to assume the mantle of leader were occasionally not successful. He did not always have his way with the various interdepartmental committees set up to prepare Canada for war in the late 1930s. Likewise, despite establishing good relations with his counterparts from Great Britain and the United States in Washington, he did not always succeed in having his voice heard. It was not easy to be a junior partner. That said, Pope did try to take the lead.

There is merit in writing about Pope. Despite an impressive military career, no one has taken the time to explore Pope's journey in any detail. We know very little about him and no one has explored what kind of leader he was. My dissertation will address that silence.

Theoretical framework

I will examine Pope's military career using leadership as my framework. Academics have been trying to define the term for well over a century. Indeed as leadership expert Bernard Bass once wrote, "there are almost as many different

¹ Pope won the 1930 *Canadian Defence Quarterly* competition for an essay on imperial relations; Burns won the same prize in 1932 for writing an essay titled 'Protection of the Rearward Services and Headquarters in Modern war'. On Pope's essay, see Maurice A. Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, p.54, and on Burns' essay, Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn and Michael Wyczynski, "E.L.M. Burns: Canada's Intellectual General," in Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris (ed), *Warrior Chiefs, Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001), p. 146. See also Doug Delaney, *Corps Commanders*, p. 64, and p. 318 FN 32 for Burns' other writings.

definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept.”² One study conducted in 1991 counted some two hundred different definitions for leadership.³ For purposes of this dissertation, leadership will be defined as the action of “influencing others, by means of formal authority or personal attributes, to act in accordance with one’s intent or a shared purpose.”⁴

What does the definition tell us? First, it assumes that there is interaction between leaders, defined as “those who engage in leadership,” and followers, “those toward whom leadership is directed.”⁵ As historian Doug Delaney pointed out, “leaders do not exist without the followers.”⁶ Military officer Peter Bradley adds “that leadership is actually determined by the followers, for if leadership consists of influencing others, the results of the leader’s influence will be manifested in the followers.”⁷ Anyone can take on the role of leader. In other words, leadership is not limited to interaction between superior and subordinates, but also across and upward in an organization. As discussed in greater detail later, a person might be a leader as a function of the position or rank he or she holds or by reason of the person’s personality and other characteristics.⁸ In addition, the definition suggests that one can exercise leadership without actually achieving any particular goals. It is enough to have an effect on others. Finally, a growing number of researchers have come to the conclusion that a person is not demonstrating leadership if one is using coercion.⁹

Influence is key. Influence is a very old term and writers have been deliberating on its meaning for centuries.¹⁰ However, there is consensus that influence is central to leadership. Indeed, without influence, there can be no leadership. Leadership involves influencing people to attain some objective that is important to the leader, the group, or the organization. In a military environment, influence can take place within the chain of military command, with other government departments, or with allies. The leader is most challenged when he is trying to influence followers without formal authority.¹¹ In these situations, the leader will be better able to influence the followers if he can establish his credibility and legitimacy to earn their trust.

Now that we have defined leadership, we can determine what approach to use to analyze it. One researcher counted some sixty-five different conceptual approaches to leadership. It is clearly beyond the scope of this dissertation to analyse them all. I will explore a combination of the traits and skills approaches. They are most suited for analysing Pope’s military career because they focus on the behaviour of the leaders.¹² I provide a brief overview of the evolution of the trait approach

² Bernard M. Bass, *Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook of Leadership Theory, Research & Managerial Applications* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 11; Robert L. Taylor, William E. Rosenbach, and Eric B. Rosenbach “Part One: Leadership - Perspectives and Context,” in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, edited by Robert L. Taylor, William E. Rosenbach, and Eric B. Rosenbach (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Westview Press, 2009), 1.

³ Peter G. Northouse, *Leadership Theory and Practice* (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2013), 2.

⁴ Adapted from Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (Kingston, Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 7; see also Bill Bentley and Robert Walker, “Influence,” in *The Military Leadership Handbook*, edited by Colonel Bernd Horn and Dr. Robert W. Walker (Toronto: Dundurn Press, and Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2008), 340.

⁵ Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces*, 6.

⁶ Douglas E. Delaney, “Looking Back on Canadian Generalship in the Second World War,” *Canadian Army Journal*, Vol.7.1 Spring 2004, 14; see also Lieutenant Colonel Peter Bradley, “Distinguishing The Concept of Command, Leadership and Management,” in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral Perspectives on Canadian Senior Military Leadership*, edited by Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris (St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2001), 114.

⁷ Bradley, “Distinguishing The Concept of Command, Leadership and Management,” in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, edited by Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, 114. For an American military perspective, see Earl H. Potter and William E. Rosenbach, “Followers as Partners: Ready when the Time Comes,” in *Military Leadership In Pursuit of Excellence*, edited by Robert Taylor, William Rosenbach, and Eric B. Rosenbach (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Westview Press, 2009), 85-95.

⁸ See Gary Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2010), 9, 27; Kotter, *Power and Influence*, 55-75, Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces*, 8.

⁹ Bradley, “Distinguishing The Concept of Command, Leadership and Management,” in Horn and Harris, *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, 114.

¹⁰ Bill Bentley and Robert W. Walker, ‘Influence’, in Horn and Walker, *The Military Leadership Handbook*, 340.

¹¹ Allan R. Cohen and David L. Bradford, “The Influence Model: Using reciprocity and exchange to get what you need,” *Journal of Organizational Excellence*, Winter 2005, 57; Kotter, John P., *Power and Influence: Beyond Formal Authority* (New York: Free Press, 1985), 55.

¹² Other approaches emphasize different variables, such as the development level of subordinates (or followers), situational factors, or the relationship between the leader’s style and the characteristics of the subordinates and the work setting. Peter G. Northouse, *Leadership Theory and Practice*.

and its current status. I then analyse the skills' approach, which has also evolved significantly since the mid-1950s. I begin with a review of the Robert Katz skills' model. Katz is credited with first suggesting a skills' application to leadership. Secondly, I analyse the 'Mumford' approach to leadership skills. And I conclude by considering the leadership framework for the Canadian Forces, which incorporates ideas from both the Mumford and Katz approaches, as well as the traits' approach.¹³

Leader traits

Writers from around the world have been reflecting on the subject of leader traits for centuries. In the 6th century B.C., Chinese writer Lao-Tzu suggested that a good leader should be, among other things, altruistic, hardworking, honest and "fair in handling conflict." Writing at about the same time, the famous Chinese military general, strategist, and philosopher Sun Tzu stressed the need for military leaders to have a temperament that "lends itself to rational action under stressful conditions." According to Sun Tzu, the military leader had to exhibit "steadiness, resolution, stability, patience, and calmness."¹⁴ Greek philosopher Plato gave the matter some consideration in his *Republic*. He stressed the need for wisdom and "reasoning capacities." Plato's pupil, Aristotle, focused on the need for leaders to guide others to "seek virtue."¹⁵ Centuries later, Italian philosopher and historian Niccolo Machiavelli explored leadership traits in *The Prince*. Written in the early part of the 16th century and published posthumously in 1532, the *Prince* suggested a different interpretation of leadership attributes.¹⁶ According to Machiavelli, political leaders needed to maintain authority, power, and order in government. They could try to achieve those objectives by securing the respect of the population by honourable means. However, should that fail, the better leaders would be those most adept at being cunning, deceitful, or ruthless. Thomas Hobbes, British philosopher of the 17th century, approached the issue like Machiavelli in his *Leviathan*. As one author pointed out, the approach to leadership advocated by Machiavelli and Hobbes "followed logically from their assumptions that man 'in the state of nature' was nasty, brutish, and self-centered."¹⁷ Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini, two of the better known military strategic thinkers of the 19th century, offered their views on leadership. Clausewitz believed, like Sun Tzu, that stability, resolution, and determination were critical traits. The German-born writer thought "self-control" or the capacity of "keeping calm even under the greatest stress" was particularly important.¹⁸ The Swiss-born Jomini thought that the better military leaders needed, first and foremost, moral courage, followed by physical courage.¹⁹ Jomini argued that military leaders also needed to be calm, firm, blessed with a "sense of fairness or generosity of spirit," and capable of inspiring their troops.²⁰

Until the beginning of the 20th century, the trait approach was based on the "great man" theory, and it focused on great political and military leaders. Those who promoted this theory assumed that these "great men" were born with certain leadership traits. The goal was to identify the traits that made them special. Researchers continued to focus on the "great man" theory even as they began to analyse leadership in a more scientific manner during the second half of the 19th century.²¹ In the early part of the 20th century, the trait approach began to evolve and writers started to appreciate that not all leaders had to be in the "great man" category. However, proponents of the trait school still argue that leaders possessed characteristics that set them apart from non-leaders. The aim of their research is still to establish an authoritative list of traits.²²

¹³ Robert L. Katz, "Skills of an Effective Administrator," *Harvard Business Review* January-February 1955; Mumford, M.D., Zaccaro, S.J., Harding, F.D., Jacobs, T.O. and Fleishman, F.A. "Leadership Skills for a changing world: Solving complex social problems," *Leadership Quarterly*, 2000, 11(1), 11-35; Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*.

¹⁴ On Lao-Tzu, see Stephen J. Zaccaro, Cary Kemp, and Paige Bader, "Leader Traits and Attributes," in *The Nature of Leadership*, edited by John Antonakis, Anna T. Cianciolo; Robert Sternberg (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2004), 101-102; on Sun Tzu, see Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War Classical Strategic Thought* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 259, 261.

¹⁵ Zaccaro, Kemp, and Bader, "Leader Traits and Attributes," in *The Nature of Leadership*, edited by Antonakis, Cianciolo, and Sternberg (Sage Publications: California, 2004), 102.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 101-102.

¹⁷ Christopher D. Kolenda, "What is Leadership? Some Classical Ideas," in Christopher D. Kolenda, *Leadership: The Warrior's Art* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania, US: The Army War College Foundation Press, 2001), 22; Bernard M. Bass, *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership Theory, Research & Managerial Applications*, 4.

¹⁸ Michael Howard and Peter Paret (ed.) *Carl von Clausewitz On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 107, quoted in Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War Classical Strategic Thought* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 262.

¹⁹ Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War* (London: Greenhill Books, 1992), 55-56.

²⁰ Handel, *Masters of War Classical Strategic Thought*, 264.

²¹ Zaccaro, Kemp, and Bader, "Leader Traits and Attributes," in Antonakis, Cianciolo, and Sternberg, *The Nature of Leadership*, 102.

²² Shelley A. Kirkpatrick and Edwin A. Locke, "Leadership: do traits matter?" *Academy of Management Executive*, 1991, Vol. 5 No 2, p. 48; Zaccaro, Kemp, and Bader, "Leader Traits and Attributes," 104-105.

The trait approach lost some standing during the mid-1950s after a number of studies criticized its methodology. For example, Ralph Stogdill, a prominent researcher in the field of leadership, concluded, after examining the findings of 124 trait studies, that there was no foundation to the notion that a person needed to have a particular set of traits to become a successful leader. Stogdill argued that leadership was determined primarily by situational factors.²³ However, Stogdill's findings did not discourage trait advocates from trying to find a universal set of leadership traits. Indeed, there were at least 163 new 'traits' studies conducted between 1949 and 1970. When Stogdill reviewed this new scholarship in a 1974 follow-up study, he revisited his earlier conclusions and acknowledged that traits were indeed factors in leadership.²⁴

There was renewed interest in the traits' approach in the 1980s. Its advocates still maintained that one could distinguish leaders from non-leaders on the basis of a list of relevant traits. And some of the studies conducted in the 1980s and 1990s did reveal some commonality among the lists of traits. They included intelligence, self-confidence, determination, integrity, and sociability. More recently, some researchers have argued that there is a strong relationship between leadership and what has been termed "the five-factor personality model." The list includes extraversion, conscientiousness, openness, low neuroticism, and agreeableness. Other promoters of the trait approach have emphasized the relationship between emotional intelligence and leadership. And in the last decade, 'trait' school researchers have focussed on the characteristics of charismatic and visionary leaders.²⁵

The Skills approach

Robert Katz was the first major proponent of the skills' approach to leadership. In an article published in the *Harvard Business Review* of January-February 1955, Katz argued for focusing "not on what good executives are (their innate traits and characteristics), but rather on what they do (the kind of skills which they exhibit in carrying out their jobs effectively)." Katz defined the concept of skill as an ability to "translate knowledge into action."²⁶ The idea was for the leader to use his knowledge and competencies to reach certain goals. Under Katz's approach, skills could be developed over time and so could leaders. Leaders were not born. They acquired experience and skill.

Katz divided his leadership skills' approach into three components: *technical, human, and conceptual*.²⁷ Although Katz acknowledged that the three were related, he thought that they were better understood if presented separately. Katz explained that *technical skills* were related to an understanding and expertise in a special kind of activity, "particularly one involving methods, processes, procedures, or techniques."²⁸ Therefore, the better leaders demonstrated a technical understanding of their field of expertise and prowess in how to use the relevant tools. *Human skills* had to do with how leaders related to their superiors, peers, and subordinates, and the individual's "ability to work effectively" with them. In other words, whereas technical skills were "primarily concerned with working with "things" (processes or physical objects)," human skills were "concerned with working with people."²⁹ According to Katz, leaders with human skills understood their own attitudes and feelings as well as those of others. They also accepted that others might have different perspectives on and approaches to issues. These leaders were, therefore, more considerate and sympathetic to what motivated others. The outcome was greater trust between the leader and the followers and it was easier to influence others. Finally, Katz defined *conceptual skills* "as the ability to see the enterprise as a whole."³⁰ The leader with conceptual skills could "work with ideas and concepts." These skills consisted of "the mental work of shaping the meaning of organizational or policy issues."³¹ Leaders with conceptual skills had creative ability and were proficient at thinking through the concepts

²³ Bass, *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership Theory*, 86.

²⁴ Bass, *Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership Theory*, 87; Northouse, *Leadership*, 21.

²⁵ Northouse, *Leadership*, 20.

²⁶ Katz, "Skills of an Effective Administrator," 33; Katz also discusses his skills approach in D. Katz and R.L. Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations* (New York: Holt, 1978).

²⁷ Canadian defence scientists Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann adapted Katz's approach in their review of what makes a good commander. In their analysis, competencies replaced skills. In addition, physical, intellectual, and interpersonal competencies replaced technical, human, and conceptual skills, respectively. The two defence scientists also added emotional competency. Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, "What is a Commander," in Bernd Horn and Stephen J. Harris, *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, 84-85.

²⁸ Katz, "Skills of an Effective Administrator," 34.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid, 35.

³¹ Northouse, *Leadership*, 46.

that supported an organization and articulating these ideas either verbally or on paper. They also understood how ideas were related and how they fit together.³²

Katz's model assumed that leaders would have all three sets of skills regardless of their position or rank. However, according to Katz, technical and human skills were more important at lower levels. At intermediate levels, conceptual skills were more important. And, by the time a person was at or near the top, technical skills mattered less, while human and conceptual skills were "paramount."³³ Katz maintained that senior leaders relied on their conceptual skills to make sound strategic decisions, although they needed both some technical knowledge and interpersonal skills for developing relationships and gathering information. Katz suggested that a person could develop conceptual leadership skills by learning from those above them, or taking on tasks that were inter-departmental in nature.³⁴

In the late 1990s, U.S. leadership expert M.D. Mumford and a number of other researchers, using funding from the U.S. Army and the U.S. Department of Defense, built upon the Katz framework and developed a new model.³⁵ The findings were based on a study of 1,800 U.S. army officers between the ranks of second lieutenant and colonel. The Mumford model espoused three components that are relevant to our discussion: *competencies, individual attributes, and career experiences*. *Competencies* include problem-solving skills, social judgment, and knowledge. *Problem-solving* encompasses activities related to defining the problem, collecting information, developing a new understanding of the problem, and developing a solution, at either the technical or conceptual level. There is no corresponding concept in the Katz approach.³⁶ The *social judgment skills* correspond very closely to Katz's human skills.³⁷ According to the Mumford model, good leaders must have the social skills to understand how their ideas fit with those of others. They must be mindful of other people's perspectives and their needs and be able to accommodate their views. And they must be able to work with others even when there is friction and disagreement.³⁸ According to the Mumford model, people need more problem-solving and social judgment skills as they "move through their careers."³⁹ Finally, like Katz, the Mumford model recognizes the importance of *knowledge*. The concept is relatively straight forward: a leader's problem solving skills are in part a function of how much knowledge the leader possesses.

The Mumford model espouses that leaders' competencies are shaped by their *individual attributes*. The model divides attributes into *general cognitive ability, crystalized cognitive ability, motivation, and personality*. *General cognitive ability* has to do with a person's intelligence; it is "linked to biology, not to experience."⁴⁰ *Crystalized cognitive ability*, similar to Katz's conceptual skills, refers to the intellectual ability that a person will acquire over time as he or she gains more experience. The Mumford model argues that *crystalized cognitive ability* is more important for people who occupy higher positions organizations, another parallel to the Katz approach. The Mumford model identifies three characteristics of *motivation* - a concept not found in Katz - that are vital to developing leadership skills. The leader must be willing to take the lead in resolving organizational problems. The leader must be willing to exert influence. And the leader will take charge in the interest of the "social good," or "the overall human good and value of the organization."⁴¹ The last attribute relates to a person's *personality*. Mumford does not have a defined set of personality traits. That said, he suggests that openness, tolerance for ambiguity, and curiosity might shape a leader's willingness to address problems. And confidence and flexibility will help ease friction between leaders and the followers.⁴² Mumford's model also emphasizes the importance of

³² Katz, "Skills of an Effective Administrator," 36. The idea of conceptual skills is not new to military thinkers. See for example Major General J.F.C. Fuller, "Generalship: Their Diseases and their Cure," in Taylor and Rosenbach (eds.), *Military Leadership*, 142, 150.

³³ Katz, "Skills of an Effective Administrator," 37; Northouse, *Leadership*, 57; see also Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 216.

³⁴ Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 216-17.

³⁵ M.D. Mumford, S.J. Zaccaro, F.D. Harding, T.O. Jacobs and F.A. Fleishman, "Leadership Skills for a Changing World: Solving complex social problems," *The Leadership Quarterly*, 11(1) (Spring 2000), 11-35.

³⁶ Northouse, *Leadership*, 54-55; Stephen J. Zaccaro, *The Nature of Executive Leadership: A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis of Success* (Washington, D.C; American Psychological Association, 2001), 24.

³⁷ Mumford et al breaks down *social judgment skills* into four components: perspective taking, social perceptiveness, behavioral flexibility, and social performance. Perspective taking is defined as "understanding the attitude of others" and having "empathy to problem solving." Social perceptiveness is the ability to recognizing what is important to others and "understanding the unique needs, goals, and demands of different organizational constituencies." Behavioral flexibility has to do with the ability to adapt. Social performance is about communicating ideas to followers. Northouse, *Leadership*, 50-52.

³⁸ Northouse, *Leadership*, 51

³⁹ Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 215-216; Northouse, *Leadership*, 55.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 52.

⁴¹ Ibid, 53.

⁴² Ibid.

experience. It suggests that a leader's diversified career assignments will add to competencies and develop individual attributes.⁴³

Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations

Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations (hereafter referred to as the *CF Conceptual Foundations* or the CF document or manual) provides the theories and ideas supporting the Canadian Forces' doctrine on leadership. It is also meant to serve "as the primary source for the development of leader training and education programs" of the Canadian Forces.⁴⁴ It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to analyse its contents in full. However, for the purpose of this thesis, it is worth examining what it has to say about leadership traits and skills in a Canadian military context.⁴⁵

The *CF Conceptual Foundations* discusses leader characteristics on the basis of what it calls a "five-dimensional model."⁴⁶ The five dimensions or "domains" include *knowledge and skills, social capacities, cognitive ability, character or personality traits, and motivation and values*. The document suggests that *technical and tactical skills* are "mandatory" for officers and non-commissioned officers in leadership positions. Conversely, the senior leaders at the operational and strategic levels need "broader knowledge and expertise relating to strategic systems and institutional functioning."⁴⁷ Skills in *social capacities* include communication, persuasion, and conflict management. The CF document also stresses that social skills are important at all levels. The document points out that junior military leaders are more likely to be leading troops and, therefore, more likely to be interacting face-to-face with individuals, teams, and various military organizations. *CF Conceptual Foundations* argues that the more senior leaders need "a sophisticated repertoire of social-influence skills...to handle the complexity of lateral, upward, and boundary-spanning relationships that typify strategic roles and functioning."⁴⁸ At senior levels, leaders have broader responsibilities that involve them in more strategic roles and large policy issues. The leaders at these levels do not interact with as many people, but the "collegial network" expands.⁴⁹ The CF document adds that there will be many situations in which senior officers will be leading troops directly. Finally, the document suggests that leaders need to have *cognitive ability or skills*. It points out that it is particularly important for senior leaders to possess analytical skills that allow them to take "a systems view of situations, to handle abstract ideas, to build conceptual models, and to identify patterns and relationships."⁵⁰

The skills taxonomy of the *CF Conceptual Foundations* bears considerable resemblance to those of Mumford and Katz. Leaders need knowledge. They must know how to work with people. And they need to have strong conceptual skills at senior levels. More generally, all three models (Mumford, Katz, CF) are consistent with what has come to be called the stratified systems theory (SST) of leadership, which was developed by American leadership experts Elliott Jacques and Owen Jacobs after observing leadership in military and large civilian organizations. Jacques and Jacobs concluded that, as a leader moves up in the hierarchy, the nature of the work becomes more complex: "problem types and decision choices become more ambiguous, less structured, more novel, and more differentiated."⁵¹

⁴³ Northouse, *Leadership*, 54-56.

⁴⁴ Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 1.

⁴⁵ Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces*, 60-62.

⁴⁶ Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 60.

⁴⁷ Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces*, 60.

⁴⁸ Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces*, 61. The Canadian Forces Professional Development Framework describes social skills as interpersonal at the junior officer level and inter-institutional at the senior level. Robert Walker, "A Professional Development Framework to Address Strategic Leadership in the Canadian Forces," in *Strategic Leadership Development: International Perspectives*, edited by Lieutenant-Colonel Jeff Stouffer and Dr. Allister MacIntyre (Kingston, Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007), 28-29.

⁴⁹ Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces*, 62. The CF Conceptual Foundations broke down human skills between leading people and leading the institution, and divided influence into direct and indirect. However, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore these concepts.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 63

⁵¹ The original work on SST is found in T.Owen Jacobs and Elliot Jacque, "Military Executive Leadership," in *Measures of Leadership*, edited by K. Clark and M. Clark (Greensboro, N.C. Centre for Creative Leadership, 1990). There is also analysis of the theory in Walker, "A Professional Development Framework to Address Strategic Leadership in the Canadian Forces," in Stouffer and MacIntyre, *Strategic Leadership development International Perspectives* 25-26; Zaccaro, *The Nature of Executive Leadership*, 24-26; and Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 215-17.

The CF document acknowledges that no one has been able to identify a “definitive list of essential leader qualities,” but it does suggest that “the probability of effective leadership is improved if leaders possess certain characteristics.”⁵² The CF document observes that many military professionals regard integrity as the most important trait. Integrity is “a way of being, a habit, formed from repeated action, reflection, and the effort to improve.”⁵³ American leadership expert Gary Yukl explains that a leader exhibits personal integrity when he is honest, ethical, and trustworthy.⁵⁴ The CF manual agrees that trust goes hand-in-hand with a leader’s integrity. Without trust, a leader will have difficulty maintaining the loyalty of followers or securing the cooperation of peers and superiors.⁵⁵ How do leaders maintain trust and integrity? Among other things, experts have found that trust will be strongest when leaders can demonstrate expertise in their field of activity. They do not use deception to get things done and they respect the confidentiality of sensitive information to which they are privy. Finally, they are approachable and respectful of others and they take responsibility for their actions.⁵⁶

The CF document also stresses the importance of various personality characteristics associated with what it calls “adaptability.” First, leaders must be open to experience. If they are, they can adapt to change more easily and learn.⁵⁷ Leaders must also be flexible in thought and behaviour. The CF Conceptual Foundations calls flexibility “the wellspring of resourcefulness and adaptability.”⁵⁸ Historian Hal Klepak echoes those sentiments, suggesting that “flexibility...has always been a trademark of a successful general or admiral.”⁵⁹ The CF document relates adaptability with self-assurance, which it defines as “confidence in one one’s abilities and the capacity to remain poised under fire.” In the context of remaining poised, the CF document stresses that leaders must be able to “monitor” [their] behaviour and to understand [their] impact on others. Leaders must also be able to “maintain composure and self-control in high-demand situations.”⁶⁰

Finally, the CF document explains the summary of *motivation and values*. It points out that research has shown that the better leaders will be driven by “a socialized power motive, oriented to the use of influence for collective betterment, rather than a self-serving power motive.”⁶¹ There is clear parallel between the concept of “socialized power motive” in the CF manual and Mumford’s own conception of “social good.”⁶² The *CF Conceptual Foundations* explain the relationship between military professionalism, motivation and values: “*professionalism*, a motivational complex of attitudes and value orientations, reflects: an intrinsic attraction to the military profession, a high valuation of professional competence and an

⁵² Canadian references include Robert W. Walker who suggests that integrity is an essential element of the character of a Canadian officer. Robert W. Walker, “Character,” in Horn and Walker (eds.), *The Military Leadership Handbook*, 52. Likewise, Canadian historian Bill McAndrew suggests that a leader will “ideally” exhibit various “qualities of character” including integrity. Bill McAndrew, “Canadian Officership: An Overview,” in Horn and Harris, *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, 38.

⁵³ Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 61.

⁵⁴ Integrity and trust are also key elements of U.S. military leadership. See Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer Jr. Leaders, “Managers and Command Climate,” in *Military Leadership In Pursuit of Excellence* (6th Edition), edited by Robert L. Taylor, William E. Rosenbach, Eric B. Rosenbach (Cambridge, Mass: Westview Press, 2009), 99.

⁵⁵ Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 61, 73. See also Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 203; Jeffrey Stouffer, et al, “Trust,” in Horn and Walker, *The Military Leadership Handbook*, 531. James Kouzes and Barry Posner, two leading experts on leadership, have called trust “the central issue in human relationships.” James Kouzes and Barry Posner, *The Leadership Challenge: How to Make Extraordinary Things Happen In Organizations* (San Francisco: The Leadership Challenge Wiley Brand, 2010), 219.

⁵⁶ Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 73. See also Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 203; Jeffrey Stouffer, et al, “Trust,” in Horn and Walker, *The Military Leadership Handbook*, 532-33.

⁵⁷ Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 61. While there is still no agreement on leadership traits, there has been consensus since the early 1990s on the five basic factors that make up what experts call personality. Openness happens to be one of those factors. Northouse, *Leadership*, 26-27; Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 208-9.

⁵⁸ Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces*, 61. Many recent studies have identified flexibility as a key element of leadership. See Walker, “A Professional Development Framework to Address Strategic Leadership in the Canadian Forces,” in Stouffer and MacIntyre, *Strategic Leadership Development International Perspectives*, 34-35.

⁵⁹ Hal Klepak, “Some Reflections on Generalship through the ages,” in Horn and Harris, *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, 35.

⁶⁰ Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 61. Self-control is part of what has come to be called emotional intelligence. The latter is of growing interest in the field of leadership. See Northouse, *Leadership*, 28; Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 201-202; Daniel Goleman, “What Makes a Leader,” in Taylor, Rosenbach, Rosenbach, *Military Leadership In Pursuit of Excellence*, 39-52.

⁶¹ Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 61-62. See Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 203; Zaccaro, *The Nature of Executive Leadership*, 248-49; John Charles Kunich and Dr. Richard I. Lester, “Reality Leadership,” in Robert L. Taylor, William E. Rosenbach, and Eric B. Rosenbach (eds.), *Military Leadership In Pursuit of Excellence*, 77-78.

⁶² See also discussion by Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 202-203 and Zaccaro, *The Nature of Executive Leadership*, 249.

associated desire to excel in military skills, strong commitment to the responsibilities and aims of the profession (professional integrity), and a personal identification with the values of the Canadian military ethos.”⁶³

Approach for this thesis

I will examine how Pope developed as a leader through the lens of the leadership characteristics presented in the *CF Conceptual Foundations*, with a focus on skills. I will use Katz’s simple taxonomy of skills, on which the CF document is based. The CF document explains that its own taxonomy has evolved from “an original triad of technical, conceptual, and interpersonal skills.”⁶⁴ The focus of my analysis of Pope’s leadership will be on his skills: how he acquired them, how they evolved over time, and how they allowed him to fulfill his functions. At the same time, the dissertation will examine how certain traits or personality characteristics affected Pope’s ability to lead. The dissertation will focus on the traits highlighted in the *CF Conceptual Foundations*: integrity, adaptability, and poise, and the concepts associated with these traits, such as trust and self-assurance. It also incorporates the concepts of socialized power and professionalism found under the *Conceptual Foundations*’ leadership domain of motivation and values. Although the CF Conceptual Foundations is intended for Canada’s military of the 21st century, many of its elements provide a sound framework for analysing how Pope exercised leadership during the first half of the twentieth century.

Some relevant leadership concepts should be clarified before moving on. The first group of concepts have to do with influence and sources of power. Many academics distinguish between two forms of leadership: *assigned* and *emergent*. *Assigned leadership* derives from the position the person occupies, whereas *emergent leadership* will emerge over time “from what one does and how one acquires support from followers.”⁶⁵ Likewise, social power - defined as the capacity or potential to influence or affect the beliefs, values, attitudes, behaviour, or performance of individuals or groups to achieve some purpose – can be either *position* or *personal*. As noted earlier, the source of power determines how a leader goes about influencing others. The source of *position power*, as the term implies, stems from legitimate authority, or the office or rank the person holds. It is similar to assigned leadership.⁶⁶ *Personal power* grows over time as the leader builds up credibility in the eyes of others. It is particularly important when a person has to work outside the chain of command. According to American leadership expert John P. Kotter, leaders will be most effective in these situations if they understand their own goals and priorities and have a good grasp of what they need. They must also determine who might resist cooperation and why.⁶⁷ Leaders must also establish a situation of trust, a concept that we have already visited. It is easier to establish trust when one has a good relationship with one’s interlocutor, more difficult when one is starting a new relationship. Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer Jr, a 37-year veteran of the U.S. Army and a writer on leadership, suggests that relying solely on positional authority is not leadership. Yukl, for his part, argues that the distinction between position and personal power should not be overplayed. He points out that “position power is important, not only as a source of influence but also because it can be used to enhance a leader’s personal power.”⁶⁸

Some researchers have distinguished between three kinds of personal power: *expert power*, *referent power*, and *connection power* or *social capital*. *Expert power* “derives from unique knowledge, skills and experience.” *Referent power* has a different source. It comes from a leader’s “concerns for and loyalty to others,” and demonstrates courage, genuineness, and integrity.⁶⁹ Finally, personal power can be in the form of *connection power*, or what some researchers have called *social capital*. It is defined as “the amount of goodwill and support to which an individual has access through his or her network of available social relationships.”⁷⁰ In other words, the social network will determine the extent to which the leader can secure access to information and exercise influence. To do so, leaders must have established trust inside their

⁶³ Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces*, 61-62

⁶⁴ The CF document includes a short bibliography and suggested readings. It does not include Katz’s article, but it includes a number of sources that have analysed Katz’s approach, such as the work by Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*.

⁶⁵ Northouse, *Leadership*, 15. The Canadian Forces Conceptual Foundations makes a similar distinction. Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces*, 8. See also Bill Bentley and Robert W. Walker, “Influence,” in Horn and Walker (eds.), *The Military Leadership Handbook*, 347.

⁶⁶ Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 155.

⁶⁷ Kotter, *Power and Influence*, 63.

⁶⁸ Ulmer, “Leaders, Managers and Command Climate,” in Taylor, Rosenbach, and Rosenbach (eds.), *Military Leadership In Pursuit of Excellence*, 101; Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 169.

⁶⁹ Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces*, p. 60; Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*, 160-162.

⁷⁰ Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces*, 60; Michelle Wisecarver, Rob Schneider, Hannah Foldes, Michael Cullen, and Michelle Ramsden, “Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities for Military Leader Influence,” United States Army Research Institute, Technical report 1281, March 2011, 6-7.

social network. A leader might have good human skills, but it is social capital that will increase or limit a leader's ability to employ that skill or ability.

There is also merit in understanding the relationship between leadership and the concepts of command and management. According to Canadian Army officer and historian Bernd Horn, leadership should always be understood to be an element of command. Horn, who served as director of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute for three years, suggests that "to be an effective commander the formal authority that comes with rank and position must be reinforced with personal qualities and skills - the human side." However, he adds that there is a major difference between commanders and leaders. Whereas the former operates within a formal chain of authority, the leader does not necessarily need it. The leader can exercise influence not only down, up, and across a military hierarchy. Horn explains, in words that echo John P. Kotter, that the actions of leaders, unlike those of commanders, are not limited by the chain of command: the individual can influence peers.⁷¹ This can take place in the context of many situations. For example, military leaders must often advise the government on defence policy, what the military needs, and what capabilities to employ, or they may seek support from other government departments and organizations outside Canada.⁷² In those situations, which are most likely to happen at the national-strategic and military-strategic level, the leaders need not necessarily be commanders.⁷³

Canadian author Peter Bradley has written on the relationship between *management and leadership*. Bradley argues that all command behaviours come from both leadership and management. He reviewed a sample of authors who have distinguished between management and leadership and he found that they conveyed a similar message: "Leadership is generally seen as an influence process that energizes followers and management is a control process aimed at bringing coordination and efficiency to people and organizations."⁷⁴ Bradley associates actions such as imposing order, control, coordination and discipline with *management behaviour*; and he associates visioning, motivating, counselling, coaching, influencing, role modeling and persuading with *leadership behaviour*. Bradley points out that commanders employ various instruments, including standard operating procedures, to manage their forces.⁷⁵ He acknowledges that leadership and management are not exclusive of each other. Most often, management and leadership roles are performed by the same person and almost indistinguishable. And this means that it is not always clear whether a person is a good manager or a good leader or both by looking at their actions.⁷⁶

Pope and leadership

The dissertation will explain how Pope learned the required knowledge and skills for the roles he performed in his military career. In the First World War, he occupied three different positions: lieutenant in a field company, staff officer in a brigade headquarters, and then finally brigade major. Each position demanded the application of different technical skills. The first required engineering skills that he had acquired while at Canadian Pacific Railways (CPR) and during his military training. In his second position, he learned how to collect, analyse and disseminate intelligence. In his third position, he conducted appreciations and prepared orders for his brigade commander. My dissertation will show how he went about learning each of these skill sets. After the war and until the early 1930s, he was involved in activities related to "general staff with troops," or general staff in formations, districts, or training institutions. Beginning in 1931, Pope's new focus was on "Capital general staff," or general staff at the national level.⁷⁷ He had to learn new technical skills and acquire new knowledge, such as how to work in national headquarters. I will demonstrate that Pope was adaptable and flexible and it allowed him to master his many diverse functions.

My dissertation will also explore Pope's human skills, or "social capacities." Pope's human skills were on display in the battlefields of France and Belgium, where he relied on a mix of position and personal power to lead his men. I will explain why personal power was important at times. After the war ended, the focus of Pope's human skills changed. In the late 1930s, he relied on his human skills to lead the various interdepartmental committees that were established to get

⁷¹ Bernd Horn, "Command, in Horn and Walker," *The Military Leadership Handbook*, 111.

⁷² *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, p. 11.

⁷³ *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, p. 9.

⁷⁴ Bradley, "Distinguishing The Concept of Command, Leadership and Management," in Horn and Harris, *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, 117.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 112-113.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 110; see also Government of Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 12.

⁷⁷ John A. MacDonald, "In Search of Veritable: Training the Canadian Army Staff Officer, 1899-1945" (MA Thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 1992), 5; John English, *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign A Study of Failure in High Command* (New York: Praeger, 1991), 55.

Canada ready for war. Pope's human skills were useful when he had something on his mind and he spoke up, whether with peers or seniors. He had a knack for getting his point across without offending.

The thesis argues that Pope was also a strong leader because of his conceptual skills. His intellectual abilities influenced how he went about his work and they allowed him to take the lead when he could. Pope became adept at developing proposals for improving army effectiveness and preparing Canada for war. He had a particularly good understanding of "Big picture" issues: Canada's place in the British Commonwealth, Canada-U.S. relations, the bicultural nature of Canadian politics, the importance of Newfoundland to Canada, and civil-military relations.

Conclusion

The following is not meant to be a complete biography, but a study of Pope as military leader. My dissertation will explain how Pope became a leader by developing the requisite technical skills. He developed a body of knowledge that made him a reliable expert in the many positions he occupied. Pope also needed good human skills in his military career. He demonstrated that he could use them on the battlefield, and later, in the boardroom and with Canada's allies. And he developed the appropriate conceptual skills to produce thoughtful analyses on a multitude of high-level and strategic issues. In addition, he used his conceptual skills to piece together and report to Ottawa on developments in Allied strategy. My dissertation will also explore how Pope tried to use his influence to shape government policy. In many cases, he had to do so by way of his personal power as opposed to his rank or position.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION

J.L. Granatstein's chapter in *The Generals* is the only work that has been written about Pope and even at that, Pope shares the chapter with Lieutenant-General Ken Stuart.¹ Using Pope's diary and various other sources, Granatstein briefly explores Pope's career before 1939, but the bulk of the narrative covers his Second World War experience. Granatstein's conclusion is that Pope was hard-working, intelligent, tactful, and sensible, a good fit for a staff officer in the 1930s and for a soldier-diplomat in the Second World War. Monique C. Dolak is the only other person to have written exclusively about Pope.² However, her paper focuses on the Canadian Joint Staff Mission in Washington. Moreover, two thirds of the paper is a discussion on the origins of the mission; only her third chapter talks about Pope. She concludes, as did Granatstein, that Pope was a diligent worker and did well, under the circumstances, to guard Canada's national interests. That is only one small part of Pope's career that this dissertation will explore.

Numerous secondary sources provide context for Pope's experiences in the First World War. The list includes the official history of the Canadian Army in the First World War, by Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, and Tim Cook's more recent two-volume history of Canada's role in the conflict.³ Two other books are particularly useful for understanding the role of Canada's military engineers and their contribution during the war: *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, Volume 1, by A.J. Kerry and W.A. McDill and Bill Rawling's *Technicians of Battle*.⁴ Dan Jenkins provides significant background on the role of the intelligence officer in the field during the First World War in his PhD dissertation "Winning Trench warfare."⁵ Kenneth Radley's *We Lead Others Follow: First Canadian Division* and the more recent works by Douglas E. Delaney provide a lot of information on the Canadian staff system.⁶ Shane B. Schreiber, in *The Shock Army of the British Empire*, provides a comprehensive analysis of the contribution of the Canadian Corps in the last hundred days of the war.⁷

Various secondary sources offer context for Pope's military career during the interwar period. James Eayrs provides an overview of Canada's foreign and defence policy between 1918 and 1940 in volumes I and II of his *In Defence of Canada*.⁸ Volume I, covering the period 1918-1935, focuses on Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King's distaste for military issues in the 1920s; and Prime Minister R.B. Bennett's efforts to deal with the armed forces during the depression. Volume II, which brings the story to 1940, highlights the continuity in the main elements of King's foreign and defence policy between his first spell as prime minister in the 1920s and his return in 1935, a period dominated by his efforts to ensure national unity and stress Canada's autonomy, especially in the context of its relations with Great Britain. *Canadian*

¹ J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddardt, 1993), Chapter 8.

² Monique C. Dolak, *To the Public Health Building: The Establishment and Function of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission in Washington during the Second World War* (Memoir submitted in partial fulfilment for a Masters in Arts in History, University of Ottawa, nd).

³ Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, C.D. *Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919, Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War* (Ottawa: Queens' Printer, 1962); Tim Cook, *At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1914-1916*, Volume 1 (Toronto: Penguin Group, 2007); Tim Cook, *Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918*, Volume Two (Toronto: Penguin Group, 2008).

⁴ A.J. Kerry and W.A. McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, Volume 1 (Toronto: Thorn Press, 1962); Bill Rawling, *Technicians of Battle* (Toronto: Military Engineering Institute of Canada and Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2001).

⁵ Dan Jenkins, "Winning Trench warfare: Battlefield Intelligence in the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918" (PhD diss., Carleton University, 1999).

⁶ Kenneth Radley, *We Lead Others Follow: First Canadian Division 1914-1918* (St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing, 2006); Douglas E. Delaney, "The Corps Nervous System in Action: Commanders, Staffs, and Battle Procedure." in *Capturing Hill 70: Canada's Forgotten Battle of the First World War*, edited by Douglas E. Delaney and Serge Marc Durlinger (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 51-77.; Douglas E. Delaney, "Mentoring the Canadian Corps: Imperial Officers and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918," *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 77. No. 3, 2013, 931-953.

⁷ Shane B. Schreiber, *The Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War* (Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2004).

⁸ James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1964); *In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1965); also Norman Hillmer, "Defence and Ideology: the Anglo-American military alliance in the 1930s," *International Journal* Volume XXXIII No. 3, Summer 1978; "The Anglo-Canadian Neurosis: The Case of O.D. Skelton" in *Britain and Canada: Survey of a Changing Relationship*, edited by Peter Lyon (London: Cass, 1976), 61-84; Robert Bothwell and Norman Hillmer, *The In-Between Time: Canadian External Policy in the 1930s* (Vancouver: Copp Clark, 1975).

Brass, by Stephen Harris, explores the growth of Canada's professional army between the 1860s and the beginning of the Second World War. It provides information of relevance for the interwar period, including the development of the various defence schemes in the army headquarters and, more generally, the activities of the Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence (DMO&I), in which Pope worked for the better part of the 1930s.⁹ Harris argues that Chief of the General Staff (CGS), General A.G.L. McNaughton did not assign Pope to a command position or elsewhere outside of Ottawa because he was too good at what he did in DMO&I.¹⁰

There are also a number of published sources on Canada's policy during the Second World that can enhance our understanding of Pope's career during this period. These works include C.P. Stacey's official history, *Arms, Men and Governments*.¹¹ Stacey concludes that the Canadian government did not enjoy much international influence or status even though the country contributed significantly to the war effort. This was caused in part by the reluctance of Great Britain and the United States to allow Canada to participate in the higher direction of the war, but also partly because of Canada's own policies. King was simply not interested in getting involved, for fear it might lead to larger external commitments, which in turn could undermine national unity. This was the environment in which Pope worked, both in Ottawa and in Washington.¹² As a member of the PJBD during the Second World War, Pope worked on a number of key issues, including the Canada-U.S. defence plans. Galen Roger Perras and Colonel Stanley W. Dziuban have written central analyses for Canada's relationship with the United States during the Second World War.¹³ Pope was also King's military advisor during the conscription crisis of November. There are a number of sources which provide background to the conscription crisis. They include the earlier publication by R. MacGregor Dawson, which has since been largely discredited and superseded by the works of J.L. Granatstein, which concentrate on King's response and how he tried to "prevent conscription to preserve unity."¹⁴ James Eayrs discusses the structure, role and activities of the post-hostilities committees in his third volume of *In Defence Of Canada*. Eayrs says that Pope came closest to understanding "the arcana of bureaucratic power."¹⁵

There is a healthy body of literature on Pope's fellow Canadian generals of the Second World War. J.L. Granatstein's *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* provides biographical profiles of a select number of senior officers during the Second World War. Douglas E. Delaney, J.N. Rickard, Paul Dickson and Dominic Graham have dug deeper into the careers of some of these generals to determine who they were, what they did, and how they exhibited leadership in their military spheres. Delaney uses leadership concepts to examine the career of Bert Hoffmeister, a divisional commander. In another, he explores the military experience of three Canadian and two British corps commanders. The books by Dickson and Graham on Generals Harry Crerar and Guy Simonds, respectively, are full-length biographies. Rickard examines McNaughton's career until he was dismissed in 1943 as Commander of the Canadian

⁹ Pope worked on the later versions of the defence schemes in the late 1930s. Stephen Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1988); see also Harris, "The Canadian General staff and the Higher Organization of Defence, 1919-1939" in B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock (ed.), *Canada's Defence Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1993); Daniel Robinson, "Planning for the 'most serious contingency: Alien internment, arbitrary detention, and the Canadian State,'" *Journal of Canadian Studies*, Summer 1993, Vol. 28, Issue 2; also Douglas L. Bland, *Canada's National Defence, Volume 2 Defence Organization* (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, 1998), 1-20.

¹⁰ Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army*, 208.

¹¹ C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Government The War Policies of Canada 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970); See also C.P. Stacey, *Six Years of War The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957); Adrian W. Preston, "Canada and the Higher Direction of the Second World War 1939-1945," *Royal United Services Institution*, Volume 110, 1965.

¹² Granatstein's *Canada's War* remains essential reading for understanding Prime Minister King's approach to a variety of political, economic, and financial issues during the war at home. J. L. Granatstein, *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government 1939-1945* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975); see also Granatstein's, "Hume Wrong's Road to the Functional principle," in Keith Neilson and Roy A. Prete (ed.), *Coalition Warfare An Uneasy Accord* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983), *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins 1935-1957* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1982; Tim Cook, *Warlords: Borden, Mackenzie King and Canada's World wars* (Toronto: Penguin, 2012).

¹³ Galen Roger Perras, *Franklin Roosevelt and the Origins of the Canadian-American Security Alliance, 1933-1945* (London: Praeger, 1998); Colonel Stanley W. Dziuban, *Military relations between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959). Dziuban's book was written as part of the official history of the relationship between Canada and the United States and is focused on U.S. sources. Perras' book is based on Canadian and American sources.

¹⁴ J.L. Granatstein, *Conscription in the Second World War: A Study of Political Management* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1969); 74; see also Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, *Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977); see Granatstein, *Canada's War, The Generals*, (chapter on Pope/Stewart); R. MacGregor Dawson, *The Conscription crisis of 1944* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961); T. Stephen Henderson, "Angus L. Macdonald and the Conscription Crisis of 1944," *Acadiensis*, XXVII, 1 (Autumn 1997), 85-104.

¹⁵ James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 50.

First Army and Dickson looks at Crerar's entire military career, from his time at RMC to his tenure in command of First Canadian Army.¹⁶

While the foregoing published material provide vital context, I use predominantly primary sources to write my narrative and develop my analysis. Many of these sources have been largely unexploited. For Chapter 3, which provides a short overview of Pope's family background and his early years, up to the end of the First World War, I consulted various family papers and letters, some of which go back to when Pope was a child. I also drew from the Maurice Arthur Pope collection at the Canadian War Museum (CWM), which includes a compendium of Pope's letters from the front during the First World War. In addition, Chapter 3 is based on various sources from Library and Archives Canada (LAC). These include the papers of Victor Odium, under whom Pope served when he was an intelligence staff officer, and various other files in the RG24 series, in which I found information pertaining to the various units and formations that Pope served in during the First World War.

I use various sources to examine Pope's training as a staff officer and duties during the 1920s and 1930s, which is the subject of Chapters 4, 5, and 6. I was given access to a large collection of family papers, including letters from Pope to his wife while he was on duty or while she was abroad visiting her family in Belgium. These letters provide Pope's impressions of his life as a staff officer and his views on some of the people with whom he worked. I garnered information from other Canadian sources, including selected collections at LAC, including National Defence departmental files and collections related to Canadian generals who attended staff college and Imperial Defence College during the 1920s and 1930s. These include the personal papers of Georges Vanier and Crerar. My sources for examining Pope's duties in Ottawa Headquarters during the 1930s consist of his memoirs, files at LAC (RG 24 files and Crerar papers), and the Kardex Collection at the Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) of the department of National Defence.

Chapter 7 covers Pope's activities between 1939 and 1941. During this period of time, he served as Director Military Operations and Intelligence (DMO&I), Senior General staff officer (Brigadier General Staff) at Canadian Headquarters (CMHQ) London, Assistant Chief of General Staff (ACGS), and, finally, Vice Chief of the General Staff (VCGS). In March 1941, Pope was also appointed as the army member to the Canadian Section of the Canadian-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence. My sources for examining Pope's duties during this period include RG 24 files at LAC and the Kardex files at DHH. Finally, I drew as well from Pope's letters to his wife. They provide his impressions of the people with whom he worked and the nature of the duties performed.

Chapter 8 is focused on Pope's tenure as Head of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission (CJSM) in Washington, D.C. I consulted a number of primary sources for this chapter. Pope's diary from March 1942 onward is at LAC and parts of it are also at DHH. I also found relevant files at DHH in the Canadian Joint Staff Washington Fonds and the Joint Staff Fonds. LAC holds a range of documents, including those contained in the department of External Affairs (RG25), the department of National Defence (RG24), Privy Council Office (RG2), and the department of Munitions and Supply (RG28). Also of use at LAC were the William Lyon Mackenzie King papers (MG26-J) and Hume Wrong papers (MG 25), in addition to various other fonds, including those of Victor Gabriel Brodeur (MG30 E312), Arnold Heeney (MG30 E144), and James Layton Ralston (MG27 III BII).

Chapter 9 examines Pope's time in Ottawa between September 1944 and October 1945. In addition to Pope's memoirs and his diary, I collected my information from LAC's archives for Privy Council Office (RG2) and from the files for department of External Affairs (RG25). I used the papers of Mackenzie King (MG26-J), Hume Wrong papers (MG 25), Arnold Heeney (MG30 E144), and J.L. Ralston (MG27 III BII). Finally, I drew from the DHH files on the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Pope may not have had an opportunity to command in the Second World War. However, this did not make him less of a leader nor did it diminish his accomplishments. He was a different leader than battlefield commanders like Guy Simonds or Bernard Montgomery. The Army needed many kinds of generals to make it function effectively. Pope assumed important responsibilities away from the front lines and he performed them well because of his leadership skills. Pope had a distinguished military career that paralleled Canada's coming of age during the first half of the twentieth century. Few scholars have paid much attention to his contribution during that period. The present work addresses that gap.

¹⁶ Paul Dickson, *A Thoroughly Canadian General*; John Nelson Rickard, *The Politics of Command: Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton and the Canadian Army* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010); Douglas E. Delaney, *Corps Commanders*; Dominick Graham, *The Price of Command: A Biography of General Guy Simonds* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993); Douglas E. Delaney, *The Soldier's General: Bert Hoffmeister at War* (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2005).

CHAPTER 3

POPE'S FORMATIVE YEARS: 1889-1918

Because of his parents, Pope was exposed to Canadian political issues at an early age. While Pope's father had strong British lineage, his mother's ancestors were French Canadian. Both parents could boast of having a long line of public servants in their respective families and both were very well connected to the upper reaches of political power by the time Pope was born. He was an average student in school, finding more pleasure in the outdoors than in the classroom. He managed to complete a degree in engineering at McGill University - although not without some challenges. However, once he joined the Canadian Pacific Railways (CPR) in 1911, he started to display technical and human skills while managing large projects.

To some extent, Pope's education as an engineer prepared him when he deployed with the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) in late 1915 as a field engineer, but managing engineer projects while under fire introduced additional - and obvious - risks. When the government decided that it would fill more of the CEF staff positions with Canadians, Pope was reassigned to Canada's 11th infantry brigade as a staff learner. Pope set aside his engineering skills - only temporarily it would turn out - to learn how to become a good staff officer. He sharpened his oral and written communication skills as an intelligence officer with the 11th Brigade and gained experience as a brigade major. He demonstrated adaptability in learning the skill set of a staff officer. When he demonstrated promise as staff officer, he was promoted to brigade major for the 4th Brigade, C.E. As brigade major, he combined his technical knowledge in field engineering and his human skills. Since he had to work with battalion commanders, all senior in rank to him, he relied partly on the power conferred to him by his position, but also on his personal power as defined in the introduction to get the job done.

Growing up

Maurice A. Pope was born on 29 August 1889 in the small village of St Patrick near Rivière-du-Loup, located along the south shore of the St. Lawrence River in the province of Quebec. Pope's parents owned a summer home in St. Patrick and visited every summer. Given that Pope's family home was in Ottawa, it was a long way to go for summer holidays. However, when Maurice was born, Rivière-du-Loup happened to be Ottawa's "summer capital."¹ Prime Minister John A. Macdonald had found Rivière-du-Loup the ideal location to get away from Canada's national capital in July and August. At the time, Pope's father, Joseph, was serving as the prime minister's private secretary. Macdonald convinced Joseph Pope to buy a summer home of his own in St Patrick so that they could be close to each other at all times.

Dedication to public service had been prominent with Maurice's paternal and maternal ancestors. On the paternal side, Pope's great grandfather had served as the Treasurer of Prince Edward Island (PEI). His grandfather, William Henry Pope, had been a politician and county judge in PEI and a strong advocate of confederation. Pope's great-uncle, James Colledge Pope, not initially a supporter of joining the other four provinces in 1867, was eventually instrumental in negotiating the terms under which PEI joined the confederation in 1873.² He also became a minister in Macdonald's government after the 1878 federal elections. After Pope's father (Joseph) worked for John A. Macdonald as private secretary, the prime minister appointed him Assistant Clerk in the Privy Council. He kept his job even after the election of Wilfrid Laurier's Liberals in 1896, despite pressure from the Liberal press to oust him. He served as Under-Secretary of State until 1909, when he became the first under-secretary of the newly created department of External Affairs. He was knighted in 1912 for his role in negotiating the sealing treaty between Canada, Great Britain, the United States, Japan and Russia.³

The family of Pope's mother, Henriette, was no less distinguished. In the words of one author, members of the Taschereau family had been "Conspicuous in the Public Life of the Country for Nearly Two centuries."⁴ Pope's mother was the daughter of Henri Thomas Taschereau, who had served as the Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal of Quebec in the early 1900s. Some of her earlier ancestors occupied senior positions in Canada's militia in the province of Quebec during the 19th Century. And Pope's mother could count among her ancestors a Cardinal (Cardinal Elzéar-Alexandre Taschereau). In addition, Henriette originated from Arthabaskaville, where Wilfrid Laurier and his wife lived prior to 1896. The

¹ Beauvais Bérubé, "Quand Rivière-du-Loup était la capital d'été du Canada," *Histoire Québec*, Juin 1995, 26.

² Pope Family Papers, Toronto, Ontario (hereafter PFP), family tree; Ian Ross Robertson, "POPE, WILLIAM HENRY," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. 10, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003-Ian Ross Robertson, "POPE, JAMES COLLEDGE," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. 11, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003-, accessed 23 July 2014.f

³ Maurice Pope (ed), *Public Servant: The Memoirs of Sir Joseph Pope* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1960), 238.

⁴ W.A. Craick, "The Romance of the Taschereaus," *Maclean's*, April 1914; see also Bernard L. Vigod, *Quebec before Duplessis: The Political Career of Louis-Alexandre Taschereau* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986), Chapter 1.

Taschereaus and the Lauriers eventually became friends. When Joseph Pope “entered the Taschereau family,” he “found friends at once in the Lauriers.”⁵ The friendship between the two families endured. Maurice later recalled walking back from many Sunday church services with Sir Wilfrid and Lady Laurier, and spending evenings at the Laurier house.⁶ To quote Canadian historian J.L. Granatstein, “no one in Ottawa had a better lineage and more propitious sponsors.”⁷

When Pope was growing up in Ottawa, the city was a booming industrial town with some of the largest papers mills in Canada. Sandy Hill, where Pope’s family lived, was one of Ottawa’s more affluent neighborhoods and the home of many senior government officials. The area had grown significantly since confederation and was becoming, by the 1890s, a residential neighborhood known for its “stately homes.” According to one author, “there were more people of rank and title in this enclave than any other comparable district in Canada.”⁸ By the time Maurice was born, the Pope family was well established in Sandy Hill. Joseph Pope was making a very comfortable salary and had the means to provide for his family, which included Maurice, four brothers, and one sister.

The young Pope was active and athletic. He played hockey, baseball and football. Later on, he picked up tennis and ran with the Ottawa Harriers, serving on its committee for at least two years. He spent most summers of his youth fishing and shooting at the summer home in St Patrick. Although he was initially sent to a Catholic school, his father decided only weeks into Pope’s first school year to pay for him to go to Ottawa’s Model School. Maurice recalled that the school had a good educational program and a number of good teachers. However, looking back, he acknowledged that he was not always on his best behaviour, which might explain partly why he was no more than an average student. He moved on to complete high school at the Ottawa Collegiate.⁹

Pope’s education was not limited to what he learned at school in those early years. He recalled that his father, although discreet about sensitive government matters, spoke about his work (what Pope called “items of permissible gossip”). Pope’s mother was also very much interested in politics. Pope was therefore exposed very early to Canadian political issues and was encouraged to write letters at a very young age.¹⁰ The letters were addressed primarily to his father who was often travelling and they pertained mainly to family events, highlighting his various fishing exploits, or how he had fared at school and his request for rewards for his good marks.¹¹ However, at times, Pope expressed interest in his father’s work. In one letter, Maurice asked his father “how he liked dinning with [U.S.] President [sic] Mickenley” and in another he wished him good luck in an arbitration case.¹² He also wrote regularly to his aunt Georgina Pope.¹³ After the aunt had deployed as a nurse with Canadian troops to South Africa, Pope wrote to express regret for Canadian casualties, but added that he was glad to hear about the “relief of Ladysmith and relief of Mafeking.”¹⁴

Despite the fact that politics and Canadian history were often discussed in the Pope household, Maurice chose not to pursue these subjects when he enrolled in university after graduating from the Ottawa collegiate in 1906. Instead, he opted for engineering at McGill University. Pope explained years later that he had chosen this field of study because there was a significant demand for engineering skills in the country at the time, which in turn presented great opportunities to make money.¹⁵ A series of summer employment experiences had given him a taste for the work of an engineer. In summer of 1905, he worked as part of a hydrographic party involved in the survey of the Georgian Bay canal. In the following two

⁵ Pope (ed), *Public Servant*, 65.

⁶ Maurice A. Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians: The Memoirs of Lt-Gen. Maurice A. Pope* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 5.

⁷ J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 207.

⁸ Shirley E. Woods, *Ottawa: The Capital of Canada* (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1980), 204.

⁹ I drew this information from a collection of family letters (hereafter PFP) held in Toronto - the papers are not organized in any specific fashion - and folders 2, 3, 4 of the Maurice Arthur Pope Collection held by the Canadian War Museum (hereafter referred as CWM, Pope Collection).

¹⁰ Pope wrote one letter in the summer of 1895 to his father. He was eight years old. CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 2, father replying to Pope’s incoming letter, 3 August 1895.

¹¹ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 2, Pope to father, 2 December 1898; Pope to father, 9 July 1899.

¹² CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 2, Pope to father, 22 November 1898.

¹³ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 2, Pope to Georgina Pope, 2 and 3 May 1897.

¹⁴ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 3, Pope to Georgina Pope, 5 March 1900, 31 January 1900 and 12 June 1900. Aunt Georgie was Georgina Pope, Joseph Pope’s sister. Georgina Pope was in charge of a group of four nurses who volunteered to deploy with British forces in 1899 in South Africa to provide medical services during the Boer War. She returned to South Africa again in 1902. She became the first permanent member of the Canadian Army Nursing Service and worked in hospitals in Great Britain and France during the First World War. Canada honoured her by including her among the fourteen figures commemorated at the Valiants Memorial in Ottawa.

¹⁵ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 10.

summers, he worked on the construction of docks on the Louise Embankment in Quebec. Even during those summer jobs, Pope was looking for ways to improve his engineering skill set.¹⁶

Pope apparently received help from his father to pay his university fees. Having done so, Pope's father took the liberty of constantly advocating financial prudence. Pope seemed to know that he was financially beholden to his father and often asked permission before spending, whether it was related to attending a school event or buying new things.¹⁷ However, on one topic, he went against his father's wishes. Shortly after he started at McGill, Maurice decided to join the university fraternity - the Alpha Psi chapter of the Zeta Psi fraternity.¹⁸ His decision was unpopular with his parents, although he does not explain why. Pope found it a very rewarding experience. In his words, "a man's capacity for friendship is limited, and to find oneself intimately associated with some thirty or so kindred souls amid many hundreds of others should satisfy most reasonable men's appetite."¹⁹ He established some strong personal connections with the members of the McGill chapter. This was made clear when he failed second year at McGill, possible signs that he was an indifferent student, and members of the fraternity reached out to help him prepare to write his supplementary exams when he was ready to do so. Pope revealed a capacity to develop strong personal relationships with people by earning their trust and support.²⁰ This was a human skill that would serve him well in the future.

Instead of writing immediately his supplementary exams in the summer of 1908, Pope decided to take a year off school, find a full time job, and earn some money.²¹ With the help of his father who used his position in the government to pull strings (as he had done for Maurice's summer employment), Pope landed a job in Frankford Ontario, where he worked as a rodman, helping out with land surveys for construction projects.²² Pope was not completely out of his environment in Frankford because of his employment in the two previous summers. He took advantage of the opportunity to enhance his knowledge in an area related to his university field of studies. He was developing skills at managing projects that would be of benefit in his future endeavours.

What comes out of Pope's reminiscence of his times in Frankford is his depiction of the people he met, including "Gillie," the local physician, Doc Simmons, and Aeneas McCallister, the blacksmith. They must have touched Pope in some form or another, as he remembered them all when he wrote his memoirs forty years later. He also remembered the group of retired men in the village who read the Toronto *Globe* and *Mail* and *Empire* every day and who "developed a racy philosophy of life..." He added that he learned much from "these old men, and not least, that the urban centres do not invariably enjoy a monopoly of wisdom."²³ Pope listened to others, no matter who they were and where they came from.

Pope returned to McGill in the fall of 1909 and completed his engineering degree in the spring of 1911. He tried at first to find employment in Alberta, where he hoped to work on a dam. That fell through. Eventually, he got a job with the engineering department of Canadian Pacific Railways (CPR) in Montreal. He was now ready to apply his engineering skills, taking along with him his new manual, *The Field Engineer – A Handy Book of Practice in the Survey, Location, and Track Work of Railroads*.²⁴ Between 1911 and 1914, Pope supervised various projects, the complexity of which appeared to grow as he became more experienced. He was enhancing his technical skills in various areas, including the survey, location and track work of railroads. The company rewarded him for his work by increasing his pay. He remained very active during this time, playing ice hockey, indoor and outdoor tennis, walking Mont Royal on the weekends, and reading material that his father sent to him, including magazines such as the *Scientific American*, or the report of the Royal Commission on the Pacific Scandal of 1873.²⁵ He took in an occasional baseball game, went to the theatre, and played some bridge. Throughout

¹⁶ On the job offers, see PFP, father to Pope, 27 June 1906 and CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 5, 5 July 1906.

¹⁷ While Pope was at McGill, he wrote regularly to his parents and they reciprocated. Pope wrote about school results among other things. The mother wrote usually about family happenings and sent him care packages on a regular basis. Joseph's letters were more often about financial issues. CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 5, Pope to father, 5 September, 17 October 1906; father to Pope, 22 September 1906; mother to Pope, 17 October 1906, 4 November 1906. There are many other letters between Pope and his parents in Folder 5.

¹⁸ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 5, Pope to father, 28 September 1906.

¹⁹ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 12.

²⁰ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 6, CB Magrath to Pope, 2 August and 15 October 1908; Folder 7, Robinson to Pope, 3 March 1909.

²¹ Ibid, Folder 6, Pope to father, 15 May 1908; father to Pope, 19 May 1908.

²² Ibid, Folder 6, Father to Pope, 28 March 1908.

²³ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 15.

²⁴ *The Field Engineer – A handy Book of Practice in the Survey, Location, and Track Work of Railroads* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1909.) I found the book in the Pope family papers, inscribed by Maurice Pope in October 1911.

²⁵ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 10, Line up for tennis tournament with Pope's name, no date; Folder 13, Pope to father, 21 February 1914, 30 March 1914.

this period, there was very regular correspondence between Pope and his parents. Pope's father wrote about other job prospects for Maurice, while his mother, writing all her letters in French, focused primarily on more personal issues.²⁶

Pope becomes a field engineer in the Canadian Expeditionary Force

In late August 1914, some three weeks after Great Britain declared war on Germany, Pope started, while still employed with the CPR, his military training with the McGill Contingent of the Canadian Officers Training Corps.²⁷ In September 1914, the CPR moved Pope to Quebec City, where he carried on with his training. By November 1914, he had decided that he would volunteer for active service and try to deploy with Canada's second contingent. Although Pope explored various opportunities, including finding a place on the establishment of a rifle regiment in Quebec, he decided that an engineer unit would be best for him, given his background and experience.²⁸

Pope's father approved of his son's military training, but was disappointed that he had decided to put his career on hold to serve overseas. Pope explained that his decision to join "was natural for a young man" of his "position." When his father urged him to postpone his decision until the government announced a third contingent, Maurice reminded him that he had often stressed to him and his brothers their "duty to the Empire": Canada was part of the Empire "as much as is the county of Surrey" and "Canadians must bear proportionally their share of the burden."²⁹ In a subsequent letter, Joseph Pope told his son that his decision to serve "King and country" was "most commendable" and he was "proud to think that...I instilled those sentiments into you. Any difference of opinion between us is not one of principle, but merely as to the time for translating principle into action." Pope's mother was patriotic -- she attended the send-off of the Princess Patricia Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) from Ottawa -- but she was very distraught that her son had signed up.³⁰ Pope's tenacity and sense of duty were overwhelming, however. Nothing could keep him away, including an offer from the CPR in early February 1915 to reward him handsomely for his growing technical and human skills with a new position with greater responsibilities.³¹

Between January and August 1915, Pope continued to enhance his military skills and prepare for deployment to Europe. By April 1915, he had graduated from army signalling with a Grade A certificate, and a month later with a similar certificate for equitation.³² In April 1915, he joined the Canadian Engineers Training Depot in Ottawa. Over the next few weeks, there was much drilling and training. In addition, Pope learned how to assemble logs bridges and build barbed-wire entanglements.³³

In early August 1915, Pope sailed for Great Britain as part of a draft of 150 men and three officers. By the end of the month, he was in Shorncliffe, which had served as a training area for riflemen since the Napoleonic wars. Pope was fortunate to have been sent there. The first Canadian contingent had been stationed in Salisbury Plain, a much less satisfactory training area.³⁴ Pope's training in Shorncliffe consisted of lectures and exercises, during which he perfected various skills such as using a rifle (engineers had to develop proficiency in basic infantry tactics), building dugouts and constructing effective defences under various scenarios. Pope revealed in his letters to his parents that he possessed an insatiable appetite for acquiring these new skills. He also yearned for an opportunity to apply his knowledge. He knew that he could only learn so much about warfare in Shorncliffe. In a 15 November letter to his father, he stated that his "training,

²⁶ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 11, Father to Pope, 27 December 1912.

²⁷ Joseph Pope (ed), *Maurice A. Pope, Letters from the Front, 1914-1919* (Toronto: Pope and Company, 1996), Pope to father, 2 August 1914, 2.

²⁸ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 10 November 1914, 7.

²⁹ Although Pope's father had issues with his son deploying so soon, he told him that should he wish to go with the second contingent, he was prepared to use his influence to make sure his son secured "the best appointment possible." CWM, Pope Collection, folder 13, father to Pope, 9 November 1914.

³⁰ CWM, Pope Collection, folder 13, Sister Adèle to Maurice, 29 August 1914.

³¹ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 7 February 1915, 11. The Canadian Pacific presented Pope with a scroll to commemorate his service in the war. Pope's father, although he may not have approved of his son's decision, helped him get his commission. He was a good friend of Major-General Gwatkin. J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 208.

³² CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 14, Copies of certificates dated 3 May 1915.

³³ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 26. The Canadian government authorized the organization of engineer units for the 2nd Canadian Division on November 5, 1914. See Colonel A.J. Kerry and Major W.A. McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers, Volume 1* (Toronto: Thorn Press, 1962), 75.

³⁴ Kerry and McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, 80.

in so far as the front is concerned, is practically over. While I have yet much to learn and [will] be really a novice when I go to France, they have taught us about all they can while yet distant from the scene of battle itself.”³⁵

By January 1916, Pope was in France. It appears he had his choice of field company. He decided to join the 4th Field Company, which supported the 2nd Canadian Division.³⁶ At the beginning of 1916, a Canadian infantry division had three field companies of engineers, each of which numbered about 140 all ranks although the size varied from company to company.³⁷ The engineering company, commanded by a major, was divided into three to four sections of thirty or plus men. Each section was normally under the command of a second-lieutenant or lieutenant (and sometimes a captain). The three field companies of each division reported to a lieutenant-colonel, who commanded the regiment. The practice at the time was to attach one company to each of the three brigades of the division. Although there was no set rule about it, each field company normally attached itself to the brigade of the same number -- in the case of Pope, the 4th Canadian Brigade of the 2nd Canadian Division.³⁸ Pope remained with the 4th Field Company for most of 1916. When Pope joined the 4th Field Company, Lieutenant-Colonel H.T. Hughes was Commander, Royal Engineers (C.R.E.), 2nd Canadian Division.

Over the ensuing months, Pope applied many of the military engineering skills he had learned since enlisting. He took command of a section of men. His quarters were initially located in a farm house close to the village of Dikkebus, about 3 miles south west of Ypres. As one historian has pointed out, “it was at the level of the section...and field company that the work was done and the losses suffered...”³⁹ Pope was clearly working at the sharp end. The focus when Pope arrived was on propping up defensive positions. This meant building and maintaining breastworks and trenches of various kinds; constantly emptying the trenches when they filled with water; setting up wire and other obstacles; building deep dug-outs and bomb storage sites; and setting up artillery and machine-gun emplacements. Pope and his men had to complete many of these tasks at night because the Germans had the better positions for observation and fire at the top of the ridge. When the Canadians did advance, Pope and his men were there in support, building light ladders and foot bridges, employing Bangalore torpedoes to create gaps in the wire, and helping to destroy enemy dugouts and emplacements.⁴⁰

During the first six months of 1916, Pope demonstrated that he had mastered many of the engineering skills necessary for his junior command appointment. He wrote about his involvement in two operations during that period of time, the first the recapture of the bluff just outside Ypres in February, followed not much later by the battle for the craters around St. Eloi. In the first instance, the Germans had captured the low-level bluff from the British during the first two weeks of February 1916 as part of “diversionary attacks” in support of their offensive against Verdun.⁴¹ The British recaptured it on 2 March. The Canadians did not participate directly in the successful British counter-attack, but they did help out by providing artillery support and subsequently taking over a portion of the British front. Pope was ordered to rebuild, in a matter of hours, the support and reserve trenches along the new Canadian front. He and his men repaired the rain-soaked and bomb-blasted defences. When writing on 22 March about the work his men did, he said that they had “worked hard in the face of great difficulties of all kinds and I think we have every reason to feel well pleased with ourselves. We have surprised a good many people.” Pope mentioned that the “Chief Staff Officer” and an “imperial Staff man” had commended them for their work.⁴²

The battle of the St Eloi craters was a much more substantial operation. The story has been told many times.⁴³ It involved the see-saw battle between troops of the 2nd Canadian Division under General R.E.W. Turner and German forces to secure control of craters that had been created after the British detonated mines between and under German lines in late March. Pope supervised the raising of the parapet of existing support lines to improve cover before the British exploded the

³⁵ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 15 November 1915, 25.

³⁶ When he told one brigade commander of his choice, he recalls being told that his unit was already in the Ypres salient and ‘he would be dead in a month.’ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 30.

³⁷ Bill Rawling, *Technicians of Battle* (Toronto: Military Engineering Institute of Canada and Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2001), 19; see also Kerry and McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, 101, 106.

³⁸ Kerry and McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, 79.

³⁹ Bill Rawling, *Technicians of Battle*, Forward, XVII. The sections would be called platoons in the Second World War. Rawling, *Technicians of Battle*, 19.

⁴⁰ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, 38; Kerry and McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, 108.

⁴¹ Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, *Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919, Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1962), 136.

⁴² Pope, *Letters from the Front*, 36.

⁴³ Nicholson, *Canadian Expeditionary Force*, 137-147; Tim Cook, *At the Sharp End Canadians: Fighting the Great War 1914-1916* (Toronto: Viking Group, 2007), 323-342.

mines. After the British blew up the mines, Pope and his men were kept busy repairing the support trenches. Pope wrote of spending many nights “trying to consolidate the new front line, i.e., repair, improve and make tenable” and getting mixed up “in a heavy bombardment.”⁴⁴ Pope does not appear to have been aware of the confusion in the battle for the craters. However, he said of Eloi that “the Canadians were handed the rawest deal imaginable. We were handed over a strange area and the newly won ground was in simply hellish shape and the consolidation supposed to have been done by the Imperials was a [poor] job.”⁴⁵ This was the first evidence we have of Pope’s unwillingness to defer instinctively to imperial authority and expertise. The lustre was beginning to wear off.

Until August, the Canadian Corps remained in the area of Ypres. Pope and his men worked on various projects during that time. He pointed out that the front was then “in a sense quiet,” but he also added that the Canadians were still taking significant casualties from machine gun and rifle fire while working at night.⁴⁶ His letters home evince a sense of pride in the skills he had developed and what his field company had accomplished. For example, in July, he wrote to his parents that he had finished another communication trench “that is very useful, and is also a very fair piece of work.”⁴⁷ In a letter to his sister Adèle, he mentioned that he had supervised a project to build a new communication trench along the front held by the 2nd Canadian Division. He explained that the trench would connect the front line, the support line, and the reserve line. (He attached a simplified map to explain what he meant.)⁴⁸

On 19 August, Pope and his men along with many other Canadian troops in the Ypres area - were re-deployed 50 miles south to the Somme area. It took the men 23 days to reach the new front. They had to travel 150 miles to get there because it was too dangerous to walk in a straight line along the front to reach their destination.⁴⁹ Strangely enough, Pope found the long march invigorating. Writing to his father a few days after arriving in the new lines, Pope said that he and his men had “enjoyed the rest, the change of scenery and conditions of life. We all grew fat and cheerful and added greatly to our reserve of strength, of which we were to be so soon in so great a need.”⁵⁰

Progress for the Allies had been slow and bloody since the beginning of the Somme campaign on 1 July. The Canadians had been largely excluded - that is, until 15 September, when of the 2nd Canadian Division attacked Courcellette.⁵¹ By the end of the day, the division had achieved its goal. Pope and his section of men followed the Canadian advance and helped in the consolidation of the position.⁵² This meant building redoubts, new strong points, observation posts, and trenches; cleaning wells in the captured areas; reversing dugout entrances; and re-aligning trench tramways.⁵³ The constant bombardment and tension must have been too much for Pope who, after two days of the operation, ended up in the rest station, suffering from nervous fatigue, or as Maurice calls it, a “crise de nerfs.”⁵⁴ Within four days though, he was back with his men. Pope had discovered that, while his university background and his work experience had given him some suitable skills for overseeing the many engineering projects that came his way, there was an “important - if subtle difference - between civilian construction projects and military engineering tasks.” As one historian explains, “the battlefield... is a different world, one in which plans must take into account not only the complexities of topography and the vagaries of weather, but possible interference on the part of an enemy whose main task is to ensure one’s operations are disrupted and one’s forces destroyed.”⁵⁵

Pope and the men of the 4th Field Company were next involved in the operation to capture Thiepval Ridge on 26-28 September. In his memoirs, Pope recalled having done his “little bit” as he and his men tried to consolidate the new territory the infantry had gained in the hours before.⁵⁶ In fact, he had to push himself and his men hard during that time. In a letter to

⁴⁴ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 4 May 1916, 39.

⁴⁵ Ibid, Pope to father, 26 June 1916, 47. Because of poor maps and the confusing terrain, the Canadians had defended the wrong craters and had suffered significant casualties as a result. Cook, *At the Sharp End Canadians Fighting the Great War*, Chapter 24.

⁴⁶ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 2 August 1916, 51.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 49.

⁴⁸ Ibid, Pope to sister Adèle, 1 July 1916.

⁴⁹ Ibid, editor’s comments, 54.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 59.

⁵¹ Ibid, Pope to parents, 21 September 1916, 60.

⁵² As one Canadian historian has pointed out, the Canadian Corps had learned by 1916 “that in an assault it was not sufficient to capture the enemy’s trenches – as German doctrine called for immediate counter-attacks - it was also necessary to turn these into defensible positions. Rawling, *Technicians of Battle*, 24.

⁵³ Kerry and McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, 118.

⁵⁴ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to parents, 21 September 1916, 60.

⁵⁵ Rawling, *Technicians of Battle*, 58.

⁵⁶ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 33.

his father on 10 October, he wrote that he had completed “a combined fire trench...” with just fifty men when the job could have used 500.⁵⁷ After the operation at Thiepval, Pope and his men were taken out of the lines and eventually sent to the Vimy front. Soon after, Pope found out that he had been re-assigned to the 5th brigade for instruction in staff duties.

What can be said about Pope’s experience in his first year as a soldier? Clearly, he did not appear to shy away from hard work and he was willing to put in long hours, even though they took their toll.⁵⁸ In a July 1916 letter to his sister, he wrote that “these days I see sunset and sunrise nearly every day, but one is nearly always too weary to notice the beauties of the latter.”⁵⁹ He was proud of what he was accomplishing and pleased that he could apply the engineering skills he had learned in university and acquired in training at CPR. Pope was willing to go into harm’s way, but he did not suffer from excess bravado. At the Somme, we begin to see evidence of Pope’s human skills. He demonstrated that he was capable of speaking his mind to superiors. He stood up for his men when they were asked to achieve unrealistic objectives.⁶⁰ Pope did not want a more comfortable role away from the battlefield. Thus, when his parents suggested in July 1916 that he should try to come back to Canada to help raise new units, he replied that he was doing “these days and nights that for which I trained for many months, that which was in my mind when I decided to join the army, and which please God I shall continue to do until this war is ended.”⁶¹

Pope revealed a complex set of emotions about the human toll of the war. In one letter to his father, he says that he was “amazed at the way” his feelings had been “dulled.”⁶² That said, one can still sense in some of his letters his sorrow at losing friends. In a June 1916 letter to his father, he wrote that he was “more than a little saddened at our cruel losses. I have lost many an old comrade lately, one who had been in the front line for only six hours. At least eight of the boys who were in the fraternity during my time have gone and at least twice that number has been wounded.”⁶³

Pope brings to light in his letters home some of his impressions about the conduct of the war. He was clearly in awe of the tremendous power of artillery. He called the preliminary bombardment by the Canadians before the Bluff on 3 March “the sight of my life.” He explained that he climbed on top of his dugout roof at the time “trembling with excitement” in anticipation of the guns doing their work.⁶⁴ Likewise, he described the barrage supporting the troops as they went over the top in the operations around Courcellette as “magnificent” and capable of breaking “the nerve and confidence of the opposing forces.”⁶⁵ However, Pope was mindful of what enemy artillery could do to one’s own nerves. At the beginning of May, when writing to his father about the operations around Mount Sorrel, Pope explained that it was very hard to describe what it was like to be “mixed up in a heavy bombardment.” He goes on to say that “[w]hen the Hun bombards, he does so in earnest and on these occasions does not bother about little stuff. A very little while of it and a man is practically useless.”⁶⁶ This was clearly what had happened to Pope in September 1916 at the battle of Courcellette and what forced him to be sidelined for a few days.

Pope was less impressed with the way in which the infantry was being employed and the very heavy burden they were carrying. He thought the men were being used as “hacks” or as “cannon fodder.”⁶⁷ In a letter to his father in June 1916, he lamented that the infantry had no time to rest or to train because its men were too often asked to dig when they were not fighting. Pope explained that “troops in Brigade reserve were out on working parties every night and those away back in

⁵⁷ Pope is likely referring to the gains recorded by the 1st and 2nd Canadian division on 26 September in an area just north of Courcellette in the direction of the German-held Regina Trench. Nicholson, *Canadian Expeditionary Force*, 174-179; Kerry and McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, 118-119. The editor of Pope’s *Letter from the Front* suggests (62) that the Canadian 1st and 2nd division secured among other areas Kenora trenches on 26 September. It was only for a short time, however, as the area switched hands many times over the new few days. Kenora trenches were only secured on 2 October. Kerry and McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, 119.

⁵⁸ In a letter dated 26 June 1916 to his father, Pope says that he has been “up front for 32 of the last 36 nights working from dusk to dawn.” Pope, *Letters from the Front*, 47. See also Pope’s letter of 16 April 1916 to his brother Billy. CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 15.

⁵⁹ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to sister Adele, 1 July 1916, 49.

⁶⁰ Pope writes of resisting the “O.C. Batt. Or Brigadier in some futile, foolish and impossible tasks that would only have meant R.I.P. for my little party and myself.” Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to parents, 21 September 1916, 59.

⁶¹ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 6 June 1916, 45.

⁶² *Ibid*, Pope to father, 6 June 1916, 45.

⁶³ *Ibid*, Pope to father, 23 June 1916, 46.

⁶⁴ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 3 March 1916, 35.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, Pope to father, 21 September 1916, 59.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 4 May 1916, 39.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, Pope to father, 26 June and 10 September 1916, 47, 57. Pope’s impressions did not change much when he reflected on his experience over 40 years later. He says that “never in our time, I imagine, was human life held as cheaply as it was on the Somme in 1916.” Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 33.

reserve were out at least one night in two.”⁶⁸ Higher command had created working parties drawn primarily from the ‘resting’ or ‘reserve’ infantry to help the undermanned engineering field units with their tasks. According to the official history of Canada’s engineers, under this arrangement, the engineers were expected to ensure the “quality” of the work, while the infantry working parties focused on the “quantity of the work.” The arrangement did not find favour with the infantry or with the engineers. The infantry was not happy to do heavy lifting for engineering groups at night *and* fight during the day. The engineers, for their part, found it difficult to coordinate the working parties and they were unsure as to the ability of the men assigned to them to complete the work. In addition, the engineers often found that the infantry did not care much about “the proceedings”; field company officers therefore had to worry about both the quantity and quality of the work, or said the engineers!⁶⁹ Pope was able to get the work done despite the less-than-enviable situation.

Despite what he had to endure and witness in his first few weeks at the front, Pope had started to explore in May 1916 the merits of pursuing a career in the permanent force. He explained to his father that he was not sure whether he would find employment in engineering in Canada after the war. Given the situation, he suggested that “joining the permanent force would be a wise precaution... and would do no harm.”⁷⁰ He asked his father to intercede on his behalf with Major-General Willoughby Gwatkin, the Chief of the General staff. Pope would have gladly taken a promotion with his transfer, but he was realistic about his prospects.⁷¹ He shared his plans with his brother Billy, who was already in the permanent force. His brother told him that he was being considered as brigade major in the new 5th Canadian Division and, should that transpire, he would like his brother to join him as staff captain. Before Pope heard anything further about Billy’s plans, he learned in December that he had been attached to the 5th Canadian Brigade.⁷² This was a good opportunity and Pope was pleased that it had happened strictly on the basis of his performance and not as a result of “family influence.”⁷³ Just six weeks later, Pope was transferred to the 11th Canadian Brigade (part of the 4th Canadian Division), under the command of Victor Odlum. He remained there for about eighteen months, learning new skills as a military intelligence officer in the general staff branch, the most important branch in the brigade since its “business” was “fighting.”⁷⁴

Learning to be a staff intelligence officer

The CEF stressed the importance of intelligence from the time it deployed in 1914. Each Canadian brigade had, from the outset, two staff captains, one of whom was responsible for brigade intelligence.⁷⁵ In contrast, British brigades had only one staff captain and it was the brigade major who was in charge of intelligence, a person who was already heavily

⁶⁸ Pope wrote on 3 March 1916 that he had a working party of 100 infantry helping out in getting ready for the operation against the Bluff. Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 3 March 1916, 34.

⁶⁹ Kerry and McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, 100, 161. The situation was only completely rectified after the reorganization of the engineers in early 1918.

⁷⁰ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 17 May 1916, 42.

⁷¹ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 15, Joseph Pope to Gwatkin, 19 July 1916; Gwatkin to Joseph Pope, 20 July 1916; Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 17 May 1916, 42; father to Pope, June 5, 1916, 43; Pope to mother, 1 July 1916, 48; Pope to father, 3 and 5 January 1917, 72-73; father to Pope, 2 February 1917, 75.

⁷² CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 16, brother Billy to Pope, 23 October 1916. His brother remained with Turner in England. Pope, *Letters from the Front*, 77. Pope wrote in *Soldiers and Politicians* (p. 33) that his commander Colonel H.T. (Skipper) Hughes had told him in the summer of 1916 that he had been “recommended to an infantry brigade as a staff learner.” However, I was unable to find any mention of the discussions between Pope and Hughes in *Letters from the Front* or from other sources.

⁷³ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, Pope to mother, 7 December 1916, 68; 69. Pope may have thought so and I found no evidence to the contrary. That said, I suspect the interventions by Pope’s father must have contributed to the decision by the Militia.

⁷⁴ Kenneth Radley, *We Lead Others Follow: First Canadian Division 1914-1918* (St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing, 2006), 82. During the First World War, the staff system for Canadian field forces was organized largely along the same lines as were their British counterparts. The general staff (GS) branch provided advice on all military operations. Its staff officers were responsible for operational orders and instructions, plans and operations, reports and messages, intelligence, and reconnaissance. The adjutant-general or “A” branch was in charge of the organization of the field army, medical arrangements, manpower, and military law. The quartermaster-general or “Q” branch dealt with supplies, ammunition, stores, quarters, and movements. See General staff, War Office, *Field Service Pocket Book 1914 Reprinted, with Amendments, 1916* (London: War Office, 1917; reprinted by Naval Press 2014), 24-27; see also Douglas E. Delaney, “The Corps Nervous System in Action: Commanders, Staffs, and Battle Procedure,” in Douglas E. Delaney and Serge Marc Durflinger (eds.), *Capturing Hill 70: Canada’s Forgotten Battle of the First World War* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 53.

⁷⁵ Dan Jenkins, “Winning Trench warfare: Battlefield Intelligence in the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918” (PhD diss., Carleton University, 1999), 47; see also comments by General Arthur Currie in Major J.E. Hahn, *The Intelligence Service within the Canadian Corps* (Toronto: MacMillan, 1930), XV.

tasked. The staff captain (I) in the Canadian brigade reported to the brigade major or brigade commander (depending on the situation and the style of the commander) for intelligence work and to the senior staff captain for administrative duties.⁷⁶

The duties of an intelligence officer were many. They included coordinating collection assets and sources to find enemy machine guns, strong points, observations posts, gun emplacements, and communication centres. The intelligence officer had to keep track of construction and destruction of enemy wire and identify enemy movements. These functions were particularly important for targeting purposes. If enemy guns, strong points and defences could be found and defined, they could be neutralized or destroyed. The brigade intelligence officer maintained contact with his counterparts at the battalion level to make sure that battalion fronts were being properly monitored and that reports of enemy activity and positions were promptly reported for processing so that they could be integrated into fire plans.⁷⁷ The brigade intelligence officer was responsible for ensuring that the battalion intelligence officers were properly trained.⁷⁸ Sound intelligence provided planners the information they needed for preparing the set-piece battles that became the hallmark of the operations in 1917.⁷⁹ The Canadian commanders saw sound intelligence as providing the tools for better planning and intensive rehearsal.⁸⁰ The tasks of the combat intelligence officer were critical. Good intelligence did not “guarantee success but without it there was almost a certainty of failure.”⁸¹

Pope was not entirely happy when first transferred to the 11th Brigade in early 1917. To begin with, the pace was slow compared to that of recent months. This was partly because the 11th Canadian Brigade, like the rest of the Canadian Corps, was trying to recover from the Somme campaign. Pope wrote that he was working long hours, but he was not overly busy. He explained to his father that he had been pleased when he had transferred to the 5th Canadian Brigade. There, he was with people he knew (the 5th Canadian Brigade was part of the 2nd Canadian Division, to which Pope’s 4th Field Company had been attached), and he was familiar with their “system.” Moreover, while he had been happy to be employed as an intelligence officer in the 5th Canadian Brigade, he found his assignments much less to his satisfaction when he was transferred to the 11th Canadian Brigade. He lamented that he had “been sent among strangers.” Odum, his brigade commander, was “an exceptionally capable officer,” but he did not delegate sufficiently.⁸² Moreover, Pope was frustrated that the brigade had tasked him with administrative work when he thought that he should be focusing on intelligence activities. These concerns he shared only with his family. Outwardly, he focussed on fitting in and learning new skills.

While Pope might have been frustrated in his first few weeks on the job, his superiors believed that he showed some promise as a staff officer. At the beginning of April 1917, Pope learned that he had been selected for the Junior Staff Course, one of the very few to be chosen.⁸³ On 7 April 1917, he reported to Clare College, Cambridge, where he worked very diligently during the five week course.⁸⁴ He genuinely found the material very interesting, even if the program, in his opinion, was too short for the amount of knowledge the instructors were trying to impart. He recalled the college commandant telling the students that “though our minds had been filled with a jumbled mass of seemingly indigestible facts we should later find that much had been retained.”⁸⁵ Pope wrote that he “was given a good report from Cambridge.” He returned to his brigade in mid-May, shortly after which he was deemed “fit to assume staff duties.”⁸⁶

In the meantime, Pope continued to think about a transfer to the permanent force. He had asked his father again in January 1917 to do what he could to bring about his transfer to the permanent force and to secure him as much seniority as

⁷⁶ Hahn, *The Intelligence Service within the Canadian Corps*, 87; Kenneth Radley, *Get Tough, Stay Tough: Shaping the Canadian Corps 1914-1918* (Solihull, England: Helion and Company Limited, 2014), 57.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 88.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 93.

⁷⁹ Dan Jenkins, “The Other Side of the Hill: Combat intelligence in the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918,” *Canadian Military History*, Volume 10, Number 2, Spring 2001, 16.

⁸⁰ Jenkins, “Winning Trench Warfare,” 269.

⁸¹ Jenkins, “The Other Side of the Hill,” 7; Jenkins, “Winning Trench Warfare,” 14. For a historical background on how commanders secured information over the centuries, see Lieutenant-Colonel Gary B. Griffin, *The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Element of Effective Command* (Combat Studies Institute, 1991). See in particular Major-General J.F.C. Fuller’s assessment (91) of command conditions during the First World War.

⁸² Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 13 February 1917, 78-79.

⁸³ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 34. For background to the training of Canadian staff officers, see Douglas E. Delaney, “Mentoring the Canadian Corps: Imperial Officers and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918,” *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 77. No. 3.

⁸⁴ Pope, *Letters from the front*, Pope to mother, 21 April 1917, 85.

⁸⁵ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 35.

⁸⁶ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 25 May 1917, 88.

possible. His father spoke to Major General Eugene Fiset, Gwatkin and others.⁸⁷ In the subsequent exchange of letters between Pope and his father on the issue, Maurice comes across as ambitious about getting ahead. He stressed to this father that he was seeking only what he thought was due to him, but he was more than happy to have him pull strings that were not available to others. It worked.⁸⁸ On 26 June 1917, Pope became a member of the permanent force and promoted to captain.⁸⁹

The 11th Canadian Brigade was out of the front lines for most of the month of July, with its headquarters near Chateau de la Haie, about 15 kilometers west of Vimy. The new Corps Commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie, had announced in late June that the 4th Canadian Division would go into corps reserve for about 4 weeks.⁹⁰ Pope and the rest of the brigade had time to watch the Canadian Corps horse show and participate in some athletic competitions.⁹¹ In addition, Odlum used the time for “systematic and progressive training,” with emphasis on “discipline and offensive tactics.” The brigade school organized the program such that each company of each battalion would participate as a complete unit for a course of one week.⁹²

Pope contributed to the brigade school in two ways. To begin with, Pope and his fellow brigade headquarters officers were expected to conduct routine visits to units, for the purpose of observing how the training was coming along and providing help as required. The directive provided that all brigade staff officers were to report to Odlum at 05:30 every morning and the brigade commander was to accompany one of the officers on his rounds. These young staff officers were to report back to Odlum in writing every evening on the activities they observed while visiting the units. The directive underscored that the purpose of the officers’ visits to units was to “promote esprit de corps and confidence throughout the brigade. Only kindly and helpful criticisms are wanted.”⁹³ Secondly, Pope served as an instructor in the training program offered by the brigade’s intelligence school. The school was run under the personal supervision of Odlum.⁹⁴ The course ran for twelve days. The staff officers from the brigade’s intelligence cell and their signalling counterparts trained battalion runners, scouts, signallers, observers and snipers, on the art and science of intelligence collection. The course included discussions on reading maps, construction of enemy trench system, the use of compasses, interpretation of aeroplane photographs, observation and location of enemy dugouts, location of bombing and outposts, close study of enemy movement and dispositions, and the duties of platoon and battalion observers.⁹⁵ The brigade made good use of Pope’s newly developed expertise in the intelligence field.

Soon, Pope started to sign off his own intelligence summaries for the brigade.⁹⁶ These summaries were standardized across units and formations within the Canadian Corps (and the British Expeditionary Force) so that the information could be used most effectively.⁹⁷ They were ordinarily divided into two sections: first, the brigade’s own activities, and secondly, those of the enemy. Pope’s summary of intelligence for July typifies the kind of report that he prepared. The summary identified “friendly” activities related to artillery, trench mortar, machine guns, sniping, aircraft, and patrols (with coordinates). On the enemy side, his report pinpointed activities related to tactical dispositions for various arms such as artillery, trench mortar, machine guns, and aircraft, as well as general enemy movement (with coordinates).⁹⁸ Pope drafted detailed reports on brigade patrols, which were numerous in August 1917. Other reports provided information on additional items such as general targets, signals, and explosions.⁹⁹ It was not just a matter of reporting what was where, but what might

⁸⁷ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, father to Pope, 2 February 1917.

⁸⁸ Ibid, Pope to father, 23 April 1917, 86; CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 18, father to Pope, 17 June 1917.

⁸⁹ Appointments, promotions and retirements Canadian Militia, dated July 5, 1917 in CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 18.

⁹⁰ The 4th Canadian Division took significant casualties, and many came from Odlum’s 11th Brigade. See Andrew Godefroy, “The 4th Canadian Division: Trenches should never be saved.” In *Vimy Ridge A Canadian Reassessment*, edited by Geoffrey Hayes, Andrew Iarocci and Mike Bechthold (Waterloo: William Laurier University Press, 2007), 211-224.

⁹¹ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to mother, 19 June 1917, 91. Library and Archives (LAC), MG 30 E300, Papers of General Victor Odlum (Odlum papers), Vol. 20, Summaries, reports and orders July 1917; LAC War Diary of Headquarters – 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade (Online - <http://www.canadiangreatwarproject.com/warDiaryLac/wdLacP07.asp>),) (hereafter LAC, War Diary 11th CIB), 20 July 1917.

⁹² LAC, Odlum papers, Vol. 20, Summaries, File Training, 11th Brigade July 1917.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ It was not the case for all regimental officers. See Radley, *We Lead Others Follow*, p. 201.

⁹⁵ LAC, Odlum papers, Vol. 20, Summaries, File Training, 11th Brigade July 1917.

⁹⁶ Ibid, Vol. 20, Summaries, reports and orders July 1917, Warning Order dated 21 July 1917; and Operation Order of 24 July 1917.

⁹⁷ Hahn, *The Intelligence Service within the Canadian Corps*, 127.

⁹⁸ LAC, Odlum Papers, Vol. 20, Summaries, reports and orders July 1917, Summary of intelligence – No. 131.

⁹⁹ Ibid, no. 133.

happen. In other words, the intelligence officer had to analyse and process the information gathered into a product that the commander could use for decision making. Pope had the skills and expertise to do that.

On 23 July, the 11th Canadian Brigade received orders to move to the Lens area. In the middle of August, Pope and the rest of the brigade were involved in the campaign for the capture of Hill 70. The attack was aimed at diverting German troops away from the main British offensive in the Third Battle of Ypres, more commonly known as the battle of Passchendaele. Currie had initially been told to attack and capture the coal town of Lens; however, the Canadian Corps Commander had managed to have his orders modified so that he could focus on Hill 70, which overlooked the town.¹⁰⁰ When the attack was launched on 15 August 1917, the 11th Canadian Brigade was in fact in front of Lens, its mission and that of the rest of the 4th Division to provide a protective flank to the main operation on Hill 70. Over the course of the battle at Hill 70, Pope's brigade sent fighting patrols into Lens and provided harassing fire. Pope was near the front lines, reporting from his observation post on enemy movements around Lens.¹⁰¹ These observation posts or report centres, manned by scouts, scout officers, observers, runners and signallers, were often built in recently-captured enemy positions. The brigade and battalion centres were normally located close to each other to facilitate the exchange of information. Pope was in charge of the brigade's reporting centre. He was responsible for collecting information, consolidating it and distributing it to commanders in the rear.¹⁰² Of the attack on Hill 70, Pope thought that the Canadians had succeeded in their mission, that "it had been a clean cut job," and that the brigade had repulsed a German counterattack which involved some of the fiercest fighting that we have yet seen."¹⁰³ He thought that the Allies had "reason to be well satisfied" because the Germans had lost twice as many men as did the Allies and "casualties alone will win or lose this war."¹⁰⁴

Pope continued to enhance his skills as a staff officer in the weeks after Hill 70. His field of expertise was clearly expanding, and he was called upon to offer his services in a growing number of situations. For example, in early October, he briefed platoon commanders of the 11th Canadian Brigade on their objectives in an upcoming operation.¹⁰⁵ He had clearly grown in the esteem of Odlum. When the brigade's staff captain was seriously injured on 3 October 1917, and divisional headquarters tried to send someone to replace him, Odlum insisted that Pope assume the position, which made him head of intelligence for the brigade.¹⁰⁶

At the end of October, the 11th Canadian Brigade took part in the battle for Passchendaele.¹⁰⁷ The Canadian Corps launched its assault on 26 October. In the opening days of the operation, Pope's brigade was in divisional reserve.¹⁰⁸ It was only on 30 October that the brigade was ordered to take over a section of line from the 12th Canadian Brigade. He travelled with the brigade's signals officer to the headquarters of the 12th Canadian Brigade to survey the area where the 11th Brigade would deploy. And he inspected one of the brigade's companies.¹⁰⁹ When the 11th Canadian Brigade joined the battle in Passchendaele, Pope was located at the brigade's observation post with brigade observers. He recalled years later that the

¹⁰⁰ Nicholson, *Canadian Expeditionary Force*, 285, 286; see also Mark Osborne Humphries, "The Best Laid Plans: Sir Arthur Currie's First Operations as Corp Commander," in *Capturing Hill 70: Canada's Forgotten Battle of the First World War*, edited by Douglas E. Delaney and Serge Marc Durflinger (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016).

¹⁰¹ Odlum papers, Vol. 20, Intelligence Summaries, operations, orders, messages and signals: reports of August 1917 - Narrative of Operations of 11th C.I.B. of 15 August 1917. Pope's messages came from the Chateau O.P. (operational post).

¹⁰² Jenkins, *Winning Trench Warfare: Battlefield Intelligence in the Canadian Corps*, 275, 278. Brigades had twelve observers on their establishment. See also Hahn, *The Intelligence Service within the Canadian Corps*, p. 86.

¹⁰³ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 31 August 1917, 101.

¹⁰⁴ In a memorandum of 23 August 1917, Odlum congratulated the officers and men of the 11th Brigade for their contribution in capturing Hill 70. The offensive patrols had achieved their goal of wearing down enemy troops and keeping them occupied. LAC, Odlum papers, Vol. 20, Intelligence, summaries, operations, orders, messages and signals, reports, August. 1917. Historians have generally agreed with Odlum and Pope on the achievement at Hill 70. See Nicholson, *Canadian Expeditionary Force*, 297; and Tim Cook, *Shock Troops Canadians Fighting the Great War* (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008), 304. However, as Cook points out (306), the campaign had not been a complete success. In the "clumsy and hurried" second phase of the attack on Lens, the Canadian Corps suffered 4,000 casualties between 21-25 August. See also Patrick Brennan, "Major-General David Watson: A Critical Appraisal of Canadian Generalship in the Great War," in Andrew B. Godefroy, *Great War Commands: Historical Perspectives on Canadian Army Leadership 1914-1918* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2010), 126-127; Douglas E. Delaney, "The Corps Nervous System in Action: Commanders, Staff, and Battle Procedure," in *Capturing Hill 70: Canada's forgotten Battle of the First World War*, edited by Douglas E. Delaney and Serge Marc Durflinger (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 70-73..

¹⁰⁵ LAC, War Diary 11th CIB, 1 October 1917.

¹⁰⁶ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 19 October 1917, 102-103; LAC, LAC, War Diary 11th CIB, 3 October 1917.

¹⁰⁷ See Cook, *Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918*, Chapter 20.

¹⁰⁸ LAC, War Diary 11th CIB, Operation Order No. 84, 3 September 1917.

¹⁰⁹ LAC, War Diary 11th CIB, Nov 6. He inspected "A" Company of the 54th Battalion.

brigade took a “heavy pounding” while trying “to hang on to our swamp-like positions.” He remembered spending some six days with the observers. He explained that the forward area had been saturated with mustard gas and “the pill box from which we observed what we could of the enemy positions had received more than its fair share.”¹¹⁰ Pope insisted in his memoirs that the campaign for Passchendaele was largely over by the time he deployed into the line. It was still dangerous though. When stationed at the brigade advanced observation post with his team of observers and signallers, his position was under very severe bombardment from high explosives and gas for an extended period of time, so much so “as to make all his staff casualties.” Between 13 and 19 November, Pope lost six observers and twelve other ranks of the signalling section. Even so, he still managed according to the report written after the battle, to provide, “accurate information as to the situation on the different occasions that the enemy threatened to counter-attack.” This allowed the artillery to direct its fire “where it had the most damaging effect on the enemy.”¹¹¹ Odlum recommended him for the Military Cross, which was granted on 25 July.¹¹²

Pope’s performance at Passchendaele solidified his relationship with Odlum. This was clear from a January 1918 letter Odlum wrote to Pope’s father, whom he had never met. Odlum called Maurice “a splendid chap” in whom he had “great confidence.” He added that he had grown “very fond of him,” and he hoped that “the friendship which is now being formed will continue thro [sic] life.” Odlum pointed out to Joseph Pope that he had been very happy to recommend his son for the Military Cross.¹¹³ Pope had earned the trust of his superior. He was rewarded with more responsibilities and the chance to acquire new knowledge, this time as a brigade major for the 11th Canadian Brigade.

Pope learns to be a brigade major

Pope was fortunate enough to begin learning the responsibilities of a brigade major in a relatively benign environment.¹¹⁴ Kenneth Radley calls the position of brigade major “kingpin,” “one of the most demanding in the Army” and “a make or break appointment.”¹¹⁵ The person in that position normally held the rank of major, was in charge of the brigade’s G staff branch, and had oversight over the other branches.¹¹⁶ The brigade major was expected to expand on and ensure that the intentions of the brigade commander were executed. He was in constant contact with the front line troops and was responsible for planning the brigade’s operations. The brigade major did a lot of writing – operation orders, deployments and re-deployment schedules, battle reports and various other documents. As Radley observes, military writing “stressed great attention to detail and absolute thoroughness as much as was humanly possible...due regard for men’s lives left no place for broad-brush canvas art or carelessness with facts or figures.”¹¹⁷

Pope approached his new appointment as brigade major prudently. That was the way he tackled most new responsibilities. As a rule, Pope did not move into new positions claiming to know it all. He explained to his father that the duties of a brigade major would test his “slender abilities to the utmost.” Nonetheless, Pope still projected confidence that he would be up to the task over time. As he explained, “experience is the great teacher and of that I am gaining plenty.”¹¹⁸ Between February and the end of May 1918, Pope assumed the position of acting brigade major on numerous occasions, while also fulfilling his intelligence functions. In his capacity as acting brigade major, he signed off on various operational orders, scheduled working parties, and supervised inter-battalion reliefs-in-place. As intelligence officer, he continued to sign off the war diary on behalf of Odlum. He kept track of brigade casualties. He organized raids to secure identification of opposing enemy formations and he provided analysis of enemy behaviour as part of his intelligence and operations

¹¹⁰ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 36.

¹¹¹ The description of Pope’s actions is taken from LAC, Odlum Papers, Vol. 21, N.C.O.’s and officers, recommendations for Passchendaele Ridge, Oct-Nov. 1917. See also David K. Riddle and Donald G. Mitchell, *The Military Cross Awarded to members of the Canadian Expeditionary Force 1915-1921* (Winnipeg: Kirkby-Moulton Press, 1991), 272.

¹¹² Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 15 August 1917, 128-29. I also found a copy of a despatch in the Pope family papers in Toronto, Ontario. The despatch reads: “The War of 1914-1918 Canadian Engineers Lt. M.A. Pope, 4th FD Coy was mentioned in a Despatch from Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig...dated 7th November 1917 for gallant and distinguished services in the Field.”

¹¹³ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Odlum to Joseph Pope, 9 January 1918, 109. In the letter, Odlum says that he “has heard so much of you both (Joseph and Lady Pope) from your boy that I feel almost personally acquainted (sic).”

¹¹⁴ The 11th Brigade had come out of the line on 18-19 November. LAC, War Diary 11th CIB, 18-19 November 1917.

¹¹⁵ Radley, *We Lead Others Follow*, 185-186; see also Radley’s *Get Tough, Stay Tough: Shaping the Canadian Corps 1914-1918* (Solihull, England: Helion and Company Limited, 2014), 57-58.

¹¹⁶ Delaney, “The Corps Nervous System in Action: Commanders, Staffs, and Battle Procedure,” in Douglas E. Delaney and Serge Marc Durflinger, *Capturing Hill 70: Canada’s Forgotten Battle of the First World War*, 54.

¹¹⁷ Radley, *We Lead Others Follow*, 192.

¹¹⁸ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 15 July 1917, 94.

summaries that were then circulated to the 4th Canadian Division.¹¹⁹ He signed off on the results of various raids and minor operations, as well as brigade manoeuvres and exercises. He provided targeting information to the divisional artillery staffs, which incorporated it into their fire plans.¹²⁰ He also accompanied the brigade commander on tours of the lines.¹²¹

Pope tried to use the lull in the first few months of 1918 - the Canadians were largely not involved in fending off the German 1918 spring offensive - to expand his knowledge and skill set. He participated in some useful professional development training. He found Currie's presentation on the "duties and responsibilities of an Officer" to be "instructive and forceful."¹²² In May 1918, he reported on demonstrations by the divisional engineers on bridging, which he found "interesting and instructive." He wrote his father that the brigade had "rarely had such a profitable training period."¹²³ He explained to Joseph Pope that "facilities for manoeuvre are plentiful and some of our field days have been as near the real thing as can be obtained without the taking of casualties."¹²⁴ The last entry of the brigade war diary for May 1918 records that Captain Pope had been ordered to report to the 4th Canadian Brigade, Canadian Engineers to take the duties of brigade major.

Pope had become more analytical about the war, whether he was writing about military operations or broader strategic issues, despite the fact that he was still working at a relatively low tactical level in the military. On the conduct of the war, he wrote to his brother that he did not see much prospect for a war of movement. He was of the view that the conflict with Germany had developed into a war of attrition and it would remain that way. He argued that the Germans had pulled back in early 1917 because they could not sustain the casualties "that a stand-to-fight summer long [campaign] would entail." Pope thought that the allies could better withstand the casualties, but he maintained that "there is also a limit to the time that we can stand the strain of this enormous load." Germany "is playing for a draw," knowing that the "Allies cannot stick it forever..."¹²⁵ Pope was already showing elements of realism that would characterize him in future years. He revisited the issue of attrition in a letter to his father in February 1918. He was clearly concerned about the home front. He wrote that "the men in the field" can withstand a war of attrition, but he was concerned that the "people at home" might not be so willing to tolerate the sacrifices.¹²⁶

Pope was growing more positive about allied senior military leadership and their direction of the war. For example, in February 1917, he argued that Lieutenant-General Julian Byng was "one of the very best Corps Commanders in the B.E.F." He thought Byng "responsible for the good name of the Canadians in France," and he thought it was thanks to the British general that Canada was developing into a "good and efficient body of troops who will do big things soon..."¹²⁷ Pope was pleased to see a positive shift in the initiative from the Germans to the allies. He observed that the allies had been focused on holding the line and conducting minor operations when he arrived at the front. By the summer of 1917, however, he believed this relatively passive approach had been replaced by "a spirit of constant offensive" and "a purely holding tour is uncommon."¹²⁸ In November, he reported that "with regularity that we are beginning to take for granted, the Canadians have forged ahead on each operation." On 30 November, he told his father that Canada's "success in battle is becoming monotonous in its regularity."¹²⁹ In April 1918, he called the Canadian Corps "the finest corps in the finest Army in

¹¹⁹ Pope reported on 18 March that "the enemy has been exposing himself with impunity. At dawn our snipers took up positions in houses in and forward of the line of outposts, and their return at dusk reported that they had obtained 6 hits - a very excellent total." LAC, War Diary 11th CIB, 18 March 1918. On March 20, Pope wrote that the "behaviour of the enemy had greatly changed... When he is obliged to go overland he does so at the double, and takes advantage of all cover he can find." Ibid, 20 March 1918.

¹²⁰ See LAC, War Diary 11th CIB, March 31 and Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 1 April 1917, 118.

¹²¹ See the entry for 21 May concerning a leapfrogging exercise conducted by the Brigade's four battalions. LAC, War Diary 11th CIB.

¹²² LAC, War Diary 11th CIB, 2 March 1918.

¹²³ Ibid, 22 May.

¹²⁴ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 24 May 1918, 121.

¹²⁵ Pope acknowledged that the German move was "ingenious" and that it would make it much more difficult for allied commanders to plan "one big offensive..." Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to brother Billy, 26 March 1917, 83-84.

¹²⁶ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 22 February 1918, 113.

¹²⁷ Ibid, Pope to father, 23 February 1917, 79.

¹²⁸ Ibid, Pope to brother Edward, 18 July 1917, 94.

¹²⁹ Ibid, Pope to father, 30 November 1917, 106. In his memoirs, Pope took a somewhat more nuanced view of certain aspects of the battles fought in 1917. He still thought that the 4th Canadian division had gained valuable experience after "being blooded by three major operation," and that it had attained "a pitch of efficiency which enabled us to act on the 'nod' as it were." He took great delight in retelling the story about General Currie standing up to British authorities when the Canadian Corps Commander was told that our troops would have to fight under the British Fifth Army. However, he was bitter about certain operations conducted in 1917, including the capture of Passchendaele. Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 34-36.

Europe.”¹³⁰ Pope attributed success to a number of factors. To begin with, the units in the corps were always at strength. If it was otherwise, there would exist, according to Pope, “a feeling of hopelessness” in the units.¹³¹ He commended the corps for working seamlessly together, which he thought had a lot to do with the “splendid organization and good understanding that exists between the various formations.”¹³² There is some parallel between his thoughts on the synergy of the Canadian Corps and the sophisticated assessment of the Canadian Corps done by academics decades later.¹³³

Pope developed an appreciation of the rank and file and what motivated them to carry on. In a letter to his father, he argued that “In battle, one is subjected to two distinct fatigues, one to the muscular system, the other to the nervous system. A few days rest repairs the former, the repair of the latter is problematical.” Pope explained that he had grown confident that the Canadian Corps could develop a good plan of attack, but it was also important to “gauge the feelings of the men who were to do the job. Granted our fellows were in the right mood for a scrap, then all the devils in hell could not stay them. On the other hand, should the men feel that they were being asked to do more than their share, the most carefully planned attack is bound to go phut.”¹³⁴ This passage, and there are others like it, demonstrates that Pope was applying his human leadership skills and had a strong understanding of human nature.

On the issue of advancement, he maintained “that the more responsibility a man takes the further he will go.” Advancement was predicated on a mixture of technical and human skills. Pope thought that “senior positions” required “a more mature judgment than is usually found in a young man, a wider knowledge of human nature and a more general familiarity with the ropes....” Experience worked as an equalizer. He wrote that, “granted an average intelligence, the whole thing is but an application of one’s experience. And mine I shall not easily forget.” He related how he had been told at Junior Staff college that “Good staff work consists of an intimate knowledge of the art of soldiering and applied common sense.”¹³⁵

Pope and the hundred days campaign

Pope became a full-time brigade major when Canadian Corps commander, Arthur Currie, on the recommendation of Corps Chief Engineer Major-General W.B. Lindsay, decided to reorganize the engineers. Currie saw the reorganization as a means of reducing the burden on the infantry who had often been brought together, as noted earlier, as working parties to support the engineers in completing projects. As a result of the changes, each division was assigned an engineer brigade with an establishment of over 3,000 men, three times what each division had before. An engineering brigade consisted of three battalions and a bridging transport unit, with an establishment of 118 officers and 3101 other ranks. Every brigade would possess its own field, pioneer, and tunneling companies.¹³⁶ The brigade headquarters had an establishment of four officers, including a colonel who was the brigade commander, a brigade major, two staff captains, and thirty-two other ranks. The new engineering organization did not have sufficient officers to fill all the new positions, including those for the new brigade majors. Pope was selected to fill one of the vacant positions. He joined the 4th Brigade, C.E., and his new commander was Colonel H.T. Hughes, under whom Pope had served in 1916 when he was a section commander of the 4th Field Company. Pope considered himself “a very fortunate young man” for the opportunity to work as brigade major. He considered that the “job of Brigade Major is a big one” and he was unsure whether he would be “able to hold it down.”¹³⁷ Pope only shared these doubts with his parents. To others, he took on his new duties with eagerness and confidently, never letting on that he might have had worries about his abilities.

When Pope returned from leave in early August, he joined his brigade as the Canadian Corps began to make its way south from Vimy in preparation for the attack on Amiens.¹³⁸ The Canadian Corps had embarked on what turned out to be

¹³⁰ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 22 April 1918, 119.

¹³¹ Ibid, Pope to father, 27 October 1917, 103.

¹³² Ibid, Pope to father, 30 November 1917, 105.

¹³³ See for example Shane B. Schreiber, *The Shock Army of the British Empire The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War* (Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2004). See in particular Schreiber’s analysis in the second Chapter, titled *The Orchestra and its Conductor*. Like Pope, Schreiber talks about the importance of the Canadian Corps remaining at full strength, as well as the ability of the various divisions and the various arms to work together, as in an orchestra.

¹³⁴ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 9 December 1918, 142.

¹³⁵ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 23 August 1918, 131.

¹³⁶ On the reorganization, see Kerry and McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, 160-167; Schreiber, *The Shock Army of the British Empire*, 28.

¹³⁷ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 4 June 1918, 122.

¹³⁸ It was his first time on leave in the past 6 months. He went to England to receive his Military Cross from the King. Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 15 August 1918, 128-9.

the last major campaign of the First World War - what would eventually be called the Hundred Days campaign. Because the attack on Amiens was intended to be a surprise, the redeployment was done by night, in accordance with the operation's deception plan.¹³⁹ Pope found the march a "gruelling" experience.¹⁴⁰ Pope and the remainder of the headquarters of the 4th Brigade, C.E., moved with divisional headquarters of the 4th Canadian Division while the three engineer battalions made the great trek with their corresponding infantry brigades.¹⁴¹ Colonel Hughes was not happy with those arrangements, since it meant that he would not be in contact with his units until just a few hours before the attack. It would add to the challenges of the commander - and Pope - in preparing to support the advance.¹⁴² Hughes discovered the exact location and objectives of the forthcoming attack on 4 August when he and Pope attended meetings at the headquarters of the 4th Canadian Division and at corps headquarters to get their instructions.¹⁴³ The instructions highlighted that there was still a lot of work to be done to prepare the Canadian sector for the upcoming battle, and much of it would have to be carried out at night, given the continuing secrecy of the preparations.¹⁴⁴ Since there was little time before the launch of the attack, Pope supplemented written orders with visits to the battalion headquarters to ensure the commanders understood their upcoming move to assembly areas.¹⁴⁵

According to the plan of attack, the Canadians were to spearhead the advance in the centre, with the Australians on the left and the French on the right. Currie assigned responsibility for launching the first phase of the Canadian attack to the 3rd, 1st, and 2nd Canadian Divisions (from right to left). The 4th Canadian Division, with the 4th Brigade, C.E., in support, would pass through the 3rd Canadian Division for the purpose of, in the words of Pope "put[ting] on the second act."¹⁴⁶ The attack near Amiens was launched on 8 August at 04:20. Pope called the attack a "complete surprise." When the 3rd Canadian Division achieved its objectives, the 4th Canadian Infantry passed through as planned, with two companies of engineers in support. During the battle, Pope was in charge of various projects, including building cross-country tracks to move the guns forward, the construction of a light railway, the wiring and "firestepping" of some trenches, the filling of craters, and the conduct of water surveys.¹⁴⁷ Much of this was done under bombardment.¹⁴⁸ Pope also inspected a new type of cork pier for the construction of bridges for the infantry. The Canadians pursued their advance on 9-10 August. By the time the operation ended on 20 August, the Canadians had advanced 13 miles, at a cost of about 12,000 casualties, and reached the trench systems that had been built by the Germans before the battle of the Somme in 1916.¹⁴⁹

Hughes was happy with how the 4th Brigade, C.E., performed at Amiens. It was the first time that it had been involved in a major operation since the re-organization of May 1918. In Hughes' narrative of the battle, he complimented his officers and the men for the effective coordination of the move to the assembly positions. He believed that the brigade had acquired "valuable experience" and had performed "quite creditably." Hughes thought Pope and the rest of his officers had demonstrated commendable "initiative and self-reliance," given the speed at which the planning and the battle itself had

¹³⁹ Schreiber, *The Shock Army of the British Empire*, 35-36; see also Brennan, "Major-General David Watson: A Critical Appraisal of Canadian Generalship in the Great War," in Andrew B. Godefroy, *Great War Commands: Historical Perspectives on Canadian Army Leadership 1914-1918*, 129-130.

¹⁴⁰ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 9 December 1918, 140. One historian called the redeployment a "difficult road move" not only because the troops had to travel at night, but also because it was moving from under the command of the British First Army, under which it had operated for almost two years, to the command of the Fourth Army. Schreiber, *The Shock Army of the British Empire*, 37.

¹⁴¹ LAC, War Diary of Headquarters - 4th C.E. (Online -<http://www.canadiangreatwarproject.com/warDiaryLac/wdLacP07.asp>), (hereafter LAC, War Diary 4th Brigade, C.E.), July 20, 1917.

¹⁴² LAC, War Diary 4th Brigade, C.E., Narrative of Battle of Amiens, Appendix 2 of January 1919 War Diary; see also Kerry and McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, 173-74.

¹⁴³ LAC, War Diary 4th Brigade, C.E., 4 August 1918.

¹⁴⁴ LAC, War Diary 4th Brigade, C.E., Narrative of Battle of Amiens Appendix 2 of War Diary January 1919. The Canadian sector, which had previously been under French control, had none of the logistical facilities such as railheads and fuel points required for the upcoming battle. Schreiber, *The Shock Army of the British Empire*, 37.

¹⁴⁵ LAC, War Diary 4th Brigade, C.E., 7 August 1918; Move to Assembly Positions, Appendix 2 to War Diary of August 1918.

¹⁴⁶ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 9 December 1918, 141. Pope recalled that he had to remain under cover for fear of getting spotted.

¹⁴⁷ LAC, War Diary 4th Brigade C.E., 11, 17, 20 August. The cork piers were used in the crossing of Canal du Nord. Kerry and McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, 189. The search for new sources of water supply was a recurring challenge throughout the 100 days campaign. See LAC, War Diary 4th Brigade, C.E., 7 August 1918; see also Kerry and McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, 176, 177, 178 for general discussion of water supply problem.

¹⁴⁸ LAC, War Diary 4th Brigade, C.E., 7 August 1918, L.C. Instructions No. 2. (E).

¹⁴⁹ Schreiber, *The Shock Army of the British Empire*, 61.

unfolded. The commander also praised the officers and the rank and file for having properly followed the instructions concerning secrecy. Hughes had no doubt that the experience would prove useful “in the Battles which were to come.”¹⁵⁰

By late August, the 4th Brigade, C.E., was again on the move, heading towards Arras to link up with the rest of the Canadian Corps, which had rejoined the First (British) Army.¹⁵¹ By the time it arrived in the area, the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions had in fact advanced east of Arras, and the Canadian Corps was preparing for its next objective, the Drocourt-Queant (DQ) Line.¹⁵² The DQ Line was “one of the most powerful and well organized German defence systems” and formed the northern hinge of the Hinderberg Line.¹⁵³ Pope was with Hughes when the brigade commander got his instructions on 28 August. They were told that the 1st and 4th Canadian Divisions would have the primary roles for the assault on the DQ line. For this operation, the 4th Brigade, C.E., and the 4th Canadian Division were to be located near each other and each engineer battalion was to work with its corresponding infantry brigade.¹⁵⁴ There was little time to plan. Pope detected that the planning cycle for operations was growing increasingly shorter. He observed that Vimy had taken “months of preparations. Four days ago I knew nothing of this affair and the job is at the very least of equal magnitude.”¹⁵⁵ He visited each unit on the morning of 29 August and issued verbal instructions for the units to move to their concentration areas.¹⁵⁶

Pope supervised various projects assigned to the 4th Brigade, C.E., including the building of tracks for cavalry and horsed transport.¹⁵⁷ One project stands out because it was critical to the success of the attack. The assault across the DQ line would only succeed if the Canadian troops could move all necessary stocks forward in a timely matter. At the time, however, the Canadian Corps was experiencing delays in moving equipment forward because the road was narrow and there was traffic congestion. Corps HQ asked the Chief Engineer to resolve the problem, and he, in turn, assigned the task of expanding the road to the 4th Brigade, C.E. It fell on Pope to supervise the crucial project. Pope set to his task with alacrity and completed the tasks on time, all of which permitted all stocks to arrive before the assault began.¹⁵⁸

The attack on the DQ line began at 05:30 on 2 September. During the battle, the 4th Brigade, C.E., had its many regular tasks to complete. These included repairing all captured roads and searching the captured German trenches for booby traps and mines.¹⁵⁹ Pope visited the three engineering battalion headquarters in the first hours of the battle to ensure that the assigned tasks were being completed. He assessed the condition of the roads in the forward area.¹⁶⁰ All of these tasks were completed to the commanders’ satisfaction.¹⁶¹ Within seven hours, the Canadian troops had crossed the line, and captured what Pope described as “the most expertly sited system of trenches” he had ever seen. However, the Canadian infantry did not advance much beyond the DQ Line because they were met by “the most appalling machine gun fire they had yet experienced.”¹⁶² Nevertheless, Currie believed that the operation against the DQ line had been a great victory. The Canadian Corps had been instrumental in pushing the Germans back to the line they had held before their March 1918 offensive. Currie considered the achievement by the Canadian Corps at the DQ Line even more significant than that at Amiens.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁰ LAC, War Diary 4th Brigade C.E., Narrative of Battle of Amiens Appendix 2 of War Diary January 1919.

¹⁵¹ As noted above, the Canadian Corps had been under the command of the 4th British Army for Amiens.

¹⁵² The attack on the DQ line was the second phase of what is commonly called the Arras-Cambrai campaign. It came to an end on 11 October when the Canadians captured Cambrai.

¹⁵³ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 9 December 1918, 141; see also Nicholson, *Canadian Expeditionary Force*, 434; Kerry and McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, 178; Schreiber, *The Shock Army of the British Empire*, 72-75.

¹⁵⁴ LAC, War Diary 4th Brigade, C.E., 29 August.

¹⁵⁵ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to parents, 2 September 1918, 132. Historian Douglas E. Delaney echoed Pope’s observations in a recent article. See Douglas E. Delaney, “Mentoring the Canadian Corps: Imperial Officers and the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918,” *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 77. No. 3, 2013

¹⁵⁶ LAC, War Diary 4th Brigade, C.E., 29 August.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, Narrative of Battle of Queant-Drocourt, Appendix 3 of War Diary January 1919.

¹⁵⁸ LAC, War Diary 4th Brigade, C.E., August 30. Also Colonel A.J. Kerry and Major W.A. McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, 182, 183.

¹⁵⁹ LAC, 4th Brigade, C.E., Narrative of Queant-Drocourt Battle, Appendix 3 of War Diary January 1919.

¹⁶⁰ LAC, War Diary, 4th Brigade, C.E., 2 September .

¹⁶¹ LAC, War Diary 4th Brigade, C.E., Narrative of Queant-Drocourt Battle, Appendix 3 of War Diary January 1919.

¹⁶² Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 9 December 1918, 141; see also Kerry and McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, 183. Pope was touching on the difficulty of sustaining the drive. For a general discussion of the issue, see Schreiber, *The Shock Army of the British Empire*, 91-92.

¹⁶³ LAC, 4th Brigade, C.E., Narrative of Battle of Amiens, Appendix 3 of War Diary January 1919; Kerry and McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, 184. The DQ operation was unquestionably a success. However, planners had hoped to seize some

After a few days' rest, the 4th Brigade, C.E., was back in the lines and supporting the next phase of the allied advance: the crossing the Canal du Nord. Currie decided that he would funnel some 50,000 troops through one very narrow area of the Canal that was still not flooded. The 1st and 4th Canadian Division would lead the charge, followed by the 3rd Canadian Division and a British division. One division would head north and clear the villages along the canal, while the other division would head east.¹⁶⁴ The Canadian Corps launched the attack on the Canal du Nord at 05:00 on 27 September. In accordance with Currie's orders, Pope conducted reconnaissance of the Canal du Nord to locate possible crossing sites.¹⁶⁵ He approved a plan and then supervised the construction of routes to the forward areas, through which the infantry and artillery would advance to their next jump off point. The 4th Brigade, C.E., also escorted artillery units, swept for mines, and located water sources.¹⁶⁶ The battle involved, according to Pope, "the most bitter fighting" Canada's troops had ever experienced. The 4th Canadian Division attacked for four consecutive days (from 28 September to 1 October) and each allied attack was followed by strong enemy counter attacks. Pope reported that Canadian "losses were cruel, almost crushing, but so must have been the enemy's."¹⁶⁷ The headquarters of the 4th Canadian Division considered using the 4th Brigade, C.E., as an infantry brigade to help out in the advance.¹⁶⁸ The report from the 4th Canadian Division explained that its infantry brigades had "fought themselves out" and that an additional brigade would be needed "should a strong counter-attack develop."¹⁶⁹ As it turned out, the engineers did not have to fight as infantry. The Canadian Corps eventually attained all of its objectives for the campaign.

Historians generally agree that the engineers contributed significantly to the successful crossing of the Canal and the capture of Cambrai. Shane B. Schreiber observes that the "Corps Engineers had proven worthy of the great faith that Currie had placed in them." Daniel G. Dancocks maintains that "No one worked harder for victory on 27 September than the Canadian engineers." David Borys says that Canadian engineers "performed feats at an unheard of rate and scale compared with previous allied action on the Western Front."¹⁷⁰ In his capacity as brigade major, Pope made sure that the men of the 4th Brigade, C.E. played their part. In a letter to his father after the battle, Pope stated that "In the crossing of the Canal du Nord, the sappers had their great opportunity and in so far as my brigade was concerned, they made full use of it."¹⁷¹

On 25 October, the 4th Brigade, C.E. made their way across the Canal de le Sensée - unopposed as the Germans had withdrawn - and joined the Canadian Corps outside Valenciennes and Mount Houy. Here the Germans decided to make another stand. The area was crucial to the German defensive line. In addition, it offered "an ideal place for a large defensive position" because Mount Houy "dominated all of the surrounding area" to the south. Finally, the Canal de l'Escaut presented "an effective water barrier against attack from the west and the north."¹⁷² When it became clear that the Germans would hold the line at Valenciennes, Pope made a survey of the whole area and prepared a progress map that described the conditions of the road within the 4th Canadian Division boundaries. He then issued a new work program for the 4th Brigade, C.E.¹⁷³ After the Canadians launched their offensive on 28 October, Pope inspected the bridges in the area to determine which ones were capable of sustaining traffic, and, if so, what kind of traffic. Once that was done, he issued instructions to build additional bridges - foot, pontoon, and heavy traffic - from the west to the east side of the Canal. He made sure the roads were in proper working order and conducted reconnaissance of enemy railways in captured territory. And he searched for "booby traps" and various mines.¹⁷⁴ By 3 November, the Germans were withdrawing towards Mons, allowing the Canadians to enter

bridgeheads across the Canal du Nord if all had gone well. It turned out to be too ambitious an objective. Schreiber, *The Shock Army of the British Empire*, 83.

¹⁶⁴ Schreiber, *The Shock Army of the British Empire*, 96.

¹⁶⁵ LAC, War Diary 4th Brigade, C.E., September 18, 19; Schreiber, *The Shock Army of the British Empire*, 96; Kerry and McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, 188-89.

¹⁶⁶ LAC, War Diary 4th Brigade, C.E., 23 September, 26 September; 4th Brigade, C.E., Instructions E.1, Appendix 6 to War Diary of September 1918.

¹⁶⁷ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 9 December 1918, 142. See also Schreiber, *The Shock Army of the British Empire*, 105.

¹⁶⁸ This was not unusual because the secondary role of engineers was to fight as infantry in the defence.

¹⁶⁹ LAC, War Diary 4th Brigade, C.E., 1 October. See also Kerry and McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers*, 194.

¹⁷⁰ Schreiber, *The Shock Army of the British Empire*, 102; Daniel G. Dancocks, *Spearhead to Victory, Canada and the Great War* (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers), 145; David Borys, "Crossing the Canal Combined Arms Operations at the Canal du Nord," September-October 1918, *Canadian Military History*, Volume 20, Number 4, Autumn 2011, 32.

¹⁷¹ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, Pope to father, 30 September 1918, 133.

¹⁷² Schreiber, *The Shock Army of the British Empire*, 121; see also Nicholson, *Canadian Expeditionary Force*, 470-71

¹⁷³ LAC, War Diary 4th Brigade, C.E., 25 October, See also Appendix 10 dated October 23 of the October War Diary

¹⁷⁴ LAC, War Diary 4th Brigade, C.E., Appendix No. 13, dated 30 October 1918.

Valenciennes.¹⁷⁵ Pope attended the ceremony, and on 8 November, went on leave.¹⁷⁶ By the time he returned to the lines, the Great War had come to an end.

Conclusion

Pope came from a long line of distinguished public servants. Pope's father tried to use his connections to advance his son's job prospects and military ambitions and Pope was not against using his family connections to secure what he wanted. At another level, given his father's position, the company his parents kept and the people Pope met when growing up, he developed a patrician attitude that led him to be less intimidated later in life when interacting with high-ranking government and military officials. In simple terms, Pope had human skills that made him less uncomfortable in the presence of people of higher rank or status because he was surrounded by them from a young age. Finally, because his father was English speaking and his mother French speaking, Pope grew up very mindful of Canada's bicultural nature. His family situation shaped his approach to Canadian politics and foreign relations, as we shall see. It was during those early years that Pope acquired his sense of identity.

From the time he entered university and through to 1918, Pope demonstrated that he could develop and apply new technical skills. As an engineer, every phase of his early journey built on the knowledge and skills he had acquired beforehand. After he graduated from McGill, he took his engineering skills to the CPR, and after he enlisted in the CEF, he learned to make use of them in war. He was selected for staff duties and he showed promise there as well. He was showing signs of adaptability, an important trait of a leader. He developed a good grasp of the intelligence cycle and how it functioned. With his appointment as brigade major in the 4th Brigade, C.E., Pope was given an opportunity to combine the experiences of his two previous assignments. He had learned the intricacies of a field engineer officer with the 4th Field Company and he had absorbed the basics of being a brigade major when he was with Odlum's 11th Canadian Brigade. He grew into the job, building on his experience as a field engineer and then as a staff officer. He demonstrated that he was able to transform knowledge from his various positions into action.

Pope demonstrated some promising human skills during these formative years. He could motivate subordinates to get the job done, whether it was at the CPR, where he directed engineering projects, or as a field engineer with the CEF, with which he led a small section of sappers and supervised working parties. Even as a junior officer, he showed poise when working with people senior to him. For example, he worked effectively as a brigade major, interacting with battalion commanders, who were senior to him in rank.¹⁷⁷ He never commanded more than 100 men. That said, he often felt that he had commanded his own brigade in 1918, so important and so broad were his responsibilities as a brigade major.¹⁷⁸ Since he had no formal staff training, his accomplishments as a staff officer was all that more impressive. Pope's relationship with Hughes was similar to that which he had developed with Odlum.¹⁷⁹ He was fully dedicated to his commanders and he had the right combination of skills to support each of them. In return, Pope earned the trust of his commanders. Pope still had a lot to learn as a staff officer, but he had already made great strides.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, 3 November .

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 8 November.

¹⁷⁷ Radley, *Get Tough, Stay Tough*, 58.

¹⁷⁸ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians* , 49.

¹⁷⁹ Pope had in fact befriended Hughes and Odlum by the end of the war. See J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 208.

CHAPTER 4

DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING NEW SKILLS IN PEACETIME: 1919-1931

Pope came out of the First World War with a broad set of technical skills and strong human skills. He drew on those skills in his first few assignments as a peace-time soldier. The assignments included serving as the military district engineer in Quebec City and a posting to Europe with the Canadian Battlefields Memorials Commission. While he was in Europe, he married a Belgian woman, whom he had met at the end of the First World War. After he returned to Canada, Pope spent only a few months in Toronto before hearing that he had been selected to go to Kingston to take the preparatory course for the British Army Staff College and to write the admission exams. He emerged from the staff college with enhanced expertise as a staff officer. What he learned at staff college prepared him to assume new leadership roles, especially training Canada's Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM). Throughout the 1920s, he displayed an aptitude for learning and an ability to teach others. His strong human skills served him well, whether it was inspiring Canada's part-time militia, establishing new long term relationships with his Canadian and British peers at staff college, or relating to his superiors and earning their trust. Finally, he took to writing and he began to reveal strong conceptual skills, as they were defined in the introduction to this work.

Working with the Battlefields Commission

On his return to Canada in the fall of 1919, Pope made his way to Military District 5 in Quebec City.¹ There, his responsibilities included commanding a small detachment of thirty non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and men, maintaining military properties in the district, and participating on some courts of enquiry. He did not find maintenance work very exhilarating and he certainly had no intention of remaining there for the rest of his career, but he understood that he had to broaden his military knowledge if he wanted to get ahead.² Pope's reading helped. He read Marshal Ferdinand Foch's *Principles of War*, a number of texts on the Napoleonic wars, and various other books from the military library he had started to build. Pope thought his in-depth study of Napoleon would "stand [him] in good stead in the future." Although he appreciated that warfare had changed significantly since the days of Napoleon, Pope believed that some of the underlying military principles of that period endured and there was merit in learning them.³ In addition, Pope decided that he needed to brush up on his English writing skills. And he got his father to give him a book on English synonyms and he worked at perfecting his English prose. While Pope found it hard work at times, he was confident it would pay off in the long run.⁴ Pope demonstrated a genuine interest in self-improvement.

He soon found himself working in Belgium, for both personal and professional reasons. He had proposed to his future wife by letter in August 1919.⁵ When she accepted, Pope had to find a way to get to Belgium for the wedding. It was at this time that an opportunity came his way. Pope had remained friendly with General H.T. Hughes, the commander of 4th Brigade, C.E. Hughes had recently assumed the position of Chief Engineer in support of the Canadian Battlefields Memorial Commission, whose mandate was to arrange for the construction of commemorative monuments on land where Canadian troops had fought some of their major battles. Hughes asked Pope to serve on his staff.⁶ Pope had earned Hughes' trust during the war and was qualified for managing the kind of projects envisaged by the commission, given his previous experience as a project manager with Canadian Pacific Railways and as a military engineer during the First World War.

Pope later recalled that his work with the commission was "interesting and in no way exacting."⁷ It consisted primarily of purchasing the sites for the memorials and then hiring the firms to get the work done. Pope wrote that the process of acquiring the sites was tedious and that "he would give long odds against anyone being able to obtain the title deeds to a property in northern France or Belgium in less than six months."⁸ The acquisition was complicated in part

¹ Canada was divided into military districts pursuant to the Militia Act of 1868. The district structure went through various changes over the ensuing years. The structure existing in the 1920s dated from 1916. Each military district was initially under the command of a Deputy Adjutant General with the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the Canadian militia. In 1896, the Canadian government replaced the position of Deputy Adjutant General with District Officer Commanding (DOC). National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), 82/978, "Geographical Composition Commands and Areas in Canada," 15 December 1960.

² Maurice A. Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians: The Memoirs of Lt-Gen. Maurice A. Pope* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 49.

³ Pope Family Papers, Toronto, Ontario (hereafter PFP), Pope to wife, 14 August 1919; 27 January 1921.

⁴ Ibid, Pope to wife, 9 November 1919.

⁵ Joseph Pope (ed), *Maurice A. Pope, Letters from the Front, 1914-1919* (Toronto: Pope and Company, 1996), 145.

⁶ Hughes was appointed pursuant to an Order in Council dated 21 November 1919 (P.C. 2334), and Pope by an Order in Council dated 24 May 1920 (P.C. 1161). Library and Archives (LAC), RG 38, Vol. 419.

⁷ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 51.

⁸ See also LAC, RG 38, Vol. 419, Hughes to the Minister of Militia and Defence, 10 February 1921, Report on progress of work.

because boundaries had often been “completely obliterated by shell fire.”⁹ Once the land was acquired, Pope supervised the contractors as they levelled and graded the ground, then built the roads over which the materials for the memorials were transported. The same roads eventually served as access for visitors.¹⁰ Other than getting married and having a child, Pope did not write about very many highlights during his two years in Belgium. But one is worthy of mention. In November 1920, Pope and Hughes had been invited by the Australian High Commissioner to attend the unveiling of a memorial tablet at the cathedral in Amiens. Marshall Ferdinand Foch was there.¹¹ Pope could not say enough about his French hero. He was honoured to meet the “Generalissimo” in person and felt “gratified” to have “grasped the hand of such a great man.” Pope attributed “the rapid and successful termination of the war” to Foch’s “genius and power of command.” Pope was impressed with Foch’s “simplicity” and “his absolute lack of affectation or pose.” Foch gave the appearance “of having sprung from the very soil of France, and was just himself a rugged French countryman. But the cut of his jaw,[,] the flash in his eyes and the grip of his hand and his matter of fact confidence at all times made us realize full well that which we already knew that there have lived few men who could impose their will over his.”¹² He was the kind of leader that Pope admired and tried to emulate in how he related to others.

Pope goes to staff college

While in Belgium, Pope prepared for entrance to the staff college. He immersed himself in 19th century military doctrine, 20th century German strategy and tactics, French-English military terms, military memoirs, and essay-writing.¹³ He was recalled to Canada in late 1921.¹⁴ After spending a few short months in Toronto, he attended preparatory courses at Kingston, where he wrote the entrance examinations for staff college Camberley.¹⁵ As pointed out by one historian, for Pope and other Canadian officers of his rank, “the route to promotion and senior positions lay with further staff training” in Camberley.¹⁶ Pope met the basic qualifications for staff college: he had been a commissioned officer for at least five years and he was above the rank of captain. In addition, Major Pope was 34 years of age, just below the age limit of 35.¹⁷

Pope had to prepare for nine examinations, of which six were compulsory subjects and three others on electives. The compulsory topics, worth about 80 per cent of total marks, were purely military.¹⁸ The topics included training for war, which required knowledge of *Field Service Regulations (FSRs)* and various training manuals. There were also military history topics, which required good knowledge of the Napoleonic wars, the U.S. Civil War, and the First World War. The students were tested on their knowledge of the organization and administration of the British Army since 1868, the organization of the imperial forces, and military law. Finally, they had to demonstrate understanding of the British Empire. For electives, Pope chose French, engineering and political economy. Applicants were warned they would be penalized for illegible writing, bad spelling, marked irrelevancy, or poor style.¹⁹ Pope borrowed from his father an atlas and various reports on foreign affairs, including former Prime Minister Robert Borden’s report on the 1921 Washington Conference. Pope also queried his father on British naval strategy, Great Britain’s relationship with Russia, Britain’s Near Eastern policy, and the working of the cabinet system.²⁰

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid, “Proposed Program of Work for the Year 1921, Report to the Secretary,” Canadian Battlefields Commission, 21 April 1921.

¹¹ PFP. The papers contain the formal invitation.

¹² Maurice Arthur Pope Collection held by the Canadian War Museum (hereafter referred as CWM, Pope Collection), Folder 25, Pope to father, 7 November 1920.

¹³ PFP, Pope to wife, 27 April 27 1921; CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 28, Pope to father, 27 March 1922.

¹⁴ Pope had been called back to Canada because there was a pause between phase I of the project, which consisted of clearing the land, and the following phase, which was the actual construction of the monuments. CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 26, Pope to father, 15 April 1921.

¹⁵ Pope and his wife moved together to Kingston, but she soon moved to Ottawa to live with Pope’s parents when she was getting close to delivering their second child. Pope remained in Kingston to continue with his studies. He took a brief break after his wife delivered, but returned to Kingston shortly thereafter.

¹⁶ Paul Douglas Dickson, *A Thoroughly Canadian General, A Biography of General H.D.G Crerar* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 73.

¹⁷ By 1938, the age limit had dropped to 33 years old. F.W. Young, *The Story of the Staff College 1858-1958* (Camberley: Staff College, 1958), 4.

¹⁸ When the Staff College initially opened, there was a lot of emphasis on mathematics. A.R. Godwin-Austen, *The Staff and the Staff College* (London: Constable and Company, 1927), 129-131, 206.

¹⁹ Godwin-Austen, *The Staff and the Staff College*, 273.

²⁰ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 28, Pope to father, 21 August 1923, father to Pope, 10, 18 October 1923.

Pope recalled that he found the curriculum “a difficult course of study,” but one of “absorbing interest.”²¹ The syllabus on tactics and staff duties was “straightforward enough,” but learning British Army administration proved trickier. Pope understood that he had to grasp its idiosyncrasies if he stood any chance at success. He made friends with people who could assist him. Major Bill Landon of the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) was particularly helpful because he had once been attached to an English regiment and understood the complexities of the British Army. Pope spent a lot of time with Landon over the fall and winter of 1922-23, discussing the British Cardwell system, the pros and cons of the regimental system, the benefits and drawbacks of both conscript and volunteer armies, and the difference between peace and war establishments. Pope’s relationship with Landon was a two-way arrangement. Pope also helped Landon, who displayed palpable nervousness about the examinations.²² Landon was not in the end successful.

Pope and five other Canadian officers sat the exams in late-February and early-March 1923. Pope found the exams a test of endurance, having completed nine three-hour sessions in five days.²³ He finished first in his class to the delight of his family and military colleagues.²⁴ General H.F.H. Hertzberg, a fellow engineer, who had graduated from the staff college in 1922, said that it was only fitting that a “sapper” would finish at the top of his class.²⁵ In his congratulating letter, Colonel James Sutherland (“Buster”) Brown told Pope that he fully deserved the results on his examination “in light of his strenuous efforts.”²⁶ Even Landon, who had failed the exams, told Pope he had no doubt that he would do well in representing Canada.²⁷

Pope succeeded because he had worked hard and maintained a robust self-discipline.²⁸ He was also well organized. His approach followed implicitly the advice offered by British author A.R. Godwin-Austen, who wrote a history of the staff college. Although Austen acknowledged that it was “impossible to suggest a suitable programme for all,” he stressed the need to “prepare a settled scheme of work and adhere to it” as much as possible, and stated that “preparatory work should extend over a year.”²⁹ Pope considered that gaining entrance to the staff college a major achievement and a new phase in his life journey. He intended to make the most of it. Field-Marshal Sir Gerald W.R. Templer, British Chief of the Imperial General staff between 1955 and 1958, wrote that an officer should not go to Staff college simply to learn new “catchwords” and secure “initials” after his name, but rather “to learn to think – logically, hard and if possible with originality.”³⁰ In other words, the staff college would help Pope to develop his conceptual skills. On the eve of his departure, he wrote to his father: “I start off a new chapter of my life with perfect equanimity. I have no wild and extravagant hopes or expectations but I have formed the resolve to make the most of whatever opportunity has to offer.”³¹

He was in the company of the British Army’s biggest ‘thrusters’. Major-General Edmund Ironside was the commandant of the staff college. An artillery officer, Ironside had seen active service during the South African war and during the First World War. Pope had met Ironside during the Great War, when the latter served as general staff officer 1 (GSO 1) for the 4th Canadian Division. Pope thought Ironside was “a soldier in every sense of the word; one who does not mince matters in any way and who is both physically and in personality a big man.”³² Ironside’s directing staff included chief instructor J.F.C. Fuller, who was one of Great Britain’s early advocates of tank warfare, Alan F. Brooke, who became the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) during the Second World War, Bob Haining, who became British Vice Chief

²¹ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 28, Pope to father, 2 November 1922.

²² PFP, Pope to wife, February 21, 1923. Landon would be admitted the following year. John A. MacDonald, “In Search of Veritable: Training the Canadian Army Staff Officer, 1899-1945” (MA thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 1992), Appendix III.

²³ PFP, Pope to wife, 3 and 5 March 1923.

²⁴ Pope scored 6262. Crerar had managed 5426 and Vanier 6045. LAC, MG 30 E157, Papers of General H.D.G. Crerar (Crerar Papers), Vol. 22.

²⁵ PFP, family scrapbook, H.F.H. Hertzberg to Pope, 30 May 1923.

²⁶ Ibid, Brown to Pope, 28 May 1923. At the time, Brown was with the general staff in Ottawa and serving as director of the Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence. See also J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 209.

²⁷ PFP, family scrapbook, Bill Landon to Pope, ND.

²⁸ He may have wanted to show that he still could succeed even if he had not graduated from the Royal Military College. J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in the Second World War*, 209.

²⁹ Godwin-Austen, *The Staff and the Staff College*, 280.

³⁰ Young, *The Story of the Staff College*, Foreword.

³¹ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 29, Pope to father, 21 November 1923.

³² CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 30, Pope to father, 22 January 1924. Ironside was promoted to Chief of the Imperial General staff in 1939.

of the Imperial General Staff during the Second World War, and Ronald Adam, a British Corps Commander in 1940 and later on the Army's Adjutant General.³³

The curriculum was extensive. The first year staff college was called the junior division and the second the senior division.³⁴ The junior division focused on command and staff work up to divisional level, while the senior division examined issues at the corps level and above. Over the course of the two years, Pope examined, among other topics, military history and strategy, the organization and administration of the British Army of India, organization of the defence forces of the dominions and colonies, imperial strategy and defence, tactics, and staff duties in peace and war. The program consisted of lectures, conferences, outdoor exercises and the writing of many précis and essays. There was considerable focus on the lessons of the First World War, not surprisingly since most if not all of the members of the directing staff had experienced warfare during the Great War and so had many of the students. Pope and his fellow classmates were told that the British did not have sufficient "driving spirit" at the beginning of the war; that "the power of the German defence had made the allied attack ineffectual and unduly costly"; and that the "revolutionary" introduction of the tank had reinstated mobility to the battlefield. There was much discussion about the role of cavalry and tanks. Pope observed that the lecturers had to be at their best because staff college students were "more than hard boiled." Pope had high praise for Colonel J.F.C Fuller, later recalling how much he had been impressed by his presentations and the very entertaining sessions, during which he "forcefully preached" the benefits of armour. Pope was less impressed with the presentation skills of Edmond Ironside.³⁵

Like the rest of the students, Pope was expected to lead some of the lectures. He made sure that he was well prepared because he fully expected his audience to be "extremely critical." He explained that the presenter had to "keep steadfastly to the subject; that "flowers of speech" were forbidden; and that the structure and subject matter had to be "framed and selected with skill in order to satisfy these very 'dificile [sic]' fellows."³⁶ He wrote about one major presentation that he gave to his classmates in November 1924. He took some risks and showed initiative by changing the structure of his presentation, relative to those that had preceded his, and offering a "bird's eye view" of Canada.³⁷ He was hoping to break away from the repetition of previous presentations and infuse some energy into the class. He began by providing an overview of the country's military forces and Canada's challenging geography. He discussed Confederation and introduced the sources of Canada's east-west discord. He spent some time discussing the place of French-Canadians in Quebec and situating Canada in the British Empire. (He was further framing his views on these subjects, which consumed him in future years.) In his presentation, Pope spoke of the political importance of Quebec in Canadian politics and the "intense love" of French Canadians in Quebec for their native land in Quebec and their desire to retain "their faith, language and customs." On the issue of Canada's relationship with the British Empire, Pope highlighted the fact that imperial defence was of little interest to Canada but that there was no desire to "weaken the British connection." He explained that the First World War had led to demands, by Canada and the other dominions, for "some voice in shaping Imperial policy," which he thought incorrectly had been conceded at the 1919 Peace Conference. He concluded by stressing that dominions that pursued nationhood "should not seek to avoid attendant responsibility."³⁸ Colonel John Patrick Villiers-Stuart, a member of the directing staff, commended Pope for his presentation.³⁹ Pope had demonstrated that he was well read on Canadian history. In addition, he possessed strong oral talents, an important human skill in effective leadership.

When Pope was not indoors in the lecture rooms, he was outdoors, either participating in exercises and tactical schemes, or in sports activities. The schemes often consumed about fifty percent of daytime activities. The students travelled to designated areas by bicycle or by motor vehicle and the mess sent out lunch. Pope recalled that the directing staff was thorough in their criticism of the exercises. This reflected presumably what one historian has called the directing staff's "extreme attention to detail."⁴⁰ Sports were also a compulsory part of the program. For example, all officers had to participate in the drag hunt that was held two afternoons a week.⁴¹ For Pope, who loved to ride on horseback, it was not too much of an imposition.

³³ After 1906, the teaching staff came to be known as Directing Staff. Young, *The Story of the Staff College*, 3.

³⁴ The following is based on the Staff College booklet called *Staff College Regulations*; LAC, Crerar papers, Vol. 22, Staff College Regulations, 1922, 11-13.

³⁵ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 58.

³⁶ PFP, Pope to wife, November 2, 1924; family scrapbook, Toronto: Canada, *Junior Division 1924 Students Lecture Canada*.

³⁷ PFP, Family scrapbook, Toronto: Canada, *Junior Division 1924 Students Lecture Canada*; Pope to wife, November 9, 1924.

³⁸ PFP, family scrapbook, Toronto: Canada, *Junior Division 1924 Students Lecture Canada*.

³⁹ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 31, Pope to father, 9 November 1924.

⁴⁰ Godwin-Austen, *The Staff and the Staff College*, 288.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, 292; Young, *The Story of the Staff College*, 42; CWM, Pope Collection, Pope to father, 24 February 1925.

Pope normally returned home from staff college in late afternoons, after which he read the newspapers and spent some time with his children. When he was at home and not at the officers' mess, he often worked until midnight. He also worked on Saturday mornings, after which he tried to shut down until Monday mornings. Even after putting in the extra hours in the evenings and on Saturday mornings, he found it difficult to complete his many assignments to his satisfaction.⁴² He still found it all very interesting though. As Pope remarked in a letter to his parents, the work "was most instructive, is interesting and after all we came here to work."⁴³ Whenever he could, Pope tried to capitalize on the fact that he was among men with very broad experience. Writing years later, he recalled how he tried to dine at the mess three times a week and sought out fellow staff college students, with whom he engaged in discussions about military issues.⁴⁴

Pope and the other staff college students travelled extensively around Great Britain and in Europe as part of the study program. In the first year, Pope and his fellow students spent a week assimilating the intricacies of mountain warfare in North Wales and honing their skills for developing operational orders.⁴⁵ In the second year, the staff college organized a tour of the main battle sites of the First World War on the Western Front.⁴⁶ Students also spent a few days in Portsmouth in July 1925, during which time Pope observed new techniques for building bridges, was submerged in a submarine, and witnessed an exercise with an aircraft carrier.⁴⁷ In mid-September 1925, the students travelled to Old Sarum airfield in the Salisbury Plain, where Pope got his first taste of flying. He was not particularly fond of "being up there." At one point, he was in the air for about three hours, while the Royal Air Force and the British Army conducted a combined military exercise. Pope could see the benefits of providing reconnaissance from the air, but he was very mindful that conducting reconnaissance was likely to be much more challenging if the aircraft were under fire.⁴⁸ Pope also had opportunity to witness some division-level manoeuvres conducted by the British Army's Aldershot Command. He revealed in his letters home a high regard for the British soldier and regimental officers. He was less complimentary about the higher command, although he did not go into specifics.⁴⁹

Most officers who went to staff college made some lasting friendships. As one author had noted, the staff college was "the place where regular officers of a generation, likely to rise in their profession, meet each other and form those friendships which come from being under simultaneous and demanding intellectual pressure, from sharing an experience."⁵⁰ Pope was very successful in that respect, a sign of his strong human skills. Since the staff college was divided into two divisions and each division had sixty students, Pope met a total of 180 officers during his Staff college years. Of the Canadians, E.W. Sansom and M.H.S. Penhale were part of Pope's junior division. Sansom and Pope became close friends. They worked together in the late 1920s when Sansom was with the Directorate of Military Training and Pope was in Military District 5. When Pope arrived in Camberley, J.K. Lawson, Georges P. Vanier, and H.D.G. Crerar were in the senior division. Pope spent much time with all three in his first year, but especially with Crerar. Pope and Crerar played tennis. They had each other over for dinner, their wives had tea, and the children played together.⁵¹ The staff college provided a forum where more senior officers could take a measure of younger officers. Crerar was given many opportunities to do that with respect to Pope in 1924. For Pope, it was the beginning of a long and beneficial relationship.⁵²

Pope established good relations with a number of British Army students, in particular Richard Henry Dewing, Gordon McCready, Archie Nye, and Vyvyan Pope (no relation).⁵³ Pope crossed paths many times with these men after

⁴² CWM, Pope Collection, Pope to father, 24 February 1925.

⁴³ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 30, Pope to mother, 16 March 1924; Folder 31, Pope to father, 6 July 1924.

⁴⁴ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 63.

⁴⁵ Pope described in great detail in letters to his wife the challenges of climbing the mountains in North Wales, sometimes in torrential rains, and how good he felt after pushing himself to travel 5 kilometres in 45 minutes. PFP, Pope to wife, 3 June 1924.

⁴⁶ Pope found this particular tour very informative because the students "approached the subject from the point of view of how could it be done with the aids of today, i.e. mechanical transport, tanks, etc." PFP, Pope to wife, May 25, 1924.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 8 July 1925.

⁴⁸ For Pope's experience, see PFP, Pope to wife, 14-15-16 September 1925.

⁴⁹ PFP, Pope to wife, 23 September 1925.

⁵⁰ David Fraser, *Alanbrooke* (London: Harper Collins, 1982), 56.

⁵¹ PFP, 1 July 1924.

⁵² John A. MacDonald, "In Search of Veritable: Training the Canadian Army Staff Officer, 1899-1945" (MA Thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 1992). Appendix III.

⁵³ Dewing, McCready, Nye, and Pope would all assume important positions in the British Army during the Second World War. Dewing was the director of Military Operations at the War Office at the beginning of the war, and he assumed various other staff functions, including deputy to John Dill, British Joint Services Mission in Washington in 1942. Macready was the head of the British Army Mission in Washington from 1942-1946. Nye served as Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff from late 1941 to the end of the war.

Camberley and the relationships he developed with them proved to be of great benefit. For example, he worked with Dewing when the British officer was on loan to the Royal Military College between 1927-1929 and Pope was training Canada's part-time militia. MacCready became one of Pope's main interlocutors when the two worked in Washington during the Second World War.⁵⁴

Pope's friendship with Nye and Vyvyan Pope was solidified when the three went on their foreign tour in Europe together. The two men had proposed to Pope that they form a syndicate for the purpose of completing their foreign tour. The foreign tour during the senior division was a standard fare for staff college students. They were expected to study some overseas campaign or battle and more generally analyse the continent's economic and physical features. They could travel anywhere in Europe, except Soviet Russia and Constantinople. Pope wanted to travel into Central and Eastern Europe and see "that part of Europe which is drained not towards the Atlantic but towards the South and East."⁵⁵ Pope's syndicate presented their proposed journey to the commandant for approval. Once that was done, they were given sufficient funds to travel about ten days, which covered the students' transportation expenses plus a per diem.⁵⁶ Pope and his companions started their tour in Antwerp, travelled through a number of Central European countries, and ended up in Budapest. Pope found the experience very rewarding, but very demanding, with long days on the road.⁵⁷ Pope turned to his staff college friends when he arrived at the War Office in London on officer exchange in 1931 and they regularly went out socially. Nye and Vyvyan Pope were also regular contacts for Pope when he was working at Canadian Military Headquarters in London in 1940-41.⁵⁸

Of the directing staff, the Pope family spent considerable time with the Villiers-Stuart family. Colonel Villiers-Stuart belonged to the Indian Army. He had been serving as the senior directing staff officer at Staff College, Camberley since the beginning of 1921. Pope must have thought that it could not hurt to get to know a person with such stature at staff college. Villiers-Stuart possessed skills and characteristics to which Pope hoped to emulate. Pope thought Villiers-Stuart "a man of rare ability possessed of a wide knowledge of military matters and of singular devotion to duty."⁵⁹ Villiers-Stuart thought highly of Pope as well. In his farewell letter to Pope, he wrote that "one meets very few people like you in the world, and when you do they make it a good place."⁶⁰

Pope's impressions of Camberley were generally positive. A few weeks into the course, he wrote that he was enjoying his experience "comprehensively."⁶¹ He thought the lectures "well prepared and delivered."⁶² A few months later, he wrote that he had just completed his best day yet while developing an attack scheme on the ground.⁶³ His positive views endured well into the second year of the course. In May 1925, he wrote about not looking forward to waking from this "very pleasant dream" when he would be forced to return to Canada.⁶⁴ The staff college assessment deemed Pope "fit" to work in any staff branch, and "well fitted for Command or Staff." He was judged to be "a hard and keen worker." The report singled out Pope's "pleasing open personality" and the fact that he was "very popular."⁶⁵ Pope had demonstrated in the First World War that he had a ferocious work ethic. That aspect of his character was reaffirmed at Camberley, as was his collegiality.

Vyvyan Pope was a major proponent of the use of armour during the interwar period and he assumed various command positions, before being killed in a September 1941 plane crash.

⁵⁴ Lt. General Sir Gordon Macready, *In the Wake of the Great* (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1965), 68-69.

⁵⁵ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 30, Pope to father, 30 March 1924.

⁵⁶ Godwin-Austen, *The Staff and the Staff College*, 290.

⁵⁷ Maurice and Vyvyan Pope had also taken a shorter trip in Europe in March 1925 during the Staff College spring break. See also Ronald Lewin, *Man of Armour: A Study of Lieut. General Vyvyan Pope C.B.E. D.S.O.M.C. and the Development of Armoured Warfare* (London: Leo Cooper, 1976), 64.

⁵⁸ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 55.

⁵⁹ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 30, Pope to father, 30 March 1924. Pope was present when Villiers-Stuart received the Commander of the Bath decoration. PFP, Pope to wife, 4 June 1924.

⁶⁰ PFP, family scrapbook, letter from Villiers-Stuart to Maurice Pope, 1 January 1926.

⁶¹ Some historians have argued that the quality of the Directing Staff was uneven over the years. See for example Jeffrey Grey, *Australian Brass: The Career of Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 55; Dickson, *A Thoroughly Canadian General*, 74. If Pope had negative views, he never wrote them down.

⁶² CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 30, Pope to father, 17 February 1924.

⁶³ PFP, Pope to father, 1 July 1924.

⁶⁴ PFP, Pope to father, 24 May 1925.

⁶⁵ PFP, family scrapbook, Toronto: Canada.

Transitioning from a student of warfare to teacher

During the first half of the 1920s, the fortunes of Canada's military waxed and waned, but mostly the latter.⁶⁶ At the end of the First World War, there had initially been some encouraging signs that the government would support a strong military in peacetime. The permanent force enjoyed an immediate, albeit small, increase in size by taking in two new infantry regiments as well as some supporting arms and ancillary services.⁶⁷ The minister of militia and defence supported the recommendations of the Otter Report, which included a "blueprint" for a permanent force of 30,000, a substantial part-time militia of 300,000 -- and conscription.⁶⁸ The military was also relatively well equipped because the British had agreed to donate enough surplus gear for five divisions.⁶⁹

The militia's confidence in its future was short lived, however. As noted by J.L. Granatstein, "the simple truth was that almost no one outside the department of Militia and Defence wanted peacetime conscription."⁷⁰ Many of the men who had served in the First World War were "anxious" to forget the conflict's "horrors and hardships." There were even those who put their trust in the League of Nations, the creation of which made "defence forces unnecessary."⁷¹ Moreover, the Canadian public did not see any need for a large military because Canada faced no imminent threat. As a result, "retrenchment and economy became the order of the day."⁷² The situation did not get any better for the militia when William Lyon Mackenzie King came to power in late 1921. The new prime minister was concerned about the government's finances.⁷³ King intended to rectify the situation by reducing expenditures and he thought the militia should assume a large part of the burden. With that in mind, after the King government created a new department of National Defence that amalgamated the department of Militia and Defence, the department of Naval Service, and the Air Board, it cut defence spending. The cuts to the Royal Canadian Navy were the most significant at the time, but the militia was slashed as well.⁷⁴ These budget reductions affected adversely the capacity of the permanent force to train the Non-Active Permanent Force (NAPM). The NAPM, for its part, was forced to reduce the number of training days and soldiers who could attend. These budget cuts forced the militia to make do, for most of the 1920s, with the equipment it received from the British after the First World War.⁷⁵ When Pope came back to Canada in early 1926, the King government had again cut the defence budget. In addition, King had introduced a cut in pay for the members of the permanent force, which led to a drop in its total strength.⁷⁶

⁶⁶ The following section is based on a number of works including: J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping Peace* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 157; Stephen J. Harris, "A Canadian Way of War: 1919 to 1939," in Colonel Bernd Horn (ed), *The Canadian Way of War Serving the National Interest* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006); George F.G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers The Military History of an Unmilitary People* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1974); John Herd Thompson, with Allen Seager, *Canada 1922-1939: Decades of Discord* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985); C.P. Stacey, *The Military Problems of Canada* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1940); Britton Wade MacDonald, "The Policy of Neglect: The Canadian Militia in the interwar years 1919-1939" (PhD diss., Temple University, 2009); Geoffrey W. Hayes, "The Development of the Canadian Army Officer Corps" (PhD diss., University of Western Ontario, 1992).

⁶⁷ The 22nd battalion – eventually renamed the Royal 22nd Regiment - and the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) joined the Royal Canadian Regiment as Canada's three permanent regiments. Granatstein, *Canada's Army*, 157.

⁶⁸ Harris, "A Canadian Way of War," 198-200.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 198. Harris points out that the equipment did not include tanks, trucks and heavy artillery.

⁷⁰ Granatstein, *Canada's Army*, 156.

⁷¹ Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, 340.

⁷² *Ibid*, 341.

⁷³ Robert Bothwell, *The Penguin History of Canada* (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2007), 313.

⁷⁴ Canada, "Report of the Department of National Defence for the Year Ending March 31, 1930 (Militia and Air Services), "Statement No. 3 – Comparative Statement of Expenditure and Revenue (Militia and Air services) for the ten years 1920-21 and 1929-30," 88-89. Total spending by the government of Canada dropped from \$441.2M to \$371.8M between 1922 and 1923. Thompson with Seager, *Canada 1922-1939 Decades of Discord*, 338, Table II; Stacey, *The Military Problems of Canada*, 88.

⁷⁵ The Royal Canadian Engineers, to whom Pope belonged, were in no better condition. The official history of the Royal Canadian Engineers observes that there were seldom sufficient officers and NCOs to complete what needed to be done. In addition, the Canadian Corps of Engineers did not have sufficient personnel to train the NPAM engineer units and it did not have the proper field and training equipment. Colonel A.J. Kerry and Major W.A. McDill, *The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers, Volume 1* (Toronto: Thorn Press, 1962), 292, 295.

⁷⁶ Canada, "Report of the Department of National Defence for the Year Ending March 31, 1924 (Militia and Air Services), 54, 74; Canada, "Report of the Department of National Defence for the Year Ending March 31, 1925 (Militia and Air Services), 55, 56. See Hayes, "The Development of the Canadian Army Officer Corps," 23. King had continued to cut defence spending even as total government spending started to increase slightly in 1925. Herd Thompson with Allen Seager, *Canada 1922-1939*, 338, Table II.

Pope had been forewarned by his father as far back as 1921 that hard times were looming for the militia. Joseph Pope had heard through his contacts that the next government – whether it was Liberal or Conservative – was likely not to be favourable towards the Canadian military and that advancement would probably be limited. He suggested to his son that he might wish to explore a return to Canadian Pacific Railways (CPR). Pope shot back that he had given some consideration to return to CPR, but he had decided to remain where he was. He explained that the army was “a very honourable” and “agreeable” profession and that he found “the study of the military art...most absorbing.” He concluded by telling his father: “I hope you will not think me a dreamer when I say that something tells me that some day I shall be very glad that I did not quit the army.”⁷⁷ Pope was willing to be patient and wait for his opportunities.

Pope's first posting upon returning to Canada was to Esquimalt, British Columbia, the headquarters of Military District 11 (MD 11). The district was responsible for all military activities in British Columbia and Yukon. Although the size of a district headquarters varied from one city to the other, the number of staff was relatively small. It was normally commanded by a District Officer Commanding (DOC), who was assisted by a garrison staff officer (Major Pope in this case),⁷⁸ a paymaster, a cadet officer, an administration officer, and sometimes a musketry officer.⁷⁹ When Pope arrived in Esquimalt, Brigadier General J.M. Ross was the DOC. They had met when Pope was brigade major with the 4th Brigade, C.E., and Ross was commander of the 10th Infantry Brigade of the 4th Division. The two men had developed a very good working relationship during the First World War.

At the time Pope assumed his new functions in Esquimalt, the role of Canada's permanent force was threefold: to provide garrisons for the Esquimalt and Halifax fortresses; to instruct the NPAM; and to provide aid to the civil power. During his two year stay in Esquimalt, Pope contributed to the first two roles. With respect to the first, Pope was responsible for providing general maintenance of the military facilities, and for tasks related to the coastal battery positions of the West Coast. The batteries were intended to provide protection to Esquimalt, Victoria and Vancouver, and the inland water passage between Vancouver Island and the mainland.⁸⁰ When Pope was in Esquimalt, he participated in an exercise to explore options for replacing the existing antiquated batteries, which he recalled had insufficient range and that “any up-to-date cruiser could have taken them on with impunity.”⁸¹

Pope's second task, and his most time-consuming one, lay in the training of Canadian part-time soldiers, or the NPAM. The impact of the funding squeeze was harsh: there was little money for training; equipment was quickly becoming obsolete; and recruitment and retention was a problem for the enlisted ranks.⁸² There were many stories of NPAM officers and soldiers donating their training pay to the regimental fund in order to keep the regiment alive. Despite these conditions, Pope recalled that he had found the NPAM “filled with enthusiasm.”⁸³ He attributed that to a combination of factors. Some members were convinced that they “were discharging a public duty.” Others approached it as an enjoyable “hobby.” This last group may have been captured “by the display of uniform, the satisfaction derived from public parades and the enhanced position in the community to which they may arise through their association with the Militia.”⁸⁴ Some Canadian historians have highlighted the poor state of the relationship between the permanent force and the NPAM, but Pope did not remember it that way in his autobiography. He thought relations between the permanent force and the part-time soldiers were good. He acknowledged that some of the instructors from the permanent force were not very effective, but he thought the members of the NPAM officers had taken the situation in stride. As long as the instructors were honest and earnest, the NPAM “willingly gave of their best.”⁸⁵ There is probably some validity in Pope's point of view that the NPAM were more content because he began to train its members when Canada's defence establishment entered a period that was somewhat more promising. This was when King appointed J.L. Ralston as Minister of National Defence. The latter was instrumental in

⁷⁷ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 26, Pope to father, 16 May 1921.

⁷⁸ The rank could vary. Pope was a General Staff Officer (GSO) III.

⁷⁹ Reginald H. Roy, *For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Major-General George R. Pearkes, V.C. Through Two World Wars* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977), 84.

⁸⁰ Roy, *For Most Conspicuous Bravery*, 99.

⁸¹ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 65. The government would not deploy new equipment for another decade. See also Roger Sarty, “Silent Sentry: a Military and Political History of Canadian Coast Defence” (PhD. diss., University of Toronto, 1983), 392.

⁸² Prime Minister King had indicated that there was no need to train the soldiers because “there were already enough veteran troops to meet Canada's security needs.” MacDonald, “The Policy of Neglect,” 101. The Quartermaster General had reported back in 1923 that the equipment Canada had received from Great Britain after the war was not “modern enough for a major war.” Harris, “A Canadian Way of War,” 202.

⁸³ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 64.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 86-87.

⁸⁵ Granatstein, *Canada's Army*, 19; Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 64.

enhancing the finances of his department. Between 1926-27 and 1928-29, the militia budget increased by 20%, of which one-third went to the NAPM. The permanent force had more money to train and the NPAM had more money for training days.⁸⁶

Pope was involved in unit training of the NAPM and in the qualification of its officers and NCOs.⁸⁷ Unit training took place either at provisional or Royal (also called permanent) Schools of Instruction. The provisional schools were normally held at convenient locations, such as the headquarters of a district or militia unit, and classes were usually held at night.⁸⁸ A select number of the NAPM travelled to the Royal Schools, which were normally located in the barracks of the permanent force for more concentrated instruction. The courses could be anywhere from three-to-six weeks, depending on the number of students in the class and the availability of instructors.⁸⁹ The examination and standards were the same for both provisional and royal schools. The syllabus included strategy, map reading, military law, signalling instruction, foot and arms drill, weapon training, and minor tactics. At the end of the course, the students wrote an examination and if they were successful, they were promoted.⁹⁰

Pope also worked on the Militia Staff Course (MSC), which was the most advanced course of instruction for NPAM officers in Canada. The course began in 1909 and produced its first graduates in 1910. It resumed after the war and became a popular course for NPAM officers. It was divided into two parts: a theoretical section and a practical section. The theoretical portion was comprised of lectures, exercises and various other activities, and it was held during the fall and winter. The Royal Military College (RMC) developed the syllabus and the examinations. The candidates were issued certain texts, including a *Manual of Military Law*, the *Field Service Pocketbook*, and the *Manual of Field Works*. The candidates sat for one set of examinations covering strategy and map reading in the third week of December and another set covering military law and training for war towards the end of April. The candidates were tested on several fields, including: (1) strategy, which encompassed plans of campaign, and the concepts of strategic concentration, interior and exterior lines of operations; (2) map reading and field sketching; (3) general organization and employment of combatant arms; (4) tactics; (5) staff duties.⁹¹ RMC was responsible for marking the papers. As one contemporary NPAM officer observed, the material in the MSC was relatively easy for some to digest, especially for those who had kept abreast of military developments and were familiar with the text books, but much more difficult for others.⁹²

Pope lectured the part-time militia of Military District 11 in Victoria, Vancouver, and Vernon. He travelled to Vancouver once a week and he made his way to Vernon every third weekend, where he lectured on Saturdays and Sundays.⁹³ He found the schedule gruelling at times, but he derived a lot of satisfaction from teaching the aspiring NAPM officers. There were substantial parallels between the technical skills he had learned in staff college and those he was trying to impart to NAPM staff officers.⁹⁴ Pope relied on his human skills to hold the attention of the students. Pope worked tirelessly at getting better, a testament of his dedication to his profession. He was particularly happy when his students were attentive and engaged.⁹⁵

⁸⁶ MacDonald, "The Policy of Neglect," 129. The largest beneficiary would be the navy. Roger Sarty, "Silent Sentry: a Military and Political History of Canadian Coast Defence," 400.

⁸⁷ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 64.

⁸⁸ In some cases, the aspiring officers took the course by correspondence. Lieutenant-Colonel A.C. Garner, "Impressions of the Militia Staff Course Western Canada, 1928-29," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, July 25, 1929, 330.

⁸⁹ During the 1920s, there was a shortfall of instructors to teach at the schools because of the other demands on the small staff qualified to teach. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, 342.

⁹⁰ R.H. Roy, *Ready for the Fray. The History of the Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's): 1920 to 2002* (Calgary, Canada: Bunker to Bunker Publishing, 2002), 11; D.J. Godspeed, *Battle Royal A History of the Royal Regiment of Canada, Second Edition* (Canada: Royal Regiment of Canada Association, 1979), 319; Roy, *For Most Conspicuous Bravery*, 93.

⁹¹ The syllabus for the MSC course broke down staff duties along familiar lines: "G," "A," and "Q". "G" included operation orders and instructions, reports and messages, appreciations, intelligence, and reconnaissance. "A" covered organization of the Canadian militia, organization of a field army, medical arrangements, manpower, military law and aid to the civil power, mobilization. "Q" dealt with supplies, ammunition, stores, quarters, and movements. LAC, RG 24 Vol. 1928, Militia Orders 1926-1928, Militia Orders No. 316, 1926.

⁹² Garner, "Impressions of the Militia Staff Course Western Canada," 376.

⁹³ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 65-66. I drew some of the information concerning his itinerary and his activities outside of Victoria from his Memoirs, but a greater portion of it was garnered from the many letters he wrote to his wife while he was lecturing off the island.

⁹⁴ PFP, Pope to wife, July 30, 2 August 1926.

⁹⁵ Ibid, Pope to wife, 27 February 1927.

The students from Military District 11 who passed the theoretical portion of the MSC qualified to join aspiring NPAM officers from Military Districts 10, 12 and 13 for the practical portion of the MSC in Sarcee Camp, Alberta.⁹⁶ The practical course was twelve days long and was traditionally held during the last week of July and the first week of August. The students in the practical portion had to hold the rank of captain in their respective units, and officers of dismounted units also required a certificate of proficiency in riding. While he was stationed in Esquimalt, Pope attended the MSC camps in 1926 and 1927 in Sarcee. Nine officers from Pope's MD 11 sessions qualified for the practical portion in 1926 and another eleven in 1927.

The practical course was run by an examining board comprised of a president - traditionally the DOC from the hosting military district - and nine or ten other members. Each arm was represented on the examining board. Pope was a member of the board in Sarcee in 1926 and 1927. He saw some familiar faces at the camps, such as Colonel H.F.H. Hertzberg, who had recently been posted to RMC. RMC sent out one of its instructors to attend the camps and sit on the Board. From his days at staff college, there was Major R.H. Dewing of the British Army. It was customary for the British Army to have a representative on the examination board and Dewing filled the position in the 1927 camp.⁹⁷ Pope was very pleased to work with Hertzberg and Dewing.⁹⁸

Pope arrived 2-3 days ahead of the students to finalize the outdoor schemes and meet with the other members of the directing staff of the examination board.⁹⁹ When the students turned up, Pope already had a full program and there were no days off. The students were divided into syndicates of five people for playing out the schemes. Each syndicate was supervised by a member of the directing staff. Pope spent a lot of time refining his schemes. He was very meticulous about it, making sure they were laid out logically so that the students would understand them. Once again, he had to use the full range of the technical knowledge he had accumulated in staff college and earlier. The schemes covered all facets of the tactical battle – offense, defence, advance, attack, consolidation, and withdrawal. Once the students started to play out the schemes, Pope observed how the students came up with solutions. At the end of each scheme, Pope and the other directing staff met with the students to discuss the results.¹⁰⁰ And when the camp was done, Pope and the other directing staff sat down to discuss various issues, including the appropriate size of the syndicates, the contents of the theoretical portion of the MSC, and the system of marking, among others. The president of the examination board then submitted his report to the director of Military Training in Ottawa. If candidates succeeded in the practical portion of the program, they could affix an 'M.S.C.' to their names, modeled on the 'P.S.C.' for those officers had "passed staff college." They were issued a certificate that qualified them to hold a staff appointment in the part-time militia up and to including the rank of brigade major.

Pope's next stop was Quebec City. He was involved, once again, in the training of the NAPM. The units included, among others, Les Voltigeurs de Québec, Le Régiment de Montmagny, Le Régiment de Québec, and Le Régiment de Beauce.¹⁰¹ In 1928, the practical portion of the MSC was held in Lennoxville. The arrangements and syllabus were largely the same as those in the Sarcee camp. There were again some familiar faces, including Hertzberg and Crerar. Pope also attended major camps organized for the permanent force in Petawawa in 1928 and again in 1929. These camps had been made possible because of the extra funding defence minister Ralston had secured for the militia.¹⁰² The 1929 camp opened

⁹⁶ The camps were normally only for the NPAM. It was unusual for a regiment of the regular forces and men of the NAPM to work together at these camps. The MSC Examination Board had proposed at various times in the past the idea of having the permanent force on the ground during the Militia Staff Course. However, military staff in Ottawa did not think it was practical in most cases to do so and it was not worth the expense of transporting units of the permanent force to Sarcee strictly for that purpose. LAC, RG24 Volume 6506, McNaughton to the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), September 24, 1928, *Militia Staff Course*.

⁹⁷ LAC RG 24 Volume 1928, Militia Orders for 1926-27, 1927-28, 1928-29, Militia Orders 316-327 for 1926-27, Militia Orders 359-360 for 1927-28; Volume 29, 1929-1930; Militia Orders 281-288.

⁹⁸ PFP, Pope to wife, Canada, 29 July 1927.

⁹⁹ The reports prepared by the Examination Boards raised the issue of arrival of the Directing Staff. The reports recommended that the DS arrive earlier but Headquarters in Ottawa rejected the proposal, on the grounds that the staff should be pulled away from their districts for as little time as necessary. LAC, RG24 Volume 6506, HQS313-33-18, Colonel T.V. Anderson to CGS, "Militia Staff Course," 24 September 1928.

¹⁰⁰ Garner, "Impressions of the Militia Staff Course Western Canada, 1928-29," 381.

¹⁰¹ LAC RG 24 Volume 1928, Militia Orders for 1928-29, 1929-30; National Defence Headquarters, Directorate of History and Heritage, (DHH), Report No. 64, "The Reorganization of the Canadian Militia," 1936.

¹⁰² Canada, "Report of the Department of National Defence for the Year Ending March 31, 1930 (Militia and Air Services), "Statement No. 3 – Comparative Statement of Expenditure and Revenue (Militia and Air services) for the ten years 1920-21 and 1929-30," 88-89; see also Stephen J. Harris, *Canadian Brass: The making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 197.

up with a presentation by the CGS, Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton.¹⁰³ Pope and Sansom played key roles in organizing the 1929 camp. They worked together on developing the training syllabus that included various schemes, map reading, and conferences, and they led the candidates in the camp's various activities. Pope reported that Colonel W.H.P. Elkins, who was the commander at Petawawa, appreciated the effort that he and Sansom put into the camp activities. The Royal Canadian Regiment's monthly bulletin commended the two for their effort: it was "doubtful if any two officers could have been chosen who combine more successfully knowledge of their profession, the ability to impart that knowledge in a manner which impresses and lingers in the memory, with that friendliness and comradeship toward brother officers which springs from the heart and is natural, spontaneous and unassumed."¹⁰⁴

By the late 1920s, Pope was demonstrating increasing maturity and poise, even when people tried to trip him up. At the Petawawa camp in 1929, he was criticized from all sides about a hypothetical draft operational order that he had developed. He did not give an inch and he thought "his stock went up" when he prevailed. On another occasion, he had to stand his ground when challenged by members of the Royal Canadian Regiment about a staff issue. He did not panic, knowing full well that he had been engaged in staff work for much longer than his audience. At the same camp, Pope was confident enough to correct Elkins on a question of organization in the artillery and he got the upper hand in a discussion with members of the Royale 22ième Régiment on an issue concerning the organization of an infantry platoon. Pope was gratified that an engineer could win the day on those issues. In another instance, the director of Military Training, Lieutenant-Colonel H.E. Boak, challenged Pope when he was trying to explain an exercise to a group of "fairly senior officers." Pope guessed that Boak was trying to play the role of "Bullyragging General." He provided Boak with sharp answers to his queries. After a few minutes, Boak eased off and eventually complimented him for his work. Sansom, who witnessed the exchange, told Pope he had shown a lot of character.¹⁰⁵ He had been quite unflappable.

Pope was beginning to show that he possessed the courage of his convictions to stand up to his superiors and disarm them at the same time. Pope always seemed to speak with respect. He knew what to say and how to say it. Pope was never loud or boorish, but he was honest. He was developing the right balance between diplomacy and assertiveness. And the targets of his interventions appeared not to take them personally. For example, Pope could correct Elkins one day and the next day they were out fishing together.¹⁰⁶ Likewise, the exchange in Petawawa between Pope and Boak did not appear to have caused any bitterness between the two men. Pope spoke his mind, even though he knew that Boak reported to McNaughton in Ottawa.¹⁰⁷

Pope saw his time at the camps, whether in Sarcee, Lennoxville or Petawawa, as a great learning experiences and opportunities to prove himself. He spent time on his schemes to make sure they were as realistic as possible. He was anxious that things went well, partly because he took pride in his work, but also because he saw these camps as an opportunity to demonstrate his skills to senior headquarters staff such as Boak, Crerar, Hertzberg, Sansom and others. He was happy that his painstaking work had earned him high praise.¹⁰⁸

During his time in Esquimalt and Quebec City, Pope developed into an articulate, smooth and polished speaker. He perfected those skills not only through his lectures to the officers of the NPAM, but also at various public speaking events. For example, Pope was the guest speaker of an event hosted by the 16th Canadian Scottish Regiment in late 1927. In a speech on the evolution of warfare and the growing role of armour, he opened his presentation by stating that "as the armoured knight ruled on the battlefields for a thousand years, so the days of armor are again returning, but in the guise of the tank."¹⁰⁹ Pope explained the manner in which the defence had had the upper hand in the opening months of the First World War. While the artillery had tried to help the infantry advance over open, it had its shortcomings. Preliminary bombardments made surprise difficult and the shells destroyed the ground over which the infantry was intended to advance. But the tank, Pope argued, had reinstated tactical mobility and made more possible the element of surprise. Pope hinted in his presentation at the thinking of the British general staff on the structure of the armies of the future. He pointed out that

¹⁰³ LAC, MG30 E133 Vol. 347, "Address to officers of the Permanent Active Military, Petawawa, 26 July 1929."

¹⁰⁴ PFP, family scrapbook, "The Connecting File," Issued by the Royal Canadian Regiment, Vol. VIII, No. 3. This is not to say that Canada's permanent force had performed admirably during those camps. See Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 197-98.

¹⁰⁵ PFP, Pope to wife, 8-10-15-21 August 1929.

¹⁰⁶ PFP, Pope to wife, 18 August 1929.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 5, 16, 23 August 1930.

¹⁰⁸ PFP, Pope to wife, 4 August 1926 (comments from Hertzberg at Sarcee camp); 3-4 July 1928 (comments from Hertzberg at Lennoxville camp); 30 July 1929 (from Elkins, Commander at Petawawa); 11 August 1929 (from Sansom at Petawawa); see also other letters from Pope to wife, 5, 7-10, 16, 23 August 1927, 2 July 1928.

¹⁰⁹ His presentation was reported in two local newspapers on 21 December 1927: *The Daily Colonist*, Victoria B.C., and the *Victoria Times*. Copies of the articles are found in PFP family scrapbook.

Great Britain had ruled out huge armies of the kind that had deployed in the First World War, explaining that this made much sense since he could not envisage how “the human race could...again stand the frightful losses of the last war.” He added that the introduction of airplane, which was bound to become more effective over time, “would prevent the tremendous concentration of troops of the last war.” He concluded his presentation by revisiting the concept of armour. He suggested that the introduction of the internal combustion engine, which was likely to be further perfected in the years to come, would make the use of armour a very effective combat arm. This was a man who could speak clearly and think conceptually.

Pope had developed a good understanding of the evolution of warfare and of the growing role of armour. He showed that he had transitioned successfully from his days as a student of warfare to a thinker and teacher. Moreover, he had clearly grasped what Fuller was saying in his staff college lectures of 1924-1925. Pope loved horses, but he had accepted long before many others that the days of cavalry as an effective tool for mobile warfare were numbered. Pope was now a shrewd analyst of modern warfare. The *Victoria Times*, although hardly an expert source, called Pope’s presentation very “instructive.”¹¹⁰

Various people and organizations invited Pope to discuss military campaigns. The battle of Tannenberg of August 1914 appeared to be one of his favorites. In a 1927 presentation to a Vancouver audience, he argued that the Germans were able to stem the Russian attack, destroy one Russian army and roll back the remaining invading forces primarily because of the superior generalship of Hindenburg and Ludendorff.¹¹¹ He lectured on the same topic at the inaugural dinner of the “Military Institute of Quebec.”¹¹² In Quebec, Pope stated that the German victory in Tannenberg “helped to divert the attention of the German people” and sustain them when the advance of the German army ground out at the Marne.¹¹³ Pope understood the importance of national will in grand strategy. In addition, he gave a presentation to the *Société des Arts, Science et Lettres du Quebec* in February 1931 on the famous trek of the 104th Regiment of Foot, based in New Brunswick (formerly the New Brunswick Regiment).¹¹⁴ The *Soleil* newspaper reported that Pope was in complete control of his subject and it commended him for providing a “wonderful narration” of the events.¹¹⁵

When Pope was not lecturing, he was developing his writing skills and eventually became as strong a writer. He started with book reviews for the *Canadian Defence Quarterly*. He submitted his first review in late 1927 on a book titled *The Army and Sea Power*. The book focused on the British Army’s role in developing the British Empire. Pope’s short review of the 220 page book demonstrated that he could get to the heart of an issue. To quote Pope’s review, “it has been stated that in respect of its strategy the Navy stands alone and that the Army can assist in no way in command of the seas. This remarkable pretension the work under review proceeds effectively to demolish.”¹¹⁶ He also reviewed a book by Lieutenant Colonel W.G. Lindsell, titled *A. & Q. or Military Administration in War*. Lindsell had been an instructor in military administration at Camberley while Pope was in his senior year. Pope’s review is revealing for his thoughts on the likely total nature of the next war. He suggested that, while “mechanization may tend to reduce the actual number of combatants it will not reduce the national effort, for the mechanization of the Army will make inexorable demands on our industries and our manpower both for production and maintenance.” Pope may not have expressed his ideas in the most eloquent prose, but he was correct in his predictions. Pope added that the government should assume responsibility for manpower and mobilization, but “the soldier must henceforth co-operate with the politician and not damn him as he did so often to his own disadvantage in the past.”¹¹⁷

Pope decided in 1930 to enter the essay competition for the *Canadian Defence Quarterly*. The military journal had been publishing since 1923, but 1930 was the first year for the essay competition.¹¹⁸ It was open to existing or retired members “of His Majesty’s Canadian Forces...or Canadian Civil Service (Federal).” The contestants were to answer the following question: “Assuming that the roles of the armed forces of Canada are derived from our obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations; our obligations to the British Commonwealth of Nations: and our obligations in respect

¹¹⁰ As reported in the *Victoria Times*, 21 December 1927.

¹¹¹ PFP, Pope to wife, 17 January and 15 February 1927.

¹¹² PFP, *Chronicle-Telegraph*, Quebec, Wednesday, 6 March 1929. The *Chronicle-Telegraph* article reported that Pope had helped to establish the Institute.

¹¹³ PFP, *Chronicle Telegraph Quebec*, Wednesday 6 March 1929.

¹¹⁴ The 104th marched on foot from Fredericton to Kingston in February 1813 to help defend Upper Canada against the Americans during the war of 1812.

¹¹⁵ PFP, family scrapbook. *Le Soleil*, Quebec, Monday, 2 February 1931.

¹¹⁶ *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, October 1927, found in PFP family scrapbook.

¹¹⁷ *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, January 1929, 277-78.

¹¹⁸ James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: From the Great war to the Great Depression* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 97.

to National Defence: Discuss the roles which should be assigned to the armed forces of Canada, indicate the form which these forces should take and outline the organization required.” The essays were to be no more than 10,000 words. They were judged by three people, one each from the general staff, naval staff, and the Royal Canadian Air Force. The judges found Pope’s paper of superior quality and he shared top prize with C.P. Stacey, later the Canadian Army’s official historian.¹¹⁹

On the eve of completing his posting in Quebec City in 1931, Pope was confident that he had established, through his work, a credible reputation among senior officials in Ottawa, and that he had gained in stature. He hoped that the “military hierarchy” would know by now the quality of his work and that he would eventually be in line for some kind of promotion.¹²⁰ He knew, however, that it was not likely to be in the near future. Like other soldiers of that period, Pope was lured by the “psychic reward or dedication to what they believed a necessary and worthy profession.”¹²¹ In graduating from Camberley, he had enhanced his chances of promotion. He was also fortunate to belong to one of the technical arms (artillery, engineering and signal corps) that the militia tended to favour over the infantry and cavalry, at least when it came to officer promotions. This was especially the case after McNaughton became CGS in 1929.¹²² Still, despite these advantages, Pope waited a long time before he was next promoted. He did not complain about his situation, or if he did, he never let on or expressed his views on paper.

It should be stressed that, while promotion did not come his way until the mid-1930s, Pope and his family were not in dire straits during the 1920s, his complaints to the contrary notwithstanding. His wife brought with her a \$20,000 inheritance. He earned about \$275/month, which was a comfortable salary for that time. They had enough money for two maids in Esquimalt and three in Quebec City, where they resided in quarters described as “quite grand.”¹²³ But Pope was cautious to a fault with his money. His father probably influenced him in this matter. Indeed, many of the letters between Pope and his father were about money. Pope’s father urged him to be careful with his money, telling him that “your dollar is your best friend.”¹²⁴ He encouraged his son to “continue to lay up corn during the season of plenty, which will not always last.”¹²⁵ Pope developed his father’s near-obsession with money. It is easy to understand why he was so upset when he had to borrow money from his father while at Camberley.

Conclusion

During the 1920s, Pope immersed himself in the science of war. He developed strong staff skills. And he came increasingly self-assertive. He perfected his teaching skills at staff college. When educating students for the MSC, he became a leader in the classroom - and in the field during the camps. The part-time militia candidates on MSC were willing to follow him because of what he knew. Pope also worked well with superiors and his strong human skills allowed him to get past some challenging interpersonal situations, especially at the camps. Very often, he had to rely on his personal power, as opposed to the power emanating from his position. He showed that he could be tactful and strong-willed at the same time. Pope believed that he had won a measure of credibility by his work. His strong human skills allowed him to establish strong long-term relationships with Canadian and British military staff college graduates from Camberley. He also demonstrated in his analysis of modern warfare that he had good conceptual skills and that he could think, write and speak about broad strategic issues. He was also totally dedicated to his profession.

¹¹⁹ Chapter 6 of this dissertation looks at Pope’s CDQ paper on Canada’s relations to the Commonwealth.

¹²⁰ Pope wrote in early 1930 that Sansom had told him that he was at the top of the list for GSO 1 positions. Of course, he waited a number of years before he was finally promoted. PFP, 11 August 1929;

¹²¹ Geoffrey W. Hayes, “The Development of the Canadian Army Officer Corps,” 25.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 27.

¹²³ Notes from interview by J.L. Granatstein with Joseph Pope, Toronto, Canada, 15 and March 1991. The notes have been reproduced in J.L. Granatstein, *The Weight of Command: Voices of Canada’s Second World War Generals and Those Who Knew Them* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 228-9.

¹²⁴ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 23, Joseph Pope to son, 21 May 1919.

¹²⁵ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 27, Joseph Pope to son, 22 September 1921.

CHAPTER 5

THE APPRENTICESHIP OF POPE AS CAPITAL STAFF OFFICER: 1931-1936

In the spring of 1931, Pope embarked on a senior apprenticeship of sorts. He left behind his role as a staff officer in the field and began to learn the functions of a staff officer in a strategic headquarters. Pope's first experience in a strategic headquarters was with the British Army between 1931 and 1933. When he returned to Canada in 1933, Pope joined the general staff at National Defence Headquarters. After a short spell with the Directorate of Military Training (DMT), he transferred to the Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence (DMO&I). Pope worked on some important policy issues, including the reorganization of the part-time militia, Defence Scheme No. 3, and mobilization instructions. In 1936, Colonel Harry Crerar sent Pope to the Imperial Defence College, where he was given an opportunity to learn about the strategic issues confronting Canada and the British Empire in the mid-1930s. These three postings prepared him for work at the highest staff levels.

Pope at the War Office

When Pope joined the Directorate of Staff Duties (DSD) of the British general staff in April 1931, the United Kingdom was stricken by the world-wide Great Depression. The British government's response to the fiscal crisis had been "conservative" or "orthodox": balance the budget by reducing spending and minimizing economic intervention, other than social relief programs.¹ Having to choose between cutting defence spending or cutting other programs to meet their fiscal objectives, the British government chose the former. The over-riding element of the British government's approach to defence funding was its ten-year rule. Instituted in 1919, it assumed that the British Empire would not be involved in "any great war" for the next ten years. The rule remained in force until 1933.² The British government used the rule when developing the annual defence budgets for the three services.³ For the British Army, it meant smaller budgets and smaller establishments.⁴ By 1930-31, the regular army, which had totalled 259,000 men in 1914, had fallen to 207,000, and its budget had dropped to 31.5M British pounds, down from 46.6M in 1922.⁵ The conditions at the War Office were therefore not encouraging or uplifting when Pope arrived in the spring of 1931. However, it does not appear that Pope was downcast. In fact, unlike many British regimental officers who did not relish the thought of working at the War Office under the best of circumstances, Pope wrote later that his time at the War Office was "quite as valuable as another Staff college course."⁶ That speaks to Pope's instinct for administration, which he was turning into a skill through sheer doggedness.

The imperial general staff was structured largely along the lines the British government had established in 1908 as a result of agreement at the 1907 colonial conference. There were four major military organizations: a general staff responsible for preparing the army for war; the adjutant-general, who was in charge of recruitment, discipline, and welfare of the soldiers; the quartermaster-general, who was tasked with supply and transport; and the master-general of the ordnance, who had responsibility for war material and clothing.⁷ The general staff was dubbed the "thinking department."⁸ It was responsible for military policy that touched on the security of the empire. It provided advice and issued orders on all military operations. It was in charge of military intelligence and it made sure that officers were properly educated and troops properly trained. Finally, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff chaired the selection committee that decided on the heads

¹ Brian Bond, *British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 192; Brian Ernest Bradshaw-Ellis, "Seven Lean Years: The Organization and Administration of the Imperial General staff 1926-1933" (MA thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1976), 22.

² The government started to re-examine the ten year rule after Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931.

³ Bond, *British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars*, 24-25; G.C. Peden, *British Rearmament and the Treasury: 1932-1939* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1979), 3.

⁴ The Army estimates for 1922 was 62.3 million British pounds. They had dropped to 37.9 million in 1933. Bradshaw-Ellis, "Seven Lean Years," 165.

⁵ Ibid, Appendix 1, Army Estimates, Column 1. The British Army was told in the fall of 1931 that it should plan for a reduction of 9% in 1932. British historian Brian Bond called the year 1931 "the nadir of the Army's fortunes in the inter-war period." Bond, *British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars*, 155.

⁶ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians: The Memoirs of Lt-Gen. Maurice A. Pope* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 76. According to historian Hampden Gordon, the War Office was at the time to regimental officers "an incredible mass of unnecessary rules." Hampden Gordon, *The War Office* (Westminster: Westminster Press, 1935), 330.

⁷ Gordon, *The War Office*, 98; Bradshaw-Ellis, "Seven Lean Years," 124-125.

⁸ The head of the general staff was initially called Chief of General Staff. He would become the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1908. Colonel John K. Dunlop, *The Development of the British Army 1899-1914* (London: Methuen, 1938), 297-98.

of the other branches.⁹ In addition to DSD, the CIGS had two other directorates reporting to him: military operations and intelligence; and military training. Field Marshal George Milne had been the Chief of the Imperial General staff for five years when Pope joined in 1931.¹⁰

Pope remembered that DSD had broad responsibilities, including “certain aspects of the security of defended ports abroad, of distant oilfields, of colonies, and of protectorates.”¹¹ In the words of a former DSD, it was essentially responsible for “any subject which was not directly associated with operations, intelligence or training.”¹² DSD’s responsibilities included organizing the army for war, and developing policy for weapons and equipment of all kinds, with the exception of artillery. It issued all training regulations and ensured that the British Army had a sufficient supply of officers in peace and war.¹³

Pope was a general staff officer, 2nd grade (G.S.O II) in SD2, a sub-directorate with four other officers: two other G.S.O IIs and two general staff officers, third grade (G.S.O. IIIs).¹⁴ The G.S.O IIs included D.C. Watson and Vyvyan Pope, both of whom had been at staff college with Pope.¹⁵ The sub-directorate determined the war organization and war establishment of the British Army. It developed war plans. It established inter-allied missions, oversaw the interchange of officers between the British Army and the land forces of the dominions and India, and it allocated weapons and equipment.¹⁶ Pope remembered that he was not given any specific responsibilities. In the words of one of his directors, “Pope, the Canadian, does the chores.”¹⁷

There is limited information concerning the specific issues on which Pope worked when he was with DSD.¹⁸ We do know that he applied and expanded his technical knowledge. For example, Pope finished the *Manual on Combined Operations* that Major John K. Lawson, his Canadian predecessor, had started. Pope participated in a committee to create a new establishment for an engineer unit at one of the home ports. He was involved in discussions about forward ammunition supply points. He worked on papers about the supply of fuel and on voluntary enlistment in the British Army during the First World War. Pope travelled outside of London for various work-related activities. For example, he journeyed to Porton Down for a gas demonstration and to Aldershot for a demonstration with armoured vehicles.¹⁹

There is no record of Pope’s thoughts on the important strategic issues of the time, but he did have a revealing exchange with Vyvyan Pope and Archie Nye about the debacle at Gallipoli in 1915. The two British officers were trying to understand why the British had displayed such “physical and intellectual inertia” in its “entire chain of command.” Moreover, they mused, could history repeat itself? Would the British officer corps fare better in the future if presented with a similar scenario? Maurice Pope did not think the British officer corps would do any differently, and that was because of the British educational system, and more specifically the people that were graduating from British schools, from which the Army was recruiting its officers. Pope argued that the individuals coming out of the British public school system were blessed with “character,” and were normally “upright, honourable, [and] game-playing.” However, he thought that the British system focused too much on “high moral qualities and fine physical development” at the expense of “intellectual training.” Pope thought there were different levels of skills.²⁰ Borrowing from the taxonomy in the introduction of this

⁹ Gordon, *The War Office*, 95-116; Bradshaw-Ellis, “Seven Lean Years,” 38.

¹⁰ The Chief’s position normally rotated every four years. However, the government had approved an extension of Milne’s appointment. He would step down as CIGS in 1933.

¹¹ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 76.

¹² Bradshaw-Ellis, “Seven Lean Years,” 94.

¹³ This excluded direct technical military training. Bradshaw-Ellis, “Seven Lean Years,” 94-95.

¹⁴ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 75. SD2 also had 6 clerical workers. Bradshaw-Ellis, “Seven Lean Years,” 107.

¹⁵ Of the 68 officers who were in the British General Staff when Pope arrived in 1931, 59 had graduated from staff college. Bradshaw-Ellis, “Seven Lean Years,” Appendix III, 168.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 104-105.

¹⁷ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 75.

¹⁸ One of the reasons there is little information on Pope’s activities at the War Office is because he made “a rule not to comment on any subject that has come under my notice in the course of my work at the [War Office] for I feel that I occupy a somewhat privileged position which is not to be abused in any way.” Pope Family Papers (PFP), 1932 Diary, 9 June 1932.

¹⁹ PFP, 1932 Diary, 5 July 1932. Porton Down is a military science park. It is located just outside Porton, north east of Salisbury. It developed as a major centre for chemical warfare and defence during the First World War and continued in that role after the war. Aldershot is a major army training camp located about an hour south east of London. It is known as the home of the British Army. Aldershot would become a major training centre for the Canadian army in the Second World War.

²⁰ PFP, 1932 Diary, 5 July 1932.

dissertation, the typical British officer had the technical skills; what he lacked were conceptual skills. Pope maintained that the men who came out of Sandhurst were “moulded to form” and they were not encouraged to “fuse [their] reasoning powers.” As a result, few officers were “intellectually capable of thinking out all the implications of a big problem and of establishing its underlying principles.” Those who could think through the “big problems” came up with solutions that “sprang from their entire being.” However, most officers could not do so. When faced with such big issues, the average officer relied solely on his technical skills, his knowledge of the subject matter, and “the latest convention” to come up with a solution.²¹

Pope took the time to learn how a large military headquarters worked. In Britain, the War Office took policy guidance from the Army Council, which was presided over by the secretary of state for war, who possessed the right of veto over all recommendations. There were four military members: the CIGS (first military member), the adjutant-general, the quarter-master general, and the master-general of the ordnance.²² The Army Council also comprised three civilian members, including the parliamentary under-secretary, who served as vice-president, ; the financial secretary, and the permanent under-secretary of state.²³ Pope recalled that the Army Council did not meet very regularly while he was at the War Office.²⁴ When the council made decisions, its members consulted informally with each other. In the words of Pope, “matters to be dealt with were discussed in a series of minutes on the file and, the requisite measure of agreement having been reached, action followed.”²⁵ The military members of the Army Council seldom disagreed with each other. According to one author, “each member enjoyed a personal expertise, or at least had recourse to expert opinions within his own department, there was a natural reluctance on the part of the other members of the Council to interfere with the activities of other departments.”²⁶

By the time Pope assumed his post at DSD, relations between the general staff and the other three military members of the Army Council were actually good. They had been less so in the early months of Milne’s tenure in 1926. However, when the time came to replace the incumbents, Milne made sure, in his capacity as chairman of the selection committee, to choose people with whom he could get along. The Chief of the Imperial General staff was called the First Military Member of the Army Council, and thus *primus inter pares*. However, Pope discovered that, if the general staff needed the Army Council approval to proceed with any proposal, it was incumbent upon it to get the support from the other military members. In other words, “if the *primus* was of importance, so, too, were the *pares*.”²⁷ Pope followed the principle of equality between the heads of the branches when he was spearheading proposals through the War Office.

Pope studied how the Finance Branch, which reported to the permanent under-secretary, worked in the War Office. He recalled that all proposals with financial considerations were reviewed by finance officials, “and this from the most junior levels all the way to the top.”²⁸ Relations between the general staff and the War Office’s director of finance, R.J. Paterson, were particularly acrimonious.²⁹ That had to do with Paterson’s brusque, meddlesome and overbearing personality. The general staff understood that he had to screen proposals for their merits. However, they were of the view that the director of finance sometimes challenged proposals that were relatively simple, resulting in unnecessary delays and undue paperwork. The relationship was so poor that the general staff sometimes tried to go around Paterson.³⁰ British historian Brian Bond thinks the issue went beyond personalities. Staff officers resented finance officials because they appeared to be working “as an outpost of the Treasury” and they “felt no responsibility for the Army’s efficiency.”³¹ Pope

²¹ Ibid.

²² They were called the Second, Third and Fourth Military Member of the Army Council, respectively. Gordon, *The War Office*, 8-9

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Bradshaw-Ellis, “Seven Lean Years,” 127; Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 77; See also Bond, *British Military Policy between the two World Wars*, 42-43.

²⁵ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 78.

²⁶ Bradshaw-Ellis, “Seven Lean Years,” 127.

²⁷ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 77. Pope’s assessment about Milne’s authority might be correct about his early years. However, some authors have suggested that Milne was “virtually Commander-in-Chief” by the time he stepped down in 1933. See Captain Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, *The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart* (London: Cassell, 1965), 108, 227; Anthony John Trythall, ‘Boney’ Fuller Soldier, Strategist, and Writer 1878-1966 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1977), 121. British historian Brian Bond is not very complimentary about Milne’s choices for replacements in the other military positions in the War Office in 1931 and that his choice for directors in the General Staff during 1931-33 were generally conservative and against mechanization. Bond, *British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars*, 156.

²⁸ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 77.

²⁹ Bradshaw-Ellis, “Seven Lean Years,” 128.

³⁰ Ibid, 143.

³¹ Bond, *British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars*, 39.

does not mention Paterson by name, but he remembered how officers at the War Office “used at times to rail” against finance officials. Pope did not sympathize with their angst. He explained that “if the military could not justify a proposed course of action to keen, knowledgeable, and experienced minds, then in all probability the proposal, as stated must have left something to be desired.”³² Pope thought that the finance officials were simply doing their jobs, as was the permanent under-secretary, who was ultimately responsible to the Secretary of State for War for the financial situation of the War Office. He recalled that the permanent under-secretary “was an essential contributing member” on many issues, and that “his participation as financial critic was, at times, the overriding influence.”³³

Most military members of the Army Council changed every four years (Milne was an exception), whereas civilian officials, including those in finance, often spent much longer in their positions.³⁴ Pope understood the concept of civil-military relations in a defence organization. He thought that the British had the correct balance. There was no need for the permanent under-secretary to have a military background or to be an expert strategist to fulfil his mandate. Pope, in fact, supported the idea of defence organizations having a strong “civilian component” that “would be limited in range [but] practically unlimited as to power within its own field.” Of course, Pope added, the minister was “entirely free to seek advice wherever he might please, inside or outside the Department.”³⁵ Pope would be mindful of British civil-military relations when examining the organization of the department of National Defence several years later.

The relationship between the CIGS and the other two services was mixed in the 1930s. The general staff got along well with the Royal Navy. The military accepted that the Admiralty was the ‘senior service’ and that, given the size and breadth of the British Empire, “such predominance was only natural.”³⁶ However, there was “deep rivalry” between the British Army and the Royal Air Force for “financial and strategic priority,” which led to “feelings of mistrust and suspicion among members of the General Staff.”³⁷ In his Memoirs, Pope reflected on the woeful state of relations between the two services and expressed dismay that “governments allowed such a disastrous state of affairs to continue.”³⁸

Based on his few observations at the time and his subsequent recollections, it appears that Pope was generally positive about his two years with the British general staff. He certainly did not give the impression that the occasional clash between military and civilian officials harmed effectiveness.³⁹ What we lack from this period are Pope’s views on how Milne and the rest of the general staff handled the issue of mechanization and armoured formations in the British Army, a question that consumed many minds in the 1920s and 1930s. Milne had his share of critics at the time, including Major-General J.F.C. Fuller and Captain Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart. These two military thinkers lamented Milne’s conservative views, his advocacy of manpower versus mobility, his cautious approach, and his lack of leadership in pushing for greater mechanization in the British Army. Historians Jay Luvaas and Robin Higham, using Fuller and Liddell-Hart’s memoirs and other sources, echoed those sentiments.⁴⁰ Pope does not mention Milne by name, in either his diary or in his memoirs, which is curious.

³² Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 78.

³³ Hampden Gordon agreed with Pope. He acknowledged that the finance functions could be “frequently irritating...But here is a case where to know all is to forgive much: for most of the duties of Army Finance proceed from a system of check and veto which lies at the root of constitutional government as understood in this ancient state.” Gordon, *The War Office*, 231.

³⁴ When Pope joined the War Office in 1931, Sir Herbert Creedy had been the Permanent Under Secretary of State for already seven years and he would stay on until 1939. Bradshaw-Ellis, “Seven Lean Years,” 128. Some authors have seen merit in the rotation of military officers. Hampden Gordon argued in 1935 that it allowed “a constant infusion of new blood, a continuous impact of fresh minds on military problems, and a perpetual interchange between the War office and the Army outside.” Hampden Gordon, *The War Office*, Forward, v. However, later on his book (259), Gordon acknowledged that the long-serving civil servants offered institutional memory.

³⁵ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 79.

³⁶ Bradshaw-Ellis, “Seven Lean Years,” 148.

³⁷ *Ibid*, 148-149.

³⁸ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 76.

³⁹ Some authors have echoed Pope’s views. For example, Bradshaw-Ellis (33) suggested that Milne had run the General Staff effectively and had done as best as he could in light of the tight budgets and other government priorities. British historian Brian Bond, writing in the early 1980s, while stating that Milne had become “tired and depressed by his thankless job at the War Office,” gave the CIGS high marks for the manner in which he worked with ministers and other War Office officials. Brian Bond, *British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars*, 56, 140, 142, 159.

⁴⁰ See J. F. C. Fuller, *Memoirs of a Unconventional Soldier* (London: Octavo, 1936), 425; Liddell Hart, *The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart*, 99-100, 100, 108-110, 227; see also Trythall, ‘Boney’ Fuller Soldier, Strategist, and Writer 1878-1966, 120-144; Robin Higham, *Armed Forces in Peacetime Britain, 1918-1940: a case study* (London: G.T. Foulis and Commonwealth, 1962), 96-97; Jay Luvaas, *The Education of An Army: British Military Thought, 1815-1940* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 357-358; 385-386.

Pope continued to read voraciously. He immersed himself in the science of war. For example, he picked up in October 1932 B.H. Liddell Hart's *British Way in Warfare*. Pope praised Liddell Hart for being "a provocative critic who may stir the soldier out of his ultra conservatism." However, he did not think Liddell Hart had "the intellectual equipment" to challenge Clausewitz.⁴¹ In addition to military history, which remained his favorite topic, Pope began to develop views on economic issues, a sign that he was broadening his analytical skills in strategic issues. For example, he had views on the economic impact of German reparations. He agreed in principle on a "firm hand." He did not think Germany should be absolved of responsibility for the destruction wrought in the First World War. On the other hand, he argued that compelling Germany to pay "huge sums" in reparations represented an "intolerable [economic] burden" and the situation had "largely contributed to the foul depression in which the world now finds itself."⁴² Finally, when he was not reading history or economics, he was looking for ways to improve his writing. For example, he consulted *On the Art of Writing* by Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch.⁴³

Pope kept a busy social agenda with military and government officials during his time in London. He thought it was important to maintain these relationships and to keep abreast of Canadian and British developments with respect to military affairs and foreign policy. On the Canadian side, Pope and his wife saw Colonel H.E. Boak (Pope had worked with Boak in Canada during the 1920s) and the Vaniers. They were guests of the Canadian High Commissioner to Great Britain, Howard Ferguson. Pope also got reacquainted with many of his former colleagues from Camberley. He saw Vyvyan Pope and Nye regularly, and he and his wife spent at least one weekend with Richard Dewing, who was with Southern Command at the time. In addition, the Popes entertained the new French Assistant Military Attaché, also a Camberley graduate.⁴⁴ Pope was socially ambitious and he had the skills to match.

Pope found himself thinking about his career prospects while in London. It was not that he was thinking about leaving the military. He remained committed even after he found out in February 1932 that the government was imposing a ten percent pay cut on members of the Canadian military as well as public servants, a development he thought "inevitable." In straitened economic circumstances⁴⁵ But he was pleased when the CGS told his mother that her son's "future was bright."⁴⁶ In May 1932, his brother Billy suggested that his experience at the British War Office would be of great value when he returned to Canada, which was also encouraging. He wrote that "it is a curious thing to be told by my relatives and friends those things which form the subject of most of my day-dreams and to which I have never given audible expression. If my friends say this to me they undoubtedly talk in the same strain among themselves and it encourages me to hope that by grace of God I have but to keep up my efforts for yet a few more years in order to achieve that real success which I so ardently desire."⁴⁷

Towards the end of his two years with the War Office, Pope received his performance evaluation. It stated that he had assumed his duties "excellently." The head of DSD2 added that Pope was "an agreeable personality who gets on well with everybody." He was "very keen [and] he demonstrated an excellent knowledge of his profession." The head of DSD2 concluded: "I have no knowledge of Canadian standards, but I am quite sure he must be well above the average of his rank." The DSD concurred with the assessment. He praised Pope for his "ability and industry... [and] a most pleasant personality which all go to make him an excellent staff officer." The assessment indicated that Pope possessed significant technical knowledge and worked well with others. In addition, he had good work ethic and was professionally motivated. Pope realized, as before, that British military evaluations of Canadians on exchange were normally "on the generous side." He therefore had no intention of letting it 'get to his head'. That said, he was very pleased that the evaluation was going directly to McNaughton. Pope hoped the CGS would be "moved" in his "favour" when deciding what to do with him when he returned to Canada.⁴⁸

⁴¹ PFP, 1932 Diary, 6 October 1932.

⁴² PFP, 1932 Diary, 27 January 1932.

⁴³ Quiller-Couch was a Professor of English at Cambridge and educational reformer. This little book consists of lectures Quiller-Couch gave at the University of Cambridge in 1913-1914. Charles Arnold-Baker, *The Companion to British History* (Revised edition) (New York: Routledge, 2001), 1044.

⁴⁴ PFP, Pope 1932 Diary, various entries.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 10 February 1932

⁴⁶ Ibid, January 4 1932.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 10 May 1932.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 14 November 1932.

Making himself “indispensable” in Ottawa

When Pope arrived at National Defence Headquarters in April 1933, the country was still in the throes of the world-wide Great Depression.⁴⁹ The Canadian government was trying to keep ahead of the dire economic conditions and it had increased funding for various relief efforts, sometimes in the guise of military projects. Canada followed the same economic dogma as did Great Britain in the early 1930s: it strove to balance its budget - or at least maintain a low deficit. This meant that it needed to offset the new money for relief programs and reduced tax revenues by slashing the budgets of most other federal activities.⁵⁰ Pope recalled years later that “defence or military policy” were dirty words in the 1930s.⁵¹ Because “defence was unpopular in the public mind and as politicians...are of necessity responsive to public opinion,” the Canadian government “gave little heed to defence matters.”⁵²

The headquarters of the Canadian militia in Ottawa was organized largely along the same lines as that of the War Office - that is with three major branches: the general staff, the adjutant-general, and the quartermaster-general. The branch responsibilities in Ottawa were also largely the same as those in Great Britain. That said, their scope was much more limited because the Canadians did not have an empire to defend, and the organizations were much smaller.⁵³ Pope recalled that “our meagre staffs could, broadly speaking, do little more than keep the administrative machine slowly ticking over.”⁵⁴

Still, Pope made the most of it. He spent a few months with Military Training, which he found rather “dull,”⁵⁵ but, in late-October 1933, he was transferred to the DMO & I to help out while Harry Crerar, the head of the Directorate, spent a year at the Imperial Defence College. Of the three directorates of the general staff, DMO & I was by far the most active in the 1930s. Indeed, by the time Pope arrived, the directorate had achieved “primacy” inside the general staff. In the words of Crerar’s biographer, Paul Douglas Dickson, it was one of the few directorates “whose task – planning for and preparing the army (on paper at least) for war – was possible and attainable.”⁵⁶ Dickson maintains that Pope was a critical addition to the directorate.⁵⁷ Crerar had thought for some time that Pope would be a good fit.⁵⁸ And Pope recognized that this was a golden opportunity to demonstrate what he could do. He made sure the Chief of the General Staff (Chief of the General Staff) noticed how hard he worked, even if it meant spending very long hours at the headquarters. He wanted to make himself “indispensable.”⁵⁹

After Crerar departed to the Imperial Defence College in December 1933, work became very hectic for Pope in his capacity as acting director of DMO&I. He recalled trying “almost single-handed to keep abreast” of the various tasks assigned to the directorate.⁶⁰ He endeavored to arrange his day in order to be as efficient and effective as possible. In the morning, he focused on developing memoranda for some of the more important issues. He reserved his afternoons “for the yards deep of routine files that kept raining down...in spate unceasing.” When everyone else had departed “in a mad five-

⁴⁹ Federal revenues dropped from \$461 million in 1928 to \$311.7 million in 1932. When Pope arrived in Canada in 1933, unemployment in the country was about 27 percent. John Herd Thompson with Allen Seager, *Canada 1922-1939: Decades of Discord* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), 338; Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, John English, *Canada 1900-1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 248.

⁵⁰ Spending on the militia, air force and navy in 1932-33 in Canada was the lowest since 1913. C.P. Stacey, *Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific* (Government of Canada: Ottawa, 1955), 5.

⁵¹ Notes of interviews by Norman Hillmer with Lieutenant General Maurice Pope on 5 and 27 July and on 23 August, 1977.

⁵² *Ibid.* See also Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 89-90.

⁵³ The Canadian militia had a separate Office of Master General of the Ordnance between 1904 until 1922, at which time the position was eliminated and its functions reallocated to the general staff and the quartermaster-general. The position of Office of Master General of the Ordnance was reinstated in 1935. William F. Rennie (Ed) *To the Thunderer His Arms: The Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps* (Lincoln, Ontario: W.F. Rennie, 1984), 336.

⁵⁴ Notes of Interviews by Norman Hillmer with Lieutenant General Maurice Pope on 5 and 27 July and on 23 August, 1977; Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG24 Vol. 18,723, Department of National Defence, Monthly Strength Returns, April 1932 to March 1933; Brian Ernest Bradshaw-Ellis, “Seven Lean Years,” Appendix III

⁵⁵ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 82.

⁵⁶ Paul Douglas Dickson, *A Thoroughly Canadian General: A Biography of General H.D.G Crerar* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 88.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 98.

⁵⁸ When Pope was still in the War Office at the beginning of 1933, Crerar told him that he thought the work of the directorate “would suit” him and that he “would do well at it.” LAC, Papers of General H.D.G. Crerar Papers, (Crerar papers) Vol. 18, File 958c.009 (D379), Crerar to Pope, 20 January 1933.

⁵⁹ PFP, Pope to his wife, 5 July 1934.

⁶⁰ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 92.

o'clock rush," he would stay behind and review what he had worked on in the morning.⁶¹ Pope recalled that McNaughton spent long hours at the office as well, and Pope was determined not to leave the office until his boss did. Thinking back years later, Pope said of McNaughton that "if you applied yourself, he was easy to work for, but working was in the contract."⁶² When Pope joined DMO & I, he had one staff officer to help him: Lieutenant Elliot Rodger, for whom he had high praise.⁶³ Pope recalled that Rodger "proved himself an angel." Rodger, for his part, remembered Pope as a "great administrator."⁶⁴ Rodger had a positive recollection of Pope, despite the fact that his boss expressed displeasure at one point with his young staff.⁶⁵

Pope's major projects in the period 1933-1935 included the reorganization of the Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM).⁶⁶ In the late 1920s, the NAPM was still based on 11 infantry and four cavalry divisions, pursuant to the recommendations of the Otter Committee of 1919. It had been structured primarily to defend Canada, and more specifically to defend against a possible attack from the United States. These assumptions had been carried forward from before the First World War, but the international environment had changed since then. A Canadian general staff memorandum of February 1933 stated that the Royal Navy was "in a position of inferiority" in the north-western Atlantic and many "responsible statesmen" had asserted on numerous occasions that "the contingency of war with the United States was so remote that it need not enter into practical calculation."⁶⁷ These developments meant that home defence was "no longer the governing factor" for organizing Canada's part-time militia. The 1933 memorandum also suggested that Canada needed to establish a new structure based on new possible missions. This included "a decision on the part of His Majesty's Government in Canada to participate in a major war in support of other members of the British Empire, or possibly, to implement a decision of the Council of the League of Nations."⁶⁸ The militia was in need of change because its force structure was much too large, for both its purposes and for funding. There was an excess of senior officers, too many cavalry and infantry units, and too few artillery regiments.⁶⁹

By the fall of 1933, McNaughton and the General staff had achieved a number of milestones with respect to the reorganization. The government was onside with its overall objective, although not with the specifics.⁷⁰ McNaughton had developed the general guidelines under which the reorganization would take place and provided guidance for the general staff in determining the type and number of units that would be allocated to each district.⁷¹ The general staff had also consulted with and advised the commanders of the military districts of the upcoming changes.⁷² When Pope arrived, the General staff was in the process of sharing these guidelines with the district commanders and the various service associations.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Notes of Interviews by Norman Hillmer with Lieutenant General Maurice Pope on 5 and 27 July and 23 August 1977; J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 211.

⁶³ Library and Archive Canada (LAC), RG24 Vol. 18723, Monthly Strength Returns, April 1932 to March 1933. DMO&I had a total staff of three officers. When Crerar was away at Imperial Defence College, he was not replaced. In the General Staff, there were only twelve positions for officers holding the rank of brevet lieutenant-colonel and above. Dickson, *A Thoroughly Canadian General*, 88. Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 92-93. Elliot Rodger would serve as a brigadier in the Second World War and would eventually rise to the position of Vice Chief of the General Staff after the war.

⁶⁴ J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddardt, 1993), 210.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 176-178; Dickson, *A Thoroughly Canadian General*, 90. McNaughton launched the reorganization using as springboard the interdepartmental committee the government had established in April 1931 to develop the government's submission to the League of Nations' disarmament conference. Background in LAC, RG24 Vol. 2741, HQS5902 Vol. 2, Memorandum Record of Cabinet Committee Meeting June 14, 1933; National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) Report # 64, *The Reorganization of the Canadian Militia, 1936*.

⁶⁷ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2741, HQS5902 Vol. 1, DMO&I Colonel W. G. Beeman to file, 21 February 1933. Attached to the covering memorandum are various memoranda including "Memorandum on the present Military Requirements of Canada," see also RG24 Vol. 2741, HQS5902 Vol. 3. "Scheme for the Reorganization of the Canadian Militia," 15 July 1935; and LAC, Crerar papers, Volume 18, Folder: Memorandum on the reorganization of the Non-Permanent Active Militia, 29 January 1931.

⁶⁸ RG24 Vol. 2741, HQS5902 Vol. 3. "Scheme for the Reorganization of the Canadian Militia," 15 July 1935.

⁶⁹ The General Staff estimated that cavalry had a surplus of 20 units out of 37 authorized and organized. The infantry's corresponding numbers were 49 out of 126. The artillery had 106 units and needed an additional 58 and the engineers' corresponding numbers were 26 and 23. LAC, Crerar papers, Vol. 11, "A Scheme for the Reorganization of the Canadian Militia," 25 October 1933.

⁷⁰ Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 178.

⁷¹ LAC RG24 Vol. 2741, HQS5902 Vol. 2, 24 June 1933.

⁷² RG24 Vol. 2741, HQS5902 Vol. 3, Memo from Crerar to Military Districts, 7 October 1933.

In mid-November 1933, Pope accompanied McNaughton to the annual meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) at Ottawa's Chateau Laurier. McNaughton presented for the first time the details of his scheme for reorganizing the part-time militia.⁷³ He acknowledged that there was likely to be considerable disagreement over the details of the reorganization and he was not expecting immediate consensus. However, he was hoping to have support for the general principles.⁷⁴ The most important matter from the standpoint of the various associations was the allocation of units to each district. In accordance with the guidelines McNaughton had developed in June 1933, each district would be allocated units on the basis of their population.⁷⁵ As a result, while the members of the CDA expressed support for the reorganization and the disbandment of inefficient units, the infantry and cavalry associations spearheaded a resolution that requested that "greater consideration be given to distribution in accordance with the existing strength of units rather than on the basis of population."⁷⁶ Many units were worried about their future under the reorganization and were trying to hold onto the old structure.

After the CDA conference, Pope and the rest of the general staff continued, despite a lack of consensus on the part of the service associations, with the reorganization. However, it did so in a very deliberate fashion.⁷⁷ The work demanded the full range of Pope's skills. First, he had to use his technical knowledge of the layout of the existing structure of the part-time militia. Second, he had to deploy his human skills when consulting with the various affected parties. He tried to earn their trust, not an easy task, and reassure them that the headquarters were mindful of their concerns. Third, he had to deploy his conceptual skills to determine how best to reorganize the NPAM in accordance with the government direction, a challenging assignment because it required consultation with 13 military districts and numerous associations.⁷⁸ Pope had to grapple with many of the concerns that had been raised at the conference, including the issue of how the reorganization would affect certain regions. The concerns related in particular to infantry units in Ontario and Quebec and cavalry units in Western Canada. Pope was involved with the issue of district boundaries. McNaughton's reorganization plan envisaged the introduction of a new regional command structure and the remapping of the districts.⁷⁹ Pope learned at the annual meeting of the Canadian Infantry Association in late-January 1934 that its members wanted the boundaries to remain unchanged until the reorganization was completed. No one wanted boundary changes. Pope used his negotiating skills to convince headquarters in Ottawa to postpone the implementation of the new command structure.⁸⁰ As a result, the general staff allocated to Military Districts 1, 2, and 3 (all in Ontario) 9 interim "unbrigaded" individual battalions. Military District 10 (Headquarters in Winnipeg, Manitoba) received a larger number of cavalry units. The general staff stressed to the military districts that the changes were "provisional" to fulfill "interim as opposed to the ultimate objective of the scheme."⁸¹ Finally, Pope helped out in the overseeing of the disbandment of inefficient units. By the end of 1934, forty-eight units had been disbanded.⁸²

⁷³ The general staff sent to the CDA Secretary Treasurer in advance of the Conference multiple copies of a secret memorandum explaining the background to the reorganization. The memorandum was circulated to the officers who were attending the Conference. LAC, RG24 Vol. 2741, HQS5902 Vol. 2, Letter from Harry Crerar to Lieutenant-Colonel Beament, 11 October 1933. McNaughton had informed the CDA at its first annual meeting in 1932 that the general staff had launched a process to reorganize the militia. However, he had not shared any specifics about his plans at the time.

⁷⁴ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2741, HQS5902 Vol. 3, Minutes of Second Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, 17 and 18 November 1933, 13.

⁷⁵ The general staff had circulated the principles to the Military Districts in October 1933.

⁷⁶ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2741, HQS5902 Vol. 3, Minutes of Second Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, 17 and 18 November 1933, 32; NDHQ, DHH, Report # 64, *The Reorganization of the Canadian Militia*, 15.

⁷⁷ The general staff understood the "importance and necessity of proceeding with the reorganization tactfully, and insofar as possible, by consent so that the morale of the Militia" would not be "adversely affected." LAC, RG 24 Vol. 2741, HQS5902, Vol. 2, Note to File, Andrew McNaughton, 16 June 1933. See also Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 178.

⁷⁸ LAC, CP, Vol. 11, A Scheme for the Reorganization of the Canadian Militia, 25 October 1933, 6.

⁷⁹ LAC, CP, Vol. 11, "A Scheme for the Reorganization of the Canadian Militia," 25 October 1933, 2-3.

⁸⁰ Pope officially advised the districts of the headquarters' decision in December 1934. LAC, RG 24 Vol. 6604, HQS5902, Vol. 2, Pope to District Officer Commanding, 20 December 1934. Pope's memo stressed once again that these changes were temporary to secure the "interim as opposed to the ultimate objective of the scheme." The new command structure was only fully introduced in 1946. NDHQ, DHH, 82/978, 'Geographical Composition Commands and Areas in Canada', 15 December 1960.

⁸¹ LAC, RG24 Volume 2740, HQS5902, Vol. 3, CGS to District Officer Commanding, 29 November 1933; LAC, RG 24 Vol. 6604, HQS5902, Vol. 2, Pope to District Officer Commanding, 20 December 1934. The interim solution allowed the Militia to postpone having to reallocate infantry battalions from Quebec to Ontario. NDHQ, DHH, Report # 64, "The Reorganization of the Canadian Militia," 1936, 16.

⁸² LAC, RG 24 Vol. 2742, HQS5902, Vol. 4. Minutes of CDA Conference of 20 December 1934, p. 8.

Pope, Quebec, and the reorganization of the NPAM

Pope was involved in reassuring the part-time militia in Quebec that their interests would be safeguarded in the reorganization.⁸³ The province of Quebec had some cause for concern. The Ontario militia associations had discovered at the November 1933 meeting of the Conference of Defence Association that the reorganization of the militia might affect many more units from Ontario than from Quebec. The representatives of the Ontario units - there were no French Canadians at the Conference - had expressed their misgivings in unequivocal terms. Pope recalled later that "several representatives...were anything but pleased" at the state of things. Pope thought McNaughton had handled himself with aplomb in explaining his plan. However, he recalled that "feelings had been stirred." When the Quebec associations got word of the discussions, they grew suspicious that Ottawa might readjust the balance at their expense.⁸⁴ Pope was sympathetic.

Pope provided a brief sketch of the future of Canada's NPAM in Quebec and across Canada. He reaffirmed that the NPAM would not be needed "to fight in Canada." The underlying purpose of the reorganization was to secure "a maximum expeditionary force which this country is ever likely to dispatch overseas in the event of a war." Because French Canadian units were deficient in training, they would not be available now or in the foreseeable future for deployment abroad. However, this was no reason for reducing units in Quebec. The Canadian government should "avoid any actions which tend to accentuate the natural divergence between the two racial points of view." This could be best achieved if the number of units in military districts were proportional to population. If deployment was ever required, the Canadian militia could mobilize those units that are better trained while it enhanced the preparedness of the "backward units."⁸⁵

Pope warned against repeating the mistakes that had been made during the First World War and that had engendered so much ethnic tension. These events remained very fresh in the minds of the French Canadian people. He cautioned against doing "anything which not only might divide the country into two camps, but which might gratuitously provide one party or the other with some hurt, real or imaginary, the effect of which would be to impair the strength of the national effort."⁸⁶

It is worth noting how Pope's views on French Canadian concerns had in fact evolved since the First World War. Back then, he was not at all sympathetic to French-speaking Canada's opposition to compulsory military service overseas. Pope's focus at the time was winning the war and he believed that conscription was necessary to sustain the allied effort. At the time, Pope wrote that conscription would be "the very best method by which the English and the French in Canada" could reconcile their differences."⁸⁷ In late-August 1917, he wrote that "the French were surely playing a very poor game and I for one am finished with them."⁸⁸

Pope's views began to change when he was a staff officer in Quebec during the late 1920s. In fact, he took the lead in rectifying a gap in militia training for French Canadians. No training manuals had been translated to French. Pope secured the help of Major E.W. Ransom, who was in the Directorate of Military Training in Ottawa at the time, and Major Ernest Légaré. Pope had been with Sansom at staff college. Légaré worked in Pope's military district. Légaré had been following the language issue for some time. He argued that the Canadian militia was not dedicating enough time to developing a good training program for French Canadians. Moreover, he lamented the extensive use of "anglicisms" in French Canadian

⁸³ For one of the letters that Pope drafted for the deputy minister, see LAC, RG 24 Vol. 6522, HQ420-18-52. Deputy Minister L.R. Laflèche to Andre D'Astou, Montreal Canadian Legion, 11 January 1934. Laflèche re-assured D'Astou that the interests of French Canadian units would be "given every consideration." See also RG 24 Vol. 6604, HQS 5902 Vol. 4, R.N. Laflèche to M. Jean-Louis Caribéau, M.P. concerning the French Canadian militia unit, Les Chasseurs, 17 April 1934.

⁸⁴ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 83. See also LAC, RG24 Vol. 2741, HQS5902 Vol. 3, Minutes of Second Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, 17 and 18 November 1933; Jean Pariseau and Serge Bernier, *French Canadians and Bilingualism in the Canadian Armed Forces*, Volume 1, 1763-1969: *the Fear of a Parallel Army* (Canada: Government of Canada, 1986), 99-100.

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, 88.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 89.

⁸⁷ Joseph Pope (ed), *Maurice A. Pope, Letters from the Front, 1914-1919* (Toronto: Pope and Company, 1996), Pope to father, 25 May 1917, 89. J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 208. On the background to Canada's decision on conscription, see J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, *Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977), 63-64.

⁸⁸ Pope, *Letters from the Front*, 101, Pope to father, 31 August 1917. Historians have shown that opposition to conscription did not come solely from Quebec and French Canadians. He told his father that he deplored "the stand taken by the Western Grits" with regard to compulsory service.

military language. Pope tried to address the problem by having the *Section Leading* training manual translated into French.⁸⁹ He later recalled that, when he circulated the French version of the manual to his instructors, he warned them that he would “break” anyone who would employ an English expression instead of the appropriate French expression.⁹⁰ In February 1931, Pope was appointed as a member for life of the Société des Arts, Sciences et Lettres de Québec. The motion from the Société commended Pope for his efforts to translate the training manual and for his overall support for the French language.⁹¹

Pope considered the French regime “a long struggle against adversity.”⁹² Against the odds, the French Canadian population of Quebec had continued to grow after the British “conquest.” In his opinion, French Canadian population growth belied the prediction of Lord Durham in his report of 1840 that “under the influence of a judicious flow of immigration from Great Britain one might confidently look forward to a day when the French Canadians would have been absorbed by the predominating English-speaking population, and as a separate people would have ceased to exist.” In a piece entitled, “The French Canadian and the N.P.A.M.” Pope argued that that French Canadians in Quebec remained no different than their ancestors “in temperament and general philosophy of life.”⁹³ After the British conquest, Pope continued, Canada’s French upper class took its money and returned to Europe. Those French Canadians who chose to stay behind were compelled “to rely entirely upon themselves” and to make a living primarily by working the land. They had no choice. There was no support from “*la mère patrie*” and they were “impotent to prevent the direction and control of commerce from passing into the hands of the English merchant.” On the other hand, French Canadians were permitted to practice their own religion, retain their own laws, and assume roles in government. This arrangement allowed French Canadians to hold on, not only to their religion, but also “to their individuality, their language, [and] their customs...in short – their tradition.”⁹⁴ French Canadians in Quebec stayed the course in large part because of the support they received from the Catholic clergy. However, by the end of the First World War, Pope saw French Canadians as being willing to go beyond careers in farming or the “liberal professions.” They could now seek their place in the world of commerce and “assume...in the business world that position which, from the beginning, [they] had enjoyed in the political sphere.” Unfortunately, as Pope suggested, education had not changed to reflect the new dynamics. The clergy continued to influence French Canadian education and it was still focused “on the centuries-old *cours classique*.” In other words, the emphasis remained on Latin and Greek, logic, rhetoric, and philosophy; “higher mathematics” was reserved for those who pursued an engineering education in an *école polytechnique*.⁹⁵

Pope thought French Canadians in Quebec had characteristics that set them apart from other Canadians. Many of their “virtues” were connected to the influence of the Catholic Church. The typical French Canadian was “docile,” deferential to “constituted authority, both civil and religious,” “law-abiding,” “self-reliant,” and inclined to mind his own business.⁹⁶ French Canadians had managed to retain these traits by isolating themselves from the outside world and from “modern thought and modern progress.” Their outlook was more “local.” They were disengaged from international affairs and they considered Europe as “a far-off world with which [they did] not feel directly concerned.” They had no particular interest in the British Empire. This should not have come as a surprise because the “Imperial tie derives its strength largely from sentiment. It is a blood tie, and the French Canadian is not an Anglo-Saxon.”⁹⁷ French Canadian attitudes towards the part-time militia were informed by their abiding belief that Canada faced no credible threat. Moreover, French Canadians, because of their restricted outlook, were not “conscious of, and would be perhaps be unwilling to admit, any obligation arising from Canada’s position as a member of the British Empire.” They saw little likelihood of using armed forces in Canada, and “with [their] use elsewhere, [they do] not feel concerned.” To Pope, this meant that French Canadians

⁸⁹ Ernest Légaré “Le français dans L’Armée Canadienne,” *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Volume VII, October 1929 to July 1930, 228-234. For example, Légaré lamented (233, 234) that there was no French equivalent for ordnance, ammunitions, or the expression “all ranks.”

⁹⁰ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 69.

⁹¹ Le Soleil, Quebec, Monday February 9, 1931. PFP Family Scrapbook. Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 69. Major Légaré moved the motion. Légaré was an active member of the Société.

⁹² The following paragraphs are based on Maurice Pope, “The French Canadian and the N.P.A.M.,” reproduced in Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 83-89.

⁹³ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 83. There continues to be debate about what Lord Durham had in mind with his 1840 report. See Robert Bothwell, *The Penguin History of Canada* (Toronto: Penguin Group, 2006), 183-186.

⁹⁴ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 84.

⁹⁵ Ibid, 85.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 85-86.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 86.

experienced little sense of public duty when they joined the militia and were therefore less motivated to improve themselves as part-time militia. The result was French Canadian units that were not as effective as those of English Canada.⁹⁸

Pope was sympathetic towards French Canadians in Quebec, if somewhat paternalistic in attitude. His analysis highlighted his conceptual skills. He had identified some important strands to explain the history of French Canadians in Quebec and the rest of Canada, such as the impact of the British conquest and the role of the clergy in the lives of French Canadians. Later historians would emphasize the same elements. He was also a realist in his evaluation of Quebec's willingness to participate in the NAPM.

Pope's skills continue to be tested

Another of Pope's major tasks was the revision of Defence Scheme No. 3. The scheme, primarily concerned with deploying Canadian troops overseas, was inextricably related to the reorganization of the militia.⁹⁹ McNaughton saw the reorganization of the militia as the first step to making it ready for deployment overseas, should the need arise. When minister of national defence James Ralston gave McNaughton approval to reorganize the NPAM in 1929, he also gave the CGS permission to start developing "an administrative outline" for mobilizing an expeditionary force. The general staff continued with the work under Donald M. Sutherland, Ralston's successor as minister of national defence. By the time Pope arrived in Ottawa in 1933, the general staff had already circulated the draft plan to the military districts and had received their comments. District staffs expressed various concerns with the plan, not least of them that the plan did not permit sufficient time to assemble battalions at local headquarters. Pope was given the task of revising the plan, which he did during the spring of 1934. This was Pope's first time working with such a high-level document, but he handled it adroitly and efficiently. He discussed concerns and possible changes with the districts, then quickly revised the document. The districts received the new version in June 1934, just under two months. Pope worked well under pressure.

In December 1934, he served as a member of a Canadian delegation that met with Colonel W.W. Torr, the British militia attaché in Washington, D.C. Torr had come to discuss Canada's defence schemes. He had also come to explore whether Canada would opt for neutrality in the event of war between Japan and the United States or would Canada follow Great Britain's lead and begin a rapprochement with Japan, notwithstanding Japan's continued occupation of the Chinese province of Manchuria. The Canadian delegation included Pope, McNaughton, and various other members of the Canadian military.¹⁰⁰ For some of the sessions, Torr met with Pope and McNaughton and at other times, it was just Pope and Torr.¹⁰¹ In one of their bilateral discussions, Torr grilled Pope about Canada's views concerning the situation in the Far East and pressed him on the issue of Japan. Pope underscored to Torr that Canada's priority -what he called the country's 'pillar of cloud by day and pillar of fire by night'- was maintaining good relations between the United States and Great Britain. When Torr asked for more details, Pope took a realist stance. He explained that Canada's position "was not dissimilar to that of the United Kingdom which, in view of the existence of a preponderant French air force, had taken good care during the last 15 years never to maintain a position in direct opposition to French interests and this often in spite of strong inclination to do so, and I instanced the Ruhr."¹⁰² Despite the disagreement, Torr was very grateful to Pope for his candor.¹⁰³ Pope had prevailed because of his conceptual and human skills. He had taken the time to analyse the developments in the Far East, and the Canadian position on them, and argued the Canadian view with tact and diplomacy.

In January 1935, when Crerar returned from his one-year stint at the Imperial Defence College, Pope relinquished his appointment as acting director DMO & I. He did not find that the workload decreased appreciably as Crerar's second-in-command, however. In fact, he recalled that "the pressure" may have been even greater.¹⁰⁴ He continued to help Crerar with the reorganization of the NAPM, despite continued opposition from the various Canadian militia associations. He reviewed the purpose of the reorganization and provided a status report. The report called the existing anxiety "understandable." However, the memorandum stressed that "an attitude of mind which gives priority to a personal consideration over the

⁹⁸ Ibid, 87.

⁹⁹ For the background to the evolution of Defence Scheme #3 in 1931-33, see Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression*, 78-85; Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 79.

¹⁰⁰ LAC, Crerar papers, Volume 10, Folder: Liaison with Military Attaché and air Attaché British Embassy Washington.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. Pope to the CGS, 11 November 1934.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid, Torr to Pope, 14 November 1934.

¹⁰⁴ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 97.

primary aim of enhancing the position of the militia as a whole, is unworthy of acceptance.”¹⁰⁵ Although activity on the reorganization would continue until the end of 1935, it would be at a reduced pace. Pope and the rest of the general staff were alive to the political implications of the reorganization and they did not want it to become an issue in the upcoming federal election.¹⁰⁶

In the meantime, Pope kept busy on the militia’s mobilization plans. Since 1934, he had represented the general staff on the sub-committee on mobilization, chaired by Colonel D.W.B. Spry of the adjutant-general’s office. He quickly established his credibility. Pope set the correct tone on what to do with depots of certain units of the NPAM.¹⁰⁷ The sub-committee had discussed the issue before Pope’s arrival and Spry had circulated a memorandum. The issue itself is less important than how Pope approached it. Writing about the memorandum, Pope stated: “I distinctly remember making the point that if the stand were taken that this document had been adopted at a prior meeting I had nothing to say, but if it was the wish to adopt the memorandum at the present meeting, then I should like to have time to study it.”¹⁰⁸ Pope was not afraid to express his views, but he was never brash, preferring instead a self-effacing approach that put his colleagues and rivals at ease. He knew as well to be deferential to his superiors.¹⁰⁹ The committee was much impressed, and Pope was soon nominated to sit on a sub-committee that would draft new terms of reference for the mobilization sub-committee.¹¹⁰

Over the next few months, Pope became very familiar with the militia’s mobilization scheme - so much so that the mobilization committee assigned him the responsibility for rewriting the *Mobilization Instructions*. The adjutant-general, Major-General Charles F. Constantine, had the lead for mobilization issues. However, Constantine asked Pope – an officer from the general staff - to develop the instructions. Pope thought it would be wise to secure approval of the way ahead from the key players before proceeding. He did so by way of a detailed memorandum that provided an outline of the new mobilization instructions. The memorandum was well-organized, thorough and showed attention to detail. Pope applied his conceptual skills to move the issue forward. He demonstrated that he had an intimate knowledge of the militia’s various service arms and mobilization issues. In addition, Pope demonstrated that he was familiar with issues such as recruitment of reinforcements and terms of enlistment. Pope drew on his British experience to suggest a way ahead for the training of reinforcements. For example, he quoted wastage numbers for infantry and artillery from Great Britain and compared them to those of Canada during the First World War. Pope’s efforts did bear fruit. His plan was approved on 11 April 1935 and he developed the *Mobilization Instructions* before the end of 1935.¹¹¹

Pope goes to the Imperial Defence College

By early-January 1936, Pope was in London for a year of study at the Imperial Defence College (IDC). Crerar recommended him for the course, a sure sign of the former’s opinion that Pope was suited for higher office. Crerar thought Pope was “eminently suitable” for the IDC program and would provide “excellent value in return.”¹¹² Pope was ecstatic when he walked through the doors of 9 Buckingham Gate for his first seminar. He recalled years later that, while staff college had provided “great value” and his two years at the War Office had been “an inestimable privilege,” he was “at a loss for words to describe the good fortune of those who are selected to attend the Imperial Defence College.” He was “once more relieved of all duty, in the company of quite senior sailors, soldiers and airmen, and civil servants, enjoying the rare privilege of studying the strategy, as well as the wider aspects of defence, for the British Commonwealth and Empire.”¹¹³

Pope was the most junior officer from the Canadian militia to attend the Imperial Defence College since it had opened. All his predecessors had held at least the rank of Colonel. McNaughton had been the first Canadian to attend. Pope’s classmates from the three British ‘fighting services’ were between the ages of 42 and 48 – Pope was 46 - and held the ranks of Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel or Wing Commander. All had to be graduates of their staff colleges and were chosen from those who were “expected from their past service and professional ability to rise to the highest appointments in

¹⁰⁵ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2741, HQS5902 Vol. 3, “Scheme for the Reorganization of the Canadian Militia,” General staff Memorandum, 15 July 1935.

¹⁰⁶ Morrison, *The Voice of Defence*, 54-55.

¹⁰⁷ LAC, RG 24 Vol. 2500, HQC1050 Vol. 7, Colonel D.W.B. Spry (Chairman Mobilization Sub-Committee) to Adjutant General, 13 March 1934.

¹⁰⁸ LAC, RG 24 Vol. 2500, HQC1050 Vol. 7, from Pope to Major D.A. Grant, Secretary Mobilization Sub-Committee, 15 March 1934.

¹⁰⁹ Even though his memo was addressed to the Secretary of the Committee, it was intended for the Chairman who was a Colonel.

¹¹⁰ LAC, RG 24 Vol. 2500, HQC 1050 Vol. 7, Minutes of the Mobilization Sub-Committee, 21 March 1934.

¹¹¹ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2500 HQC 1050 Vol. 7, Mobilization Committee, Proceedings of meeting of 11 April 1935.

¹¹² LAC, CP, Vol. 10, Binder #2. Crerar to Major-General R.H. Haining, Imperial Defence College, 5 June 1935.

¹¹³ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 98.

the Fighting Services.”¹¹⁴ The class size was normally thirty people. Although Canada could nominate two people per year, it had done so only four times since 1927.¹¹⁵ In 1936, Pope was joined by Commodore V.G. Brodeur of the Royal Canadian Navy.¹¹⁶

The program included numerous lectures and exercises. The lecturers came from the government, from the three British services, and from the private sector. The speakers’ expertise included foreign policy, defence, trade, finance, and business. Pope recalled how he was struck “by the attention paid to the economic side of warfare, and by the remarkable knowledge possessed by British experts of the economies of our potential enemies.”¹¹⁷ Many of the lectures were intended to inform the various strategic exercises. The exercises could be from two to six weeks in duration depending on the issue discussed. The class broke up into syndicates for each exercise and each syndicate had a member of each of the services plus one or two representatives from civilian departments. Each exercise pertained to the resolution of a strategic issue. When Pope was at the Imperial Defence College, the study program focused on issues emanating from three regions: the Far East, the Middle East, and Europe. The students examined the broad strategic problems of each region, as they pertained to imperial security. The students had to be familiar with each region’s geography, its military problems, its economic and political issues, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the empire and possible rivals in the area.¹¹⁸ Each syndicate was expected to do some role-playing, representing a particular country or set of countries. Each group would present their solution to the group. Solutions from the syndicates were then compared against “the solution evolved by the collective wisdom of the instructors.”¹¹⁹

Pope’s assessment of the program was generally positive, although he did harbour some reservations. He told his wife that he found the syndicate discussions and the lectures to be first-rate. He noted, with approval, that the IDC did not allow the “rather hectic international situation” to disrupt the program.¹²⁰ To Crerar, Pope was more nuanced in his assessment of the program. He was happy with the commandant, Bob Haining. But he did find many of the British instructors, and that included Haining, still buried in the past when it came to imperial relations. They were still pushing the old centralized version of relations between the colonies and the mother country. Pope was at times unimpressed with how exercises unfolded. He lamented the fact that the ‘service mind’ was unable “to think objectively and to see the whole rather than a scattered number of bits.” In addition, he was annoyed by the lack of candour on the part of the participants. The students were not willing to be forthright about challenging current thinking, presumably in the fear that speaking up would harm their career.¹²¹ Pope’s inclination was to speak his mind about issues. He was courageous and confident enough to present alternative views when he thought it was appropriate to do so, even if it went against accepted orthodoxy. This had been his approach since joining the military and he did not see why he should change.

With that in mind, Pope took the lead on many issues during the twelve-month program at IDC. Two situations in particular epitomized Pope’s approach. In the first, the students participated in a mock imperial conference, which was organized around papers that the students had prepared earlier in the course on the outcomes of previous imperial conferences. Pope’s paper read as follows: “that the British Commonwealth had developed in accordance with a natural law of evolution in that executive power had gradually passed from the parent nation to the younger communities overseas; that these younger communities, now fully autonomous, would themselves decide their degree of defensive preparations; that this degree of defensive preparation would be found to be directly proportional to the sense of insecurity of the local public, without whose support political action was impossible; that provision and coordination of effort would become possible by reason of an upsurge of public opinion in the event of a grave emergency...”¹²² But the exercise papers on the dominions and their commitment to imperial defence sounded nothing like that. Pope “tossed his hat into the ring” and pointed out how

¹¹⁴ LAC, RG 24 Vol. 2684, HQS5199 Vol. 2, General staff Memo, “An Outline of the Function and History of the Imperial Defence College,” 5 September 1936.

¹¹⁵ Canada could use one of its slots to send a civilian. The civilian departments had yet to avail themselves of that opportunity in 1936. LAC, RG 24 Vol. 2684, HQS5199 Vol. 2, General staff Memo “An Outline of the Function and History of the Imperial Defence College,” 5 September 1936.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 98.

¹¹⁸ LAC, Crerar papers, Vol. 10, Folder Liaison No. 2, U.K. and U.S., 958c.009 (D212), Address by Crerar on the Imperial Defence College to the Canadian Artillery Association, 9 February 1935, 5.

¹¹⁹ Fraser, *Alanbrooke* (London: Harper Collins, 1982), 75.

¹²⁰ PFP, Pope to wife, 24 September 1936 .

¹²¹ LAC, Crerar papers, Vol. 10, Liaison No. 2, U.K. and U.S., Correspondence with Lt-Colonel M.A. Pope, Pope to Crerar, October 24, 1936.

¹²² Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 99.

the so-called principles contained in the exercise papers he had been issued were hopelessly out of date. He argued that they were unrealistic because the dominions could not simply be told what to do. The ‘principles’ assumed a “highly centralized Empire,” which Pope did not think reflected the current state of “inter-Imperial relation.”¹²³ Pope reported that he had a one-on-one discussion with Haining at the end of the mock imperial conference. Pope explained that it was inappropriate to ask military officials to provide “insight” into what he thought was clearly a political issue. Military men should not be expected to do so. Pope argued that “little can be expected from the application of military technique to the conduct of a political conference.”¹²⁴ He suggested that the Foreign Office and War Office would be of the same view if they were asked to comment on the exercise. Pope’s intervention said a lot about his position on imperial relations. It said just as much about his willingness to express his view to authority. He was not there to win approval from his British hosts. There were more important interests at stake. He was confident that his realist approach to Commonwealth relations was correct and he was willing to defend it.

In a second exercise, the syndicates were asked to develop a British policy towards Europe. Pope thought the objective of British policy should be aimed at calling “a halt to Germany’s employment of Power Politics.” He thought he had observed in British official policy “a growing tendency” to espouse such an approach, coupled with a willingness to “meet [Germany] half-way on the lesser things, such as Memel, Danzig, and even Austria should the latter evince a genuine desire to link up with her great neighbour.”¹²⁵ Pope worked with his friend Archibald Rowlands on the exercise.¹²⁶ He recalled that they were not the official head of their syndicate but that did not prevent them from taking the lead. Pope and Rowlands convinced the syndicate, after some prodding, to propose a regional pact more comprehensive than Locarno. The expanded Locarno that Pope and Rowlands proposed would have included France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria. Yugoslavia, Romania and Russia would also have been asked to join, or so they hypothesized.¹²⁷ Pope did not expect that Germany would be interested. He explained that “if Germany has really peaceful intentions she can come in; if she has not then there will be a club over her head big enough to keep her peaceful.”¹²⁸ Pope recalled that he and Rowlands got a visit from a member of the directing staff, Air Commodore Charles Portal, some weeks later. Their paper was covered with “red ink” and Portal tried to have them change their approach. Pope and Rowlands stuck to their views.¹²⁹

Conclusion

In the period 1931-1936, Pope became a “capital staff officer.” He grew accustomed to his new surroundings very quickly, first at the British War Office and subsequently in Ottawa with the Canadian general staff. He came to understand quickly how a large headquarters worked. He developed a better understanding of relations between the general staff and other defence organizations, how the services related to each other, and the role of civilian and military officials in a democracy. He enhanced his technical skills. He developed good relations with other branches of the general staff and with personnel from the other services. He showed good analytical insight on interconnected issues. It was largely a period of apprenticeship, but there were still opportunities for Pope to exercise leadership, and he capitalized on them. As to Pope’s thoughts on the place of French Canadians in Canada, they underscored his analytical skills. He captured some of the issues that shaped Quebec history and what underlay the province’s sense of vulnerability and distinctness. Few in the military had taken the trouble to reflect on those matters. Throughout the period 1931-1936, Pope was highly motivated, showed superior work ethic, and was always seeking to improve himself. He was adaptable and self-assured, and he worked in a deliberative fashion. Leadership experts associate these important traits with effective leaders.

¹²³ LAC, CP, Vol. 10, Liaison No. 2, U.K. and U.S., Correspondence with Lt-Colonel M.A. Pope, Pope to Crerar, 14 May 1936.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid, Pope to Crerar, 24 September 1936.

¹²⁶ Pope had met Rowlands in 1932 when he was at the War Office. Rowlands worked in finance. The two became close friends.

¹²⁷ LAC, CP, Vol. 10, Liaison No. 2, U.K. and U.S., Correspondence with Lt-Colonel M.A. Pope, Pope to Crerar, 14 May 1936, see also Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 102. There were in fact seven different treaties under Locarno. However, the most important one pertained to the guarantees of the borders between France and Germany and Germany and Belgium, plus the maintenance of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. France, Belgium, and German had agreed to the guarantees and signed the Treaty, and its terms had been guaranteed by Great Britain and Italy. Germany violated the 1925 Treaty when it occupied the Rhineland in 1936.

¹²⁸ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 102.

¹²⁹ Canadian War Museum, Maurice Arthur Pope Collection, (hereafter referred as CWM, Pope Collection), Folder 32. Rowlands to Pope, 2 May 1939. Rowlands told Pope in his 2 May letter that he had met Portal recently. Portal revisited the exchange between the three of them. Portal remembered how he “attacked” the two students concerning the policy they were promoting and, how, he noted, it was now largely the British government policy. Pope took great delight in knowing that Winston Churchill had recommended “a not dissimilar proposal” in a letter to The Times. Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 103.

Chapter 6

Preparing Canada for War: 1937-1939

The Canadian government was in the midst of a defence policy review when Pope returned to the Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence (DMO&I) after completing Imperial Defence College in January 1937. In February 1937, the government issued its defence policy, and Pope became involved in its implementation. At the same time, Pope developed proposals to reorganize Canada's defence institutions and create a new committee structure to prepare Canada for war. Pope and the rest of the general staff had difficulty convincing the government of the importance of the committees. Pope persevered. The government eventually approved a new committee structure, albeit not exactly in the form the general staff had been advocating.

Until the mid-1938, Pope was able to focus on his committee work and not worry too much about operational duties related to DMO&I. However, he was eventually drawn back into directorate tasks because it was understaffed and the work load picked up. His life became even more complicated in August 1938, when he became acting director of DMO&I. This coincided with rising international tensions related to the situation in Czechoslovakia. When Pope left DMO & I at the beginning of 1939, he refocused on his committee work. This chapter explores how Pope's skills allowed him to take the lead in these committees and how he was able to influence how they did their work and the decisions they made. The chapter also examines Pope's conceptual skills and intellect, as reflected in his thoughts on the evolving relationship between Canada and Great Britain.

Implementing the new Canadian defence policy

In January 1937, when Pope resumed his functions in the army's national headquarters, the Liberal Government of William Lyon Mackenzie King had again been in power for over a year. Ian Mackenzie, member of parliament from British Columbia, was the minister of national defence. Major-General E.C. Ashton had replaced Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton as Chief of the General Staff (CGS) in the middle of 1935 and was now well settled in his new post. The relationship between Ashton and Mackenzie was cordial. However, Ashton had no interest in playing the politics of McNaughton, his predecessor.¹

When General Ashton took stock of international events and assessed how well Canada was equipped to respond to the evolving military situation in Europe and Asia, he did not like what he saw. Ashton conveyed the concerns of the general staff to the minister in a series of memoranda, the first of which was an amended version of a document his predecessor had prepared for the prime minister in 1935.² The prime minister read Ashton's revised memorandum in early August 1936, and responded by creating a new sub-committee of cabinet, the Canadian Defence Committee (CDC), which met for the first time on 20 August 1936.³ The prime minister directed all three services to prepare detailed assessments of the Canadian defence situation and to identify "immediate minimum requirements" to address deficiencies. The Joint Staff Committee (JSC) produced a document called "Appreciation of the defence Problems Confronting Canada" that the minister presented to the CDC on 5 September.⁴ Mackenzie explained that the European situation remained complex and fluid. Germany had achieved "a dominant position in European politics," its military preparations were "rapidly approaching comparative completion," and, "in the world of today the chances of a major European war developing into a world war are definitely great." With respect to the situation in Asia, the possibility of war breaking out "brought Canada, as a Pacific Power, face to face with definite local responsibilities concerning defence." The possibility of "direct attack on Canada by Japanese forces [had] become a matter requiring urgent consideration and action." The "direct defence" of Canada was the country's most important defence priority. While the "indirect defence" of the country through "the cooperation with other Empire forces in

¹ Paul Dickson, *A Thoroughly Canadian General, A Biography of General H.D.G. Crerar* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 100; Stephen Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 159.

² LAC, MG27 III B5, Papers of Ian Mackenzie (Mackenzie Papers), Volume 29, X-4, Major general A.G.L. McNaughton memorandum, "The Defence of Canada (A Review of the present position)," 28 May 1935; Volume 29, X-4 "The Requirements of Canadian Defence (A Review of the Present Position)," 12 November 1935; "The requirements of Canadian Defence: A review of the position as of 22 April 1936," 22 April 1936.

³ C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada* (Ottawa: Queen Printer, 1970), 3; see also Roger Sarty, "Silent Sentry: a Military and Political History of Canadian Coast Defence" (PhD. diss., University of Toronto, 1983), 461.

⁴ LAC, Mackenzie Papers, Volume 29, X-6, "Appreciation of the defence problems confronting Canada," 5 September 1936.

a war overseas” was a “secondary responsibility,” Mackenzie told the CDC that if war broke out in Europe, Canadians would have difficulty “remaining at peace.” The minister called for a greater defence effort in light of the evolving international environment. The budgetary request from National Defence totalled \$199 million, of which \$65 million would be for the first year. The military portion was close to \$27 million in the first year and about \$71.3 million in subsequent years. The funding included acquisition of equipment for mobile warfare.⁵

The government laid out Canada’s defence policy and defence priorities when, in February 1937, King and Ian Mackenzie presented the 1937-38 defence estimates in parliament. The policy had three key elements. Canada was going to take the necessary military steps to ensure its neutrality in the event of a war between the United States and Japan. It would proceed with the appropriate measures to defend its coasts, harbours, terminals and large centres. And Canada would contribute “towards the defence of all those countries that may be some day necessarily associate themselves for the purpose of preserving their freedom against an aggressor, come from wherever he may.”⁶ The King government placed its priority on the first two. Parliament approved a total budget of \$36 million for 1937-1938 for National Defence, a far cry from the \$65 million requested in the joint memorandum.⁷

Pope had mixed feelings about King’s approach to defence in early 1937. On the one hand, he considered King’s February speech on the estimates to be “the first positive statement on defence policy made by a leader of government since Confederation.” On the other hand, Pope was unhappy with what he considered inadequate increases to defence budgets. Pope acknowledged that threats to Canada or Canadian interests were of “an exceptionally low order,” but, he added, the country was “not in a position successfully to meet them.” Pope explained that it was “an essential obligation” of a military headquarters to prepare for war, but Canada’s military had not been given the means to do so. He maintained that the general staff was organized for “peace-time routine administration” and unable to “contemplate the very considerable task of war preparation.”⁸ He explained the situation some twenty five years later as “the lot of public officials to become aware of the need for remedial action long before it becomes politically expedient, or even possible, to take it.”⁹

Shortly after Pope rejoined the Directorate of Directorate of Military Operations, he was tasked with the many issues associated with the issue of Canadian neutrality in the event of a war between the United States and Japan. Pope was already familiar with the file, since he had to read up about it before he had met Colonel W.W. Torr in 1934. The issue of Canadian neutrality had been of concern to Canada since the Japanese Army had invaded Manchuria in 1931. At the beginning of 1937, the CGS asked Pope to prepare a general staff paper for the 1937 Imperial Conference that laid out the principle of neutrality for Canada. Pope argued that “the abstention of a state from all participation in a war imposes a definite obligation, namely, the maintenance of an attitude of impartiality in its dealings with belligerents and, correspondingly the recognition by belligerents of this abstention and impartiality.” Recognition on the part of the belligerents would be a function of the extent to which the non-belligerent state “could defend its neutrality, or in other words, to maintain its right of sovereignty.”¹⁰

⁵ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2693 HQ5199-B, Vol. 1, Ashton to the Minister of National Defence, 9 September 1936; also in LAC, MacKenzie Papers, Vol. 29, X-6.

⁶ Maurice Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians: The Memoirs of Lt-Gen. Maurice A. Pope* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 125.

⁷ Despite the smaller sums, the prime minister had trouble with some Cabinet ministers. There were also many members of Parliament who were not convinced the threat to Canada warranted such levels of defence spending. Roger Sarty, “Silent Sentry: a Military and Political History of Canadian Coast Defence” (PhD. diss., University of Toronto, 1983), 474-478; see also Sarty, “Mr. King and the Armed Forces,” in *A Country of Limitations: Canada and the World in 1939*, edited by Norman Hillmer, Robert Bothwell, Roger Sarty and Claude Beauregard (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1996), 217-246.

⁸ National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), Canadian Armed Forces Personnel Records Envelope, Maurice A. Pope, 112.3S2009 (D23), “Comparative Study of Organization of DND – March 37/Apr 1942;” “The Organization of the Department of National Defence,” 3 March 1937.

⁹ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 92

¹⁰ LAC, RG24, Vol. 2684, HQS5199, Vol. 2, “Imperial Conference, 1937, Canadian Defence,” 16 January 1937. Crerar also asked Pope in early 1937 to analyse the neutrality implications of an impending request from the United States to use Canadian territory and/or territorial waters for running a United States-Alaska air service. Pope explored the issue of how Canada could maintain its neutrality if it authorized the air service and the United States became engaged subsequently in a military conflict “with another Pacific Power.” Crerar called Pope’s memorandum a sound analysis. See LAC, RG24 Vol. HQS 5199-A, Volume 2, Crerar to Chief of the General Staff (CGS), 16 February 1937.

When the three services decided to re-constitute the Joint Staff Sub-Committee on Neutrality in early 1937, Pope represented the general staff and took on the position of chair.¹¹ The three services ranked the preparation of plans for the maintenance of Canadian neutrality “second only in importance to service plans in respect to the defence of Canada.”¹² The sub-committee submitted its plan to the JSC in September 1937. The report assessed possible action by the belligerents. It reviewed the rules of neutrality. After that, it explored what Canada needed to do to assert its neutrality and what capabilities it could deploy if it was compelled to do so.¹³ The minister of national defence approved the plan in late January. It became Defence Scheme No. 2, the “Plan for the Maintenance of Canadian Neutrality in the event of a war between the United States and Japan.”¹⁴ Pope acknowledged years later that the assumptions governing Defence Scheme No. 2 were unrealistic. He explained that the “idea that it might some day become incumbent on Canada to defend her neutrality was the height of absurdity. For it was clear that should the United States become involved in a war in the Far East our West Coast... would immediately become of vital importance to the former in the prosecution of the war. Consequently, it was equally clear that if in such circumstances Canada should attempt to remain neutral and aloof, our American neighbours would ride roughshod over us and make use of our territory and facilities as it pleased them.”¹⁵

Another task for Pope in 1937 had to do with updating Defence Scenario 3. Pope had rewritten the defence scheme in 1934-35, and the general staff issued a new version in August 1936. The first order of business for Pope was to modify Defence Scheme No. 3 to reflect the government’s defence policy as it had been laid out in February 1937. The general staff launched the process by submitting to the minister of national defence the general framework of the new scheme. The covering memorandum stressed that the focus of Canada’s forces would now be on the direct defence of Canada, although it added that “the possibility of a Government decision to despatch Canadian forces overseas has not been ignored, and the revised text includes arrangements to enable this to be done if necessary.”¹⁶ Defence Scheme No. 3 assumed three scenarios: war in the Far East; war in Europe; and a world war in which German and Japan would form a coalition. In light of these scenarios, the scheme envisaged “adequate local defence of the coastal Military Districts,” ensuring “internal security of all Military Districts... against minor military operations...” and “the speedy mobilization, and concentration wherever necessary, of a Mobile Force of all arms capable of independent action.”¹⁷ The Mobile Force (a new term that replaced the Field Force of the previous version) would consist of an army corps of two divisions and ancillary units.¹⁸ It would be utilized primarily to respond to enemy landings on Canadian territory, but the scheme did not rule out the possibility of the Mobile Force deploying abroad should the government choose to do so.¹⁹

The chief of the general staff forwarded the document to the minister for approval, which was duly secured. In a handwritten note, the minister told the CGS that he was “glad to observe that the dominant motif of the plan” was the defence of Canada and internal security, but he added “that whereas Government policy is at the moment concerned with the defence of Canada and the protection of Canadian neutrality it is the duty of the Staff to prepare for every possible contingency.”²⁰ In other words, the minister acknowledged that the CGS had not ruled out the possibility of deploying the Mobile Force overseas. Pope recalled later that, while the Canadian Corps “might conceivably be held for service at home,

¹¹ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2684, HQS5199-A, Volume 2, CGS to Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) and Senior Air Officer (SAO), 9 April 1937. The sub-committee had initially sat in February 1933 to discuss the matter and had prepared the Beeman report. Defence had passed it on to External Affairs, which had sat on it. Sarty, “Silent Sentry: a Military and Political History of Canadian Coast Defence,” 415.

¹² LAC, RG24 Vol. 2693, HQS5199A, Vol. 3, from the three service chiefs to the Minister, 20 January 1938.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid. Joint Staff Committee (JSC), from CGS, CNS and SAO to the Minister of National Defence, 25 January 1938; also LAC, MacKenzie Papers, X-18.

¹⁵ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 91. For a different perspective, see Sarty, “Entirely in the Hands of the Friendly Neighbour: The Canadian Armed Forces and the Defence of the Pacific Coast, 1919-1939,” in *The Maritime Defence of Canada*, edited by Roger Sarty (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996), 97-98; also Sarty, “Mr. King and the Armed Forces,” in *A mixed feelings: Canada and the World in 1939*, edited by Norman Hillmer, Robert Bothwell, Roger Sarty and Claude Beaugard (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1996), 217-246.

¹⁶ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2646, HQS3498 Vol. 10, Covering Memo to the Minister, Defence Scheme No. 3, March 1937.

¹⁷ Ibid, Defence Scheme No. 3.

¹⁸ Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 181.

¹⁹ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2646 HQS3498, Vol. 10, “Defence Scheme 3,” 13 February 1939. In the words of C.P. Stacey, Defence Scheme No. 3 “was a mobilization plan combined with a plan for local defence. It could not be a general war plan or plan of operations without discussion and coordination with Canada’s potential allies” and the government did not permit that. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 108.

²⁰ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2648 HQS3498, Vol. 22, Minister to Chief of the General staff; see also Sarty, “Silent Sentry: a Military and Political History of Canadian Coast Defence,” 568-569; Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 183.

there was no doubt in our minds that in the coming war with Germany the Government of the day would decide on its dispatch overseas.”²¹ Mackenzie King’s priority remained home defence and he expected national defence to establish defence procurement requirements accordingly. The military would have preferred to purchase equipment for an expeditionary force. Historian Stephen Harris has pointed out that the situation “played havoc with the army’s justification for new equipment.”²²

After the general staff received the minister’s blessing, the CGS asked Pope to take the lead in fleshing out the chapter on local defence and internal security of Defence Scheme No. 3. The chapter established the roles of district officers commanding (DOC) for the protection of their districts against four main kinds of threats. They included attacks on Canadian coastal ports and certain inland centres, with corresponding threat levels defined by estimates of forms and scales of attack, and damage to vulnerable points by disaffected persons. In addition, the list envisaged the possibility of raids by enemy sympathisers from across the U.S. border as well as civil unrest. The scheme established how the forces would be organized to respond to these threats. The chapter also contained an expanded section on the protection of vulnerable points.²³ The general staff asked district commanders with responsibility for ports and other coastal facilities (districts 5, 6, 7, 11) to develop a general outline of their plans for local defence, internal security, and for the defence of ports.²⁴ Pope was responsible for reviewing the annual local defence plans.²⁵ In addition, he spearheaded changes to the authorities of district commanders for consulting on vulnerable points. Before 1938, local commanders were authorized to consult with appropriate provincial and municipal government authorities concerning vital point security in their jurisdictions, but they were not allowed to discuss the matter with the heads of private corporations. Pope convinced Crerar to seek the minister’s approval for district commanders to consult with various large companies that owned important infrastructure. Defence Scheme No. 3 was strictly for the land forces. The navy and air force agreed in 1938 that they would work with the militia to develop a similar scheme for all three services and decided to establish a joint sub-committee to examine the matter. Pope chaired the sub-committee. The minister approved the new joint plan in July 1938.²⁶

Organizing Canada for war

In addition to its many other duties, Pope examined two high-level issues in 1937 that influenced how defence was organized by the start of the Second World War. First, he studied the merits of establishing a new committee structure to prepare Canada in the event of war or emergency. Secondly, he proposed some changes to the organization of Canada’s defence establishment.²⁷ With respect to the first issue, Pope called the Canadian Defence Committee “the most important step taken with respect to defence for a great number of years.”²⁸ However, Pope did not think that the committee would be capable of discharging all of its responsibilities on its own. He thought the government should create sub-committees under the Canadian Defence Committee to help out in what he called “Canada’s defensive preparations in its wider aspect.”²⁹ He recommended committees to oversee the development of a War Book, war emergency legislation, and censorship

²¹ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 93, 123.

²² Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 183. See also Dickson, *A Thoroughly Canadian General*, 108.

²³ The concept of protection of vulnerable points was not new. The Canadian government had instituted protection of vulnerable points at the beginning of the First World War. LAC, RG24 Vol. 2643, HQS 3498 Vol. 7, “Protection of Vulnerable Points during the Great War,” 7 December 1937. See also Sarty, “Silent Sentry: a Military and Political History of Canadian Coast Defence,” 573.

²⁴ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2643, HQS 3498 Vol. 7, Crerar to Military Districts 5,6,7,and 11, 5 March 1938; also RG24 Vol. 1154, HQS 3653, Crerar to Military District 7, 5 March 1938; Crerar to Military District 7, 11 March 1938.

²⁵ LAC, RG24, Vol. 2645, HQS3498, Vol. 8, DMO&I to DOC, 12 October 1937; NDHQ DHH 112.3 M2014 (D1)) Defence Scheme No. 3.

²⁶ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2645 HQS 3498 Vol. 6, Ashton to the Minister 9 November 1937. On the evolution of the Defence Scheme No. 3 in 1937 and 1938, see “Silent Sentry: a Military and Political History of Canadian Coast Defence,” 605, footnote 179. See also Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 108.

²⁷ Pope prepared two memorandums. They are found in National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), Canadian Armed Forces Personnel Records Envelope, Maurice A. Pope, 112.3S2009 (D23), (1) “A Canadian organization for the Higher Direction of National Defence, 8 March 1937 (A Canadian organization);” (2) “The Organization of the Department of National Defence,” 9 March 1937. The first memorandum is also in LAC, RG24 Vol. 2697, HQS5199-K; and the second in LAC, RG2 18, Vol. 2, D. 19 as well LAC, Crerar Papers, MG 30 E-157 Vol. 11, Folder Canadian Organization for the Higher Direction of National Defence.

²⁸ “A Canadian organization,” 8.

²⁹ *Ibid*, 1-2.

provisions.³⁰ These new committees were essential because the next war would be conducted “under conditions and with method which are difficult if not impossible to visualize.”³¹ It would be much more total in nature, with Canada likely be called upon to organize “a national effort in which, not only the combatant services, but every branch of government, and all the resources of industry, and of manpower” would be involved.³² Pope was prescient about the nature of the next war.³³

Inside the defence organization, Pope looked at the Defence Council and the JSC. Pope did not think the Defence Council worked very effectively. It was comprised of the minister as president, the deputy minister as vice president, the heads of the three services, the three senior administrative heads of the militia, the Judge Advocate General, and a secretary. Pope predicted that the demands on the Defence Council were likely to increase. It would respond more effectively if it was a smaller organization. His views were informed by his experience at the British War Office. He had noticed that the Army Council was too large and unwieldy and, as a result, did not meet very regularly. He saw the much the same in Canada. To resolve the issue in Canada, Pope proposed removing the three administrative heads of the militia and the Judge Advocate General from the council.

Pope then turned to the Joint Staff Committee (JSC). The DMO&I served as its secretary. Pope thought the demands on the JSC, like those on the Defence Council, would likely go up in the coming months. He recommended that the organization be retained, but that it should be renamed the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and that the three services be placed on an equal footing. Pope stressed the importance of the services working together. The recent war had demonstrated the importance of combined naval and land operations. It was now even more important, “given the constant and inescapable necessity for combining air action with that of the other services, and the increased, and now total, dependence of all three services on the resources of industry and skilled manpower.”³⁴ And finally, he recommended that the position of secretary should be “filled by a full-time officer, preferably a graduate of the Imperial Defence College.”³⁵ Pope was probably trying to create the position for himself.

Pope explained that there was a need for both the Defence Council and the proposed COSC. The former should continue to provide advice on what he called “the general policy” of the Defence Services. The latter would provide “technical” advice to the minister, and, in some cases, to cabinet. Pope explained the relationship of the Council to the COSC as follows: “The general direction of the three services as a whole, which is the special responsibility of the Defence Council, would be based, in the last analysis, on the approved recommendations of the COSC resulting from a technical appreciation of the country’s defence problems.”³⁶ The Defence Council would allow for more coordination between civilian and military officials. In fact, Pope called for “a single, concentric policy of National Defence, embracing, not only the activities of the three Services, but, to some extent in peace and certainly in war, those of many civil Departments of State as well.”³⁷

Pope explored the role of the deputy minister on the Defence Council. Once again, his recommendations were informed by his experience at the War Office in 1931-33. He had detected a major difference between Canada’s Defence Council and the British Army Council. The vice president of the British Army Council was the parliamentary under-secretary of state of war, an elected politician. The deputy minister of national defence, an unelected official, served on the Defence Council in much the same way. Political control was always “assured” in Great Britain; it was not the case in Canada.³⁸ The permanent under-secretary of state for war was a member of the Army Council, but he did not serve as vice president. There was therefore a clear dividing line between public servants and their political masters on the British Army Council, but not so in the Canadian model.³⁹ Pope did not think that the deputy minister should serve as vice president of the Defence Council because only a member of cabinet should fill in when the minister was absent. If no replacement was

³⁰ The Committee on Defence Coordination would develop the War Book, which outlined what needed to be done in the event of an emergency or war. The Committee on Emergency Legislation would determine what legislation and regulations were required to implement the War Book.

³¹ “A Canadian organization,” 1-2

³² *Ibid.*, 9.

³³ “A Canadian organization,” 9-10

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 14.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

³⁸ “The Organization of the Department of National Defence,” 4.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

available, the Defence Council should simply not meet.⁴⁰ His recommendations reflected a sound understanding of the proper role of elected officials in a democracy.

Pope had another problem with the current role of the deputy minister. Because he was vice president of the Defence Council, the three chiefs had to go through him before proposals reached the minister - and that made the deputy minister effectively their chief of staff. Pope thought it all wrong: "if there is grave objection to the appointment of a Chief of Staff drawn from one of the three services how much more overwhelming must be the argument against the appointment of a civilian Chief of Staff."⁴¹ Pope thought the situation could be easily remedied if the deputy minister, while still a member of the Defence Council, no longer served as vice president, and recommended that each of the Chiefs report directly to the minister on service-specific issues. Pope stressed that this was not an effort to curtail the power of the deputy minister. The deputy minister would continue to assume his responsibilities "and his one effective source of power, namely that of financial control, would remain unimpaired."⁴²

Most of Pope's recommendations concerning the internal re-organization of the department were officially approved over time.⁴³ The members of the JSC acted on Pope's proposals concerning the Defence Council and the Joint Staff Committee when they travelled to the Imperial Conference in the spring of 1937, but the minister did not give his approval to making them permanent. He did, however, put the services on equal footing. At the end of 1938, he authorized the re-designation of the Senior Air Officer to Chief of the Air Staff. The head of the air service no longer had to report through the CGS. The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization was renamed the Chiefs of Staff Committee at the beginning of 1939. And, by the summer of 1940, the deputy minister was no longer the vice president of the Defence Council. In many ways, Pope was a key architect of Canada's wartime decision-making apparatus.

In early April 1937, the minister of national defence took to cabinet proposals for a new government committee structure, largely along the lines of what Pope had suggested. Cabinet approved the recommendations a few weeks later, but the implementation of the committees followed a long drawn-out process. Pope was kept busy producing internal memoranda for the CGS and the deputy minister.⁴⁴ Pope's series of memoranda are important because they highlight his perseverance in getting the committees and sub-committees up and working. When the general staff learned in early August 1937 that O.D. Skelton, under-secretary of state for external affairs, was getting close to making a decision on the committee structure, Pope wrote a detailed memorandum from the general staff to the minister of national defence that laid out how the military was hoping the sub-committees would be created and how they would operate. Because the committees were to be interdepartmental, the "impetus" for creating the sub-committees, Pope counselled, should come from the prime minister. The deputy minister of the department most directly involved with the subject would chair the relevant sub-committee. Each sub-committee would nominate a joint secretary to assist the ex-officio secretary who would ideally come from the department most closely involved with the subject matter to be investigated.⁴⁵ Pope called the Cabinet Secretariat "the corner-stone of the whole edifice." Its secretary was to serve as ex-officio secretary of all the sub-committees. Pope had thought through how the process should work and was intent on seeing it implemented.

The Governor-in-Council officially approved the interdepartmental committees on 14 March 1938. They included the Committee on the Treatment of Aliens and Alien Property, the Committee on Censorship, the Committee on Treatment of Ships and Aircraft the Committee on Air Raid Precautions, the Committee on Emergency Legislation, and the Committee on Defence Coordination.⁴⁶ The committees were identical to those that Pope had proposed. However, the government decided not to follow his suggestions on reporting relationships and structures. There would be no secretariat with responsibilities to support the Canadian Defence Committee and coordinate the work of its various sub-committees. Instead,

⁴⁰ For Pope's speculation about why Canada did not follow British practice, see paragraph 7 of "The Organization of the Department of National Defence."

⁴¹ "The Organization of the Department of National Defence," 8.

⁴² *Ibid*, 10.

⁴³ Crerar circulated Pope's proposal on the composition of the defence council to the heads of the other administrative branches of the Militia before they were submitted to the Minister. They were generally supportive of the proposal. LAC, RG24 Vol. 2697, HQS5199-K, Acting Master-General of the Ordnance (MGO) to CGS, 22 August 1940; Major-General E.J.C. Schmidlin, Quartermaster-General (QMG) to Crerar, 19 August 1940; MGO to CGS, 23 August 1940.

⁴⁵ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2759, HQS6615, Memorandum to the Minister, "Defence Committee: organization of sub-committees," 14 August 1937.

⁴⁵ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2759, HQS6615, Memorandum to the Minister, "Defence Committee: organization of sub-committees," 14 August 1937.

⁴⁶ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2759, HQS6615, Minute of meeting of the Committee of the Privy Council of 14 March 1938.

the department of national defence would coordinate the work of the interdepartmental committees and all were to report to the minister. Once the committees finished their work, the minister of national defence would submit their reports to the Canadian Defence Committee or to full cabinet. Instead of having a permanent secretary, national defence would appoint a person to serve as general secretary to all the committees. The minister of national defence agreed that Pope would assume this function.⁴⁷ Pope had to attend the many meetings of the committees for which national defence was directly responsible, including censorship. He participated in the meetings of the other committees and helped out as required. This included developing many of the committee documents and reports. He tabled all briefs to the JSC before they were forwarded to the minister of national defence. Pope fully expected “to give the greater part of his time to committee work.”⁴⁸

Crerar revealed his very positive views on Pope in March 1938.⁴⁹ In a memorandum on staff appointments to the DMO & I, Crerar thought Pope should assume the director’s duties if Crerar was transferred or promoted. In the meantime, he believed that Pope would be serving an even more important function in “his inspiration and coordination” of the various interdepartmental committees. In Crerar’s estimation, there was “nothing of such fundamental importance to the successful evolution of measures required for the defence of Canada as the work of these Committees.” Moreover, if the Government appointed a permanent secretary to the Canadian Defence Committee, he believed Pope to be the only possible choice, given “his intellectual qualifications and his previous experience...” Thus, in the eyes of Crerar, Pope had the correct set of skills to establish trust very quickly with the various sub-committees and work effectively with its members. It demanded someone with strong personal power to influence the various committees because a permanent secretary would have no direct authority over them. Crerar acknowledged that Pope would no longer be available to the department. However, he would be of greater value to National Defence “in an indirect capacity.” Crerar also believed that it was “quite essential to ensure that Lt-Col. Pope’s promotion and prospects be assured.” Crerar recommended that Pope be appointed secretary to the JSC with the temporary rank of Colonel and that the director of DMO&I be relieved of those duties. He believed that the rank of Colonel would be warranted, given Pope’s new responsibilities as secretary of the Joint Staff Committee and general secretary of the interdepartmental committees.⁵⁰ By the summer of 1938, Pope was a colonel and secretary on the JSC.

Pope and the committees - The Master Military Bureaucrat

The Committee on Censorship met for the first time in late March 1938. It was chaired by the deputy minister of national defence. Pope had been preparing himself for the first meeting of the committee for weeks. He read about the Canadian experience on censorship in the First World War. He perused the papers of the informal interdepartmental committee on censorship that national defence had created earlier in the 1930s.⁵¹ Pope thought hard about the nature of censorship Canada should consider.⁵² He recalled that he made significant use of British documents on censorship to develop the Canadian approach.⁵³ However, it was not simply a matter of taking British documents and changing the committee title. Pope still had to acquaint himself with the subject matter and how it applied to Canada.

By early August 1938, Pope had already finished drafting his First Interim Report for the committee and it was in the hands of the minister of national defence. The report was labelled “Interim” because the committee wanted the government to endorse the general approach to censorship before proceeding with the necessary regulations.⁵⁴ In general terms, censorship aimed to do two things: prevent the enemy from gaining information “inimical to the national interest,” and secure valuable defence and economic information from the enemy for conducting the war. Pope’s report recommended that the government institute censorship for communications transmitted by submarine cables, radio, and the printed press. Censorship was also to apply to postal and other means of communication to the extent it was deemed advisable. The

⁴⁷ LAC RG24 Vol. 2759, HQS6615, Crerar to CGS 30 July 1938.

⁴⁸ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2759, HQS6615, Joint Staff Memorandum, 28 February 1938.

⁴⁹ LAC, Crerar papers, Vol. 9, Crerar to CGS, 29 March 1938.

⁵⁰ Crerar said of the creation of these committees that “it did more for “Defence” both local and imperial, that all my other activities in this job [DMO&I] put together.” Dickson, *A Thoroughly Canadian General*, 112.

⁵¹ The former committee had met only sporadically and it had not consulted outside the government. On the background to the earlier work, see note prepared by Pope in LAC, RG 24 Vol. 2760, HQS 6615-1, “Note on Present Position with regard to Censorship,” 25 March 1938.

⁵² LAC, RG24 Vol. 2759 HQS6615, Letter from Laflèche to Read, 19 November 1937.

⁵³ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 128.

⁵⁴ The government had the power to institute the regulations under the War Measures Act, 1914. LAC, J. E. Read Papers, MG30 E-148 (Read Papers), Vol. 8, Folder 52, “Committee on Censorship First Interim Report August 1938.”

government should decentralise and divide responsibility for censorship between National Defence (cable and wireless messages), Transport (Radio), Post Office (Postal), and Secretary of State (Press).⁵⁵

Pope guided the discussions of the first meeting of the Committee on Treatment of Ships and Aircraft, held on 11 April 1938.⁵⁶ The committee's task was to determine how the government should treat ships or aircraft of all nationalities in the event of war or emergency, but especially what to do with enemy ships and aircraft that were within Canadian territory when hostilities began. Although Pope was not the official secretary of the committee, he took the lead in its work. At the first meeting, Pope tabled a memorandum that showed him in complete control of his subject matter. Many of the issues covered by Pope's memorandum clearly fell outside the technical knowledge demanded of a general staff officer. Pope read up on the issues. For example, he explored how the government could prohibit the transfer to foreign flags of ships registered in Canada and how it could assume control of the movements of Canadian merchant ships. He examined how the government would go about requisitioning of Canadian vessels that may be required for defence. Pope was a quick learner who could make himself an authority, even in subjects that were fairly unfamiliar to him.

Pope worked assiduously and intelligently with the Committee on Defence Coordination as well. Chaired by the deputy minister of national defence, the committee comprised representatives from all major federal departments, who "were to inquire and report upon a system of coordinating the action of several Departments of the Government and/or other agencies in Canada in the event of war, or emergency real of apprehended." The committee's ultimate objective was to produce a War Book, the purpose of which was twofold: to describe all the measures that Canada would implement when it moved from a state of peace to a state of war (initiating the Precautionary and War Stages); and to provide to all departments concerned what they needed to know as the country moved along the process. Pope primed himself for the first meeting of the Committee on Defence Coordination, which took place in April 1938. He reviewed the War Book that his father had prepared before the beginning of the First World War. He thought that the instrument had achieved its purpose at the time but that, "after a lapse of a generation," the committee needed to develop a new document.⁵⁷ He did not think the committee needed to work in the dark. The British had been developing and revising their War Book for the last thirty years. Pope thought the British War Book would be valuable "as a basis of comparison" for Canada to develop its own document. After reviewing the material, Pope prepared a memorandum to guide the committee's discussions. He explained to the committee that the War Book need not include all of the information for each department. Instead, each department was to produce its own War Book, which would explain how the department intended to implement the relevant provisions of the government War Book.⁵⁸ Pope did not present a complete framework for the War Book at the first meeting because the document's organization would be a function of the reports from the various other committees, including the committees on Air Raid, Treatment of Ships and Aircraft, and Censorship. The War Book would therefore be completed as part of an iterative process.⁵⁹

As general secretary, Pope also attended, very regularly, the meetings of the Committee on Emergency Legislation, which first sat in June 1938. Whereas the Committee on Defence Coordination developed the War Book and determined what needed to be done in the event of an emergency or war, the Committee on Emergency Legislation identified and developed the necessary legal framework required to implement the War Book. The committee concluded early on that the War Measures Act provided the government all the legislative powers it needed "to take pretty well whatever action might be found necessary to meet the exigencies of war or other emergency."⁶⁰ However, that was not the case for regulatory powers.⁶¹ The regulations were meant to provide the necessary delegated authorities to the ministers who were in charge of such matters as internal security, the prevention of sabotage, the treatment of aliens, censorship, control of trade, shipping, civil aviation, and transport. In advance of the first meeting, Pope dug up and circulated old regulatory documents from the First World War, including the *Defence of Canada Order 1917* to inform the discussions. Pope also provided the committee

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ LAC, Read Papers, Vol. 8, Folder 44, Minutes of Meeting of 11 April.

⁵⁷ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2768, HQS6615-6 Vol. 1, Pope note for Committee on Defence Coordination, "Note on the nature of the work to be undertaken by the Committee," 4 April 1938.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid, Memorandum from Pope to members of Committee on Defence Coordination, 28 April 1938.

⁶⁰ The only exception was in the area of Finance. LAC, RG24 Vol. 2766, HQS6615-5 Vol. 4, Minutes of second meeting of Committee on Emergency Legislation, 10 June 1938; *Defence of Canada Regulations*, Government of Canada (Ottawa: Canada, 1939), 3.

⁶¹ Ibid.

with a detailed summary of the subjects that the other committees were discussing.⁶² The sharing of information was important.

Pope and the committees - Pope takes charge

Pope started to fall behind on his committee work in the summer of 1938 because he was pulled back into DMO & I duties, the more so when Crerar departed in early August to assume the position of commandant of the Royal Military College.⁶³ Pope became acting director, but the directorate was short-staffed because there was no replacement for him when he was bumped up. There was just Pope and two other staff officers.⁶⁴ In addition, Crerar's departure coincided with a sharp increase in tension over the future of Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland region and increased concerns over defence issues in Canada. Pope discovered that balancing his committee work and DMO&I responsibilities was not easy, especially since "not a week passed...before the despatches from the Dominions Office made it abundantly clear that events were fast moving towards a crisis." He was mindful that "there was much to be done in DMO & I before the storm broke, if an unpleasant situation was to be avoided." Between the end of August and the beginning of October, he was therefore under "intense (sic) pressure." He was able to juggle both functions, but in his words, "day and night work has its limits."⁶⁵

There were some key DMO&I issues that demanded Pope's attention. For example, when Pope began to examine the lists of vulnerable points that the districts had submitted, he realized that some of the local commanders had interpreted too broadly Section 12 of Defence Scheme No. 3.⁶⁶ The result was far too many vulnerable points to protect and too few military forces to do it. Many of these sites were factories and utilities. Pope argued that the threats to these sites consisted mostly of sabotage by agents or disgruntled employees, threats that could be handled by the local police forces.⁶⁷ In Pope's view, the department had to be clearer, and more restrictive, about what it meant by "Vulnerable points." The CGS and the minister both agreed with Pope, who sent clarifying direction to all districts in September 1938. Pope's direction indicated that "military protection [would] be provided only at vulnerable points the maintenance of which is essential to the national welfare, or to the effective prosecution of the war, and which at the same time are of such a nature that military guards can in fact render effective protection."⁶⁸ The direction also specified canals, key railway points, arsenals, and armouries that required military protection.⁶⁹

Pope had to rationalize district defence plans developed as part of Defence Scheme No. 3. A good example of this was Pope's correspondence with Brigadier H.E. Boak, DOC of Military District 6, in September 1938.⁷⁰ Boak's plan consisted of protecting vulnerable points and defending Halifax, Sydney, and the Strait of Canso against attack in accordance with Defence Scheme No. 3. Boak thought he would need two cavalry regiments, three mobile artillery batteries,

⁶² LAC, RG24 Vol. 2766 HQS6615-5, Minutes of second meeting of Committee on Emergency Legislation, 10 June 1938; Pope to MacNeill, 17 June 1938.

⁶³ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2759, HQS6615-5, Pope to CGS, 12 December 1938.

⁶⁴ Major W.H.S. Macklin served as G.S.O. (II) and Captain H.A. Sparling as G.S.O. (III). Lieut. C.J.H. Wattsford was attached to look after intelligence. LAC, RG24 Vol. 18,723, Return of Strength at Defence Headquarters, 31 July 1938. Macklin would rise in the army during the Second World War. When he was the commander of the 13th infantry brigade in 1944, he wrote an important report on the issue of mobilization of the home forces for service overseas. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 591; see also Daniel Byers, *Zombie Army The Canadian Army and Conscript in the Second World War* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), including 125, 133, 170, 171.. Macklin would later become deputy chief of staff at Canadian Military Headquarters and the army's adjutant general after the war.

⁶⁵ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2759, HQS6615-5, Pope to CGS, 12 December 1938.

⁶⁶ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2646, HQS3498, Pope to District Officer Commanding Military District No 1 to 13, 9 September 1938. See also Sarty, "Silent Sentry: a Military and Political History of Canadian Coast Defence," 573-575.

⁶⁷ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 130-1; Sarty, "Silent Sentry: a Military and Political History of Canadian Coast Defence," 575

⁶⁸ LAC, Mackenzie papers, Vol. 30, X-52, District Officer Commanding Military Districts No. 1 to 13 Defence Scheme, 9 September 1938.

⁶⁹ LAC RG24 Vol. 1154, HQS3653 Vol. 1, Pope to District Officer Commanding Military District No. 7, 20 September 1938. There was significant parallel between the sites listed in the general staff memo and the vulnerable points that the general staff identified during the First World War. See RG 24, Vol. 2646, Vol. 9, DMO&I to District Officers Commanding (DOsC), 9 September 1938 and Vol. 2645 HQS 3498, Vol. 8, General staff, "Review of Measures for Local Defence during the Great war," 22 November 1937. See also Sarty, "Silent Sentry: a Military and Political History of Canadian Coast Defence," 606.

⁷⁰ Boak's memorandum is in LAC, RG24 Vol. 2744 HQS 5902-2, Boak to Secretary, Department of National Defence, 12 September 1938. Pope's analysis is found in LAC, RG24 Vol. 2646 HQS3498 Vol. 9, Pope to CGS, 21 September 1938 and RG24 Vol. 2744, HQS5902 Vol. 5, Pope to Boak, 7 October 1938.

and seven infantry battalions, in addition to the units needed for port defences to deliver his mission.⁷¹ Pope argued that Boak's demands were excessive. He reminded Boak of the nature of the threat envisaged in Defence Scheme No. 3 for his district. It included bombardment from the sea and from the air for all three sites, and in the cases of Halifax and Sydney, attacks by raiding parties of no more than 250. The three areas were to defend themselves against bombardment from the sea or air with the fixed and anti-air armament on hand. (Defence Scheme No. 3 assumed that the enemy would aim at destroying valuable assets in the port, such as dry-docks or naval dockyards.) The fixed and anti-air armament provided the only effective army defence against bombardment. Infantry and the cavalry not assigned to vulnerable point security were to be used to repel raids. Troops actually protecting the vulnerable points had to defend against "acts of stealth on the part of individuals or very small parties" and not against "organized attacks by armed bodies." Pope estimated that enemy forces would be unable to approach the port by way of the harbour because they would be in range of coast guns. Therefore, the only way for the enemy to approach would be to land on the coast outside the range of the port's guns and proceed from there. Since such raids were not expected to exceed 250 men, the allocation of one rifle battalion and a quota of machine guns should be sufficient for Halifax and Sydney.⁷²

Pope arrived at his conclusions after studying the relevant clauses of the British Manual of Coast Fortress Defence. It was clear to him that the manual was written for all fortresses, including those that were much larger than Halifax and for which the scale of attack was much more significant. For example, Hong Kong had to worry about sudden attacks from two or three divisions. Halifax had no such concerns. The garrison in Hong Kong could count on two British battalions and an Indian battalion, and it was expected to fight for eighty to ninety days before being relieved.⁷³ In the concluding paragraph of his letter to Boak, Pope wrote that "the tenor" of his letter had made it sound as if the units in his district would have to defend all of Nova Scotia on their own. Pope explained that "should it ever appear that Nova Scotia might be exposed to a risk of large scale landings or invasion...its defence would not be a District problem but a national problem – the defences of Canada."⁷⁴ Pope's analysis was shrewd and his argument followed an unassailable logic.

Pope demonstrated strong initiative during this period of heightened tension. When he heard of private impending offers to raise troops for service abroad, he acted immediately to nip a potential problem in the bud. The chaotic mobilization of 1914-1915 loomed large in Pope's thinking. He advised the CGS that "if even one of these is accepted our Plan will be compromised, chaos will ensue and we shall wind up in the condition in which we found ourselves in 1914." He urged, "with all the seriousness he [could] command" to give "earnest consideration to the advisability of bringing to the attention of the Minister and others the imperativeness of holding to our pre-arranged plans."⁷⁵ Pope further argued that press reports made clear that the militia and the public knew nothing of the Defence Scheme No. 3. Unless something was done to change that perception, it would be assumed that there was no plan for mobilization in the event of an emergency and that "some special force would be raised....that the militia as such would not be used." The minister passed on these concerns to the "highest authority," presumably Mackenzie King himself. The prime minister agreed that something should be done, and minister Mackenzie approved the idea of communicating "with guarded publicity" the government's contingency plans, namely, "that in the event of trouble the Militia units ... recruited to full strength.... would be utilized."⁷⁶

⁷¹ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2744 HQS 5902-2, Boak to Secretary, Department of National Defence, 12 September 1938; see also Sarty, "Silent Sentry: a Military and Political History of Canadian Coast Defence," 574-75.

⁷² RG24 Vol. 2744, HQS5902 Vol. 5, Pope to Boak, 7 October 1938.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid. He provided another detailed analysis to a request from Military District No. 7. See LAC, RG24 HQS3653 Vol. 1, Pope to District Officer Commanding Military District No. 7 Defence Scheme No. 3, 23 September 1938. Pope had to manage a number of other urgent DMO&I issues during the period August-September time frame. The issues included security threats to the St. Lawrence; how to implement precautionary measures; request for additional information on vulnerable points; and how to go about seizing enemy ships. Information on Pope's role with respect to those matters can be found in the following: NDHQ, DHH, 181.001 (D276), Joint Staff Committee Minutes of 36th meeting of 13 September 1938 and in LAC, RG24 Vol. 2700 HQS5199-0, Vol. 1; RG24 HQS3498, Vol. 9, Pope to Military District 6 "Organization of Signal Units," 24 August 1938; Pope to District Officer Commanding Military Districts No. 1 to 13, "Seizure of Enemy Ships (and Aircraft) in time of war," 24 September 1938; LAC, Mackenzie papers, Vol. 30, X-52, Memorandum from Ashton to the Minister Statement of Military Precautionary Measures, 9 September 1938; LAC, RG24 HQS3498, Vol. 9, Pope to Senior Air officer, 23 September 1938.

⁷⁵ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2766, HQS3498 Vol. 9, Pope to CGS 26 September 1938.

⁷⁶ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2766, HQS3498 Vol. 10, Ashton to the Minister of National Defence, 11 October 1938; Sarty, "Silent Sentry: a Military and Political History of Canadian Coast Defence," 570.

Pope generated some sense of urgency for the committees. For example, the Committee on Legislation had barely begun its work by September 1938. Pope communicated with J.H. MacNeill, the secretary of the committee. Pope advised him that if action was not taken before war broke out, each department would try to take independent action concerning regulations, which would be chaos. Overlap and confusion would surely ensue. The secretary agreed to follow up with his deputy minister.⁷⁷ In the meantime, Pope reviewed similar British legislative documents to get some guidance. He revisited the 1917 Defence of Canada Order to see what could be salvaged and he circulated it to the other services and asked them to define their needs within that framework. He convinced the committee that, in the interests of time, it should use the old 1917 defence order as the basis for their work. Why completely reinvent the wheels? Pope took the lead in amending it “so as to make it suitable” for use in the emerging crisis.⁷⁸ The committee convened in the afternoon of 27 September and worked straight through to the following morning.⁷⁹ The committee submitted its report to the minister of national defence, who, in turn passed it to the prime minister. By the time the 1938 Order reached the prime minister, however, the crisis had dissipated and the document was never implemented.

The Censorship Committee was probably further ahead in its work than most. However, Pope knew there was still urgent work to be done and he was hoping that the situation in Europe would strengthen his hand. Pope reminded the committee members that should the government decide to institute some form of censorship, departments would have to be ready to respond quickly. He encouraged departments to identify and train personnel as censorship staff.⁸⁰ Pope urged Ashton to urge the minister to expedite Governor-in-Council approval of the Interim Report. Departments could then begin to develop detailed plans for censorship and have them ready for implementation, if and when the need arose. In addition, Pope had started to chart what national defence would have to do. Actions included contacting cable and wireless companies, nominating a department of national defence (DND) censor, and finding him some staff. Moreover, national defence had to develop its own detailed plan and issue instructions to all of the military districts.⁸¹

Canada and the British Commonwealth

The question of Canada’s relations with the British Commonwealth had been of interest to Pope since the 1920s, if not earlier.⁸² Back then, Pope had argued that imperial centralization was a thing of the past. He explained that “the hands of the clock do not move backwards easily and it seems that centralized control is an aspiration the realization of which would be to undo the work of one hundred and sixty years.”⁸³ Pope explored what motivated Canada to maintain close relations to Great Britain. Pope thought Canadians had initially followed Great Britain into the First World War primarily because of sentimental attachment. While Canada’s attachment to the mother country remained strong as the war progressed, national interests came into play when Canadians began to realize “that they were fighting for their own existence.”⁸⁴ If Germany had defeated Great Britain, Canada’s relations with Europe would have been transformed.

⁷⁷ Report of his discussion in LAC, RG24 Vol. 2766, HQS3498, Pope to Senior Air officer, “Defence of Canada Order 1917,” 26 September 1938.

⁷⁸ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2167, HQS6615-5 Vol. 4, Pope to CGS, Chief Naval Staff (CNS), and Senior Air Staff (SAO), Defence of Canada Order 19-, 11 May 1939.

⁷⁹ Pope and the committee met from about 3:00 P.M. to 6:00 P.M. and again from 8:00 P.M. to 12:15 A.M. LAC, RG24 Vol. 2766, HQS6615-5 Vol. 4, Minutes of Third Meeting of Committee on Emergency Legislation, 27 September 1938.

⁸⁰ LAC, Mackenzie papers, Vol. 32, X-52, Pope to the Committee on Censorship, 22 August 1938.

⁸¹ Ibid, Chief of the General staff to the Minister 3 September 1938. Pope recalled that, shortly after Cabinet approved the committee’s report, he went to Montreal and he and Major Burns, who was the general staff officer at Military District No. 6, sat down with senior officials of the cable companies and with Marconi to discuss the issue of censorship. He completed his plan shortly thereafter. Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 135.

⁸² I have drawn from the following sources to develop the section: Personal Family Papers (PFP), “The Problem of Imperial Defence,” Paper prepared for Staff College 1925; Canadian Defence Quarterly 1930 Essay Competition, Prize Essay by Major M.A. Pope from *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Volume 8, No. 2, January 1931; PFP, Maurice A. Pope, “Imperial Defence, Its Strategical and its Imperial Organization” (reproduced in part in Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 108-122); Canadian War Museum, Maurice Arthur Pope Collection (hereafter referred as CWM, Pope Collection), Folder 32, Pope to Rowlands, 8 June 1939.

⁸³ “The Problem of Imperial Defence,” 6.

⁸⁴ “The Problem of Imperial Defence,” 7. When Pope considered the issue in his 1930 paper for the Canadian Defence Quarterly competition, he focused on the country’s national interests as the main reason Canada fought in the First World War. *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 1930 Essay Competition, 156.

Pope compared the post-First World War situation of Australia to Canada. He thought it was in Australia's national interests to maintain strong imperial ties, even if it meant deferring to Great Britain more often than Canada ever would have done. Australia worried about Japan and needed British support in the event of Japanese aggression. Canada was not driven by the same motive because it did not face the same kind of threat. This was in line with Pope's theory of "propinquity to threat." That said, Pope stressed that no dominion was more "deeply attached to the Empire than are the Canadian people of Anglo-Saxon stock."⁸⁵ Pope acknowledged that Canada's military - and that of the other dominions - relied significantly on Great Britain. Their soldiers acquired their higher military training from the mother country. They used the same manuals as the British regular army and they worked with the establishments set by the War Office. In other words, Canada's permanent forces "wholeheartedly" copied the British Army.⁸⁶ They did so because it was cheaper: it saved Canada and the dominions from having to maintain large military forces or establish their own military schools and staff colleges. More importantly, according to Pope, Canada and the other dominions wanted "uniformity across in matters military throughout the Empire."⁸⁷ He suggested that Canada and the dominions could improve the machinery of imperial defence without harming the central tenets of decentralization by dispatching officers of all ranks to work in Great Britain. Among other responsibilities, dominion military staffs would support the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in developing contingency plans for future operations.⁸⁸ Pope stressed that the Imperial General staff would not have executive power in the new defence cooperation scheme. Once contingency plans were completed, they would be circulated to the dominions, "where headquarters and possibly governments" would be "educated as to their probable role and unless there are grave reasons against it the government of the day will accept, on the outbreak of war, the plans which have been made by the Imperial General Staff in time of peace in conjunction with the staffs of the Dominions."⁸⁹

In his 1930 paper for the *Canadian Defence Quarterly* contest, he discussed Canada's role in future conflicts involving Great Britain. He did not foresee Canada's participation alongside Great Britain in deployments governed "by reason of a purely British line of policy," or if it were some colonial squabble in which Canada had no interest. However, if Great Britain was involved in a conflict with a European power, it would be a different matter, especially if it involved "the continued existence of the Empire." Pope assumed that the dominions would have "some voice" in determining the policy. He also thought Canada would decide of its "free will" how it would participate. In the same 1930 paper, Pope differentiated between equality of status and equality of stature. After the Balfour Declaration of 1926, imperial relations were meant to be based on the concept of equality of status.⁹⁰ Equality of stature was another matter, however. The United Kingdom remained, Pope wrote in 1930, "the keystone of the Imperial arch." He added that "Imperial strength and cohesion" stemmed from "the power and influence" of Great Britain, the "predominant partner of what the modern generation prefers to call the British Commonwealth of Nations."⁹¹

In 1938, Pope wrote that the decentralization of the empire had been the result of consensus between dominion and British statesmen. The latter had sensed the growing pressure towards decentralization and they had decided not to resist. The Statute of Westminster of 1931 was the result of "good statesmanship," the essence of which was "the ability to recognize the inevitability of change in good time and to encourage reform where reform is needed well before the opposition becomes dangerously insistent."⁹² Canada's relations with Great Britain, Pope argued, remained primarily sentimental and the "remaining tie" between the various parts of the British Empire was "common allegiance to the Crown."⁹³ Pope acknowledged that the "bond" between Great Britain and the dominions may have appeared weak because there was no constitution guiding relations. He maintained that "the Anglo-Saxon" had no fondness "for written instruments," which explained why the unwritten British constitution and British common law had evolved in the way they did. However, Anglo-Saxons had managed to succeed in "every test to which they have been subjected." Imperial relations

⁸⁵ PFP, "The Problem of Imperial Defence," 6.

⁸⁶ Pope wrote in his memoirs that Canada's army "was indeed British through and through with only minor differences imposed on us by purely local conditions." Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 53

⁸⁷ "The Problem of Imperial Defence," 9-10.

⁸⁸ "The Problem of Imperial Defence," 9-10.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 10-11.

⁹⁰ The Balfour Declaration asserted that Great Britain and the Dominions were "autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate, to one another, in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." Norman Hillmer, ed., *O.D. Skelton: The Work of the World, 1923-1941* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2013), 151.

⁹¹ *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 1930 Essay Competition, 157

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ PFP, "Imperial Defence, Its Strategical and its Imperial Organization," 36.

followed a similar evolution, pursuant to “a natural and truly British way by British peoples in the fulfilment of their aspirations.” Pope pointed out that it had been a solution that had “not failed them in the past,” and he was optimistic that it would not fail them in “the grave times that are to come.”⁹⁴

Pope reflected on the role of public opinion concerning relations between Canada and Great Britain. “According to the British way of government.” Pope explained, “the Cabinet is but the executive of Parliament to which it is responsible. This responsibility, however, goes farther. Parliaments are in turn responsible to the people, and this they are not likely to forget. It follows, then, that Cabinets are practically limited to such policies as will commend themselves to the electorate.” Pope concluded that “important measures require public support, which will only be forthcoming when the need therefor was clearly apparent.” Public opinion was capable of evolving and Pope had perceived in late 1938 that “the sluggish conscience of the democracies” was “awakening to the perils to which they are exposed, gradually the forces of humanity are being mustered in defence of common ideals.”⁹⁵

Pope pursued the issue of the influence of public opinion on relations between Canada and Great Britain in a letter to his British friend, Archie Rowlands. Pope believed there were two schools of thought on the issue of public opinion: those who thought that government leaders had significant power to marshal public opinion, and those who believed that events determined public opinion. Pope did not believe that Canada - and the same went for other democratic governments including Great Britain - was equipped to shape public opinion. Public opinion of the electorate was awakened “only in time of crisis” and it did not shift in response to what Pope called “hypotheses,” no matter how “terrifying” they were.⁹⁶ Although politicians could try to “educate the public,” it was “the events themselves and nothing else” that could “enlighten” opinion.⁹⁷ Pope acknowledged that “the cause of peace would be advanced” if Great Britain, Canada and the other dominions were not limited in what they could do. However, it was the price these governments had to pay to safeguard democracy, which was, in Pope’s words, their “most priceless possession.”⁹⁸ Canada and other dominions were likely to take even longer than Great Britain to appreciate the dangers because they were “situated so far from the storm centre.” Pope thought “propinquity to danger” went a long way in explaining why Canada had not responded palpably to recent developments in Europe.⁹⁹ Great Britain needed to be content with what Canada was doing to prepare itself for the looming crisis. He did not think the King government would survive if he chose to provide the British prime minister with a “blank cheque.” He could not see any merit in “endeavoring to force this action” when Great Britain should know full well that “the blank cheque will be freely given as and when the need for it arises.”¹⁰⁰ Pope was not only conversant with Canadian history; he was also politically aware and very astute.

Pope lamented that, in 1938, there were still many in Great Britain who behaved as if nothing had changed since the end of the First World War. British service officers and, in some cases British civilian government officials, were still guilty of “centralist” concepts of empire.¹⁰¹ Pope took every opportunity to stand up for Canada. He did so when Major-General Edmund Ironside, the commandant of the British staff college, belittled the reaction of Canadian officers who had witnessed a speech given by Lloyd George in the First World War. Pope stressed to Ironside that Canadian and British officers were different and that he should not lump them together.¹⁰² He defended Canada’s interests when he was involved in the mock imperial conference at the Imperial Defence College in 1936. And he had heated debates with friend Rowlands during the 1930s about Canada’s place in the British Commonwealth.¹⁰³

That said, Pope counted himself among those who still believed in a strong British connection. He realized that the two countries shared common ideals, beliefs and values. Pope had been delighted to attend the British staff college, to work in the War Office, and finally, and to study at the Imperial Defence College. He appreciated the benefits of sharing military

⁹⁴ Ibid, 38-39.

⁹⁵ Ibid, 53.

⁹⁶ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 32, Pope to Rowlands, 8 June 1939.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid. Pope hinted at his theory of propinquity in a subsequent letter to his colleague J.F. MacNeill. He wrote that “as it took the loss of the BEF [British Expeditionary Force] to stir this [British] government it would have been unnatural if the Canadian Government, which is really so far removed from the actual source of danger, should have moved first.” Pope concluded that the fact Canadians “moved simultaneously” was “very complementary to ourselves.” CWM Pope Collection, Folder 32, Pope to MacNeill, 17 June 1940.

⁹⁹ CWM, Pope Collection Folder 32, Pope to Rowlands 8 June 1939.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 59-60.

¹⁰³ CWM, Pope Collection, Folder 32, Rowlands to Pope, 30 May 1939.

doctrine with Great Britain. Moreover, Pope did not shy away from using British documents in his committee work. When Skelton tried to tell him that the British papers were “tainted,” Pope defended their use.¹⁰⁴ When the government curtailed the avenues for British and Canadian military officials to discuss issues through CIGS liaison letters to Canada, Pope found ways to circumvent the restrictions. He thought it was “absurd” that the government would worry that the military “would take upon themselves to say things that might some day constitute a commitment.”¹⁰⁵ Pope advocated a relationship between two separate nations, perhaps not equal in stature but at least equal in status.

Pope and the Committees – pressure resumes

Pope was able to rededicate himself to his committee work in early October 1938. Developing the War Book, which he had set aside around the time of the Munich crisis, was a priority. The Committee on Defence Coordination did not meet often, but Pope consulted with the other members of the committee regularly. He knew he had to work very closely with External Affairs. According to some historians, relations between External Affairs and National Defence had not been very good for a number of years, mostly because of what one author called “mutual distrust as well as a fundamental disagreement over what was best for the country.” The result was “a wide gulf” between the two departments that “was not easily bridged.”¹⁰⁶ Pope tried not to let bad blood get in the way. In fact, he recalled that his eyes were always fixed on External Affairs because “there would have been little profit in going farther than they would accept.”¹⁰⁷ While National Defence chaired the Committee on Defence Coordination, Pope was very mindful that External Affairs controlled the overall process and to ignore that reality was to court disaster.¹⁰⁸ With that in mind, Pope met with Skelton in October 1938. Pope told Skelton that “the directing influence of this work of necessity had to be the Department of External Affairs, that is to say, the Prime Minister’s permanent advisors.” Pope wanted to make sure Skelton and the prime minister were satisfied with his approach and that he was “proceeding on the right lines in so far as higher government policy was concerned.” Pope reported that Skelton appeared to approve of the fact that Pope was “aiming” to put himself “under the general direction” of the under-secretary of external affairs. Skelton told him that what he had done to date would “prove to be most valuable and it undoubtedly constituted the first essential step towards the preparation of a Government War Book.”¹⁰⁹ Pope may have embellished Skelton’s endorsement. But at least Pope secured the green light to proceed. It was the most he could expect from Skelton. As Pope wrote years later, he did not remember ever receiving an overwhelming “imprimatur” from Skelton. He was “always happy to settle for a “nihil obstat.”¹¹⁰

By November, DMO&I workload piled up again on Pope.¹¹¹ When he alerted the CGS of the situation, he was informed that help was on its way and that he would be relieved of his responsibilities as acting director of DMO&I in early December, when Colonel Ken Stuart would take over. Unfortunately, as it turned out, Stuart was barely in the position a few days when he became sick, which meant that Pope had to resume his functions as acting director until Stuart had recovered. Pope worried that the situation would force him to fall behind again on his committee responsibilities. He fretted that Canada was well behind in its military preparation. The crisis of September 1938 had revealed “many weak spots” in Great Britain and the British had been preparing for much longer than Canada.¹¹²

In December 1938, Pope conveyed his concerns to the CGS, Major-General T.V. Anderson. Pope thought his first order of priority should be his committee work. If Stuart was to be absent, he suggested that Major W.H.S. Macklin, the most senior officer after Pope, should manage DMO&I. Pope pointed out that he had been largely on his own in 1934 while Crerar was at the Imperial Defence College. He acknowledged that it would lead to a drop of productivity, but there was no way around it. In addition, he recommended that the army accelerate Major J.C. Murchie’s posting to DMO&I. He observed that there had been three appointments made to the directorate in recent months and, in each case, they had been cancelled because of other priorities. Pope, as was his habit, was diplomatic about his views on the situation. He recognized that these developments had been “unavoidable,” but added that it had “been a bit hard on us.” He concluded by saying that he would

¹⁰⁴ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 138-39; see also Notes of interview by Norman Hillmer with Lieutenant General Maurice Pope on 5 and 27 July and 23 August 1977. Courtesy of Professor Hillmer.

¹⁰⁵ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 130. See also C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 72-76.

¹⁰⁶ Harris, *Canadian Brass*, 162.

¹⁰⁷ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 127.

¹⁰⁸ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2768 HQS6615-6 Vol. 1, Pope to CGS 7 October 1938.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 127.

¹¹¹ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2759, HQS6615-6 Vol. 1, Pope to Chief of the General Staff, 12 December 1938.

¹¹² Ibid.

“work quite happily either with Operations or with the committees but I cannot do both.”¹¹³ Anderson accepted Pope’s reasoning and agreed to all points. By January 1939, Pope had handed off his responsibilities in DMO&I.¹¹⁴

He was now free to focus on influencing the work of the various committees, starting with the Emergency Legislation Committee. He persuaded the committee to cast aside the 1917 order and start with a clean slate, taking the initiative to develop the new document.¹¹⁵ The committee members did not think Pope could develop a new document in a timely matter, but he proved them wrong when he produced “as much if not more than they could deal with in one meeting.”¹¹⁶ He convinced the committee members to use, for purposes of drafting the Canadian regulations, various documents that the Committee of Imperial Defence in London had produced and he amended the British document to suit Canadian needs.¹¹⁷ Pope drew a favorable response from the Emergency Legislation Committee and the various other interdepartmental committees when he proposed the consolidation of provisions from all the other reports into the Draft Defence Regulations document. Pope managed to convince McNeill, the committee secretary, and Read, from External Affairs, to proceed as he had proposed. By August 1939, the Defence Regulations had become, in the words of Pope, “a pretty formidable document.”¹¹⁸

Pope’s success in moving the Legislative Committee forward was testimony not only to the broad knowledge he developed, but also to his strong human skills. To begin with, Pope forged a very positive relationship with J.F. McNeill, from the department of Justice, who served as the secretary of the committee. Even though Pope had no legal training, he could converse on nearly equal ground with McNeill and they worked very closely.¹¹⁹ In addition, Pope was aware that the committee was filled with departmental experts. He had to provide advice without telling people how to do their job.¹²⁰ Pope knew when to compromise, even on subjects for which he was well familiar.¹²¹ Although Pope took pride in his work, he did not allow pride of authorship to get in the way when he was writing his various reports. McNeill expressed concern about some sections of the censorship report that Pope had written. Pope took MacNeill’s comments into consideration when revising the report.¹²²

Pope drew from the same combination of skills to develop the First Annual Report of the Committee on Defence Coordination and the War Book. Pope felt pressure in the spring of 1939 to complete the War Book, especially after Hitler’s mid-March invasion of Czechoslovakia. To assemble the War Book, Pope gathered together what he had learned from the various other committees, in addition to the information he had amassed directly from National Defence and from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. He strove to gain a working knowledge of the various topics, and he developed good professional relations with Read at External Affairs. He earned Read’s confidence and that of the other committee members. He was always prepared when meeting with the Committee on Defence Coordination.¹²³ By the end of April 1939, the War Book was starting to take final shape and Pope could say with some pride that he had built up “a not entirely incomplete picture of the practical measures which comprise the subjects of defensive preparations in its wider aspects.”¹²⁴ Pope sent the War

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ LAC, RG24 Vol. 18723, Returns of Strength, 31 January 1939.

¹¹⁵ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2767, HQS6615-6 Vol. 2, Minutes of the meeting of April 20, 1939 of the Committee on Emergency Legislation.

¹¹⁶ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 129.

¹¹⁷ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2767, HQS6615-5, Vol. 2, Pope to MacNeill, 6 February 1939; 22 April 1938; 10 May 1939. For example, the Defence Order of 1917 and the draft British documents touched on the issue of explosives. Pope examined the two documents and developed a clause that suited Canadian requirements. LAC, RG24 Vol. 2767 HQS6615-5 Vol. 6 Pope to Colonel Leach, 6 May 1939.

¹¹⁸ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2759, HQS6615 Vol. 2, Pope to Christie, 22 August 1939.

¹¹⁹ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 144. Pope recalled that McNeill was “immense... around the committee.” He added that he was “forthright, he knew his stuff, he knew his role.” Record of interview of 29 June 1977, part of Oral History Program, Norman Robertson.

¹²⁰ A good example is how he handled the issue of control of transport in time of war. LAC, RG24 Vol. 2768 HQS6615-6 Pope to Smart, 8 February 1939.

¹²¹ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2767, HQS6615-5, Vol. 2. Pope to MacNeill, 10 May 1939.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ See for example LAC, Read papers Vol. 8, Committee on Defence Coordination, Notes for 3rd meeting, 2 February 1939.

¹²⁴ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2767, HQS6615-5-6, Vol. 2, First Annual Report Committee on Defence Coordination, 7 July 1939.

Book and his report to the minister on 7 July.¹²⁵ Historian C.P. Stacey assessed the War Book as “very valuable” when Canada declared war in September 1939.¹²⁶

On August 17, 1939, Cabinet approved a number of documents: the report from the Committee on Defence Coordination (to which was attached the Government of Canada War Book); reports from sub-committees of the Defence Coordination Committee on Vulnerable Points and War Risks Insurance of Canadian Shipping; the report from the Committee on Emergency Legislation, with the attached Draft Defence of Canada Regulations; and a report from the Committee on Treatment of Ships and Aircraft.¹²⁷ It was the culmination of many months of hard work and it was just in time.

Conclusion

The years 1937-1939 were a defining period in Pope’s journey. When he returned from Imperial Defence College, Crerar assigned him a leading role in the most important directorate of the general staff, the DMO&I. In his capacity as secretary for some committees and general secretary for all of them, Pope revealed his leadership skills. He succeeded because he understood the technical side of the various subjects and he had the analytical skills to develop a way ahead. He initiated action, found solutions to problems, and established good relations with committee members. He amassed a large pool of information in his committee work. If he did not know the answer, he knew where to find it. He was on good terms with the committee members, in part because of his engaging personality but also because he was trustworthy and worked hard to understand his subject matter. In his committee work, he influenced processes much more by *personal power* than by his position. The sources of Pope’s personal power came from his *expert power* or knowledge, skills and experience; his *referent power* or relationships to others; and *connection power* or *social capital* that he was able to generate from his social contacts.

Relying on his conceptual skills, Pope provided shrewd analysis on high-level issues. He had spent considerable time in 1931-1933 learning how the War Office worked, noting its strengths and pitfalls. When he came back to Canada, he translated what he had learned into proposals for a more effective Canadian defence headquarters. He understood the role of elected officials in civil-military relations and decision-making. In addition, Pope influenced how the government organized “Canada’s defensive preparations in its wider aspect.” He predicted accurately that the looming war would be total in nature and that the government had to plan accordingly. He advocated strongly for the establishment of the various sub-committees. Pope also played a crucial role in making sure the government was ready, when war came, to implement the plans contained in the War Book as well as the Defence Regulations.

Pope was an increasingly astute student of history and politics, especially in his analysis of Canada’s evolving relations with Great Britain. For example, his distinction between equality of status and equality of stature demonstrated a sound understanding of Canada’s place in the British Commonwealth. His analysis of public opinion demonstrated acute understanding of the primacy of domestic politics in Canada. Pope’s understanding of political issues helped him interact with politicians and officials. He understood their concerns and how they addressed them. That made him a credible interlocutor. His perspective on Anglo-Canadian relations provides the prism through which we can understand how Pope related to British officials during his career.

¹²⁵ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2767, HQS6615-5-6I, Pope to Deputy Minister, 7 July 1939.

¹²⁶ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 33; Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 70. When the Committee on Defence Coordination created two sub-committees to examine the issue of vulnerable points and war risks insurance, Pope represented National Defence and wrote the two committee’s reports. LAC, Read papers, Vol. 45, 16 September 1939.

¹²⁷ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2759 HQS6615, Senior Private Secretary to Pope, 17 August 1939. By late August 1939, Cabinet had approved the report from the Committee on the Treatment of Aliens and Alien Property and the report from the Committee on Treatment of Ships and Aircraft.

CHAPTER 7

MAKING A DIFFERENCE: 1939-1942

When Canada declared war on Germany on 10 September 1939, Pope was finalizing his committee work. Within a few weeks, he replaced Colonel Ken Stuart as director of the Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence (DMO&I). He was familiar with the directorate's functions, but the country was now at war and Pope found the pace faster and the deadlines tighter. In March 1940, he sailed to Great Britain to work for Major-General Harry Crerar who was heading the Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London. Crerar put Pope in charge of the general staff branch at the CMHQ and promoted him to brigadier-general. He immediately jumped into planning the deployment of Canadian troops to France, and then the troop deployment to Iceland. He was in London during the height of the blitz, which made working at CMHQ hazardous. It was during his time at CMHQ that Canada concluded the arrangements for creating the I Canadian Corps. By March 1941, he was on his way back to Canada.

When Pope returned to Canada, he became assistant to the chief of the general staff (ACGS). He reviewed and signed off many documents originating from DMO&I and the other general staff directorates. He looked over memoranda from the army's other administrative branches.¹ Some matters were quickly handled. Others required more effort and analysis. He spearheaded an army program to boost the recruitment of French Canadians, and he became the army representative on the Permanent Joint Board of Defence, a function that he would retain for the next three years. Pope required his full repertoire of technical, human, and analytical skills during the period 1939-1942. Often he had to rely more on his personal power than his position to achieve results. When he worked with the British in London, he relied on the strong relationships he had established since he had entered staff college in 1925. He managed to get along with the Americans as well, even though they were often on opposite sides on policy questions. Pope was always mindful of Canada's national interests.

Canada at war

On 15 October, Pope assumed the duties of the director of DMO&I. The workload was heavy and the staff of the directorate still small for a country at war.² As he recalled, "the crushing pressure continued unabated." He worked "six nights out of seven each week."³ Many of Pope's responsibilities were related to implementing the domestic provisions of Defence Scheme No. 3. For example, he played an important role in the transfer of the protection of vulnerable points from the Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM) to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The minister of justice asked the Committee on Defence Coordination to convene a meeting of the sub-committee on vulnerable points to discuss the matter. J. F. MacNeill from the department of justice chaired the sub-committee and Pope represented national defence. MacNeill asked Pope to provide the perspective from national defence. Pope was pragmatic. He reminded the sub-committee that the role of the military was to "fight...against the armed forces of the enemy." He stressed that the military was expensive to maintain, and protecting vulnerable points was not an effective use of its resources.⁴ The sub-committee agreed with Pope and reaffirmed the previous decision (of September 1938) for the transfer of responsibilities. Governor-in-Council approved the report of the sub-committee on 7 November, after which time Pope had to determine what to do with 3,809 military guards protecting vulnerable points across the country.⁵ Some judgment was required on the part of the military district and from DMO&I because the military retained responsibility for protecting certain sites in the coastal military districts as well as a few selected facilities in the inland districts.⁶ At times, Pope had to decide whether to add to the

¹ On 19 November 1940, Governor-in-Council approved an Order-in-Council that stated that "The Military Forces of Canada shall henceforth be designated and described as "The Canadian Army." C. P. Stacey, *Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966), 89

² Pope had a staff of 2 Lieutenant-Colonels, 4 Majors, and two other junior officers, plus 12 other ranks. Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG24 Vol. 18725, Return of strength at Defence Headquarters, 24 November 1939.

³ Maurice Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 143.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2650, HQS3544-Vol. 1, DMO&I to Military District No. 2, 22 December 1939.

⁶ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2657, HQS3652-Vol. 1, Pope to Military District No. 3, "Protection of Vulnerable Points – Uplands Airport," 6 December 1939.

list of vulnerable points to be protected by military guards. At other times, he had to rule on whether to grant authority to military districts to increase the number of guards protecting certain military facilities.⁷

Pope and his directorate had to oversee the manning of the coast batteries across the country. The militia had completed the Interim Plan in August 1939, making some headway in improving the defence of Canada's coasts.⁸ It had used the equipment that was readily available. As C.P. Stacey reports, the guns "were...ready to fire" when the war began, but Canada's coast defence were not ready for war, with many of the guns in "temporary positions," much of the equipment obsolete, and the men not properly trained. That said, Stacey thought what had been achieved between 24 August 1939 and the first week of September had been "a not unimpressive performance."⁹ It was now a matter of implementing the Ultimate Plan by acquiring the equipment that was needed.¹⁰ Pope had to work in less than ideal circumstances, given that there was still a shortage of equipment. When the army moved - or added artillery - to new locations, he had to make sure there were men at the new placements who were ready to operate the equipment.¹¹ He signed off on the creation of new units or the conversion of existing ones.¹² He challenged the military district demands for manning or equipment when he thought they were excessive. As Stacey says, the war was "being fought on a limited budget" at this time. Pope ensured that the military lived within its means.¹³

Home defence required securing all approaches to Canada, which meant making sure Newfoundland was properly defended. The defence of Bell Island was particularly important because Sydney, Nova Scotia, secured most of its iron ore for its steel industry from this small piece of land off the Newfoundland coast.¹⁴ Pope had researched the matter of Bell Island when he prepared a briefing for the prime minister for the 1937 Imperial Conference.¹⁵ He also raised the matter informally with British officials in the fall of 1938. He thought at the time that Canada should discuss defence issues with the Newfoundland Commission.¹⁶ Formal talks never got underway, however, mostly because of the King government's aversion to external commitments.¹⁷ That changed when the war began.¹⁸ The Canadian government agreed at the end of September 1939 to 'loan' Newfoundland the equipment it required to equip the Newfoundland Defence Force, but it needed a lot more.¹⁹ The military - and the other two services - began to devote more time and resources to defending Newfoundland. Pope's directorate took the lead for the militia. He was also responsible for working with the other two

⁷LAC, RG24 Vol. 2657, HQS3652-Vol. 1, Pope to Military District No. 3, "Protection of Vulnerable Points – Petawawa," 25 October 1939; Pope to CGS, 25 October 1939; LAC, Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence (DMO&I) War Diary, 27 October.

⁸ Canada chose to purchase the new coast equipment from the United Kingdom. Because the British and other dominions were in the process of enhancing their own coastal defence, Canada faced delays in getting the equipment it needed. National Defence developed an "Interim Plan," under which they would make use of all the fixed armament available in Canada, including some loaned out by the Royal Canadian Navy. In accordance with the government's priorities, the Interim Plan was initially focused on the defence needs of the west coast. LAC, Mackenzie Papers, X-27, Defence of Pacific Coast, "The Interim Plan of Coast Defence," 26 January 1938. See Sarty, "Silent Sentry: a Military and Political History of Canadian Coast Defence," (Ph. D. Diss., University of Toronto, 1983), 545.

⁹ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 148.

¹⁰ LAC, DMO&I War Diary, 8 November.

¹¹ Pope was familiar with the issues. He had served as secretary to Crerar on the 1937 sub-committee that examined Canada's coast defence needs. He had also worked on determining the personnel that national defence would need once it began to receive the new equipment. See LAC, RG24 Vol. 2744 HQS5902, Vol. 5, "Organization of Coast Defence and A.A. Defence Units, NPAM;," 4 December 1937; LAC, RG24 Vol. 2743 HQS5902-1, Vol. 2, Crerar to Director of Military Training and Staff Duties, "Responsibilities of Operations Directorate in connection with changes in Organization," 26 March 1938; LAC, RG24 Vol. 2744, HQS5902-3, Vol. 1 "Organization of New Coast Defence and A.A. Defence Units in Military Districts 6,7, 11," General Staff, 3 December 1937; LAC, RG24 Vol. 2744, Pope to District Officer Commanding, "Military District No. 6 Organization of New Coast Defence and A.A. Defence Units, N.P.A.M.," 27 April 1938; Crerar to District Officer Commanding, "Military District No. 6 Organization of New Coast Defence and A.A. Defence Units, N.P.A.M.," 8 June 1938. See also Sarty, "Silent Sentry: a Military and Political History of Canadian Coast Defence," 559-560.

¹² LAC, DMO&I War Diary, 22 October 1939.

¹³ LAC, DMO&I War Diary, 10 November; Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 70.

¹⁴ David Mackenzie, *Inside the Atlantic Triangle: Canada and the Entrance of Newfoundland into Confederation 1939-1949* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 25.

¹⁵ LAC, RG 24 Vol. 2684, HQS5199 Vol. 1, Defence of Sydney and its steel industry, Submission to Minister, 22 February 1937; RG 25 G-1 Vol. 1789, 318-T, "Imperial Conference, 1937, Defence Questions, Joint Staff Committee Request for Instructions."

¹⁶ Mackenzie, *Inside the Atlantic Triangle*, 28.

¹⁷ C. P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada* (Ottawa: Queen Printer, 1970), 87.

¹⁸ Mackenzie, *Inside the Atlantic Triangle*, 30.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 31.

services and consulting with External Affairs, which had the lead on the discussions with the Commission Government.²⁰ When Newfoundland submitted a request to the Canadian government for the defence of Bell Island - for two four-inch guns and two searchlights for the island - Pope supported the proposal and made sure it received proper consideration.²¹ The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) discussed the matter, after which it went to Cabinet, where ministers authorized National Defence to determine what defence capabilities were needed to defend Bell Island. National defence, based on the advice from Pope and his directorate, agreed to the two guns and the searchlights.²²

Pope contributed to the government's efforts at instituting censorship at the beginning of the war. He took a broad perspective on censorship questions, and he strove to balance the demands of the press and the national security of the country. Pope recalled that cable, postal and radio censorship "worked well enough from the start, but not so the press censorship with regard to which little or no preparatory work had been done in time of peace." The process was chaotic at the outset, with the press not willing to relinquish any of its "inalienable freedoms."²³ The press censors were not under any obligation to accept the military advice.²⁴ Daily, they asked Pope for advice on a very wide range of issues.²⁵ He tried to be fair and flexible. He may not have agreed with the views in certain scripts, but he did not object to their broadcast if they did not harm Canada's national interests.²⁶ Likewise, he tried to keep an "open mind" about certain military information.²⁷

Pope demonstrated the same kind of flexibility in December 1939 when Ernest Lapointe, the minister of justice (who was also the acting secretary of state of Canada) asked the Censorship Coordination Committee to explore whether the Canadian provisions were more stringent than those in Great Britain and whether changes were necessary, especially those pertaining to print shops and the press.²⁸ By then, Pope had become chairman of the committee. He acknowledged that the 1939 Canadian Censorship Regulations were indeed more severe than the British ones and he recommended that the government rescind them.²⁹ The government would continue to exercise censorship under the Defence Regulations of Canada. Lapointe had also received representations from the press sector that two of the provisions of the Defence Regulations on censorship went too far. The committee report agreed to recommend the deletion of one troubling provision, but recommended retaining another, which authorized the minister to order the submission of press material for censorship prior to publication.

Pope took a leading role in modifying the censorship regime in Halifax. This he did after learning from the chief cable censor about possible leakage of military information from the port. The main issue was the transmission of messages by land telegraph lines from the Halifax area. The secretary of state of Canada had responsibility for the activity, but he had not established any mechanism to monitor the traffic of messages. Pope spearheaded the government response. He thought the minister of national defence should take over the responsibility. He secured the support of the CGS for this proposed transfer of responsibility, after which he prepared a memorandum for the minister. Once Pope had the CGS and the minister onside, he convened a Joint Planning Sub-committee to discuss the matter. The sub-committee produced its report at the beginning of November, supporting the transfer along with other measures proposed by Pope.³⁰ Pope travelled to Halifax on 13 November to discuss the sub-committee's recommendations with Canadian National (CN) and Canadian Pacific (CP) Telegraphs, members of the press community, and senior officials of Atlantic Command.³¹ He was quite at ease with the

²⁰ LAC, DMO&I War Diary, entries for 30 November, 9 December, 19 December, 1939.

²¹ Ibid, entries for 25 and 28 December 1939 and 17 January 1940; see also Mackenzie, *Inside the Atlantic Triangle*, 32.

²² LAC, DMO&I War Diary, entries for 2 and 13 March 1940; Mackenzie, *Inside the Atlantic Triangle*, 31; see also Peter Neary, *Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), 128.

²³ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 141.

²⁴ LAC, RG24 Volume 2760, HQS6615-1-4, Pope to CNS, 13 December 1939.

²⁵ LAC, RG24 Volume 2760, HQS6615-1-4, Pope to Thompson, 15 September 1939; Pope's note on policy regarding statistical information, 16 September 1939; Pope to R.P. Landry, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 26 September 1939.

²⁶ LAC, RG24 Volume 2760, HQS6615-1-a Vol. 2, Pope to Landry, 26 January 1940.

²⁷ LAC, RG24 Volume 2760, HQS6615-1-a Vol. 2, Pope to C.J. Hanratty, Press Censor for Canada, 27 January 1940.

²⁸ LAC, RG24 Volume 2760, HQS6615-1-a Vol. 2, Lapointe to Pope, 6 January 1940.

²⁹ At the time censorship was governed by two sets of regulations: the stand-alone regulations Pope had developed for the Censorship committee and those included in the Defence of Canada regulations. When the government introduced the Defence of Canada regulations, it had not revoked the stand-alone regulations. LAC, RG24 Volume 2760, HQS6615-1-a Vol. 2, Censorship Coordinating Committee Report, 10 January 1940.

³⁰ LAC, RG24 Volume 2760, HQS6615-1-a Vol. 2, Pope to F.E. Jolliffe, 9 November 1939.

³¹ LAC, DMO&I War Diary, 9 November.

experts. His influence was partly a function of his position in Ottawa, but also his *personal power*. His personal power came from deploying his technical knowledge of the port of Halifax and his vast expertise in the field of censorship, what we labeled *expert power* in the introduction. Pope also relied on his *referent power*. He gave all interested parties an opportunity to discuss their concerns, and secured their agreement, or at least their compliance. Governor-in-Council approved the changes in responsibility for inland cable on 17 November 1939.³²

Initially, there was confusion about the purpose and extent of censorship measures. Pope believed it had not been well explained to the press or the Canadian public, whom he thought would be supportive if they understood what censorship was and what it was meant to do. To that end, he delivered a radio broadcast in which he explained its objectives. He began by placing censorship in the context of national interests.³³ Censorship consisted of “the exercise of a government’s right, in the interests of national defence or public safety, to examine all communications and publications and to modify or dispose of them in the manner best calculated to promote those interests.” He then explained why censorship was necessary when countries were waging war. “When countries are at war, each is entitled to use every means sanctioned by international law to impose its will upon the enemy.” Pope emphasized that Canada had instituted a censorship regime that was far less intrusive than in countries such as France. He reassured listeners that the military was only one of the many departments that managed censorship in Canada and that each organization was “fully autonomous” for purposes of its activities. But, they all worked together and “one purpose actuates them all, namely the national interest.”³⁴

After a brief summary of censorship of cable, radio, and postal communications, Pope spoke of press censorship, which he deemed “the mildest of them all.” He suggested that the censorship of the press in fact did not exist “in the technical sense of the word” because of its voluntary characteristics and the fact that Canada did not have any legislation that obligated the press to submit material prior to its publication. Pope explained that the government did not intend to “interfere in any way whatever with the legitimate freedom of the Press. We are engaged in a war for the preservation of that freedom which we never weary of maintaining is our greatest heritage.” However, Canada was at war and the country’s “national will for survival” would only attain “its fullest expression” if it was willing to live with some limits on its freedom. It was the least that Canadians at home should be willing to do in light of the many others who had “given up...their freedom” to defend the country. In retrospect, Pope concluded from his experience with censorship that it should have been incumbent “upon responsible ministers, who are versed in political techniques, to state government policy - and not public servants.”³⁵ Pope had tried to fill the void in his public broadcast, demonstrating a deft touch, clarity of expression, and strong political instincts.³⁶

Pope was involved in another series of broadcasts for the government. In early October 1939, Norman Rogers, the minister of national defence, met with Pope and Stuart to discuss the idea of preparing public broadcasts concerning the work of the three “Fighting Services.”³⁷ The minister envisaged broadcasts of about 15 minutes that would give Canadians a clearer picture of what National Defence was “trying to do” and how it was “attempting to do it.” Rogers told Pope and Stuart that he wanted a service officer to deliver the broadcasts (their identity would be kept secret), but that the minister or even the prime minister might decide to speak on some subject. Stuart assigned Pope the task of preparing the broadcasts and told him that he should expect to deliver some of them. Pope made the first broadcast, preceded by a short introduction by the minister. It introduced the functions of each service and explained how they went about their business.

³² LAC, RG24 Volume 2760, HQS6615-1-a, Pope to Commissioner RCMP, 21 November 1939.

³³ LAC, RG36 Vol. 19, 10-A-10, “Script of broadcast on censorship,” January 1940.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 141-142.

³⁶ Historian Claude Beaugregard claims that Pope wrote the only government document that set out the main elements and objectives of Canada’s censorship regime. Canadian historian Mark Bourrie praises Pope for having “cobbled together consensus from the major Canadian media, especially the powerful Canadian Press wire service, and having made journalists co-architects of the system. This gave journalists some ownership of the system that was designed to limit their freedoms.” However, Bourrie says Pope managed censorship poorly. He says Pope loaded his subordinates with work, but was unwilling to “delegate official responsibility over the system, even during the long periods when he was in London and Washington on military business.” He criticizes Pope for not having a central policy structure. Bourrie does not cite any sources to substantiate his claims. Had Pope tried to effect greater coordination from National Defence, the Press would not have been very welcoming. The idea of military administration of censorship would have run against many of the principles of the Fourth Estate. Claude Beaugregard, *Guerre et censure au Canada, 1939-1945* (Septentrion: Quebec, 1998), 60, 93; and Mark Bourrie, *The Fog of war: Censorship of Canada’s Media in World War Two* (Toronto: Douglas and McIntyre, 2011), 43-44.

³⁷ LAC RG24 Vol. 2701, HQS5199-T Vol. 1, Pope memorandum to file, 4 October 1939.

The CBC wrote to Pope in mid-October that his broadcast had been highly satisfactory.³⁸ On 24 October, Pope delivered the second broadcast on the Canadian Active Service Force (CASF). There were subsequent broadcasts on the navy, the air force, and various other topics. Pope developed and delivered all of the other military-related broadcasts.³⁹ He was preparing clear explanations for public consumption.

When it appeared in the fall of 1939 that the government might severely limit the deployment of Canadian forces overseas, Pope explored what to do with the NPAM. The issue was how to go about making sure every unit of the NPAM across the country would have an opportunity to contribute to the war effort. Pope understood the sensitivity of the issue. He had taken a leading role in the 1934-35 reorganization of the NPAM, and he was mindful of the pride that the units took in being called up. He argued that “to be denied the honour of being selected for Active Service would be heartbreaking,” and that was likely to happen if the government did not increase the country’s military contribution beyond two divisions.⁴⁰ Under the current mobilization system, each mobilized battalion had its own “Regimental Depot.” The depots were responsible for providing the reinforcements for the parent units. As Pope noted, “the whole scheme of reinforcing infantry units of the [Canadian Active Service Force (CASF)] was developed to maintain those units indefinitely without any contributions from the remainder of the infantry battalions in the NPAM”⁴¹ Pope proposed the grouping of NPAM infantry battalions, both mobilized and unmobilized, into regiments on a territorial basis as had been done in the First World War. The militia would replace the current regime of battalion depots with regional depots or centres, with sub-depots if necessary. Each battalion would have someone working with the District Recruiting Organization. Recruits would proceed to an infantry training centre. The centre would train all of the recruits of the regiment - or regiments - of the district. Should the government expand the CASF by a battalion or a division, the NPAM would be reduced accordingly. Under those circumstances, should the CASF grow to its fullest measure, the units of the NPAM would all disappear. The military would have in Canada only regional depots and training centres that would provide reinforcements and administer returned casualties. The men would retain their regimental titles and badges while in Canada.⁴² Pope envisaged special measures for coastal garrisons, but with the same objective: to increase participation in the CASF. Pope knew that his proposal would find favour with the Infantry and Machine Gun Association, since it had lamented at its recent annual meeting the limited opportunities for many NPAM units to serve overseas.⁴³ The administrative heads of the military supported Pope’s proposal, and so did the government.⁴⁴ Pope had used his understanding of the recruitment and training processes to suggest a practical solution that was agreeable to everyone. The government implemented Pope’s proposal in July 1940.⁴⁵

Pope is posted to the Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ)

Pope spent the next eight months at the CMHQ in London. The government appointed Crerar as the Senior Commander of CMHQ when the headquarters opened in September 1939 and he was still in that position when Pope arrived. When Crerar had learned in the spring of 1940 that Colonel E.L.M. Burns, his second in command, was being posted out, he wanted a strong officer to replace him and he asked for Pope.⁴⁶ By the time Pope arrived in London, the responsibilities of the CMHQ had been largely settled. The CMHQ made sure the men had proper training opportunities and equipment, and coordinated the requisitioning of what they needed from the War Office. The CMHQ maintained regular contact with the various Canadian formations in Great Britain, the High Commissioner, and the War Office.⁴⁷

Pope arrived shortly after Crerar had managed to secure approval from Ottawa to increase the size of CMHQ.⁴⁸ Crerar’s goal was to relieve the Senior Combatant Officer and others senior military officials from the minutiae of running

³⁸ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2701, HQS5199-T Vol. 1, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation to Pope, 14 October 1939 and 16 October 1939.

³⁹ The transcripts are all found in LAC, RG24 Vol. 2701, HQS5199-T Vol. 1 and Vol. 2.

⁴⁰ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2648, HQS3498 Vol. 20, Pope to CGS, 27 October 1939.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² LAC, RG24 Vol. 2648, HQS3498 Vol. 20, Hertzberg to CGS, 18 May 1940.

⁴³ Ibid, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Infantry and Machine Gun Associations of Canada, 4 November 1939.

⁴⁴ LAC RG24 Vol. 2648, HQS3498 Vol. 20, Copy of Order-in-Council P.C. 2546 of 5 June 1940.

⁴⁵ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 114.

⁴⁶ LAC, Papers of General H.D.G. Crerar, (Crerar Papers), Vol. 15, War Diary, 8 March 1940.

⁴⁷ LAC, Crerar Papers, Vol. 1, 958c.009 (D2), Memorandum and responsibilities of Canadian Military Headquarters; LAC, RG24 Vol. 2837, HQS8249 Vol. 1, Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) to Department of National Defence, memorandum on organization and responsibilities, 4 July 1940.

⁴⁸ LAC, Crerar Papers, Vol. 15, 14 February 1940.

the headquarters. This would give them more time to consult with the 1st Canadian Infantry Division at Aldershot and with the War Office, and offer more opportunities to attend military demonstrations and exercises. Ottawa also authorized Crerar to create a “three-branch” organization, largely along the lines of the Canadian military in Canada: general staff, adjutant-general staff, and quartermaster-general staff.⁴⁹ Pope was put in charge of the general staff branch, and promoted to the rank of brigadier shortly thereafter.⁵⁰

Two days after his arrival, Pope was instructed to develop plans for deploying a brigade group to France. The situation was precarious. The day before Pope’s ship docked, the Germans had reached the Channel Coast around the Abbeville area.⁵¹ This was when British military authorities approached Crerar to see whether the Canadians could help out. On 23 May, Crerar directed Pope and the other staff branch heads to take all necessary measures to prepare the Canadian troops to cross to France as soon as possible.⁵² By 24 May, the first of the Canadian units had arrived in Dover and preparing to embark. Over the next few days, the British military put the mission on hold and then resurrected it, several times, as the tactical situation changed.⁵³

On 5 June, the British War Cabinet approved the deployment of a second British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to France. The reconstituted BEF would consist of up to three divisions under the command of Lieutenant-General A.F. Brooke. On 6 June, Crerar learned that the 1st Canadian Infantry Division might be selected as one of the three divisions deployed. Later that day, Crerar sat down with Pope and staff from the other two branches to discuss how to get troops across the channel to France as soon as possible. Crerar told them that the 1st Canadian Brigade of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division would be the lead element of Canada’s contingent. When Crerar received confirmation on 10 June that a Canadian contingent would be deploying, he put Pope in charge of a CMHQ staff team to coordinate with British military authorities in France.⁵⁴ Pope carried out a number of other tasks concurrently. He worked closely with Brigadier Archibald Nye, Deputy Director, Staff Duties, in charge of planning the deployment of non-divisional assets. Pope spearheaded the military component of the communications strategy to announce that the 1st Canadian Infantry Division was heading to France.⁵⁵ The 1st Canadian Brigade started deploying to Brest on 11 June as planned. On 14 June, however, Pope got word from Crerar that, in light of the deteriorating situation in France, the deployment had been cancelled. Those elements of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division that had been deployed were to be brought back.⁵⁶

Pope also supported another deployment of Canadian troops, this time to Iceland. The British asked Canada for a full brigade. They were hoping Canada could deploy a battalion as soon as possible to reinforce a British brigade already there. The Canadian government approved the British request on 22 May. The Canadian military decided to send a battalion of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division.⁵⁷ Pope sent NDHQ an assessment of the Iceland situation in late May. In addition, his staff identified the nature of the war establishment for the first-deployed battalion, figured out what kind of unit transport the Canadian contingent needed, and whether the battalion would need an anti-tank company.⁵⁸ Pope soon learned, however, that the War Office wanted the entire 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, plus whatever divisional troops Canada could spare.⁵⁹

The CMHQ was not happy with the British request. They were reluctant to dispatch all of the 2nd Canadian Division to Iceland until the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions were properly trained. Otherwise, Canadian territory would be largely undefended, a concern because of growing worries about Japanese intentions. External Affairs sent a letter to British

⁴⁹ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 197.

⁵⁰ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2837, HQS8249 Vol. 1, CMHQ to Department of National Defence, “Memorandum on organization and responsibilities,” 4 July 1940; LAC RG24 Vol. 13361, CMHQ General staff War Diary, 6 May 1940.

⁵¹ See Stacey, *Six Years of War* 263-284.

⁵² Although Crerar had instructed Pope and others to begin planning for the movement of Canadian troops, he cast doubt on the value of the deployment. If the French and British troops in the area could not stem the German advance, Crerar could not see how a Canadian brigade would make the difference and McNaughton was of the same opinion. LAC, Crerar Papers, Volume 15, War Diary, 24 May.

⁵³ LAC RG24 Vol. 13361, CMHQ General Staff War Diary, 4 June 1940.

⁵⁴ LAC, RG24 Vol. 13361, CMHQ General Staff War Diary, 10 June 1940.

⁵⁵ Ibid, CMHQ General Staff War Diary, 6-7-10 June; CMHQ Weekly progress report no. 16, period ending 15 June 1940.

⁵⁶ Ibid, CMHQ War Diary, 14 June.

⁵⁷ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 83.

⁵⁸ LAC, RG24, Vol. 12302, 3/Iceland/1, Pope to Defensor, 30 May, 1940; Defensor to CANMILITARY, 24 MAY 1940.

⁵⁹ LAC, RG24, Vol. 12302, 3/Iceland/1, Caldecote to Massey, 27 June 1940; Vol. 12302, 3/Iceland/2, Pope memorandum 21 June 1940; Canmilitary to defensor, 19 June 1940..

authorities along those lines on 28 June, and again on July 11.⁶⁰ The British eventually withdrew their larger request. As Stacey explains, Prime Minister Winston Churchill had apparently been apprised of the situation and decided that it was best to keep the 2nd Canadian Division together in Great Britain for home defence tasks.⁶¹ Pope had to remain abreast of the changing requirements and plans. After the British accepted the smaller Canadian contribution, Pope made sure that the rest of the Canadian contingent reached Iceland.⁶²

Pope did what he could to make Canadian divisions in Britain battle ready.⁶³ Pope tried to secure equipment for the 2nd and 1st Canadian Divisions. On 17 August, he met Nye, who was now director of Staff Duties at the War Office. Nye was not encouraging.⁶⁴ Pope discussed the matter with McNaughton and Major-General John Percival Montague, who had replaced Crerar as senior officer at CMHQ. On 19 August, the three met with British military officials, but they did not get any further. The British had shortfalls of their own, the result of leaving a lot of equipment at Dunkirk; and, of the equipment that came off the production line, much of it was earmarked for the British troops overseas. Equipment shortages would continue to plague Canadian units for weeks, even months. There was not much Pope or anyone else at CMHQ could do about it, but they did try.⁶⁵

Pope demonstrated initiative in resolving problems while he was in CMHQ. In June 1940, Pope and his staff explored the design of a CASF Training School in the United Kingdom. The 1st Canadian Division had experienced some difficulties on their arrival in Great Britain because it lacked qualified instructors. CMHQ had first proposed the creation of a Canadian training establishment in April 1940.⁶⁶ Pope resurrected the proposal a few months later when the severity of the military situation demanded it. This time CMHQ and NDHQ approved it. Pope and his staff proceeded to secure the teaching staff, in cooperation with Headquarters VII Corps (soon to be designated I Canadian Corps) and the headquarters of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division. The Training School was to have three main wings: weapons, technical instructions, and an Officer Cadet Training Unit (OCTU). The Canadian Training School delivered its first course for officer cadets at the beginning of August.⁶⁷ On 23 November 1940, the first thirty-eight cadets graduated from the OCTU, and more followed.⁶⁸ The school was an important step in addressing the shortfall in Canadian trained officers in Great Britain.⁶⁹

Working at CMHQ was challenging, even more so when the Germans launched their blitz in the summer of 1940. When air raids started to be common in August, Pope remained at his desk, but most military and civilian personnel vacated their premises to head for the air-raid shelters. He was not happy with the disruptions.⁷⁰ By mid-September, Pope reported that air raid warnings were being issued several times every day.⁷¹ At the end of October, the Sun Life building, where CMHQ was primarily located, had no heat and part of its sub-basement had been flooded, the result of a direct hit. There was limited elevator service and the windows had been “bricked up.” Pope tried his best to make the premises workable. For example, with the support of Montague, he instituted a new policy under which all civilian personnel would proceed to the shelters as soon as the warning sounded - in accordance with government practice instituted for all departments in London - but military personnel would remain at their desks until the danger become more apparent.⁷² For those officers who preferred not to go home after work hours or had to work after buses had stopped running, Pope made arrangements for

⁶⁰ LAC, RG24, Vol. 12302, 3/Iceland/2, Massey to Caldecote, 28 June 1940.

⁶¹ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 85.

⁶² LAC, RG24 Vol. 13361, CMHQ General Staff Diary, 12 August, 21 September.

⁶³ LAC, RG24, Vol. 12302, 3/Iceland/1, Defensor to CANMILITARY, 19 June 1940. Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 86.

⁶⁴ LAC, RG24 Vol. 13363, CMHQ General Staff War Diary, 17 August 1940.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* Progress Report no. 22 and 23, week ending 24 August and 31 August 1940, respectively; see also CMHQ General Staff War Diary, Pope to Nye, 6 November, Nye to Pope, 7 November 1940.

⁶⁶ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 236.

⁶⁷ LAC, RG24 Vol. 13361, CMHQ Progress Report, period ending 13 July 1940. Because of lack of accommodation, the other two wings did not open fully until 1941. LAC, RG24 Vol. 13361, CMHQ Progress Report, period ending 12 October; see also Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 237.

⁶⁸ Geoffrey W. Hayes, “The Development of the Canadian Army Officer Corps, 1939-1945” (PhD diss., Western Ontario University, 1992), 104

⁶⁹ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 240.

⁷⁰ LAC, RG24 Vol. 13363, CMHQ General Staff War Diary, 17 September.

⁷¹ LAC, RG24 Vol. 13363, CMHQ General Staff War Diary, 17 September 1940.

⁷² *Ibid.* Progress report no. 31, week ending 26 October 1940; progress report no. 33, week ending 9 November 1940.

the basement to be strengthened and a dormitory to be installed. By November, heat was slowly coming back and the elevators were almost back to normal.⁷³

Pope played an important role when Canada completed the negotiations that paved the way for the creation of the I Canadian Corps. Military and civilian officials had been discussing the matter with their British counterparts since shortly after the Canadian federal election of March 1940.⁷⁴ It was ultimately decided to transform the British VII Corps into a Canadian formation.⁷⁵ The crunch came in December 1940 when the minister of national defence, James Ralston, and Crerar visited London.⁷⁶ The minister received a preliminary briefing on 5 December and then another on 18 December. At the briefing of 18 December, Pope prepared a draft telegram from the minister to the prime minister “urging that action be taken” to establish the corps before the end of 1940.⁷⁷ Since the United Kingdom had offered to provide the necessary ancillary units, there appeared to be no financial issues preventing the two countries from going forward.⁷⁸ The prime minister supported Ralston’s proposal and encouraged him to complete his consultations as quickly as possible – the minister still needed to see Anthony Eden, the British secretary of state for war – so that “the effective day for the constitution of the Canadian Corps” would be Christmas Day.⁷⁹

When Pope consulted with Lester B. Pearson at the Canadian High Commission to confirm that there were no financial impediments to forming a Canadian Corps, he was surprised to learn that some uncertainty had crept in as a result of a letter from the War Office. The British had paid for Canada’s ancillary costs when the 1st Canadian Infantry Division joined the British VII Corps. The British wanted Canada to pay for the ancillary costs of the units that would remain with the I Canadian Corps. Pope held multiple discussions with Pearson, the minister, and McNaughton for the purpose of developing a Canadian proposal.⁸⁰ On 23 December, Pope was present when Ralston and Eden reached a compromise. Each government would assume the cost of its own units and personnel, “whether these be British serving in the Canadian Corp or Canadian serving in a British formation.”⁸¹

Work in London was demanding and took a toll. Pope spent the better part of January 1941 in the hospital from what he called “fatigue.”⁸² By the time he was fully recovered at the beginning of February, he was only two weeks away from sailing back to Canada. In his ten months at CMHQ, Pope had continued to demonstrate important technical, human and conceptual skills. He learned quickly how the Canadian headquarters in London worked and with whom he needed to interact. He had key responsibilities for the deployments in France and Iceland. They were not large, but their requirements were rapidly-changing and unpredictable. Pope remained abreast of the constant changes. He established good relations with McNaughton, Burns, the Canadian High Commission, and his British Army counterparts. He was involved in some complex financial negotiations concerning the Canadian corps. In summary, he assumed responsibility for many disparate tasks and he displayed the flexibility required to bring them all to fruition. He remained poised and calm under pressure, a continued testament of his leadership. He relied on the many British contacts he had cultivated since staff college in 1924-25 to make progress on many of the issues that he had to handle. It was a matter of using the personal power that derived from his expertise, his positive relationship with the British Army, and the *social network* he had built up with men such as Nye and

⁷³ Ibid, Progress report no. 31, week ending 26 October 1940; progress report no. 33, week ending 9 November 1940.

⁷⁴ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 76.

⁷⁵ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 154.

⁷⁶ LAC, RG24 Vol. 13,364, CMHQ General Staff War Diary, Pope memorandum: Constitution of Canadian Corps, 27 December 1940; Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 154-158.

⁷⁷ LAC, RG24 Vol. 13,364, CMHQ General Staff War Diary, 18 December; Pope memorandum: “Constitution of Canadian Corps,” 27 December 1940.

⁷⁸ LAC, RG24 Vol. 13,364, CMHQ General Staff War Diary, Pope memorandum, “Constitution of Canadian Corps,” 27 December 1940.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Pope was not working under ideal circumstances. He was consulting with Ralston while the Minister was convalescing at The Royal Masonic Hospital and with Pearson while he was ill at home. Pope wrote about being on the road at 20:00 on 22 December on his way to Pearson during which time “anti-aircraft guns were firing savagely at German aircraft...” LAC, RG24 Vol. 13,364, CMHQ General Staff War Diary, “Pope memorandum, “Constitution of Canadian Corps,” 27 December 1940.

⁸¹ LAC, RG24 Vol. 13,364, CMHQ General Staff War Diary, Pope memorandum: Constitution of Canadian Corps, 27 December 1940.

⁸² Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 158.

others. Pope recalled that his British contacts “busy as they were,” always made an effort to “find time to receive a Canadian visitor, and without exception, to go as far as they could to put me in the picture.”⁸³

Pope becomes Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff

When Pope returned to Ottawa in the spring of 1941 and became assistant to the CGS, a variety of issues came across his desk. A British proposal to designate the province of Nova Scotia a protected area under Article 4 of the Regulations was a case in point.⁸⁴ Pope agreed that the Canadian government should improve security at Halifax, but he thought that making the whole province of Nova Scotia a protected area was completely unnecessary. He observed that there had been no sabotage reported in Nova Scotia or anywhere else in the country for that matter. The British had not even envisaged protected areas in Glasgow, Liverpool, or Bristol, all of which had important ports. Pope recommended that the RCMP send Security Control Officers as soon as possible in Halifax to control access around the port. Once they had experience with activities there, they could recommend what areas around Halifax to designate for protection⁸⁵ When the COSC reviewed the matter in early July, they agreed with Pope, as did the government.⁸⁶ The government would eventually institute protected areas strictly around the Port, as Pope had recommended.

Pope displayed conceptual skills and intellect in his examination of various policy issues related to the Canadian Army. For example, in September 1941, he reviewed a memorandum that Colonel E.L.M. Burns had prepared concerning the role of the Canadian Corps commander in the United Kingdom.⁸⁷ The Canadian Corps commander reported at the time to General Headquarters Home Forces, but there were discussions underway concerning the possibility that the corps could be moved to South-Eastern Command. If the changes came about, Burns was concerned that it might be necessary, under some circumstances, for the Canadian Corps commander, “to go over the head of his immediate Commander” if, as an example, the British requested the use of Canadian troops in an overseas operation. Burns thought that the situation could be remedied by renaming the Senior Canadian Officer at CMHQ as General Officer Commanding in Chief (GOC-in-C) Canadian Army in the United Kingdom. He would remain the Senior Officer of CMHQ, but would also take on the responsibilities of “advising the Canadian Government on military operations of the Canadian Army overseas, through the Department of National Defence.”⁸⁸

Pope acknowledged that the current situation was not as the Canadian Army had originally envisaged it. The army had expected that its troops would be operating outside of the United Kingdom. That was clearly not the case. However, Pope did not see any need to change: “the present machinery, set up for a quite different situation has been made to work, and is working.” He was at a loss to understand why the Canadian Army would establish “an abnormal piece of machinery to meet this abnormal condition which may not continue indefinitely.”⁸⁹ In addition, Pope corrected Burns’ interpretation of the Visiting Forces Act that he had suggested in his memorandum. In accordance with the Order-in-Council the government had passed earlier, the Canadian Corps Commander in fact lost his flexibility to redeploy its troops once he joined British troops beyond the British Isles. Outside the United Kingdom, the Canadian troops would be “acting in combination,” instead of “serving together.”⁹⁰ Pope had made some strong points against Burns’ proposal. It did not go any further.

Pope also challenged a DMO&I memorandum on the composition of the I Canadian Corps. DMO&I was concerned that the corps was becoming unnecessarily large - certainly larger than its British counterparts. The corps headquarters could be reduced in size if it was stripped of some of its supporting and ancillary units, many of which had representatives in the

⁸³ Ibid, 153.

⁸⁴ LAC, RG24 Vol. 13200, War Diary Assistant CGS (War Diary ACGS), 18 June 1941; RG24 Reel 8340, HQS 7362, Extracts from MI 5 memo regarding deficiencies in the security of the Port of Halifax, nd; Massey to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 5 May 1941; Memorandum on security to the director of Naval Intelligence, 20 June 1941.

⁸⁵ RG24 Reel 8340, HQS 7362, Pope to CGS, “M.D. 6 Defence Scheme No. 3 local defence plans security control measures, Port of Halifax,” 18 June 1941; Pope to CGS, 2 July 1941.

⁸⁶ Ibid, Chiefs of Staff Committee to Minister, 5 July 1941.

⁸⁷ NDHQ, DHH, 112.1 (D16), Burns, Command of the Canadian Army in the United Kingdom, 18 August 1941; Pope to CGS, 8 September 1941.

⁸⁸ NDHQ, DHH, 112.1 (D16), Burns, Command of the Canadian Army in the United Kingdom, 18 August 1941.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ On the *Visiting Forces Act*, see Douglas E. Delaney, “Cooperation in the Anglo-Canadian Armies,” in *The British Way in warfare: Power and the International System, 1856-1956*, edited by Keith Neilsen and Greg Kennedy (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), 201; Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 151-152

headquarters. The Corps could absorb, argued DMO&I, the reductions without harming its effectiveness because the likely form and scale of its future operations had changed. The army had assumed in January 1941 that the Corps would participate in operations similar to those in which the Canadian military was employed in 1917-18, but DMO & I staff argued that was not likely to happen. DMO&I went on to say that “perhaps the British army will land on the Continent only after Germany has been broken by air bombardment and the action of the people she is now holding down.” Canada’s role would therefore be to “help the conquered nations restore peace and order.”⁹¹

Pope countered that it was wrong to compare the Canadian and British corps and their headquarters. The Canadian Corps commander had greater duties than that of a British commander. He had a direct responsibility to his government and he was the point of contact for all questions of policy and organization. Regardless of where the Canadian army would meet the German foe, whether it was in Western Europe, in the Middle East or Africa, Canada’s ground troops should expect to fight a “strong” enemy that was well prepared. Pope did not rule out the possibility that the German army might be “disintegrating” by the time the Allies established a “front” in Western Europe.⁹² That said, Canada was likely to engage strong German forces in the coming months - perhaps not in Western Europe, but in some theatre.⁹³ Pope thought it was important to determine “a question of principle” at the outset. The British expected that a Canadian corps, when it joined a British army in a theatre of operations, would have its own line of communication and base units. The Canadian government had agreed to that and the Canadian army had so informed the War Office. Canada could not now back out of the commitment. McNaughton was of the same view. DMO&I’s proposal did not go any further.

At the end of September 1941, Crerar, as CGS, asked Pope to prepare a survey of the current state of the Canadian Army. In his response, Pope focused on the status of the active (General Service) army and the active (Home service) army.⁹⁴ He identified three outstanding issues: how to fill the establishment holes in the formations already deployed or about to deploy; how to fill out the units that remained in Canada; and what to do, at least for the next six months, with “Home Service Draftees” coming out of training schools. Pope estimated that holding or reinforcement units in the United Kingdom were 13,000 men short. Should the corps deploy, the shortfall would naturally increase. Pope recommended that the “Home Service Draftees” should be directed to units of the coast garrisons and the brigade groups of the 6th Canadian Division (in British Columbia). This would free up active service personnel who in turn could be posted for service overseas or in active army units slated to go overseas. The army should begin by seeking volunteers from the active army in Canada. If it was unable to generate the proper numbers for each arm, the military would have to resort to compulsory transfers. Pope did not expect that finding volunteers would be an issue for arms other than infantry. As for the infantrymen, if they volunteered for overseas service, they would have the option of requesting a transfer to another arm of the service, or asking to transfer to another active service battalion.

Over time, Pope expected that formations in the United Kingdom would reach their targeted establishments, given recruitment forecasts. Pope anticipated that the training schools were likely to generate, within the next six months, more than enough “Home Service Draftees” to fill all the positions in Canada in the 6th Canadian Division and in his coast garrisons. He did not favor creating new “home service units” to absorb the extra men unless there was a home defence need for them, which he did not think there was. To make more room for the “Home Service Draftees,” Pope recommended that the men coming out of the training schools should also be eligible for service in Newfoundland. Pope reasoned that the documents signed by Canada in the context of the British-American bases-for-destroyers agreement provided “that the defence of Newfoundland is an integral part of the Canadian scheme of defence...”⁹⁵ Therefore, the Canadian government had good grounds for extending the provisions of the National Resource Mobilization Act to Newfoundland. The COSC approved Pope’s approach on training, reinforcements, and the assignment of draftees. So did the cabinet. By 1942, draftees were being deployed not only to Newfoundland but numerous other areas in North America.⁹⁶ Pope’s analysis was sound. He was confident in his analytical skills and willing to challenge assumptions from army staff, and his recommendations were measured and grounded in a solid logic.

⁹¹ NDHQ, DHH, 112.1 (D33) Pope to CGS, 5 September 1941; Pope to CGS, 8 September, 1941.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ NDHQ, DHH, 112.1 (D16), “Army organization: A survey as of September 1941,” Pope to CGS, 23 September 1941.

⁹⁵ Ibid. On the bases-for-destroyers agreement, see David Mackenzie, *Inside the Atlantic Triangle, Canada and the Entrance of Newfoundland into Confederation 1939-1949* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), especially Chapter 3.

⁹⁶ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 123.

French Canadians and the Army programme

By the time Pope arrived in Ottawa in the spring of 1941, the Army had started to experience difficulties in finding sufficient men to fill Crerar's army programme.⁹⁷ Crerar thought he could address the issue in part by increasing the recruitment of French Canadians who were underrepresented in the army.⁹⁸ Pope took the lead in the general staff branch. He started by asking the Directorate of Staff Duties (DSD) to determine barriers that were discouraging French Canadians from joining the army. DSD identified a number of issues.⁹⁹ There was a dearth of French language training material. The army needed more French Canadian instructors and more French Canadians in staff and command. And the army had to mobilize more French-speaking units and increase the quotas of French Canadian men in reinforcement units. The DSD assessment also identified various measures to improve recruitment of French Canadians. By 6 August, the minister had reviewed the package of measures and directed that immediate action be taken on most of them.¹⁰⁰ Pope travelled to military training institutions in Ontario and Quebec to promote the various army initiatives.¹⁰¹ He fended off demands from the minister's office to create a separate officer training centre for French Canadians in the province of Quebec. Pope was of the view that, while the army wanted to increase the number of French-speaking units, "the fact remains that these units must operate in the most intimate association with English-speaking units." Pope asserted that the creation of a separate officer training centre in Quebec would contradict Canada's efforts at maintaining unity of purpose, which "ranks so high in national interest." Instead of encouraging the "separation of the two races," which a distinct centre would do, the Army should promote efforts to get French and English Canadians to work together.¹⁰² Pope had demonstrated that he was sympathetic to the situation in French Canada, but he drew the line. He was a Canadian, not a Quebecois. He looked for the most pragmatic and effective way of winning the war. In addition, Pope spearheaded his own idea of recruiting from civilian sources. Under the Scheme, the army enlisted French-Canadians from civil life into the reserve army as private soldiers and provided them with a special basic training course of four weeks at the St. Jérôme Basic Training Centre. Once the men completed the course, they were to proceed to a cadet wing at St. Jerome where they would go through another four weeks of special preparatory training to get them ready for the Officer Training Centre in Brockville. The minister of national defence approved the circular on 31 December 1941.¹⁰³

With Pope's help and guidance, by January 1942, the army had started to implement a number of measures related to the recruitment of French Canadians.¹⁰⁴ For example, the general staff made significant progress in translating all relevant documents, including the *King's Regulations and Orders* and *Field Service Regulations*. The OCTU in Brockville had reached its objective of 125 French-Canadian candidates by December 1941. The army reserved an appropriate number of vacancies for French Canadians on senior officers' and company commanders' courses at the Royal Canadian Military College in Kingston. The Junior Leaders' School in Megantic was taking in a proportionate number of French Canadians to train, in French, as NCOs. The Army Trades School in Hamilton was developing a bilingual instructional staff. And most advanced training centres had a senior French-speaking instructor and advisor to the commandant. This was progress.

Pope confronts the Americans on Unity of Command

On his return to Canada, Pope replaced Stuart as Canada's army representative on the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD). Canada and the United States had created the PJBD following the Ogdensburg Agreement signed by

⁹⁷ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 115.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ LAC, RG24 Vol. 5812 HQS8841 Vol. 1, Pope to Chief of the General staff, "The Recruiting Problem in the Province of Quebec," 27 June 1941; Pope to Adjutant General (AG), 28 June 1941.

¹⁰⁰ See LAC, RG24 Vol. 5812, HQS8841 Vol. 1, CGS to Minister, "French Canadian representation in the Army," 6 August 1941. Attached to the memorandum is a "synoptic table" that lays out the measures that the Minister approved. The table identifies in a separate column the comments Pope provided over the course of the review.

¹⁰¹ LAC, RG24 Vol. 5812, HQS8841 Vol. 1, Pope to CGS, 29 September 1941; Vol. 2, Chief of the General Staff to the Minister, "French Canadian Army Representation," 1 October 1941.

¹⁰² LAC, RG24 Vol. 5812, HQS8841 Vol. 1, Pope to VCDS, 29 September 1941; Colonel Magee (Minister's office) to Minister of National Defence, 7 October 1941; Chief of the General Staff to Minister, 9 October 1941; Magee to the Minister, 11 October 1941; CGS to Minister, 6 December 1941.

¹⁰³ LAC, RG24 Vol. 5812, HQS8841 Vol. 2, Pope to Chief of the General Staff, 26 November 1941; memorandum from Chief of the General staff to the DOCs and GOCs, "Selection and Preparatory Instruction French Canadian Candidates for Commission," 31 December 1941.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* "Progress report: French-Canadian Representation in the Army," 28 January 1942.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Canadian Prime Minister King on 17 August 1940. The board provided a bilateral forum for the two countries to develop joint plans for the defence of North America. In mid-1941, the board was working on two plans: the joint operational plan for Basic Defence Plan No. 1; and Basic Defence Plan No. 2, later called ABC-22. The board had approved Basic Defence Plan No. 1 in the fall of 1940. It rested on the assumption that Germany would defeat the United Kingdom and the Royal Navy would be seized or destroyed. The plan had identified defence tasks for each country, but not how they were to be completed.¹⁰⁵ The joint operational plan for Basic Defence Plan No. 1 was meant to guide the “disposition, concentration and employment” of Canadian and American ground and air forces and the tasks of the Royal Canadian Navy and the U.S. Navy.¹⁰⁶ In addition, Canadian and American service planners were working on ABC-22 to reflect changes in the international situation across the Atlantic. That is, fears of a German invasion of Great Britain had abated significantly by the spring of 1941, and there was less trepidation about Germany “seizing a post in the North Eastern portion of the Continent [North America] from which further operations might be projected.” Basic Defence Plan No. 1 was completely different to that of ABC-22. Under Basic Defence Plan No. 1, “the front line was in the Western Hemisphere,” while for ABC-22, it was in Europe.¹⁰⁷ Finalizing these plans should have been straightforward, given the work that the Canadian and American sides had already completed

It was anything but straight forward. Pope and Stuart were at a meeting of the PJBD service members in March 1941 when the American side first hinted that they were seeking strategic control for the execution of both plans. After some discussions, the U.S. delegation tabled drafts of both plans and the meeting adjourned.¹⁰⁸ On 17-18 April, the two sides agreed on a definition for strategic direction: “the higher direction of war, including the assignment of missions to the [Canadian armed forces] and the allocation of the means required to accomplish them.”¹⁰⁹ The nub of the disagreement was who would exercise strategic direction and when. Under Basic Plan No. 1, Canada was prepared to accept American strategic direction. This meant transferring strategic control of Canada’s defence forces to the United States, subject to consultations with the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, while Canada assumed tactical command of its land and air forces and those of the U.S. operating in the Maritime Provinces and in Newfoundland.¹¹⁰ However, Canada was not prepared to do the same with respect to ABC-22. Pope did not say much at the April PJBD meeting because, as he recalled, the Canadian and American naval representatives monopolized the very acrimonious discussions. However, Pope discussed the matter of strategic direction with U.S. Army Colonel C. Bissell on the margins of the meeting. Pope told Bissell that he could not understand why the Americans would seek strategic direction of Canadian land forces in Canada “on the basis of a War in Europe and the Eastern Atlantic.” Pope eventually convinced Bissell of his perspective, and they went as far as drafting some text.¹¹¹ Although the meeting did not achieve final resolution of the issue, Pope and Bissell appeared to have made some headway in ironing out differences over the issue of strategic direction.

Things became much more complicated when the Canadian side began to cast doubt in late April about the concept of strategic direction under either plan. In particular, O.M. Biggar, the Canadian chair, preferred that the two countries cooperate in the case of both Basic Defence Plan 1 and ABC-22.¹¹² He wrote to the prime minister, indicating he would welcome “a general directive” on the issue. The Cabinet War Committee discussed the issue on 23 April.¹¹³ The cabinet decision stipulated that, with respect to Basic Defence Plan 1, “if no more satisfactory solution could be found by the Board, it might be necessary to accept strategic direction by the United States, subject to consultation with Canada.” On ABC-22, the ministers expressed the view that “it would be desirable” for the issue of command to be resolved in accordance with the views of the Chiefs of Staff, namely that the two countries would cooperate in defending North America, instead of the U.S. assuming strategic control.¹¹⁴ Biggar concluded from the cabinet decision that he had the authority to start with a clean slate in his negotiations and that he could revisit the concept of strategic direction in the case of both plans. He ignored the fact

¹⁰⁵ Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 345 and 349.

¹⁰⁶ NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Joint Operational Plan No. 1, 14 April 1941

¹⁰⁷ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2764, HQS, 5199-W-1-V Vol. 1, Memorandum from Chiefs of Staff to Minister, 22 April 1941.

¹⁰⁸ NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Pope to VCGS, 23 March 1941; “Joint Operational Plan No. 1,” 10 April 1941.

¹⁰⁹ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2764 HQS5199-W-1 Vol. 1, Memorandum from Chiefs of Staff to Minister, 22 April 1941.

¹¹⁰ NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Pope to Atlantic Command, 21 April 1941.

¹¹¹ Ibid, Pope to CGS, 18 April 1941.

¹¹² NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Memorandum to PJBD on command of joint operations, 22 April 1941; Biggar to Pope, 23 April 1941.

¹¹³ The Chiefs of Staff Committee reviewed the matter on 20 April and agreed to the idea of the Americans assuming strategic control under Basic Plan, but not ABC-22. The chiefs of staff presented their position to the ministers of National Defence on 22 April. LAC, RG24 Vol. 2764 HQS5199-W-1-C, Minutes of Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting of 20 April 1941; LAC, RG24 Vol. 2764, HQS, 5199-W-1-V Vol. 1, Memorandum from Chiefs of Staff to Minister, 22 April 1941.

¹¹⁴ RG24 Vol. 2764 HQS5199-W-1-V Vol. 1, Extract of Cabinet War Committee meeting of 23 April.

that the ministers were willing to live with American strategic direction in the case of Basic Plan No. 1, as indicated in the cabinet decision.¹¹⁵ On 29 April, Biggar wrote to the American PJBD Chair, F.H. LaGuardia, to explain his new position. LaGuardia was incensed.¹¹⁶ This led to what Pope would later call “the almost interminable and not too pleasant discussion” over the issue.¹¹⁷

Pope was not surprised by the American reaction. He knew full well that the Americans would not allow anything to impair the defence of the Western Hemisphere. U.S. Pope had heard Secretary of Defense Henry L. Stimson say as much in a recent broadcast. Pope wrote that, “while doubtless we have all for long been aware of the United States’ extreme sensitiveness to any development might have the effect in the smallest degree of impairing their complete immunity from overseas attack, I cannot recall any public address which so clearly states the thought that is uppermost in their minds.”¹¹⁸ Pope was mindful of the American position as he tried to resolve the issue. He met with Biggar on May 12, but he did not get very far. Biggar did not think there was any urgency in settling the issue of strategic direction in Basic Defence Plan No. 1 because the plan was unlikely to be implemented, especially given recent events across the Atlantic. Biggar saw “little or no significant differences” in the responsibilities of the two countries in the plans. He wanted “to avoid the use of vague phrases and clearly define the respective powers of the two governments.” Biggar told Pope at one luncheon that he had discussed with LaGuardia the issue of strategic direction and his American counterpart had not reported any concerns. That was clearly at odds with what Canadian defence officials knew to be the case.¹¹⁹

Pope acknowledged that the chances of giving effect to Basic Defence Plan No. 1 were slim. However, he did not think the Americans were of the same view about Great Britain’s capacity to stand up to Germany. He interpreted Biggar’s word changes simply as an effort to move away from strategic control and his efforts at eliminating “vague phrases” akin to trying to “define the undefinable.” Instead of struggling to do that, Pope advised Biggar that Canada and the United States should endeavour “to lay down broad and sound principles to cover [their] respective relations and responsibilities in the two clearly definable military contingencies.”¹²⁰ Pope doubted the Americans would agree to expunge the words “strategic direction” from the text of Basic Defence Plan No. 1. He considered doing so “tantamount to excluding the word ‘strategy’ from our vocabulary, which I must frankly say does not commend itself to me.” The Americans, he expected, would insist on retaining the position of strategic direction at least in Basic Defence Plan No. 1. The Americans and the British knew what the term meant and had incorporated it in the ABC-1 Agreement. (The Americans and the British had negotiated ABC-1, January 1941-March 1941. It laid out how the two countries would work together to defeat Germany and its allies if the Americans declared war.) The word strategy was “constantly used in the military profession” and would continue to be employed. With respect to Biggar’s report of his discussions with LaGuardia, Pope took it to mean that American service members did “not propose to argue a military question through the mouth of their civilian chairman.”¹²¹ Pope turned to various sources to explain to Biggar what constituted strategic direction. He explained the differences between political direction and military direction.¹²² This was classic Pope. He was respectful but firm. He was tenacious. He used logic to make his point. He emphasized the importance of precision in arriving at a definition of strategic control. And eventually, Biggar and the cabinet agreed to give ground on Basic Plan No.1.¹²³ However, the battle with the Americans was not over.

The PJBD met again on 28-29 May. On the first day, after Canada indicated that it was prepared to concede strategic direction in Basic Plan No. 1, the two sides worked on trying to find a compromise for ABC-22. The two delegations took turns drafting text and sharing it with the other side.¹²⁴ Pope recalled years later that he took a risk in intervening in the evening of the first day of the meeting. John Hickerson and Hugh Keenleyside, the two civilian secretaries

¹¹⁵ Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 351; see also Galen Roger, *Franklin Roosevelt and the Origins of the Canadian-American Security Alliance, 1933-1945* (London: Praeger, 1998), 80-81.

¹¹⁶ RG24 Vol. 2764 HQS, 5199-W-1-V Vol. 1, Biggar to LaGuardia, 29 April 1941; *Ibid*, LaGuardia to Biggar, 2 May 1941. See also Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 351.

¹¹⁷ NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Pope to CGS, 26 July 1941.

¹¹⁸ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2790, HQS 7410-7 Vol. 1, Pope to CGS, 8 May 1941.

¹¹⁹ NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Biggar to Pope, 15 May 1941 to which is attached a memorandum to members of the Canadian section; see also NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Stuart to CGS, 14 May 1941.

¹²⁰ NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Pope to Biggar, 16 May 1941.

¹²¹ *Ibid*, handwritten note from Pope to CGS, nd.

¹²² RG24 Vol. 2724 HQS, 5199-W-1-V Vol. 1, Pope to Biggar, 22 May 1941; NDHQ, DHH 112.11 (D1A), Pope to Biggar, 25 May 1941.

¹²³ NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Pope to CGS, 31 May 1941. See Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 352.

¹²⁴ NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Pope to CGS, 31 May 1941.

on the PJBD, came up with draft wording on the issue of command relations. They garnered some support in the room, including from LaGuardia, who apparently said: “Now that this has been approved, let’s hear no more about it.”¹²⁵ Pope saw that most Canadian members appeared to support the Hickerson-Keenleyside proposal and he did not want to “break through the tradition of [Canadian] unanimity.”¹²⁶ However, he did not like the proposal. He told the people around the table that he felt very confident that the Chiefs of Staff would not approve the proposal, and he was certain they would not recommend it to the government. On that, they agreed to adjourn for the night.

The two sides pursued the discussions on command relations the following day and disagreement continued to prevail. Pope explained to the Americans that they had to provide a rationale for wanting unity of command in ABC-22.¹²⁷ It was not sufficient for them to say that it was the president’s position, since his position on the issue simply reflected “an expression of the views that have been given the President by Chiefs of Staff.” Pope wanted proof that the president felt strongly about it. Moreover, it was not enough to simply say that “unity of command was essential in war.” When the Americans pointed to the April 1918 Beauvais agreement, under which Marshal Ferdinand Foch assumed strategic direction over the Allied armies, Pope told them they could not possibly be comparing the situation in 1918 to that prevailing in 1941. He had read his history. In 1918, Foch had strategic direction over 350 divisions doing battle in a series of major campaigns. In the situation that potentially confronted Canadians and Americans in 1941, the two countries would have to defend their joint coastlines, only against the “occasional hit and run raids.”¹²⁸

Eventually, the Americans backed down. The journal for the meeting of 28-29 May reported that, when the service members of the board met in the near future, “it would be desirable for the question of command relationship under Plan No. 2 to be considered on the basis of command by cooperation.”¹²⁹ The PJBD service members met as planned in Montreal on 3-4 June. The U.S. had come equipped with a draft text with which Pope and the remainder of the Canadian section was pleased.¹³⁰ The CGS, Harry Crerar, was satisfied with it as well. He told Pope on 6 June that he “approved” of Pope’s “further efforts” to secure agreement of the Americans to the revised text.¹³¹ At the PJBD meeting of July 29-30, the service members of the two countries signed a letter submitting ABC-22 to the Canadian and U.S. Chiefs of Staff for approval. The Cabinet War Committee approved ABC-22 (officially known as Joint-Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan No. 2) on 15 October 1941.¹³² As noted by Canadian historian C.P. Stacey, “the final stage...had been handled entirely through military channels.”¹³³ Pope had ensured that Canada’s interests were safeguarded. He had been diplomatic but unyielding with the Americans. Using his own strong analytical skills, he had forced the Americans to see that there was fault in their logic.

The PJBD discussed various questions related to the defence of Newfoundland after the Americans gained a foothold on the island as part of the destroyers-for-bases agreement concluded in September 1940.¹³⁴ Pope used finesse on the matter of railways in Newfoundland. The PJBD had established that the government of Newfoundland and the Americans would assume most of the responsibility for the work on the railroad and for purchasing the rolling stock. The Americans were aiming to finish the rehabilitation of the railroad before the winter of 1941 set in. Bissell of the Americans delegation approached Pope and asked if Canada could spare a unit of military engineers to expedite work on the railroad. Pope apologized that Canada had none to spare. The Americans then asked whether they could use their own troops. Pope was disinclined, “as a matter of general principle,” to allow the Americans to pursue any action that would permit them “a greater measure of control over Newfoundland affairs than they have at present.” He acknowledged that they were within their rights to complete what needed to be done to “conduct military operations” in the area of the leased bases, but he was sensitive about not having a large American military contingent on territory where Canada had a strategic interest. In an effort to accommodate the Americans, while keeping to the “general principle,” Pope recommended that the Americans

¹²⁵ Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 352. Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 165-166.

¹²⁶ Ibid. There is no record of the specifics of the Hickerson-Keenleyside proposal.

¹²⁷ NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Pope to CGS, 31 May 1941; Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 354.

¹²⁸ NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Pope to CGS, 31 May 1941.

¹²⁹ Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 352

¹³⁰ NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Pope to CGS, Pope to CGS 5 June 1941.

¹³¹ RG24 Vol. 2724 HQS5199-W-1-V Vol. 1, Crerar to Pope, 6 June 1941.

¹³² President Roosevelt approved it on 29 August 1941. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 352.

¹³³ Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 352.

¹³⁴ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 179.

approach Canada's two railway companies for civilian staffs.¹³⁵ Pope's response reflected a sound understanding of the broader issues of living with the Americans in Newfoundland.¹³⁶

At the meeting of the PJBD on 9 September, Pope thought he detected a change in American attitudes about the defence of Newfoundland and, more generally, about the Western Hemisphere. The American service members on the PJBD appeared to shift their attention. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy were prepared to leave behind "the apprehension which seized them some fifteen months ago, and that rather than concentrating their attention on Hemispheric Defence, their minds are apparently ranging further afield." The U.S. service members accepted the view that Canada should maintain a minimum of forces in Newfoundland and focus "in the decisive theatres of war."¹³⁷ Indeed, the Americans supported a Canadian proposal for releasing the 4th Canadian Division from general reserve in Canada. Pope told the Board that the war to defeat Germany and its allies was being fought overseas, which was where Canada should have most of its troops. Pope reassured LaGuardia, who had queried him about Canada's intentions, that the aim of its proposal was not to reduce the size of Canada's overall commitment to the war effort, but rather to increase it. The senior American Army representative, Lieutenant-General S.D. Embick, secured support from his superiors in Washington for Pope's proposal.¹³⁸

Days after Pearl Harbor, Pope got word that the U.S. War Department was examining the merits of instituting unity of command in Newfoundland.¹³⁹ In fact, Major-General Brant, Commander of U.S. Army Base Command Newfoundland, was trying to make it happen without consultation. On 23 December, Pope directed Atlantic Command to cooperate with the U.S. commander, but the Canadian commander was "to refuse to recognize [the U.S. Commander] assumption of position of dominant partner."¹⁴⁰ Pope was prepared to debate the issue of unity of command in Newfoundland in December 1941 because he had already put some thought into the matter some months earlier. In September 1941, he observed that Newfoundland was a large island with a number of defended localities "widely separated from one another by wide stretches of barren and impassible country."¹⁴¹ Given the terrain, each garrison would have to "fight its own little battle, if the forms and scales of attack warrant the use of this term." The forms and scales of attack established for these localities assumed that the garrisons would be expected to have to defend themselves at most against only "sporadic attacks and minor raids." It was possible that the United States Army might be capable of providing some support. If so, Pope thought the U.S. forces should be under tactical Canadian command. He did not see how unified command would contribute to the situation.¹⁴²

Pope did acknowledge that the situation in St. John's was less clear-cut, however. Although the United States and Canada had established coastal artillery, anti-aircraft defence units and infantry garrisons in St. John's, one country should take on the command of the defence of the port. Given that the Royal Canadian Navy used the port as its main naval base in Newfoundland, logic dictated that the Canadian Army should assume primary responsibility for its defence. The Americans were in St. John's because the U.S. Navy had initially expected to use St. John's as its naval base when the Roosevelt government negotiated the destroyers-for-bases agreement in 1940. The U.S. Navy had subsequently decided that St. John's was too small and it had established its main naval base in Argentia. However, in the meantime, the U.S. Army had dispatched a garrison to St. John's. It was still there. Pope thought the U.S. Army should move its forces out of St. John's, or reduce them at the very least, and allow Canada to take charge in defence of the port. Canada, having provided three permanent coast artillery batteries at St. John's, should offer to build another counter-bombardment battery to the north of

¹³⁵ Ibid, Pope to CGS, 7 August, 8 August, 11 August 1941.

¹³⁶ Although Pope was mindful of Canada's national interest in Newfoundland, he did not try to keep up with the Americans' propensity to spend on infrastructure. For example, while the United States had ambitious plans about highways on Newfoundland, Pope thought the Canadian contingent had already done sufficient road work for the defence of St. John's. In approaching their share of the work, the Americans had said that they would never allow their garrisons to "be exposed to defeat in detail." Pope thought the U.S. view was "farfetched." The Canadian Army should assess future road projects "very objectively and we should not allow ourselves to be influenced" by American plans. NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Pope to CGS, 8 August 1941.

¹³⁷ NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Pope to CGS, 11 September 1941.

¹³⁸ LAC, RG24 Vol. 13000, War Diary ACGS, 6, 11 and 18 November 1941; NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Pope memorandum, Release of 4th Canadian Infantry Division from general Reserve, 9 November 1941. NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Pope to CGS, 18 November 1941.

¹³⁹ On the command situation in Newfoundland, see Stanley W. Dziuban, *Military relations between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959), 116.

¹⁴⁰ LAC, RG24 HQS7410-7 Vol. 3, Pope to Atlantic Command, 23 December 1941.

¹⁴¹ LAC, RG24 Volume 2725, HQS5199-W-1A, Pope to CGS, Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan No.2 and Command relations in Newfoundland, 13 September 1941.

¹⁴² Ibid.

the harbour entrance and then assume the command of the combined St. John's garrison. In the meantime, the most important point was for Canada and the United States to coordinate their efforts in accordance with the ABC-22 principle of mutual cooperation. Canada should not contemplate unity of command under any circumstances.¹⁴³

Pearl Harbor did not force any revisions of Pope's opinion on the need for unity of command in Newfoundland. Despite the new war conditions, Pope did not think the situation in Newfoundland, based on the underlying forms and scales of attack for the Island, warranted the establishment of unity of command, whether by the local commander or by the Chiefs of Staff. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff had not had any cause to change assumptions about the forms and scales of potential attack on Newfoundland and the rest of eastern Canada. The United States Defence Plan, a copy of which Pope had in his possession, rested on a similar assessment.¹⁴⁴

By the time the PJBD met on 19-20 December, Pope observed that the U.S. War Department "had steadied down after the shock" of Pearl Harbor. While they still worried about continental defence, the Americans were demonstrating "that their minds were already ranging farther afield."¹⁴⁵ It did not prevent U.S. Navy commander Forrest Percival Sherman from broaching the subject of Newfoundland with Pope between formal sessions. He asked Pope if it was time to institute unified command in Newfoundland, and if it could work. Pope replied without hesitation that he did not think there was any need to do so. After dealing briefly with the arrangements pertaining to the navy and air force, Pope moved on to the army situation. He explored with Sherman the points he had laid out in his earlier memoranda of September. He acknowledged that the situation was "all askew" in St. John's. If the Americans were interested in transferring their coast defence guns to Canada, and Pope understood that there were indications to that effect, the Canadian Army was prepared to assume the task and take overall responsibility for the defence of St. John's. Pope told Sherman that he was confident that the issue of St. John's would eventually resolve itself.¹⁴⁶

When the matter of command in Newfoundland came up during the formal session of the PJBD meeting, Pope proposed a general principle, now that ABC-22 had been invoked, under which local commanders would assume responsibility to deliver on the tasks that they had been assigned. The two countries would decentralize decision-making to local commanders and they would take responsibility for "execution" because they were in the best position to take action, especially when prompt action was necessary. Using Pope's approach as a guide, he and Embick developed Recommendation 22. It read as follows: "That the United States and Canadian Governments now authorize the Commanders named in paragraph 12 of ABC-22, or their duly authorized representatives, to effect by mutual agreement any arrangements they deem necessary for the perfection of preparation for the common defence, including but not limited to, the installation of accessory equipment in the Territory of either, the transit of armed forces, equipment or defence materials into or through the territory of either, and the utilization by either nation of the base and military facilities of the other."¹⁴⁷

Pope similarly resisted American impulses to unify command on the west coast. Pope had heard through his military contacts that the suggestion was coming and he had conducted a preliminary analysis of the matter. Pope recognized that the events of 7 December had weakened the Allied position in the Pacific. Having lost their numerical superiority, the Allies had to pursue a "more defensive" strategy than originally envisaged, but he did not think that the west coast was "liable" to major land attack. He argued that "Japan's aims are in eastern and south-eastern Asia and the course of the war, so far as it has developed, has been in accordance with these aims." Pope maintained that Japan's operations were already putting a lot of pressure on its scarce resources, leaving few available to conduct a "major combined operation" on the west coast of North America. He concluded that the threat to the west coast was limited to bombardment by carrier-launched aircraft and other sporadic raids "which, apart from their effect on public opinion, cannot possibly endanger the national security."¹⁴⁸ The garrisons at Victoria-Esquimalt, Vancouver, and Prince-Rupert were more than sufficient for defending against raids. Moreover, the Canadian Army had a general reserve, currently an infantry brigade (soon to be increased to a brigade group), which could be reinforced with troops from eastern Canada. He acknowledged that anti-aircraft defences needed to be

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Pope to Air Commodore Cuffe and Commodore Reid, 26 December 1941.

¹⁴⁵ NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Pope to CGS, 22 December 1941.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid; see also Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 363-364.

¹⁴⁸ NDHQ, DHH 72/145, Permanent Joint Board on Defence, File Pope "Note on question of United States-Canada Unity of Command," 18 December 1941.

bolstered, and work was already underway to do so. Pope concluded that there was no need for a unified command, given the low probability of a large Japanese amphibious operations and the state of Canadian defence forces on the west coast.

Contrary to Pope's expectations, the American service chiefs did not raise the issue at the PJBD meeting of 19-20 December. One historian has suggested that the U.S. side did not bring it up because the U.S. Army had not convinced the U.S. Navy that there was a need for unity of command on the west coast.¹⁴⁹ LaGuardia still thought the situation on the west coast warranted unity of command. He tried to secure Roosevelt's assistance.¹⁵⁰ When that did not work, he wrote directly to Biggar on 2 January. He suggested that Pearl Harbor justified invoking Basic Defence Plan 1 - as opposed to ABC-22 - on the west coast and the institution of unified command, under the U.S. commander for Western Theatre.¹⁵¹

When Pope got hold of LaGuardia's letter, he pointed out to the other two services that this was not a PJBD issue, but a matter to be addressed by the military staffs of both countries, pursuant to ABC-22.¹⁵² The Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed. On 14 January 1942, Pope heard from Embick.¹⁵³ The U.S. General reiterated in his letter what LaGuardia had said to Biggar in his 2 January correspondence. Pope laid out to Embick what he understood the strategic situation to be in the Pacific. Pope observed that Canada and the United States were finding themselves in the position ABC-22 had contemplated, with the United States engaged and the United Kingdom not defeated. ABC-22 had not planned for Pearl Harbor, which had "transferred naval superiority in Northern Pacific to Japan," but that did not mean that the west coast was at risk of a major land attack any more than before. Given this low threat assessment, there were no grounds for instituting unity of command on the West coast. Pope informed Embick that Canada would pursue the matter only if there were reasons to believe that "the method of cooperation" established in ABC-22 had "broken down."¹⁵⁴ When the service members of the PJBD met in Montreal on 20 January 1942, Embick raised the issue as expected. Pope and the other Canadian service members were ready. They pointed out that the British agreed with Canada on their assessment and so did some "Service authorities" in Washington, although the Canadian side did not specify whom. Pope told the Americans that, if the U.S. Army felt strongly about instituting unity of command, the chief of staff of the U.S. Army would have to reach out to his Canadian counterpart. Pope suspected that the American side would not be interested in doing so, and he was correct. The Americans resigned themselves to have a statement reflecting their views in the minutes.¹⁵⁵ That was the end of that episode. Pope had resisted the Americans one more time.¹⁵⁶

Conclusion

In the period 1939-1942, Pope had ample opportunity to display his leadership skills. He continued to establish good relations with peers and superiors at National Defence, across the government, and with his British and American counterparts. He had used his human and analytical skills to influence policy, achieve compromises, and cope with complex challenges. He was confronted with some familiar and recurring issues, such as censorship, but the pace and the problems were more challenging. The environment in London at the CMHQ was different from that of Ottawa, with Pope much closer to the front lines. He maintained his composure and made sure that Crerar did not regret his decision to call for him when Burns moved on. The deployments to France and Iceland were not large relative to later Canadian movements of troops. However, they were planned within short timelines and under shifting political and strategic circumstances. Pope was given a leading role in making sure everything had been done to organize the troops and get them to their destination. He displayed self-control when finalizing the agreement on the establishment of I Canadian Corps. He had to rely on his

¹⁴⁹ Perras, *Franklin Roosevelt and the Origins of the Canadian-American Security Alliance: 1933-1945*, 84.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), LaGuardia to Biggar, ND, Biggar to LaGuardia, 3 January 1941.

¹⁵² NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Pope to CGS, 3 and 16 January 1942. The Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed that it would not take any further action on LaGuardia's letter unless the American chiefs of staff brought it to their attention. NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to H.L. Keenleyside, 9 January 1942.

¹⁵³ NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Embick to Pope, 14 January 1942. Pope told Crerar that he found it inappropriate that Embick was writing "on a matter of this kind" on behalf of his government to "an officer of the Department of National Defence." NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Pope to CGS, 16 January 1942.

¹⁵⁴ NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), Pope to CGS, 16 January 1942; Pope to Embick, 17, 19 January 1942; see also Perras, *Franklin Roosevelt and the Origins of the Canadian-American Security Alliance: 1933-1945*, 85.

¹⁵⁵ NDHQ, DHH, 112.11 (D1A), "PJBD Meeting 20 January 1942," Pope to CGS, 21 January 1942

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. See also Perras, *Franklin Roosevelt and the Origins of the Canadian-American Security Alliance: 1933-1945*, 85-86.

personal power when working with his British counterparts. He had established trustworthy relationships with them since his days at staff college. The social capital, or amity, he had accumulated through these relationships bore fruit.

When he returned to Ottawa in the spring of 1941, it was no longer as head of a small directorate, but as the number three on the general staff. He had larger responsibilities. At times, it was primarily a matter of using his human skills and a combination of the power emanating from his position and personal power to convince others of his position. At other times, his political adroitness helped. On the question of increasing French Canadian recruitment, Pope had a good understanding of the place of French Canadians in Canada. He knew that recruitment of French Canadians would be difficult if they felt ostracized, or if the Army did not address their specific needs. He contributed significantly to the early success of the recruitment initiative. Pope had demonstrated flexibility and adaptability as he shifted from one posting to another, an important characteristic of leadership.

Pope combined his human and analytical skills to resolve problems of strategic control and unified command. When it came time to negotiate with the Americans, Pope had a good appreciation of Canada's national interests and those of the United States, which helped him to anticipate what they might say. He had taken the time to think them out, and he stood up to the Americans when he thought Canadian national interests were in jeopardy. He understood that allowing the Americans to take strategic control under ABC-22, or institute unified command in Newfoundland or on the west coast, posed some serious sovereignty problems. In 1940, the U.S. had managed to secure in 1940 everything they had wanted with respect to the destroyers-for-bases in Newfoundland. That Pope prevailed in his discussions with the Americans was no small achievement. J.L. Granatstein writes that the Military Attaché in Ottawa thought that Pope was always very friendly towards the United States.¹⁵⁷ He established these positive relations by being courteous, firm and resolute, not by conceding on important policy questions.

¹⁵⁷ Granatstein, *The Generals*, 213.

CHAPTER 8

“INSIDE THE CIRCLE”: 1942-1944

In March 1942, Pope arrived in Washington. His primary functions were to monitor and report on the strategy that the Americans and the British were developing to defeat Germany and Japan; head a small army staff responsible for procurement and assignment issues; and, with respect to these two functions, defend Canada's interests when he thought they were at risk. He used his human and analytical skills to exercise leadership in a new forum and with a new cast of characters. It was a one man-mission until July 1942, when the Canadian Joint Staff Mission (CJSM) proper opened and began operating. At that time, Pope was joined by Rear Admiral V.G. Brodeur and Air Vice Marshal G.V. Walsh. Pope was the Chairman of the CJSM, but he still had to tread carefully with his colleagues. He did his best to assuage their doubts and gain their confidence. Outside the CJSM, he established positive relations with External Affairs officials, including the staff in Washington and those with whom he interacted in Ottawa.

Canada was not invited to sit on the U.S.-U.K. Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) organization, where most strategic decisions were taken. The King government was not interested in formal membership on the CCS but it did want to know what was being said and what was being decided. It was Pope's role to fill that requirement. He said of his function that it was primarily "if not almost entirely, a matter of personal contact."¹ He developed a network of contacts to secure the information he needed. It was a matter of getting reacquainted and nurturing old relations and establishing new ones. Between his many contacts, his access to various documents, and a multitude of briefings, Pope developed an appreciation of the discussions unfolding between the Americans and the British on military strategy. This chapter will focus on Pope's reporting from Washington and his own perspective. In addition, the chapter will identify instances in which Pope tried to influence the Canadian debate.

Pope established a good rapport with the department of Munitions and Supply (M&S) in Ottawa. Pope took a key role in trying to secure Canada a seat on the Munitions Assignment Board, and in introducing a rational process into Canada's Mutual Aid program.

The genesis of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission

Long before Pope arrived in Washington, the King government had contemplated a Canadian military mission in the U.S. capital. The British and Americans balked at first, but they eventually agreed. Until the beginning of 1942, Pope's involvement had been limited to considerations of who would represent the Canadian Army if it were to send someone to Washington as part of a mission. Pope thought General Georges Vanier would be an ideal candidate. In the latter part of January 1942, Pope became more engaged in the issue.² On 22 January, he travelled to Washington to explore informally the "nature and scope of our proposed army representation vis-à-vis the British Joint Staff and the United States Chiefs of Staff." (At the time, the British and Americans were in the process of finalizing the details concerning the CCS organization.)³ During his visit, Pope met with Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Head of the British Joint Staff Mission. Pope explained to Dill that Canada had no intention of seeking "an equal voice" in the conduct of the war in theatres in which Canada "had but a general and perhaps somewhat removed interest." However, Canada was "concerned" about some theatres, the Western Hemisphere among them, and the Canadian government would expect, for "important political aspects," to secure representation at the "highest Service level" for discussion on such areas of interest. Canada was also hoping to have a seat on the Joint Planning and Joint Intelligence "sections" of the British Joint Staff in Washington. Lastly, Canada sought an "active participation" on the allocation committees.⁴ Dill committed to providing the Canadian army representative in Washington with a separate desk in the Public Health Building, where the army Branch of the British Joint Staff was located. In addition, Dill told Pope that the Canadian army member would be "fully informed" of all matters and he would "represent the Army side when questions of direct Canadian concern were under discussions with the United

¹ LAC, RG24 Reel 8375, HQS8790-2, Pope to Chief of the General Staff, 4 August 1942.

² Pope must have had some inkling that he was heading to Washington in January. LAC, RG24 Vol. 13200, Vice Chief General staff diary, entries for 21 January 1942; 14 February 1942.

³ LAC, RG24 Reel 8375, HQS8790-1, Pope to CGS, "Canadian Army Representation Washington," 24 January 1942. By the time Pope travelled to Washington, the general staff had managed to secure a general sense of what the Americans and the British were contemplating from meetings between the Chiefs of Staff and Lieutenant-General Macready and with Dill. LAC, RG24 Volume 5183, HQS15-9-35, Vol. 1, Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 6 January 1941; see also C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Government The War Policies of Canada 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970) 161-2.

⁴ LAC, RG24 Reel 8375, HQS8790-1, Pope to CGS, "Canadian Army Representation Washington," 24 January 1942.

States Chiefs of Staff.” Dill thought it would be “natural, that on other occasions when questions farther afield were being considered, the Canadian representative might well represent the senior British army member, should the latter for any reason be unable to attend.” Dill concluded that “in view of the importance of Canada’s war production,” the Canadian army representative would “fill a distinct role...in this particular field.”⁵ Dill was able to keep his promise about Pope having his own desk in the Public Health Building, but that was the extent of it.⁶

Pope and the rest of Ottawa learned of the new CCS by way of a communiqué on 27 January, not having been consulted by the Americans or the British before the announcement.⁷ The communiqué indicated that the CCS would be responsible for major strategy; that is, the “broad programme of war requirements based on strategic policy and the allocation of resources as between theatres.”⁸ The communiqué announced at the same time the creation of the Munitions Assignment Board (MAB) in Washington and its three committees for navy, ground, and air. The MAB reported directly to the CCS. Pope met the same day with Norman Robertson, under-secretary of state for external affairs, and A.D.P. Heeney of the Privy Council, to discuss how to proceed.⁹ They decided that the Chiefs of Staff would forward a memorandum on the matter to the Cabinet War Cabinet for its consideration. The joint memorandum echoed what Pope had told Dill. It recognized that Canada had no right to equal representation on the various committees, except where Canadian interests were fundamentally concerned.¹⁰ That said, the government would ask to be fully informed of developments so that it could determine if the country’s interests were engaged. Canada’s representatives should not be part of a British (Commonwealth) Joint Staff so as to maintain “the line of responsibility back to Ottawa.” The memorandum also called for Canada to be represented on the allocation committees. Failing that, Canada would maintain the “right of allocation” for all Canadian production in response to orders from Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other countries.

When the Cabinet War Committee met on 11 March, King reported on the various Canadian efforts to open an office in Washington. The prime minister explained to ministers that Canada had been unable to get agreement from the United States and the United Kingdom on full representation, meaning one representative from each of the three services. The minister of national defence, James Ralston, told the War Committee that the Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to allow a member of one service to represent them all in Washington. Lester B. Pearson of the Canadian Legation in Washington told the committee that the Americans had made it very clear to him that it was either one person or none at all. The ministers came up with a compromise. The Canadian officer chosen would not represent the Chiefs of Staff but the Cabinet War Committee.¹¹ The committee agreed to the National Defence proposal that Pope be appointed as “the representative of the War Committee in Washington, for the purpose of maintaining continuous contact with the Combined Staffs and the Combined Planning Committee, and to represent the War Committee before the Combined Staffs when questions affecting Canada were under consideration.”¹² To appease the other two services, the cabinet agreed that “when matters of concern to Canada, specifically Navy or Air Force in character, were before the Combined Staff, a Naval or Air Force officer, named for the purpose, would replace General Pope.” As C.P. Stacey points out, Pope’s position was strange. He would be “representing a political and civil authority (the War Committee) before a purely military authority (the Combined Chiefs of Staff).”¹³

In accordance with the government’s decision, Pope operated on his own at first. In May 1942, however, Hume Wrong of the Canadian Legation met with Pope to discuss the future of the mission. Wrong suggested that it was time to start pressing for a full mission with members from the air force and the navy because the Americans were no longer against the idea. Pope expressed concern that there might not be enough work to keep everyone busy. In any event, he was willing to support Wrong’s proposal. Wrong told Pope that Leighton McCarthy, the Canadian minister in Washington, was

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 162-3.

⁸ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2728, HQS5199-W-10, Pope to Chief of the General Staff, “Canadian Services Representation in Washington,” 29 July 1942. The British Chiefs of Staff in London and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington were in charge of actual conduct of operations “inside the theatres of war lying within their own sphere of strategic responsibility.”

⁹ LAC, RG24 Vol. 5183, HQS15-9-35, COSC Secretary to Chiefs of Staff, 29 January 1942.

¹⁰ LAC, RG24 Vol. 5183, HQS15-9-35, Chiefs of Staff to Minister, 3 February 1942; 14 February 1942.

¹¹ Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 164-5.

¹² LAC, MG27-IIIIF4, Maurice Pope Papers, Major-General Pope’s Diary (hereafter LAC, MP diary), 18 March.

¹³ LAC RG24 Vol. 11962, File M.S. 3 pt. 1 British Joint Staff Mission – General 1942, Appointment of Pope as military representative, Annex 1, copy of letter from Leighton McCarthy to Summer Wells, of 25 March 1942; see also Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 165.

travelling to Ottawa in the coming days and he planned to raise the matter with the service ministers.¹⁴ The Chiefs of Staff tabled a proposal before the Cabinet War Committee on 4 June, and ministers approved it on 17 June. The Canadian Joint Staff Mission held its first staff meeting on 1 July.¹⁵

Establishing his network

Pope became chairman of the CJSM and its senior staff officer. He was no longer the military representative for the War Committee. Pope was joined by Brodeur and Walsh, both of whom had worked as defence attachés in Washington. The members of the CJSM represented their respective Chiefs of Staff in Washington. They monitored and reported on developments concerning the CCS, particularly with respect to discussions on Allied strategy, and intervened when they thought Canada's national interests were at stake. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff had agreed that Pope would serve as their representative before CCS and the MAB. It was understood that the other service members "would be associated" with Pope when relevant issues came up.¹⁶ Pope was to keep the other members of the CJSM fully apprised of information he might secure through his work with the CCS and the Munitions Assignment Board. The members of the CJSM were instructed to "maintain their independent identity" while working in Washington. They were directed to serve as "advisors" to the Canadian minister at the Legation in Washington. When the Americans were officially advised of the CJSM, Canada chose to omit that last instruction. The Canadian minister in Washington was concerned that it might be "misunderstood by the U.S. service authorities," since the American military did not like to work with civilians.¹⁷ Pope argued that Military Attachés had different duties and they should be kept separate.¹⁸

Pope had to establish good relations with numerous people to fulfill his monitoring and reporting functions. It started inside the CJSM. Although Pope was senior to Brodeur and Walsh, he had to move carefully if he wanted to prevent service jealousies from interfering with the mandate of the mission. Brodeur had a reputation for being difficult and uncompromising. When Wrong was speaking to Pope in May 1942 about who would join him from the other two services, Walsh's name came up but not Brodeur's. Wrong had made his views known about Brodeur when Canada had explored in late 1941 the option of opening a PJBD office in Washington and the Chiefs of Staff had proposed moving the defence attachés over to the new organization. Brodeur would have been in charge. Wrong argued that "Canada would greatly lose in influence in Washington, rather than gain in representation...and Canada would be off to a bad start" with Brodeur at the helm.¹⁹ Even Brodeur acknowledged that he was not much of a diplomat.²⁰

Brodeur and Walsh had not been favourably disposed towards Pope while they were still serving as attachés. For example, in late March 1942, Brodeur had complained to Admiral Percy W. Nelles, the chief of the naval staff, that he was having more difficulty finding information about navy matters since Pope had arrived. He was worried that Pope was discussing navy issues without letting him know.²¹ Brodeur's fears lingered, and so did Walsh's, after they learned that they were to join Pope. They shared their doubts with Pearson at the Legation.²² Because of their continuing concern over access to information, Brodeur and Walsh tried to convince Pope that the CJSM should operate as an integrated mission, with the three services working very closely. Pope preferred a more decentralized organization, which was actually more in line with

¹⁴ LAC, MP diary, 12 May; RG25 Vol. 4573, File 50043-40, "Canadian Defence Services Representation in the U.S." 25 May 1942.

¹⁵ LAC RG24 Vol. 11962, File S.1-1, pt 1, Minutes of CJSM 1 July 1942; for more background on events leading up to the Cabinet decision to create the CJSM, see Dolak, "To the Public Health Building: The Establishment and Function of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission in Washington during the Second World War," 34-36.

¹⁶ See draft Press statement in LAC, RG25 Vol. 4573, File 50043-40 Part 1, 3 July 1942.

¹⁷ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2728 HQS5199-W-10, "Instructions Canadian Service Representative in Washington," 20 June 1942; Canadian Joint Staff Washington (CJSW) to Defensor, Ottawa, 4 August 1942; LAC RG24, Vol. 8088, File NSS 1272-2, Vol. 3, Chiefs of Staff Committee; Minutes of the 162nd Meeting, June 2, 1942; LAC, RG25, vol. 11967, File S. 170, Pearson to Heeney, 5 June 1942.

¹⁸ On Pope and the defence attachés, LAC, RG24 Reel 8375, HQS8790-1, Pope to CGS, "Canadian Army Representation Washington," 24 January 1942; Washington Report no. 4, 15 September 1942.

¹⁹ LAC, RG25, vol. 2902, File 2341-40c, Wrong to Robertson, Proposed Military Mission to Washington, 4 December 1941.

²⁰ LAC, MG30-E312, Victor Gabriel Brodeur fonds, Vol. 4, file 35, Brodeur to Prime Minister Mackenzie King, 1 January 1942, See also Bill Rawling, *Victor Brodeur: Officier de la marine canadienne*, (Athena: Quebec, 2008), 202-203; Dolak, "To the Public Health Building," 37.

²¹ LAC, MP diary, April 18, 1942; LAC, RG 25, Vol. 4573, File 50043-40, "Canadian Defence Services Representation in the U.S." Copy of note from Brodeur to Nelles sent to Robertson, 25 May, 1942; LAC, RG25 Vol. 2902, File 2341-40c, Heeney to Nelles, 22 June 1942; LAC, RG25, Vol. 4573, File 50043-40, Wrong to Robertson, April 27, 1942; LAC, RG25, Vol. 11967, File S. 170, Brodeur to Nelles, 24 March, 1942. See also Rawling, *Victor Brodeur*, 203.

²² LAC, RG25, vol. 4573, File 500043, Part 1, Pearson to Wrong, 6 July 1942; Wrong to Pearson, 8 July 1942.

what Ottawa had in mind, and it likely suited Pope who thought it would be easier to carry out his mandate that way.²³ It would save him the trouble of always having to secure the formal approval of Brodeur and Walsh before issuing reports or carrying out his other tasks. He did, however, make an effort to seek their comments when they were available.

Walsh had another problem. He preferred not to be closely associated with the British mission because he thought that the CJSM would be placed in a "subordinate capacity."²⁴ If the Canadians were unable to join the CCS committees, Walsh wanted to work more closely with the Americans. That was in part because Walsh considered the CJSM more as a vehicle for developing defence relations with the U.S. than for prying into the CCS. Pope did not stand in Walsh's way if he wanted to work more closely with the Americans; however, Pope chose to operate differently, establishing contacts with the CCS, working with the Americans when he could, while relying more significantly on the British for strategic intelligence. External Affairs did not object to the CJSM working with the Americans or the British as required.²⁵

Pope tried to include Brodeur and Walsh in briefings, meetings, and other events. They joined Pope for the briefings that Field Marshal Dill provided on a regular basis starting in 1943. When he was invited to events with other delegations, he made a point of trying to include them.²⁶ However, there were times when Pope was unable to do so despite his best efforts. For example, McCarthy from the legation decided at the beginning of 1943 that he would host regular meetings of some of the heads of Canadian agencies located in Washington. Pope was invited to attend, but Brodeur and Walsh were not because of a recent clash between the two officers and McCarthy. Pope met unsuccessfully with Pearson and McCarthy at the beginning of January to plead his case that his CJSM colleagues should accompany him. Pope revisited the matter when McCarthy held his first meeting in April 1943. Invitees included, in addition to Pope, representatives from the department of Munitions and Supply, the Wartime Information Board, the Wartime Prices and Trade Board, and Pearson from the Legation. McCarthy suggested that the group would be limited to those present at the meeting. Pope intervened once again. He reminded everyone that he had no executive authority over Walsh and Brodeur, even though he was the Chairman of the CJSM. He explained to those present that not inviting them would present him with some "considerable family difficulties." The other attendees were not convinced, and Brodeur and Walsh remained on the outs, as it were.²⁷

Pope developed sound relations with officials from External Affairs and the Privy Council. They were important contacts for Pope. The External Affairs staff in Washington served as another source of information for what was transpiring in Washington, while Pope relied on his Ottawa contacts to remain abreast of events in the Canadian capital. He met McCarthy during his first days in the U.S. capital and made sure to nurture his relationship with the minister in the following months. He recalled years later that his interactions with McCarthy "were of the happiest."²⁸ He met Pearson regularly on day-to-day issues. The two sat on the Washington Advisory Committee on Mutual Aid and they met socially. Pope's relations with senior staff in Ottawa were also positive. These included dealings with Norman Robertson of External Affairs and Arnold Heeney of the Privy Council.²⁹

Pope delivered on his monitoring and reporting functions by cultivating important relationships with allied missions in Washington. He had to establish good relations first and foremost with the British and the Americans who served on the CCS and the Munitions Assignment Board. Pope had an inauspicious start with the British Army officers in what appeared to be a concerted effort on their part to coopt him into the British Joint Staff Mission. Just days after he arrived in Washington in March, he met with General C. Wemyss of the British Army staff. Wemyss invited Pope to assume some senior duties on the British Army staff while he was away in London and the mission was undergoing some personnel

²³ Dolak, "To the Public Health Building," 41.

²⁴ Walsh had clearly changed his views since December 1941. At the time, he had advocated a British Commonwealth Mission. LAC RG25, vol. 2902, File 2341-40c, Memorandum of conversation between Walsh, Keenleyside and Angus, 11 December 1941. See also Dolak, "To the Public Health Building," 41-42.

²⁵ Dolak, "To the Public Health Building," 42. When Wrong heard of the discussions from Pearson, he said there was no need to follow "any set pattern. After all it is the results that count." LAC, RG25, vol. 4573, File 500043, Part 1, Pearson to Wrong, 6 July 1942; Wrong to Pearson, 8 July 1942.

²⁶ LAC, MP diary, 22 April 1942.

²⁷ LAC, MP diary, 8 April 1942. The rift had come about because Brodeur and Walsh had not advised McCarthy about a North Atlantic anti-submarine conference.

²⁸ LAC, MP diary, 4 May, 1942, 7 April 1943, 29 May 1943. See also Maurice A. Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians: The Memoirs of Lt-Gen. Maurice A. Pope* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 203-4.

²⁹ LAC, MP diary, 18 April 1942; Pope to Heeney, 16 May 1944. If there is one exception to this positive report, it had to do with Pope's relations with Keenleyside. The two appeared very often to be on opposite side of issues and Pope appeared to take great pleasure in criticizing him. LAC, MP diary, 9 February 1943; 1-2 April 1943; 15 April 1943.

changes. Pope politely declined.³⁰ Only a few days later, Pope received a similar invitation from Major-General Richard Henry Dewing. Pope and Dewing had known each other since the two had met at staff college. They worked together in the 1920s while Dewing was posted at the Royal Military College. Dewing must have thought he would have more luck than Wemyss. Pope declined once again. He explained to his British friend that he was a member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), a task that took up a lot of his time. More importantly, he was in Washington to represent the Canadian CGS - and the War Committee - and he could not perform these functions in good conscience if he became a member of the British Army staff. There were conflicting loyalties. Dill also broached the matter with Pope, expressing regret that Pope had not accepted the British invitation, but Pope, once again, politely demurred.³¹ Pope shared these events with Wrong and the CGS in Ottawa. They supported Pope's approach.

Once he had fended off the British overtures, he could carry on with his task of establishing his network. On the British side, his main interlocutors were Dill, Brigadier Vivian Dykes, who served as British secretary to the Joint U.S.-U.K. secretariat to the CCS (replaced by Brigadier-General H. Redman in the spring of 1943), and Lieutenant-General Gordon Macready, the senior British Army officer in the BJSM.³² Dill was the senior British member of the CCS, the head of the BJSM, and he represented Churchill in his capacity as minister of defence. He was therefore, in the view of Alex Danchev, "the most influential foreign resident in Washington."³³ Pope saw Dill almost daily. As Pope recalled, Dill shared what he could with Canada and the other dominions.³⁴ He spoke to Pope about a multitude of issues, including the "jealousy between the American Army and Navy;" the clash between the British and the Americans over strategy; and command issues in Newfoundland.³⁵ There were times when Dill would sit down with Pope to review British planning papers.³⁶ Even when Dill was away for an extended period, as he was at the beginning of 1943, he took time on his return to discuss with Pope the strategic developments in the various theatres of war. Pope tried to curry favour by providing assistance any time he could. For example, in December 1943, he helped Dill prepare for a speech at the University of Toronto where the Field Marshal was to receive an honorary degree.³⁷

Pope introduced himself to Dykes, the British secretary of the Joint Secretariat to the CCS, a few days after he arrived in Washington. Dykes became the first British head of the Combined Secretariat.³⁸ Dykes was the consummate staff officer and an important person for Pope to get to know. Dykes and U.S. Brigadier-General Walter Beddell Smith controlled the Combined Secretariat. Pope had done his research about Dykes. When Pope first met him, he managed to smooth the path by discussing the work of the Committee of Imperial Defence during the interwar period. Dykes had been involved with the committee for many years. Pope visited Dykes' office in the Public Health Building as regularly as possible, reading through the pile of papers made available to him. Dykes spoke openly about the differences between the Americans and the British over future strategy. Pope's last discussion with Dykes appears to have taken place in early January 1943, just before the latter left for the Casablanca conference. Dykes died in a plane crash a few days after the conference, and Pope was genuinely saddened by the death of "poor Vivian Dykes."³⁹

At the end of March 1943, Pope met Brigadier-General Redman, Dykes' replacement.⁴⁰ Redman was not as congenial as his predecessor and he had less favorable views on Pope's mandate. He told Pope that he did not think it was incumbent on the part of the BJSM to share information with the Canadians or the other dominion representatives. The officers of the British mission were "representatives only" in Washington and their task was to relay information to London. According to Redman, it was up to officials in Whitehall to pass on the information to the Dominions. Pope tried to argue

³⁰ National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) 314.009 (D336), Pope to Chief of the General staff, 13 March 1942; LAC, MP diary, 13 March 1942. Wemyss served as the head of the British military mission until replaced by Dill. See also Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 193.

³¹ NDHQ DHH, Pope to Chief of the General Staff, 16 March 1942; LAC, MP diary, 15 March 1942, 3 April 1942.

³² Macready replaced General Sir Colville Wemyss shortly after Pope arrived.

³³ Alex Danchev, *Very Special Relationship Field-Marshal Sir John Dill and the Anglo-American Alliance 1941-44* (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986), 15-16.

³⁴ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 191.

³⁵ LAC, MP diary, 19 October 1942.

³⁶ LAC, MP diary, War Diary 20 April 1942.

³⁷ LAC, MP diary, 29 December 1942.

³⁸ See Alex Danchev, *Establishing the Anglo-American Alliance: The Second World War Diaries of Brigadier Vivian Dykes* (London: Brassey, 1990); see also Andrew Roberts, *Masters and Commanders: How Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall and Alanbrooke Won the War in the West* (London: Penguin Books, 2008), 93-96.

³⁹ LAC, MP diary, 30 March 1943.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

that the role of a military mission was to gather information “from the organization [the CCS] to which it is attached to send back to the organization it represents.” He wanted to use the BJSJ as one of his sources to develop his reports. Redman appeared to be willing to concede the point with respect to the CCS, but not necessarily with respect to the BJSJ.⁴¹ Pope and Redman clashed over the briefings that Dill offered to Canada and the other dominions. Dill’s briefings were comprehensive and informative, and they revealed sensitive information. This annoyed Redman. After one briefing in June 1943, Pope got a call from Redman who told him that he had been instructed by Dill to advise all dominions that the briefings were “off the record.” Therefore, the attendees were not permitted to report any of the proceedings to their capitals. And if the dominion representative felt strongly about relaying any information from the Dill briefings to their capitals, Redman would have to approve them.

Pope thought Redman’s suggestion reeked of impertinence, and he relayed this opinion to Redman and Royal Navy Captain R.D.C. Coleridge, his Deputy.⁴² Pope explained to them in strong terms that “his business in life” was to report to the Chiefs of Staff in Ottawa on what transpired inside the CCS, which was “broadly speaking, directing the war effort of the United Nations, of which we were one.”⁴³ He expressed the same views to Dill at the end of one of his briefings. Pope explained to Dill that he hoped to be able to share the information gathered at the briefings with his CGS. Dill replied: “Of course you must, and you haven’t reached your present age without knowing what to spill, when, and to whom.”⁴⁴ He asked Pope to speak to him if he wanted to report an item directly. Pope got the upper hand on the issue. He knew when to use the iron hand and when to speak softly. Nevertheless, Pope knew he had to find a way to work with Redman. After a while, he invited Redman to dinner, acknowledging in his diary that he probably should have done so sooner. Relations between Redman and Pope appeared to improve thereafter. For example, when Pope had a problem with an Allied policy on the use of gas warfare, he worked with Redman to steer the matter through the CCS.⁴⁵

Gordon Macready was another important British contact in Washington. Macready had become the head of the British Army Mission shortly after Pope arrived in Washington. He was not only a member of the CCS, but a member of the Munitions Assignment Board as well.⁴⁶ When Pope needed information, he always knew that he could ask Macready “to set his compass” for him.⁴⁷ Pope could grill him with questions of Allied strategy *and* get clarification on issues of procurement and assignment. He saw Macready regularly and he had him for dinner on numerous occasions. Pope had time for Macready when the British general wanted to rant about the American conduct of the war.⁴⁸ At times, Pope relied on Macready to help him secure certain equipment, such as military transport. The supply of equipment was often tight and it was important to have people who could help.⁴⁹ There were times when Pope simply sought Macready’s advice. For example, when he was exploring the possibility of merging some of the Canadian Army staff procurement operations in Washington with those of the department of Munitions and Supply, Pope spoke to Macready about the British experience.⁵⁰ Discussions between the two were occasionally heated. Pope stood tall when he thought Canadian interests were at stake and he did not hesitate to tell Macready when he was not happy with how the Canadians were getting treated by the BJSJ.⁵¹ They disagreed most of the time, but remained on very good terms.

Pope’s overarching problem with Macready and the rest of the staff of the BJSJ in Washington was that they sometimes forgot that Canada could speak for itself. He tried to get the British to agree that the U.S.-U.K. Secretariat had two choices in the event of having to deal with matters in which Canada had an interest. The British could consult Canada, or if time did not permit, draft a response in the name of the United Kingdom only. Canada would decide in due course. However, Pope was not optimistic that the United Kingdom would stop taking “a centralized view of the Empire.”⁵² In

⁴¹ Ibid, 31 May 1943.

⁴² Ibid, 17 June 1943.

⁴³ Ibid..

⁴⁴ Ibid. see also Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 237.

⁴⁵ LAC, MP diary, 28 July 1943, 7 September 1943.

⁴⁶ See Lt-General Sir Gordon Macready, *In the Wake of the Great* (London: William Clowes and Sons, Ltd, 1965).

⁴⁷ LAC, MP diary, 12 June 1944.

⁴⁸ Ibid, LAC, MP diary, 19 November 1943. See also 7 March 1944.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 25-26 January 1943.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 18 November 1942.

⁵¹ Ibid, 23-24 January 1942.

⁵² LAC, MP diary, 14 and 25 June 1943.

addition, the British tried at times to send problems to the PJBD for resolution when it was, in fact, the CGS in Ottawa that needed to review the matter. On more than one occasion, he felt compelled to explain to the British the role of the PJBD.⁵³

Pope did not have anyone like Macready on the American side with whom he could commiserate, but he established relationships with some influential U.S. military personnel. For example, Pope saw Lieutenant-General Stanley Dunbar Embick regularly. He was a good person to know since he was friendly with General George Marshall, the U.S. Chief of the Army Staff. Embick was the senior U.S. Army member on the PJBD when Pope became the Canadian Army representative on the Board in 1941. In 1942, Embick became the Chairman of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, an important committee of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁵⁴ With Embick, Pope discussed PJBD issues, such as the future of Newfoundland, but Allied strategy came up as well. By 1942, Embick had become a strong advocate of defeating Germany first before the Allies turned their attention to Japan, with the effort to be focused on Western Europe. He had very little time for British military operations in the Mediterranean; he had not been happy with the Allied decision to invade North Africa. For Embick, the priority was to cross the English Channel as quickly as possible and destroy the German Army in Northwest Europe. Pope disagreed and told Embick so. Pope argued that it was very important “to clear the area” around the Mediterranean and “remove the threat to the Middle East for the remainder of this war at least.”⁵⁵ But disagreements on second fronts did not prevent Embick from seeking Pope’s advice on certain issues.⁵⁶ He also shared some personal views on the conduct of his own government since he knew that Pope would be discreet about it.⁵⁷

John Hickerson from the State Department was Pope’s other regular American contact. Pope had first met Hickerson at a PJBD meeting in 1941. Hickerson was very familiar with Canada. He had spent the years 1925-1927 in Ottawa and, upon returning to Washington, became the State Department’s first Canadian desk officer in the Division of British Commonwealth affairs.⁵⁸ Pope and Hickerson became close colleagues. They would sometimes travel together back from PJBD meetings and Pope would have Hickerson for dinner. Sometimes Embick joined them. It was not a one-sided arrangement. Hickerson, like Embick, also picked Pope’s brain about various issues such as war criminals, the war in Italy, and the merits of conducting international negotiations in public.⁵⁹ Not unlike most U.S. diplomats during the Second World War, Hickerson was not directly engaged in the high strategy of the war, but he was well connected to the White House and well informed on war matters.⁶⁰

In general, Pope found the Americans far less forthcoming than the British. Although Pope sometimes carped at how the British treated the CJSM in Washington, he recalled years later that he had managed to secure much more information from the BJSM than from the Americans. Pope was successful in establishing rapport, especially with Embick and Hickerson, but relations with the Americans were never as productive, from Pope’s point of view, as they were with the British side. In addition, the Americans were no different than the British in that they too had to be reminded that Canada was an independent state. In general, those who observed how Pope related to the Americans and the British in Washington came away impressed. Pearson wrote in his diary that Pope “had established admirable relations with the top U.S. and U.K. Service people.”⁶¹ Even the British noted the manner in which Pope doggedly pursued information.⁶²

At times, Pope had to do battle with both the U.S. and the U.K. military staff at the same time. Two situations highlight the problem. The first example had to do with the deployment table that the Americans and British had prepared to support the Arnold-Slessor-Towers (also known as the Arnold-Portal-Towers) Memorandum of Agreement, which was

⁵³ LAC, RG24 Volume 2728, HQS5199-W-10, Pope to Chiefs of Staff, “A.B.C. and the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board of Defence,” 4 September 1942.

⁵⁴ For background on Embick, see Mark A. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill: the University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 10-15, 42-43.

⁵⁵ LAC, MP diary, 10 April 1943.

⁵⁶ Embick asked Pope to review a presentation he was giving to the Inter-American Defence Board. Embick was the Chairman of the Board. LAC, MP diary, 6 January 1944.

⁵⁷ LAC, MP diary, 3 December 1943.

⁵⁸ Robert Bothwell and John Kirton, “A sweet little country,” in Norman Hillmer (ed), *Partners Nevertheless: Canadian-American Relations in the Twentieth Century* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd, 1989), 43-65

⁵⁹ LAC, MP diary, 4 September 1943, 1944, 1 April 1944.

⁶⁰ Bothwell and Kirton, “A sweet little country,” 49.

⁶¹ LAC, L.B. Pearson Papers. N1, Vol. 3, Crerar File, Pearson to Crerar, 24 March 1944.

⁶² Granatstein, *The Generals*, 214.

intended to establish the allocation of air force assets around the world.⁶³ Pope discovered in June 1942 that the British had not consulted Canadian air force officials before they assigned numbers to the deployment table. The Canadian numbers were wrong. Pope took the matter up with Dykes and Smith at the Combined Secretariat. They concurred that the matter had been poorly handled.⁶⁴ Smith agreed to return the document to the planners and instruct them to follow the proper consultative procedures. Pope's role in the matter was not over. As part of the deployment table process, the U.S. had forwarded various questions to the United Kingdom, including a request for the British assessment of the strategic requirements of the dominions. Pope and the representatives from the other dominions reviewed the questionnaire and the answers the British had provided. They managed to get agreement on 12 changes.⁶⁵ Pope had kept Robertson and Heeney informed about the deployment table developments, and they were very pleased with the outcome.⁶⁶

Pope also discovered that continental defence issues could get held up because of occasionally sour relations between the United States and the United Kingdom. In February 1942, Pope received a CCS assessment of possible forms of enemy attack on the west coast of North America. A few months later, Pope sought to have the threat assessment changed. He thought the scale of potential enemy attack should be adjusted downwards. The February 1942 assessment had been developed in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor and the international situation had since changed. Pope consulted the British, who agreed that a change was in order, after which he met with Brigadier-General A.C. Wedemeyer of the Operations Division at the War Department.⁶⁷ Wedemeyer was also onside. Pope thought it would be a simple matter of getting the scales changed since all sides appeared to agree. The Americans supported the proposal, brought forward by British CCS representatives, to revise the text, but they wanted a covering note forwarded to the CCS, indicating that the defence of North America was the responsibility of the PJBD. Pope took that to mean that the Americans were telling the British to stay out of North America's business. He thought the American observation was "gratuitous." The British, for their part, were not inclined to agree that they had no interest in the matter of Canadian defence.⁶⁸ Wedemeyer suggested to Pope that the British had put the Canadians up to getting the scales revised. Pope told him in no uncertain terms that it had been his doing and the British had nothing to do with it. It was clear that the Americans did not trust the British and thought their proposal to reduce the scales on the west coast was an attempt to redistribute forces and equipment to other theatres. Pope insisted that this was not a British subterfuge to get their way on other issues. The CCS finally approved the revised scales on 22 January 1943.⁶⁹ Pope had managed to broker a deal between the Americans and the British. He conveyed his views diplomatically, but forcefully, and he had prevailed.

Pope established good relations with Lieutenant-General Edward K. Smart and Brigadier Allan B. Williams of the Australian and New Zealand missions, respectively. Pope had his usual round of luncheons and dinners with the two men, during which they compared notes on developments in the Pacific. They did not always agree on priorities. The Australians and New Zealanders would have preferred more activity in the Pacific. That said, Smart delighted Pope when he told him the Australians had been pleased that Canada had stood up to the United States on the issue of strategic direction in the PJBD. It had emboldened Australia to insist on "managing their own military household even when subject to United States' higher military command."⁷⁰ These commiserations contributed to Pope's understanding of how the Australians and the New Zealanders viewed the war in the Pacific. Moreover, Pope used his exchanges with Williams and Smart to develop his reports to Ottawa.

In addition to his extensive network of contacts, Pope used various other sources to monitor Allied strategy and report to Ottawa. He gathered information from the various documents the British Secretariat provided him, some of which pertained to situation reports from the various theatres of war, and a multitude of CCS discussion papers. Pope occasionally

⁶³ U.S. Army Air Force Lieutenant-General Henry H. Arnold and Air Chief Marshall Charles Portal signed the initial agreement at the Arcadia Conference. U.S. Navy Rear Admiral John Towers, Air Vice Marshal J.C. Slessor (replacing Portal) and Arnold signed the July 1942 amended agreement. Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, *United States Army in World War II: The War Department Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955), 275-77.

⁶⁴ LAC, MP diary, 1 July 1943; Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 197-98.

⁶⁵ LAC, MP diary, 22 July 1943; Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 198.

⁶⁶ LAC, MP diary, 29 July 1943.

⁶⁷ LAC, MP diary, Report no. 14 to Chiefs of Staff, 11 November 1942; LAC RG24 Vol. 11962, File S.1-1, pt. 1, Minutes of meeting of Canadian Joint Staff Washington, 10 November 1942.

⁶⁸ LAC, MP diary, 27 December 1942.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 9 February 1943.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 17 April 1942, 7 May 1942.

saw papers, memoranda, and correspondence between the BJSM and the Chiefs of Staff in London that were not circulated to the U.S. side.⁷¹ He also attended briefings. In addition to those chaired by Dill, Pope sat in on meetings of the Military Representatives of the Associated Pacific Powers with the CCS. The group had representatives from Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, China, Netherlands, and New Zealand. The meetings were sometimes chaired by Marshall and at other times by Dill. Pope came away from some briefings elated with the information he had managed to gather. However, Pope still sensed that, when it came to strategic planning, “great efforts will be made” to conceal decisions.⁷²

Pope echoed the same thoughts years later. He wrote that, “apart from the occasional nod to us, the [CCS] jealously kept information relating to the higher direction of the war almost entirely to themselves.”⁷³ As a result, “the task of making an informed appreciation of the general war situation at any particular time [was] by no means an easy one.” He found it challenging, and at times “impossible,” to gather “full and accurate information.” The U.S. and the U.K. were responsible through the CCS “for the general direction of the war” and they had not demonstrated “much desire to share with the military representatives of the lesser United Nations.”⁷⁴ Pope explained that this was easy to understand: “It is but a truism to say that, in the last analysis, the measure of a country’s influence in international affairs is but a function of its military strength. And the United Kingdom, no less than the United States, is never unconscious of the predominant strength of its armed forces when compared to those of the dominions, China, Holland and the other nations.” In addition, continued Pope, the U.S. and the U.K. took long enough to agree on strategy. Adding other countries into the mix would make the situation more difficult.⁷⁵ Pope was patient.

He was also a realist. He stressed that it was not all gloom. Canada’s armed forces benefited from working in the words of the Visiting Forces Act, “in combination” with British forces, and Pope thought the arrangement provided Canada “with an effective point of liaison” with the British Joint Staff Mission. Canada had already established a strong relationship with the United States because of the two country’s shared responsibility for the defence of North America.⁷⁶

Allied disagreement over strategy

Not long after arriving in Washington, Pope sensed that there was dissension among military planners about strategic priorities. He discovered that the dissension started within the American planning apparatus. The U.S. Army had accepted that the defeat of Germany came first, in accordance with the strategy President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Churchill had laid out at Arcadia in late December 1941. The U.S. Navy was still glued to the Pacific, which had a lot to do with U.S. Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. Admiral F. Sherman, U.S. Navy representative on the PJBD, told Pope in April 1942 that the Canada-U.S. disagreement over strategic direction paled in comparison to the dispute between the U.S. Navy and the Army.⁷⁷ Pope discussed the matter with Dykes and other British planners. Dykes reminded Pope that the British had fought in similar fashion in the First World War, “with the Navy fighting one war, the War Office another” and the Colonial Office conducting “a series of minor wars off their own bat.” Pope sensed that the British were frustrated with the U.S. internal disagreements. When a British planner suggested that the BJSM should simply pack up and leave Washington, Pope advocated “patience, more patience and still more patience.”⁷⁸

Pope learned that, while the U.S. Army and British planners agreed on Europe-first, they did not agree on much else. A major disagreement pertained to the method by which the Allies would open a second front and provide relief to Russian troops fighting on the Eastern front. Historians have recounted the story often.⁷⁹ In simple terms, the Americans

⁷¹ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2728, HQS5199-W-10, Pope to Chief of the General Staff, “Canadian Services Representation in Washington,” 29 July 1942.

⁷² Ibid, 27 July 1942.

⁷³ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 192.

⁷⁴ LAC, MP diary, Washington Report 31 March 1943.

⁷⁵ Ibid. Pope transcribed part of this text in Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 191-192.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 20 April 1942; NDHQ DHH, Pope to Chief of the General Staff, 8 May 1942. Disagreements between the two U.S. services had been ongoing for many decades. See Chapters 1 and 2 in Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*.

⁷⁸ LAC, MP diary, 4 May 1942.

⁷⁹ There are a large number of books dedicated to the issue. I used for purposes of reference Roberts, *Masters and Commanders*; Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*; Mark Stoler, *Allies in War: Britain and America against the Axis Powers, 1940-1945* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2005).

wanted a second front established as soon as possible in Northwest Europe. The British agreed that the Allies would eventually need to conduct a cross-channel operation, but later on. In the meantime, the British thought that the Allies should tighten the ring on German forces in the Mediterranean. This disagreement plagued relations between the two countries for many months. Pope heard it regularly from his British contacts and occasionally from the American side. He had a front row seat, from which he monitored the developing situation, and he tried to influence the debate when he had the opportunity.⁸⁰

In May 1942, in one of his first reports to Ottawa, Pope wrote that an operation in Northwest Europe should be pushed back until at least 1943. He understood that “it is but natural that certain minds [in the U.S.] should want the Army to put in hand some action, the effect of which would relieve the pressure against the Russians.”⁸¹ He argued that it would be a mistake to contemplate such action for now. He was aware that there was political pressure to expedite a second front, but it did not make military sense. The Allies would need to plan such a mission carefully and it was getting already late to start planning for an operation in 1942. It should not happen until at least 1943. He thought that an early cross-channel attack would be very costly in both men and equipment.⁸² He shared his views with Major-General J.C. Murchie, VCGS, when he travelled through Ottawa on his way to a PJBD meeting.⁸³ The VCGS did not demur. Pope expressed similar views to Dill at the beginning of May when the Field Marshal showed him a draft of a British paper on strategy for 1942-1943. The draft paper suggested that a cross-channel operation might be necessary in the summer of 1942 if events turned against Russia on the Eastern Front. Pope told Dill that it would be a mistake to proceed that way because the Allies were bound to lose valuable resources which could scuttle chances of conducting a cross-channel invasion for the following year.⁸⁴ When Pope discussed the matter with Dewing, the British general explained that the BJSM had decided that “it would be bad tactics bluntly to tell their U.S. friends that nothing could be done this summer.” The British would “welcome the idea, sure in the knowledge that when planners in London got down to actual cases, it would be seen that that the prospects for this year were really not too promising.”⁸⁵

Pope had an opportunity to discuss strategy on the Western Front with Wedemeyer of the War Plans Division after the Americans and British landed on the coast of North Africa in November 1942.⁸⁶ Pope had gone to see Wedemeyer about scales of attack on the west coast of North Africa. Wedemeyer asked a surprised Pope for his thoughts on what the Allies should do after they completed operations in North Africa. He wanted to know in particular what Pope thought about the British desire to cross into Sicily and Sardinia. Wedemeyer told Pope that the Americans had been reluctant to conduct combined operations in Northwest Africa and had only done so at the insistence of the British. Echoing the views of the U.S. Army, he argued that these operations “were a diversion from the main object, namely the defeat of the Germany Army (and air force).” Pope responded that there was a lot of merit in controlling both sides of the Mediterranean and that losing North Africa and the Middle East could mean “the loss of the war.” In addition, success in the region would have a positive “psychological” impact on the Allies and “well-wishers in the conquered countries.”⁸⁷

Appreciative of Pope’s strategic acumen, or perhaps wanting to draw him in on the American side of the debate, Wedemeyer pressed him on what should be the Allied priority. Pope acknowledged that Northwestern Europe should rank first, but he added that a cross-channel operation was very risky at the moment and the Allies should wait for a more propitious time when the Germans were weaker. Wedemeyer was pleased to hear Pope’s views about the priority of a cross-channel operation, but not so much about his comments on timing. Wedemeyer thought that the British had deceived the Americans in April 1942 when they had visited London. The British had agreed to the cross-channel operation at the time,

⁸⁰ It was serious enough that Field Marshall Dill wrote a circular letter in October 1942 to Heads of Missions in Washington urging everyone to do their utmost to “foster and maintain the best relations between the two countries.” LAC, MP diary, 28 October 1942.

⁸¹ LAC, MP diary, 22 April.

⁸² NDHQ DHH 314.009 (D336), Report # 7, Pope to CGS, 1 May 1942.

⁸³ LAC, MP diary, 25 April 1942.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 7 May 1942.

⁸⁵ NDHQ, DHH, 314.009 (D336), Report # 7, Pope to CGS, 1 May 1942.

⁸⁶ Wedemeyer worked as a major for Eisenhower in the war plans division (later called the operations division), where he had written a document called the Victory Program in 1941. The document estimated how much the U.S. would have to generate in men and materiel to defeat Germany. He rose very quickly thereafter, from major to brigadier-general in twelve months. He travelled with George Marshall, the U.S. Chief of Staff for the Army, to many of the allied conferences. For details on his full military career, see A. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports*, (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1958).

⁸⁷ LAC, MP diary, 11 November 1942.

but Wedemeyer thought that they had accepted the concept “with tongues in cheeks.”⁸⁸ Reflecting on his discussion with Wedemeyer, Pope wrote that “it is impossible for an Englishman to overlook the importance of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It is almost impossible to make an American do so.” Pope was a shrewd judge of his Allied partners. By the time he wrote to the CGS about his discussions with Wedemeyer, he had learned that the British were intending to convince the Americans to postpone the landing beyond 1943 and increase the air campaign over Germany.⁸⁹

Although Pope believed the Allies should postpone a major operation in Northwest Europe, he lamented the fact that there appeared to be no plans on the part of the Canadian government to deploy troops from the United Kingdom to Western Europe. He took it upon himself to write to the CGS on the matter in November 1942. Pope acknowledged that the status of the Canadian troops in the United Kingdom was not his “official concern,” but he felt he needed to share his thoughts because he was of the view that “the continued inactivity of our forces in the United Kingdom is anything but in the national interest.”⁹⁰ He anticipated that the Americans would eventually agree to “the hard fact that an assault on the coast of France at the present stage could only result in costly failure...” and that it was wiser to postpone an operation in Northwest Europe beyond 1943.

Pope expected that action in the coming year would likely be confined to the central Mediterranean - that is around Italy - and he was strongly of the view that “legitimate considerations of self-respect” suggested that Canadian troops should participate. Pope explained that Canada now had five divisions, enough for a field army, but the Allies were not likely to ask Canada to deploy the full formation in 1943. If Canada were to participate in operations in the coming year, it had to be prepared to divide its army. Pope knew that what he was proposing went against Canadian policy of the last three years. However, he argued that, if Canada “insisted on fighting only on our own terms we are likely to end up by not fighting at all.”⁹¹ This would have medium-to-long term implications for Canada. Pope was thinking about Canada’s role after the war. He was concerned that Canada would be “assigned an insignificant role” in making peace if it did not assume its share of the burden of the war. He stressed that it went beyond what Canada was contributing in materiel. Pearson from the Canadian Embassy forwarded Pope’s letter to External Affairs, where Hume Wrong agreed that the issue was important and he subsequently prepared a memorandum for the under-secretary of external affairs conveying the same message.⁹² In mid-March 1943, Pope lamented to Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart that Canada had taken itself out “of the next party,” meaning Italy, because it had not acted fast enough. Stuart told him that the general staff was still trying to get Canada involved. In late March, Pope learned that the United Kingdom had turned down Ottawa’s latest request to deploy a formation to Italy.⁹³

Pope continued to monitor the debate between the Allies, confident of his ability to conduct his work by way of what he called “informal discussions.” He maintained that “security was never absolute and what with a phrase here and word there, together with what we are officially told, not only can the general picture of the moment be built up but also an intelligent forecast can be made of things that are to come.”⁹⁴ He was not always successful, especially when the CCS was holding many of its meetings outside of Washington, such as at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943.⁹⁵ Pope found it particularly challenging to determine what the Allies were thinking at the time of the Casablanca conference. Therefore, his report stressed that he was only speculating on its outcome, based on various inferences. He added that the U.S. and the U.K. would likely not reveal much even after the two delegations returned from Casablanca, because the decisions emanating from the conference would be classified as “operational” and available to a “selected few.”⁹⁶ Nevertheless, his

⁸⁸ US Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall had apparently used the same words with Wedemeyer on the flight back from London. See Roberts, *Masters and Commanders*, 166; see also 217, 343 on Wedemeyer’s bitterness towards the British.

⁸⁹ LAC, MP diary, 11 November 1942. The U.S. and the U.K. agreed officially at the Conference at Casablanca in January 1943 to push back the cross-channel operation to 1944 and to increase the air campaign over Germany.

⁹⁰ NDHQ, DHH, 314.009 (D336), Pope to Stuart, 28 November 1942.

⁹¹ Pope was targeting not only the government but also McNaughton. Pope believed that the Canadian general was a prime advocate of keeping the Canadian army together in the United Kingdom until the Allies went ahead with their cross-channel operation. For a different perspective, John Nelson Rickard, *The Politics of Command Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton and the Canadian Army 1939-1943* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 70-71.

⁹² NDHQ, DHH, 314.009 (D336), Pearson to Robertson, 28 November 1942; Memorandum for the Prime Minister, “Employment of the Canadian Army,” 7 February 1943.

⁹³ For full details, see Christine Leppard, “Fighting as Colony? 1st Canadian Corps in Italy, 1943-45” (PhD diss., University of Calgary, 2013).

⁹⁴ LAC, MP diary, Washington Report, 31 March 1943.

⁹⁵ Stacey estimates that the CCS held 89 of its 200 formal meetings outside Washington. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 161

⁹⁶ LAC, MP diary, 2 and 8 January 1943.

assessment was not off the mark. The Americans and the British, he assessed, were still poles apart. The American military remained resentful that they had been forced to fight in North Africa, even though Pope thought the operation had saved the Middle East.⁹⁷ The British did not disagree that a cross-channel attack was necessary, but they questioned the timing of it. The Germans, in British estimation, remained too strong in France for the Allies to gamble on a major operation. The British prevailed in extending Mediterranean operations, argued Pope, because the Americans did not have sufficient shipping to build up its forces in the U.K.⁹⁸ Although Pope could not get confirmation on Sicily, he observed that it was the “objective most frequently mentioned.”⁹⁹

Pope picked up mixed signals from the British during the summer of 1943 about Operation Overlord. Macready told him the odds were still against an invasion in 1944. When Pope visited England in July 1943 and sat down with Brigadier W. Porter, director of plans at the War Office, he heard differently. Porter thought there were better than even chances that the invasion would proceed in 1944, although he added that the operation in Italy (to be launched in September) was important and “part and parcel of the assault upon German-Europe.”¹⁰⁰

The King government called Pope back from London to attend the Quebec Conference of August 1943 (Quadrant). His instructions upon arriving were “never to be in the way and yet never out of the way.”¹⁰¹ Pope served many functions at the Quebec Conference - including serving as a tour guide and escorting dignitaries to the theatre - but his principal task was to report to the government what was happening because the Canadians had not been invited to participate in any of the major Anglo-American proceedings.¹⁰² He had to piece together what he could from whatever information he could gather. Pope wrote later that it required a lot of “snooping.”¹⁰³ Pope thought he worked best one-on-one. After one dinner, Pope wrote that “he had come close to getting some information but, unlike a pickpocket, I find I cannot work in a crowd.”¹⁰⁴ He found that his sources were more willing to confide when discussions were one-on-one. He tried to approach as many people as he could. When Prime Minister King invited Pope to join the principal dignitaries on an excursion along the Saguenay, he had further sidebar discussions with Dill, Alan Brooke, the CIGS, and others. These talks allowed him to dispel “some of the fog in my mind.”¹⁰⁵ He reported that “both sides had left Quebec well satisfied that more than useful measure of work had been achieved,” despite “conflicting views and difference in emphasis.”¹⁰⁶

On the issue of the cross-Channel operation, the two sides had confirmed that they would launch the cross-Channel offensive in the spring of 1944. They also agreed that the Americans and the British would be returning a total of seven divisions (four and three respectively) to the U.K. in preparation for the attack. However, Pope noted that the British had disclosed to him that they still harboured doubts about the timing and thought September 1944 might be more realistic. Of course, Pope observed, they had not shared these thoughts with the Americans.¹⁰⁷ Looking back at the Quebec Conference a few months later, Pope wrote that he had prepared “not inaccurate forecasts of the strategy to be followed by the United Nations.”¹⁰⁸ But Pope was surprised to hear, as late as November 1943, that the British - or at least Macready - were still harbouring doubts about a cross-channel operation in the spring of the following year. Macready told him that he was frustrated that the Italian front was being starved of resources, while planning continued for Overlord.¹⁰⁹ Pope’s reporting on developments in Europe tailed off after the Americans and the British agreed on a general plan and timelines in Quebec.

Strategy in the Pacific

Pope tried to keep abreast of developments in the war against Japan, but it was more difficult because there were no unified commands in the Pacific for the most of the war and decision-making was decentralized, CCS playing a minor

⁹⁷ LAC, MP diary, Washington Report 31 March 1943.

⁹⁸ Ibid..

⁹⁹ The Americans and the British had indeed agreed on Sicily at Casablanca.

¹⁰⁰ LAC, MP diary, 3 August 1943.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 9 August 1943.

¹⁰² Ibid, 14 August 1943.

¹⁰³ Ibid, Pope to Heeney, 28 April 1944.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 16 and 19 August 1943.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 22 August 1943.

¹⁰⁶ NDHQ, DHH, 314.009 (D332), “The Quebec Conference August 1943.”

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ LAC, MP diary, Pope to Heeney, 28 April 1944.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, LAC, MP diary, 19 November 1943.

role.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, his reports to Ottawa normally contained some useful information about ongoing Allied discussions concerning the Far East. He touched on all the important issues, including the shipping situation for the allies and Japan, the status of the Burma Road, and the disagreements on strategy between the Americans and the British.¹¹¹

During the spring and summer of 1942, Pope revealed his views on the war in the Pacific in a series of exchanges with Major-General Victor Odlum, Canada's High Commissioner to Australia.¹¹² As the situation in the Pacific continued to deteriorate, Odlum decided that he would try to use Pope as an advocate for sending Canadian troops to the theatre.¹¹³ Odlum understood that the war in Europe took priority. However, if the war in Europe was lost, "the Pacific war would at once step up into first place." Odlum thought General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of South-West Pacific Area (SWPA) could take at least a limited offensive if he had one more division from which to draw. Odlum suggested that the Canadian Army could contribute one by deploying one of the divisions currently assigned home defence. If Canada did dispatch a division to the Pacific, Odlum argued, "it might be of definite value in shaping post-war negotiations."¹¹⁴

Pope thought the idea a bad one. In a well-considered reply to Odlum, he accepted that Canada had expended too much since the beginning of the war on home defence. Japan had no aspirations to attack Canada's west coast. Pope viewed the Japanese occupation of the Aleutian islands of Attu and Kiska as strictly "diversionary and defensive."¹¹⁵ The islands were too far away to serve any other purpose. Kiska was located 2,000 miles from Prince Rupert and 2,500 from Vancouver. Pope agreed that Canada could contribute more to the war by sending a division to Australia, but the public had "allowed their nerves to be preyed upon by vague and ill-defined fears." And besides, the CCS had made Europe the priority. The Pacific was and would continue to be "a secondary theatre." Even if the King government could reassure the public that there was no risk of Japan attacking Canada, deploying a division to the Pacific would require the meeting of three conditions: the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff would have to agree that there was a need to increase the number of troops in the region; the Allies would have to find the necessary shipping to transport the troops and equipment; and the United States would have to agree to sending Canadian troops in the place of American troops. The U.S. had personnel to spare. The idea of sending a Canadian division to the Pacific was thus a "doubtful starter." Pope concluded that Odlum should not expect the CJSM to do his bidding in Washington. Canada had no standing in Washington to influence "the higher direction of the war." The conduct of the war was controlled by the "Big Two," and the "United States are determined to keep it so."¹¹⁶

Even so, Pope thought there was some scope for Canada to get more engaged in the Pacific. In May 1943, an opportunity knocked. When Pope and Hickerson were returning from a meeting of the PJBD in Montreal, his American colleague mentioned to him the possibility that Canada could help to drive the Japanese out of Kiska and Attu.¹¹⁷ Pope expressed great interest in the idea. Hickerson told Pope that he would endeavour to get U.S. authorities to invite Canada to join U.S. troops if and when the mission came about. When Pope discovered that the U.S. War Department had already developed a plan, he suggested to the CGS that he should approach the Americans on the matter, and Stuart agreed. Pope met with Marshall on 13 May to inform him of Canada's interest in the operations in the Aleutians. By then, the Americans were already landing at Attu but, Marshall told Pope, the U.S. was still developing plans for a landing at Kiska and the Canadians could be included. Before the end of the month, Marshall instructed his regional commander to speak to Major-General George Pearkes of the Canadian Pacific Command to coordinate Canadian participation in the Kiska operation. On the advice of Hickerson, Pope continued to deal directly with Marshall on the Kiska operation, which took place on 15 August.¹¹⁸ As it turned out though, the Japanese had already evacuated the island by the time the Canadians (13th Canadian

¹¹⁰ Steven L. Reardon, *Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, 2012), 29-31.

¹¹¹ See LAC, MP diary, Washington Report, 10 April 1942; Washington Report, 31 March 1943; Maurice Pope diary, 27 May, 10 August 1943.

¹¹² Odlum had been given the job of High Commissioner because he was well connected. See J.L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 35-38.

¹¹³ It was not the first time Odlum had tried to galvanize Canada into doing more in the Pacific. See Granatstein, *The Generals*, 39.

¹¹⁴ LAC, MG30 E300, Papers of Victor Odlum (Odlum papers) Vol. 21, File Lt. Gen. Maurice Pope, Odlum to Pope, 11 August 1942.

¹¹⁵ See Galen Roger Perras, *Stepping Stones to Nowhere: The Aleutian Islands, Alaska, and American Military Strategy, 1867-1945* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), Chapter 5-6.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, Pope to Odlum, 18 September 1942.

¹¹⁷ The following is based on Pope's diary entries and Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 214-216.

¹¹⁸ LAC, MP diary, 28 May 1943. Marshall was unavailable. Pope spoke to Lieutenant-General Joseph T. McNarney, the Deputy Chief of Staff.

Infantry Brigade) and Americans troops landed. Pope was disappointed that the Canadian army did not get any combat experience out of the mission.¹¹⁹

Pope took the lead in another Canadian venture in the Pacific. In the spring of 1943, after hearing a Churchill speech in which the prime minister pledged increased British support for the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany had been complete, Pope suggested to the CGS that Canada deploy observers to the Australian and New Zealand armies. He mused about a scenario in which Canadian troops might find themselves fighting alongside Australian and New Zealand land forces in the Pacific. He thought there was merit in sending Canadian military observers to serve with the soldiers of the two British dominions. The goals of such an initiative would be two-fold: it would expose Canadians to fighting conditions in a theatre with which the army was not familiar; and it would show the Australians and New Zealanders that Canada had an interest in their theatre of war, something that the Canadian government had not demonstrated since the beginning of the war.¹²⁰ Ottawa, however, considered the observer scheme “inexpedient” at the time.¹²¹ Pope was emboldened to pursue the matter further when he learned that the British were sending a Tactical-Technical Mission to the Pacific to gather information on the organization and tactics for fighting in jungle areas.¹²² In November 1943, he discussed with Stuart the possibility of sending some observers, this time to join the U.S. Army in the Pacific. Stuart expressed interest. However, when Pope spoke to Robertson at External Affairs, he was told that the government was not interested in being “associated” with U.S. defence forces in the Pacific.¹²³ Pope did not let the matter go that easily. In December he suggested directly to the CGS that Canada send some students to the Australian Army School of Jungle Fighting.¹²⁴ His efforts were not in vain. The new CGS, Lieutenant-General John Murchie, agreed both to that proposal and the observer scheme, and the Cabinet War Committee approved the proposals on 12 January 1945. The Canadian Army would send two groups of observers: the first group, drawn from First Canadian Army in Europe would be deployed in the South West Pacific and South East Asia to train with British and dominion forces; and the second group, from the home army in Canada, would travel to the South West Pacific to train with Australian, New Zealand, and American forces.¹²⁵ Murchie instructed Pope to consult with the U.S. War Department and with the Australian and New Zealand military missions.¹²⁶ In the end, Canada sent close to sixty observers to the Far East.¹²⁷ Although the war in the Pacific ended before Canadian troops could participate, Pope had contributed to an important initiative. The Canadian Army took some important steps, through the observer program, to prepare for war against Japan. The observers shared some important information on organization, training, equipment, and staffing that was very important to prime the Canadian Army in the Pacific. In addition, the observer initiative provided Canadian troops with an opportunity to train with their American counterparts, something it had not done in any significant way in the past.¹²⁸

Procurement and assignment issues

Canadian officials from the department of Munitions and Supply had been in Washington and working with U.S. authorities on matters of production and allocation since the beginning of the war. When, after Pearl Harbor, the United States and United Kingdom created the munitions assignment regime, it changed the procurement process significantly for Canada. Before that time, Munitions and Supply could buy all it needed for Canada in the U.S., either by using normal commercial channels, the U.S. government’s ordnance acquisition system, or the British Purchasing Commission. Now, Canada had to process almost all of its demands through the new Munitions Assignment Board (MAB), and it needed a

¹¹⁹ LAC, MP diary, 17 August 1943. Years later, Pope wrote about another regret related to the matter of the deployment to Kiska. It was to do with his failure to mention to Stuart that he should bring up the matter with the Minister’s office before the letter from Stimson arrived. Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 215; see also LAC, MP diary, 4 June 1943.

¹²⁰ LAC, MP diary, Pope to Chief of the General Staff, 24 May 1943; also in DND, DHH, 314.009 (D51) Canadian Army Observers (May 43–November. 44).

¹²¹ LAC, MP diary, Pope to CGS, 5 November 1943.

¹²² Ibid, 24 June 1943.

¹²³ Ibid, Pope to Chief of the General Staff, 5 November 1943 and 14 December 1943.

¹²⁴ Ibid, Pope to CGS, 18 December 1943.

¹²⁵ DND, DHH, 73/1223 Series 2 File 3/38, 314.009 (D51) Canadian Army Observers (May 43–November. 44), Pope to CGS 5 November 1943; see also Andrew Brown, “Stepping in New Directions: The Canadian Army’s Observer Program in the Asia-Pacific region,” unpublished paper, 2017; courtesy of Andrew Brown.

¹²⁶ Ibid, 7 February 1944.

¹²⁷ Stacey, *Six Years of War*, 507—509.

¹²⁸ This is drawn from Andrew Brown, “Stepping in New Directions: The Canadian Army’s Observer Program in the Asia-Pacific region.”

representative on that body.¹²⁹ The Americans were not sympathetic. Harry Hopkins, the chair of the Washington MAB, opposed Canadian representation.¹³⁰ Pope had to work with the Canadian legation to find a solution to resolve the issue. While minister Leighton McCarthy coordinated the Canadian approach with the U.S. State Department, Pope worked on Gordon Macready to garner British support.¹³¹ McCarthy met face to face with Hopkins in the last week of May 1942 and again in early June to discuss the matter. Hopkins told McCarthy that the MAB was not functioning properly and he was worried that adding Canadians to the board would make matters worse. In addition, if the U.S. and the U.K. accepted Canada's request, it would likely lead to similar requests from other nations. Hopkins showed no flexibility.¹³² Pope's work with Macready paid off. Macready proposed that the MAB give Canada full representation - only when it was discussing Canadian production. Hopkins reluctantly agreed. Canada would attend all meetings, but it would only speak up when matters of Canadian production were on the agenda. Hopkins, however, would not permit direct Canadian bidding or direct assignment to Canada from U.S. production for Canadian needs in North America. This meant that Canadian bids for munitions required for Canadian use in the North America area were to be rolled together with British bids.

That was not what Pope had proposed, but he calculated that Canada should accept the proposal and hope that Canada could work out a broader role over time, which is what he did.¹³³ In early August, Pope met with U.S. General J.M. Burns, who was at the time acting Chairman of the MAB, to develop the terms of the agreement. Pope told Burns that, in accordance with the principle that "the greater must surely include the less," Hopkins's proposal implied that Canada would also sit on the three service committees of the MAB. Burns agreed. In addition, Pope suggested that Canada should be able to place bids for U.S. product on its own behalf as opposed to consolidating demands with Great Britain. Burns agreed to that as well.

Pope had secured a workable agreement but internecine squabbling in Canada undermined what he had arranged. Pope learned from Pearson at the legation that the ministers of national defence and munitions and supply were at loggerheads over who should sit on the board. Munitions and supply was not interested in Canada having a seat on the MAB if the seat was to be occupied by a military representative. Pope despaired that Ottawa's delays were "not very creditable to us."¹³⁴ He waited for further official instructions from Ottawa, but they never came.¹³⁵ In retrospect, Pope primarily blamed munitions and supply for the outcome. Writing years later, Pope argued that Canada had missed out on a "unique opportunity to enhance our national prestige."¹³⁶ After Canada failed to fill what was essentially a secure seat on the MAB, it decided not to pool its production with the British. The government established its own Canadian War Production and Assignments Board.¹³⁷

Pope became a member of the Washington Advisory Committee on Mutual Aid when it was created in the spring of 1943. In that capacity, he played an important role in determining Canadian mutual aid to China. Canadian mutual aid during the Second World War had its origins in late-1942 negotiations for Canada to provide financial aid to the United Kingdom.¹³⁸ The result was a Mutual Aid Board to administer the program, the main purpose of which was to finance British purchases in Canada. Canada would soon expand its mutual aid program to China, as well as India, the Soviet Union, the Free French, and the West Indies. In the summer of 1943, Canada established the Washington Advisory Committee to advise the Mutual Aid Board on assignments and allocations.¹³⁹ In June 1943, the committee discussed mutual aid to

¹²⁹ LAC, RG24 Reel C-8375, HQS8790-2, C.D. Howe to J.B. Carswell, 19 February 1942.

¹³⁰ Ibid, 28 May 1942.

¹³¹ LAC, RG24 Reel C-5267, McCarthy to Cordell Hull, 13 May 1942.

¹³² LAC, RG24 Vol. 5183, HQS15-9-35 Vol. 1, McCarthy to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 26 June 1942. The War Committee met on 1 July to discuss the Hopkins letter and told McCarthy to see Hopkins again, and failing that, Cordell Hull, Summer Wells, or even the President. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 169.

¹³³ LAC, MP diary, 10 and 11 July 1942.

¹³⁴ LAC, MP diary, 20 August 1942; see also Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn, C.D. Howe: A Biography (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979), 171.

¹³⁵ LAC, MP diary, 19 September 1942.

¹³⁶ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 202.

¹³⁷ Leighton and Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1943*, 254-55; see also Granatstein, *Canada's War*, 297; Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 172.

¹³⁸ Robert A. Wardhaugh, *Behind the Scenes The Life and Work of William Clifford Clark* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 235.

¹³⁹ LAC, MP diary, 16 June 1943; Granatstein, *Canada's War*, 313; John Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1, The Early Years, 1909-1946* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 256.

China.¹⁴⁰ Pope knew from monitoring the situation in South East Asia that Canadian aid for China would be challenging. The Japanese Army had closed off the Burma Road into China and the primary air route from Assam in India had very limited capacity for delivering equipment. In addition, Canada would have to compete with the U.S. that used the route to ship supplies to American air forces operating in China. Pope thought it was imperative that Canada coordinate its mutual aid to China with the Americans in Washington.¹⁴¹ But the assignment process for China started to unravel quickly. On 9 June, Hopkins informed the MAB that the Canadian Mutual Aid Board was exploring the possibility of assigning up to 50,000 tons of munitions as mutual aid to China. He told the members of the MAB that Canada should consult Washington since Canadian companies were using American raw materials to produce the munitions. Karl Fraser, managing director of the Mutual Aid Board, assured Hopkins that the board would consult with Washington, but his actions continued to belie his assurances. Fraser hinted in July 1943 that Ottawa might be prepared to work with Washington, but the board wanted iron clad guarantees on assignments. When Pope spoke to Macready about the demands from the Mutual Aid Board, the British General explained that the Americans and the British were unable to provide guarantees about MAB assignments because they could change significantly in the event of a convoy loss or a change in the strategic situation.¹⁴²

Pope was appalled by the “pathetic tactics” Ottawa was using to deliver mutual aid to China. He traced the problem to the fact that civilians in Ottawa failed to understand, or were unable to accept, that the “machinery for the higher direction and the winning of the war is centered in Washington, that actions originating elsewhere must, if their sponsors really hope that their efforts will achieve even a moderate measure of success, be intimately related at the outset to the spirit and trend of thought prevailing here.” Canada’s Mutual Aid Act specified that mutual aid would be provided on the basis of strategic needs. The board could not possibly meet the Act’s mandate if it did not consult with the Americans and the British in Washington. Pope maintained that Ottawa would continue to run into problems until it accepted the fact that it needed to deal with Washington before it made commitments.¹⁴³

By September 1943, Canada had made a firm commitment to ship to the Chinese Army 288 twenty-five pounders and munitions, representing 20,000 tons of shipping space. The Canadian-American Joint War Aid Committee (JWAC) reviewed the proposed shipment.¹⁴⁴ The Americans were not happy, stressing that the docks in India from which the equipment would ship were already clogged up. E.P. Taylor, the chair of the Washington Advisory Committee, suggested that the equipment could be used by the U.K. and India if shipping to China was not possible. Pope was embarrassed at “the poor figure [Canada] had cut” at the meeting of the JWAC. Pope arranged for he and Taylor to sit down with Macready and others to discuss the matter further. The British told Taylor that they did not need the equipment in India and that storage space was at a premium. The Mutual Aid Board eventually agreed to reduce significantly the size of the shipment.¹⁴⁵ Pope met with a Chinese military official in Washington, who argued that Canadian mutual aid was being “subjected to political sabotage from Washington.” He suggested to Pope that the Burma Road would likely open in two to four months’ time. In fact, from what Pope had gathered, the time-frame for opening the Burma Road was more like eighteen months. Shipping the goods to India when they could not reach the Chinese Army would mean jamming up Indian ports unnecessarily, at a time when Admiral Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Commander for the South-East Asia Command, was trying to plan an upcoming campaign in Burma.¹⁴⁶

In February 1944, Pope convinced the Mutual Aid Board to consult once again with Washington. By then, Canada had already shipped to India a batch of Bofors Guns and anti-tank guns, with associated equipment, munitions and motor transport. The board was planning to ship the second batch of equipment in May or June 1944, but Pope thought he should seek CCS opinion on the second shipment.¹⁴⁷ The CCS response confirmed what Pope had been saying for some time.

¹⁴⁰ LAC, MP diary, 7 June 1943. The Mutual Aid Board had approved in principle the idea of providing mutual aid to China in May, that is before Parliament approved the Mutual Aid Act, provided there was a “satisfactory guarantee” the equipment would get to their destination. Matthew J. Bellamy (ed) Robert B. Bryce, *Canada and the Cost of World War II: The International Operations of Canada’s Department of Finance 1939-1947* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 158.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, 8 June 1943.

¹⁴² LAC, MP diary, 12, 16 June and 20 July 1943.

¹⁴³ Ibid, 17 September 1943.

¹⁴⁴ The U.S. and Canada created the new Committee in August 1943 to provide advice on coordinating allocations under Canadian mutual aid and U.S. Lend-Lease. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 172.

¹⁴⁵ Matthew J. Bellamy (ed) Robert B. Bryce, *Canada and the Cost of World War II*, 159.

¹⁴⁶ LAC, MP diary, 28 October 1943. He met an official by the name of Kiang (no first name). He was probably a military attaché at the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 7 April 1944.

Transportation capacity was an issue; Canada should suspend shipments earmarked for China, with the exception of small items and munitions.¹⁴⁸ The Mutual Aid Board took the CCS decision to mean that they could proceed with the current shipment, but that future deliveries should be limited to lighter equipment. At the board meeting of 19 May, Wrong cautioned that proceeding in the face of U.S. objections might lead to “repercussions” in Canada’s relations with the CCS – with British and Americans alike – and the American representatives on the Joint War Aid Committee.¹⁴⁹ The board agreed that Pope should conduct further consultations. Pope spoke to Macready and Dill. They all agreed that the matter should be referred to the CCS again.

To Pope’s surprise, within days, the Americans had completely changed their tune.¹⁵⁰ Pope offered one possible explanation in his diary. He learned in late-May that the Americans were planning a large China-bound shipment of equipment through India, effectively trying to do an ‘end-run.’¹⁵¹ They figured the backlog in India was not such a big issue after all. If that was the case, the Americans could hardly object to Canada’s plans. Pope therefore proposed a meeting of JWAC as soon as possible to get U.S. support for the Canadian shipment. The JWAC supported the Canadian shipment. It was always best to stay on good terms.¹⁵²

Pope maintained that he could only perform his tasks, whether it was reporting on Allied strategy or securing a piece of equipment for troops in the field, if he could retain the trust of his interlocutors and maintain credibility. Leadership was about trust and integrity. Pope wrote that the CJSM could best accomplish its mission by “building up that measure of confidence in the minds of both British and United States officers without which we could accomplish little.”¹⁵³ He was, therefore, always displeased when Canadian staff in Washington or in Ottawa did anything to harm that trust. For example, he was “indignant” that NDHQ had copied a CCS memorandum and circulated it around the headquarters. He wrote that copying the document was “nothing short of a breach of trust and the Secretariat would *never* condone it.”¹⁵⁴

Credibility mattered, and sometimes soldiers and statesmen made it difficult for Pope to do business, at least that is how Pope saw it, especially after the debacle over representation on the Munitions Assignment Board. In that case, Ottawa had not only turned down an agreement that Pope had negotiated in good faith with Burns, but it did not even take the time to respond officially to the American proposal. Pope wrote that the situation had placed him and the Canadian staff in Washington in an unenviable position. Canada would be hard-pressed to make new demands of any kind until Canada came “clean in one way or another.”¹⁵⁵ On the issue of equipment, Pope thought Canada’s credibility had been jeopardized because Ottawa had put forward a weak case to procure 500 M4A1 tanks from the United States while Canada waited for tanks to come off the Canadian production line.¹⁵⁶ He was also disappointed with the way Canada managed a request for ball bearings that were needed for the production of light anti-aircraft gun mounts. Pope had spent a lot of human capital on this “urgent” request from U.S. production lines, only to discover that Ottawa had exaggerated the urgency of the request. He wrote that the situation placed the CJSM in “an uncomfortable position.”¹⁵⁷

Conclusion

Pope relied on his human and analytical skills to pursue his mandate in Washington. He established workable relations with Brodeur and Walsh and did his best to find common ground with the two men. He demonstrated leadership in a difficult situation as he endeavoured to get his mission partners to trust him. He established effective relations with most of the External Affairs staff. He made sure to consult with them on matters that concerned Canadian foreign policy. Pope wrote

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, 15 May 1944.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, 22 May 1944. Wrong had already sent a strongly worded missive in February 1944. Bellamy (ed) Robert B. Bryce, *Canada and the Cost of World War II*, 160.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ LAC, MP diary, 24 May 1944.

¹⁵² The British were not privy to the decision of the JWAC and were not pleased: not only would the shipment sit and rot at the docks, but the British were short of the motor transport equipment that Canada was planning to ship to India for China. The British drafted a letter to Canada to express its opposition. Macready drafted the letter and Pope did his best to tone down its rhetoric. LAC, MP diary, 29 May, 7 June, 18 June, 3 July 1944.

¹⁵³ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2728, HQS5199-W-10, Pope to Chief of the General Staff, “Canadian Services Representation in Washington,” 29 July 1942.

¹⁵⁴ LAC, MP diary, 30 June 1942.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, 25-26 January 1943.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, 23 June 1943.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, 11 December 1943; 7 January 1944; see also Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 235-236.

at the end of 1942 that he was enjoying the work in Washington because it took him “inside the circle that is directing the war as a whole” – meaning the highest levels of Anglo-American military decision-making. His ability to work “inside the circle” was largely a factor of his human skills. He built contacts because of his congeniality, his integrity, his willingness to listen to others, and his helpfulness. Pope spoke his mind when he thought it was essential, but he was generally diplomatic when approaching the Allies. In other words, he maintained that proper balance between diplomacy and assertiveness. His conceptual skills allowed him to assemble accurate and cogent reports on Allied strategy and intentions.¹⁵⁸ Pope was able to develop analyses because his contacts and acquaintances were willing to provide him with information, a function of his personal power and the social capital he had accumulated.

Pope took the mantle of a leader with respect to the Munitions Assignment Board. He used his knowledge of the assignment and procurement process to convince Macready, with whom he had established a good relationship, that Canada had a strong case to participate on the MAB. He used the same skills to negotiate a good final agreement with Burns, securing more than he had initially expected. He was persistent on the issue of Mutual Aid. He demonstrated a shrewd understanding of the situation in South-East Asia. His conceptual skills allowed him to boil issues down to their essence.

Pope thought it was incumbent upon the soldier to provide his views if he saw the need to offer corrections or suggestions on military matters. This was not because Pope had an inflated impression of the role of the soldier. He was a realist. The soldier’s duty was to defer to the civil authority and wage war in accordance with government policy.¹⁵⁹ He had no doubt about that. However, duty should not prevent soldiers from speaking up. It was in this spirit that he lobbied for a Canadian role in the Mediterranean and tried to influence the debate in late 1942 about whether to keep the Canadian army together. For the same reason, he did not hesitate to suggest that Canada get engaged in the Pacific, even if in a small way.

¹⁵⁸ Prime Minister King spoke highly of Pope’s work at a dinner hosted by the Minister of National Defence on 14 July. Pope was traveling back to Washington through Ottawa from a trip in Alaska. LAC, MP diary, 30 June 1943.

¹⁵⁹ LAC, MP diary, Pope to Pearson, 18 March 1944.

CHAPTER 9

THE ANALYTICAL GENERAL: 1944-45

On 1 September, the government announced that it had appointed Pope as military staff officer to the prime minister, military secretary to the cabinet war committee, and a member of the chiefs of staff committee.¹ Pope remained in these posts until September 1945. Pope played an important role in supporting the King government when it grappled with the issue of conscription. It was a political matter, but King needed military advice, and he relied on Pope. Pope inspired trust - he was steady, smart, and politically astute. In addition, by the time Pope arrived in Ottawa, the debate had been raging for some months on what role Canada should assume in the final defeat of Japan. The chapter will examine how Pope contributed to that debate and how he displayed the kind of conceptual skills required to propose sound policy advice.

With regards to post-war planning, Pope participated in the advisory and working committees of the government's Post Hostilities Problems (PHP) process. The PHP examined a number of issues. Pope's focus was on the broad military and political aspects of Canada's post-war defence commitments. He weighed in on two major issues: Canada-U.S. relations and the defence of Newfoundland. When he returned from United Nations conference in San Francisco, he spent the few weeks he had left in the Canadian capital preparing various papers, including a think piece on the future of Canada-United Kingdom defence relations after the war. He also led the Canadian section of the PJBD in a discussion on the future of the board.

"A Completely Uncharted Course"

In the third week of August 1944, the prime minister discussed with Arnold Heeney, the clerk of the privy council and secretary to the cabinet, the idea of creating a new military position to help the government in the management of defence issues. Heeney thought King might have in mind a person with functions similar to those of British Lieutenant General Hastings Ismay vis-à-vis Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Heeney had his staff do some digging on Ismay's responsibilities. He discovered that Ismay served as the deputy secretary (military) of the War Cabinet, chief of staff to Churchill in his capacity as minister of defence, and member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, all while retaining his duties as Secretary of the Committee on Imperial Defence. Heeney shared the information with the prime minister, who told him to write to James Ralston, the minister of national defence, about the matter. In his letter to Ralston, Heeney explained that there was a pressing need for a senior military officer to work in the East Block. The incumbent would provide advice to the government on emerging and growing number "of mixed Service and political problems." The person would work closely with the Chiefs of Staff and with External Affairs "in the preparation of plans and advice" on various policy issues, including the state of post-war Europe and the war in the Pacific. He would also maintain contact with the Canadian joint staff missions in Washington and in London.²

Ralston immediately thought of Pope, whom he met on 30 August. The minister told him the prime minister had decided to create a new position of military advisor and he wanted Pope to fill the role, as did Ralston.³ The minister acknowledged that details of his position still needed to be fleshed out, but that his functions would be similar to those of General Ismay. On 31 August, Pope sat down with the prime minister. King admitted that he knew very little about "military organization" and that he would like to have someone in the office of the prime minister "with whom he could intimately discuss the many military problems that were constantly before the War Committee." King told Pope he would be doing him "a favour" if he accepted the offer. Pope responded that it would be an honour to serve him.⁴

When Pope moved into his new position in Ottawa in September 1944, he found his functions to be "vague and undefined." However, after a few months in his new functions, he wrote that the job was "developing in interest, and I hope, in usefulness," but he was still feeling his way. He was travelling "over a completely uncharted course," where "one must feel every inch of the way." Pope had no illusions about his functions. He acknowledged that his title might be similar to

¹ It was issued by the Prime Minister's office and the Department of National Defence at the same time. Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 2 Vol. 35, C-10-3, Heeney to Prime Minister, 1 September 1944; Prime Minister's Office Press Release, 5 September 1944.

² LAC, RG 2 Vol. 35, C-10-3, Baldwin to Heeney, 25 August 1944; Heeney to Ralston, 28 August 1944.

³ LAC, MG26-J13, Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King (King diary), 31 August 1944.

⁴ Ibid; Maurice A. Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians: The memoirs of Lt-Gen. Maurice A. Pope* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 240.

that of General Ismay in London, but that is where the similarity ended.⁵ Pope worked closely with Arthur Heeney and his staff. Heeney was pleased that Pope had joined him.⁶

The Conscription Crisis of 1944

Soon after Pope arrived in Ottawa, he became involved in one of the most intense episodes of the war for the King government. It had to do with the reinforcement issue and conscription.⁷ Since late September 1944, Ralston had been out of the country, exploring the status of the manpower situation with Canadian military commanders in the United Kingdom and Europe.⁸ On 13 October, Ralston suggested to the prime minister that the government might have to “reassess” the reinforcement situation in light of what he had discovered. King took that to mean that his government might have to institute conscription.⁹ The prime minister decided that the War Committee should discuss the issue of reinforcements before it went to full cabinet. It was placed on the agenda for 19 October.

Before ministers met, King sat down for an hour with Pope and Heeney. The prime minister placed a lot of trust in Pope on the matter of conscription. King wrote that Pope was “the best informed on these matters.”¹⁰ He asked Pope and Heeney whether the government had been given any indication in the past few months that reinforcements would be insufficient and that conscription might be necessary. Pope and Heeney confirmed that it had not been the case. Pope advised the prime minister that the government could address the reinforcement issue without recourse to conscription. They discussed the proposals that the under-secretary of state for external affairs, Norman Robertson, had suggested, including reducing the size of the units and changing the regulations on age. Pope counselled that such changes could be “disastrous,” although he did not provide specifics.¹¹ They did not come to any resolution of the matter.

Stuart advised the Cabinet War Committee on 19 October that he had examined the issue carefully and he could no longer see any option other than “extending the terms of service of N.R.M.A. [National Resources Mobilization Act] personnel to include overseas service in any theatre.”¹² The minister of national defence agreed with him. On 21 October, Pope approached Ralston to stress that while “he appreciated that he was responsible, as minister, to ensure the integrity of the Canadian Army, he had other and more important responsibilities - what Pope called a duty to the country.”¹³ Pope explained that he did not want to diminish the role of the Canadian Army “in fighting our battles in the field, but the army was but a part, important enough...but still but a part of that bigger community that is Canada.” He was concerned that instituting conscription “would wreck the very basis of our life at home. The Canadian Army was fighting for peace, and with that the wellbeing of our people. It followed in consequence that no wise Canadian could reasonably embark on a course of action, the result of which would be to bring to naught that for which our men were fighting and dying.” Pope suggested that the army should pursue further the merits of reducing the number of rifle companies in each battalion to three, or reducing the physical standards for admission into the army.¹⁴

When Ralston said that the army had explored all other options and that he saw no other way out, Pope suggested to Ralston that his political ambitions might be getting in the way. He told Ralston that it was “the duty of a man in public life to serve in the way that others might judge to be most in the national interest, and this at the expense of legitimate personal ambition.” At the end of the meeting, Ralston recognized that Pope’s pleas were genuine and his opinions “deeply” felt. But

⁵ Canadian War Museum, Maurice Arthur Pope Collection (CWM Pope Collection), Folder 32, Pope to Crerar, 13 January 1945; Pope to Major-General H. Redman, 2 January 1945.

⁶ LAC, RG 2 Vol. 35, C-10-3, Heeney to Pope, 1 September 1944.

⁷ R. MacGregor Dawson, *The Conscription Crisis of 1944* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961) has been largely superseded by the following studies: J.L. Granatstein, *Conscription in the Second World War* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969); C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1970); J.L. Granatstein, *Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada* (Toronto: Oxford University Press); Richard Walker, “The Revolt of the Canadian Generals, 1944: The Case for the Prosecution,” in Howard G. Coombs, *The Insubordinate and the Noncompliant: Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and Disobedience, 1920 to the Present* (Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 2007); Daniel Byers, *Zombie Army The Canadian Army and Conscription in the Second World War* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016).

⁸ Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 441-2.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 443.

¹⁰ LAC, King diary, October 19.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 444.

¹³ LAC, MP diary, 21 October 1944; Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 248-251

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

Pope did not detect that Ralston had changed his position. Pope wrote years later that he was confident the government could have addressed the issue by reducing the number of rifle companies per battalion, had it taken action before the press began to circulate stories about the possibility of conscription. However, once that happened, positions hardened and neither side was interested in compromising.¹⁵ It is interesting that Pope suggested a measure of this kind when he had apparently told the prime minister that reducing the number of companies would be problematic. Pope might have been already “grasping at straws” by then. C.P. Stacey argues that toying with the number of companies per battalion “would have entailed the gravest criticism within Canada.”¹⁶ Pope had expressed his views very strongly to Ralston. He felt duty-bound to do so because the government was facing a dangerous crisis. He spoke with the courage of his convictions.

The War Committee met again on 24, 26, and 27 October. The discussions then shifted to the cabinet. Pope did not attend the cabinet meetings, although he had an inkling that things were not going well.¹⁷ On 2 November, Ralston stepped down and retired Lieutenant-General Andrew McNaughton was appointed the new minister of national defence. Pope wrote to Ralston that morning to say that “if the news this morning is not unfounded, allow me to send you this word of farewell, to which I would add the expression of my highest respect.”¹⁸

King’s trust in Pope grew steadily. In early November, he sent Pope as his representative to Sir John Dill’s funeral. Pope suggested that he take the opportunity to discuss the Canadian manpower situation with his British and American colleagues, which King thought a good idea. King also proposed that Pope take a personal message to the president.¹⁹ The prime minister wrote a “short letter to Roosevelt, requesting an audience for Pope and adding that “you may trust him implicitly.”²⁰ In his diary, King reflected that “the more I thought of it, the more I felt this was an act of providence. The fact that Pope would be the right man to represent me at Sir John Dill’s funeral and was, in fact, my military advisor, together with his knowledge of the whole situation of the men in Washington and all here, made him the ideal person for a such a highly confidential mission.”²¹

Pope finally saw Roosevelt on 16 November. He repeated almost verbatim what King had instructed him to tell the U.S. President.²² Pope covered the War Committee meeting of 19 October and King’s concerns about the manpower situation. The U.S. President did not appear to be familiar with Canada’s manpower issue, but he took the opportunity to broach the issue of manpower pertaining to the United States and Great Britain. He explained that the Americans had almost run out of military manpower, despite what the British might think. At the end of their conversation, the American President told Pope to inform King that he would be willing to give the Canadian prime minister whatever “psychological” help necessary. In response, Pope told Roosevelt that King wanted simply to apprise him of the situation in Canada and that he was not looking for assistance. The meeting with Roosevelt had unfolded smoothly, a function of Pope’s ability to remain composed in a stressful situation.²³

While Pope was in Washington, he decided to discuss Canada’s manpower issue with Lieutenant-General Gordon Macready at the British Joint Staff Mission. He told Macready he was not looking for help but was simply telling him the nature of the manpower challenge that the Canadian government was facing. When Macready suggested that he should inform the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Pope agreed and immediately penned a short note that indicated that the shortfall was particularly acute with infantry and that the other arms were satisfactory. The note also suggested that the situation was “the gravest that had confronted any Canadian Government since Confederation.” Macready passed the note on to Alan Brooke.²⁴ A week or so later, Brooke responded through Macready that he believed the issue appeared to be entirely political and that there was nothing he could do about it.

¹⁵ Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 251

¹⁶ Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 445.

¹⁷ LAC, MP diary, 31 October and 1 November. For a summary of the events during that period, see Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 445-446.

¹⁸ LAC, MP diary, 2 November 1944.

¹⁹ LAC, King diary, 6 November 1944.

²⁰ Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 467.

²¹ LAC, King diary, 6 November 1944.

²² Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 253-254; LAC, King diary, November 17, 1944; Pope family papers, Toronto, Ontario (PFP), Pope to Prime Minister, 22 November 1944; Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 467-8.

²³ LAC, King diary, November 17, 1944.

²⁴ PFP, Pope to the Prime Minister, 22 November 1944.

King was concerned when he learned from Pope on 22 November about the letter from Brooke. Had Pope given Macready the impression that Canada was looking for help? Pope reassured King that he had not done so. The prime minister was uncharacteristically displeased with Pope's diplomatic venture. King thought Pope had gone beyond his instructions when he told Macready that he was talking to him with the Canadian prime minister's knowledge. King thought Pope would be approaching Macready strictly on an informal basis. The prime minister was concerned that the British might think Canada "was trying to interfere" with the Allied conduct of the war.²⁵ King instructed Pope to advise Macready's that he had spoken to him a few weeks earlier purely for the purpose of letting him know about the situation in Canada.²⁶

Had Pope exceeded his authority in his discussions with Macready in Washington? Pope had told the prime minister before leaving that he was planning to discuss the matter of conscription with his British contacts, and King had no objections.²⁷ The letter from Macready to Brooke gave no indication that Canada was seeking assistance of any kind with respect to its manpower issue. Brooke misconstrued the purpose of Macready's memorandum. Pope's venture had been carried out with the best intentions. However, he should have known that the prime minister was a cautious man, bordering on paranoid, and that he would have balked at the idea of Pope sending a memorandum to Brooke. Pope worked hard to win back the prime minister's confidence and his currency was still good.

Meanwhile, ministers continued to thrash out the manpower issue in cabinet. Pope was not privy to most of the discussions, but he suspected they were not going well.²⁸ On the evening of 22 November, he got a call from Pickersgill that his late night services were needed to help out with a speech that McNaughton would be giving to the House of Commons the following day. He was going to announce that the government had decided after all to institute conscription for overseas service. Pope, Pickersgill and others worked on McNaughton's draft until 04:30 the following morning.²⁹ On 23 November, King read in the order-in-council authorizing the minister of national defence to call up to 16,000 home conscripts for deployment to the United Kingdom and eventually the European continent. Pope thought King's timing had been impeccable: "he had accepted the inevitable but only to the extent that was absolutely necessary. He will disappoint Quebec but to the least possible extent."³⁰ Pope's involvement with the conscription crisis came to an end after the government announced its decision in late November 1944.

Years later, Pope reflected on the crisis, particularly with respect to the relations between the government and certain military officials. By then, political scientist MacGregor Dawson had published his book, in which he suggested that the military had conspired against the government on the conscription issue. James Eayrs came to a similar conclusion.³¹ Pope thought otherwise. He argued that military officials were simply carrying out their duties when they told the minister that they were unable to recruit volunteers for overseas service from troops drafted under the NRMA.³² A year before his death, Pope had occasion to revisit the matter with Canada's national archivist. His views had not changed. The military officers at the time had simply discharged their duties. He added that he did not recall anyone, including Robertson and Pickersgill, who thought there was a possibility of a generals' revolt afoot.³³

Pope had played a supporting role when the government grappled with the issue of conscription. Pope was brave to speak to Ralston as he did. He was forthright with the prime minister as well. Conscription was a political issue, but the prime minister still needed military advice and Pope gave it freely. Pope made sure he was available at any time, day or night, if the prime minister needed him. King relied on Pope, and he trusted him too.

²⁵ LAC, King diary, 21 November 1944.

²⁶ LAC, MP diary, 20 November 1944.

²⁷ PFP, Pope to the Prime Minister, 22 November 1944.

²⁸ LAC, MP diary 21 November 1944.

²⁹ LAC, MP diary, 22 November 1944; Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 255.

³⁰ LAC, MP diary, 23 November 1944.

³¹ Dawson, *The Conscription Crisis of 1944*; James Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 90-95.

³² Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 260-1.

³³ LAC, RG24, Vol. 22327, HQS9072-2-5, Pope to Smith, 13 May 1977. C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 471, agrees with Pope. For a less charitable interpretation, see Walker, "The Revolt of the Canadian Generals," in Howard G. Coombs, *The Insubordinate and the Noncompliant: Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and Disobedience, 1920 to the Present*.

The War against Japan

Pope was at the centre of important government discussions about Canadian participation in the Pacific War. Indeed, he had been involved in the debate long before left Washington. In the fall of 1943, Pope speculated at a dinner with U.S. officials that Canada might be eager to continue the war against Japan to the end. One possible scenario would be for Canadian troops to join British forces operating from India. However, the more likely scenario, “even if only for political reasons alone,” would see the Canadians working with American troops “westwards from Canada.”³⁴ His American colleague expressed interest in the idea when he mentioned it. And, when Pope discussed the matter with the CGS in October 1943, Stuart was favorably disposed. They understood, though, that the issue was more political than military and it would have to be resolved at cabinet level.³⁵ But the government had a limited appetite for the Pacific in 1943. Pope learned in late October that “the highest Canadian circles” had discussed the matter and that the government had decided that it was not a good idea for the moment.³⁶

At the beginning of February 1944, the director of Military Operations (DMO), Col. J. H. Jenkins, sought Pope’s advice on a draft memorandum that he had prepared on the possible parameters of a Canadian military role in the Pacific. If Canada was to participate, Pope envisaged two options. Troops could travel through Europe, the Indian Ocean, and the Bay of Bengal and work with British troops under the South East Asia Command in Burma. That was unlikely, but “fantastic things often happen in war.” The second scenario envisaged Canadian troops deploying with American troops from Honolulu. It would be up to the British or the Americans to determine what and where Canada would contribute.³⁷ The paper that Jenkins submitted to the CGS reflected the essence of Pope’s observations.³⁸ When the British released the agenda for the Commonwealth prime ministers conference of May 1944, it included an item on the war in the Pacific. Arnold Heeney asked National Defence to provide the prime minister with current thinking on the issue. King brought with him to London the Jenkins memorandum as well as papers from the other two services. The May conference did not settle on a course of action, in part because the British had not yet decided among themselves what they wanted to achieve in the Far East.³⁹

When King returned to Canada, the Cabinet War Committee directed the Chiefs of Staff, in cooperation with Norman Robertson from External Affairs and Heeney, to explore options for Canada’s participation in the Pacific.⁴⁰ Ministers discussed the matter again at its meeting of 14 June. A cabinet document prepared by Heeney identified two options, similar to those laid out by Pope in his memorandum to Jenkins in February 1944: either with the British in South East Asia or with the Americans in the Pacific. The memorandum acknowledged that there was some merit in the three Canadian services continuing to work with their British counterparts, and if so, the likely theatre would be South East Asia. However, Canada could be “better served” if it worked with U.S. troops in the North or West Pacific.⁴¹ On 27 June, King wrote to Churchill to apprise him of the situation, explaining that the Canadian government was leaning towards working with the Americans in the Pacific.⁴² Robertson forwarded the letter to Lester B. Pearson in Washington and told him to pass it on to Pope so that he could follow up with the Americans.⁴³

Pope gathered that the Americans would likely attack Japan from the south or southeast. The Northern route was therefore out. He expected that the Americans would seek in the coming months to re-occupy the Philippines, after which

³⁴ LAC, MP diary, 7 October 1943.

³⁵ Ibid, 25 October 1943.

³⁶ Ibid, 29 October 1943.

³⁷ Ibid, Pope to Jenkins, 9 February 1944.

³⁸ LAC, RG24-C-1-a, Vol. 2921, File HQS-9131; RG2 18 Vol. 32, D-19-1, “Appreciation of Canadian Participation in the Pacific Theatre of War,” 24 April 1944; see also Galen Roger Perras, “Once Bitten, Twice Shy: The origins of the Canadian Army Pacific Force, 1944-45,” in *Uncertain Horizons Canadians and their World in 1945*, edited by Greg Donaghy (Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1997), 81-82; C.P. Stacey, *Six Years of War The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1957), 510.

³⁹ LAC, RG24-C-1-a, Vol. 2921, File HQS-9131, “Extract from Minutes of Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) of 7 June 1944.” See Perras, “Once Bitten, Twice Shy,” 83.

⁴⁰ LAC, RG24-C-1-a, Vol. 2969, File HQS8055, Vol. 3, “Extract from memorandum from Secretariat Cabinet War Committee to Chairman COSC,” 24 May 1944.

⁴¹ NDHQ, DHH, 112.1009 (D22), Murchie to the Minister, “Selection of formations for Service in Far east and Germany,” 20 September 1944; also in LAC, RG24-C-1-a, Vol. 2921, HQS9131.

⁴² LAC, RG24-C-1-a, Vol. 2921, HQS9131, King to Churchill, 27 June 1944.

⁴³ RG2 18 Vol. 32, D-19-1, Robertson to Pearson, 28 June 1944.

they might aim for the capture of a port in south China, or the island of Formosa, although Pope emphasized that nothing had been decided. Nevertheless, Pope thought the Canadian Army should indicate as soon as possible to that it was hoping to cooperate with the Americans in the Pacific. External Affairs had already indicated to the British that Canada would prefer working with the United States in the Pacific, but the government had not conveyed a similar message to the Americans.⁴⁴ Pope told the general staff that timing was becoming an issue, given that the defeat of Germany might come as early as the fall of 1944 – or at least that was the Allied expectation at the time. He stressed that Canadian troops would need “special training, acclimatization, special organization and special equipment,” if they were to deploy to the Pacific. Pope calculated, based on estimates of wastage to December 1944, that Canada would have 60,000 officers and men in its reinforcement units by the end of December 1944. In other words, Canada did not have to worry about dispatching home defence forces. Pope was concerned that Canada would not look very worthy if the war in Europe ended and the country had all these men at home doing nothing. Indeed, it would harm Canada’s national interest, about which Pope was always very mindful. In this case, he was concerned about Canada’s national standing in the international community. Murchie read Pope’s letter with “much interest.”⁴⁵

When Pope arrived in Ottawa at the beginning of September 1944, the government was still reviewing Canada’s role in the Pacific, although the picture was beginning to clear up. At the Cabinet War Committee meeting of 31 August, King informed ministers that he would entertain proposals for the war in the Pacific only if the Canadian contributions were north of the Equator.⁴⁶ On 6 September, the full cabinet met to discuss a Chiefs of Staff memorandum that laid out the plans of each service with respect to the war in the Pacific.⁴⁷ The army proposed deploying one division with ancillary troops in the North or Central Pacific. The air force and navy were much more ambitious. The navy wanted to send all of its modern fleet to the Pacific once the war in Europe was over, with the aim of bolstering the Royal Navy fleet already operating there. The air force proposed sending forty-seven squadrons, most of which would be operating with the Royal Air Force.⁴⁸ The ministers endorsed the idea of sending troops to the Pacific and favoured the North or Central Pacific to Southeast Asia. They did not raise any objection to the army’s proposed military commitment, but they were not at all supportive of the size of deployments proposed by the air force and navy. The War Committee agreed to withhold a final decision on the form and extent of the Canadian participation until after the Quebec Conference scheduled for 12-16 September.⁴⁹

Pope joined the Canadian delegation when it travelled to Quebec City for the Octagon Conference. Although the Canadian government was the host, it did not attend any of the major allied meetings, the same situation as the Quebec Conference of August 1943, so negotiations were a tricky business. On 13 September, the prime minister chaired a meeting of the War Committee, and Pope was there to take notes.⁵⁰ The meeting lasted close to four hours, highlighted by a clash between Angus Macdonald, the minister for the Royal Canadian Navy, and the prime minister over the war in the Pacific. Macdonald was not all pleased that King wanted to prevent the three services from operating south of the Equator, thereby keeping them outside of Southeast Asia.⁵¹ King agreed to explore what the British government was planning in the final phases of the war against Japan, although he knew already that the British had lowered their expectations. On 14 September, the War Committee met with Churchill. Also present were the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and their British counterparts. They discussed where in the Far East the Canadian contingent should deploy. King was pleased to hear Churchill say that Canada should be operating north of the Equator and that operations in South East Asia were a British responsibility.⁵²

The Canadian government was able to better define Canada’s role in the war in the Pacific in the following 48 hours, and Pope played a part. It started when King met Roosevelt at a dinner on 14 September. The Canadian prime minister told the president that Canada was prepared to contribute to the war against Japan either in the Northern or Central

⁴⁴ LAC, RG24-C-1-a, Vol. 2921, HQS-9131, Pope to Chief of the General Staff, 19 August 1944; MP diary, 19 August 1944.

⁴⁵ Ibid, Murchie to Pope, 27 August 1944,

⁴⁶ LAC, MG 27, III B11, Ralston papers, vol. 49, File Japan 1944, King to Ralston, Power, and Angus Macdonald, , August 30, 1944; RG2 18 Vol. 32, D-19-1, King to Ralston, 30 August 1944.

⁴⁷ LAC, RG24-C-1-a, Vol. 2921, HQS-9131, Chiefs of Staff to the Minister, “Canadian participation in the Pacific War and in Europe after the defeat of Germany,” 6 September 1944. See also Roger Sarty, “The Ghosts of Fisher and Jellicoe,” in *The Second Quebec Conference Revisited*, edited by David B. Woolner (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 143-170.

⁴⁸ LAC, RG24 Vol. 2921, HQS9072-2-2, COSC to minister, 6 sept.

⁴⁹ LAC, RG24-C-1-a, Vol. 2921, HQS9131, “Cabinet conclusion, 6 September 1944.” See also Perras, “Once Bitten, Twice Shy: The Origins of the Canadian Army Pacific Force, 1944-45,” 89.

⁵⁰ LAC, MP diary, 13 September 1944.

⁵¹ Sarty, “The Ghosts of Fisher and Jellicoe,” 161.

⁵² Ibid, 162.

Pacific. Roosevelt was pleased with King's offer, although he did not think the Canadian troops would be needed "for some time."⁵³ The following day, King met with Churchill and Roosevelt to discuss the matter further. They agreed the Canadian Army should approach General George Marshall, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, to lay out Canadian plans "without commitment, and to discuss methods whereby mutual planning could be worked out to integrate a Canadian Army component."⁵⁴ Pope and the Canadian CGS, Lieutenant-General J.C. Murchie, met with Marshall on 16 September. Murchie explained that the Canadians were seeking to participate in "those areas in which Canada had a direct interest, namely the Central and North Pacific."⁵⁵ The document that Pope and Murchie prepared for Marshall indicated that the Canadian Army had no interest in participating in the far North, such as the Kuriles. It stressed that Canada wanted to be part of "the final assault on Japan proper." Because Canada planned to use forces currently employed in Europe, the army would not be ready for "an earlier operation." Troops for the Pacific "would have to be reconstituted...and returned to Canada where they would be given leave and be re-equipped and trained, as might be necessary, to fit them for the operational role in which they would be employed."⁵⁶ Canada wanted to deploy a division plus ancillary troops, an offer that Marshall welcomed. He suggested that there were "psychological" as well as "political" advantages to inserting a Canadian formation in the Pacific. He agreed that it was "desirable" that the men have "battle experience."⁵⁷ Marshall explained that he would communicate with the Canadian military once his staff had reviewed the Canadian offer.⁵⁸

Pope kept abreast of the talks between the Americans and the British throughout the Quebec Conference and he prepared his usual summary. His report was upbeat. The people attending the Second Quebec Conference were largely the same as those who had attended the Quebec Conference of 1943, but the fortunes of the Allies had significantly improved. The Germans were being rolled back, and so were the Japanese. Pope reported that the CCS agenda for the war in Europe was lighter for Octagon than it had been for Quadrant because the leaders believed that "the end of the war in Europe [was] in clear view."⁵⁹ The Allies spent much more time discussing the sequence of events for attaining the ultimate goal of defeating Japan. The British were determined to assume a role because they had a "score to settle with Japan." However, for the Americans, it was simply a matter of deciding how Great Britain would fit into the U.S. plans. Pope gathered that the Americans were still contemplating operations on the coast of China and against the island of Formosa before launching its final assault on Japan. General Douglas MacArthur would be responsible for retaking the Philippines from the Southwest and he had been assigned a U.S. Navy task force to conduct the operation. Pope reported continuing uncertainty concerning British plans. They might include air and naval operations in the Pacific under U.S. operational command and "such operations as may be necessary" to oust the Japanese from Burma and the Malayan Peninsula.⁶⁰ In addition, Pope expected that British troops based in northwestern Australia would start to move towards Borneo and aim thereafter for the Chinese mainland around Hong Kong. The Americans and the British assumed that it would take between eighteen to twenty-four months to defeat Japan after the war in Europe ended.⁶¹

When Pope went down to Washington to "take his leave" of the CJSM in late September 1944, he had further discussions about the war in the Pacific with British and American personnel.⁶² When Pope came back from Washington, Admiral G.C. Jones, the Chief of the Naval Staff, asked to see him about the war in the Pacific. While Pope had been away, the naval and air staffs had been preparing for the next meeting of the War Committee, scheduled for 5 October. That was when ministers would be discussing the Pacific contingents once again. Pope urged Jones to come well prepared for the meeting.⁶³ He suggested, for example, providing more information on the size of the British naval presence in the Pacific and the ways that the Royal Canadian Navy would integrate with the Royal Navy. Jones paid only lip service to Pope's suggestions and he paid the price. Pope was at the committee meeting and recorded that the navy proposal got "a rough ride," and so did the one from the air force. The prime minister reiterated what the War Committee had already determined

⁵³ Perras, "Once Bitten, Twice Shy: The origins of the Canadian Army Pacific Force, 1944-45," 89.

⁵⁴ LAC, RG24-C-1-a, Vol. 2921, HQS9131, Pope Note to file 16 September 1944.

⁵⁵ RG24-C-1-a, Vol. 2921, HQS9131, Pope summary of meeting of 16 September 1944; RG2 18 Vol. 32, D-19-1, Pope to the Prime Minister, 17 September 1944.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ RG24-C-1-a, Vol. 2921, HQS9131, Murchie to the Minister, 16 September 1944.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Pope's summary of the Quebec Conference can be found at LAC, RG2 Vol. 34, D-19-1, "The Quebec Conference, 1944," also in NDHQ DHH, 314.009 D333.

⁶⁰ Sarty, "The Ghosts of Fisher and Jellicoe," 160.

⁶¹ LAC, RG2 Vol. 34, D-19-1, "The Quebec Conference, 1944;" also in NDHQ DHH, 314.009 D333.

⁶² LAC, MP diary, 29 September 1944.

⁶³ LAC, MP diary, 3 October 1944.

earlier: namely, that Canadian participation should be in theatres of direct interest to Canada as a North American nation -- for example, the North or Central Pacific, not the more remote areas such as Southeast Asia. The navy and the air force had to rework their proposals.⁶⁴

In January 1945, Pope received King's approval to travel to Washington to "keep in touch with men and things down there."⁶⁵ Much of his discussions with U.S. and British officials pertained to developments in the Pacific. By then, the Americans had made significant progress in the Philippines. Pope observed that their advance had been "remarkable" especially on the Island of Luzon. In a meeting with George Marshall, he learned that U.S. plans were still unfolding, but the U.S. Army chief was expecting "hard fighting." Pope observed that the U.S. Joint Staff had become "China Coast conscious," and they had their eyes on the Island of Hainan as a starting point. The Island was poorly defended and it had more accessible beaches than Formosa, "where almost unscaleable [sic] cliffs are said to be the rule rather than the exception." Between the possession of Luzon and Hainan, the U.S. could, said Pope, "cut the Japanese lines of communication leading into and through the South China Sea and thus seriously impair the capacity of Japanese to maintain their forces in Indo-China, Malaya, and beyond."⁶⁶ The British were not unhappy with the American strategy, especially if it included operations close to the Malay Peninsula.⁶⁷ The Americans had made significant progress in reopening the Burma Road as well. Pope heard from Marshall that the Americans had just finished flying newly trained Chinese forces into China and they were hoping to ship heavy equipment using the overland route. In the meantime, the Americans were continuing to ship equipment over the "Hump" air route. Pope reported that the U.S. was making progress in negotiating terms for Russians entry into the war against Japan. The Americans were particularly interested in getting access to Russia's maritime provinces, from which they could bomb Japan.⁶⁸

At the beginning of March, Pope met with Major-General Victor Odlum at the latter's request to discuss the war in the Pacific.⁶⁹ They had not met since Pope's days in Washington. Odlum explained to Pope that the purpose of his visit was to promote Canada's economic opportunities in China. He thought Canada could enhance its future economic prospects in China if it made its military effort against Japan visible to Chinese leaders. Pope did not have encouraging words for his former commander. He reminded Odlum that the Allies had generally shied away from conducting major Army operations on the Chinese mainland and Canada was not likely to do anything different. Therefore, the Canadian Army would not have much profile in that part of Asia. The same went for the Royal Canadian Navy. Pope was somewhat more positive about the Royal Canadian Air Force. He explained that the RCAF had not finalized its plans, but there was a possibility that it could use Luzon as a "stepping-stone to somewhere else, and more likely than not, to the Chinese mainland." Before departing, Odlum asked Pope to promote his ideas to the Canadian government if he had an opportunity. Pope said he would try, but doubted he would have the right opportunity to do so.⁷⁰ Pope had given Odlum a realistic assessment of the situation.

In the second week of March, King asked Pope to travel with him to Washington.⁷¹ The Canadian Army had been lamenting that there was still much uncertainty concerning American plans for the war in the Pacific. Pope took the opportunity while in Washington to sit down with American, British and Australian officials to get another update on developments.⁷² He discovered that U.S. plans had shifted again. What had appeared cast in stone six months ago had now been almost completely set aside. Pope learned, among other things, that the United States Army and its air forces were considering the possibility of capturing land along the Chinese coast, but much further north than previously planned. Once they had achieved a firm foothold, they would use the captured territory to continue their bombing campaign against Japan and employ it as an advanced base for the final assault. Pope's American interlocutors confided in him that the debate between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy on whether MacArthur or Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander in Chief,

⁶⁴ LAC, MP diary, 5 October 1944. Pope worked with Jones over the course of the next few days on a revised proposal. The War Committee of 11 October went much more smoothly, but the outcome was not at all to the navy's satisfaction. The total Canadian naval deployment to the Pacific had been cut by almost 50 percent. Sarty, "The Ghosts of Fisher and Jellicoe," 163; LAC, MP diary, 14 October 1944.

⁶⁵ LAC, MP diary, 8 January 1945.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, "Washington Revisited," 31 January 1945.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ LAC, MP diary, 31 January 1945.

⁶⁹ CWM Pope Collection, Pope to Robertson, 1 March 1945; LAC, MP diary, 1 March 1945.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 7 March 1945.

⁷² NDHQ DHH 112.21.009 (D197 Box 2), Deputy Chief of General staff (DCGS) to Chief of the General staff, 3 February 1944.

U.S. Pacific Fleet, should be in charge was still being played out, but that “expert opinion” was leaning towards MacArthur. Pope gathered from speaking to the Australians in Washington that their military continued to be “restive” about serving under U.S. command. He learned that the Americans were thinking of using the Australians for a major operation, and Pope speculated that Borneo might be the objective (which it was, May-August 1945). He highlighted the importance of Borneo to the Allies because of its oil and rubber resources.⁷³ Pope was encouraged by the fact that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff was taking a positive approach towards Canadian troops joining the Americans “in the final assault on Japan.”⁷⁴

In late March, Pope learned that the Royal Air Force (RAF) wanted the RCAF to assume a greater proportion of the proposed Canadian-British air component to operate out of Northern Luzon in the Philippines. The British request came by way of a message from Churchill to King. Pope drafted King’s response, which expressed concerns that Canada was being “called upon, on somewhat scanty premises, to assume a disproportionate commitment [when] the practical utility of the proposals . . . seem open to question.”⁷⁵ Pope saw many problems with the British proposal. The proposed base would be located in Northern Luzon, some 1,600 miles from Tokyo. It would be beyond the range of Canadian aircraft, therefore requiring a stop for refuel. The U.S. Air Force was using Super Fortress aircraft, with much better range than Canadian bombers, and they were taking off from Saipan, 200 miles closer. Moreover, the Americans had just captured Iwo Jima, 750 miles from Tokyo, and they were using it also as a staging ground. If the Americans proceeded with a base on the east coast of China, they would be launching bombers from three locations, all of them much closer than Luzon. In addition, U.S. bombers might in the future take off from the maritime provinces of the Soviet Union. Vladivostok was only 600 miles from Tokyo. “It was difficult to avoid the thought,” suggested Pope, “that the proposed British-Canadian bombing effort from far-off Luzon might perhaps show up rather poorly.” In addition, it would take many months to build the airfield and assemble the forces.⁷⁶

Once the invasion of North Borneo was completed, Pope added, the British could reach Singapore much more readily. They could launch attacks towards Singapore instead of aiming for Japan, because Singapore “exercises a powerful attraction on the British Mind.”⁷⁷ A special Cabinet Committee considered the issue on 20 April and agreed with Pope’s assessment. Heeney wrote to Air Vice Marshal W.A. Curtis, acting chief of the air staff, to inform him that the government had expressed doubt on the merits of the proposal from the United Kingdom and it could not support Canadian participation in the initiative unless the air staff could provide more information to substantiate the proposal.⁷⁸ Pope had demonstrated a sound understanding of Canadian and allied strategy in the Pacific in dissecting the proposal from the RAF. Other than working with Heeney on a draft for the prime minister’s House of Commons statement at the beginning of April, Pope was done with the government’s preparations for the war in the Pacific.⁷⁹

Planning for post-war

At the end of October 1944, Hume Wrong, of External Affairs, invited Pope to join the Working Committee of the Advisory Committee on Post Hostilities Problems (PHP).⁸⁰ The Advisory Committee provided direction and guidance to the Working Committee and was responsible for proposing, when required, recommendations to the Cabinet War Committee on PHP questions. The Working Committee kept the Advisory Committee apprised of post-hostilities issues and undertook studies on their own initiative or at the behest of the Advisory Committee.⁸¹

Pope began participating in the debate on post-war Canada-U.S. defence relations in early 1944 when Colonel J.H. Jenkins, the DMO, asked for his views on the future of the PJBD and the evolving strategic environment. In his reply, Pope suggested that the PJBD would continue to deal with defence relations between Canada and the United States. The two

⁷³ Pope’s intelligence was correct. The Australians landed two divisions on Borneo between 1 May and 1 July. Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio, *Implacable Foes War in the Pacific 1944-45*, 296; Max Hastings, *Nemesis The Battle for Japan, 1944-45* (London: Harper Press, 2007), 371-2

⁷⁴ LAC, MP diary, 13 March 1945.

⁷⁵ RG2 18 Vol. 32, D-19-1 Pope to Prime Minister, 27 March 1945; Pope to Prime Minister, 4 April 1945.

⁷⁶ Pope to Prime Minister, 4 April 1945.

⁷⁷ RG2 18 Vol. 32, D-19-1, Pope to Prime Minister, 4 April 1945.

⁷⁸ RG2 18 Vol. 32, D-19-1, Heeney to Vice Air Marshall W.A. Curtis Acting Chief of Air Staff, 20 April 1945.

⁷⁹ RG2 18 Vol. 32, D-19-1 Heeney to Prime Minister, “Parliamentary statement on Canadian participation in Pacific war, 24 March 1945.”

⁸⁰ LAC, MP diary, 17 October 1944.

⁸¹ NDHQ DHH 2002/17 193.009 (D30), Miscellaneous August/December 1943, “Draft memorandum to War Committee on PHP”; see also Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence*, 143.

governments had included the word “Permanent” for that very reason.⁸² The United States would likely ask Canada to amend and re-sign ABC-22 after the war, and Pope saw no reason why Canada would refuse to do so. Although he deemed it unlikely, Pope did not rule out completely a “recrudescence of strength of Germany and Japan.” Canada and the U.S. would therefore need to remain vigilant. He did not think that the Soviet Union and the United States would go to war against each other after they had defeated Germany and Japan. Indeed, he did not think the Soviet Union would be interested in starting a new war with any country for many years.⁸³ However, should the countries clash because of “idealistic” differences, the Americans would expect Canada to join them. Canada could either stand with the U.S., side with the Soviet Union (not likely), or stand back. In the latter two cases, the United States would not hesitate to march into Canada. Canada could choose to make “a minor show of force” and then stand back as the U.S. invaded, although he added that the country’s “feelings of self-respect” should be sufficient “to dismiss that thought.”⁸⁴ Jenkins circulated Pope’s assessment to the Working Committee in Ottawa. Norman Robertson thought Pope’s letter had significant merit and passed it on to the prime minister. King was less worried than Pope about a resurgent Germany or Japan, but he did agree with Pope that Canada would have to be mindful that it lay between the United States and the Soviet Union. The relationships would “have to be worked out with very special care.”⁸⁵ Officials in Ottawa valued Pope’s analysis, a testament of his conceptual skills.

Jenkins used Pope’s comments as general guidance to develop a paper in the spring of 1944. The paper went through various drafts and eventually became a PHP paper.⁸⁶ The 26 May version of the paper described the relations between Canada and the United States as “close,” but no longer “amicable,” the language used in an earlier draft. Relations would remain close “unless disturbed by factors which have not hitherto arisen...characterized by a mutual willingness and ability to reach agreement on all questions of importance.” The paper explored the implications of Soviet power in the post-war international environment and the possibility of clashes with the U.S. The paper suggested that the future United Nations would help in maintaining good relations between the two sides. It should also provide a forum in which Canada could contribute to the settling of issues. And if there was a breakdown in the world organization, the PJBD could provide an alternative “up to a point.”⁸⁷ The PHP paper explored various scenarios in Canada-U.S. relations if the Americans had a disagreement with the Soviet Union. Echoing Pope’s earlier comments, the PHP paper did not rule out, in one scenario, Canada allying with the Soviet Union and ceasing joint military planning with the U.S. However, unlike Pope, it did not contemplate how the U.S. would react if Canada backed the Soviet Union. In its conclusions, the PHP paper from the Working Group simply stated that Canada’s military relations with the United States should not give the Soviet Union reason to be suspicious “of our intentions.” When the Working Committee submitted its paper to the Advisory Committee on 16 June, it explained that the analysis was based on two main premises. Firstly, there would be no risk of attack on North America for ten years after the war. Secondly, the USSR would very likely not contemplate war against the United States, even in the event of friction between the two countries, because the Soviet Union would be focusing on rebuilding its economy.

Shortly after the Working Committee submitted its Report to the Advisory Committee, Jenkins asked Pope to provide his views on the threat assumptions. Pope focused on the Soviet threat. In doing so, he differentiated between capabilities and intentions, and how they related to resources. The Americans were inclined to focus on capabilities. Canada should worry more about intentions. He explained that an enemy state might have the capabilities to strike, but what were its intentions? What were “the reasonable grounds for assuming” that the enemy would strike? He cautioned against trying to defend against “enemy capabilities everywhere” because “you would soon exhaust your resources.”⁸⁸ Canada had finite resources and it should draw a line beyond which it should resist American demands to enhance its defence capabilities. Moreover, he did not think the Soviet Union, while well-armed, had any intention of attacking North America.

Pope was consistent in his views on the issue of defence spending and capabilities. It should be Canada’s defence policy to maintain a sensible level of defence at home, “not so much as to defend ourselves...but more to ensure that there was no apprehension as to our security in the American public mind.” The United States would continue to view the defence

⁸² LAC, MP diary, Pope to Jenkins, 4 April 1944; Pope to Pearson, 17 April 1944.

⁸³ LAC, MP diary, 4 May 1944.

⁸⁴ LAC, MP diary, Pope to Jenkins, 4 April 1944.

⁸⁵ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence*, 321.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 322-326.

⁸⁷ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence*, 325.

⁸⁸ LAC, MP diary, Pope to Jenkins, 27 June 1944.

of Canada as part of continental defence.⁸⁹ The United States should never again “feel insecure” because Canada was not doing enough to defend itself. Canada needed to assume its share of continental defence. At the beginning of July 1944, he told Hugh Keenleyside from External Affairs that Canada was suffering from “Little Canadianism.”⁹⁰ In a similar vein, Pope told the PHP working committee on Canada-U.S. relations in January 1945 that Canada needed to be more mindful of its national interest and willing to “undertake commitments that can properly be held to fall within the Canadian sphere.”⁹¹ But, as he told Hickerson at the beginning of May, the U.S. should not ask for too much from Canada in terms of defence. Pope wrote that “the wise man does not press for more than the person on the other side of the table can reasonably concede.”⁹² Pope told Jenkins that Canada had willingly gone along with most U.S. defence requests without much scrutiny since 1940. This had meant agreeing at times to “foolish things” that were now “a burden on taxpayers,” although he did not cite examples. Canada ought to be more willing after the war to challenge U.S. demands if they were unreasonable. War with the United States was completely unthinkable and Canada had to resolve its issues with its neighbor “peacefully.” But the Canadian government should do so without “losing its self-respect.”⁹³ Pope advocated a pragmatic approach. Canada should take a strong stance when negotiating with the U.S., but it should always strive for a compromise with which it could live.

When the Advisory Committee met on 4 July to discuss the Canada-U.S. paper, its members agreed with Pope’s assessment on resources and capabilities. However, the naval member of the committee likened the ten-year rule mentioned in the PHP paper to that which the Allies had followed before the war with negative consequences. The committee decided that it would recommend flexibility in the ten-year period.⁹⁴ When the Advisory Committee tabled its report at the Cabinet War Committee on 19 July, Ralston recommended, and the other ministers agreed, that Canada should ask the American Joint Chiefs for their views on the ten-year assumption.

Pope was assigned the task. He spoke to various American service officials. A member of the PJBD told Pope that Canada was being overly-optimistic in its international predictions. Another contact, a member of the U.S. Strategic Survey Committee, informed Pope that, while the U.S. and the USSR might not have grounds to go to war against each other in the foreseeable future, the Americans might be dragged into a military conflict on the side of the British if they went to war with the Soviet Union. Finally, Pope spoke to a “Deputy Chief of Staff of a Service Department,” who told him that the American services would be reluctant to provide an official assessment because all three intended to clamour for large budgets after the war and it would harm their chances of securing the funding if they agreed to the ten-year peace assumption.⁹⁵ When Pope reported on his discussions with the Americans, Heeney decided not to pursue the matter any further. The next version of the document eliminated the ten-year rule and posited that it would be “unwise to ignore the possibility of attack from the Soviet Union.”⁹⁶

Jenkins wrote to Pope again on 15 August, sending along a new version of the PHP Canada-U.S. document that he had revised, but that he had yet to circulate to the Working Committee.⁹⁷ Pope expressed doubt once again about the Soviet threat and argued that Canada should not be preparing the army for that contingency. Canada should have an army able to contribute to general deterrence, but more importantly, “inspire confidence in the minds of our American friends” that it could assume its own defence responsibilities. It was more important to focus on those roles than on the “hypothetical fear that Russia and the United States might some day come to grips and settle their differences over our own fair land.”⁹⁸ Pope knew that the Canadian Army would have a difficult time convincing the government to fund even a minimum force posture. Pope had an understanding of the limits of the federal government’s commitment to defence. He told Jenkins that Canada’s politicians would remain reluctant to spend on the military, given the country’s “fortunate geographical and

⁸⁹ LAC, MP diary, Pope to Pearson, 17 April 1944.

⁹⁰ NDHQ, DHH, 314.009 (D17), Vol. 111, Pope to Keenleyside, 3 July 1944. Pope’s letter pertained to the installation of a radio navigation system (Loran station) in Newfoundland and who should assume its costs.

⁹¹ LAC, RG2 Vol. 39, W-22-5-M, 23380, “Minutes of 39th meeting of the Working Committee on Post Hostilities Problems (PHP),” 18 January 1945.

⁹² LAC, MP diary, 6 May 1944.

⁹³ NDHQ, DHH, 73/1223 Series 7 File 3/27, Pope to Jenkins, 27 June 1944.

⁹⁴ RG2 18 Vol. 20, W-22-8, Vol. 2, Secretary COSC to Secretary Advisory Committee, 2 January 1945.

⁹⁵ LAC, RG24 Vol. 6172, HQS15-48-12, Secretary COSC to Secretary CJSM, 26 July 1944; NDHQ, DHH, 73/1223 Series 7 File 3/27, CJS Washington to Secretary Chiefs of Staff, 5 August 1944; RG2 18 Vol. 20, W-22-8, Vol. 1, Secretary, Advisory Committee to Heeney 26 August 1944; Cabinet War Committee, Schedule of decisions, 19 July 1944.

⁹⁶ RG2 18 Vol. 20, W-22-8, Vol. 1, Heeney to Secretary of COSC, 29 August 1944; Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence*, 328.

⁹⁷ NDHQ, DHH, 73/1223 Series 7 File 3/27, Jenkins to Pope, 15 August 1944.

⁹⁸ LAC, MP diary, Pope to Jenkins, 24 August 1944.

therefore favourable strategic position.” It was Pope’s theme of “propinquity to the source of danger,” articulated in a different fashion. In a country with a representative government, elected leaders would spend on the army only in proportion to how insecure Canadians felt. Since Canadians would likely feel well sheltered by geography, they would not support “more than very embryonic military forces.”⁹⁹

By the time Pope joined the Working Committee in late October 1944, it had completed the review of another version of the Canada-U.S. paper. The document contained many of the elements Pope had been advocating. Among them, it anticipated that Canada and the United States would not experience “any irreconcilable conflict of policies” after the war. The PJBD would continue to play a major role in defence relations between the two countries and North America would not be threatened directly for several years. However, there were some new elements. The document suggested that the “victor nations, including the United States would maintain larger armed forces than before the war to enforce peace.” The document looked at the impact of air power and offered that Canada and the rest of the continent were no longer protected by their geographical location.¹⁰⁰ Pope reviewed the October version of the paper. He told Heaney that he was much happier with the new version of the paper, relative to what he had seen earlier.¹⁰¹

In December 1944, just when the Working Committee thought it had the full support from everyone, Air Marshall Robert Leckie, the Chief of the Air Staff intervened.¹⁰² He wanted a more nuanced interpretation to the threat assessment. He discussed the matter with the service chiefs and Pope at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC).¹⁰³ The revised document still assumed no immediate threat to North America after the war, but it added that “it is necessary, however, that the means to meet any such threat should be available during this period.”¹⁰⁴ The document was sent back to the Advisory Committee for further revisions after the War Committee reviewed it in early January.¹⁰⁵ Ministers wanted the document to make clear that it was meant to serve as a general statement of policy and that it was not proposing commitments. Pope suggested some new wording in the introduction and elsewhere in the document. It went to the War Committee on 28 February. The committee finally approved it on 19 July 1945 after King and the rest of the Canadian delegation had returned from the international conference on the United Nations Charter in San Francisco.

Pope was involved in another post-war related issue while he was still the head of the CJSM in Washington. It had to do with the defence of Newfoundland. In May 1944, Pope had submitted to the CGS his perspective on the matter, focusing on Canada’s army presence. It appears that Pope developed his paper on Newfoundland on his own initiative.¹⁰⁶ He did not think the defences of Newfoundland had changed much since he had started to keep watch in 1940. However, Pope remained confident that this situation should not be of concern because of the low-level threat, which was still small scale raids. Pope reckoned that the United States had overestimated the threat to Newfoundland when they deployed troops in 1940-41, after the British had granted the Americans use of bases at St. John’s, Argentia, and Stephenville. The Americans had not factored in what Canada could contribute to its defence.¹⁰⁷ The U.S. now knew with certainty that Canada considered the territory “an integral feature of the Canadian scheme of defence.”¹⁰⁸ Pope expected that the United States

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ LAC, RG24, Vol. 11751, HQS11751, “C.P.H.P (44) Report 5 (Revised final) Post-War Defence Relationship with the United States: General Considerations,” 26 October 1944. Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence*, 329.

¹⁰¹ RG2 18 Vol. 20, W-22-8, Vol. 2, Pope to Heaney, 11 October 1944.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid, Secretary COSC to Secretary Advisory Committee, 2 January 1945; Pope to Wrong, 4 January 1945.

¹⁰⁴ LAC, RG24 Vol. 6172 HQS15-48-12, Secretary COSC to Secretary Advisory Committee, 2 January 1945; Wrong to Heaney, 3 January 1945; Leckie to Chairman Advisory Committee, 4 January 1945; Pope to CAS, CGS, and CNS, 4 January 1945.

¹⁰⁵ RG2 18 Vol. 20, W-22-8, Heaney to MacTavish, 10 January 1945; LAC, RG24 Vol. 6172 HQS15-48-12, “Minutes of the 6th meeting of the Advisory Committee,” 12 January 1945;

See also NDHQ DHH 73/1223 Series 7 File 3124A, Jenkins to C.G.S. 7 October 1944.

¹⁰⁶ NDHQ DHH 73/1223 Series 7 File 3124A, Pope to C.G.S., 6 May 1944; LAC, RG24 Vol. 8185, HQS1818-3, Pope paper on “Post-War Defence of Newfoundland,” 6 May 1944. External Affairs had initiated the process by producing a paper in March 1944 on the political, legal and military ramifications of Canada’s continued presence in Newfoundland after the war. The three services had reviewed the External Affairs paper and had provided comments. Pope had heard of the ongoing debate about Newfoundland in Ottawa and he wanted to contribute to it.

¹⁰⁷ LAC, MP diary, Pope to Jenkins, 27 June 1944.

¹⁰⁸ LAC, RG24 Vol. 8185, HQS1818-3, “Post-War Defence of Newfoundland,” 6 May 1944.

would agree if Canada offered to assume responsibility for the defence of all of Newfoundland, with the exception of those bases that the United States would want to retain for operations “farther afield.”¹⁰⁹

When Pope’s paper on Newfoundland arrived in Ottawa, the planning staffs of the three services reviewed it, after which it was discussed by the Joint Planning Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.¹¹⁰ The sub-committee agreed with Pope that Canada should assume responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland. It took note of Pope’s suggestion that the United States might be inclined to terminate its lease in St. John’s and willing to transfer the defence of Newfoundland to Canada. The sub-committee suggested to the Chiefs of Staff that Pope’s views be “accepted in principle” and his report be passed on to External Affairs for its consideration, given the political implications of Pope’s recommendations.¹¹¹ The Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations of the sub-committee and Pope’s report was forwarded to External Affairs.¹¹²

Pope displayed a solid understanding of Canada’s future interests in Newfoundland when Jenkins sought his advice in the summer of 1944 about the army’s plans for reducing the military presence on Canada’s east coast and Newfoundland. Pope agreed that the threat to Newfoundland was no greater than that to the east coast. The army could safely pull all of its forces from Newfoundland so long as they could be returned in the event of an emergency. However, the matter of Canada’s military presence in Newfoundland required a nuanced approach because of the unique political situation. He proposed that the Canadian Army maintain a garrison in Newfoundland, one that would be on a par with the U.S. garrison. Pope was certain that Canada would eventually approach Great Britain, the U.S. and the Newfoundland Commission about taking full responsibility for the defence of the Island. Canada’s case for doing so would be greater if it had a strong military presence on the island when negotiations began.¹¹³ In Jenkins’ letter to the CGS concerning the reductions on the East Coast, he echoed Pope’s views on maintaining a certain level of Canadian troops on the Island so as not to “upset present satisfactory Command relationships there.” The War Committee approved a policy almost exactly in line with Pope’s suggestion.¹¹⁴

When Pope was next involved on the future of Canada’s defence relations with Newfoundland, he was in Ottawa. On 2 November 1944, with Pope sitting in on his second meeting of the Working Committee on Post Hostilities Problems, the Chairman, Hume Wrong, proposed an expanded work plan that included the defence of Newfoundland. When the working committee deliberated over the course of several weeks the matter of Newfoundland defence, Pope showed an in-depth knowledge. He was in his element. During a meeting of 1 December 1944, when the committee discussed how Canada would go about offering to take over Newfoundland’s local defence after the war, Pope made some astute comments on the procedural paper that the committee had circulated. Pope told the committee that the British had discussed even before the war “devolving United Kingdom defence commitments to other countries of the Commonwealth according to the principle of ‘area defence.’”¹¹⁵ In informal discussion with the Americans, they had told him that they would prefer to wait until after the war to discuss the matter. Pope did not think so. It was better to negotiate an agreement with Newfoundland while the war was still on and defence still on people’s minds. But it was equally imperative to keep the United Kingdom, the United States, and Newfoundland all informed. A “policy of exclusiveness” would only lead to misunderstandings. In his comments, Pope was as at home with the material as was R.A. MacKay, another member of the working committee, who was special assistant to the under-secretary of state for external affairs and one of Canada’s leading experts on Newfoundland.¹¹⁶

The Working Committee reviewed the first draft on Newfoundland on 14 December and it reconvened again two weeks later to discuss a new version of the paper. At that meeting, Hume Wrong alluded to a letter from J.S. Macdonald, Canada’s High Commissioner to Newfoundland, which suggested that the people of Newfoundland might not be interested

¹⁰⁹ LAC, MP diary, “Post-War Defence of Newfoundland,” 6 May 1944.

¹¹⁰ NDHQ DHH 73/1223 Series 7 File 3124A, Jenkins to C.G.S. 13 May 1944; LAC, RG24 Vol. 8185, HQS1818-3, “Comments on the Argument of Major-General Pope’s paper,” ND, no author; paper to navy director of Plans from navy staff officer. “The Postwar Defence of Newfoundland,” 22 May 1944.

¹¹¹ LAC, RG24 Vol. 8185, HQS1818-3, “Minutes of Meeting of Joint Planning Sub-Committee of 22 May 1944.”

¹¹² Ibid, Lieutenant-Colonel E.W.T. Gill (Secretary of COSC) to Chairman, Joint Planning Sub-Committee, 2 June 1944; LAC, MP diary, 14 June 1944. External Affairs accepted the report. However, there was no follow-up at the time.

¹¹³ LAC, MP diary, Pope to Jenkins, 24 August 1944.

¹¹⁴ NDHQ DHH 314.009 (D17) Vol. 3, Jenkins to C.G.S., 13 July 1944; LAC, RG24 Vol. 8185, HQS1818-3, Secretary COSC to Secretary CJS Washington, 10 October 1944.

¹¹⁵ NDHQ DHH 73/1223 Series 7 File 3126, Minutes of 36th meeting of the Working Committee PHP, 1 December 1944.

¹¹⁶ Peter Neary, *Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World* (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988), 203; David Mackenzie, *Inside the Atlantic Triangle: Canada and the Entrance of Newfoundland into Confederation, 1939-1949* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 149.

in entertaining Canada's proposals for defence. Pope chimed in and reminded the committee that the U.S. and the U.K. had struck "hard bargains" with Newfoundland at the beginning of the war and it would be "unfortunate" if Canada followed in their footsteps. Canada should approach Newfoundland on defence issues with a spirit of "cooperation." Pope reiterated that it would be "inconceivable" for the British to oppose Canada's efforts to assume the defence responsibilities of Newfoundland since they did not have the means of doing it themselves. But Newfoundland needed to be onside as well.¹¹⁷ This was characteristic Pope, searching for consensus.

The Working Committee submitted its report to the Advisory Committee after its meeting of 28 December. The report proposed that Canada offer to take responsibility for the "local defence of Newfoundland and Labrador, including immediately adjacent areas of the High seas, either in co-operation with Newfoundland or alone."¹¹⁸ The final document stressed, as Pope had done, that Canada would have to address the interests of Newfoundland, the United Kingdom and the United States when negotiating a new agreement with Newfoundland. There was a "strong anti-Canadian feeling in Newfoundland, and a strong desire for autonomy." The report recommended that the Canadian government begin the negotiations as soon as possible while Canada still has troops stationed in Newfoundland and before Newfoundland developed "a sense of immunity from attack." The Advisory Committee reviewed the report on 12 January and approved it, subject to some minor revisions.¹¹⁹ The final report had been developed by a committee, but Pope's imprint was very clear.

Shortly after Pope arrived in Ottawa, he began work on a paper about how the government should manage and administer defence after the war. He was concerned primarily with the three services and other departments that were engaged "with the wider aspects of defence." The objective was to make certain that the country operated at a proper level of "preparedness for war...commensurate with the world situation as it will then prevail." Before writing his paper, he consulted British and American military officials. He discussed post-war defence with Alan Brooke, Hastings Ismay, and Gordon Macready at Quebec City in September 1944. And Pope met subsequently with Marshall when he was in Washington to clear up his old office at the end of September. He learned that both countries were leaning towards a single defence ministry for defence after the war. Marshall told him that he was hoping to recommend that the American fighting forces be brought together under one department, with one "Minister of War" and associate ministers for each of the services. Marshall envisaged that the service Chiefs of Staff would report in their corporate capacity to the president, supported by a Chief of Staff who would also serve as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff. After his consultation with Allied officials, Pope held some preliminary discussions with Heeney and with his lawyer friend from the 1930s, J. F. MacNeill, from the department of Justice.¹²⁰

By January 1945, Pope had completed a first draft. It laid out his assumptions on defence preparedness and how "a national sense of insecurity was invariably related to a country's propinquity to the source, or sources of danger." Canada was in a favorable geographical position, shielded as it was by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. He acknowledged that Canada needed to be more mindful in the future of "the increased range of aircraft and of the continued development of the flying bomb," but added that, "if aircraft have shattered our former ideas as to time and space, they have also made overseas expeditions, unaccompanied by air superiority, somewhat hazardous undertakings." Canada was likely to continue to assume certain defence obligations "requiring the use of, or at least the threat of, force against would-be aggressor nations."¹²¹

Pope proposed that Canada change how it managed defence after the war. First and foremost, he recommended that the government replace the War Committee with a Defence Committee of the Cabinet. The new committee would be charged with advising cabinet on all defence-related issues. The prime minister would chair the Defence Committee, but would likely delegate his duties to the minister of national defence who would serve as the deputy chair. If the government decided to retain separate ministers for air and naval services, they would also be members. The Defence Committee should include the minister of finance, given the importance of economic issues. The committee would invite other ministers to sit as required over time. Pope saw the minister of national defence exercising fully his statutory power of coordinating all

¹¹⁷ Ibid, Minutes of 36th meeting of the Working Committee PHP, 28 December 1944.

¹¹⁸ NDHQ DHH 73/1223 Series 7 File 3124A, C.P.H.P. (44) Report 7 (Final), Post-War Defence of Newfoundland and Labrador – Canadian Position, 28 December 1944.

¹¹⁹ RG2 Vol. 44, W-22-5-M (Vol. 2), "Minutes of the Sixth meeting of the Advisory Committee," 12 January 1945.

¹²⁰ LAC, MP diary, 11, 12, 15, 29 September; CWM, Pope Collection, Pope to Major-General Redman, 2 January 1945; Pope, *Soldiers and Politicians*, 242.

¹²¹ LAC, RG24 Vol. 22327, HQS9072.5, Pope to three services chiefs, Heeney, Robertson, and Wrong with paper attached "Post-War Politico-Military Organization," 13 January 1945.

issues that pertained to more than one service. The minister already had the authority, but he had not exercised it during the war. Pope also recommended that the government establish the necessary number of subordinate committees, with ministers sitting as chairs. The Chiefs of Staff had become, over the course of the war, a principal advisory body to the War Committee. He thought it might be appropriate for the relationship to be formalized so that the Chiefs of Staff could report directly to the new Defence Committee, even though they would not be official members of the committee. He stressed that he had in mind only their “collective and corporate capacity” and not their “separate and individual responsibility towards their respective Services.” The government should maintain a secretariat of service officers to support the Defence Committee.¹²²

Pope circulated his paper to Heeney, Robertson, the three service chiefs, and to the minister. He suggested that the paper could be distributed to the Advisory Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems if there was “a measure of concurrence” in its recommendations and conclusions. McNaughton read Pope’s paper in March and liked it.¹²³ Colonel Jenkins from DMO&I provided detailed comments and general support, although he thought non-elected officials should manage the various sub-committees. The Deputy CCGS also offered his comments. He was fully supportive of a Defence Committee reviewing defence issues before they were presented to the cabinet. He agreed with Jenkins that the sub-committees should not be headed by government ministers.¹²⁴ In July 1945, Heeney gave the prime minister his views on the matter. He agreed with Pope that the government should continue to have a subordinate committee that would deal “in the first instance with defence questions,” and urged prompt action.¹²⁵ Finally, on 3 August 1945, Cabinet agreed to create a Cabinet Defence Committee, charged with considering all defence questions and reporting to the full Cabinet “upon major matters of policy relating to the maintenance and employment of the three services.” The government went further than Pope had recommended. The three chiefs of staff became members of the new committee, as did the three service ministers.¹²⁶

When Pope returned to Ottawa in the summer of 1945 from the Conference in San Francisco on the future United Nations, he wrote a few other think pieces, one of which merits mention because it reflects Pope’s understanding of the evolution of relations between Canada, Great Britain, and the United States. Pope commented on an intervention that Lord Cranborne, the British secretary of state for colonial affairs, had made during the May 1944 Commonwealth conference in London.¹²⁷ In simple terms, Cranborne wanted to enhance mechanisms for consultations inside the Commonwealth and resuscitate the idea of a more centralized Commonwealth defence organization. Pope thought that the existing mechanisms at the political and service level already provided sufficient opportunity for consultation. He agreed with Cranborne that Canada should explore the potential for coordinating its industrial production with that of the United Kingdom. However, Pope added, Canada should do the same with the United States. The issue was complex and would require thorough analysis. Pope saw merit in Commonwealth armed forces continuing to be organized, equipped, and trained on common line, as they had since early in the 20th century. However, the Commonwealth should seek to achieve standardization with the American armed forces as well. Canada, Pope counselled, had to recognize the new importance of the United States in the equation.¹²⁸

Conclusion

Pope was in Ottawa during turbulent times between September 1944 and September 1945. On the issue of conscription, King turned to Pope on numerous occasions for his views, a sign that the prime minister trusted his military advisor to be well informed and forthright about the matter. Pope spoke courageously and forcefully to Ralston in an effort to have him change his recommendations on compulsory service overseas. In another sign that King had great confidence in Pope, he sent the general as a personal emissary to Roosevelt. Pope exhibited human skills. He worked closely and seamlessly with Arnold Heeney at the Privy Council and with Norman Robertson at External Affairs. When he had to meet

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ LAC, MP diary, 5 March 1945.

¹²⁴ LAC, RG24 Vol. 22327, HQS9072-5, Jenkins to Chief of the General Staff, 1 March 1945.

¹²⁵ LAC, MG26 J4, PCO War Cabinet Committee Memoranda May-August 1945, Heeney to Prime Minister, 16 June 1945.

¹²⁶ LAC, RG24 Vol. 22327, HQS9072.5, Extract from Cabinet decision of 3 August 1945.

¹²⁷ LAC, LAC, MP diary, Pope to Robertson, Wrong, and Heeney, 11 August 1945.

¹²⁸ Pope made similar observations when he prepared a paper for the PJBD in September 1945 on the future of the Board. See LAC, RG24 Vol. 6170 HQS15-48-1 Vol. 2, “Postwar collaboration;” “Continental Defence Value of the Canadian Northwest,” Major-General Guy V. Henry, 8 June 1945; NDHQ DHH 314.009 (D17) Permanent Joint of Defence Vol. iii, Note by Pope on General Henry’s statement, 3 September 1945. Pope suggested that there was no urgency in harmonizing U.S. and Canadian defence forces in light of the benign security environment. He preferred to see American and British adopting common elements of military organization, training and equipment rather than forcing Canada to choose between the standards of the two countries.

with very senior officials such as King, Marshall, or Roosevelt, he maintained his composure. Pope contributed constructively and insightfully to the debate on Canada's role in the Pacific War. He was able to do so because of his proven conceptual skills. Pope also helped the Canadian government in planning for peace in the post-war era. His contributions came in various forms and in numerous forums. He prepared papers and otherwise provided input on documents prepared under the auspices of the Working Committee and the Advisory Committee on Post Hostilities Problems, especially on the issues of Canada-U.S. relations and Newfoundland.

CHAPTER TEN

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This work has been about how Maurice A. Pope developed as a leader, with an emphasis on skills. As discussed in the introduction, there are three categories of skills: technical, human, and conceptual. Leaders acquire technical skills by mastering the methods and techniques of their profession. Human skills have to do with leaders' ability to interact with those above them, their equals, and their subordinates. Conceptual skills are related to leaders' ability to work with and develop proposals on complex matters related to their organization. These include high-level policy issues or questions of strategy.

Influence goes hand-in-hand with leadership. Leaders try to influence people to achieve certain goals that are important to them, their group, or their organization. That said, one can demonstrate leadership without achieving any goals. It is more difficult for leaders to influence others when they do not have formal authority. Leaders have to use their personal power under those circumstances, as opposed to power derived from their position. Personal power can be of three categories. *Expert power* pertains to the knowledge and experience leaders have developed. *Referent power* has to do with the quality of relationships leaders have established with others. *Connection power*, or social capital, is the amount of goodwill and support leaders can secure by the force of their personality and the trust they have established with their business contacts.

The introduction identified some important traits of military leaders drawn from *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*. They are not a definitive list, but the better leaders are likely to exhibit the following characteristics. *Integrity* comes first, which is closely associated with trust. Leaders will develop trust by showing expertise in their field. They will also be friendly and respectful to others. In addition, good leaders have to show significant levels of *adaptability* and, therefore, be open to new experiences. And they must remain *poised* under stressful situations. *Leadership in the Canadian Forces* also stresses the importance of the leadership domain of *motivation and values*, in which leaders have to be driven by collective betterment rather than personal goals and they exhibit a fascination with the military profession and a constant desire to improve.

How did Pope acquire his skills and hone his leadership traits? To begin with, he was able to take on the mantle of a leader during his thirty some years in the Canadian military because he developed the correct mix of technical, human, and conceptual skills. In the early years, he relied primarily on his technical and human skills to achieve success. Later on, there was a greater demand on his conceptual skills. Over the course of his career, Pope learned the required knowledge and technical skills in his various positions. During the First World War, as a lieutenant in an engineer field company, he managed to get the most out of his small section of men because he had mastered the necessary engineering skills. He drew this knowledge from his work at Canadian Pacific Railways and from his training after joining the Canadian Expeditionary Force. His men were willing to follow him because he understood his field of work - in other words, how to build trenches, parapets, wire obstacles, and other necessary trench warfare defensive systems. By having a firm grasp of the technical details of field engineering, Pope earned the trust of his men. Later, he became a reliable army intelligence officer. He mastered very quickly the intricacies of military intelligence and became, in a relatively short time, a leader in the field and in the class room, where he had an opportunity to impart his knowledge to others. At the same time, he started to learn how a brigade headquarters worked, how to conduct appreciations, and how to write operational orders. These were technical skills that served him well when he was appointed brigade major with the 4th Brigade, C.E. After the war, he improved his technical skills as a staff officer when he spent two years at staff college, Camberley.

By the early the 1930s, Pope had to absorb new technical skills and learn the mechanics of large military organizations. In his apprenticeship years between 1931 and 1935, at the War Office and then in Ottawa, he developed an understanding of how large military organizations worked. He mastered moving policy issues up the decision line and securing approval to courses of action. After he came back from the Imperial Defence College and after the war began, Pope's work cut across many government organizations and he became adept at understanding the relationship between defence and other federal departments. He applied the knowledge he had gained in Ottawa when he was in charge of the general staff branch at Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London in 1940-1941. As the head of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission (CJSM) in Washington from 1942 to 1944, Pope familiarized himself very quickly with the intricacies of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) and identified the roles and responsibilities of the main players so that he could fulfill his role most effectively. When he returned to Ottawa, he had to learn the Cabinet approval process.

Pope revealed his human skills in the battlefields of France and Belgium, where he relied on a mix of position and personal power, to lead his men. His human skills came into play when he worked with battalion commanders - all senior to him - in his capacity as brigade major. Pope was also on very good terms with his direct superiors because he possessed a

good understanding of the technical side of his work and because of his human skills. In the 1920s, the nature of Pope's interactions started to change. He took the lead in the classroom, in front of the aspiring part-time militia officers and he worked with them in the field at Sarcee and at other camps.

In the late 1930s, Pope relied on his human skills to lead the various interdepartmental committees that the government had agreed to establish to get Canada ready for war. Most of the time, he depended on his personal power to get other departments to follow his lead, guiding and directing the work of the committees. During the Czech crisis, Pope was irked by the inertia of the committees, when he thought the situation demanded urgency. By the force of his personality, he succeeded in compelling the committees to move forward more quickly. After Prague, he maintained pressure on the committees to complete their work. He exercised leadership much more by the strength of his personality than by the function of his position, although the fact that he was the general secretary of all the committees did help.

When Pope had something on his mind, he spoke up. He managed to convey his positions or points without being disrespectful. The need for candour came up when he was dealing with Canadian officers, whether or not they outranked him. He did not do so indiscriminately: he chose his moments. For example, when he was participating in the training of the part-time militia, he did not shy away from correcting his superiors. Judging from his reports, he handled the situations properly. As Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., a former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff said: "there are ways to let people know you are not aboard and that you think you have a better idea without just totally pushing them off a cliff." Crowe added that speaking up without speaking out of turn was "an art" that took time to develop. Pope demonstrated in the 1920s that he had mastered the art.¹

When Pope served as Chairman of the CJSM in Washington, he interacted regularly with Rear Admiral V.G. Brodeur and Air Vice Marshal G.V. Walsh, who were of equivalent rank. He strove to minimize service jealousies and he made sure everyone worked together. However, he did not hesitate to be frank when he thought it was necessary. Pope preferred to work on his own. He held regular staff meetings, but their discussions focused on administrative issues such as accommodation.

Pope used the correct balance between assertiveness and diplomacy in his dealings with Great Britain. Pope had been schooled in British Army establishments and he viewed the British Empire as a force for good in the world. But he had also seen the apogee of Canadian arms during the First World War and he had witnessed missteps by British political and military authorities, so he saw no need to be deferential. Pope never hesitated to defend Canada and its interests. He did so when he was a student at staff college, Camberley, when he was at the Imperial Defence College, and when he was in Washington. In the U.S. capital, he established fruitful relationships with Lieutenant-General Sir Gordon Macready, the British Army representative on the British Joint Staff Mission, despite the fact that they often disagreed. Pope knew the importance of maintaining good relations with Macready and Brigadier H. Redman because they were an important source of information. Pope lost his self-control once with Redman, but he realized that it was in his best interest to resolve the situation. He revealed the same set of human skills when working with the Americans. The fact that he resisted their efforts in 1941 to institute unified command did not harm his rapport with the Americans, before or after he went to Washington. Although his connection with the Americans was never as deep as it was with the British in Washington, and although the Americans were never as forthcoming with information, the relationship was still cordial. General George Marshall, U.S. Admiral Ernest King and other senior defence officials were always willing at least to see Pope to discuss urgent issues, even if they could not often help. Pope and Hickerson also worked well together, despite their occasional differences over policy, a credit to both of them. Macready, John Hickerson, Marshall, Major-General S.D. Embick, among others, were part of Pope's network, from which he developed his *connection power*, or *social capital*. Pope relied on this network to secure information. He knew that he would do so only if the members of the network trusted him. In addition, he reached out to the same network when he had difficulty with Allied policy. At times, he was successful in getting them to change their approach. At other times, he had to be satisfied with registering his concerns.

Pope led through his conceptual skills. He manifested these skills in his analysis of a number of large strategic questions. Pope's papers were insightful because of his knowledge of Canadian history and his discerning observations, such as his distinction between equality of status and equality of stature within the Commonwealth, and his concept of propinquity to danger. His analysis of public opinion and the importance of parliament in a democracy were also perceptive. There was no alternative to democracy for him. He accepted the primacy of domestic politics. Pope was well versed in civil-military relations. He translated what he had learned in the War Office to propose amendments to Canada's own defence

¹ Edgar F. Puryear Jr., *American Generalship - Character is everything: The Art of Command* (New York: The Random House Publishing Group, 2000), 130.

organization in 1937, challenging old ideas and proposing new ways of doing things. He was prophetic when he said that the next war would be total in nature and that Canada needed to plan accordingly. In his capacity as general secretary of the manifold committees, he took the lead on a variety of matters because he demonstrated a sound understanding of their complexities. When he became the Chairman of the CJSM, Pope continued to display similar conceptual skills. He developed a sound understanding of the evolving allied strategy. His reports back to Ottawa were well structured, precise and informative, piecing together what he had been able to assemble from his many consultations with allies.

When the 1969 Rowley Report examined officer education before and during the Second World War, it concluded that Canadian officers lacked political awareness.² This may have been the case for some Canadian officers, but not for Pope. Historian David Bercuson said that George C. Marshall was “in touch with the pulse” of American society and Marshall’s biographer said he was “familiar with the civilian point of view” on important political and military issues.³ Pope was more like Marshall. Pope’s acumen is reflected in his writings on Canada’s defence relations with Great Britain, on the bicultural nature of Canadian national politics, and on public opinion. Similarly, Pope displayed a good understanding of Canada’s national interests. National interests were manifest when Pope explained the merits of censorship; when he stressed the dangers of instituting conscription; when he proposed to break up the Canadian Army so that some of Canada’s soldiers could get battle experience; and when he advocated deploying Canadian troops to the Pacific.

Pope’s efforts at influencing the world around him took many forms. Sometimes, he worked at changing policy processes, organizational structures, and roles and responsibilities. Included in this category were Pope’s efforts at amending the structure of the department of National Defence, changing the roles of the deputy minister and re-organizing the government to prepare Canada for the looming war. He was instrumental at limiting the size of the controlled area around the Port of Halifax and who should be in charge of security. In addition, the government acted on many of his recommendations concerning the management of defence in the post-war. At other times, he tried to influence the course of Canadian defence policy, including the ideas of splitting up the Canadian Army so that it could experience combat in 1943, and advocating for the Canadian Army to be deployed to the war in the Pacific. In addition, he contributed to the debate on post-hostilities. He articulated the importance of maintaining a presence in Newfoundland after the Second World War and he had ideas about parameters around which Ottawa should develop a framework for Canada-U.S. relations after the war. During his last weeks in Ottawa in the summer of 1945, he developed some discerning papers on the future of Canada-U.K. relations and Canada-U.S. relations. Both papers were farsighted in the way they captured the growing role of the United States in the new world dynamic and the importance of coordinating defence matters not only with the British, but also with the Americans. In hindsight, Pope’s observations appear bland and self-evident. However, at the time, the government was just beginning to explore these important questions and Pope provided some answers. It is difficult to ascertain how much influence Pope had on those issues. He was clearly not the only person pursuing these questions. The important point is that Pope was making an effort to influence the debate, and decision makers valued his contribution, returning to him for further comments.

Pope exhibited numerous traits associated with leadership. Pope was adaptable and flexible, growing quickly into the many diverse functions he assumed. He was as comfortable writing policy memoranda as he had been writing operational orders as a brigade major. While he often expressed trepidation when he took new functions, he overcame his initial self-doubt rapidly and always proved to be up to the task. His ability to move from one set of issues to another enabled him to exert leadership. He possessed the professionalism required of military leaders, motivated to learn and improve how he performed. He took initiative when he could. He had possessed an abiding interest in all things military since his early days in the militia and his appetite to learn was enduring. He remained poised, whether his position was under fire during the First World War or when the Sun Life Building was under bombardment during the London blitz of August-November 1940. He was equally composed when he was dealing with short deadlines and shifting objectives. Pope showed integrity in his relations with the allies in Washington. There were no games or deception for him. In return, Pope earned their trust, which made it easier for him to try to influence the course of events.

There is common theme running through Pope’s approach as a leader to questions and issues that came across his desk. It was Pope the realist who reviewed and rejected demands for more resources from military district no. 6 in 1938, or rejected the idea of making all of Halifax a protected area. He took the same realistic approach to the need of roads for Newfoundland. Canada did not have the resources to match what the U.S. was spending to link its three bases and there was

² Randall Wakelam and Howard Coombs (eds), *The report of the Officer Development Board Maj-Gen Roger Rowley and the Education of the Canadian Forces* (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2010), p. 22-23

³ David Bercuson, “A Man (or Woman) for all Seasons: What the Canadian Public Expects from Canadian General Officers,” in Horn and Harris, *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, 410.

no need for it. The fact that Pope was a realist did not mean he was a minimalist. He did not support the proposal from the Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence to reduce the size of the Canadian Corps. Pope was also a realist on large strategic issues. It was the underlying theme of his distinction between equality of status and equality of stature with respect to Great Britain. Canada had achieved the former under the 1931 Statute of Westminster, but equality of stature was a different matter.

Pope exhibited leadership skills and traits even though he was seldom in a command position. In addition, he was rarely a central decision maker, but it was important for him to try to make a difference. He had a strong sense of the art of the possible. He provided a voice of reason. Pope's military career ended with the end of the war. He went to Berlin in 1946 to lead Canada's military mission in Germany in the capacity of a diplomat. As this thesis has demonstrated, he had diplomatic skills in abundance, but he would no longer exercise them as a soldier.

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