**“Fear of a Name Increases Fear of the Thing Itself”**

How Media Coverage of Terrorism Allows Terrorists to *Succeed* by Undermining International (State) Legitimacy

***“La peur d'un nom ne fait qu'accroître la peur de la chose elle-même”***

*Comment la couverture médiatique du terrorisme facilite le succès du terrorisme en sapant la légitimité internationale de l'État*

A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Graduate Studies  
of the Royal Military College of Canada  
by

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This dissertation is dedicated to my father, Dr. Michael Glogauer.

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Abstract

In this study, I seek to answer the questions of whether and how terrorism succeeds in relation to the way that media coverage frames terrorism in the news coverage of terrorism produced by Reuters, the Associated Press (AP), and Agence France-Presse (AFP) between January 1, 2012, and January 31, 2018. Here, ‘success’ is predicated on terrorists’ ability to undermine international (state) legitimacy, where legitimacy constitutes the legality of actions taken, the justification associated with these actions, and the state’s constituents’ consent to its continued governance. In exploring the relationship between media coverage, (state) legitimacy, and terrorism, I revisit the scholarly and policy debates associated with defining terrorism, International Relations (IR) scholarship that ties together notions of legitimacy and statehood, and academic literature about the relationship between terrorism and the media. I use my description and analysis of these debates (the subject of Chapters 3, 4 and 5) to provide for the way that I operationally define media coverage of terrorism (my independent variable) and international (state) legitimacy (my dependent variable) for the purposes of mixed methods analysis. To that end, I conduct multivariable data analysis (MVA) consisting of concurrent Spearman correlations, simple linear regression analyses, and the calculation of (the coefficient of determination) to suggest *whether* there is a negative correlation between media coverage of terrorism and international (state) legitimacy in Chapter 6. I expand on the results I describe in Chapter 6 by using basic statistical methods (including the calculation of the -scores associated with the ratio of terrorist incidents perpetrated on a given date to media bulletins relating to terrorism published on that same date) to narrow down my seven-year sample to specific dates that saw the publication of a disproportionate amount of media coverage of terrorism. The media bulletins published on the 7 high coverage and 35 low coverage dates that I identify using these calculations establishes a smaller sample of 2,276 media bulletins. Then, I use Provalis Research’s QDAMiner and WordStat software packages to detect and identify instances of bias in this smaller sample, ultimately using critical discourse analysis (CDA) in conjunction with media framing approaches that emphasize the role of perceptions, biases, and pre-existing knowledge in influencing information conveyed through written media to examine the different ways media coverage depicts terrorism. After this Chapter 7 discussion about *how* media coverage of terrorism damages (state) legitimacy, I compare and contrast the instructions regarding journalistic depictions of terrorism provided by Reuters, AP and AFP’s style guides by both analyzing the three style guides in relation to one another, *and* examining to what extent each news agency’s portrayal of terrorism in its published media bulletins actually accords with the guidelines outlined in its style guide. Finally, I conclude this study by using the insight gleaned from this Chapter 8 comparative analysis to draw policy-relevant conclusions about the interplay between terrorism and the mass media.

Resumé

Dans cette étude, nous visons à répondre aux questions connexes de savoir si et comment le terrorisme réussit, en raison de la manière dont la couverture médiatique produite par Reuters, l’Associated Press (AP) et l’Agence France-Presse (AFP) entre le 1 janvier 2012 et le 31 décembre 2018 présente le terrorisme par rapport à l’État. Dans ce contexte, ‘la réussite’ constitue la capacité des terroristes à saper la légitimité internationale de l’État. Alors, nous conceptualisons la légitimité en fonction de la légalité des actions de l’État, de la justification associée à ces actions, et du consentement des constituants de l’État à la gouvernance continue de l’État. L’examen de l’interaction entre la couverture médiatique, la légitimité de l’État et le terrorisme, nous oblige à revisiter les débats académiques et politiques sur la définition du terrorisme, les ouvrages académiques qui relient les notions de légitimité et d’État, ainsi que la littérature sur la relation entre le terrorisme et les médias. La description et l’analyse de ces débats (le sujet de chapitres 3, 4 et 5) sera utilisée pour définir opérationnellement la variable indépendante (la couverture médiatique du terrorisme) et la variable dépendante (la légitimité de l’État) dans le contexte d’une combinaison des méthodes qualitatives et quantitatives que nous utilisons pour mener cette étude. Sera ainsi effectuée l’analyse exploratoire des données (AED) multivariée qui comprend calcul simultané des coefficients de corrélation de classement de Spearman (), des analyses de régression linéaire simple, et le calcul de  (le coefficient de détermination) pour voir s’il existe une corrélation négative entre la couverture médiatique du terrorisme et la légitimité de l’État dans le chapitre 6. Nous élargissons les résultats décrits au chapitre 6 par l’emploi des méthodes statistiques de base (y compris le calcul des statistiques- associé avec le ratio des attentats terroristes entre la publication des communiquées de presse à une date précise) pour ramener l’échantillon de sept ans aux dates spécifiques correspondant à la somme disproportionnée de couvertures médiatiques du terrorisme. Les communiqués de presse publiés pendant les 7 jours avec le plus de médiatisation et les 35 jours avec le moins de médiatisation que nous définissons à l’aide de ces calculs permettent d’obtenir un petit échantillon de 2,276 communiqués de presse. Ensuite, nous utiliserons les logiciels de Provalis Research, QDAMiner et WordStat, afin de détecter et d’identifier les cas de biais dans ce petit échantillon, pour finalement utiliser l'analyse critique du discours (ACD) en conjonction avec les approches de cadrage médiatique qui mettent l'accent sur le rôle des perceptions, des préjugés et des connaissances préexistantes sur l'influence des informations véhiculées par les médias écrits et examiner les différentes manières dont la couverture médiatique dépeint le terrorisme. Après la discussion sur la manière dont la couverture médiatique du terrorisme porte atteinte à la légitimité de l’État (au chapitre 7), nous comparerons et contrasterons les instructions concernant les représentations journalistiques du terrorisme fournies par les guides de style de Reuters, l’AP et l’AFP en analysant les trois guides de style les uns par rapport aux autres et en examinant dans quelle mesure la représentation du terrorisme par chaque agence de presse dans ses bulletins médiatiques publiés correspond effectivement aux directives énoncées dans son guide de style. Enfin, nous concluerons cette étude en utilisant les apports de l’analyse comparative décrite au chapitre 8 pour parvenir à des conclusions portant sur les politiques pertinentes sur l’interaction entre le terrorisme et la couverture médiatique.

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List of Symbols/Nomenclature

Terrorism

The number of terrorist attacks perpetrated each calendar year between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2018 (inclusive). The values for are taken directly from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which defines a terrorist attack as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non‐state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”

Capability

The annual value of the total United Nations budget.

Global Population

The total number of people in the world, based on open-source data taken from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

Income

Annual gross world product (GWP) statistics taken from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook database.

International (state) legitimacy. Or, the legitimacy of the state as an international institution.

To calculate , I rely on David Beetham’s proposal for a tripartite understanding of legitimacy as necessarily involving three equally weighted elements: *legality*, *justification*, and *consent.* I quantify *legality* based on the measurement of : State Legitimacy established by the Fragile States Index (FSI). I quantify *justification* based on the Rule of Law Index’s measurement of the extent to which country practice adheres to the rule of law (). I quantify *consent* based on the percentage of United Nations member states that have representatives present at each substantive vote conducted by the General Assembly in each year of my sampling frame.

Expressed as an equation, my calculation of international (state) legitimacy constitutes

: The Rule of Law Index’s measurement of the extent to which country practice adheres to the rule of law.

: The measurement of State Legitimacy established by the Fragile States Index (FSI).

: The mean (average) percentage of United Nations member states that had representatives present at substantive votes conducted by the United Nations General Assembly in a given calendar year.

Degrees of freedom

Goodness of fit (of a regression equation)

Hypothesis

Terrorism ‘succeeds’ by negatively affecting state legitimacy.

Terrorism negatively affects state legitimacy because media coverage of terrorism frames the threat that terrorism poses in a way that confers status on and amplifies its legitimacy claims and demands for authority, territoriality and/or statehood.

*:* An aggregate measure of media coverage of terrorism comprised of three subsets:

*:*Media coverage of terrorism produced by *Reuters*.

To calculate , I used the Dow Jones Factiva Service (DJFS) to conduct keyword searches for “terror,” “terrorist,” “terrorists,” and “terrorism,” on its records of media coverage produced by *Reuters* between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2018 (inclusive). I then enumerated the number of media bulletins containing at least one of these keywords published on each day of my sampling frame, and calculated the frequency of *Reuters’* media coverage of terrorism by comparing the resulting statistic to the total number of media bulletins produced by *Reuters* each day.

*:* Media coverage of terrorism produced by the *Associated Press* (AP).

To calculate , I conducted keyword searches for “terror,” “terrorist,” “terrorists,” and “terrorism,” on the NexisUni database’s records of media coverage produced by the *AP* between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2018 (inclusive). I then enumerated the number of media bulletins containing at least one of these keywords published on each day of my sampling frame, and calculated the frequency of the *AP*’s media coverage of terrorism by comparing the resulting statistic to the total number of media bulletins produced by the *AP* each day.

*:* Media coverage of terrorism produced by *Agence France-Presse* (AFP).

To calculate , I conducted keyword searches for “terror,” “terrorist,” “terrorists,” and “terrorism,” on the NesixUni database’s records of English-language media coverage produced by *AFP* between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2018 (inclusive). I then enumerated the number of media bulletins containing at least one of these keywords published on each day of my sampling frame, and calculated the frequency of *AFP*’s English-language media coverage of terrorism by comparing the resulting statistic to the total number of English-language media bulletins produced by *AFP* each day.

The highest deviation between observed and expected occurrences of a single word/phrase across a body of text.

Population

Sample

; *p-value* Probability

Probability is too high to reject the null hypothesis

Coefficient of determination

Research Question

Does media coverage of terrorism affect international (state) legitimacy?

How does media coverage of terrorism affect international (state) legitimacy?

Standard Deviation

Simple Linear Regression

Spearman correlation coefficient

List of Abbreviations

ACM Association for Computing Machinery

AFP Agence France-Presse

AP Associated Press

BOAC British Overseas Airways Corporation

CDA Critical Discourse Analysis

CIAO Columbia International Affairs Online

DCAF Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, formerly the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

DJFS Dow Jones Factiva Service

EHI Ethnic Heterogeneity Index

EUT Expected Utility Theory

FSI Fragile States Index

GTD Global Terrorism Database

GWP Gross World Product

GWSD Global Warming Stance Dataset

IMF International Monetary Fund

IPTC International Press Telecommunications Council

IR International Relations

IRA Provisional Irish Republican Army

ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

ITERATE International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events project

MVA Multivariate Data Analysis

MVDA Multivariable Data Analysis

NHL National Hockey League

PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization

RUSI Royal United Services Institute

SARF Social Amplification of Risk Framework

SIGMOD Special Interest Group on Management of Data

START National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

TSA Transportation Security Administration

TWA Trans World Airlines

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

UNODC United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime

UNSC United Nations Security Council

US United States

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VNM von Neumann-Morgenstern rationality

VNSA Violent Non-state actor

WEO World Economic Outlook database

WVS World Values Survey

Glossary of Terms

*Media Coverage:* News stories produced, framed, and disseminated to the international public by the journalists, editors and publishers that constitute the international news media.

*News Bulletin:* A concise and focused report or announcement designed to furnish audiences with the most recent and significant information on unfolding events, developments, or stories. News bulletins are pivotal in distributing up-to-the-minute information to the public, and are a prevalent component of the media landscape, offering a swift and easily accessible means for individuals to stay abreast of global affairs. In (written) print and online news, media bulletins are typically generated and circulated by major news agencies and newswires.

*Media Coverage of Terrorism:*In the context of this dissertation, media coverage of terrorism consists of media bulletins about terrorists and terrorism, published by the *Associated Press* (AP), *Agence France-Presse* (AFP) and Reuters between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2018 (inclusive), that I identify by conducting keyword searches for the following terms: “terror,” “terrorist,” “terrorists,” and “terrorism.”

*Terrorism:*The intentional threatening or taking of criminal action designed

to influence a state, an international organization, or another decision-making body’s taking of action or failure to take action by intimidating the general population. (Such actions include, but are not limited to, perpetrating homicide, actions that result in serious physical injury to persons, and the damage or destruction of property.)

*International (State) Legitimacy:*The extent that the state – as an international institution – is considered to have the “right to rule” in the context of the international system, predicated on perceptions of *legality*, *justification*, and the *consent* of its governed. In other words, the extent to which the state is considered the primary actor of import in the conduct of international relations. International (state) legitimacy thus necessarily involves the inference of assumptions underlying state decision-making on the basis of actions that the state has undertaken (and conversely, refrained from taking).

*Legality:* Recognition of the validity of rules (that the legitimate entity supports or endeavors to impose on its subordinates)

*Justification:* The “generalized perception of the assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”

*Consent:* Subordinate (constituent) actions that indicate constituents’ acceptance of their dominant’s “right to rule.” In other words, “the extent to which [constituents’ acceptance of its governors’ “right to rule” is] confirmed in practices demonstrating compliance.”

*Domestic Legitimacy:*The authority that state actors exercise within the territory over which each state claims sovereignty.

*Constituents:* Actors that are subject to the legal and/or political authority of the regime (or institution) in question.

*Post-Modern Warfare:* Decentralized warfare characterized by a mixture of conventional and asymmetrical conflict that is motivated largely based on “identity politics,” and does not limit participation to states. To that end, post-modern warfare is a macro-level process that affects the evolving character of the international system and the conduct of international relations.

*:* An aggregate measure of media coverage of terrorism comprised of three subsets:

*:*Media coverage of terrorism produced by *Reuters*.

To calculate , I used the Dow Jones Factiva Service (DJFS) to conduct keyword searches for “terror,” “terrorist,” “terrorists,” and “terrorism,” on its records of media coverage produced by *Reuters* between 2012 and 2018. I then enumerated the number of media bulletins containing at least one of these keywords published on each day of my sampling frame and calculated the frequency of *Reuters’* media coverage of terrorism by comparing the resulting statistic to the total number of media bulletins produced by *Reuters* each day.

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*:* International (state) legitimacy. Or the legitimacy of the state as an international institution.

To calculate , I rely on David Beetham’s proposal for a tripartite understanding of legitimacy as necessarily involving three equally weighted elements: *legality*, *justification*, and *consent.* I quantify *legality* based on the measurement of : State Legitimacy established by the Fragile States Index (FSI). I quantify *justification* based on the Rule of Law Index’s measurement of the extent to which country practice adheres to the rule of law (). I quantify *consent* based on the percentage of United Nations member states that have representatives present at each substantive vote conducted by the General Assembly in each year of my sampling frame.

*News Cycle:* The number of days it takes for media coverage of terrorism to return to average after a notable increase.

*High Coverage Dates:* Days when the three international news agencies produced a larger volume of coverage relative to the amount of terrorism internationally reported on the immediately preceding days.

*Low Coverage Dates:* Days when the three international news agencies generated smaller volumes of coverage compared to the amount of terrorism perpetrated internationally on the immediately preceding days.

*Affirming Devices:* Words or phrases used to frame a concept that indicate and reinforce the quality of evidence supporting an implicit claim made in the text about that concept.

*Factive and Semi-Factive Predicates:* Verbs that presuppose the truth or reality of the content of their complement. Factive verbs imply that the information provided is true or corresponds to reality, often conveying surprise or unexpectedness.

*High-Commitment Verbs:* Verbs expressing strong certainty, decisiveness, or a firm commitment, leaving little room for interpretation or doubt. They convey a strong commitment to a particular course of action or statement.

*High Commitment Adjectives:* Adjectives conveying a strong sense of certainty, intensity, or emphasis associated with the qualities of the nouns they describe, expressing a clear and unwavering quality.

*Hyping Adjectives:* Descriptive words used to enhance, promote, and exaggerate the positive qualities or significance of something, involving subjective language and persuasion to create a favorable impression.

*Quantity Indicators:* Words or expressions providing information about the quantity or amount of something, crucial for conveying precise information about amounts, sizes, or degrees.

*Evidence of Consensus Modifiers:* Words or phrases indicating supporting information suggesting widespread agreement or shared belief, such as “widely accepted,” “commonly agreed upon,” or “broadly acknowledged.”

*Doubting Devices:* Words or phrases reinforcing frames of debate and controversy, implicitly questioning the veracity of information and opinions presented in relation to a concept.

*Neg-Factive Verbs:* Verbs typically involving negation that presuppose the truth of a negative proposition, conveying surprise, disappointment, or unexpectedness.

*Low Commitment Verbs:* Verbs conveying uncertainty, tentativeness, or a lack of strong commitment, leaving room for flexibility, and avoiding firm commitments.

*Argumentative Verbs:* Verbs playing a crucial role in expressing a specific position, presenting evidence, or challenging opposing viewpoints in the context of an argument.

*Low Commitment Adjectives:* Adjectives conveying flexibility, uncertainty, or a lack of strong commitment, leaving room for interpretation, avoiding absolute statements, or expressing a tentative attitude.

*Undermining Adjectives:* Descriptive words that weaken or erode the support, power, or effectiveness of something, diminishing the positive qualities or significance of a noun.

*Lack of Consensus Adjectives:* Adjectives conveying a sense of disagreement, dispute, or controversy, suggesting an absence of clear consensus among individuals or groups.

*Multivariate Data Analysis:* A statistical technique for analyzing data involving observations on more than one variable, providing insights into relationships between multiple variables.

*Multivariable Data Analysis:* Examination and interpretation of datasets involving three or more variables, allowing for a comprehensive understanding of complex relationships.

*Bivariate Analysis:* A statistical method analyzing relationships between two variables, focusing on associations, correlations, or dependencies between them.

*Machine Learning:* A subfield of artificial intelligence developing algorithms allowing computers to learn and make predictions based on data.

*Independent Variable:* A variable presumed to cause some change in the dependent variable.

*Dependent Variable:* The variable the study is trying to explain, assumed to depend on the independent variable(s).

*Control Variable:* A variable not of primary interest but measured to infer relationships between main variables.

*Sampling Frame:* A list of units composing a population from which a sample is selected.

*Variance:* The extent to which scores in a dataset deviate from the mean.

*Covariation:* Variables changing together in a systematic, directional manner.

*Magnitude of Relations:* The extent to which variables negatively or positively covary.

*Frequency:* The rate or occurrence of something within a specific time period.

*Statistical Mean:* The average of scores in a dataset.

*Standard Deviation:* Indicates the average amount a set of values deviates from their mean.

*t-Score:* Describes the extent to which a specific data point differs from the mean of the sample.

*Correlation:* A statistical technique showing the strength and direction of the relationship between two variables.

*Spurious Relations:* Coincidental statistical correlation caused by a third variable.

*Spearman Correlation ():* A measure of relationship between two variables that considers the rank of the scores and not their absolute value; used when one or both variables is ordinal.

*Ordinal Variable:* Values represent categories with an intrinsic relation.

*Coefficient of Determination ():* Represents the percentage of variance in the dependent variable explained by changes in the independent variable.

*Degrees of Freedom ():* The number of independent pieces of information used to calculate a statistic.

*P-Value:* A measure indicating the probability of obtaining results as extreme as or more extreme than observed results under the assumption of the null hypothesis.

*Null Hypothesis ():* A statement of no effect or difference, the hypothesis being tested.

*Statistical Significance:* Determines the likelihood that observed differences in data occur by chance.

*Not Statistically Significant:* A term used in statistical analysis to describe a result that does not provide enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis. In simpler terms, if a finding is not statistically significant, it means that the observed effect or difference in the data is likely to have occurred by chance. It's important to note that "not statistically significant" does not imply that the effect or difference is nonexistent or unimportant; it simply indicates that the evidence in the data is insufficient to support a claim of statistical significance.

*Simple Linear Regression:* A correlation that treats both variables involved as equal; at least one variable is considered independent (predictor, ) and the other is the dependent variable (outcome, ). The dependent variable should be quantitative. Linear regression relies on two assumptions:

1. the relation between the dependent variable and each independent variable is linear,
2. the distribution of the dependent variable is normal.

*Regression Equation:* A mathematical model that represents the relationship between a dependent variable and one or more independent variables. In simple terms, it expresses how changes in the independent variables are associated with changes in the dependent variable.

Chapter 1 – Introduction

“… a plane that appears to be cruising at slightly lower-than-normal altitude over New York City… it appears to have crashed into… it hit directly in the middle of one of the World Trade Center towers… It was teetering back and forth, wingtip to wingtip, and it looks like it crashed into, probably twenty stories from the top of the World Trade Center, maybe the 80th to 85th floor. There is smoke billowing out of the World Trade Center… I can see flames coming out of the side of the building.”

– Sean Murtagh, 11 September 2001.[[1]](#footnote-1)

On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda terrorists coordinated the hijacking of four commercial airliners. Two of these planes were flown into the World Trade Center in New York City, a third was flown into the Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia, and the final aircraft crashed into a field near a Pennsylvania township after its passengers confronted the hijackers. The death toll caused by these terrorist attacks totalled nearly three thousand innocent victims, injured a further six thousand individuals, and caused billions of dollars in damage to property and infrastructure.[[2]](#footnote-2) Understandably, United States’ opinion polling in the aftermath of the attacks noted an increase in public levels of fear and anxiety about potential of future terrorist attacks. However, more than two decades after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, public opinion polling in the United States indicates that this heightened fear of terrorism has been sustained. (Polls measuring anxiety as relating to terrorist attacks have not yet decreased to the level that they were recorded at before 9/11.)[[3]](#footnote-3) Notwithstanding the magnitude of the damage affected by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, public opinion on the danger presented by terrorism and terrorist attacks does not accord with the actual danger posed by terrorist attacks to American citizens.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Public anxiety of this nature is not localized to the United States: it is prevalent internationally.[[5]](#footnote-5) This is reflected in data collected by the World Values Survey (WVS), specifically in participant responses to Question 147 (7th wave of the WVS, spanning mid-2017 to 2020) and Question 184 (6th wave of the WVS, spanning 2010-2014). (Both Q147 and Q184 ask participants, “To what degree are you worried about… A terrorist attack?”, with possible answers “1. Very Much”, “2. A Good Deal”, “3. Not Much”, and “4. Not at all”.) As such, the 6th wave data indicates that 61.84% of WVS participants experience significant ongoing worry about potential future terrorist attacks, while the 7th wave data suggests a slightly increased 66.59% of participants are similarly anxious.[[6]](#footnote-6)

Anxiety about terrorism motivated the creation and consolidation of national and international counterterrorism apparatuses in the aftermath of 9/11. Harvey Sapolsky, Eugene Golhz and Caitlin Talmadge argue that the public’s desire for guarantees that unexpected crisis with implications for their physical safety (specifically, terrorist attacks) will not reoccur puts pressure on politicians to affect fast, visible crisis responses in security policy-making.[[7]](#footnote-7) Moreover, Sapolsky et. al. cite the United States government’s creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) as a reaction to the September 11 attacks to illustrate that ‘homeland security’ is a reactive classification conceived of as a response to what James Q. Wilson-termed “politically irresistible need for action.”[[8]](#footnote-8) Similarly, Arnold Wolfers conceives of ‘security’ as a purposefully ambiguous concept that enables “everyone to label whatever policy he favors with an attractive and possibly deceptive name.”[[9]](#footnote-9) These claims by Sapolsky, Gholz, Talmadge, and Wolfers are comparable to the argument that some scholars make against using the term ‘terrorism’ as a descriptor because the label ‘terrorist’ is pejoratively and normatively loaded, and lacks analytical “precision, objectivity and certainty.”[[10]](#footnote-10)

Nowhere is this more evident than in the media coverage of terrorism, which tends to sensationalize terrorism in a way that amplifies its immediate effects. Besides, the social functions of media confer status and establish claims within a hierarchy created by a public agenda, with “the medium [becoming] the message.”[[11]](#footnote-11) In this manner, media coverage amplifies terrorist claims by creating, codifying, and circulating narratives that legitimize and situate actions within societal norms and values.[[12]](#footnote-12) Consequently, the media’s decision to cover incidents of terrorism suggests and reinforces to the public that the terrorism in question is significant enough to warrant its focus and attention. Most importantly, the media’s coverage of terrorism provides a space for performative expressions of fear that ultimately serve to ‘terrorize’ the public in furtherance of the terrorists’ initial objectives in perpetrating terrorism.

But what are the objectives underlying the perpetration of terrorism? *What are terrorists ultimately trying to accomplish? How do media help them succeed? Finally, how can such questions be qualitatively and quantitatively assessed?* In this study, I amalgamate claims from the literatures on terrorism, legitimacy, and media and communications studies to advance the following key argument: Terrorism ‘succeeds’ because media coverage of terrorism delegitimizes the Westphalian state as the *exclusive* territorial power with the monopoly over the legitimate use of force. My interdisciplinary approach allows for an analysis of media coverage of terrorism as the *mode* of post-modern warfare that connects terrorism as a *means* with the *ends* of delegitimizing the state as an institution.

This dissertation uses a mixed methods (qualitative and quantitative) approach to determine *how* terrorism ‘succeeds’ through the media coverage of terrorism’s delegitimization of the (Westphalian) state. Consequently, I situate terrorism within the broader discussion on the means, mode, and ends of (postmodern) warfare. However, note that this dissertation does *not* measure terrorist success or failure broadly, or in comparison to other types of violence that affects states. Terrorism’s ‘success’ is only relevant in the context of my research to the point that it *delegitimizes* the state as an institution. Utilizing a constructivist view of the history of the state and the international system as integral to defining terrorism, I emphasize both the social construction of world affairs, and the effects that perceptions, biases, and external information play in influencing observations in contextualizing *how* terrorism ‘succeeds’ as a result of its depiction in media coverage. Rather than comparing terrorism to other types of militaristic existential threats faced by states to specify the conditions that it must meet in order to ‘succeed,’ I conceive of terrorism’s ‘success’ as inherently ideational, predicated on perception and context. It is the practical utility of the ‘terrorist’ descriptor that interests me here. Why is ‘terrorism’ necessarily more noteworthy than any other (threatened or realized) violent crime? In answering this question, this dissertation seeks to understand the nature of terrorism, its relationship with the media, and most importantly, its intrinsic connection to the Westphalian state.

Extant scholarship on terrorism reiterates the normatively loaded and pejorative nature of the label. Nevertheless, this literature has been invaluable in establishing that terrorism is often used to label violent actors that a state does not approve of, or groups perceived to be acting in opposition to the state and/or its interests. Meanwhile, scholarship on warfare describes terrorism as a standalone form of post-modern warfare. Starting with these premises, I operationally define terrorism in a practical, policy relevant manner that emphasizes the primacy of states and state-actions in the international system following traditional realist and liberal notions of the state as the actor of consequence in the conduct of international relations. This definition accords with traditional realist and liberal IR scholarship, which understands the Peace of Westphalia as the catalyst for the establishment and evolution of the state system. Correspondingly, Max Weber’s definition of the state (which has also achieved widespread recognition and acceptance) conceives of the state as the human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force.[[13]](#footnote-13) I use these claims in conjunction with one another to inform my extension of a critical constructivist framework to Ian Clark’s “two faces of legitimacy.” This view of legitimacy facilitates my understanding of *international* (state) legitimacy as predicated on subordinate perceptions of the state’s ability (as the *legitimate* governing power) to protect its subordinates (constituents) in its sovereign territory. The perpetration of terrorism necessarily contravenes the public’s perception of the state in this manner, as by definition, terrorism involves the exercise of *illegitimate* violence. Media coverage plays an integral role in this dichotomy between terrorism and the state because of the media’s role in *mediating* between the public (the constituents of the state) and those that seek governing authority over it. It is thus problematic that scholarly literature on the interplay between terrorism and the media either conceptualizes terrorism as “propaganda of the deed,” or argue that there is a symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media. Both of these tendencies imply that the media amplification of terrorism is merely a by-product of the connection between terrorism and the media. Instead, I propose that media amplification isthe factor of consequence to the relationship between the two sets of actors. Moreover, I assert that this amplification is ultimately what is responsible for terrorism’s efficacy at delegitimizing the state.

Ultimately, this dissertation interrogates prevailing assumptions about the objectives, or *ends*,of terrorism. As such, I do not assume that terrorists’ end goal is simply perpetrating extra-normal violence. Moreover, I challenge the notion, implicit in popular consciousness, that terrorism does *not* succeed. This idea derives from sources like Western governments’ public avowals of the futility of negotiating with terrorists, when in reality they have done so repeatedly.[[14]](#footnote-14)In contrast with much of the extant (IR) scholarship, I employ an interdisciplinary approach in order to integrate insights and methodologies from the media and communications studies literatures, and the scholarship on linguistics and machine learning. And, as is more common in IR and political science, I also incorporate relevant claims from history and (political) philosophy scholarship.) Accordingly, I hypothesize that terrorism ‘succeeds’ because the manner in which media coverage frames terrorist activity confers status on and amplifies sub-state actors’ legitimation claims against those of the state as the primary referent object that constitutes the contemporary international system. In this context, ‘success’ is predicated on whether terrorist activity furthers its perpetrators’ legitimation claims, concurrently and necessarily challenging the legitimacy of the state.

In testing my hypothesis and answering my key research question, this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2presents the methodology used in this dissertation. This involves a detailed case justification, as well as the general description of the research design employed and an explanation as to the utility associated with mixed quantitative and qualitative methods. Then, Chapter 3 revisits the scholarly and policy debates associated with defining ‘terrorism’ in order to suggest the existence of *de minimis* definitions of terrorism implicit to the policy and scholarly literature. Ultimately, this chapter argues in favour of adopting a policy definition of terrorism over an academic definition based on extant terrorism scholarship. Thus, Chapter 3 contains aspects of the literature review necessitated by my research. As the remaining parts of this dissertation’s literature review, Chapters 4 and 5 identify themes and trends implicit to the scholarly literature as it currently stands, with Chapter 4 reviewing existing conceptualizations of (state) legitimacy, and Chapter 5 discussing the relationship between terrorism and the media. Both chapters ultimately build on their respective discussions of extant scholarship to suggest notable gaps that contextualize and situate my research and presentation. As such, Chapter 4 contextualizes terrorism in the scholarship addressing notions of statehood, which I frame in terms of the narrative arc provided by the traditional International Relations (IR) understanding of the Peace of Westphalia as constituting the starting point for the emergence of the modern state.[[15]](#footnote-15) This supports the assertion that actors in the international system establish legitimacy by demonstrating the *legality* of their actions, the acceptance of the underlying *justification* associated with their actions, and that their continued governance retains the *consent* of their subordinates. Next, Chapter 5 deconstructs the manner in which media coverage depicts terrorism and situates it within public discourse. To this end, I provide an overview of the scholarship on media and terrorism, which I then categorize into two main types: conceptualizations of terrorism as “propaganda of the deed,” and arguments as to whether a symbiotic relationship exists between terrorism and the media. I also discuss the different ways that bias and media framing come into play in the different stages of the media production process. I then conclude this chapter by describing and classifying the types of bias indicators that I use and why, in order to explain how media coverage of terrorism damages (state) legitimacy.

Subsequent to the conclusion of the literature review presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, Chapter 6 uses quantitative analysis to expand on the theory suggested at the end of Chapter 5. Specifically, I use multivariate data analysis (MVA) to establish both covariation and the magnitude of relations between the media coverage of terrorism, and (state) legitimacy. In this context, I quantify media coverage of terrorism using data from the NexisUni, and Dow Jones Factiva services. I also use the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland to enumerate and catalogue actions perpetrated by terrorists, and the Fragile States Index’s state legitimacy measure to score legitimacy by year.[[16]](#footnote-16)

This chapter’s analysis of the hypothesized interplay between media coverage of terrorism and (state) legitimacy focuses on answering the following research question: *does* the media coverage of terrorism affect (state) legitimacy? Based on the results presented as the answer to the research question interrogated in Chapter 6, *Chapter 7 then uses mixed quantitative and qualitative methods to suggest the manner in which the negative correlation between the two variables is generated* – *how* terrorism succeeds using media coverage to challenge state legitimacy. To that end, this chapter centres on the key research question: *how* does media coverage of terrorism damage (state) legitimacy?) Demonstrating the implications of the results presented in Chapter 7, Chapter 8 then goes on to compare and contrast the instructions provided in each of three major international news agencies’ style guides regarding journalistic depictions of terrorism. This involves both analyzing the three style guides in relation to one another, *and* examining to what extent each news agency’s portrayal of terrorism in its published media bulletins actually accords with the guidelines outlined in its style guide. Finally, this dissertation concludes with Chapter 9 which extends and demonstrates the relevance and import of my Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, analyses of whether and how the media coverage of terrorism affects international (state) legitimacy using insight from the comparative analysis of the news agency style guides undertaken in Chapter 8. Such an approach allows me to draw policy-relevant conclusions about the interplay between terrorism and the mass media. In conceiving of the recommendations that I present in Chapter 8, I aim to tangibly contribute to global efforts to combat the systemic threat constituted by terrorism.

Overall, this dissertation seeks to answer the questions of *whether* and *how* terrorism succeeds in relation to the way that media coverage frames terrorism in the news coverage of terrorism produced by Reuters, the Associated Press and Agence France-Presse between January 1, 2012 and January 31, 2018 (inclusive). In this context, *success* is understood as the ability to undermine international (state) legitimacy (predicated on the legality of actions taken, the justification associated with those actions and the consent of those subject to the state’s governance). This study aims to produce an original synthesis of the literatures on violence, legitimacy, terrorism, and media that incorporates interdisciplinary perspectives beyond the traditional reach of IR and security studies, including those of media and communications studies and public policy. This study will also analyze evident trends relating to both the implicit and explicit correlation between media framing and international (state) legitimacy. In conclusion, this dissertation contributes to the academic study of terrorism by pointing to much-needed definition resolution, a deeper understanding of the relationship between terrorism and state legitimacy and, most significantly, by providing evidence as to how governments (rather than terrorist actors themselves) use the media to further securitize the threat posed by terrorism and, in so doing, help terrorism “succeed.” Moreover, this dissertation will tangibly contribute to global efforts to combat the systemic threat terrorism poses to the legitimacy of the state through its comprehensive analysis of the integral role that media plays in determining and exacerbating terrorism’s ability to damage the contemporary international system.

Chapter 2 – Methodology

In this dissertation, I use a mixed-methods approach to assess both *whether* and *how* media coverage of terrorism facilitates terrorism’s ‘success’ by challenging international (state) legitimacy. The research presented in this dissertation is best described as an explanatory sequential mixed methods study because it involves a quantitative phase that subsequently informs a qualitative phase.[[17]](#footnote-17) To wit, I conduct an initial multivariable data analysis (MVA) to suggest the nature and scale of any possible relationships between terrorism, media coverage of terrorism, and (state) legitimacy. Next, informed by the results of the MVA, I use quantitative methods to narrow the focus of my research to news coverage of terrorism on specific high coverage and low coverage dates that fall between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2018. I then employ machine learning to conduct a preliminary analysis of this news coverage. Finally, I use media framing and critical discourse analysis (CDA) approaches to examine *how* media coverage of terrorism undermines the legitimacy of the state as an (international) institution. In this chapter, I develop a research design to answer the linked questions of *whether* and *how* terrorism ‘succeeds’ due to media coverage of terrorism. In order to achieve this objective, I outline the details of, and justifications for my use of the abovementioned approaches in Chapter 6 (in which I quantitatively analyze whether media coverage of terrorism *does* affect international (state) legitimacy) and Chapter 7 (in which I use mixed methods to discuss *how* media coverage of terrorism affects international (state) legitimacy).

Justification for Mixed-Methods Approach

I employ mixed methods – an amalgamation of quantitative and qualitative methodologies – to understand the nature of terrorism, its relationship with the media, and its intrinsic connection to the Westphalian state. Mixed methods provide the combined advantage of quantitative methods’ ability to establish correlation, covariation and the magnitude of relations, and qualitative methods’ provision of a more nuanced and exploratory analysis of the research variables that establish an understanding of underlying factors.[[18]](#footnote-18) Quantitative analysis provides so-called ‘big picture’ data, facilitating my ability to suggest whether media coverage and framing of terrorism correlate with a decrease in international (state) legitimacy. Qualitative analysis allows for a more in-depth understanding of the individual variables, affording my ability to draw conclusions specifically as to ‘how’ media coverage and framing of terrorism might impact state legitimacy.

Justification for Sampling Frame

The research that I present in this dissertation is deliberately conceived of as a small-*n* analysis, in accordance with both Arend Lijphart’s theory-driven comparative method and Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune’s advocacy for the use of “system specific” indicators that “serve to operationalize the same concept in distinct ways in different concepts.”[[19]](#footnote-19) Focusing on a specific seven year time period provides for a rich examination of specific and contingent history and context, as well as better accounting for the potential explanatory role of third-party independent variables (spurious relations). In contrast, large- approaches have the potential to negate the rich and specific *sui generis* character of each case.

My sample size is also limited to seven years due to data availability constraints. In 2012, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) transitioned to a system that is entirely based on data collected by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, which enhanced its internal consistency and comprehensiveness. Concurrent to this change in methodology, the GTD calculates a notable increase in the frequency of international terrorist attacks between 2011 and 2012.[[20]](#footnote-20) Given that there is no way to accurately determine to what extent this increase can be accounted for by GTD methodology change (as opposed to real-world developments), it would be academically disingenuous to draw general conclusions about terrorism using the pre-2012 data. Moreover, the lapse in funding that the GTD experienced at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in significant gaps in the data that the GTD was able to collect in connection with 2019 terrorist attacks.[[21]](#footnote-21) Given the incomplete nature of the data available when I conducted this study, data collected by the GTD in relation to terrorist incidents that occurred after December 31, 2018 is also unsuitable for the research I present in this dissertation. Given that the GTD terrorist attack data is key role to my ability to correlate between terrorism and media coverage of terrorism, I necessarily focus my research on the media coverage of terrorism that occurred between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2018.

Research Question and Hypothesis

The overarching question that this dissertation proposes to answer ties together three separate elements: terrorism, media coverage, and (state) legitimacy. Accordingly, I aim to suggest how terrorism ‘succeeds’ by analyzing English-language international media coverage of terrorism between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2018.[[22]](#footnote-22) To that end, my research interrogates the following research question:

: How does media coverage and framing of terrorism affect (state) legitimacy, particularly by challenging state claims to legitimate authority?

I hypothesize that terrorism ‘succeeds’ in this regard because both direct and indirect media coverage of terrorism frames the threat posed by violent sub-state actors and the terrorism that they perpetrate in a manner that both confers status on, and amplifies their legitimacy claims. These legitimacy claims (and their related demands for authority) necessarily conflict with those of the Westphalian state because both terrorists and states pursue legitimacy with the aim of establishing themself as an actor that matters in the international system. ‘Direct’ media coverage of terrorism refers to the publication and provision of details and information relating to specific contemporary incidents of terrorist activity. ‘Indirect’ coverage, on the other hand, relates to the facilitating of broader understandings of the membership, history, grievances, and overall objectives of terrorism. ‘Indirect’ coverage also includes the publication of news articles that do not specifically address terrorism but reference it in order to provide context for or (temporally or spatially) situate the subject matter that is their focus. (State) legitimacy is understood as a form of social contract deriving from perceptions of legality, justification, and consent. Conceiving of terrorism’s potential success as intrinsically related to the media coverage and framing of terrorism predicates its determination on establishing whether terrorism is effective tactically. In this context, ‘success’ refers to whether or not terrorism delegitimizes the state (a necessary precondition for terrorism serving to further its perpetrators’ legitimacy claims). This argument operationalizes media coverage as a *mode* (or operational level) that links terrorism as a specific *means* (or tactical level) to legitimacy as the *ends* (objective) of post-modern warfare. Accordingly, the hypotheses underlying my research are as follows:

: Terrorism ‘succeeds’ by negatively affecting state legitimacy; and

: Terrorism negatively affects state legitimacy because media coverage of terrorism frames the threat that terrorism poses in a way that confers status on and amplifies its legitimacy claims and demands for authority, territoriality and/or statehood.

I use quantitative methods to address in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 then uses mixed quantitative and qualitative methods to address . I address the rationale associated with structuring my dissertation in this manner in detail in the following section on Research Design.

Chapter 6’s Quantitative Research Design

Before I can discuss *how* media coverage of terrorism affects legitimacy, I must first establish that media coverage of terrorism *does* have an effect on (state) legitimacy. Thus, I use quantitative methods to answer the following research question:

:Does media coverage of terrorism affect international (state) legitimacy?

The methodology that I use expands on that employed by Daniel Masters and Patricia Hoen in their 2012 article “State Legitimacy and Terrorism.” Masters and Hoen used bivariate analysis to assess the relationship between overarching ‘state legitimacy’ measures and the average number of domestic terrorist attacks per year. The results of this analysis empirically support Masters and Hoen’s hypothesis that ‘low legitimacy states’ experience higher levels of domestic terrorist activity than ‘high legitimacy states’.[[23]](#footnote-23) Masters and Hoen then employ multivariable data analysis (MVA) to suggest whether state legitimacy can be considered the main explanatory variable in connection with their bivariate correlation. Similar to Masters and Hoen’s 2012 study, the first part of my research involves a four-factor MVA to correlate and determine the nature, scale and strength of any possible relationship between the media coverage of terrorism and the legitimacy of the state as an institution.

The first element of the MVA that I conduct in Chapter 6 consists of a Spearman correlation (the calculation of Spearman’s ) to measure the strength and nature of applicability of any possible relationship between the (aggregate) media coverage of terrorism (hereafter ) and international (state) legitimacy (hereafter ). [[24]](#footnote-24) I quantify by aggregating the media coverage of terrorism produced by Thomson-Reuters (Reuters), the Associated Press (AP), and Agence France-Presse (AFP) (independent variables , and ).[[25]](#footnote-25) I measure by calculating the average (mean) of the individual measurements of state legitimacy calculated by the annual reports produced by the Fragile State Index (FSI).[[26]](#footnote-26) The value of suggests whether any correlation exists between the media coverage of terrorism and international (state) legitimacy. I use the results produced by this analysis (which indicate that there is a negative correlation between and ) to support my hypothesis that increases in the media coverage of terrorism result in decreased levels of (state) legitimacy.

The second element of my MVA then involves calculating Spearman’s in connection with the individual variables that I merge in calculating . These variables are Reuters’s coverage of terrorism (hereafter ), the AP’s coverage of terrorism (hereafter ), and AFP’s coverage of terrorism (hereafter ). I measure based on the volume of online and print media bulletins relating to terrorism that are produced by Reuters in a given year. I determine the number of media bulletins produced by conducting keyword searches for “terror,” “terrorist,” “terrorists,” and “terrorism,” on the Dow Jones Factiva Service’s (DJFS) records of media coverage produced by Reuters between 2012 and 2018.[[27]](#footnote-27) Similarly, I calculate and based on the volume of online and print media bulletins produced by the AP (), and AFP () in a given year. I calculate the number of media bulletins produced by these international news agencies using keyword searches for “terror,” “terrorist,” “terrorists,” and “terrorism,” on the NexisUni database’s records of media coverage produced by each agency between 2012 and 2018.[[28]](#footnote-28) Determining the individual values of , , and is important because it provides for my suggestion as to whether the different style guides employed by each international news agency (and the resulting manner in which each news agency depicts terrorism) impact any effect that media coverage of terrorism has on international (state) legitimacy.

Subsequently, the third element of my MVA involves conducting simple linear regression (SLR) analyses in connection with the Spearman correlations that indicate an association between their composite variables. Put simply, I conduct SLRs in connection with the Spearman correlations described as the first and second of this MVA where the value of is calculated as greater than 0.2.[[29]](#footnote-29)

The fourth and final element of my MVA involves the concurrent calculation of the coefficient of determination () in connection with , , and .[[30]](#footnote-30) Calculating , , and is important because it provides for my ability to suggest the precise amount of variance in international (state) legitimacy that can be attributed to a specific measurement of increase or decrease in media coverage of terrorism.[[31]](#footnote-31) Conducting these SLRs and concurrently calculating in connection with the same variables is integral to my analysis of whether media coverage of terrorism affects international (state) legitimacy because using known values to model the relationship between international (state) legitimacy and the media coverage of terrorism in this manner allows me to suggest the numerical amount that a specific increase or decrease in the media coverage of terrorism will change international (state) legitimacy.

Control Variables

I also integrate an assortment of control variables in my analysis of the relationship between the media coverage of terrorist activity and (state) legitimacy.[[32]](#footnote-32) The rationale behind the variations in the control variables used by this study, on the one hand, and the Masters and Hoen study, on the other, ultimately comes as a result of the key difference between the two: the manner in which each constitutes the legitimacy used in its analysis. While I differentiate between domestic state legitimacy and the legitimacy of the state as an institution in the broader context of the international system, choosing to focus on the latter as its dependent variable, Masters and Hoen conceptualize legitimacy as relevant to individual states on a more domestic level, evidenced by their breakdown of “the component parts of the legitimacy score[s used…]: security legitimacy, political legitimacy, economic legitimacy, and social legitimacy.”[[33]](#footnote-33) To that end, this study omits four (4) of the control variables used by Masters and Hoen that only apply when conceptualizing domestic legitimacy: *executive constraints* and *political competition* (the two variables that constitute *regime type*), *durability* and *ethnic fragmentation*.[[34]](#footnote-34)

Notwithstanding, while adjusted to reflect the systemic nature of the legitimacy measured and analyzed in this study, the control variables used largely correlate with the control variables employed by the 2012 Masters and Hoen study. As in the Masters and Hoen study, the *history of terrorism* variable is construed an important predictor of terrorist activity because “current levels of terrorism are a function of past terrorist activity… [because] terrorist organizations build over time.”[[35]](#footnote-35) This study relies on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which defines a terrorist attack as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non‐state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation,” to quantify the history of terrorism as a control variable.[[36]](#footnote-36) The GTD’s widespread recognition as “the most comprehensive database on terrorist events around the world from 1970 [onwards]” is the rationale underlying this study’s reliance on data from the GTD in quantifying the history of terrorism as a control variable.[[37]](#footnote-37) To that end, this study uses GTD data to enumerate how many terrorist attacks were perpetrated in the annual period that comprises up to the day prior to the date associated with the relevant dependent variable data point.[[38]](#footnote-38)

The other control variables used in this study include capability, population, and income. As in the Masters and Hoen study, the *capability* variable relates to the strength of the governing body (the United Nations apparatus, in the context of this study). This study, however, diverges from the Masters and Hoen study by incorporating a separate control variable to account for an additional dimension of the *capability* variable. For the purposes of this study, I operationalize capability along two dimensions: the total value of the annual UN budget, and the number of UN member states that meet their required contribution to the UN budget each year (out of a possible 193 countries). This is because, like Masters and Hoen, I relate the capability variable to the strength of the governing body. In this context, I rely on traditional realist, liberal, and – in particular – English School notions of the state as the actor of consequence to the conduct of international relations to constitute that body the United Nations apparatus.[[39]](#footnote-39) *Population* is quantified on the basis of open-source data enumerating the global population taken from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Similarly, the *income* control variable is calculated on the basis of the gross world product (GWP) statistics taken from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook database.

Chapter 7’s Mixed-Methods Research Design

In Chapter 7, I build on my Chapter 6 suggestion that media coverage of terrorism decreases (state) legitimacy to discuss *how* this occurs. Accordingly, Chapter 7 interrogates the following research question:

: How does media coverage of terrorism affect international (state) legitimacy?

Answering this question involves integrating quantitative and qualitative research methods. More specifically, I use quantitative methods to identify the specific high coverage and low coverage dates that are the focus of my qualitative analysis of how media coverage frames terrorism. This involves employing basic methods of statistical analysis to determine the length of the average news cycle. (That is, the number of days that it takes media coverage of terrorism to return to its normal (average) frequency after a terrorist attack occurs.) I also use quantitative statistical methods to identify and detect instances of bias in the media coverage of terrorism on the identified dates. (Each instance of bias identified using these approaches is subsequently manually verified.) Finally, I use critical discourse analysis (CDA) approaches to examine the different ways that media coverage of terrorism both explicitly and implicitly describes terrorism. To that end, I contextualize my employ of CDA using media framing approaches that emphasize the effects that perceptions, biases, and pre-existing knowledge play in influencing information that is conveyed through the text of written media.

Quantitative Methodology (Statistical Analysis)

Within the larger sampling frame constituted by the media coverage of terrorism from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2018, my qualitative analysis focuses on seven *high coverage* dates and 35 *low coverage* dates.[[40]](#footnote-40) My analysis focuses on these dates because they constitute points of high deviation (outliers) in the context of this study’s overall sampling frame. Put simply, the newswire coverage of terrorism produced on these days stands out from the 2,557 days of coverage that this dissertation examines. On high coverage dates, the three international news agencies produced larger amounts of coverage relative to the amount of terrorism perpetrated internationally on the immediately preceding days. Conversely, on low coverage dates, the same three international news agencies produced smaller volumes of coverage relative to the amount of terrorism perpetrated internationally on the immediately preceding days.

To identify high coverage and low coverage dates, I first determine the length of the news cycle, in relation to the media coverage of terrorism. To that end, I calculate the number of media bulletins that constitute media coverage of terrorism produced for each of the 2,557 days between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2018. Concurrently, I derive the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated each day for these same 2,557 days from GTD data. Then, I use the resulting sets of statistics to compute a ratio describing the relationship between the quantity of media coverage of terrorism produced on a given date, and the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated on that same date. Next, I calculate the statistical mean, the standard deviation (), and the -scores associated with this data.[[41]](#footnote-41) Given that international news agencies begin to produce media bulletins immediately after they are informed that a terrorist attack has occurred, I deduce the length of the average news cycle precipitated by terrorism based on the number of days that it takes for the -score of the data to return to zero. Put simply, the length of the news cycle (as it pertains to the media coverage of terrorism) is the number of days that it takes for the volume of media coverage of terrorism to return to an average level after a notable increase in the frequency of terrorist attacks occurs.

After determining the length of the (terrorism) news cycle, I reformulate my data accordingly, tabulating the number of media bulletins about terrorism published for each news cycle. I adjust my data on the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated in a similar manner (by calculating the number of attacks perpetrated per news cycle, instead of per day). Then, I compute a ratio describing the relationship between the quantity of media coverage of terrorism produced in a given news cycle, and the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated in that same news cycle. Next, I calculate the statistical mean, the standard deviation (), and the -scores associated with this data. I classify the final dates corresponding to news cycles with -scores greater than 5.25 ‘high coverage dates,’ and the final dates corresponding to news cycles with -scores of less than 1.37 ‘low coverage dates.’

Identifying Bias

After identifying the high coverage and low coverage dates associated with my sampling frame, I eliminate media bulletins that present with a greater than 90% similarity to others included in my sample. Here, I use the Provalis Research’s QDAMiner software, engaging its code similarity command to calculate similarity index.[[42]](#footnote-42) (In the context of this research, I also use QDAMiner to manually code recurrent media frames identified through qualitative analysis.) Then, I use the WordStat software, also developed by Provalis Research, to code the instances of bias present in the coverage of terrorism produced on these dates and calculate their frequencies and the frequencies with which they co-occur with one another.[[43]](#footnote-43) (Here, ‘bias’ refers to the media’s demonstration of its inclination in favor of or against incidents of terrorism, terrorists and terrorist organizations, individual states and the state as an international institution that it describes.) To accomplish this, WordStat quantitatively analyzes textual data by comparing lists of words and phrases developed by the user (dictionaries) to the texts uploaded to the software. WordStat then calculates the frequencies with which dictionary entries occur in the uploaded sample. Moreover, WordStat provides for frequency calculations in conjunction with proximity searches. This allows me to calculate how often specific words and phrases occur within a specific distance of the words used to identify terrorism.[[44]](#footnote-44)

To identify and code bias in the media discourse on terrorism, I use the lexicon of framing devices identified by Yiwei Luo, Dallas Card, and Dan Jurafsky in the context of their development of the Global Warming Stance Dataset (GWSD).[[45]](#footnote-45) Specifically, Luo, Card, and Jurafsky use their analysis of 56,000 news articles published by fourteen news outlets (seven left-leaning outlets, and seven right leaning outlets) to establish a linguistic typology of affirming devices, and doubting devices. Affirming devices “affirm the *quality* of evidence.”[[46]](#footnote-46) As such, affirming devices “include factive and semi-factive predicates[,]… verbs with connotations of factivity and/or high subject commitment[,]… high commitment adjectives[,]… and [Lerchenmueller et. al.’s (2019)] “hyping” [adjectives].”[[47]](#footnote-47) Moreover, the affirming devices category also encompasses “modifiers that affirm the *quantity* of evidence and index consensus.”[[48]](#footnote-48) Conversely, Luo, Card, and Jurafsky’s doubting devices “reinforce frames of debate and controversy” by implicitly questioning the veracity of information and opinions presented. Thus, doubting devices include “neg-factive verbs[,]… low commitment verbs[,]… low commitment adjectives[,]… adjectives of undermining[,]… and adjectives indexing lack of consensus.”[[49]](#footnote-49) Luo, Card and Jurafsky also classify “verbs with argumentative connotations” as doubting devices.[[50]](#footnote-50)

I employ Luo, Card, and Jurafsky’s categorizations of the abovementioned five affirming devices (factive and semi-factive predicates, highly factive/high-commitment verbs, high commitment adjectives, hyping adjectives, and quantity indicators/evidence of consensus modifiers), and six doubting devices (neg-factive verbs, low commitment verbs, argumentative verbs, low commitment adjectives, undermining adjectives, and lack of consensus adjectives) as bias indicators in the context of in the media coverage of terrorism produced on the five high coverage dates and thirty-five low coverage dates encompassed in my sampling frame.[[51]](#footnote-51)

I use WordStat to facilitate the initial detection and identification of bias in the media bulletins that constitute my sample. To that end, I conduct a series of keyword proximity searches. The first of these searches identifies instances in which at least one affirming or doubting device occurs in the same sentence as the words and phrases used to refer to terrorism.[[52]](#footnote-52) The second of these searches identifies instances in which at least one affirming or doubting device occurs in the same sentence as the words and phrases used to refer to the state.[[53]](#footnote-53) I then use WordStat to isolate and extract the entire paragraph surrounding each sentence identified by the searches. Finally, I manually verify and hand-code each paragraph identified, eliminating paragraphs in which the affirming or doubting device does not occur with specific reference to terrorism or the state.

Qualitative Research Design

The final component of my analysis of how the media coverage of terrorism affects international (state) legitimacy consists of the qualitative analysis of the extracted paragraphs containing both an instance of bias and a reference to terrorism. To that end, I employ media framing approaches and critical discourse analysis (CDA) in the context of focused case analysis to determine how media coverage of terrorism potentially erodes international (state) legitimacy.[[54]](#footnote-54) These discursive approaches analyze the construction of knowledge based on a linguistic understanding of discourse as the use of language as part of social practice. As such, discursive approaches transform human behavior and decision-making into legible progressions. Moreover, these approaches also serve to constitute both subject position and bias *assets* (rather than detriments) to the analytical process. This tenet of discursive approaches plays a critical part in this study because the journalistic choice to use the term ‘terrorism’ already indicates a degree of bias from the outset of any analysis.[[55]](#footnote-55)

Framing approaches serve as the point of departure for my qualitative analysis of the media bulletins for the same reason that discursive approaches are so critical for this study. Framing approaches are text-based inductive methods of content analysis that examine “the selection and salience of certain aspects of an issue,” as depicted by and emphasized through media coverage, “by exploring [the] images, stereotypes, metaphors, actors, and messages” employed.[[56]](#footnote-56) Framing approaches thus assume the relevance of the original conception of agenda setting, as the idea that media coverage calls public attention to certain topics, issues and ideas.[[57]](#footnote-57) This also relates to framing as the manner in which media coverage and the so-called ‘media gatekeepers’ organize and present the material that is covered.[[58]](#footnote-58)

Framing involves context and implies messaging. To some degree, the framing of news takes the emphasis off of *what* is being said, instead implicitly shifting focus to *how* the information is being presented. In this sense, to paraphrase Marshall McLuhan, ‘the medium becomes the message.’[[59]](#footnote-59) As an abstract notion that serves to structure social meaning, framing influences audiences’ perceptions of news in a way that not only tells individuals “what to think about,” but also “how to think about it.”[[60]](#footnote-60) For this reason, framing approaches are helpful to this study; their implicit critical constructivist conception of reality emphasizes both its social construction and the effects that perceptions, biases and information play in influencing what is observed. This is integral to my qualification of international (state) legitimacy and variations in state legitimacy, given that it constructed on the conception of legitimacy as a form of social contract, and social contract theory is predicated on individuals agreeing to cede inherent personal liberties to a governing authority because they believe that the relinquishment of these freedoms will result in their overall gain.

In this study, I use framing to contextualize my use of a CDA approach. CDA is assumed to be both relevant and important methodologically because of its focus on deconstructing spoken and written language through predominantly linguistic elements. Integrally, it accounts for inherent biases, and constitutes the role of discourse as “produc[ing] as subjects publics,” ‘legitimating’ specific “authorized actors,” making “publics” aware of “the existence and qualities of different phenomena,” and creating perceptions of “how public officials should act for them and in their name.”[[61]](#footnote-61) This study uses the CDA approach in connection with the Derridean application of Martin Heidegger’s “deconstruction” of written texts, through Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework for CDA.[[62]](#footnote-62) Fairclough’s framework layers and integrates the micro-, meso- and macro-levels of the analysis of discursive events. These levels are represented by “genres” – particular ways of manipulating and framing discourse, “discourses” – explaining the interrelated elements of production, form and reception, and “styles” – understanding the ontological nature of the text under discussion, as influenced by its broader societal and historical context.[[63]](#footnote-63) In this context, I apply the Derridean conceptualization of “deconstruction” with specific focus on delimiting “social acts,” “speech acts” and identifying instances of the Copenhagen School’s “securitization” process.[[64]](#footnote-64)

Conclusion

This chapter (Chapter 2) presents the research questions, hypotheses, and methodology that I employ in interrogating how terrorism succeeds as a result of its depiction in media coverage. This involves the justification of both my larger sampling frame (media bulletins from AFP, AP and Reuters published between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2018, inclusive) and my smaller sampling frame (media coverage of terrorism on high and low coverage dates that occur in the context of my larger sampling frame), its limitations, and my decision to employ a mixed-methods approach in conducting this research. I also use this chapter to outline my research design in detail. Accordingly, the quantitative methodology used in Chapter 6 consists of Spearman correlations in connection with and , and , and , and and . These correlations provide for my determination as to whether a relationship exists between the various typologies of media coverage of terrorism (an aggregate measure of the media coverage of terrorism, Reuters’ coverage of terrorism, AP’s coverage of terrorism and AFP’s coverage of terrorism) and international (state) legitimacy. Then, I conduct SLR analyses in connection with the Spearman correlations that indicate an association between their composite variables in order to model the relationship between the independent variable (the aggregate media coverage of terrorism, the AP’s coverage of terrorism or the AFP’s coverage of terrorism) and the dependent variable (international (state) legitimacy). Finally, I calculate the value of in connection with the abovementioned SLR analyses (, , and ) to suggest how much variance in international (state) legitimacy can be attributed to a specific measurement of increase or decrease in the media’s coverage of terrorism.

I then begin Chapter 7 by using quantitative methods to calculate the statistical frequency of 28 definitional elements across 2,276 media bulletins that comprise my smaller sampling frame to derive a *de minimis* definition of terrorism implicit in media coverage of terrorism. (I conduct a similar analysis based on the definition of terrorism implicit to the domestic legislation of the 193 United Nations member states in Chapter 3.) Then, I use Provalis Research’s WordStat software to identify instances of bias relating to two targets (terrorism and the state) in my smaller sampling frame. (Subsequently, I manually check and confirm each instance of bias.) I use qualitative analysis (specifically, CDA approaches informed by conceptions of media framing, on the one hand, and Derridean application of Heidegger’s “deconstruction” of written texts, on the other, to identify and code frames that are used in connection with terrorism on a recurring basis. I code these manually, using Provalis Research’s QDAMiner software. Subsequently, I use WordStat to calculate both the frequency with which these occur across my smaller sampling frame, and the frequency with which each frame is used by each specific international news agency. (I also use these qualitative methods in analyzing the implications of the media frames that I identify as recurring in the media coverage of terrorism.) Finally, I conduct a second statistical frequency analysis of 28 definitional elements across state government officials’ statements about specific instances of terrorism that occur within the timeframe covered by my smaller sampling frame to derive a *de minimis* definition of terrorism implicit to state conduct. (I also use WordStat’s automated text classification module to identify the terms most often used to refer to terrorism in the media bulletins produced by AFP, AP and Reuters as part of my Chapter 8 analysis of the effect that style guides have on the way that media coverage frames terrorism.)

As such, Chapter 6 builds on the overview of extant scholarship relating to each of my variables (terrorism, (state) legitimacy and media coverage) provided in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, using multivariable data analysis to suggest *whether* terrorism and/or media coverage of terrorism affect (state) legitimacy. Then, in Chapter 7, I examine *how* media coverage of terrorism erodes (state) legitimacy using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. Finally, Chapter 8 uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to demonstrate the relevance and the importance of the results presented in Chapters 6 and 7 and further, to propose policy recommendations on the basis of conclusions that I draw from my analysis of the interplay between the media coverage of terrorism and (state) legitimacy.

Chapter 3 – Understanding Terrorism

Before I can analyze how terrorism undermines state legitimacy, or how terrorism ‘succeeds’, I must first define terrorism. The initial purpose of this chapter is to revisit both academic and policy attempts to define and thus understand the constituent features of terrorism. A general objective of this chapter is also to limit the range of actions that I will analyze in relation to how the mass media’s written depiction of these actions affects (state) legitimacy. Crucially, this chapter’s focus on operationally defining terrorism provides an understanding in terms of both conceptual utility and significance. To that end, this chapter also extends scholarly applications of W.B. Gallie’s notion of “essentially contested concepts,” by building a continuum that clarifies the focal underpinning necessarily associated with attempts to define terrorism.[[65]](#footnote-65) Claims such as “terrorism is fundamentally “a[n essentially contested concept] because ‘one person’s terrorist, is another person’s freedom fighter’” point to a broad literature that focuses on the normatively loaded and pejorative nature of terrorism.[[66]](#footnote-66) The label ‘terrorist’ is often used to label both violent actors that state(s) do not approve of and groups perceived to be opposing a state and/or its interests. There thus arise claims like those made by Nicholas J. Perry, Sam Jackson, and Connor Cruise O’Brien who argue that the use of the term ‘terrorism’ as a classification for a specific violent act or set of actions is analytically imprecise, historically indistinct, and legally vague and overbroad.[[67]](#footnote-67) Much of the existing literature relating to terrorism focuses on attempts to establish a single, universally-accepted definition (or, conversely, to explain why no such definition has yet been established).[[68]](#footnote-68) These lines of inquiry beg the following question: Is there *any* utility in defining terrorism?[[69]](#footnote-69)

In this dissertation I do not challenge the ideas that terrorism is pejoratively and normatively loaded, analytically imprecise, historically indistinct, and legally vague and overbroad. Nor do I disagree with the premise that the labels ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ are often subject to political manipulation, particularly as they are operationalized by state governments. I do not contest these ideas precisely *because* they are the reason that there is significant political weight associated with any use of the ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ labels. The terrorism label connotes a certain type of gravity and severity in and of itself, even before its contextualization is analyzed. This chapter is thus underpinned by the argument that the utility of the terrorism label is its identification of specific instances of political violence that institutions – specifically the state – conceive of as existentially threatening.

In this chapter I review scholarship that addresses defining terrorism, highlighting the diverging focal points around which terrorism is conceived. I then thoroughly explain W.B. Gallie’s “essentially contested concepts,” which I use as a conceptual framework through which to understand the debate associated with defining ‘terrorism.’ This discussion draws on the work of Christine Swanton, John N. Gray, and Harvey Boulay and suggests that “essentially contested concepts” exist along a definitional continuum. I use that suggested continuum to foreground the difference between two varieties of terrorism definitions: policy-oriented definitions of terrorism and scholarly definitions of terrorism. Developing these concepts highlights the inherent contradictions in how definitions of terrorism can be operationalized. Finally, using all the above discussion, I propose a *de minimis* definition of terrorism implicit to international policy and state conduct that I use in this dissertation. Critically, this definition serves as my operational definition of ‘terrorism’ for the purposes of this study, and I explicitly identify it at this juncture in order to limit the specific actions and activities that my research examines.

Attempts to Define ‘Terrorism’

Any research relating to ‘terrorism’ is subject to problems caused by the scholarly and policy literatures’ collective disagreement as to what constitutes a “definition of terrorism… [that] commands full international approval.”[[70]](#footnote-70) Research conducted by Alex P. Schmid in 1994 cited the existence of 212 different policy-oriented definitions of terrorism then in circulation globally. At the time ninety of these definitions were actively used by states and institutions on a recurring basis.[[71]](#footnote-71) Efforts to define “terrorism” in the context of international policy have long contended with the dilemma of how to establish a definition that is sufficiently specific, from a legal perspective, yet at the same time refrains from “criminalizing all armed resistance to oppressive regimes.”[[72]](#footnote-72) Of particular note is the failure to reach international consensus on a “generally acceptable” definition of terrorism that precluded the Rome Statute’s ability to account for terrorism as an offense in its own right in the late 1990s. Indeed, Resolution E adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court includes preambulatory clauses that both recognize the import of terrorist acts (“by whomever and wherever perpetrated and whatever their forms, methods or motives”) to the international community, and express regret “that no generally acceptable definition of the crime…of terrorism… could be agreed upon for the inclusion, within the jurisdiction of the [International Criminal] Court.””[[73]](#footnote-73) While on a domestic level, “many [state] legislatures employ the language of terrorism to underline the high disvalue associated with some violent behavior *and* to justify the application of a special regime, with a special emphasis on criminal law,” states hold widely differing positions on whether ‘state terrorism’ should be accounted for under any potential internationally-accepted definition of terrorism. Moreover, notable international organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have expressed concern that the use of “all-inclusive term[s]” in proposed definitions of terrorism “could be interpreted in ways that undermine freedom of expression.”[[74]](#footnote-74) Such concern on the part of human rights organizations relies on legalistic approaches and involves the delicate balancing of rights versus security concerns. The end result, however, is that there is no United Nations Convention on Terrorism in the same manner that there exists a United Nations Convention on Genocide and a United Nations Convention on Torture.

A similar situation exists in relation to scholarly literature on terrorism. In 1988, Schmid and Albert Jongman proposed an “academic consensus definition of terrorism” which they constructed by distilling 109 distinct questionnaire responses from a 1985 survey sent to international terrorism experts.[[75]](#footnote-75) Moreover, 2004 research conducted to update the frequency of the definitional elements integral to Schmid and Jongman’s 1988 definition enumerated seventy-three different working definitions of terrorism in three journals alone.[[76]](#footnote-76)

Within both the scholarly and policy literatures, the definitional variance associated with the term ‘terrorism’ stems from the conflicting focal points around which each definition is conceived: the separation between the ‘ends’ and ‘means’ of terrorism. To illustrate this point, consider the Rand Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, a record of incidents of terror that occurred across the globe dating back to 1986. This database defines terrorism solely on the basis of the ‘means’ through which it is accomplished – the nature of the act itself. As such, the Rand Database’s definition does not take into account “the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause.”[[77]](#footnote-77) Conversely, Bruce Hoffman’s widely-used definition suggests terrorism as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in pursuit of political change.”[[78]](#footnote-78) To that end, Hoffman frames his definition of terrorism on the basis of the ‘ends’ that its perpetrators are trying to affect. In doing this, he fails to specify the *type* of actions that constitute terrorism *as a phenomenon,* with complex constituent factors but also the ways in which terrorism works through media to achieve specific goals. The notion of media coverage as the ‘mode’ through which terrorism affects (state) legitimacy will be discussed further in Chapter 5; the manner through which media coverage is able to have this effect will be analyzed in Chapter 7.

Is Terrorism an “Essentially Contested Concept”?

The seeming incompatibility of the merits associated with the approaches to defining terrorism exemplified by Hoffman and the Rand Database leads scholars like J.A.S Wild to suggest that terrorism be identified as one of W.B. Gallie’s essentially contested concepts: a term so normatively loaded that no amount of debate or evidence will lead to agreement on their “correct or standard use.”[[79]](#footnote-79) Indeed, “essentially contested concepts” are best described as existing on a continuum.[[80]](#footnote-80) One extreme of this continuum represents the “stronger variants” described by Christine Swanton, which border on John N. Gray’s doomsday prediction of a “radical sceptical nihilism” in relation to academic attempts to define concepts in the first place.[[81]](#footnote-81) The continuum’s other extreme consists of Harvey Boulay’s description of “operationalized… clarifi[ed] concepts” that are asserted to have clear-cut definitions.[[82]](#footnote-82) The space between the two extremes, on the other hand, is constituted by varying strengths of the “weaker” variations of Gallie’s “essentially contested concepts” described by Swanton.[[83]](#footnote-83)

The Analytical Utility of “Essentially Contested Concepts”: Conceptual Clash

Understanding the analytical utility associated with both Gallie’s notion of “essentially contested concepts,” and the construction of an essential contested-ness continuum requires exploring the rationale behind conceptualizing a concept like ‘terrorism’ as essentially contested. This rationale accords with Baldwin’s assertion that the core of what this classification denotes rests on its “generat[ing] vigorous disputes as to the nature of the concept and its applicability to various cases.”[[84]](#footnote-84) Gallie’s essentially contested concepts are notions, ideas, terms and phrases whose definitions are disputed on the basis of a competing clash. I conceive of a conceptual clash associated with the implicit question(s) that the competing definitions proposed are trying to answer. To that end, clash is advanced here as a means that forces us to face definitional irreconcilabilities. The clash associated with a definitional debate on or about an “essentially contested concept” inherently constitutes “the nature of the concept” and, to that end, “its applicability to various cases.”[[85]](#footnote-85) As such, the clash associated with an “essentially contested concept” necessarily involves the convergence of two opinions on one idea. In the context of the definitional debate associated with one of Gallie’s concepts, the clash creates a situation where the point, or points of contention, between the disputing parties cannot be resolved without negating the implicit arguments that both parties are trying to make about its nature, applicability, and operationalization.

An example of an “essentially contested concept” in the context of the National Hockey League (NHL) is the question of which team constitutes “the best team” in the NHL in a given year. In this context, “best team” is an “essentially contested concept” because different ideas as to what makes a team the “best” are necessarily irreconcilable.[[86]](#footnote-86) On the one hand, there is the opinion that the “best team” is necessarily the team with the most talent, as indicated by its “regular season record.”[[87]](#footnote-87) On the other hand, there is the necessarily contrasting opinion that “the best team always wins the Stanley Cup.”[[88]](#footnote-88) The second opinion prioritizes the idea that being the “best” involves being able to put out the necessary performance when it matters. [[89]](#footnote-89) Crucial to understanding the concept of “the best team” as “essentially contested” in nature is that both of the opinions mentioned above *cannot be true at the same time*. As such, the clash associated with “the best team” as one of Gallie’s “essentially contested concepts” is the implicit question as to whether being able to perform “when it matters” is a more significant indicator of being “the best team” in the NHL than a team’s overall performance over the course of the season. Key to this example of clash is the understanding that there are two different definitions of “best,” both of which are factually accurate but cannot be reconciled with one another. Similarly, it is possible to conceive of multiple definitions of terrorism that cannot all be true at the same time but are all academically accurate just the same.

Competing *De Minimis* Definitions of Terrorism

There is utility associated with conceiving of terrorism as an essentially contested concept because implicitly, clash is necessarily inherent to all essentially contested concepts as Gallie conceives of them. The dichotomy between the underlying focus of the *de minimis* scholarly definition of terrorism and the underlying focus of the *de minimis* policy definition of terrorism hint at the clash associated with defining terrorism. This dissertation takes Schmid and Jongman’s 1988 “academic consensus definition of terrorism” as its point of departure in suggesting a *de minimis* definition of terrorism implicit within the scholarly literature. As well, it extends Schmid and Jongman’s methodology, in conceiving of their “academic consensus definition of terrorism,” to suggest a parallel *de minimis* implicitdefinition of terrorism relevant to contemporary international policy.

A *De Minimis* Scholarly Definition of Terrorism

In 1988, Schmid and Jongman produced “the best-known work on this problem of definitions” by collating an academic consensus definition of ‘terrorism’ that distills the distinguishing features of ‘terrorism’.[[90]](#footnote-90) These features are derived from the 1985 input of 109 ‘terrorism’ experts of international renown based on the distilling of submitted questionnaire responses into twenty-two distinct definitional elements.[[91]](#footnote-91) Schmid and Jongman’s asserted objective in undertaking this study was to construct the *most* comprehensive definition of terrorism possible.[[92]](#footnote-92) To that end, they conceptualize ‘terrorism’ as:

… an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.[[93]](#footnote-93)

This definition is significant because it integrates the sixteen elements that Schmid and Jongman identified as having the highest frequency of recurrence in the 109 responses analyzed by their 1988 research. 2004 research produced by Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler later confirmed the frequency of these sixteen elements. Weinberg et. al. substantiated Schmid and Jongman’s conclusion as to the necessity that any definition of terrorism specifies the following three most frequent definitional elements in both studies:

1. violence, the use of force;
2. the political reasons underlying its perpetration, and
3. an emphasis on inculcating fear and terror.

This demonstrates that it *is* possible to conceive of a *de minimis* definition of terrorism implicit in the scholarly literature by employing a reverse-variation of the 1988 Schmid and Jongman methodology.[[94]](#footnote-94) This dissertation employs a *de minimis* definition of terrorism implicit in the scholarly literature by amalgamating the definitional elements that the 1988 and 2004 studies identify as having a greater than fifty (50) percent frequency of recurrence.[[95]](#footnote-95) In accordance with Weinberg et. al.’s 2004 study’s confirmation of two of the three elements identified as having a greater than 50 percent frequency of recurrence in the original 1988 study, this dissertation conceives of the *de minimis* definition of terrorism implicit to the scholarly literature as constituting the use of violence or force towards political ends.[[96]](#footnote-96)

Conceiving of a *De Minimis* Policy Definition of Terrorism

Much of the added value of the 1988 Schmid and Jongman study stems from its innovative interdisciplinary methodology. That notwithstanding, there is a significant oversight in Schmid and Jongman’s approach which is only representative of the definitional debate on terrorism as it is conceptualized in the scholarly literature. Unfortunately, the 1988 Schmid and Jongman study does not account for the parallel debate on defining terrorism in the context of international policy. Here I amend Schmid and Jongman’s methodology in order to derive a *de minimis* definition of terrorism that reflects the nuances of the policy debate on defining terrorism.[[97]](#footnote-97) This is important because terrorism is not simply a matter of arcane debate among International Relations (IR) and security academics; terrorism has real world implications in terms of how laws and policies are designed in the areas of anti- and counter-terrorism.[[98]](#footnote-98) Notwithstanding, there is still significant utility to academic definitions of terrorism which ultimately endeavor to ensure their maximal intellectual accuracy in order to account for every possible manifestation of terrorism. My approach involves taking Schmid and Jongman’s 1988 list of twenty-two definitional elements as a starting point in analyzing the one hundred and ninety-two unique definitions of terrorism contained in the domestic legislation of one hundred and ninety-two (192) member states of the 193 United Nations General Assembly in order to identify an expanded list of twenty-eight (28) specific definitional elements.[[99]](#footnote-99) For the purposes of this dissertation, these elements are coded numerically as follows:

[1] use of force, violence; [2] destruction of, or damage to property; [3] damage of, or destruction to the environment; [4] physical injury, homicide, death of a victim; [5] fear, terror; [6] intimidation; [7] threat; [8] extra-normality; [9] coercion, extortion; [10] arbitrariness, unpredictability; [11] groups, associations, movements; [12] premeditated, planned, organized action; [13] covert; [14] intention; the deliberate, purposive action; [15] influence decision-makers’ taking of action, or a failure to take action; [16] political; [17] religious; [18] ideological; [19] publicity, propaganda; [20] incitement; [21] criminal, unlawful; [22] symbolism; [23] security; [24] sovereignty; [25] economic; [26] state, country; [27] public, general population; [28] civilians, non-combatants.[[100]](#footnote-100)

Identifying and hand-coding these elements within existing definitions of terrorism contained in the United Nations member states’ domestic legislation facilitated my ability to calculate the frequency of recurrence for each of these 28 definitional elements. This resulted in my identification of ten (10) definitional elements as recurring with a greater than fifty (50) percent frequency of recurrence across the 192 international policy definitions of terrorism that comprise the dataset for this analysis. The elements that recur with greater than 50 percent frequency are:

[27] *public; general population* (identified with a recurrence frequency of 90%);

[4] *physical injury; homicide; death of a victim* (identified with a recurrence frequency of 78%);

[14] *intention; the deliberate, purposive taking of action* (identified with a recurrence frequency of 74%);

[2] *destruction of, or damage to property* (identified with a recurrence frequency of 68%);

[26] *state; country; national* (identified with a recurrence frequency of 68%);

[8] extra-normality (identified with a recurrence frequency of 66%);

[15] *influence decision-makers’ taking of action, or a failure to take action* (identified with a recurrence frequency of 66%);

[6] *intimidation* (identified with a recurrence frequency of 61%);

[21] *criminal; unlawful* (identified with a recurrence frequency of 55%);

[7] *threat* (identified with a recurrence frequency of 53%).[[101]](#footnote-101)

To that end, I suggest that a *de minimis* definition of terrorism *is* in fact possible, given this analysis derived from the domestic legislation of 192 of the United Nations member states (hereafter “the policy definition of terrorism”) such a definition would be

the [7] threatening, or [14] intentional taking of [21] criminal action designed to influence a [26] state, an international organization, or another decision-making body’s [15] taking of action or lack thereof by [6] intimidating the [27] general population.

1. Such actions include, but are not limited to, perpetrating [4] homicide, actions that result in [8] serious physical injury to persons, and [2] the damage or destruction of property.

I conceive of the abovementioned *policy* definition of terrorism on the basis of ten out of the twenty-eight definitional elements identified on the basis of Schmid and Jongman’s 1988 study that have a frequency of recurrence of greater than fifty percent. This notwithstanding, the *academic* definition of terrorism proposed by this chapter is only based on two definitional elements that have a greater than fifty percent frequency of recurrence within the dataset used by Schmid and Jongman in 1988, and the dataset used by Weinberg et. al. in 2004, neither of which overlaps with the ten elements that are used to construct the policy definition of terrorism. The twenty-eight definitional elements that I identify can be categorized based on their conceptually constituting any one or more of the ‘means,’ ‘mode,’ objective, and ‘target’ of terrorism.[[102]](#footnote-102) (The two elements that have the highest frequency of recurrence in the 1988 and 2004 research are included in my overall list of twenty-eight elements.) Of the ten elements that I suggest comprise the policy definition of terrorism, three are categorized as both the ‘means’ and the objective of terrorism, one is categorized as both the objective and the target of terrorism, two are categorized solely constituting the target of terrorism, one is categorized as only constituting the ‘mode’ of terrorism, two are categorized as constituting both the ‘means’ and the ‘mode’ of terrorism, and one is characterized as constituting the ‘means, the ‘mode’ and the objective of terrorism.

Of the two elements that the 1988 and the 2004 studies identify as having the highest frequency of recurrence, one constitutes only the ‘means’ of terrorism, and the other constitutes both the ‘means’ and the objective of terrorism. As such, while the scholarly definition of terrorism is seemingly limited in its scope on the basis of the conflicting foci underlying definitions in its dataset, the policy definition of terrorism amalgamates elements that are representative of each of the foci that I identify as integral to defining terrorism: its situation-specific, micro-level ‘means,’ ‘mode,’ objective, and target.[[103]](#footnote-103) This difference suggests perspectives diverge on whether the target and ‘mode’ of terrorism are or should be integral to its definition.

Thus, when it comes to the conflicting perspectives represented by the academic and policy definitions of terrorism suggested in this chapter, the clash associated with defining terrorism is the relevance of identifying the ‘mode’ and/or the target of the offense when defining terrorism. Policy definitions place greater emphasis on establishing broader criteria as to what constitutes an instance of terrorism, which allows for the identification of conspiracies to commit terrorist offenses, unsuccessful attempts to perpetrate instances of terrorism and threats to perpetrate instances of terrorism. Academic definitions, on the other hand, seem to limit their focus on the ‘means’ used to perpetrate instances of terrorism and the objective of any terrorism committed. Constraining the focus of terrorism in this manner limits the range of offenses that can be labeled ‘terrorism’, which allows the label to provide for the normatively loaded character of such incidents.

These explanations imply that the *real* clash associated with the international policy and scholarly literature’s definitions of ‘terrorism’ that are being used in this paper is not over what terrorism *is*, but over the intended *utility* of establishing the definition. In short, the core of the disagreement between the definitions is associated with the various authors’ perceptions of the utility that they might derive from their suggested definition. This necessarily involves understanding the reason that the actor in question wishes to classify an incident as ‘terrorism’ – in other words, why establishing that a specific incident constitutes ‘terrorism’ is useful to the actor doing the labeling. To that end, scholars have different motivations than government agencies and other political actors. An actor’s use of the label terrorism constitutes “implicit validation… of [its] own brand of violence” because doing so causes a specific instance of violence (or threat of violence) to be viewed pejoratively, in contrast with that actor’s own exercise of force. [[104]](#footnote-104) The clash relevant to the definition of terrorism is whether retaining the ability to employ this implicit legitimation strategy is of greater value than ensuring intellectual accuracy in identifying the key tenets of how ‘terrorism’ practically manifests. As such, underpinning the clash associated with defining terrorism is the question of whether actions constitute terrorism because a legitimate actor says that they are terrorism, or because they meet specific, academically predetermined definitional criteria. Based on this clash, the “essential contestedness” continuum relevant to defining terrorism exists between the two extremes represented by:

1. the utility of being able to validate actions taken in the context of a zero-sum game; and
2. specifically limiting the scope of the term ‘terrorism,’ in order to bolster a “moral and normative stance against terrorism” and general perception of the international regime.[[105]](#footnote-105)

Scholarly definitions of terrorism tend to produce a more *theoretical understanding* of *how* terrorist activity *manifests in practice*. This is because, overall, scholarly definitions necessarily limit the actions that constitute terrorist activity, in order to provide precision and clarity to terrorism as a concept. Conversely, policy definitions of terrorism are created with the goal of demarcating instances of terrorism *in order to both facilitate and allow for a practical institutional response to their perpetration*.[[106]](#footnote-106) To that end, Thomas G. Weiss and Anoulak Kittikhoun assert that in the discipline of International Relations, the shorthand juxtaposition “[theory vs. practice] conjures up the chasm that separates two belligerents in world politics – those who analyse a subject and those who practice it.”[[107]](#footnote-107) Put simply, there is a gap between academic International Relations scholarship and the real-world practice of international relations due to the nature of the interactions (and lack thereof) between the theoretical study of IR and the real-world activities associated with the practice of international relations.[[108]](#footnote-108) In the context of the debate on defining terrorism, I err towards definitions that are predicated on real-world policy relevance because at the end of the day analyses of the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of terrorism depend on the consequences of policy as states’ actual, manifested responses to terrorism. For this reason, I find specific utility in the conceptual clash that is hinted at by classifications of terrorism as an essentially contested concept.[[109]](#footnote-109)

While identifying the clash associated with defining an “essentially contested concept” like terrorism does not provide for the explicit definition of the concept, it facilitates greater understanding of the definitional challenges associated with that concept. In the case of terrorism, understanding the underlying clash associated with defining terrorism informs my decision to understand the manner in which media coverage of terrorism affects the legitimacy of the state on the basis of the *de minimis* policy definition of terrorism. This is because the theoretical focus characteristic of the scholarly definitions of terrorism is *less* relevant to facilitating an understanding of *how* terrorism potentially undermines (state) legitimacy in practice. Instances of terrorist activity are not perpetrated to delegitimize or contest theoretical, academic understandings of ‘terrorism.’ Rather, the perpetration of terrorist activity constitutes an actor’s practical attempt to inculcate fear or terror to serve its own interests.[[110]](#footnote-110) To put it bluntly, I contend that terrorism is not perpetrated for the benefit of those sitting in the ivory tower. The crux of my argument is that actors perpetrate terrorist activity to further their own interests, which necessarily oppose those of states and their governments. Accordingly, I do not believe that academic debate centering on definitional purity (or the lack thereof) helps achieve this dissertation’s stated goal - to help us understand how terrorism works to undermine state legitimacy.”

Terrorism and Post-Modern Warfare

Understanding that terrorism is perpetrated to further interests that are diametrically and necessarily opposed to those of states *as institutions* suggests that terrorism is a kind of post-modern warfare. This classification begs the following question: how does terrorism fit into traditional models and understandings of war? Extant scholarly literature seems to implicitly understand terrorism as an action in and of itself. This kind of definition collapses ideas that terrorism can constitute a ‘means,’ a ‘mode,’ or an ‘ends’ of warfare. This dissertation, however, constructs a typology of terrorism as post-modern warfare. In this typology, the ‘means’ refer to *what* is used (the specific weapons, tactics, and strategies employed in the context of warfare), the ‘ends’ constitute the ultimate objective or goal that is the desired end result of the war, while the ‘mode’ describes *how* the use of the ‘means’ results in the realization of the ‘ends.’ This dissertation conceives of terrorism as *more* than just a descriptive label. Accordingly, the *de minimis* policy definition of terrorism allows for an understanding of terrorism as a class of activities that are conducted towards the specific ‘end’ of eroding (state) legitimacy in the context of military and/or political conflict. When terrorism is conceptualized in the context of post-modern warfare, its ‘success’ or ‘failure’ becomes predicated on whether its use as a ‘means’ achieves the desired ‘ends’ – its perpetrators’ objectives in engaging in post-modern warfare in the first place. Understanding terrorism in the context of post-modern warfare is thus integral to a basic premise of this dissertation: the understanding that terrorism ‘succeeds’ by undermining (state) legitimacy.

The idea that terrorism’s ‘success’ is predicated on undermining the legitimacy of the state as an institution is further bolstered by critical constructivist perspectives on terrorism. Constructivism assumes a non-fungible, relational nature of power.[[111]](#footnote-111) As such, constructivist scholarship assumes the centrality of the state as an ideational construct in analyzing terrorism.[[112]](#footnote-112) As with constructivist explanations of the state, terrorism is conceived of as an inherently ideational construct. It is in that vein that Colin Wight argues, “terrorism cannot be defined in the absence of some or other account of the state [which can only be understood] in terms of its history.”[[113]](#footnote-113) States define what terrorism is in practice through their actions and inactions. State politicians debate and pass laws that create definitions that result in the labeling of specific instances as ‘terrorism. Police and security services investigate and arrest those charged with specific acts or with inchoate offences such as conspiracy and attempts. Finally, courts, by interpreting laws and rendering judgments in specific cases, can expand or refine what is meant by terrorism. It is this context that policy definitions of terrorism emerge, ultimately dictating the way that states and state agencies, as institutions, interact with terrorism in the context of both counter- and anti- terrorism policies and laws. Ayşe Zarakol extends the premise of Wight’s argument, contending that terrorism is either “[state] system affirming” (if it claims legitimacy on the basis of local authority) or “[state] system threatening” (if its legitimacy claims are predicated on “rejec[ting] all external authority”).[[114]](#footnote-114) The necessarily inverse correlation between terrorism and the legitimacy of the state alluded to by Zarakol supports this dissertation’s understanding of terrorism as post-modern warfare, in accordance with its definition per the *de minimis* policy definition of terrorism that I establish in this chapter. This is important because it allows for an understanding of terrorism as a type of ‘battle’ for legitimacy in the international system – not just violence for the sake of violence.

Conclusion

Much of the existing academic analysis of terrorism fails to take into account how state actors – the actors who are most affected by terrorism when it succeeds – view and understand terrorism and what actions they take as a result more scholarly, theoretical understandings of terrorism often come into direct conflict with policy definitions. To that end, it must be understood that policy definitions are the ones that *actually* have implications for terrorists themselves and state actors who respond to them. This is particularly important because no one definition of ‘terrorism’ has been established within the scholarly literature and international policy either collectively or individually. There is no International Convention on Terrorism with an internationally-agreed upon legal definition, as exists for genocide.[[115]](#footnote-115) As I have outlined in this chapter, this lack of definitional consensus amongst academics and policymakers stems from the diverging focal points around which each of their individual definitions of ‘terrorism’ is conceived. To that end, while certain scholars have used this to suggest that ‘terrorism’ constitutes one of Gallie’s “essentially contested concepts,” I argue that while terrorism does indeed constitute an “essentially contested concept,” it does *not* do so on the basis of previously established ideas of this notion as a framework or a hypothesis. Rather, I argue that a term or phrase that constitutes an “essentially contested concept” can only be understood *if* the idea of the clash around which its lack of definition is centered is specifically identified. This is because an understanding of any “essentially contested concept” can only occur if the “essential contestedness” continuum is constructed on the basis of an underlying clash that facilitates an understanding of the range of possible definitions as existing between two extremes. In the context of defining terrorism, I conceive of these extremes as the separate rationales associated with defining terrorism from a purely scholarly perspective on the one hand, and from a policy-oriented perspective on the other. As such, I constitute these extremes as follows:

1. the utility of being able to validate actions taken in the context of a zero-sum game; and
2. specifically limiting the scope of the term ‘terrorism,’ in order to bolster a “moral and normative stance against terrorism” and general perception of the international regime.[[116]](#footnote-116)

In this dissertation, I favour a policy-relevant approach in conceptualizing terrorism on the basis of the *de minimis* definition that I infer from definitions of terrorism taken from the domestic legislation of the 193 United Nations member states. The definition that I derive implicitly contextualizes terrorism within the international system by conceiving of states and international organizations as the primary decision-making and governance bodies or actors that terrorist activity aims to influence. This emphasis on actors of international import as the targets of terrorist influence attempts accords with liberal approaches to international relations, which understand collectives (states and private groups), and specific influential individuals as the main units of analysis in international politics.[[117]](#footnote-117) Consequently, based on the analysis above, I have developed the following definition of terrorism:

the intentional threatening, or taking of criminal action designed to influence a state, an international organization, or another decision-making body’s taking of action or failure to take action by intimidating the general population. (Such actions include, but are not limited to, perpetrating homicide, actions that result in serious physical injury to persons, and the damage or destruction of property.)[[118]](#footnote-118)

It is noteworthy that the definition of terrorism that I establish in this chapter concretely establishes the relationship between state(s) and terrorists as diametrically opposed to one another. Moreover, this definition also implicitly reinforces that states are the institutions that constitute legitimate actors in the context of the international system.

The next chapter (Chapter 4) considers questions of legitimacy and the state and will elaborate upon the implications associated with the type of actors that my definition of terrorism suggests are legitimate in the context of the international system. I then tie the idea of what constitutes a legitimate international actor to the manner in which written media coverage depicts terrorism in Chapter 5. Defining terrorism in the manner established in this chapter also plays a significant role in informing my decision to use data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) to test the quantitative correlation between written mass media coverage of terrorism and state legitimacy in Chapter 6. While the GTD definition of terrorism, at first glance, differs from my policy definition of terrorism in several respects, it ultimately incorporates the *same* four core elements included in the definition of terrorism that I established in this chapter.[[119]](#footnote-119) To that end, the GTD definition of terrorism is largely in accordance with my understanding of terrorist activity as a means of post-modern warfare perpetrated against the state.[[120]](#footnote-120) I will further elaborate on the coherence of the two definitions of terrorism in the context of the quantitative analysis of the correlation between the media coverage of terrorism and state legitimacy described in Chapter 6. Finally, the definition of terrorism that I establish in this chapter informs my qualitative analysis as to *how* the media coverage of terrorism affects state legitimacy in Chapter 8.

Chapter 4 – Terrorism, the State, and International Legitimacy

Whether and how terrorism ‘succeeds’ is grounded in how success (or failure) is defined and measured. To that end, the definition of terrorism that I establish in Chapter 3 conceives of the relationship between the state and terrorists as predicated on their diametric opposition to one another. This relationship is necessarily adversarial precisely *because* both actors pursue international legitimacy with the aim of establishing themself as an actor of consequence to international relations.[[121]](#footnote-121) This conception of the relationship between terrorists and the state implies states are as the *most internationally legitimate* of the actors in the international system. Fully understanding how terrorism ‘succeeds’ thus involves revisiting the legitimation claims and processes implicit to the history of the modern state. Understanding this relationship is also integral to my hypothesis that media coverage of terrorism erodes and damages the state’s international legitimacy because, to be effective, terrorism breaks down the perception that the state – as an institution – has the exclusive monopoly over the legitimate use of force.

For the purposes of this hypothesis, I take Max Weber’s definition of the state as “the human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force” as my point of departure in understanding the state as an institution.[[122]](#footnote-122) I also allude to the continually evolving nature of state interests and identities.[[123]](#footnote-123) Put simply, the state’s international legitimacy derives from its ability to protect civilians residing in the territory over which sovereignty is claimed.[[124]](#footnote-124) The state is, in short, an effective and time-tested response to a human security dilemma. Moreover, this correspondence between sovereignty, territory, and legitimacy is integral to the contemporary state as an institution. This correspondence also establishes the international system as constituted by a perceived balance of power that is independent of the recognition of states as clearly defined, centrally controlled, independent entities that recognize one another’s sovereignty and territory.[[125]](#footnote-125)

In Chapter 4, I argue that terrorism ‘succeeds’ by breaking down the perception that the state has the exclusive monopoly over the legitimate use of force. To that end, I conceptualize international (state) legitimacy as the *ends* (objective) of terrorism as a means of post-modern warfare. First, I outline the narrative from the existing literature on statehood that understands states as the critical enterprise of the international system as a whole. This narrative takes the perspective of traditional IR theory (classical realism and liberalism) that sees the Peace of Westphalia as the starting point for the emergence of the modern state. Then, I review extant scholarship on (state) legitimacy. I make the case that extant scholarship generally agrees that *at least one* of three underlying components – legality, justification, and consent – must be incorporated in any proposed definition of (state) legitimacy. I suggest that a significant shortcoming of the existing literature stems from its disproportionate focus on state activity and task performance at the *domestic* level. Next, I use insights from this analysis to differentiate between the state’s domestic legitimacy and the international legitimacy of the state *as an institution.* To accomplish this, I reconcile David Beetham’s three-fold conception of legitimacy with a critical constructivist framework based on Ayşe Zarakol and Mark Shirk’s scholarship addressing the relationship between terrorism and (state) legitimacy, and Ian Clark’s scholarship on legitimacy in international society. This approach allows me to extend Beetham’s understanding of legitimacy as predicated on its constituent elements to *systemic* international (state) legitimacy. This supports my hypothesis that international (state) legitimacy is inherently predicated on the (international) public’s perception of states’ abilities to fully ensure their constituents’ security within their sovereign territory.[[126]](#footnote-126) Finally, I conclude Chapter 4 by extending the understanding of terrorism proposed in Chapter 3 to discuss *why* terrorism is necessarily detrimental to the state’s international legitimacy. Thus, Chapter 4 ultimately argues that terrorism intrinsically challenges the perception of the state as the *exclusive* territorial power in the international state system with the monopoly over the (legitimate) use of force.

Subsequently, Chapter 5 elaborates on the resulting suggestion that terrorism aims to break down perceptions of the state’s international legitimacy, proposing that terrorists seek to delegitimize the state in this manner by provoking media coverage of their violent (political) activities. Crucially, this facilitates an understanding of the state’s international legitimacy that provides the foundation for my Chapter 7 analysis of *how* the media coverage of terrorism damages the state’s international legitimacy. This understanding of legitimacy also acts as the foundation for my Chapter 7 analysis of *how* the media coverage of terrorism damages the state’s international legitimacy.

Statehood

International Relations (IR) scholarship emphasizes the relevance of legitimacy to theories of the state, international regimes, and institutions. Colored by its formal emergence as a discipline in the immediate aftermath of World War I, initial IR scholarship sought to understand how power politics caused ‘the war to end all wars.’ Those collective efforts resulted in the interconnected theoretical frameworks that endeavor to explain the behavior, actions, and interactions of states. Consequently, historical IR scholarship conceives of the international system as constituted primarily by the actions and interactions of state actors in their relations with one another.[[127]](#footnote-127) This scholarship effectively establishes state actors as the dominant actors within international relations. Exemplifying this conception of international relations, the creation of the international political system in the aftermath of the First and Second World Wars was premised on this idea of states as the primary actors of relevance in the international arena. For these reasons, older theoretical frameworks such as classical realism and liberalism focus on states as the primary units of analysis relevant to understanding international politics.[[128]](#footnote-128) Ultimately, the primacy of the state in this regard supports the argument that the international system is a “(modern) ordering activity:” a way for states to collectively ensure that they retain power and authority.[[129]](#footnote-129) By retaining both power and authority, states provide order and security on a predictable and daily level for their citizens.

The state’s primacy in the international system begs the following questions: *how* did states become the influential actors they are in the global arena? Moreover, *why* have states been able to maintain primacy in a system that has continued to evolve and is an increasingly crowded geopolitical space? Prevalent theories of sovereignty propose that sovereignty, as a practice, involves the “claim [to] the supremacy of the govern[ing authority]… over the people, resources, and, ultimately, over all other authorities within the territory it control[s].”[[130]](#footnote-130) Correspondingly, sovereignty is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations as “the sovereign equality [of member states].”[[131]](#footnote-131) (Liberal theorists conceive of the United Nations as an ultimate manifestation of the “open and rule based international order” for which they are proponents.)[[132]](#footnote-132) Put simply, does sovereignty solve a succession problem? Locating sovereignty in the state rather than in the person of a ruler or governing authority means that the state “lives on” regardless of personage or regime type.

Classical realists and liberals both consider the institutional origins of the modern state as emerging from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.[[133]](#footnote-133) This claim is essential not only to notions of statehood in International Relations (IR) but also to my conception of the international politics as an enduring struggle for international legitimacy. In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War, a war of religion between the Catholics and the Protestants that had resulted in over 7.5 million casualties.[[134]](#footnote-134) To put the significance of this statistic into context: in Germany, “about 40% of the rural population” and 33% of the urban population lost their lives between 1618 and 1648.[[135]](#footnote-135) While neither the Catholics nor the Protestants achieved a clear victory in the context of the conflict, the Peace of Westphalia brought order to Europe by formalizing the status quo on the basis of its codification of the conflicting parties’ consensus on the following three principles:

1. *Rex est imperator in regno suo* (“An emperor in his own realm”): the acknowledgement that a king is the emperor in his own territory and is therefore not subject to any higher political authority.[[136]](#footnote-136)
2. *Cuius regio, eius religio* (“His realm, his religion”): “the denial of a role for religious authority in secular matters” through the formal recognition that a king is solely responsible for determining the religion that is to be endorsed in his territory.[[137]](#footnote-137)
3. The mutual recognition of sovereignty among states, such that no state should emerge as superior and try to assert control over other states.[[138]](#footnote-138)

These ideas are key to informing modern conceptions of sovereignty. The first principle, *rex est imperator in regno suo*, formalized the recognition of kings as legitimate, independent, and equal in relation to one another. This represents a transition from hierarchical relationships to more horizontal relationships between polities. The second principle, *cuius regio, eius religio*, explicitly references religion in establishing that, as the ruler of his own realm, the king has the inherent right to not have others interfere in his decision making and internal state affairs. The final principle inspired states to work to establish a balance of power to preserve this newly established horizontal relationship among themselves. As perhaps the first codified theory of sovereignty theory, the Peace of Westphalia facilitated the *sharing* of political authority in a way that enabled the co-existence of states.

The evolving Westphalian conception of sovereignty is coherent with the later Weberian definition of the state as “the human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” when it is understood in relation to the role that the nineteenth century “nationalization” and “territorialisation” of culture’s manufacturing of identity play in establishing the nation-state as the “unitary body in which sovereignty rest[s].”[[139]](#footnote-139) Westphalia formalized the norms that went to establishing correspondence between sovereignty, territory and legitimacy. Moreover, the overall, cumulative effects of Westphalia lead to the establishment of states as clearly demarcated, centrally controlled, independent entities that recognize one another’s sovereignty and territory.[[140]](#footnote-140) That being the case, the argument that I make in this dissertation sustains the idea that the enduring legacy of Westphalia is its codification of the existence of a political ordering system premised on co-existing sovereign states. Westphalia is thus not only about statehood and sovereignty, but (international) *legitimacy* as well.

Notwithstanding the emphasis on legitimacy as integral to Westphalian statehood, theories of sovereignty also feature significantly in conceiving of the modern state. Two distinct theoretical conceptions of contemporary (state) sovereignty have developed out of rationalist and reflectivist IR theory.[[141]](#footnote-141) Rationalist theory sees sovereignty manufactured through “discourse, practice, and for value satisfaction; and a degree of institutionalization and hierarchy.” This conception of sovereignty suggests that the state exists as a polity at the same level as other, similar polities such as “tribes, empires, corporations, trading leagues, city-states, rebel groups, religions, [and] private groups.” By contrast, reflectivist sovereignty sees the state as a specific type of polity, thus explicitly establishing that the terms “state” and “polity” cannot be understood as synonymous with one another. In this context, the term “polity” refers to an organized political entity, while a “state” is a *specific* type of polity produced by sovereignty (conceived of, here, as the practice of drawing boundaries around political authority).[[142]](#footnote-142) This implies that states inherently possess some underlying feature that distinguishes the institution of the state from other entities. As well, analyzing sovereignty using a reflectivist framework effectively frames both states and the international system as ideational constructs. In this context, the state is conceived of as having its interests and identity shaped and transformed by the practice of international relations.[[143]](#footnote-143)

By seeing the state as a continually evolving practice, constructivist scholarship suggests that “the international system is bound by intersubjectively held beliefs about the “social identity of the state and the basic parameters of rightful state action.”[[144]](#footnote-144) For Ayşe Zarakol and Mark Shirk, the constructivist understanding of the international system amounts to a “(modern) ordering activity:” the state’s “project [to] reduc[e] indeterminacy through classification and comparison.”[[145]](#footnote-145) Accordingly, Jef Husymans argues that “the state system… aim[s] at… the destruction of strangers, or more generally strangehood,” as a way for states to collectively ensure that they individually retain authority in international relations.[[146]](#footnote-146) His view of destruction can be understood as the way that states try to assure their individual security within the wider international system. Moreover, Husymans’ claim alludes to post-modern understandings of what Richard Ashley labels “the anarchy problematique” as predicated on “certain assumptions regarding sovereign[ty].”[[147]](#footnote-147)

Richard Devetak asserts that claiming “the state system… aim[s] at… the destruction of… strangehood” assumes that there is an inherent dichotomy between sovereignty and anarchy that is predicated on the understanding of the two terms as “mutually exclusive and exhaustive.”[[148]](#footnote-148) In making this argument, Devetak concurs with Ashley’s claim that as the opposite of anarchy, sovereignty necessarily requires “a domestic realm of identity, homogeneity, order and process guaranteed by legitimate force.”[[149]](#footnote-149) Reciprocally, he constitutes the “outside” of the sovereign state – so, the practice of international relations (and, by extension, the international system) – “an anarchical realm of difference, heterogeneity, disorder and threat.”[[150]](#footnote-150) Similar to the notion that Westphalia established correspondence between sovereignty, territory and legitimacy, Ashley argues that states seek to repress “any traces of anarchy that reside within them” in order to clearly establish the sovereign state as a direct contrast to the anarchy that pervades the international system.[[151]](#footnote-151) For this reason the state needs to eliminate “transversal struggles” within its borders because these struggles weaken the state as the embodiment of this “clearly identifiable and demarcated sovereign identity.”[[152]](#footnote-152) The Weberian definition of the state as “the human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” is necessarily one of the assumptions underlying the idea that “transversal struggles” can weaken state sovereignty. This interplay between Weber and Ashley is made evident through their mutual employment of zero-sum thinking in conceiving of sovereignty and “the legitimate use of force” as finite resources.[[153]](#footnote-153) Weber’s definition of the state combined with Ashley’s claim that the nature of the state necessitates its elimination of any internal conflicts, buttress my argument that an ultimate objective of a state is to secure *international legitimacy*. To that end, I examine the key IR scholarship on legitimacy in the next section.

Legitimacy

IR scholarship emphasizes the relevance of legitimacy not only to theories of the state, but also to the international regimes and institutions that comprise the international system. A “structural condition deriving from social practice,” legitimacy involves a belief in “some sort of external approval” of an actor’s exercise of authority.[[154]](#footnote-154) Broadly speaking, IR scholars tend to agree that legitimacy is an actor’s “right to rule.” [[155]](#footnote-155) However, they have failed to reach a consensus on the specific set of conditions from which the state’s “right to rule” derives.[[156]](#footnote-156) This is a significant shortcoming of extant scholarship on legitimacy. Another problem with existing legitimacy scholarship is that it tends to focus on conceptualizing legitimacy in relation to the authority that the state exercises *domestically*,within its sovereign borders.

My understanding of international (state) legitimacy depends on the (international) public’s perception of the degree to which states are able to ensure their constituents’ safety within their sovereign territory. Taken in conjunction with one another, these ideas lead me to argue that terrorism – as elaborated in Chapter 3 – is detrimental to the state’s international legitimacy because terrorist activity implicitly (and also explicitly by the actions undertaken) challenges the perception that the state is the exclusive territorial power with the monopoly over the (legitimate) use of force.

To explain *why* terrorism is detrimental to states, I find it necessary to differentiate between domestic state legitimacy and the international legitimacy of the state *as an institution*. I accomplish this by using a critical constructivist framework to reconcile Ian Clark’s work on legitimacy in international society with David Beetham’s three-fold conception of legitimacy. While I appreciate that my definition is not legitimacy in its totality from the perspective of many disciplines, for the purposes of this dissertation, international (state) legitimacy is understood as the state’s “right to rule.” Moreover, this view of legitimacy is based on the international community’s perception that

1. the rules the state imposes (or tries to impose) are valid (*legality*);
2. that its actions accord with accepted societal norms (*justification*); and
3. that its exercise of authority occurs with the consent and/or support of its constituency (*consent*).

My understanding of international (state) legitimacy thus depends on the (international) public’s perception of the degree to which states are able to ensure their constituents’ safety within their sovereign territory. Taken in conjunction with one another, these ideas lead me to argue that terrorism – as I conceive of it in Chapter 3 – is detrimental to the state’s international legitimacy because terrorist activity implicitly challenges the perception that the state is the exclusive territorial power with the monopoly over the (legitimate) use of force.

What is (State) Legitimacy?

The general consensus in IR scholarship is that, broadly speaking, legitimacy is an actor’s “right to rule.”[[157]](#footnote-157) Notwithstanding, there are discrepancies in how different scholars conceptualize legitimacy because there is no scholarly consensus as to the conditions from which this “right to rule” derives.[[158]](#footnote-158) A close-reading of more than 30 scholarly definitions of legitimacy suggests that for the most part, IR and political science scholarship conceptualizes this “right to rule” as predicated on at least one of three constituent elements:

1. *Legality,* understood as the recognition of the validity of rules (that the legitimate entity supports or endeavors to impose on its constituents);[[159]](#footnote-159)
2. *Justification,* understood as the “generalized perception of the assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions;”[[160]](#footnote-160)
3. *Consent*, understood as subordinate (constituent) actions that indicate its acceptance of the dominant’s “right to rule.”[[161]](#footnote-161) (In other words, “the extent to which [constituents’ acceptance of its governors’ “right to rule” is] confirmed in practices demonstrating compliance.”)[[162]](#footnote-162)

This idea that any of all of the abovementioned three elements play a key role in defining legitimacy is supported by David Beetham’s proposal for a tripartite understanding of legitimacy. Beetham conceives of legitimacy as an attempt at “justification,” in response to the fundamentally contested nature of political power. He asserts, “[legitimacy as justification] is so problematical, societies will seek to subject it to justifiable rules, and the powerful themselves will seek to secure consent to their power from at least the most important among their subordinates.”[[163]](#footnote-163) Aoife McCullough extends this argument, contending that Beetham’s establishment of three dimensions on which “all legitima[tion claims] rel[y]” suggests that “people’s perceptions of legitimacy are influenced by the justifications provided by an authority” and vice versa.[[164]](#footnote-164) As such, she outlines Beetham’s argument that legitimate authority “conforms to established rules which are… “justifiable in terms of people’s beliefs” with “evidence of consent by the subordinate.”[[165]](#footnote-165) To that end, both Beetham and McCullough portray legitimacy as an attempted justification of an actor or an entity’s power that endeavors to demonstrate the consent of the actor or entity’s (relevant) subordinates, as well as performatively demonstrate the legality of the actions taken by the actor and what they purport to represent.

Notwithstanding the existing scholarship’s tendency to rely on at least one of three constituent elements (legality, justification, and consent) in defining legitimacy, it can also be categorized in terms of framing the underlying nature of legitimacy. In this respect, the two dominant schools of thought in the scholarly literature differ due to rationalists’ framing of legitimacy *as an attribute*, on the one hand, and reflectivists’ conception of legitimacy as fundamentally *relational*, on the other.

Rationalist IR theory (namely, classical realism and liberalism) tends to regard international legitimacy as “a property or characteristic of regimes that satisfy criteria laid out by the observer,” which frames legitimacy as predicated on an *absolute definition*.[[166]](#footnote-166) This *attributional* understanding of legitimacy is based on an actor’s ability to meet specific, predetermined standards that exist independent of the actions and inactions of the actor itself. Attributional conceptions of legitimacy are implicitly rooted in the assumption that legitimacy is a quasi-material quality to be sought, acquired, and possessed through an actor’s successful employment of power. In the context of rationalist theories that emphasize the roles played by norms and institutions, then, legitimacy is seen as an almost fungible commodity – a quality that can be earned and ‘banked’ so that it can be used at will by the actor in question. Accordingly, Uriel Abulof asserts “policy legitimates authority and polity, which may then legitimate identity,” summing up rationalist notions of attributional legitimacy by conceiving of legitimacy as a self-perpetuating cycle (a feedback loop).[[167]](#footnote-167) In other words, actors’ actions and inactions justify their claims to authority and specific territory. This justification then labels them as having the “right” to wield this power and authority going forward.

While rationalist IR theories share a joint conception of legitimacy as *attributional,* reflectivist frameworks (namely, constructivism) assert that international legitimacy is inherently *relational*. Reflectivist conceptualizations of international legitimacy as relational stem from the idea that legitimacy can only be conferred to an actor by that actor’s constituents – the (subordinate) actors that are directly affected by the actions of the (legitimate) actor, and upon whom that actor exerts power. Similarly, constructivist scholars posit that legitimacy is an ideational construct, conferred on the basis of subordinate beliefs and perceptions of the appropriateness of the actions and inactions of their dominant.[[168]](#footnote-168) In a constructivist view, perceptions and social meanings constitute the key determinants of behavior relating to international politics.[[169]](#footnote-169)

Constructivists define legitimacy as “refer[ring] to the boundaries of the acceptable within a given social community, and… therefore set[ting] out the limits of sustainable social practice.”[[170]](#footnote-170) On a basic level, legitimacy is the manifestation of an actor’s belief “that [a] rule ought to be obeyed” because it “constitute[s] an appropriate use… of power.”[[171]](#footnote-171) As such, legitimacy is a norm reflecting a constituent perception and interpretation of the actions of their dominant regime or actor. Thus, as a reflectivist paradigm, constructivism opposes tenets of rationalism that contend that assumptions and structures influence actions and beliefs.[[172]](#footnote-172) Instead, constructivists argue, beliefs and actions *create* assumptions and structures. While rationalists assert that states can actively manufacture international legitimacy, constructivists contend that the state’s international legitimacy is a consequence of the beliefs that constitute states as states.[[173]](#footnote-173) So on the one hand, rationalists argue that the “right to rule” that is legitimacy derives from legitimate states’ actions. Reflectivists, on the other hand, emphasize that legitimacy derives from the assumptions that constitute states to begin with.

Scholars’ inability to agree on what conditions determine an actor’s “right to rule” is a significant shortcoming of the existing legitimacy scholarship. Such lack of consensus prevents scholars from establishing an explicit definition of legitimacy, which effectively renders legitimacy into the category as a latent concept. Nevertheless, latent concepts cannot be measured directly. The idea that legitimacy is a latent concept thus seems to be a barrier hindering my proposed quantitative analysis of whether and how terrorism affects international (state) legitimacy. Notwithstanding, Kenneth Bollen and Richard Lennox explain that there are, in fact, two different approaches that allow for the measurement of latent concepts so that they can be quantitatively analyzed.”[[174]](#footnote-174) The first of these methods involves determining and amalgamating the measurement of “lower order constitutive (what they call ‘cause’) variables that conceptually *define* the higher order concept.”[[175]](#footnote-175) This method provides an effective way to measure a latent concept as long as we have found data that reliably and validly captures the subtypes themselves… and properly aggregated it.”[[176]](#footnote-176) The second way to measure a latent concept is by identifying “substitutable (what they call ‘effect’) variables… [that] are… posited [to have a] close correlation to the invisible concept we are trying to measure.”[[177]](#footnote-177) This second method is said to “provid[e]… an empirical solution to the aggregation problem” because it weights “ indicators that seem to ‘clump’ together in factor analysis or correlation matrices.”[[178]](#footnote-178) These two approaches are widely considered to result in effective operational definitions because “measures can be viewed as causes of latent constructs.”[[179]](#footnote-179)

The methodological validity of this approach is widely accepted by quantitative IR scholars and political scientists. Moreover, the first method described by Bollen and Lennox (using constitutive variables to measure a latent concept) is already used to quantify *domestic* state legitimacy in extant IR and political science research.[[180]](#footnote-180) Appreciating that there are many different perspectives on what constitutes legitimacy, I use *legality*, *justification* and *consent* – the three ‘cause’ variables associated with legitimacy that I identify in this chapter – as proxies through which to quantify international (state) legitimacy in accordance with Bollen and Lennox’s first method in Chapter 6.

Domestic vs. International (State) Legitimacy

Another shortcoming of the extant legitimacy scholarship is its tendency to focus on *domestic* state legitimacy. That is, the authority that state actors exercise within the territory over which they individually claim sovereignty – *inside* what Ashley terms the “realm of identity, homogeneity, order and process.”[[181]](#footnote-181) In the context of rationalist legitimacy scholarship, some of this narrow focus can be attributed to rationalist IR theory’s implicit conception of international relations from the perspective of states. Classical realism and liberalism conceive of state legitimacy from a domestic perspective because of their shared understanding that the focus of international relations is ensuring that states adhere to rules, norms, and commitments.[[182]](#footnote-182) This joint premise places states at the center of International Relations, assuming that state motivations constitute the point of departure for any discussion of concepts relating to international relations. Reflectivist scholarship (particularly constructivism) opposes the essentialist view of inherent and timeless features to the international system. Reflectivism in IR rose to prominence as the foil of rationalist IR paradigms in the aftermath of the Cold War and placed an overwhelming focus on state behaviour and motivation. Constructivism, then, understands the behaviour of states as constituted by the actions and motivations of their lower order (constituent) actors.

By contrast, my research specifically discusses *international* (state) legitimacy – the legitimacy of the state as the primary international institution of note in international relations. I distinguish between understandings of legitimacy specific to domestic authority and conceptualizations of legitimacy within the international system and the conduct of international relations. To that end, English School theory plays a key role in my understanding and conception of (state) legitimacy.

English School legitimacy scholarship focuses on *international society* as the framework in and through which legitimacy is affected. As such, English School theory does not view states as “rational actors” that are able to form beliefs. Instead, English School scholars suggest that the state’s international legitimacy necessarily involves the inference of assumptions underlying state decision-making on the basis of actions that the state has undertaken (and conversely, refrained from taking).[[183]](#footnote-183) English School scholarship on legitimacy is also notable because it is the seminal scholarship that specifically conceptualizes *international* legitimacy (as opposed to the domestic legitimacy associated with a specific state and its governance). English School theory extends understandings as to the types of actors, actions and interactions that comprise of international relations, amalgamating classical realist and liberal perspectives. Thus, the English School is premised on the central claim that the international system, while anarchical in structure, forms a “society of states” wherein interests play integral roles in shaping international politics.[[184]](#footnote-184)

Integral for discussions about legitimacy, the English School conceives of a “triad,” consisting of a realist “international system,” a rationalist “international society,” and a revolutionist “world society” as three distinct but interconnected spheres that operate simultaneously to constitute international relations.[[185]](#footnote-185) In this way, the English School expands the classical realist and liberal conceptions of the material capabilities of states, suggesting that roles played by ideas, norms and interests to be taken into account.

In accordance with the tenets of English School theory, Ian Clark categorically separates between “principles and practices of international legitimacy” and “principles and practices of domestic legitimacy.”[[186]](#footnote-186) Clark’s conception of legitimacy has “two faces”— “rightful membership,” and “rightful conduct.”[[187]](#footnote-187) Clark understands these “two faces” of legitimacy as *mutually constitutive*: per Clark, legitimacy “possess[es]… both an inward [(domestic)] and an outward [international] dimension” that are inherently interrelated and interdependent.[[188]](#footnote-188) Clark further extends this two-fold conceptualization of legitimacy, ultimately suggesting that “rightful membership” is “the key instrument for generating ‘rightful conduct.’”[[189]](#footnote-189) In simple terms, Clark argues that the structure of international society embodies rules for identifying which actors get to ‘count’ as members (whose consent matters), which is inherently tied to ‘rules’ governing the types of member conduct that are appropriate on a domestic level.

Clark’s claim that legitimacy has two mutually constitutive “faces” is ultimately compatible with this notion of legality, justification, and consent as the constituent elements comprising international legitimacy. While Clark’s “rightful membership” directly corresponds with the “consent” described in the IR scholarship, and his “rightful conduct” is based on notions of the validity of any rules and requirements legitimately imposed on subordinates, the relevance of justification is less immediately evident. In terms of its practical manifestation, justification is necessarily a post-hoc attribute. That is to say, the idea that “the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate…” can only be established in the aftermath of the actions themselves having been undertaken, if such a determination is “confirmed in [constituent] practices demonstrating compliance”.[[190]](#footnote-190) Justification establishes a reaction to actions and inactions used to substantiate international legitimacy claims, and is thus less intrinsic to conceptualizing legitimation claims (practices of international legitimacy as they manifest in process), specifically in the context of international relations.

Like Clark, Ayşe Zarakol also differentiates between domestic and international (state) legitimacy. She analyzes the historical trajectory of the state’s international legitimacy, arguing that the modern state eclipsed the religious and localised modes of authority by claiming political authority on the basis of “the consent of the governed” – its constituents. She contends that Westphalian statehood overrode the personal mode of authority by appropriating the jurisdiction that had previously been reserved for religious authorities, rationalizing its increasing interference in its citizens’ private lives by “promis[ing] a more stable, better, peaceful… society.”[[191]](#footnote-191) Ultimately, Zarakol categorizes terrorism as either “system affirming” or “system threatening” based on of the type of legitimacy claimed by its perpetrators.[[192]](#footnote-192) Terrorism based on local authority is “system affirming,” because “these claims to legitimacy can be accommodated within the modern state system’s ordering principles.”[[193]](#footnote-193) Per Zarakol, this type of terrorism tends to constitute “a contained problem,” targeting only the legitimacy of specific *states.* For example, nationalist-secessionist organizations like the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Irgun that emerged as “quasi-rational response[s] to contradictions in the modern state project.”[[194]](#footnote-194) Per Zarakol, while the terrorism perpetrated by these organizations does “superficially threaten” the security of the state “by creating uncertainty and muddling the stranger/enemy distinction,” this kind of terrorist activity “does not endanger the ontological security of states at a profound level.”[[195]](#footnote-195)

Zarakol contrasts “system affirming” terrorism with “system threatening” terrorism, which she conceives of as “rejecting the ontology of [the] modern state… system altogether” by dismissing all notions of external authority over the individual.[[196]](#footnote-196) In light of this rejection of the state as an institution, “system threatening” terrorism derives from claims of personal authority and religious authority.[[197]](#footnote-197) For example, Al Qaeda: an organization whose leadership, Zarakol asserts, is “rhetorically clear in the fact that it has no interest in maintaining the organizing principle of Westphalian sovereignty in the event of its triumph.”[[198]](#footnote-198) Thus, for Zarakol, the difference between “system affirming” domestic legitimacy and “system threatening” *international* legitimacy is tantamount to whether or not the type of authority claimed by the terrorists can be accommodated within the Westphalian order.[[199]](#footnote-199)

In the context of this dissertation, terrorism’s ‘success’ is predicated on its efficacy, which intrinsically relates to its ability to undermine the legitimation claims that support the state’s “right to rule.” The definition of terrorism that I establish in Chapter 3 establishes that terrorism ‘succeeds’ when it influences a state or an influential international actor’s decision-making processes by constituting itself a threat to the state or organization’s constituents. The question of whether and how terrorism ‘succeeds’ thus refers to whether and how terrorism furthers the legitimation claims of its perpetrators. Conceiving of terrorist activity in this manner, in conjunction with Weber’s understanding of the state as “the human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” suggests that (state) legitimacy is grounded on constituent perceptions of the state’s ability to protect them in the territory over which it claims sovereignty.

To that end, ‘successful’ terrorist activity necessarily demonstrates that the state is unable to effectively secure its territory, which to an extent amounts to revoking a legitimation claim as having monopolized the use of force within its borders. This is because territorial sovereignty and state authority based on the monopoly of the legitimate use of force have replaced the traditional personal, local, and religious modes of authority upon which legitimacy and legitimation claims were predicated prior to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. For that reason, the perpetration of terrorist activity is *also* a pursuit of legitimacy: one that necessarily comes at the expense of the legitimacy of the state as an institution. This conception of the pursuit of international legitimacy as a zero-sum game exists by virtue of the modern Westphalian state replacing and discarding the traditional personal, local, and religious modes of authority upon which pre-modern legitimation claims are based.

Conclusion

In this dissertation, I conceive of whether or not terrorism succeeds as predicated on its efficacy in achieving its objectives, which intrinsically relate to its ability to undermine the legitimacy claims that support the state’s “right to rule.” As specified both earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 3’s definition of terrorism, terrorism succeeds when it influences the state’s decision-making processes by constituting itself a threat to the constituents of the state. Taken in conjunction with the Weberian understanding of the state as “the human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force,” the state’s international legitimacy is predicated on its subordinates’ perceptions of its ability (as the *legitimate* governing power) to protect them in its sovereign territory. Thus, the perpetration of ‘successful’ terrorism, by its very existence and continued success as by violent and ongoing stabilization, demonstrates that the state does not hold the *exclusive* monopoly over the legitimate use of force in its territory. If it did, there would be no terrorism. Notions of Westphalian statehood have effectively institutionalized the values that supported the establishment of the modern state is having subsumed the traditional personal, local, and religious modes of authority underlying legitimacy claims, particularly in the aftermath of the Peace of Westphalia.

For that reason, I argue that terrorism inherently involves violent sub-state actors’ pursuit of international legitimacy, which necessarily erodes the state’s international legitimacy. Given this intrinsic connection between terrorism and historical accounts of the state, the integral feature of terrorism, as a phenomenon, is not the means by which it is perpetrated, the modes of violence that it employs, its indiscriminate fear-inducing nature, or the motivations underlying its perception. Instead, the crucial factor implicit in any conceptualization of terrorism is the sub-state actor’s demonstrated use or threatened use of force that undermines the state’s international legitimacy (therefore constituting what Zarakol terms “system threatening”).[[200]](#footnote-200) Ultimately, terrorism undermines the state’s international legitimacy because its (international) legitimacy claims cite the traditional personal and religious modes of authority that the establishment of the state necessarily rendered obsolete.[[201]](#footnote-201)

The next chapter (Chapter 5) moves to a practical discussion of media coverage as constituting the operational level (*mode*) that provides for terrorism’s ability to affect the state’s international legitimacy. To that effect, Chapter 5 deconstructs the manner in which print media coverage has and had depicted terrorism. In order to do this, such coverage is contextualized within the media production cycle. The understanding of international legitimacy established in this chapter (Chapter 4) informs both the quantitative analysis that I undertake in Chapter 6 (which analyzes *whether* media coverage of terrorism affects the state’s international legitimacy), and the mixed methods analysis that I undertake in Chapter 7 (which examines *how* media depictions of terrorism affect the state’s international legitimacy). More specifically, the theoretical foundation established in this chapter (Chapter 4) informs my quantitative operational definition of the state’s international legitimacy as predicated equally on its three constitutive variables: legality, justification, and consent. As I explain in further detail in Chapter 6, I derive the values for ‘legality’ and ‘justification’ using data from the Fragile States Index (FSI) maintained by the Fund for Peace, on the basis of the conception of international legitimacy as the normative expression of the justification for an actor’s “right to rule” that I establish in this chapter (Chapter 4). (Significantly, FSI bases its state legitimacy measure on factors relating to government effectiveness and international perceptions thereof, in accordance with an understanding of legitimacy as a form of social contract deriving from consent.) Meanwhile, I use member state voting attendance at substantive United Nations General Assembly votes to establish the values used to quantify ‘consent’.

Chapter 5 – Terrorism and the Media

In Chapter 4, I argue that challenges to the perception of the state as the *exclusive* territorial power with the monopoly over the legitimate use of force are an intrinsic feature of terrorism. Terrorism’s ability to mount this challenge depends on the messaging that perpetrators impart to the state’s constituents.[[202]](#footnote-202) This begs the following question: how do terrorists communicate with a state’s population to persuade them that the state cannot fully control the use of violence within its borders? Media and terrorism scholars tend to either focus their analyses on a conception of terrorism as “propaganda of the deed,” or, argue that there is a ‘symbiotic relationship’ between terrorism and the mass media. Both these scholarly foci suggest that media coverage of terrorism serves to amplify the immediate effects of the incidents of terrorism. The analysis of the interplay between terrorism and the media undertaken here aligns with this general view but differs in conceiving of media coverage as the ‘operational level’ through which terrorism (as the ‘means’) is able to affect the ‘ends’ of damaging the state’s international legitimacy. Put simply, the media coverage of terrorism amplifies the message that the terrorists are trying to convey by perpetrating violent incidents. To that end, I argue that media coverage is ultimately the factor that makes terrorism effective because it facilitates terrorism’s ability to damage the state’s international legitimacy. As established in Chapter 4, terrorism aims to break down perceptions that the state, as an institution, has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force by provoking media coverage of its violent (political) activities. In this chapter, I argue that media coverage of terrorism facilitates this objective by amplifying the impact of terrorism, as well as its perpetrators’ grievances and/or demands. It is this amplification that ultimately delegitimizes the state as an institution. Moreover, media coverage of terrorism provides terrorists with an (internationally legitimate) platform and makes space for terrorists’ talking points within the hierarchy of the public agenda. This contributes to the international public’s perception of terrorists’ legitimacy, which necessarily detracts from the state’s international legitimacy (the legitimacy of the state as an institution).[[203]](#footnote-203)

This chapter also centres on my argument that media coverage’s amplification of terrorism’s effects is ultimately what makes terrorism effective and allows it to succeed. To that end, I deconstruct the way that the written media coverage of terrorism depicts terrorism and situates it within public discourse. First, I review existing scholarship on the media coverage of terrorism and the nature of the relationship between terrorists and the mass media. Here, I stress the issues that arise from the literature’s overwhelming focus on conceptions of terrorism either as “propaganda of the deed,” or in the context of the so-called ‘symbiosis’ between terrorism and the media. I argue that this narrow focus on only two facets of the interplay between terrorism and media coverage contributes to extant scholarship’s failure to explicitly link media coverage’s ability to amplify the effects of terrorism to terrorism’s ability to succeed. Then, I build on this argument by examining how the publication of written news influences both public opinion and discourse about terrorism. My resulting understanding of media influence leads me to consider media coverage the “line of communication” between terrorists and the state’s constituents. This perspective on the interplay between terrorism and media coverage supports my conception of media coverage as the ‘mode’ that corresponds to terrorism as the ‘means’ (and international legitimacy as the ‘ends’) of post-modern warfare. Next, I identify and discuss mechanisms through which media coverage exerts influence. More specifically, I examine the interplay between media bias and framing. I conclude that bias can manifest as framing in media coverage, which informs the way that I depict media coverage’s creation, codification and circulation of narratives surrounding terrorist activity in this dissertation. I also utilize communications, linguistics, and English literary scholarship to identify different types of bias indicators that I use to argue that the media coverage of terrorism damages the state’s international legitimacy in Chapter 7. Finally, I examine the way that bias and framing come into play in the different stages of the media production cycle. My analysis of this process calls attention to specific actors’ abilities to inject bias into media coverage at different stages of the production process, specifically highlighting the role that international news agencies and their respective style guides play in the creation and global dissemination of English language news. This overview of the media production process justifies my decision to focus the analysis in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 on media coverage of terrorism produced by *Reuters*, the *Associated Press* (AP) and *Agence France-Presse* (AFP) – the three “outfit[s]… of global reach” essential to the production of global news.[[204]](#footnote-204)

Chapter 5 thus builds on the understanding of terrorism established in Chapter 3, and the conception of the relationship between terrorism and the state’s international legitimacy put forward in Chapter 4 to argue that media coverage of terrorism – terrorists’ behavior, actions, and inactions – erodes the state’s international legitimacy by exposing the general population to the implication that the state is no longer the power with the monopoly on the legitimate use of force in its territory.Crucially, this chapterestablishes AP, AFP and *Reuters* as the discourse units whose media coverage of terrorism I use to analyze whether and how media coverage of terrorism affects international (state) legitimacy in this dissertation.

Propaganda of the Deed

A significant subset of existing scholarly literature that addresses the connection between the mass media and terrorists conceives of terrorism as “propaganda of the deed.”[[205]](#footnote-205) This conceptual tradition involves the strategic use of symbolic violence, implying that an inherent objective of terrorists is to garner media attention.[[206]](#footnote-206) Historically, notions of “propaganda of the deed” originate in the same time period that saw the introduction of anarchism in Italy. However, it is important to note that the ideological genesis of “propaganda of the deed” significantly predates the establishment of the term itself.[[207]](#footnote-207) Significantly, the historical genesis of “propaganda of the deed” clarifies the motivations underlying its inception, which serve to distinguish the *anarchist* “propaganda of the deed” from arguments relating to the media coverage of terrorism.

The evolution of “propaganda of the deed” dates back to 1857, when Carlo Pisacane, the Neapolitan revolutionary who initiated the uprisings that ultimately provided for the overthrow of the Bourbon Monarchy in 1859, argued against “propaganda of the idea.” This suggested “ideas spring from deeds and not the other way around.”[[208]](#footnote-208) Instead, Pisacane advocated for “cooperating with the material revolution,” which, he specified, involves participating in “conspiracies, plots, [and] attempts.”[[209]](#footnote-209) While Pisacane was a casualty of the 1857 uprising, his notion of “propaganda of the deed” proliferated. The notion was further developed by anarchists Errico Malatesta, Carlo Cafiero, and Emilio Covelli, as evidenced by Malatesta and Cafiero’s failed Benevento insurrection in 1877.[[210]](#footnote-210) Although the Italian theory of “propaganda by the deed” played a significant and influential role in anarchists’ discussions of various types of revolutionary propaganda in the 1870s, it involved “a method of insurrection not political assassination.”[[211]](#footnote-211) Indeed, the 1880s saw “a very broad acceptance of the term [propaganda of the deed]” that “extended far beyond political violence.”[[212]](#footnote-212) At that time, “propaganda of the deed” was understood to refer to “any act of revolt, even when the act was not performed consciously to elicit support for the anarchist cause.”[[213]](#footnote-213)

Outside of Italy, “propaganda of the deed” surfaced in “Letters to a Frenchman on the Present Crisis,” an 1859 collection of writings that comprise the contributions of Russian revolutionary anarchist Mikhail Bakunin to the theory and practice of revolution. Regarding the importance of “propaganda of the deed,” Bakunin asserts “we must spread our principles, not with words but with deeds, for this is the most popular, the most potent, and the most irresistible form of propaganda.”[[214]](#footnote-214) Practically, the “propaganda of the deed” proposed by Bakunin originated with Sergei Nechayev’s development and implementation of the ideas of revolution conspiracy, and propaganda.[[215]](#footnote-215) Bakunin and Nechayev’s conception of “propaganda of the deed” served as inspiration for Nikolai Morozov’s *Narodnaya Volya* (trans. *The People’s Will*), a revolutionary political organization that operated in the Russian Empire in the mid-to-late 19th century.[[216]](#footnote-216) The first modern terrorist group, *Narodnaya Volya* often employed “propaganda of the deed” methods. A notable example of this is *Narodnaya Volya’s* employment of “propaganda of the deed” in connection with both its 1881 attempted assassination of Tsar Alexander II, and its successful assassination of the Tsar later that year.[[217]](#footnote-217)

Anarchists officially endorsed “propaganda of the deed” at the London Social Revolutionary Congress in 1881. The Congress resulted in the adoption of the resolution that “the time has come, to shift from the period of assertion to the period of action, and to add to verbal and written propaganda… propaganda by the deed and insurrectional action.”[[218]](#footnote-218) The Congress’s endorsement formalized “the very broad acceptance of the term… [that] prevailed in the early 1880s” in anarchist circles.[[219]](#footnote-219) Significantly, as scholars like Constance Bantman and Marie Fleming note, this conception of propaganda of the deed as “any act of revolt, even when the act was not performed consciously to elicit support for the anarchist cause” extended far beyond political violence.”[[220]](#footnote-220) This understanding of propaganda of the deed is in accordance with theories of illegalism. While, as Bantman asserts, illegalism is generally “closely connected with early twentieth century French individualist anarchism,” the theory was also used near the end of the nineteenth century to refer to “the anarchist tolerance of a wide range of unlawful actions” that went towards undermining the capitalist order.[[221]](#footnote-221)

The 1880s played a significant role in the trajectory of “propaganda of the deed,” in that this time period saw the notion of propaganda of the deed “transfer from theory to action.”[[222]](#footnote-222) *Narodnaya Volya*’s successful assassination of Tsar Alexander II at the end of 1881 marked the inception of a series of violent attacks that scholars like Max Nettlau have described as “attacks by contagion.”[[223]](#footnote-223) Indeed, French anarchist Antoine Cyvogt set off a bomb in a Paris café less than a year after the assassination of the Tsar, and “a series of bomb plots and assassinations in [took place in] Germany” between 1883 and 1885.[[224]](#footnote-224) Subsequent to the incidents in Germany, anarchist Charles Gallo perpetrated an attack on the Paris stock exchange in 1886.[[225]](#footnote-225) “Anarchists” in the United States also executed the Haymarket bombing in Chicago that same year.[[226]](#footnote-226) In accordance with Nettlau’s description of these attacks as “attacks by contagion,” Richard Bach Jensen argues that although the aforementioned violent incidents “had little direct connection with anarchist ideology” they “came to be seen as anarchist” due to the support that their perpetrators received within anarchist circles.[[227]](#footnote-227) Supporting Jensen’s argument, Fleming notes that the early 1880s saw “a very broad acceptance of the term [propaganda of the deed]”… as ‘any act of revolt, even when the act was not performed consciously to elicit support for the anarchist cause.”[[228]](#footnote-228) Ultimately, the support that the sporadic instances of “propaganda of the deed” of the 1880s received from the anarchist community writ large, in turn, facilitated these incidents’ influence on “subsequent anarchist views on the use of violence.”[[229]](#footnote-229)

Manifestations of propaganda of the deed in the 1890s – which Jensen terms “the decade of regicide”– came in stark contrast with the sporadic violent attacks that had been characterized as “propaganda of the deed” in the 1880s.[[230]](#footnote-230) Between 1894 and 1901, propaganda of the deed claimed the lives of French President Sardi Carnot; Spanish Prime Minister Antonio Canovas; King Umberto I of Italy; and United States’ President, William McKinley.[[231]](#footnote-231) Austrian Empress Elisabeth also became a victim of “anarchist” propaganda of the deed during the same time period.[[232]](#footnote-232) In addition to the role that it played in the assassinations of the aforementioned heads of state, propaganda of the deed resulted in the deaths of over 200 people throughout the Western world between 1878 and 1914.[[233]](#footnote-233) The same instances of propaganda of the deed were also responsible for injuring more than 750 people – the vast majority of whom were “illegitimate [civilian[ targets such as ‘innocent men, women, and children.’”[[234]](#footnote-234) While propaganda of the deed had “always [been] a minority creed and pursuit” within the greater anarchist community, the human cost associated with its implementation rendered “political violence… one of the most polarising issues within the [anarchist] movement.”[[235]](#footnote-235) This caused the anarchist community at large to “mostly – if not unanimously – reject… [propaganda by the deed] from the mid-1890s onwards.”[[236]](#footnote-236)

Ultimately, the anarchist community’s widespread rejection of propaganda of the deed in the 1890s hearkens to the schisms that formed amongst anarchist factions when initial conceptions of “propaganda of the deed” brought about questions as to whether violence is one of its necessarily inherent features. It thus makes sense that there are differing conceptualizations of the interplay between violence and “propaganda of the deed” in existing scholarship. As well, the resurgence of “propaganda of the deed” scholarship in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks has generated considerable discussion as to the nature of any relationship between terrorism and “propaganda of the deed.”[[237]](#footnote-237) In arguing that the relationship between terrorism and media coverage is necessarily different from historical understandings of “propaganda of the deed,” I challenge the claims that terrorist strategy involves the employ of “propaganda of the deed” that are pervasive to the scholarly literature.

Extant scholarship generally accepts that propaganda of the deed and terrorism can work in tandem.[[238]](#footnote-238) This compatibility is explained by Neville Bolt’s claim, “Today’s war is a war of words and ideas” – violent acts only have longevity within public consciousness if they are explicitly tied to a specific cause or objective. [[239]](#footnote-239) Accordingly, scholars like Randall Law, Matt Carr, Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin conceive of propaganda of the deed as constituting a strategy that informs the actions that revolutionaries take in an effort to affect change.[[240]](#footnote-240) Similarly, Ariel Merari argues that propaganda of the deed represents the first stage of an insurgency struggle.[[241]](#footnote-241) By contrast, scholars including James Billington, Marie Fleming and Walter Lacqueur assert that propaganda of the deed is used to *rationalize* revolutionaries’ decision to employ violent means.[[242]](#footnote-242) Laqueur, in particular, views propaganda of the deed as a *post hoc* justification for terroristic violence.[[243]](#footnote-243) As such, notions of propaganda of the deed as a rationale for using violence implicitly assume that violence begets propaganda of the deed. Conversely, the argument that propaganda of the deed constitutes a strategy conceives of violence as a consequence of propaganda of the deed.

There are also differing scholarly treatments of propaganda of the deed. The dominant conception of propaganda of the deed considers it a strategy. Indeed, scholars including Matt Carr, Kristy Kate Campion, Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin conceptualise propaganda of the deed as informing terrorist actions so that they ultimately serve a larger objective.[[244]](#footnote-244) Similarly, Randall Law asserts that propaganda of the deed is a “cornerstone of terrorist strategy.”[[245]](#footnote-245) Notwithstanding, there are dissenting scholarly opinions that consider propaganda of the deed a concept, or alternatively, a strategy. Notably, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) conceives of propaganda of the deed as a “multi-event narrative with symbolic and rhetorical significance [that] trigger[s] deep-seated grievances.”[[246]](#footnote-246) RUSI asserts that propaganda of the deed “transcends an operational technique.”[[247]](#footnote-247) Also of note is Nicholas O’Shaunessy and Paul Blaines’ argument that propaganda of the deed should be considered a “genre of symbolic communication.”[[248]](#footnote-248)

Conceiving of terrorism as propaganda of the deed is problematic first and foremost because doing so perpetuates historical misunderstandings of the relationship between anarchy and violence. Such misunderstandings tend to stem from an underlying misconception that conflates anarchy and violence (and, in a similar vein, anarchy and terrorism).[[249]](#footnote-249) These misunderstandings become further entrenched when terrorism is conceptualized as propaganda of the deed because propaganda of the deed originates in the anarchist movement.[[250]](#footnote-250) Further exacerbating this conflation, propaganda of the deed first achieved general recognition during a time period that saw the anarchist movement as a whole blamed for the actions of select individuals that used bombs and violent acts in an attempt to further their (anarchist) political goals.[[251]](#footnote-251)

On an ideological level, anarchists and terrorists conceive of terrorism – and the use of violence in general – very differently from each other. For some anarchists, terrorism is one of a variety of possible strategies that can be employed in furtherance of their opposition to “hierarchical forms of government associated with the nation state.”[[252]](#footnote-252) Moreover, “propaganda of the deed was always a minority creed and pursuit” within the greater anarchist movement – a consequence of many anarchists’ rejection of violence.[[253]](#footnote-253) Conversely, violence – terrorism – is terrorists’ tactic of choice in their efforts to damage the state’s international legitimacy. Thus, “parallels between” anarchism and terrorism “lie less in the perpetrators’ ideology and *modus operandi* than in the [state’s] reception and instrumentalisation of” instances of violence that anarchists and terrorists perpetrate in furtherance of their respective causes.[[254]](#footnote-254) Terrorism is perpetrated against the (innocent) inhabitants of the state, generating fear. As elaborated upon in the previous chapter (Chapter 4), I hypothesize that this threatened or realized perpetration of violence affects the state’s inhabitants’ support of the state and its policies. I argue that this diminished level of support for the state occurs because on a theoretical level ‘successful’ terrorism undermines the international legitimacy that is implicitly granted to the state by the consent of the international community. Terrorists conceive of the international public as targets that can be weaponized against the enemy constituted by the state. Anarchists, on the other hand, aim to ignite the “spirit of revolt” in the general population by “demonstrating that the state is not omnipotent.”[[255]](#footnote-255) To that end, anarchists conceive of the general population as potential allies and seek their ‘enlightenment,’ rather than to terrorize, kill, or destroy them because they are the constituents of the state.

The Symbiosis between Terrorism and the Mass Media

A second recurrent theme in the existing literature about the media coverage of terrorism characterizes the interplay between terrorism and the mass media as a “symbiotic relationship.”[[256]](#footnote-256) This scholarship tends to focus on the centrality of violence to terrorism’s manifestation *as a communication technique*. After the perpetration of terrorism, the media then amplifies the terrorists’ message by disseminating information about the incident. Michel Wieviorka notes that this perspective dates contemporary terrorism to the series of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijackings that opened with the attack on El Al flight 426 in 1968.[[257]](#footnote-257) According to Wieviorka, the PFLP hijackings exemplify the notion of reciprocal interest that assertions of the “symbiotic relationship” between terrorists and the media are ultimately based upon, in that “terrorists provide the media with the sort of public spectacle they need to satisfy their audience… while the media, for their part, supply the terrorists with an immediate audience… on a potentially planetary scale.”[[258]](#footnote-258) Here, scholars like Brigitte L. Nacos disagree with Wieviorka. Nacos specifically argues that, prior to Hezbollah’s 1985 hijacking of Trans World Airlines flight 847, international terrorism was regarded as “merely a nuisance.”[[259]](#footnote-259) Nacos provides statistics to substantiate this claim: viewed from the perspective of the United States (US), the effect of the international terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s was inconsequential when contrasted with the homicide statistics in major US cities.[[260]](#footnote-260) At a point when the effects of terrorism were, for the most part, limited to casualties resulting from terrorist incidents, the 387 American citizens killed by terrorist attacks in 1983 (at the time, an astronomical statistic), was a mere half of the nearly 800 homicides perpetrated that year in the city of Chicago alone.[[261]](#footnote-261) Notwithstanding, Nacos and Wieviorka concur that hijacking incidents are ultimately the factor that catalysed the increase in both policymakers and scholars’ focus on terrorism. Wieviorka posits that this “may be explained in terms of the reactions that the media… provoke in response to [terrorist] acts which are, intrinsically, of limited immediate impact.”[[262]](#footnote-262)

Wieviorka also differs from scholars like Nacos in that he challenges the notion of a symbiosis between terrorists and the media altogether. Instead, Wieviorka proposes a four-fold typology of “relational modes” that can exist between the two sets of actors, from the perspective of the terrorists: pure indifference, relative indifference, media-oriented strategy, and a total break with the broader community.[[263]](#footnote-263) To an extent, Wieviorka subscribes to the view that doubts whether the media serves as an important factor in the formulation of terrorists’ operational strategies, because it is unclear to what extent public opinion influences decision makers, especially in connection with matters of foreign affairs and security.[[264]](#footnote-264)

In 1997, Paul Wilkinson published a specific challenge to “Wieviorka’s dismissal of the claim that there is a symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media.”[[265]](#footnote-265) To that end, Wilkinson refutes Wieviorka’s claim as to the four distinct types of relationships that can exist between terrorists and the media, arguing that the “spectacular acts of destruction or atrocity” of attempts to bolster the credibility of their threats inherently and necessarily attract media attention because they provide “an endless source of sensational and visually compelling news stories capable of boosting audience/readership figures.”[[266]](#footnote-266) Notably, Wilkinson asserts that in “attempting to spread terror… some channel or medium of transmitting information… will inevitably be involved,” because perpetrators of terrorist activity “want… to obtain… the aura of legitimation that… media attention gains for them.”[[267]](#footnote-267) Nacos extends Wilkinson’s argument, coining the term “mass-mediated terrorism” to describe a phenomenon wherein “most terrorists calculate the consequences of their carefully planned strikes” and in doing so, endeavor to hijack the “media [in its capacity of] provid[ing] lines of communication between public officials and the general public.”[[268]](#footnote-268) Accordingly, Nacos conceives of a “triangle of communication” that depends upon the role played by the media in facilitating communication between domestic publics and their governments.

Wilkinson and Nacos both argue that terrorists make use of a multi-phase, rational strategy that involves perpetrating an attack in order to achieve widespread media coverage.[[269]](#footnote-269) Scholars that take this position – like Wilkinson and Nacos – believe that the changes in communication technology that occurred throughout the 1990s are a key reason that a “new terrorism” has emerged.[[270]](#footnote-270) Conceived of in this manner, the strategic goal of “new terrorism” is to intimidate the public and affect pressure to influence decision-makers’ enacting of policies to help further the terrorists’ agenda.[[271]](#footnote-271) Wilkinson’s perspective on the relationship between terrorist activity and media coverage is also representative of key scholarly claims about mass-mediated contagion relating to terrorist activity.[[272]](#footnote-272) “A contagion effect,” Brian Jenkins explains, with “heavy media coverage of hijackings, kidnappings and other hostile seizures carried out by terrorists increas[es] the likelihood that similar incidents will occur in the period immediately following.”[[273]](#footnote-273) Notably, the contagion effect hypothesis is substantiated by Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn’s quantitative analysis of media reporting of terrorist incidents, which concludes that there is “considerable evidence of a contagion effect wrought by [media] coverage [of terrorism].”[[274]](#footnote-274)

The interplay between Wilkinson and Wieviorka represents one of the two predominant schools of thought as to whether terrorists collectively, consciously and strategically solicit media attention. A second debate that emerges in the scholarship relating to the “symbiotic relationship” between terrorists and the media involves arguments as to the emergence of a “new” terrorism. Proponents of the “new terrorism” thesis argue that “new” terrorism is “more lethal, more likely to inflict catastrophic harm on target societies, and more often the work of religious or pseudo-religious groups or individuals.”[[275]](#footnote-275) A terrorist organization that is considered to have perpetrated “new” terrorism is Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese doomsday cult whose membership carried out the 1994 Matsumoto and 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attacks.[[276]](#footnote-276) In contrast, “old terrorism” is characterized as having negotiable and limited goals.[[277]](#footnote-277) To that end, an often-cited example of “old” terrorism is the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA).[[278]](#footnote-278) Martha Crenshaw suggests that proponents of the “new terrorism” thesis view perpetrators of “old terrorism” as “presumably sensible terrorists whose objectives were realistic and pragmatic.”[[279]](#footnote-279) Hoffman’s assertion that “secular [“old”] terrorists regard violence either as a way of instigating the correction of a flaw in a system that is basically good or as a means to foment the creation of a new system” further supports this point.[[280]](#footnote-280) The violence initiated by the IRA is considered “old” terrorism because it was perpetrated in pursuit of “nationalism and territorial autonomy” – what Crenshaw deems “understandable and tangible” goals.[[281]](#footnote-281) Moreover, the IRA instigated violence using tactics that were proportionate to their stated objectives. Namely, in their conflict with the United Kingdom – a State – the IRA employed similar tactics to those that States tend to use in the context of conventional (inter-state) warfare.

To further elaborate: the “new terrorism” thesis suggests that a “distinctively religious terrorism” emerged in the early 1990s.[[282]](#footnote-282) Asserting that the ‘ends’ of “new” terrorism are both unlimited and non-negotiable, proponents suggested the objectives of “new terrorism” as originating in religious doctrines that center on “transformational and apocalyptic beliefs*.*[[283]](#footnote-283)This scholarship assumes that “new terrorists” exist in diametric opposition to the values and culture associated with Western civilization.[[284]](#footnote-284) In this vein, Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin emphasize that “the new terrorism differs fundamentally from the more familiar politically motivated terrorism” on the basis of its lack of two specific features: “a plausible political agenda,” and “constraints on violence.”[[285]](#footnote-285) Likewise, Laqueur observes that “new” terrorism is “indiscriminate in the choice of its victims” because it aims to inflict “maximum destruction.”[[286]](#footnote-286) Laqueur attributes this objective to the religious fanaticism of “new” terrorists, who, he argues, suffer from delusion and persecution mania.[[287]](#footnote-287) To an extent, Hoffman also concurs with the “new terrorism” thesis, concluding that “new terrorist organizations embrace far more amorphous religious and millenarian aims, and wrap themselves in less-cohesive organizational entities, with more diffuse structure and membership.”[[288]](#footnote-288) Aum Shinrikyo’s decision to deploy a chemical weapon against civilians conforms with the idea that “new” terrorists are “eager to cause the largest possible number of casualties among their enemies and also be willing to sacrifice any number of their own in the process.”[[289]](#footnote-289) To that end, the violence enacted by Aum Shinrikyo befits the kind of “unprecedented lethality” that is said to characterize “new” terrorism because, for “new” terrorists, “the means have become an end in themselves, not a way of reaching an audience other than the[ir] deity.”[[290]](#footnote-290) In the case of Aum Shinrikyo, the “unprecedented lethality” of the sarin attack is often attributed to their desire to, in accordance with their religious beliefs, instigate a final conflict that would culminate in a nuclear Armageddon and usher in the End of Times.[[291]](#footnote-291)

Crenshaw and other critics of the “new terrorism” thesis argue that contemporary terrorism “is not a fundamentally or qualitatively new phenomenon but grounded in an evolving historical context.” Crenshaw argues that differences in the method and manifestation of twenty-first century terrorism are “of degree rather than kind.”[[292]](#footnote-292) She criticizes Hoffman’s argument that the “new” “religious” terrorists constitute uniquely isolated “outsiders” that do not see themselves as “components of a system worth preserving, arguing that “accounts of a “new” terrorism… [are] not… grounded in sufficient knowledge of history or understanding of contemporary terrorism.”[[293]](#footnote-293) Crenshaw also notes that Hoffman and other proponents of the “new terrorism” thesis make a false equivalency between the “creation of a new system” and “fundamental changes in the existing system,” in part because “it is not clear whether there is a chronological dimension [to the “new” vs. “old” terrorism debate”].”[[294]](#footnote-294) As such, Crenshaw queries whether we should “assume that the “new” [terrorism has] replac[ed] the old? [If so,] when was the transition [between the two]?”[[295]](#footnote-295) Gideon Rose also questions the historicity of the “new terrorism” thesis, asserting that it “would have been accurate… a century earlier, when a loose-knit transnational movement quite literally devoted to the promotion of anarchy wreaked havoc across the globe.”[[296]](#footnote-296) Additionally, Niall Ferguson bolsters Crenshaw and Rose’s arguments in asserting, “there are [historical] precedents for nearly all the elements of the attacks of September 11; the only real novelty was their *combination*.”[[297]](#footnote-297)

Another theme that recurs in scholarship that addresses the symbiosis between terrorism and the media involves the nature of the media’s role in its relationship with terrorism. In this regard, David L. Paletz and John Boiney note the existence of “two diametrically opposed camps: those that indict the media as pro-terrorist and those that indict the media as antiterrorist.”[[298]](#footnote-298) Kevin Barnhurst identifies scholars that “see… the media as ‘culpable,’ instrumental to terrorism,” while others “argu[es] that the media are ‘vulnerable,’ victims themselves of the manipulation by terrorists, yet not directly responsible for their deeds.”[[299]](#footnote-299) Moreover, scholars like Alex P. Schmid and Yonah Alexander argue for media’s culpability, arguing that the media become “co-participants” in the terrorism that is perpetrated.[[300]](#footnote-300) Similarly, Raphael Cohen-Almagor suggests a weaker variant of this hypothesis. Thus, Cohen-Almagor states that “problematic and irresponsible” media coverage of terrorism has resulted in the media furthering the terrorists’ objectives, and acting contrary to the interests of the government in combatting terrorism.[[301]](#footnote-301) To that end, such scholarship tends to place overwhelmingly critical focus on problems caused or perpetuated by the mass media. Extant scholarship on the interplay between terrorism and media coverage has gotten sidelined from what it *ought* to be focusing on. I diverge from this trend by arguing that properly understanding both the interaction between terrorism and media coverage, *and* how terrorism works in a more general sense necessitates understanding that media coverage of terrorism is ultimately the ‘mode’ that provides for terrorism’s efficacy.

The scholarship focused on the interplay between terrorism and the media as a “symbiotic relationship” is a fundamental misunderstanding, and to that end also a misrepresentation of the nature of the mass media***.*** Most significantly, this errant conception of the media emerges in extant scholarship’s use of the term “media” in an indistinct manner that ultimately “conflate[s] communication technologies, content carried by media platforms, and media organizations.”[[302]](#footnote-302) Moreover, indistinctly defining “media” in the context of discussions about its relationship with terrorism facilitates scholars’ mistaken constitution of media as a unitary and rational actor. By virtue of comprising many different organizations, institutions, individuals and processes, the media cannot be reduced or understood in this manner. This differentiated nature of the sources that comprise the media is further compounded by other factors including differing ownership structures and diverging perspectives that characterize different media outlets. Indeed, the media cannot be considered either a unitary actor or a rational actor because it does not possess a single, centralized decision-making authority.[[303]](#footnote-303) Overbroad generalizations of the terrorism and media symbiosis thesis notwithstanding, the media also does not have universal, standardized objectives or a streamlined thought process.[[304]](#footnote-304) Disproving the notion that the media is a unitary and rational actor ultimately undercuts a key tenet undergirding the media-terrorism symbiosis scholarship. Doing so also exposes the existing scholarship’s failure to integrate insights from the media and communications studies literatures. Indeed, much of the literature addressing the purported symbiosis between terrorism and the media “is stuck in the [twentieth] century”, in that it relies on ideas analogous to theory that communications and media scholars have since “deemed unsatisfactory… and replaced [with] more nuanced models.”[[305]](#footnote-305) The communication and media studies literatures are explicitly relevant to the media-terrorism symbiosis scholarship because they largely focus on the role that the media plays in connection with public opinion, and the role of propaganda, which is conceived of as a form of deliberate control of narrative and the proliferation of information.[[306]](#footnote-306) To that end, the existing scholarship’s failure to integrate connections from these literatures is surprising, given Wilkinson’s argument that “when one says terrorism… one also says media… [because terrorism] depends on communicating a threat to the wider society.”[[307]](#footnote-307)

The academic literature also assumes a truism that media amplify the effects of terrorism. To wit, L. John Martin asserts that terrorists seek to reach a “large audience” and further, that in their quest to reach this audience, terrorists “have learned to exploit the media’s own modus operandi to maximize their reach.”[[308]](#footnote-308) Notwithstanding, both Martin and extant scholarship in general fail to deconstruct the amplification process itself. Moreover, scholars have long neglected to focus on the role that the amplification process by its very nature plays in terrorism’s realization of its objectives. Instead, the literature tends to focus on the outcome of the media’s having amplified the terrorist message. This suggests the enduring relevance of Marshall McLuhan’s argument that “the medium is the message.”[[309]](#footnote-309) To elaborate, this McLuhanesque view understands information transmitted as media coverage as ultimately comprising two layers: the message manifested by its substantive content, and the often-overlooked message conveyed by the character of the medium used to relay the content itself.[[310]](#footnote-310) As such, media coverage’s amplification of terrorism constitutes a message that the terrorism itself (as well as its perpetrators’ grievances and objectives) is important enough to warrant space on the public agenda. Indeed, the status conferral function of media coverage proposed by Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton parallels this approach by suggesting that media attention increases the prestige of specific issues in the eyes of the public by legitimizing specific events and occurrences.[[311]](#footnote-311) As per Lazarsfeld and Merton, this legitimization is bolstered by the media’s extensive and repetitive highlighting of terrorism and terrorist incidents.[[312]](#footnote-312) One of the more noteworthy, contemporary examples of media coverage’s ability to elevate the prestige of an incident is the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. The extensive and repetitive coverage of these attacks by news outlets around the world not only informed the public about the events but also amplified the impact of the attacks on a global scale. The continuous airing of footage showing the planes crashing into the World Trade Center towers, along with interviews with survivors, experts, and policymakers, reinforced the perception of terrorism as a grave threat to national security. The repetitive coverage of the September 11 attacks across broadcast, print and online media also contributed to legitimizing the War on Terror and shaping public attitudes and policy responses towards counterterrorism efforts. The disproportionate media attention afforded this subject matter also provides for terrorism’s prominence on the public agenda’s hierarchy of issues and incidents that are considered important.[[313]](#footnote-313) To that end, agenda setting theory is also relevant to proposals that media coverage draws public attention to certain topics, issues, and ideas and thereby increases their visibility and relevance.[[314]](#footnote-314) In basic terms, it does not matter *what* the media is saying about terrorism. The fact that time and attention is devoted to terrorism *at all* keeps terrorists relevant to the public and legitimizes them, their actions, and their cause. Moreover, such coverage also securitizes terrorism as a threat.

To conclude: neither the scholarly literature that addresses the purported ‘symbiosis’ between terrorism and the media nor the “propaganda of the deed” literature facilitates a complete and fulsome understanding of the interplay between media coverage, terrorism, and public sentiment. Specifically, these literatures are underdeveloped and lack nuance. Notably, they fail to explicitly link the role that the media plays as an amplifying factor for terrorism to any ‘success’ that it achieves. The most problematic aspect of the extant literature is an implicit conceptualization of media amplification of the effects of terrorism and underlying messages as a mere by-product of the relationship between terrorism and media. To rectify this flaw, I integrate theoretical insights from the communications and media studies literatures, as well as methodology and operational definitions from existing linguistics and English literary scholarship. This interdisciplinarity ultimately illustrates my argument that media coverage is the *‘mode’* corresponding to the ‘means’ of post-modern warfare constituted by terrorism.[[315]](#footnote-315) For this reason, I argue that media coverage’s amplification of the effects of terrorism is ultimately what makes terrorism effective.

The Media and Political Communication

The effect that terrorist activity has on the state’s international legitimacy depends on its perpetrators’ ability to communicate with a wider audience through their behavior, actions, and inactions. The media plays an integral role to this communication process because of the role that it plays in mediating between important actors (particularly governments) and their constituencies.[[316]](#footnote-316) Media coverage – news stories produced, framed and disseminated to the international public by the journalists, editors and publishers that comprise the communications industry – exerts significant influence on the shaping of public opinion, which, in turn, affects public policy decision-making.[[317]](#footnote-317) Media coverage exerts this influence largely through its description and framing of terrorism, which is presented as news. Thus, as an institution the media has not just influence but actual power in the traditional International Relations (IR) sense of the word.[[318]](#footnote-318)

Political scientists like Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz conceive of power as “participation in decision-making.”[[319]](#footnote-319) Power, as reflected and constituted in and through the media context, goes one step further: rather than simply “participating” in decision-making, the media at least partially defines the *trajectory* of the decision-making processes through an ability to determine the type and scope of discussion about “important” and “unimportant” policy issues. Thus, the amount of influence that the media potentially has over the state’s constituents is greater than the influence that politicians might be able to realize in the same context. As per agenda setting theory, “the media salience of political issues increases the salience of those issues in public opinion.”[[320]](#footnote-320) Thus, the media both *have* power and are in control of the medium (sphere) in which this power can be operationalized effectively. Put in different terms, the media constitute both the *means* and the *mode* of power. In this context, bias – the media’s demonstration of its inclination in favor of or against the incidents of terrorism that it describes – also plays a significant role. While manifold and systemic biases are inherent in the structure of any political ecosystem, ultimately determining what can be debated and discussed, the media has the power to change the structure of the system itself.[[321]](#footnote-321) Of course, the media only have this ability in jurisdictions where states do not directly or independently control the mass media. While this understanding of bias seemingly gives the media a tremendous amount of agency, the media can only report on “information that is actually being generated by social processes.”[[322]](#footnote-322) While media may provide and privilege an amount of commentary and embellishment, media coverage is necessarily reflective of trends in societal discourse and, most significantly: of what is going on in the world.[[323]](#footnote-323)

This dissertation is informed by Neo-Marxist conceptions of the media as tending to support and reinforce elite (in this context, state) control at a societal level. This classic Neo-Marxist conception of the media is an extension of Gramsci’s argument about hegemony, where elites control cultural sensibilities, and that this control facilitates elite domination over the working class. I use an extension of Fanon’s work because it not only bolsters my conception of the media as a tool, but also supports Zarakol’s argument as to “system threatening terrorism” being necessarily predicated on localized authority. This conceives of terrorists’ successful exercise of influence in connection with the media as a demonstration of terrorists’ local authority in the context of the international system.[[324]](#footnote-324) Accordingly, I extend Frantz Fanon’s claims about the relevance of language and the reformation of discourse when it comes to ending colonialism to apply in the context of the conflict between terrorism and the state.[[325]](#footnote-325) In *Black Skin, White Masks,* Fanon asserts that when an individual subject to colonialism masters their colonizer’s language, this effort toward recognition as being “like” their oppressor subordinates the colonized individual’s humanity.[[326]](#footnote-326) In my analysis,, Fanon’s colonizer becomes my state, and his colonized people are thus analogous to my terrorists. This facilitates my understanding that terrorists’ use of both violence and, to a lesser extent, the media as a “line of communication” with the state’s constituents is seen by the state as “predatory and not transformative.” This also supports my understanding of the media as an implement employed by both the state and terrorists in their respective quests to influence public perceptions of systemic power. I thus conceive of the media as a ‘mode’ with the ability to influence international public opinion of the state as the societal superstructure.

Media Bias and Framing

A notable mechanism through which media coverage can influence the international public with regard to the perception of the state and terrorism involves the injection of bias into news content through framing during the media production process, to either the benefit or detriment of the state and/or terrorist(s) in question. Generally, the term ‘bias’ refers to ““an inclination or prejudice for or against one person or group, especially in a way considered to be unfair”, and as “a concentration on or interest in one particular area or subject.””[[327]](#footnote-327) Conceiving of bias in connection with both news content produced by journalists and the media as an institution seems counterintuitive to notions of journalistic neutrality, as there is near-consensus in journalism scholarship that a journalist’s key professional responsibility involves reporting the news in an accurate and objective manner.[[328]](#footnote-328) Nevertheless, academic literature outside of journalism tends to minimize and/or challenge the idea of media neutrality. Indeed, Killian J. McCarthy and Wilfred Dolfsma suggest that “by choosing what event to report, how much and how frequent[ly] to report an event, and by choosing what descriptive tone to adopt in their coverage, the media has a non-neutral impact on the economy” and thus “shapes the world in which we live.”[[329]](#footnote-329) Bias plays a key role in facilitating the media’s influence in this regard.

“Bias” in media suggests a disproportionate slant in favor of (or against) an actor or an idea in news coverage that can influence news consumers’ perception of that actor or idea. Here, it is important to note that media influence is not unidirectional. This adds an additional layer to the issue of bias, as new content should be understood as a by-product of interactions between journalists and relevant actors to their subject matter, with both parties “impacting one another throughout the process.”[[330]](#footnote-330) In contrast with general bias, Alden Williams’ classical definition of “media bias” establishes that it must be both intentional and sustained.[[331]](#footnote-331) Felix Hamborg, Karsten Donnay, and Bela Gipp elaborate on this definition, asserting that for media bias to be considered “intentional” by Williams’ standards, it must “reflect a conscious act or choice.”[[332]](#footnote-332) Moreover, they interpret Williams’ “sustained” requirement to indicate that the media bias in question must “represent a systematic tendency rather than an isolated incident.”[[333]](#footnote-333) Thus, their conception of “media bias” necessarily involves violations of journalistic standards that suggest a pervasive tendency within the media *as an institution*, rather than efforts by individual news outlets or journalists.[[334]](#footnote-334) This diverges from mainstream conceptions of bias, which distinguish between “the actual message that is being transmitted through the media” and media bias as “problems with, or implications of, the ways in which the message is being communicated.”[[335]](#footnote-335)

Notwithstanding Hamborg et. al.’s standalone definition of the term, “media bias” tends to emerge as a trend indicating (general) bias. It is important to identify different types of bias and the different ways that it manifests in news content. To that end, Sendhil Mullainathan and Andrei Shliefer’s categorize two types of bias – “ideological bias” and “spin bias” – which both occur during the writing stage described by Hamborg et. al.[[336]](#footnote-336) “Ideological bias” occurs when news is reported in a manner designed to promote a specific opinion on a given topic.[[337]](#footnote-337) Per Mullainathan and Shliefer, “spin bias” occurs when a media outlet sensationalizes its reporting to create a more memorable story.[[338]](#footnote-338) “Spin bias” is particularly prevalent in news media because it can also manifest as a component of writing style (during Hamborg et. al.’s “writing” stage) and presentation style (“editing”), in addition to fact selection (“gathering”).

Similarly, a second conception of media bias differentiates between “two classes of bias”: *epistemological bias* and *framing bias*. Consequently, Marta Recasens, Cristian Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil and Dan Jurafsky conceive of epistemological bias as focusing on the believability of a proposition. Recasens et. al. suggest that this type of bias “involves propositions that are either commonly agreed to be true or commonly agreed to be false and that are subtly presupposed, entailed, asserted or hedged in the text.”[[339]](#footnote-339) This can involve employing *factive verbs* (verbs that presuppose the truth of their complement clause), *entailments* (directional relations that hold whenever the truth of one word or phrase follows from another), *assertive verbs* (verbs whose complement clauses assert a proposition), and *hedges* (used to reduce commitment to the truth of a proposition in order to avoid bold predictions or statements). In contrast to epistemological bias, framing bias “occurs when subjective or one-sided words [that are linked with a particular point of view] are used, revealing the author’s stance in a particular debate.”[[340]](#footnote-340) Recasens et. al. emphasize that framing bias can involve *subjective intensifiers* (adjectives or adverbs that add (subjective) force to the meaning of a phrase or proposition), and *one-sided terms* (which reflect only one of the perspectives associated with a contentious issue).

In brief, framing comprises “political claims and counter-claims that appear in and dominate the content of public discourse.”[[341]](#footnote-341) The term “media framing” was first coined by Erving Goffman in 1974 as referring to the “schemata of interpretation” that stem from the human practice of “actively classify[ing] and organiz[ing]… life experiences to make sense of them.”[[342]](#footnote-342) Media framing thus serves the purpose of enabling individuals’ abilities to “locate, perceive, identify, and label.”[[343]](#footnote-343) Correspondingly, Marvin Minsky defines frames as “template[s] or data structure[s] that organize… various pieces of information.”[[344]](#footnote-344) According to Robert Entman, framing involves “select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality, and mak[ing] them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”[[345]](#footnote-345) As such, framing takes the emphasis off of *what* is being said, implicitly shifting focus to *how* the information is being presented. Moreover, Entman’s definition identifies four ways to categorize framing: suggesting the existence of a specific problem, providing a diagnosis as to the cause of the problem, evaluating the (“moral”) motivations guiding the actions of agents relevant to the problem, and recommending a solution (“treatment”) to solve the problem.[[346]](#footnote-346) Thus, media framing necessarily involves context and implies messaging.

Media framing tends to fall into four categories: literature that focuses on defining and operationalizing framing, literature that conceptualizes different typologies of frames, literature that emphasizes the use of theory in framing research, and literature that proposes methodologies for frame analysis.[[347]](#footnote-347) The existence of these subsets within the discussion solidifies a general conception of framing as the manner in which media coverage organizes and presents the material that its producers choose to cover.[[348]](#footnote-348) Put simply, framing is an abstract notion that serves to structure social meaning, influencing audiences’ perceptions of news in a way that not only tells consumers *what to think about*, but also *how to think about it*.[[349]](#footnote-349) Framing plays an integral part in this dissertation’s conceptualization of media coverage’s creation, codification, and circulation of narratives surrounding terrorist activity. For that reason, bias that emerges as framing in the context of media coverage of terrorism is significant to my Chapter 7 analysis of *how* the media coverage of terrorism diminishes the state’s international legitimacy. Bias is also important to my argument that framing ultimately legitimizes the perpetrators of terrorism by simultaneously situating their actions within the norms and values within society and increasing the impact factor of their actions.[[350]](#footnote-350) In doing the aforementioned, my work is informed by the research on discourse units which is part of the subset of scholarship on media framing that focuses on proposing methodologies for frame analysis.

In particular, I draw on methodologies pioneered by studies like L. Paul Husselbee and Larry Elliot’s 2002 research on how news coverage framed the communities in Jasper (Texas), and Laramie (Wyoming) in the wake of the James Byrd Jr. and Matthew Shepard murders that conceive of news items or articles as discourse units.[[351]](#footnote-351) In particular, Husselbee and Elliot’s study inspired both my use of keyword searches to identify media bulletins that comprise the relevant discourse units for this research.[[352]](#footnote-352) Husselbee and Elliot’s methodology also influenced my decision to use inductive analysis to both identify and develop a classification of the relevant frames in my research. Thus, I rely on their study’s correlation between “good news” and favourability, “bad news” and unfavourability in my analysis as to whether a discourse unit is damaging to the state’s international legitimacy (and therefore, beneficial to terrorism).[[353]](#footnote-353)

Media Production

Media bias that emerges in the framing of news content significantly influences news production. This influence tends to emerge in the “writing” and “editing” stages of news production described by Felix Hamborg, Karsten Donnay and Bela Gipp. I conceive of Hamborg, Donnay and Gipp’s three stages of news production as implicit development on the “news production circuit” associated with Anabela Carvalho and Jacquelin Burgess’s “circuits of communication” model. Carvalho and Burgess identify three overarching phases that communications necessarily interact with as they transition between the public sphere and private spheres of individual engagement. The first circuit associated with this model – their “news production” circuit – involves media professionals’ creation and compilation of news stories.[[354]](#footnote-354) While Carvalho and Burgess also develop successive “public dissemination” and "personal engagement" circuits, my research primarily focuses on this first circuit because it is integral to understanding how media coverage, shaped by biases, serves as a key component in the portrayal of terrorism as a means of post-modern warfare. Implicitly expanding on Carvalho and Burgess’s work, Hamborg, Donnay and Gipp subdivide the news production process into three stages: gathering, writing and editing.[[355]](#footnote-355) Their “gathering” stage involves news producers’ selection of facts and events to report on, culminating in the “commission or omission” of information that affects the perspective that the news story produced will ultimately reflect.[[356]](#footnote-356) Their “writing” stage then involves the literary creation of the news story in question, while their third “editing” stage deals primarily with the presentation style that is to be associated with the news story.[[357]](#footnote-357)

Notwithstanding the “circuits of communication” model’s initial conception specifically in relation to the media coverage of climate change, I extend the framework established by the interaction between Carvalho and Burgess’ model and Hamborg, Donnay and Gipp’s breakdown of the news production process to media coverage of terrorist activity. Extending the use of these models from media coverage of climate change to media coverage of international security issues is possible due to the similar interaction between policy decision-making, media coverage and public opinion. For that reason, I use this framework to contextualize its description of bias elements associated with the news production process that come into play even before a journalist begins writing a news story. My resulting understanding of how and when bias can surface in the news production process helps me more narrowly define the universe of media coverage of terrorism – media bulletins produced by the three international news agencies responsible for producing the majority of English language news globally – that I analyze in this dissertation.

While I outline two typologies of bias that come into play during the writing process earlier in this chapter, there is also a third typology of bias that distinguishes between “coverage bias,” “gatekeeping bias,” and “statement bias.”[[358]](#footnote-358) “Coverage bias” and “statement bias” focus on the visibility and representation (or lack thereof) of specific topics or entities in media coverage, while “gatekeeping bias” relates to which stories media outlets select (or conversely reject) for reporting.[[359]](#footnote-359) Similar to Mullainathan and Shliefer’s “ideological bias,” “coverage” and “gatekeeping” biases both come into play primarily during the “gathering” phase of the news production process outlined by Hamborg, Donnay, and Gipp.

A further factor that plays into gatekeeping bias is the increasingly instrumental role played by content sources – international news agencies – in the “gathering” stage of Hamborg, Donnay and Gipp’s news production process. The role of content sources has expanded in tandem with increased globalization, in large part due to major newspapers’ increasingly reliance on the “recycled news” that they produce and disseminate.[[360]](#footnote-360) Indeed, Jane Johnstone and Susan Forde argue that, since the introduction of cable television channels dedicated to news coverage, “the needs of a twenty-four-hour newsroom have led to a greater reliance” on sources that are individually able to provide news producers with hundreds of diverse news reports on a daily basis.[[361]](#footnote-361) Moreover, the offering of twenty-four-hour news increased the competition amongst media organizations for audience share, which, coupled with the economic considerations of these organizations’ corporate ownership, has put increased pressure on journalists to publish stories as fast as possible.[[362]](#footnote-362) This requires near-instantaneous access to information on developing stories, which has contributed to a significant reliance on international news agencies on the part of news organizations. These considerations for media outlets’ increasing reliance on content courses ultimately work with the understanding of how bias factors into the news production process delineated earlier in this chapter to justify this dissertation’s focus on the media coverage of terrorism constituted by media bulletins produced by the three international news agencies responsible for producing the majority of English language news content globally.

Style guides produced by major news agencies also serve an additional gatekeeping function that indicates the importance of a word or topic (or, the specific framing associated with that word or topic) to the public agenda.[[363]](#footnote-363) Guides published by significant international news agencies facilitate the integration of these terms and their framing “from the margin to the mainstream, and conversely ensur[e] that other forms which are not adopted remain marginal.”[[364]](#footnote-364) Moreover, “the advice journalists receive from these tools shapes the language of news reports” and this conditions the lexicon associated with the English-language international news media.[[365]](#footnote-365)

International news agencies have long “la[id] claim to journalistic resources that most news organizations could not sustain” from a practical perspective.[[366]](#footnote-366) This has led to the current state of affairs, where the basis for online news worldwide is what Chris Paterson terms the “de facto duopoly” of two news agencies:AP and *Reuters*.[[367]](#footnote-367) Further substantiating the centrality of news agencies to the news production process, Paterson finds that 85 percent of the news coverage generated by a range of major online news services constituted measurable verbatim news agency coverage.[[368]](#footnote-368) While concurring with Paterson’s conclusions as to the centrality of AP and *Reuters* as “wholesale news providers,” Phil MacGregor also cites a third international news agency, AFP, as one of the three “outfit[s]… [of] global reach” that are essential to the production of global news.[[369]](#footnote-369) Moreover, the style guides produced by these major news agencies, which set out the standards and best practices that a specific news producer expects journalists to adhere to in producing media bulletins, “become, in effect, house style decisions for thousands of other news agencies… globally.”[[370]](#footnote-370) This is, in part, due to “the[se news agencies’] status as the largest global news agencies in terms of revenue and subscribers, and thus influence.”[[371]](#footnote-371) Widespread conformity to the journalistic standards established in the *Reuters*, AP and AFP study guides also occurs for practical reasons: “if only because some of the sources that [smaller news outlets] quote use [the standards and practices outlined in these guides.]”[[372]](#footnote-372) Consequently, many analyses – including the one I undertake in this dissertation – rely on the framing of terrorism based on media bulletins disseminated by the abovementioned three international news agencies.

Conclusion

This dissertation conceives of media coverage of terrorism as the *mode* of post-modern warfare that connects terrorism as a *means* with the *ends* of delegitimizing the state as an institution. Accordingly, the understandings of the intertwined circuits of communication and media production processes, and typologies of bias and framing detailed in this chapter provide the basis for my conception of media coverage as a *mode* of post-modern warfare. A review of the existing scholarship on the interplay between terrorism and the media demonstrates two dominant tendencies: to conceive of terrorism as either “propaganda of the deed,” or of a purported symbiotic relationship between terrorists and the media. Both approaches are problematic because they fail to account for the role of the media in amplifying terrorism’s immediate effects (and thus facilitating its ‘success’ in delegitimizing the state) and thus are rejected as appropriate for the analysis undertaken here As demonstrated here, the most significant flaw in the extant scholarship about terrorism and the media is its implicit understanding of media amplification as a *by-product* of the relationship between the two actors, rather than as *the* factor that is ultimately responsible for terrorism’s efficacy at delegitimizing the state. By identifying and discussing different types of bias and media framing, this chapter advances the proposition that terrorism’s delegitimization of the state occurs as a result of the bias and framing of the state (as an institution) in media coverage. Given their significant international influence, the role that they play in setting international journalistic standards, and the fact that they are collectively responsible for generating more than three-quarters of original, international English-language news content, the three international news agencies – AP, *Reuters*, and AFP, the “outfit[s]… [of] global reach” – are the discourse units that I use to analyze the media coverage of terrorism.[[373]](#footnote-373)

In the next chapter (Chapter 6), I suggest that there is an inverse negative correlation between the media coverage of terrorism described in this chapter, and the state’s international legitimacy. This proposition, that an increase in media coverage of terrorism results in an overall decrease in the state’s international legitimacy, relies on the understanding of international legitimacy as the *ends* of terrorism that I establish in Chapter 4, in concert with the definition of terrorism that I propose in Chapter 3. Moreover, the typologies of bias and framing established in this chapter inform the methodology that Chapter 7 employs to qualitatively analyze the manner in which media coverage frames terrorism, ultimately facilitating my proposal as to *how* terrorism succeeds through the media coverage of terrorism’s delegitimization of the state.

Chapter 6 – *Does* Media Coverage of Terrorism Affect International (State) Legitimacy?

In the context of this dissertation’s overall stated objective of discussing whether and how terrorism succeeds, quantitative analysis facilitates my ability to more concretely suggest whether this relationship might exist, as well as any practical effects that it might have. Such a conclusion is not provided for by the existing scholarly literature, which largely focuses on outlining the specifics of how terrorism’s relationship with the media works and suggesting methods to combat it. To that end, this chapter builds on the literature review that I conduct in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, employing quantitative analysis to suggest that increased media coverage of terrorism decreases the legitimacy of the state as an international institution. In order to come to this conclusion, I conduct the four-part multivariable data analysis (MVA) described in Chapter 2 to establish both covariation and the magnitude of relations between the independent and dependent variables. This chapter presents the results of the aforementioned MVA. The MVA’s first component involves a Spearman correlation between (media coverage of terrorism) and (international (state) legitimacy). The second component of this analysis involves conducting Spearman correlations between (Reuters’s coverage of terrorism), (the Associated Press’s (AP’s) coverage of terrorism), and (Agence France-Presse’s (AFP’s) coverage of terrorism), and D0 (international (state) legitimacy). The third component of this analysis involves conducting simple linear regression analyses (SLRs) between and , and and . Then, the fourth and final component of this analysis involves calculating the coefficient of determination () for the correlations between, as well as each of the control variables (,, , and ) and , and , and , and , and .

Research Question and Hypotheses

This dissertation focuses on determining how terrorism ‘succeeds’ by analyzing the interplay between the media coverage of terrorism and international (state) legitimacy between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2018 (inclusive).[[374]](#footnote-374) In order to suggest how terrorism succeeds, I must first establish that it *does*, in fact, succeed. As such, the analyses conducted in this chapter are premised on the following research question:

:Does terrorism ‘succeed’?

When terrorism’s potential ‘success’ is thought of as intrinsically related to *how* it is framed by media coverage, terrorism can *only* succeed if the use of terrorism is tactically effective. Thus, in this context, terrorism *succeeds* when its perpetration strengthens its legitimacy claims which exist in direct contention with international (state) legitimacy. Since 1648, Westphalian territorial sovereignty and state authority based on the monopoly of the legitimate use of force have replaced traditional personal, local, and religious modes of authority.[[375]](#footnote-375) I contend that terrorism seeks the legitimacy conferred by these modes of authority.[[376]](#footnote-376) International (state) legitimacy, ] understood as a form of social contract deriving from consent, is predicated on the state’s ability to protect the population located in the territory over which the state claims sovereignty.[[377]](#footnote-377) The legitimacy claims associated with terrorism illustrate a state’s inability to ensure security because the social functions of media confer status and establish claims within a hierarchy created by a public agenda. Media coverage thus amplifies terrorist claims by creating, codifying, and circulating narratives that legitimize and situate actions within societal norms and values.[[378]](#footnote-378) In conjunction with my Chapter 4 contention that international (state legitimacy depends on dominant constituent perceptions of the legitimacy claims of the modern state, media coverage’s ability to amplify terrorist legitimacy claims leads me to assume for this analysis that media coverage frames terrorism in a manner that both confers status on, and amplifies terrorists’ legitimacy claims in direct contention with those of the Westphalian state.[[379]](#footnote-379) In this context, terrorism’ ‘success’ is predicated on whether terrorism furthers terrorists’ legitimacy claims, concurrently and necessarily challenging the legitimacy of the modern state. This operationalizes media coverage as a *mode* (or operational level) that links terrorism as a specific *means* (or tactical level) to legitimacy as the *ends* (objective) of post-modern warfare.[[380]](#footnote-380)

Given that the underlying premise of this research is that media coverage of terrorism propagates a narrative that directly challenges international (state) legitimacy, I hypothesize that terrorism *succeeds*.[[381]](#footnote-381) Accordingly, I formulate my hypotheses as follows:

: Terrorism ‘succeeds’ by negatively affecting international (state) legitimacy; and

: Terrorism negatively affects international (state) legitimacy because media coverage of terrorism frames the threat that terrorism poses in a way that confers status on and amplifies its legitimacy claims and demands for authority, territoriality and/or statehood.

While Chapter 7 addresses , this chapter (Chapter 6) focuses on substantiating the first hypothesis (), which suggests that terrorism is detrimental to international (state) legitimacy by using quantitative analysis to suggest the nature, scale and strength of any possible relationships between the media coverage of terrorism (, the aggregate of , , ), and international (state) legitimacy ().[[382]](#footnote-382) To accomplish this, it is also necessary to determine the nature, scale and strength of any correlation between the perpetration of terrorism itself (), and international (state) legitimacy ().

Operational Definition of Variables

Independent Variables

In this dissertation, media coverage refers to news stories produced, framed and disseminated to the international public by the journalists, editors and publishers that constitute the international news media.[[383]](#footnote-383) The specific focus is on media bulletins disseminated by three international news agencies – the “outfit[s]… [of] global reach” essential to the production of global news: Reuters, AP and AFP).[[384]](#footnote-384) When interpreted in the context of the study widely considered to be “the primary authority on news agency content,” media bulletins produced by Reuters, AP, and AFP represent over 85 percent of the news coverage generated by major news sources.[[385]](#footnote-385) This means that, by using coverage produced by these three news agencies alone, this analysis captures a very large majority of global English language news coverage for the relevant time period (2012 to 2018).[[386]](#footnote-386) To identify Reuters’ coverage of terrorism, I searched the Dow Jones Factiva Service (DJFS) database using the search string [“terror” OR “terrorism” OR “terrorist” OR “terrorists”]. I quantify AP and AFP’s coverage of terrorism by searching the NexisUni database using the same search string. Once collected, these news reports were enumerated, and the frequency of the news coverage of terrorism (relative to the overall number of media bulletins produced) calculated on an annual basis. The calculation of (the *cumulative* frequency of media coverage of terrorism) is made by aggregating the number of media bulletins relating to terrorism produced annually (by each of Reuters, AP, and AFP), relative to the total number of media bulletins that each of these news agencies produce annually. Calculating in this manner does not assign equal weight to the individual frequency of media coverage of terrorism produced by each news agency. (This may help explain why there is a strong correlation between and , weak-medium correlations between and , and and , but no correlation between and .) As such, calculating in this manner is important because it allows me to encapsulate the broader global English media environment in a single statistic.

In addition to quantifying as an aggregate measure representing media coverage of terrorism in general, I also calculate the frequency of media coverage of terrorism produced by each specific international news agency. These individual frequencies are also key to the analysis of ‘how’ media coverage of terrorism affects international (state) legitimacy undertaken in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. Isolating the frequency of each news agency’s coverage of terrorism allows me to compare and contrast *how* the publication and reporting standards of news agencies the frequency of whose coverage of terrorism correlates with notable increases and/or decreases in international (state) legitimacy differ from one another. Put simply, this lets me identify media coverage of terrorism that is more strongly correlated with increased or decreased international (state) legitimacy for more focused examination and analysis. Comparing the way that each specific news agency’s coverage of terrorism interacts with international (state) legitimacy provides the point of departure for my Chapter 7 analysis as to *how* the media coverage of terrorism activity affects international (state) legitimacy (). To that end, I classify each of these subsets of as follows:

: Media Coverage of Terrorism produced by Reuters;

: Media Coverage of Terrorism produced by AP; and

: Media Coverage of Terrorism produced by AFP.

Dependent Variable

This study necessarily differentiates between *domestic* state legitimacy and international (state) legitimacy in the broader context of the international system (*international* legitimacy). To suggest whether and how terrorism succeeds international (state) legitimacy is defined in accordance with Ian Clark’s “rightful membership… face [of legitimacy].”[[387]](#footnote-387) Clark argues that there are two ‘faces’ associated with legitimacy. Clark’s “rightful conduct” face of legitimacy comprises rules that govern the types of state conduct that are appropriate on a domestic level, while his “rightful membership” face of legitimacy specifies rules for identifying which actors get to ‘count’ as members of the *legitimate* international order.[[388]](#footnote-388) As discussed in Chapter 4, “rightful conduct” and “rightful membership” are mutually constitutive, with “rightful membership” serving as the key instrument for generating “rightful conduct.”[[389]](#footnote-389) My conception of international (state) legitimacy also takes into account David Beetham’s proposal for a tripartite understanding of legitimacy as necessarily involving *legality*, *justification*, and *consent*. I use the following sources of data (listed below) to assign annual numerical values to each *legality*, *justification*, and *consent*:

*I derive my empirical measure of legality from the World Justice Institute Rule of Law Index (RLI).* The RLI measures the extent to which country practice adheres to the rule of law, represented as an annual value () on a 0.0 to 1.0 scale. Its assessment is based on eight dimensions of the rule of law (constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, order and security, fundamental rights, open government, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice) disaggregated into forty-seven different indicators. The World Justice Project conceptualizes adherence to the rule of law as occurring when a system upholds the following four principles:

1) “The government and its officials and agents are accountable under the law.

1. The laws are clear, publicized, stable and fair, and protect fundamental rights,

including the security of persons and property.

1. The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is

accessible, efficient, and fair.

1. Justice is delivered by competent, ethical, and independent representatives and

neutrals who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the

makeup of the communities they serve.”[[390]](#footnote-390)

When the government and state officials are accountable under the law, they necessarily recognize the validity of the rules that they support. Similarly, for the enactment, administration and enforcement of the law to be considered both transparent and fair, constituents of the legitimate entity must recognize the validity of the rules that it is endeavoring to impose upon them. As such, the manner in which the RLI definition of the rule of law manifests in practice is in agreement with the definition of legality that I rely on in conceptualizing (state) legitimacy for the purposes of this dissertation.[[391]](#footnote-391) While the RLI establishes scores for a total of 112 countries in its 2016, 2017 and 2018 annual reports, my quantification of *legality* derives from the mean of the 96 country scores produced by the RLI in *all seven reports* published between 2012 and 2018. I exclude the sixteen country scores that are not included across the full seven years of data both to prevent the data from being distorted by calculating the annual statistic for each year based on a different number of data points, and in order to allow for comparison across the data.

*I quantify justification based on the measurement of P1: State Legitimacy established by the Fragile States Index (FSI).*[[392]](#footnote-392) The FSI calculates its annual state legitimacy measure (), which is based on factors relating to domestic government effectiveness and international perceptions thereof, on a 1.0 to 10.0 metric. The FSI measurement takes into account public confidence in the political process, as well as measures relating to political opposition. Of specific relevance to this study is the measurement’s consideration of “the ability of the state to exercise basic functions that infer a population’s confidence in its government and institutions. My quantification of *justification* thus derives from the mean of the FSI’s annual measurements of state legitimacy associated with specific countries.

To quantify *consent*, I rely on Clark’s claim that the structure of international society’s embodiment of rules for identifying which actors get to ‘count’ as members is inherently tied to the ‘rules’ that govern the types of member conduct appropriate on a domestic level.[[393]](#footnote-393) Clark’s “rightful membership” correlates with an implicit establishment of “consent” as a constituent element of legitimacy, where “consent” manifests as constituent actors’ actions that indicate acceptance of their dominant’s “right to rule.”[[394]](#footnote-394) This accords with this dissertation’s general understanding of legitimacy as “the right to rule.”[[395]](#footnote-395) Taken in conjunction with the political idealist camp claims that “equate the United Nations with the international system as a whole,” this allows for legitimacy to be calculated on the basis of member state voting attendance at substantive United Nations General Assembly votes. This data is extrapolated from Michael A. Bailey, Anton Strezhnev and Erik Voeten’s “United Nations General Assembly Voting Data” dataset. As such, *I base the consent portion of my international (state) legitimacy calculations on the average percentage of the 193 United Nations member states that have representatives present at each substantive vote conducted by the General Assembly () in a given year*.[[396]](#footnote-396)

Together, the abovementioned three measures for *legality*, *justification*, and *consent* comprise my dependent variable – international (state) legitimacy variable (). I weight each element associated with my operationalization of legitimacy equally, in accordance with Beetham’s implicit constitution of legality as involving three elements of equal importance. Expressed as an equation, my calculation of international (state) legitimacy constitutes

Put another way, I convert the scale variables that I derive from the RLI, FSI, and United Nations General Assembly voting data to equivalent values on a 100.0 scale. Then, I take the average of these values, giving me a fraction with a denominator of 100 (percentage) for each year of data in my sample (2012 to 2018). (So, seven values. One for each year of data.)

Data Analysis

The first component of my assessment of whether there is a negative correlation between the media’s coverage of terrorism and international (state) legitimacy involves a directional (one-tailed) test to calculate the Spearman correlation coefficient associated with four different sets of variables. The results of these Spearman correlations, as well as my calculation of the coefficient of determination () for each, are depicted in Table 6-1, on the next page.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Independent Variable** | **Dependent Variable** |  | df |  | **Significance** |  |
| Media Coverage of Terrorism | International (State) Legitimacy | 7 | 5 | -0.75 | At , | | 0.3174 |
| Reuter’s Coverage of Terrorism | 7 | 5 | -0.2857 | 0.1735 |
| AP’s Coverage of Terrorism | 7 | 5 | -0.2142 | 0.1041 |
| AFP’s Coverage of Terrorism | 7 | 5 | -0.0357 | 0.0659 |

Table 6- : Correlation Analysis of Variables

The Spearman correlations measure the strength and nature of applicability of any possible relationship between international (state) legitimacy –– and each of (aggregate media coverage of terrorism), (Reuters’s coverage of terrorism), (AP’s coverage of terrorism), and (AFP’s coverage of terrorism). To that end, the correlation between and () suggests that media coverage of terrorism and international (state) legitimacy are highly correlated in a negative manner. Put simply, this means that in the context of the data that I analyze, increased media coverage of terrorism tends to be associated with decreased international (state) legitimacy.

I also conduct Spearman correlations between and each of the individual news agencies’ coverage of terrorism that I aggregated to conceive of (, , and ). The Spearman coefficient calculated in connection with ( does not indicate any relationship between AFP’s coverage of terrorism and international (state) legitimacy. Notwithstanding, the Spearman coefficients calculated in connection with and (), and and () suggest that there are weak-moderate negative correlations between both Reuters’s coverage of terrorism and international (state) legitimacy, and AP’s coverage of terrorism and international (state) legitimacy. The existence of these correlations supports further (qualitative) investigation as to why Reuters’s and AP’s depictions of terrorism tend to correspond with a decreased level of international (state) legitimacy in the context of my data. In conjunction with the results of the Spearman correlation between and (), these statistics provide the starting point for my Chapter 8 analysis of *how* the Reuters, AP and AFP style guides influence the depictions of terrorism in the media bulletins produced by each international news agency.

Building on the Spearman correlations’ indication that there *is* an association between and and , and and , I use simple linear regression (SLR) as an additional measure and interpretation of the strength of these correlations. In contrast with Spearman correlations, which indicate the existence and strength of any association between two variables, SLR analyses evaluate the *relative impact* of an explanatory variable (i.e. aggregate media coverage of terrorism, Reuters’s coverage of terrorism, AP’s coverage of terrorism) on a particular outcome variable (i.e. international (state) legitimacy). For that reason, I use SLR to model the sets of variables that the Spearman correlations suggest are correlated with one another.

When SLR tests if the aggregate media coverage of terrorism significantly predicts international (state) legitimacy, the regression model is , depicted in Figure 6-1, on the next page.

Figure 6- : SLR Analysis of v.

According to this model, international (state) legitimacy decreases by 1.1576 percent for each one percent increase in the aggregate media coverage of terrorism when aggregate media coverage of terrorism is calculated as the percentage of all of the media bulletins produced in a year constituted by the number of media bulletins relating to terrorism produced in that same year. Notwithstanding, the overall regression between and cannot be considered statistically significant (, ). While this lack of statistical significance could be attributed to the possibility that no relation exists, it can also be attributed to low sample size (). To that end, although the strict interpretation of would only seem to indicate that changes in account for 31.74% of the change in , the small number of datapoints available for analysis makes the statistic unreliable. Thus, it is unlikely that the statistic would identify a significant result in a sample this small because not enough data has been collected to identify any kind of consequential linear relationship between the variables in the first place. Put simply, the absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence.

I also use SLR to model the correlations between and (depicted in Figure 6-2, below), and and (depicted in Figure 6-3, on the next page).

Figure 6- : SLR Analysis of v.

Figure 6- : SLR Analysis of v.

The SLR measuring the association between and determines regression model . This model indicates that international (state) legitimacy decreases by 1.3226 percent for each one percent increase in Reuters’s coverage of terrorism, when Reuters’s coverage of terrorism is expressed as the percentage of all of the media bulletins Reuters publishes in a given year that is comprised of media bulletins relating to terrorism. As with the regression model calculated in connection with and (Figure 6-1) it cannot be considered statistically significant (, ).

The final SLR I conduct in this context measures the association between and , yielding the regression model . This result suggests that international (state) legitimacy decreases by -0.3912 percent for each one percent increase in AP’s coverage of terrorism, when AP’s coverage of terrorism constitutes the percentage of all of the media bulletins AP publishes in a year that relate to terrorism. Like the other regression models calculated in connection with and , and and , cannot be considered statistically significant (=.1041, ).

The control variables that perform best in my analysis of whether media coverage of terrorism affects international (state) legitimacy include the global population variable (), and the global incomevariable (). (See Table 6-2, below.)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Independent Variable** | **Dependent Variable** |  | df |  | **Significance** |  |
| Terrorism | International (State) Legitimacy | 7 | 5 | 0.2857 | At , | | 0.0055 |
| Capability | 7 | 5 | -0.0357 | 0.1372 |
| Population | 7 | 5 | -0.8929 | 0.8270 |
| Income | 7 | 5 | -0.4286 | 0.2455 |

Table 6- : Correlation Analysis of Control Variables

The Spearman correlation coefficient calculated in relation to and suggests that the variables are highly negatively correlated in a significant manner (). These results indicate that increases in the global population tend to occur in tandem with decreases in international (state) legitimacy in the context of my data. The Spearman correlation I conduct between and shows a moderate negative correlation ().

The most noteworthy result of the analyses conducted in relation to the control variables involves the history of terrorism variable (). The Spearman correlation conducted between and indicates (a weak-moderate positive, significant correlation between the variables. This means that the occurrence of terrorist attacks themselves either have limited impact on international (state) legitimacy or, it is possible that terrorist attacks may slightly strengthen international (state) legitimacy. Or, put another way: when terrorist attacks occurred between 2012 and 2018, country adherence to the rule of law slightly increased, fragile states became slightly less fragile, and a few more states participated in votes at the United Nations General Assembly. This makes the negative correlation between media coverage of terrorism and international (state) legitimacy established earlier in this chapter all the more significant. In effect, the correlations between and , and , and and need to work to overcome the opposite direction (positive) impact that the terrorist attacks exert on international (state) legitimacy for the negative correlation between media coverage of terrorism and international (state) legitimacy that has been demonstrated in this chapter to be so statistically apparent. These results suggest that it is *not* terrorist attacks themselves that delegitimize the state as an institution. Rather, the results of the correlations between and , and and , and , and and indicate that, between 2012 and 2018, the *media coverage* of terrorism is highly negatively correlated with international (state) legitimacy a notable amount more than the mere volume of terrorist attacks that occurred in the same time period.

Conclusion

The results of this chapter’s quantitative interrogation as to whether media coverage of terrorism affects international (state) legitimacy are noteworthy, as they suggest that terrorism, in and of itself, does not have a negative effect on the legitimacy of the state as an international institution. In testing (in which I posit that terrorism succeeds by negatively affecting international (state) legitimacy), I generate results indicating that *some* international news agencies’ (Reuters’s and AP’s) coverage of terrorism between 2012 and 2018 negatively correlates with international (state) legitimacy. Analysis of the control variables associated with this research suggests the existence of a weak-moderate positive correlation between the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated and international (state) legitimacy. All told, these results indicate that a more focused analysis of media coverage of terrorism is warranted in order to suggest *why* it negatively correlates with international (state) legitimacy, even though terrorist attacks themselves do not correlate with international (state) legitimacy in the same manner.

In the next chapter (Chapter 7), I build on the results of this chapter’s quantitative analysis by comparing Reuters’s coverage and framing of terrorism, AP’s coverage and framing of terrorism, and AFP’s coverage and framing of terrorism. This involves using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods to further explore media coverage as a *mode* of terrorism (as a *means* of post-modern warfare that aims to affect the *ends* constituted by the erosion of international (state) legitimacy). Then, in Chapter 8, I contend that the discrepancy between the correlations conducted in relation to Reuters’s coverage of terrorism and international (state) legitimacy, AP’s coverage of terrorism and international (state) legitimacy, and AFP’s coverage of terrorism and international (state) legitimacy likely results from the differing protocols (or lack thereof) that each news agency has established for their journalists’ use of the terms ‘terrorist’, ‘terrorists’, and ‘terrorism’ in the context of published English language media bulletins. This chapter’s highlighting of this discrepancy in the statistical data directly informs the comparative analysis of the Reuters, AP, and AFP style guides (in relation to both the use of these terms and their general guidelines relating to depictions of terrorism) that I undertake in Chapter 8.

Chapter 7 – *How* Does the Media Coverage of Terrorism Affect International (State) Legitimacy?

Between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2018, the Global Terrorism Database estimates that 87,938 terrorist incidents were perpetrated internationally. These attacks were responsible for the deaths of 205,532 people.[[397]](#footnote-397) Notwithstanding the enormity of this statistic, deaths caused by terrorist attacks comprise only a fraction (less than 0.00008%) of the estimated 2,524,362,373 individuals that died around the world in the same time period.[[398]](#footnote-398) *So, why do states and the international community as a whole place so much emphasis on terrorism?* In Chapter 3, I conceptualize the ‘success’ of terrorism as predicated on its ability to influence the state’s decision-making processes. Taken in the context of the overview of international (state) legitimacy provided in Chapter 4, my *de minimis* policy definition of terrorism implies that states focus on *terrorism* because they perceive it as challenging principles fundamental to their very statehood. In other words, the state claim to their “monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force” within their sovereign territory.[[399]](#footnote-399) States label certain instances of violence or threatened violence as terrorism, then, to identify activity that is inherently threatening. The label terrorism acts as a signal to the states’ constituents that they should *also* conceive of these incidents of violence as threatening.

From a state perspective, there is significant utility to using the term ‘terrorism’ as a descriptive label. Similar to Barry Buzan’s argument as to the function of the descriptor ‘national security,’ describing and categorizing specific incidents of violence as terrorism “offers scope for power maximizing strategies to political and military elites because of the considerable leverage over domestic affairs which can be obtained by invoking it.”[[400]](#footnote-400) Moreover, it is in state governments’ interests to “securitize” terrorist violence. To apply the label ‘terrorism’ suggests the referent object, the state, is existentially threatened, necessitating some degree of the suspension of normal political functions.[[401]](#footnote-401) This allows governments to establish policies and make decisions that their constituents might not otherwise support.[[402]](#footnote-402)

On the other hand, understanding that the term terrorism securitizes the state implies that the significant security threat posed by terrorism exists *because* of the implications that have become inherent to its use as descriptive label. The analytical framework provided in Buzan and Ole Wæver’s securitization theory further underscores this point. Buzan and Wæver understand the process of securitizing issues as self-referential acts, affected through spoken word. As such, issues are “securitized” – constituted security problems – not because they are inherently threats, but because they are conceived of as threats due to how they are contextualized. Specifically, both the overall content and the specific word choice that goes into what is said about these issues is what ultimately frames them as problematic.[[403]](#footnote-403) By securitizing themselves through their interaction with terrorism, states *create* and constitute their own perceived worst enemy.

In the preceding chapter (Chapter 6), the results of the multivariate data analyses I present suggest that, in the context of my sample, there is no negative correlation between terrorism in and of itself and international (state) legitimacy. However, these results also make evident that there *is* a demonstrated negative correlation between international (state) legitimacy and the *media coverage* of terrorism within the observed sample. These conclusions relate back to my understanding of terrorism as post-modern warfare, where terrorism constitutes the ‘means’ (the specific tactics and strategies used) to realize the ‘ends’ (overarching objective) of eroding international (state) legitimacy.[[404]](#footnote-404) Even more significantly, these conclusions are supported by my Chapter 5 conceptualization of media coverage as a ‘mode’ of post-modern warfare: the “line of communication” between the state and its constituents (or, conversely, between terrorists and the state’s constituents) with the ability to influence international public opinion of the state as the societal superstructure.[[405]](#footnote-405) Consequently, the conclusions that I reach in Chapter 6 go towards substantiating my hypothesis that *media coverage* is the key factor that ultimately facilitates terrorism’s ability to affect international (state) legitimacy.

This chapter combines quantitative and qualitative methods to discuss how the inverse correlation between the media coverage of terrorism and international (state) legitimacy established in Chapter 6 emerges. Specifically, Chapter 7 suggests the manner in which the media coverage of terrorism erodes international (state) legitimacy – *how* the media’s reporting on terrorism delegitimizes the state as an (international) institution. To accomplish this, I use the methodology developed in Chapter 3 to derive a *de minimis* definition of terrorism implicit to the media coverage of terrorism that constitutes my sample. This *de minimis* definition of terrorism supports my assertion that terrorism necessarily manifests in direct opposition to state authority (and thus, legitimacy). Next, I identify the frequencies and cooccurrence frequencies associated with the different types of positive and negative bias that manifest in the news coverage of terrorism (positive and negative bias towards terrorism, positive and negative bias towards the state, and positive and negative bias towards counter-terrorism). I also use the WordStat software to calculate the relative frequency of each of eleven different subtypes of positive and negative bias, as well as the frequency with which they cooccur with one another. Analysis of these frequencies supports my argument that terrorists and the state compete for the same overarching type of (legitimate) authority. Then, I identify and analyze the frames that media coverage of terrorism tends to employ in connection with its depictions of terrorists and terrorism. I then discuss the ways in which these frames situate the phenomenon of terrorism as key in the context of modern international political conflict and international relations in general.[[406]](#footnote-406)

Tying into the debate as to whether violence inherently begets propaganda or terrorists intentionally use violence to generate propaganda, this framing analysis begs questions as to *why* the media promotes a narrative that places terrorists on the same level as states.[[407]](#footnote-407) As such, the final component of this chapter’s analysis of how media coverage of terrorism affects international (state) legitimacy involves my analysis of statements made by public figures in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in order to determine both how the public perceives state practice to implicitly defines terrorism, and whether this final implicit definition of terrorism accords with my policy definition of terrorism. These analyses are the premise of my argument that states have, in effect, created their own worst enemy by labelling terrorists as ‘terrorists.’ To that end, the four overarching and interconnected arguments that define this chapter ultimately lead me to conclude that media coverage of terrorism negatively affects the international legitimacy of the state by framing terrorism as necessarily manifesting in direct, diametric opposition to state authority (thereby calling into question its legitimacy).

Terrorism Manifests in Opposition to State Authority

In Chapter 3, I analyze the definitions of terrorism used in 192 United Nations member states’ domestic legislation in order to establish a *de minimis* definition of terrorism implicit in international policy. This involves identifying 28 definitional elements that are present in multiple definitions across the abovementioned 192 sample sampling frame.[[408]](#footnote-408)

To ascertain how *the media coverage of terrorism* delegitimizes the state, it is first necessary to determine the manner in which media coverage perceives and depicts terrorism. To that end, I use the *de minimis* definition of terrorism outlined in Chapter 3 to determine which of 28 definitional elements recur in depictions of terrorism with greater than 50 percent frequency.[[409]](#footnote-409) Figure 7-1, on the next page, shows the recurrence frequencies of each of the 28 elements in the context of my 2,276-media bulletin sampling frame. This sampling frame is taken from the same sources and timeframe as the data analyzed in the preceding chapter’s quantitative analysis of *whether* media coverage of terrorism has a negative effect on international (state) legitimacy (Chapter 6).

Figure 7- : Relative Frequencies of 28 Definitional Elements in the Media Coverage of Terrorism

As depicted in Figure 7-1, above, five definitional elements of the total 28 definitional elements analyzed meet the significance threshold that I use to establish a *de minimis* definition of terrorism implicit in international policy (henceforth the “the policy definition of terrorism”) in Chapter 3.[[410]](#footnote-410) These definitional elements are

[2] *destruction of, or damage to property* (identified with a recurrence frequency of

92%);

[4] *physical injury; homicide; death of a victim* (identified with a recurrence frequency

of 60%);

[14] *intention; the deliberate, purposive taking of action* (identified with a recurrence

frequency of 56%);

[19] *publicity, propaganda* (identified with a recurrence frequency of 66%);

[27] *public; general population* (identified with a recurrence frequency of 94%).

The first two elements listed above (elements [2] and [4]) fall at the intersection between the “means” and the “mode” of terrorism, when terrorism is conceptualized in accordance with the overlapping classification of elements that I propose in Chapter 3.[[411]](#footnote-411) Alternatively, these two elements can be understood as components of the “who” (*who* is directly affected by a terrorist attack?; the victim(s) of the attack) and the “what” (*what* happened?) associated with a terrorist incident. The third element – element [14] – meanwhile, can be classified as a “mode” (the *how*) associated with a terrorist attack. Similarly, element [19] is classified as part of the *motivation* subset of the “mode” associated with terrorism. Motivation speaks to the factors that influence both *how* the attack is conceived of by its perpetrators, and *how* the terrorism ultimately manifests (as an attack). As such, element [19] also constitutes a component of the “why” associated with a terrorist attack (*why* did this happen?). Finally, element [27] falls under the “target” classification and should thus be understood as an (immediate) “ends” towards which the terrorist incident in question is perpetrated. Understanding the definitional elements per the aforementioned model is important because doing so helps me suggest whether an incident qualifies as terrorism under one or more of the specific *de minimis* definitions that I establish in this dissertation. This is because an incident must meet *at least one* of the elements in each category covered by that definition to be considered to meet its criteria.

There is also significant benefit associated with this model’s provision of an easy way to compare and contrast specific definitions of terrorism. In the context of the research that I present in this dissertation, the utility to this model comes in the context of the assessment of various *de minimis* definitions of terrorism that comprises a significant part of the analysis I undertake in this chapter (Chapter 7) and Chapter 8.

Assessing the *De Minimis* Media Coverage Definition of Terrorism in Relation to the *De Minimis* Policy Definition of Terrorism

Per the *de minimis* definition of terrorism implicit to the English language media coverage of terrorism established in the preceding section of this chapter, terrorism is

*the intentional targeting of the general population in order to generate news or garner publicity, which can include (but is not limited to) perpetrating homicide, other actions that result in physical injury or death to persons, and damaging or destroying property*

This is notable because it seemingly contrasts with my Chapter 3 establishment of a *de minimis* definition of terrorism relevant to international policy that understands terrorism as

*the threatening, or intentional taking of criminal action designed to influence a state, an international organization, or another decision-making body’s taking of action or lack thereof by intimidating the general population, which can include (but is not limited to) perpetrating homicide, other actions that result in serious physical injury or death to persons, and the damaging or destroying property.*

Figure 7-2, on the next page, shows the overlap between the elements that comprise these two definitions.




Figure 7- 2: Comparing the Composition of the De Minimis Definitions of Terrorism Implicit to Policy and Media Coverage of Terrorism

Figure 7- 2: Comparing the Composition of the De Minimis Definitions of Terrorism Implicit to Policy and Media Coverage of Terrorism

As depicted in Figure 7-2, above, the *de minimis* definition of terrorism implicit in media coverage (hereafter referred to as my media coverage definition of terrorism) largely accords with my policy definition of terrorism. Strikingly, both definitions situate their author (either the state, in the case of the policy definition, or the media, in the case of the media coverage definition) centrally in the public drama precipitated by a terrorist incident.[[412]](#footnote-412) To that end, my media coverage definition includes media coverage and propaganda as the *mode* through which terrorism operates (element [19]), while my policy definition identifies influencing the state and/or other decision-making institutions as the ultimate objective of a terrorist incident. That both of these actors implicitly position themselves as considerations that are taken into account in the perpetration of a *terrorist* incident suggests that there is some significance to the terrorism label that is somehow greater than that associated with other types of violence. So, from the perspectives of the state and the news media, *what is the utility of labeling an incident ‘terrorism’?*

While both definitions establish terrorism’s *means*, *mode*, and *ends*, my policy definition provides a narrower understanding of both the nature of specific *means* of terrorism, and the way that these *means* of terrorism affect its perpetrators’ ultimate objectives. (Or, to put it another way, the *mode* through which the *means* brings about the *ends* of terrorism.) To that end, my policy definition adds dimension to terrorism’s *means* by explicitly providing for the inclusion of the extra-normality and criminality associated with the *means* of terrorism, as well as threatened action as a *means* of terrorism, and intimidation and influence as short-term objectives of these *means*. Describing the *means* of terrorism this way is notable in that doing so establishes terrorism as both distinct from, and more significant than, other, ‘more ordinary’ types of criminal violence. Moreover, this emphasis on the specific *means* necessarily focuses the understanding of terrorism imparted by this definition on shorter-term objectives underlying the deployment of terrorism’s specific *means* – intimidation, influencing decision-making processes. As well, including *threat* as a *means* of terrorism allows for terrorism that does not ‘succeed’ (or even actually materialize as action) to be labeled terrorism. This inclusion alludes to the subjective *mens rea* requirement that common law-based legal systems use to differentiate between terrorism and other types of violent crime – *intent*.[[413]](#footnote-413) In practice, this means that the successful prosecution of terrorism charges requires direct evidence of the mental component(s) associated with the crime in question. Like nearly all crimes, terrorism charges depend on the prosecution’s ability to prove beyond a reasonable doubt perpetrator’s *mens rea* (“guilty mind,” Latin) . The key feature unique to terrorism (and crimes like it – i.e. hate crimes) is that it blurs the distinction between the requirement to prove the accused *mens rea* and to prove, as well, the *actus reus* (“guilty act,” Latin). This necessitates showing that the perpetrator has actually committed the action components of the crime. With regard to terrorism, *mens rea* seems to be identical to the key, distinctive element of terrorism’s *actus reus* – the intent behind the impugned activity upon which the state wants to convict the perpetrator and label terrorism.[[414]](#footnote-414) Or, to put it another way: successfully charging someone with terrorism indicates that they committed a crime with the aim of harming people as a direct means to achieve their objective(s). Accordingly, scholars like Frances Kamm contend that the legal impermissibility of terrorism stems from its “treat[ment of] people (non-combatants) as mere means (tools) to one’s ends.”[[415]](#footnote-415) This bolsters my classification of *intimidation* [Element 6] as a *mode* used in connection with *the general population* [Element 27] as a *means* of terrorism. It is also of note that both my media coverage definition and my policy definition of terrorism provide for Element 27 as a *means* of terrorism.

While my policy definition of terrorism classifies *intimidation* ([Element 6]), *threat*s ([Element 7]), and *extranormality* ([Element 8)] as *modes* of terrorism in addition to intent ([Element 14]), my media coverage definition also specifies *publicity* ([Element 19]) as both a *mode* of terrorism and a *motivation* underlying its perpetration. This latter point supports that terrorism achieves its *ends* by publicizing, and thereby drawing attention to, its perpetrators (and their cause). This argument is integral to one of the arguments that defines this dissertation: the idea that media coverage constitutes a *mode* integral to affecting the *ends* of terrorism, when terrorism is conceptualized as post-modern warfare.[[416]](#footnote-416)

A final, significant, distinction between the two definitions is my policy definition’s explicit delineation between terrorism’s *immediate target* (its *means* – *the general population, the public* [Element 27]) and its *ends* (*targeting the state* [Element 26]). Notwithstanding, both definitions’ focus on the *destruction of persons* ([Element 4)] and *property* ([Element 2)] as (criminal) *means* that terrorism can use to target people (the constituents of the state). This places terrorists in direct conflict with the state as “the human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.”[[417]](#footnote-417) As such, both the policy definition of terrorism and the *de minimis* definition implicit in the media coverage of terrorism provide for the idea that state actors understand terrorism as existing in direct opposition to states. Moreover, both definitions suggest that terrorism is perpetrated to further interests that are diametrically opposed to those of the state *as an institution.*

An effective way to demonstrate the utility of conceiving of these separate *de minimis* definitions of terrorism involves identifying contemporary examples of media discourse about similar violent criminal incidents. From my perspective, the most relevant, recent examples that can be compared to illustrate the *practical* differences between these two definitions are the 2018 Toronto van attack (which meets the criteria associated with my media coverage definition of terrorism, but not those specified by my policy definition of terrorism) and the 2020 Toronto machete attack (which accords with my policy definition of terrorism, but not my media coverage definition of terrorism). These differences are illustrated by the explanations that follow.

In the early afternoon of April 23, 2018, 25-year-old Alek Minassian deliberately targeted pedestrians in Toronto’s North York Centre business district with a rented van, killing 11 people and injuring a further 15 in less than ten minutes.[[418]](#footnote-418) Within hours of the attack, former New York City Police Commissioner Bill Bratton told MSNBC the incident had “all the hallmarks of” a terrorist attack, and moreover, cited his “[anonymous] sources in Canada” in explicitly characterizing it a terrorist attack. Journalists affiliated with other media sources also published information that seemingly gave credence to the notion that the incident was a terrorist attack before Toronto police had even publicly identified a suspect. Examples of this include Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s (CBC) Natasha Fatah, who stated that per eye-witness accounts, the perpetrator of the attack “…looked wide-eyed, angry and Middle Eastern.”[[419]](#footnote-419) Her description was then cited by Breitbart’s Chris Tomlinson in the headline of his article, “Fatalities as white van hits pedestrians in Toronto, driver described as “angry and Middle Eastern.”[[420]](#footnote-420) A more explicit instance of this kind of reporting is Global TV’s Mike Drolet’s description of the attack as the “alleged Toronto terror incident.”[[421]](#footnote-421) An article published by Global News lends credence to this assertion, describing a press conference held in the immediate aftermath of the incident by asserting “police aren’t confirming if the incident was an act of terrorism…” [[422]](#footnote-422) In reality, Toronto Police Chief Mark Saunders’s answer to a question as to whether the incident was terrorist in nature involved his statement that “at this point with respect to [the evidence] we have right now” it cannot be called terrorism.[[423]](#footnote-423) Instead of conveying that there is currently no evidence to suggest that the incident is terrorism, the Global News article frames Saunders’s comment to suggest that law enforcement is just refusing to classify the incident as terrorism *at this time* (implying the terrorist label might be applied later on), when in actual fact, Saunders’s statement indicated that there is no reason for police to believe that the incident is terrorism (suggesting that it will *not* be classified as terrorism *at any point* in time).

Media speculation that the attack constituted terrorism was also bolstered by the media’s factual representation of statements made by public figures that become what Brian Monahan terms “issue-owners” by virtue of their official capacity. In coining the term “issue owner” to describe an individual “who can draw on their professional expertise or… experience to provide an authoritative voice” in publicly discussing a topical issue with the media, Monahan uses Joseph Gusfield’s definition of ownership as “a status reward that can be derived from participation in public drama.”[[424]](#footnote-424) As such, Monahan’s “issue-owner” tends to “derive… authority from his or her official capacity” and is sought out by journalists who value the legitimacy that this allows them to attribute to comments made by these individuals.[[425]](#footnote-425) Statements by issue-owners play a key role in informing the manifestation of bias in the mainstream news media. In the context of the 2018 Toronto van attack, a notable example of this occurs in Deputy Commissioner of the NYPD, Phil Walzak’s issuance of a press release reassuring the public that “The NYPD is monitoring developments in Toronto… in coordination with the Joint Terrorism Task Force.”[[426]](#footnote-426) Notwithstanding that the press release does not explicitly classify the attack as terrorism, its explicit acknowledgement of NYPD efforts to coordinate with the Joint Terrorism Task Force implies a connection between the incident and terrorism as a phenomenon writ large.

Ultimately, Minassian was found guilty on 10 counts of first-degree murder and 16 counts of attempted murder in March 2021. Canadian authorities did not pursue terrorism charges against Minassian for perpetrating the attack. In Canada, for an act to be legally classified as terrorism, it must be carried out for political, ideological, or religious reasons with the intention of intimidating the public or compelling the government to do something.[[427]](#footnote-427) In the judgement document outlining reasons for the verdict, Judge Anne Molloy, who presided over Minassian’s 2020 trial, explains that, because “It is almost impossible to tell when [Minassian] is lying and when he is telling the truth...[, w]orking out his exact motivation for this attack is… close to impossible.”[[428]](#footnote-428) Accordingly, while Minassian's attack was horrific and its impact was devastating, it did not fulfill the specific criteria set out in Canadian anti-terrorism legislation that provide for terrorism charges.[[429]](#footnote-429)

In contrast with the 2018 Toronto van attack, the 2020 Toronto machete attack did not initially receive media attention as a terrorist attack. After a 17-year-old male killed the 24-year-old receptionist of a Toronto erotic spa with a sword and injured the spa’s owner on February 24, 2020, initial news reports only referenced a fatal stabbing and first-degree murder charges.[[430]](#footnote-430) Media outlets only began to label the incident a terrorist attack months after it occurred, with the word ‘terrorism’ first appearing in media coverage about the incident on May 19, 2020 – the same day that authorities updated the charges against the perpetrator to include a “terrorist activity” enhancement.[[431]](#footnote-431) As such, the public discourse surrounding the 2018 Toronto van attack and the 2020 Toronto machete attack effectively illustrates the difference between my policy and media coverage definitions of terrorism. Media and online discourse labeled Alek Minassian’s murder of 11 civilians terrorism almost immediately after the attack occurred, despite the lack of legal charges to support this classification. In contrast, the perpetrator of the 2020 Toronto machete attack was not referred to as a terrorist in news coverage until June 6, 2023 – the date that Justice Sukhail Akhtar ruled that his 2020 attack on employees of a Toronto massage parlour amounted to an act of terrorism.[[432]](#footnote-432) The similarities and differences between my policy and media coverage definitions of terrorism suggest that the state and the news media diverge with regard to their perspectives on the utility associated with labeling an incident ‘terrorism.’ For the state, the terrorism label serves the dual function of narrowing down the different components of an incident that can constitute it terrorism and securitizing the state. Providing (more) specific criteria that an offense must meet to be considered terrorism makes it easier for the state to successfully prosecute terrorism. Moreover, terrorism’s securitization of the state implicitly justifies increased state powers (so, state control within its borders) in the aftermath of significant terrorist incidents, which, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, have historically tended to infringe on individual rights and freedoms. As such, my policy definition of terrorism conceptualizes terrorism per the effects that it can generate to benefit the state (that tend to negatively impact its constituents’ personal freedoms and rights to privacy). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in the case of the 2018 Toronto van attack, Judge Molloy ruled that "… the incel movement was not in fact a primary driving force behind the attack.”"[[433]](#footnote-433) Accordingly, the incident did not meet the relatively narrow criteria that my policy definition (and Canadian law) establish for a successful terrorism charge. The news media, on the other hand, implicitly defines terrorism in relation to a (more immediate) tangible benefit that it can provide to its perpetrator(s) by emphasizing a motivation underlying its perpetration (*media coverage, publicity* [Element 19]). This is of direct benefit to the news media, because it amplifies and sensationalizes news for the public and thus generates readership (revenue).[[434]](#footnote-434) This might also be a motivation underlying my media coverage definition’s more overbroad scope as to the incidents that it allows to be classified terrorism, in comparison with my policy definition of terrorism. In the case of the 2020 Toronto machete attack, little information was available about the perpetrator, given that he was underage at the time of the attack. Moreover, the attack only resulted in a single fatality. Given the lack of detail available about the perpetrator and the difficulty associated with sensationalizing the attack itself based on the known facts, media coverage did not deem the attack suitable to generate public drama and thus merit the terrorism classification, even though it met the criteria associated with my policy definition of terrorism (and was ultimately charged as such in the context of the Canadian legal system).

States and Terrorists Compete for the Same Authority

Historically, the notion of the state as an institution is premised on its endeavor to “successfully claim… the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” within a given geographic territory.[[435]](#footnote-435) Consequently, as an institution, the state works to accrue support for its “right to rule,” which is predicated on three interrelated elements: *legality*, *justification*, and *consent*.[[436]](#footnote-436) Terrorists, on the other hand, work to acquire sufficient (political) authority so as to be considered ‘important enough’ that they *need* to be obeyed in the context of policy-making and decision-making processes *relating to the specific issues that are important to their cause.* As such, terrorists and states both seek the ability to make meaningful decisions that will be operationalized in practice. However, where the state pursues the acquisition of this authority by seeking to accrue international and domestic legitimacy, terrorists lay claim to this authority by demonstrating their ability to harness the (traditional) modes of personal, local, and religious authority that the establishment of the state necessarily rendered obsolete.[[437]](#footnote-437) This inherently puts terrorists and the state (as an institution) at odds with each other, as the correspondence between sovereignty, territory and legitimacy that established the state as the “unitary body in which sovereignty rest[s]” does not leave space for entities that cite the traditional claims to authority that the establishment of the state superseded.[[438]](#footnote-438) To be clear, terrorism does not just pose a threat to the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force *just because* it occurs within a state’s geographic borders. The threat that terrorism poses to the legitimacy of the state stems from the public legitimation of the terrorists that occurs when the state recognises the threat that their actions pose, applies the ‘terrorism’ label, and the media disseminates this classification to the state’s constituents.

Analyzing the different types of bias that occur and co-occur with one another in the media coverage of terrorism indicates that terrorists and states are perceived as competing with one another for prominence and importance on the public agenda. In this context, “positive bias” manifests as its target’s (the terrorists’, or the state’s) depiction as being of vital importance to both setting the public agenda and resolving key issues on the public agenda. Conversely, “negative bias” serves to portray its target in a manner that detracts from its target’s publicly perceived relevance. Accordingly, I code negative bias on the basis of the six “doubting devices” (neg-factive verbs, low commitment verbs, low commitment modifiers, lack of consensus adjectives, undermining adjectives, and argumentative verbs) identified by Yiwei Luo, Dallas Card and Dan Jurafsky.[[439]](#footnote-439) Three of these categorizations (neg-factive verbs, low commitment verbs, and low commitment modifiers) fall under Recasens, Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil and Jurafsky’s *epistemological class of bias*, which focuses on the believability of a proposal.[[440]](#footnote-440) The remaining three categorizations (lack of consensus adjectives, undermining adjectives, and argumentative verbs) can be classified as indicative of the class of bias that Recasens et. al term *framing bias*, in which “subjective or one-sided works are used, revealing the author’s stance in a particular debate.”[[441]](#footnote-441) Similarly, I code positive bias on the basis of the five “affirming devices” (factive and semi-factive verbs, high commitment adjectives, high commitment verbs, quantity indicators/evidence of consensus modifiers, and hyping adjectives) identified by Luo, Card and Jurafsky. Four of these five categorizations (factive and semi-factive verbs, high commitment adjectives, high commitment verbs, and quantity indicators/evidence of consensus modifiers) fall under Recasens, Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil and Jurafsky’s *epistemological class of bias*.[[442]](#footnote-442) Luo, Card and Jurafsky’s fifth categorization of affirming devices – hyping adjectives – comes in a class unto itself, as it involves the “us[e of] positive terms to promote or “spin” [the] accomplishments of [whatever is being described].”[[443]](#footnote-443) To that end, I calculate the overall relative frequencies of the positive and negative bias associated with the targets constituted by terrorism and the state. I also determine the composition of each type of bias by calculating the percentage comprised by each of its sub-categorizations (the five affirming devices signifying positive bias, and the six doubting devices signifying negative bias). Table 7-1, on the next page, details the occurrence frequencies of each type of bias and its signifiers.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Nature of Bias | Bias Signifier | Occurrence Frequency |
| Terrorism | Positive | - | 73.1% |
| Factive and Semi-Factive Verbs  High-Commitment Verbs  High-Commitment Adjectives  Hyping Adjectives  Consensus of Evidence Adjectives | 37.9%  14.6%  1.6%  88.3%  25.9% |
| Negative | - | 24.5% |
| Neg-Factive Verbs  Argumentative Verbs  Low-Commitment Verbs  Low-Commitment Modifiers  Lack of Consensus Adjectives  Undermining Adjectives | 6.7%  12.4%  28.6%  45.7%  5.7%  48.6% |
| The State | Positive | - | 78.1% |
| Factive and Semi-Factive Verbs  High-Commitment Verbs  High-Commitment Adjectives  Hyping Adjectives  Consensus of Evidence Adjectives | 36.2%  19.7%  3%  91.1%  26.2% |
| Negative | - | 24.5% |
| Neg-Factive Verbs  Argumentative Verbs  Low-Commitment Verbs  Low-Commitment Modifiers  Lack of Consensus Adjectives  Undermining Adjectives | 17.6%  19.5%  37.1%  37.6%  8.3%  39.5% |

Table 7- 1: Occurrence Frequencies of Different Types of Bias in the Media Coverage of Terrorism [[444]](#footnote-444)

In 88.3% of cases involving positive bias towards terrorism (73% of the articles that constitute my sampling frame), and 99.1% of cases involving positive bias towards the state (78% of the articles that constitute my sampling frame), positive bias manifests by way of hyping adjectives that sensationalize its target and/or its target’s actions.[[445]](#footnote-445) These statistics suggest that positive bias in the media coverage of terrorism tends to ascribe prominence and importance to both the state and terrorism by touting their respective actions and reactions as accomplishments and contributions. Conversely, negative bias towards the state tends to co-occur with negative bias towards terrorism. The most frequently occurring negative bias signifiers are hedges (low commitment verbs and low commitment modifiers) and undermining adjectives.[[446]](#footnote-446) In 45.7% of cases involving negative bias towards terrorism, and 37.6% of cases involving negative bias towards the state, this type of negative bias manifests as the use of low commitment modifiers.[[447]](#footnote-447) In 28.6% of cases involving negative bias towards terrorism, and 37.1% of cases involving negative bias towards the state, this type of negative bias manifests as the use of low commitment verbs.[[448]](#footnote-448) In 48.6% of cases involving negative bias towards terrorism, and 39.5% of cases involving negative bias towards the state, this type of negative bias manifests as the use of undermining adjectives.[[449]](#footnote-449) These statistics imply that negative bias in the media coverage of terrorism (in relation to both terrorism and the state) is somewhat more likely to manifest as Recasens et. al’s *framing bias*, which manifests by taking a specific side or stance in relation to the subject matter depicted.[[450]](#footnote-450)

Relative occurrence frequencies measure how often something happens, in relation to all of the outcomes that occur. As such, my analysis of positive bias towards terrorism indicates that more than three-quarters of all of the instances of this bias present in my sample are expressed through hyping adjectives. Similarly, my examination of positive bias towards the state determines that more than ninety percent of all instances of this type of bias included in my sample manifest as hyping adjectives. Negative bias, on the other hand, presents in a bit more of a diversified fashion in the context of my sample. Negative bias towards terrorism tends to involve the use of undermining adjectives and low-commitment modifiers more than it does any of the other doubting devices. Similarly, negative bias towards the state is overwhelmingly expressed as low-commitment verbs, low-commitment modifiers, and undermining adjectives at similar frequencies.

After identifying the trends in how each type of bias tends to manifest that are presented in Table 7-1, I use WordStat to calculate the co-occurrence frequencies for each type of bias. These frequencies, as well as the strength of each association identified, are presented in Table 7-2, below.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Type of Bias | Co-Occurring Type of Bias | Association Strength |
| Positive Bias Towards the State | Positive Bias Towards Terrorism | 0.024 |
| Positive Bias Towards the State | Negative Bias Towards Terrorism | 0.000 |
| Negative Bias Towards the State | Negative Bias Towards Terrorism | 0.018 |
| Negative Bias Towards Terrorism | Positive Bias Towards the State | 0.000 |

Table 7- 2: Co-occurring Types of Bias in the Media Coverage of Terrorism

The strongest association presented in Table 7-2 relates to the fact that positive bias towards the state tends to co-occur with positive bias towards terrorism in the context of my sample. Similarly, negative bias towards the state recurs at the highest frequency with negative bias towards terrorism. Put simply, in the context of my sample, media bulletins that depict the state in a more positive manner is likely to depict terrorism in a similarly positive manner and media bulletins that describe the state in a less favorable way are also likely to describe terrorism in a less favorable way.

That positive bias towards the state tends to co-occur with positive bias towards terrorism, and that negative bias towards the state tends to co-occur with negative bias towards terrorism accords with my contention that terrorists and the state are perceived as seeking the same type of prominence (which, in practice, ultimately translates to authority – legitimate or otherwise). Moreover, conceiving of terrorists and the state as in pursuit of the same type of legitimate authority aligns with my claim that terrorism manifests in direct opposition to state authority and legitimacy. Ultimately, it does not matter if terrorists are consciously in pursuit of statehood and/or the monopoly over the legitimate use of force in a given territory because the type of reaction that their actions generate results in effects (which are ultimately emblematic of the terrorists exerting a type of control over the public) that result in the state losing a measure of legitimacy, as I conceptualize it for the purposes of this dissertation. [[451]](#footnote-451)

Further expansion on these ideas requires me to consider the frames that the media coverage of terrorism tends to use in its depictions of terrorism. Thus, the next component of my argument that media coverage of terrorism negatively affects the international legitimacy of the state by framing terrorism as necessarily manifesting in direct, diametric opposition to state authority centers on the historical references embedded by media coverage’s framing of terrorism. These references provide tacit context that, taken in conjunction with the way that public figures’ statements implicitly define terrorism, leads me to the conclusion that states have, in effect, created their own worst enemy in terrorists. States, in short, play an important role in amplifying terrorist messages through how their own spokespersons communicate with the media and, in so doing, help terrorists “succeed.”

Media Coverage of Terrorism Places States and Terrorists on the Same Level

As discussed in Chapter 5, framing involves making “some aspects of a perceived reality… more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment for the item described.”[[452]](#footnote-452) Accordingly, there are two components intrinsic to any media frame that provide an analytical dimension: function, and focus.[[453]](#footnote-453) The *function* of a media frame both “define[s] a [specific] issue, and explains [the] relevance” of that issue, or the problem associated with it.[[454]](#footnote-454) This can (but does not always necessarily) involve “identify[ing] the cause of the problem”, “assign[ing] a moral evaluation to [the issue identified by the frame],” and/or “propos[ing] a remedy” for the problem.[[455]](#footnote-455) This understanding of framing focus accords with Entman’s articulation of the four ways that media frames can be categorized: as problematizing, as diagnosing a cause of an identified problem, as a “moral” evaluation of the problem identified (or the motivating underlying the problem), and/or as recommending a “treatment” to solve the problem.[[456]](#footnote-456) Alternatively, the *focus* of a media frame centres on the unit of analysis that the frame focuses on to illustrate its *function*.[[457]](#footnote-457) In this context, units of analysis consist of issues, events and/or (political) actors.[[458]](#footnote-458)

To identify frames that recur in the media coverage of terrorism, I conducted a basic content analysis of the media coverage of terrorism produced on seven *high coverage* dates, and 35 *low coverage* dates. [[459]](#footnote-459) (These dates fall within the larger sampling frame used in Chapter 6 – all English-language media coverage of terrorism produced by the Associated Press, Agence France-Presse, and Reuters between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2018).[[460]](#footnote-460) This content analysis allowed me to identify six types of media frames that emerge on a recurring basis in the context of the media coverage of terrorism. Then, I hand-coded 836 media bulletins (approximately 37% of my sampling frame) to quantify the frequency with which each of these frames appears, and to identify keywords and phrases characteristic of each frame. Finally, I used WordStat to conduct a series of keyword searches to quantify the prevalence of each frame throughout the remainder of my 2,276-media bulletin sample.[[461]](#footnote-461) The six media frames and the frequency with which each recurs in the context of each the title and body of my 2,276-news

bulletin sample is detailed in Table 7-3, below.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Frame | Recurrence Frequency – Body of News Bulletin |
| (A) | Good vs. Evil | 73.8% |
| (B) | (International) Unity | 33.5% |
| (C) | Freedom vs. Terrorism | 1.2% |
| (D) | Democracy vs. Terrorism | 78.1% |
| (E) | Humanity vs. Terrorism | 2.5% |
| (F) | War on Terrorism | 15.3% |

Table 7 – 3: Terrorism Content Analysis Frames Present in Media Coverage of Terrorism

In interpreting the recurrence frequencies cited in Table 7-3, above, higher numbers (numbers that are closer to 100%) indicate that the frame in question occurs in an increased number of the articles in the sample. Conversely, lower numbers (numbers that are closer to 0%) indicate that the frame in question is used in fewer articles in the sample. Per Table 7-3, the two frames with the highest recurrence frequencies in the body text of the media bulletins are Frame D (democracy vs. terrorism), and Frame A (good vs. evil). Frame D is present in 78.1% of my sample (so, in approximately 1,778 out of 2,276 media bulletins). Similarly, Frame A occurs in approximately 1,680 media bulletins (a 73.8% recurrence frequency in the context of my 2,276-media bulletin sample).[[462]](#footnote-462)

For the most part, the media coverage of terrorism operationalizes Frame A (good vs. evil) and Frame D (democracy vs. terrorism) by explicitly quoting political and diplomatic statements made regarding specific terrorist incidents and actors. Two obvious examples of this arise within my sampling frame (media coverage of terrorism produced between 2012 and 2018). The first example relates to media coverage produced in relation to the 2016 Nice truck attack that occurred on July 14, 2016.[[463]](#footnote-463) The second example that occurs in this time period is the media coverage associated with the 2015 Paris attacks that occurred on November 13, 2015.[[464]](#footnote-464) Table 7-4, below, lists the quotations that are most often cited in media bulletins in connection with these specific attacks that use Frame A and Frame D in their depictions of terrorism.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2016 Nice Truck Attack | | | 2015 Paris Attacks | |
| Democracy vs. Terrorism | **Good vs. Evil** | | **Democracy vs. Terrorism** | **Good vs. Evil** |
| "We are determined to show that democracy is stronger than the terrorists," – Charles Michel, Belgian Prime Minister  “… we are reminded of the extraordinary resilience and democratic values that have made France an inspiration to the entire world… We know that the character of the French Republic will endure long after [this terrorist attack].” – Barack Obama, President of the United States | “[The perpetrators of such terrorist attacks] have followed the footsteps of the devil, shed blood, and terrorized" innocent people. - Shawki Allam, Egypt's Grand Mufti  “… terrorism is an evil phenomenon that will only be eradicated through international unity and collaboration," - Bahram Ghasemi, Spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry  “[Israel is willing to send] help to the French government to fight against this evil which must be eradicated.”  “[Israel stands ready] to help the French government fight this evil until it is defeated”. – Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Prime Minister | “… the United States stands with the people of France and its vibrant, multicultural democracy.” – Ash Carter, United States Defence Secretary  “… Europe is a fortress of democracy and human rights. Even the brutal attacks of Islamist terrorists won't change this.” – Joachim Gauck, German President  “… terrorists must be defeated. They cannot break democracies that stand together.” – Kristian Jensen, Danish Foreign Minister  “When you see what happened in Paris, and what is happening over here, you realise that a democracy that cannot defend itself will find it much harder to prevail,” – Zev Elkin, Israeli Security Cabinet Minister  “This is the fast response of a democracy faced with barbarism.” – Manuel Valls, French Prime Minister | | “[The attacks in Paris are] “heinous, evil” and “vile,” calling them “an assault on our common humanity.” – John Kerry, United States Secretary of State  “[Other disputes should be put aside to] unite our efforts in our fight against this evil, this terrorism”.  “It's obvious that an effective fight against this evil demands a real unity of the forces of the international community.” – Vladimir Putin, Russian President  “It is a global struggle for freedom against those who seek to suppress it and seek to assert some form of religious tyranny; a threat in the name of God but is truthfully the work of the devil” – Malcolm Turnbull, Australian Prime Minister  “ISIL is the face of evil.” – Barack Obama, President of the United States  “… if you create a product that allows evil monsters to communicate in this way, to behead children, to strike innocents -- whether it's at a game in a stadium, in a small restaurant in Paris, take down an airliner -- that's a big problem.” – Danielle Feinstein, United States Senate Intelligence Committee |

Table 7- 4: Examples of Frequently Cited Quotations that Frame Terrorism in Terms of Frames A and D

(NOTE: Titles associated with individual public figures mentioned in this table reflect their positions as of 2015-2016.)

I use WordStat to determine that the majority of media coverage of terrorism that frames terrorism in terms of democracy vs. terrorism (Frame D) in connection with the Nice truck attack does so by directly citing one of the quotations listed in the first column of Table 7-4, above. Similarly, I find that media coverage of that same attack that frames terrorism in relation to good vs. evil (Frame A) tends to do so using one or more of the quotations listed in the second column of Table 7-4. Meanwhile, media coverage of terrorism relating to the 2015 Paris attacks that employs Frame D tends to cite one or more of the quotations in the third column of Table 7-4. Finally, media coverage of the Paris attacks that frames terrorism in terms of Frame A tends to use one or more of the quotations listed in the fourth column of Table 7-4 to do so.

In Table 7-5, below, I deconstruct these two frames (democracy vs. terrorists, and good vs. evil) as they are operationalized in the quotations cited in Table 7-4 on the basis of their *function* and *focus.*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Frame Function | | | Frame Focus | |
| **Problem Definition, Relevance** | **Moral Evaluation** | **Remedy Proposal** | **Issue** | **Actor(s)** |
| (A) | **Good vs. Evil** | Terrorism as an extreme/ taking something too far.[[465]](#footnote-465) |  | Moral condemnation.[[466]](#footnote-466) | Us vs. them;  “Othering” | A group.[[467]](#footnote-467) |
| Terrorists are (extra-normally) bad. |
| Opponents of terrorism are good. |
| (D) | **Democracy vs. Terrorism** | A value (democracy) is being threatened. |  | Work to defeat the ideology underlying terrorism.  (Continue to support/ believe in democracy/ democratic institutions.) | Democracy; Democratic values. | \  Terrorists; Democracies (so, states). |
| Democracy is a desirable value.  *(Implicit.)* |
| Thus, terrorism is bad because it exists counter to democracy. |

Table 7 - 5: Deconstruction of the Terrorism Content Analysis Frames with the Highest Recurrence Frequencies

The frame function/frame focus deconstruction depicted in Table 7-5, above, allows me to compare Frame A and Frame D along the site of contestation (clash) created by Frame A’s function as morally evaluative, on the one hand, and Frame D’s proffer of a remedy proposal, on the other.[[468]](#footnote-468) Good vs. evil (Frame A) is a master frame, “a generic type of collective action frame*”* with scope and influence that are wide enough to affect “articulations and attributions… sufficiently elastic, flexible, and inclusive enough… that any number of other social movements can successfully adopt and deploy it in their campaigns.”[[469]](#footnote-469) Similar to moral equivalence arguments, master frames like good vs. evil are effective because they operationalize the suggestion that their negatively-evaluated subject matter (in this case, terrorism) is equivalent to other societally relevant issues that have received similar treatment. This type of framing has the reverse effect of constituting the issue or actor that is (either implicitly or explicitly) determined to exist counter to the negatively evaluated subject matter (in this case, the state) as desirable or valuable. Diverging from Frame A’s focus on moral evaluation, Frame D (democracy vs. terrorism) emphasizes the necessity of remedying (implicitly, eliminating) terrorism. As such, Frame D’s problem definition situates democracy as necessarily opposing the ideological underpinnings of terrorism and their practical (institutional) manifestations. Thus, employing Frame D establishes the conflict between terrorists and democracies as a zero-sum game. Put another way, Frame D creates a *pareto-efficient* situation, a circumstance in which either terrorism *or* democracy must ‘win,’ eliminating the possibility for both to prevail. (In essence, this constitutes media coverage that employs Frame D pro-state propaganda.) The clash inherent to comparing Frame A (good vs. evil) to Frame D (democracy vs. terrorism), then, is whether the way terrorism is framed should focus on situating it as an extra-normally problematic issue within international public consciousness, *or* whether it should center on implicitly informing the international public that it is necessary for democracy to ‘win’ in order to eliminate terrorism.

In addition to revealing the clash between moral evaluation-focused and remedy proposal-focused framing of terrorism, Frame A (good vs. evil) and Frame D (democracy vs. terrorism) also provide historical perspective supporting my conceptualization of terrorism as post-modern warfare. The media frame most frequently employed in the media coverage of terrorism, Frame D (democracy vs. terrorism), is reminiscent of another frame that held for decades in the context of the Cold War (and post-Cold War) contest for hegemony between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In the aftermath of World War II, there were significant international efforts to prevent the recurrence of general warfare of a similar magnitude and consequence in affecting both casualties and destruction.[[470]](#footnote-470) In this context, the United States and the USSR – the ‘victors’ of the “total warfare” of World War II – emerged as the figureheads of a newly bipolar world order.[[471]](#footnote-471) On a basic level, the Cold War constituted these two powers’ contest for global influence, which manifested under the guise of clashing political ideologies (capitalism, and communism). These ideologies manifested as “two very different political systems…[and] their built-in ideological conflict, [which] ensured a deadly political and military rivalry.”[[472]](#footnote-472) The practical manifestation of these rivalries evolved over the course of the two major phases of the Cold War.[[473]](#footnote-473) In the détente phase of the Cold War, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States and the USSR “[came] to several agreements whereby they tacitly regulated the arms race and tried to avoid conflict in sensitive areas.”[[474]](#footnote-474) These agreements were the impetus for the marked increase in both powers’ involvement in proxy warfare, whereby both countries would engage in an existing conflict, each through a different actor that served as the conduit for its superpower benefactor’s weapons, training and funding.[[475]](#footnote-475) In the context of these smaller conflicts that carried far less of a risk of inciting nuclear war, the United States often intervened on the pretext of spreading democracy.[[476]](#footnote-476) Such interventions were often presented as countering USSR intervention efforts in the same conflict, with the ultimate objective of containing communism.[[477]](#footnote-477) As such, notions of the USSR as an active opponent of democracy propagated over the course of the Cold War, as a component of the United States’ campaign against the USSR and the communist ideology.

Situating terrorism in the context of the bipolar struggle for global dominance that characterized the Cold War analogizes terrorists with “great power” states. To that end, the democracy vs. terrorism media frame implicitly elevates the importance of the fight against terrorism to the pedestal generally reserved for interstate conflicts of an international magnitude – “war[s] to end all wars.”[[478]](#footnote-478) As previously established in Chapter 4, states are the primary actors in international relations. Put differently, *states* are the actors whose voices and decisions necessarily matter the most in the conduct of international politics.[[479]](#footnote-479) By contrast, terrorists are explicitly violent *non-state* (or even *sub-state*) actors, which are, by definition, less significant than states.[[480]](#footnote-480) Notwithstanding, media coverage of terrorism’s treatment of terrorists (specifically relating to the employ of the democracy vs. terrorism frame) implies that, as actors, terrorists are of equal import to states in the context of international relations or at least worthy adversaries to merit such attention in binary frames. Using the terrorism label sensationalizes the ideological and real challenge that terrorism poses – hyperinflating it, given the rhetoric employed. To be clear, I am not trying to suggest that terrorists *are* on equal footing with states, in terms of their practical capabilities and other real-world considerations. (Put another way, I absolutely believe that, in practice, the dominant actors in the practice of international relations are still state actors.) Rather, I contend that media coverage’s depiction of terrorism contributes to the hyperinflation of the public *perception* of the threat posed by terrorism by implicitly framing the conflict between states and terrorists as one where the two parties to the conflict are on (relatively) equal footing with one another. This framing constitutes states’ collective and individual decision-making strategies (and policy-making in general) *reactive* in the context of the conflict between states and terrorists.

The second of the two media frames that recurs in my sampling frame with the highest frequency is Frame A (good vs. evil). Like Frame D (democracy vs. terrorism), discussed above, Frame A hearkens to the Cold War, albeit more subtly. Moreover, Frame A also implicitly references the immediate aftermath of the fall of communism, a time period that extends from the 1991 collapse of the USSR until the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and is significant in this context because it saw the inception of the ‘human security debate’ in International Relations (IR).[[481]](#footnote-481) On a disciplinary level, IR has traditionally concerned itself with the connection “between men, states and war,” focusing on conflict and the practices of statecraft and strategy formulation through the lenses of competition and fear.[[482]](#footnote-482) Even though the emerging conception of ‘human security’ in the post-Cold War era problematized and expanded the referent object associated with notions of ‘security’, state (and group) actors continue to dominate the international system and the practice of international relations. Notwithstanding, the human security debate’s reframing the focus of contemporary IR to include individuals in addition to states ultimately allows terrorist decision-making processes to be understood on the basis of the same implicit assumptions as states.[[483]](#footnote-483) The human security debate expansion of IR gives terrorists more agency, ultimately providing for any ability terrorists have to be considered as being of similar import to states, and, crucially, to have their decision-making processes understood on the basis of the same implicit assumptions.[[484]](#footnote-484) This is significant in relation to any discussion deconstructing Frame A because considering good vs. evil in the context of IR benefits from an understanding of its employ in the Cold War. Moreover, the good vs. evil frame alludes to Western (particularly American) notions of its contentions with terrorism (i.e., “The War on Terror”) as having filled the void in the sensationalized coverage of potential violence/threat left by the abrupt conclusion of the East-West conflict that characterized the Cold War era.

Good vs. evil framing was prominently employed in the Cold War-era propaganda produced by both the United States and the USSR.[[485]](#footnote-485) In the context of the Cold War, each superpower used the good vs. evil frame to implicitly emphasize the superiority of its own ideology and values while simultaneously denigrating those of its adversary.[[486]](#footnote-486) Consequently, either superpower’s use of this frame casts its adversary’s ideology and values as immoral, while glorifying its own ideology, beliefs and values. During the Cold War, this was invaluable to the US and the USSR because it enabled them to both cultivate a sense of superiority among their own citizens and create and maintain alliances with countries of a similar ideological persuasion.[[487]](#footnote-487) This binary framing of good and evil pitted ‘good’ democratic countries (led by the United States) against ‘evil’ communist states (championed by the USSR). After the 1991 collapse of the USSR put an end to the bipolar world order of the Cold War era, subsequent outbreaks of intrastate violence in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia exemplified the newly unipolar system’s inability to act as a ‘check’ on mass atrocity violence. The effects of post-Cold War globalization coupled with the technological and communications-related developments of the 1990s, facilitated greater public access to the graphic details of these conflicts, which served to demonstrate that evil continues to exist in the aftermath of communism’s demise. Implicit questions as to the root cause(s) of ‘evil’ internationally became seminal to the United States-helmed international system of the 1990s, which spent more than a decade working to reframe and situate the *delicta juris gentium* (most serious crimes of concern to the international community) in the “new order of international criminal justice” of the post-Cold War era.[[488]](#footnote-488)

By and large, both Frame A (good vs. evil) and Frame D (democracy vs. terrorism) reference the context and manner in which states have, to some extent, ceased to exist as the only primary actor of note to contemporary international relations. Framing terrorism in terms of either good vs. evil or democracy vs. terrorism suggests that the significance and magnitude often attributed to terrorism should resonate with the (international) public similar to the way that the narrative regarding communism and the USSR colored the experiences of the (Western) public throughout the Cold War. The tacit implication here, in the context of the democracy vs. terrorism and good vs. evil frames, is that terrorists constitute the new foil for (Western) states, replacing communism and the USSR as the international system antagonist that ‘explains’ the continued existence of evil in post-Cold War, post-communist international relations. Going back to the idea (presented in Chapter 5) that media coverage necessarily reflects public perceptions of what is going on in the world, the prominence (and therefore salience) of terrorism framed as *the* most significant threat since that which the USSR posed to the US is noteworthy because it elevates terrorist actors in terms of the level of consideration that they are afforded in the context of international relations.[[489]](#footnote-489)

States Have Established Their Own Worst Enemy in Terrorists

Conceptualizing terrorists and states as international actors that have similarly important statuses in the international system is problematic because, based on surface level analysis alone, terrorists and states have vastly different material and strategic capabilities. It is true that each specific instance of terrorism may be fleeting, practically speaking. Moreover states tend to have more long-term endurance (‘staying power’) than specific terrorists/terrorist organizations. Notwithstanding, the label “terrorism” bundles different terrorist attacks and terrorists together within public discourse, almost constituting “terrorism” a single, amorphous actor. To wit, this observable discrepancy in the resources and capabilities available to different types of actors that engage in violent conflict provided the impetus for scholarship addressing the disappearing distinction between symmetrical and asymmetrical tactics in the context of contemporary conflicts.[[490]](#footnote-490) Based on the objective facts alone, terrorists are not (and should not be) considered the same type of actor as states. So, why does the international public (specifically, the news media) favor the ‘states vs. terrorists’ narrative?

Reasons that international news media tends to use the ‘states vs. terrorists’ narrative to frame the discourse about terrorism relate to the scholarly debate (outlined in Chapter 5) about whether violence constitutes inherent propaganda, or whether violent actors like terrorists use violence with the conscious intention of generating propaganda.[[491]](#footnote-491) Ultimately, this seemingly philosophical discussion boils down to whether the media is to any extent culpable for the effects of terrorism, given that publicity is said to incentivize perpetrators of extra-normal violence. On the basis of its inclusion of definitional element [19] – *publicity, propaganda*, the media coverage definition of terrorism established earlier in this chapter ostensibly supports the position that terrorists intentionally use violence to generate propaganda.[[492]](#footnote-492) However, it is necessary to examine how states – the purported actors of note to international relations – conceive of the relationship between terrorism and the media. While it is true that states cannot be reduced to the rhetorical flourish that populates the media frames discussed here in terms of what they *actually do in practice*, legitimacy (as it is conceived of in this dissertation) depends to a not insignificant extent on the perception of the general public. To that end, what matters in the context of the discussion here is that a large part of the public conceives of the state in terms of how it (and its actions) are depicted in media coverage. Thus, it is important to determine how states understand the relationship between terrorism and the media in order to not only understand whether states see terrorists as intentionally perpetrating violence to provoke media coverage, but also to examine the state’s perspective as to how important terrorist actors really are in the context of international relations.

The *de minimis* definition of terrorism employed here relates to state *conduct.* It is necessary for me to determine how state conduct treats terrorism in a manner that is separate from the policy definition established in Chapter 3 because states distinguish between their conduct in international relations and the establishment of international law, in that there tends to be a disconnect between the ‘lip service’ paid to shared norms in establishing legislation, on the one hand, and states’ behaviour as it manifests in practice, on the other.[[493]](#footnote-493) My *de minimis* policy definition of terrorism is derived by analyzing state domestic legislation – effectively constituting a state’s statement of intent – to infer how states define terrorism. Taken in isolation, this *de minimis* policy definition of terrorism is not necessarily representative of *how* states understand terrorism in deciding what practices to carry out to combat terrorists in emergent situations.

To rectify this oversight, I use the methodology outlined in Chapter 3 (and used earlier in this chapter) to determine which of the 28 definitional elements public figures prioritize when making public statements in the aftermath of significant terrorist incidents. This leads to my initial identification of four elements (Element [27] - *public; general population;* Element [8] – *extranormality;* Element [26] – *state; country; national; and* Element [4] *- physical injury; homicide; death of a victim*) that recur with greater than 20 percent frequency.[[494]](#footnote-494) Then, I determine which of the definitional elements used by a given state’s officials overlap with the definition of terrorism cited in its domestic legislation. The results of this process are depicted in Figure 7-3, below.

Figure 7- 3: Recurrence Frequencies of 28 Definitional Elements that Co-occur in Public Figures’ Statements about Terrorism and State’s Domestic Legislation on Terrorism

The definitional element that co-occurs in public figures’ statements and domestic legislation in the individual United Nations member states surveyed with the highest frequency is Element [27] - *public; general population*. The definitional element that co-occurs with the second highest frequency is Element [8] – *extranormality*, followed by Element [26] – *state; country; national*. The abovementioned definitional elements are the only three elements with co-occurrence frequencies that meet the 20-percent inclusion threshold established above. Thus, based on analysis of the overlapping definitional elements in the policy and state practice definitions of terrorism associated with the relevant states depicted in Figure 7-3, above, the *de minimis* definition of terrorism that takes into account both a state’s conduct and its legislative policy (henceforth, the *de minimis* statedefinition of terrorism) constitutes *extra-normative action against the general population that ultimately targets the state*.[[495]](#footnote-495)

Here, I must note that the limitations associated with this analysis. Only 34 of 193 United Nations member states (put differently, 17.61% of the United Nations total membership) are represented in this analysis. Additionally, certain states are represented by multiple (different) statements made by different public figures. Moreover, statements analyzed were made at different times in the wake of the relevant terrorist incident, and thus reflect the ways that investigations into the relevant incident had evolved up until that point. To that end, the official statements I analyzed to provide evidence for my proposed *de minimis* definition of terrorism implicit tostate *conduct* are not directly comparable with one another. Notwithstanding, comparing each of these 34 countries’ state practice definitions of terrorism with their counterparts in domestic state legislation (and thereby generating my proposed *de minimis* statedefinition of terrorism) provides some understanding as to the extent to which ‘talk and action’ differ in the context of the state’s perspective on terrorism when the abovementioned caveats are taken into consideration.[[496]](#footnote-496)

In practice, how does the *de minimis* state definition of terrorism compare to the *de minimis* policy definition of terrorism outlined here? Moreover, how does the *de minimis* state definition of terrorism compare to my *de minimis* media coverage definition of terrorism? To answer these questions, I must first increase the definitional element inclusion threshold associated with my policy and media coverage definitions to 20-percent to match the threshold associated with my *de minimis* state definition of terrorism.[[497]](#footnote-497) At this inclusion threshold, all three definitional elements present in my *de minimis* state definition of terrorism (Element [27] – *public; general population*; Element [26] – *state; country; national*; Element [8] – *extranormality*) are included in my policy definition of terrorism. It is of note that at the 20-percent inclusion threshold, my policy definition also encompasses an additional 18 definitional elements that do not present in my *de minimis* state definition of terrorism.[[498]](#footnote-498) Moreover, Element [27] – *public; general population* occurs with the highest frequency in the analyses used to derive both my *de minimis* state definition of terrorism and my *de minimis* policy definition of terrorism, presenting with a 58.82% frequency across the 34 definitions implicit to state conduct, and an 85.29% frequency across these states’ corresponding policy definitions.

As established above, the *de minimis* policy definition of terrorism contains all of the elements associated with the *de minimis* state definition of terrorism. However, this congruence is not reflected when the *de minimis* media coverage definition of terrorism is compared to the *de minimis* state definition of terrorism. This is important because, in the context of my sample, it suggests that media reporting on terrorism (which influences public understanding of what terrorism *is*) does not emphasize the same underlying features of terrorism as the people perceived as speaking on behalf of the country. This sends conflicting messages to the public, in terms of what the country’s government considers the important features of terrorism. Only one of the three definitional elements included in the *de minimis* statedefinition of terrorism (Element [27] – *public; general population*) co-occurs in the *de minimis* media coverage definition of terrorism. Moreover, my media coverage definition of terrorism actually expands upon (and, in doing so, makes more specific) *what actually constitutes terrorism* by including 13 additional elements at the twenty percent inclusion threshold that do not co-occur in my state practice definition.[[499]](#footnote-499)

The analysis of the definitions of terrorism associated with 34 states’ conduct surveyed here suggest that the manner in which terrorism is implicitly defined by state conduct (through states officials’ public statements) does not necessarily reflect the way that domestic state legislation implicitly defines terrorism. More significantly, this analysis highlights that the media coverage definition of terrorism does *not* explicitly define terrorism on the basis of the state as the ultimate target of terrorism. Specifically, while Element [26] (state, country, national) is present in both the *de minimis* policy definition and the *de minimis* state definition, it is not present in the *de minimis* media coverage definition at the 20-percent inclusion threshold. This suggests that the blame that scholars who view the media as “‘culpable,’ [and] instrumental to terrorism” misattribute the blame that they place on media coverage for the consequences of terrorist incidents.[[500]](#footnote-500) The media is neither “pro-terrorist” nor “anti-terrorist”; media coverage merely reports on newsworthy events and occurrences, which necessarily include a significant number of repetitive citations of statements made by state officials in response to events that have occurred.[[501]](#footnote-501) Thus, states (through the public figures that derive authority from their official capacity related to a specific country) have re-affirmed terrorists as a significant adversary given how their statements about terrorist incidents serve to situate and frame terrorism in the context of the international system. Put simply, states have created their own asserted worst enemy as a result of the framing that contextualizes the official discourse on terrorism.

Conclusion

Although terrorism does *not*, on its own, have a measurable effect on international (state) legitimacy, the media coverage of terrorism *does* have a detrimental effect on international (state) legitimacy. In this chapter, I expand on this idea, premised on my hypothesis that *media coverage* is the key factor that enables terrorism to have a demonstrable effect on international (state) legitimacy. In exploring *how* the media coverage of terrorism detracts from the international legitimacy of the state as an institution, I construct four interconnected arguments. First, I derive a *de minimis* definition of terrorism implicit within the media coverage supports the argument that terrorism is in direct opposition to state authority. In the context of the media coverage of terrorism, I suggest terrorism is

*the intentional targeting of the general population in order to generate news or garner publicity. (This can include, but is not limited to, perpetrating homicide, other actions that result in physical injury or death to persons and damaging or destroying property.)*

Second, I use cooccurrence frequencies associated with positive and negative bias towards terrorism, and towards the state to support the argument that terrorists and state necessarily *compete* with one another for the same overarching type of authority. Third, I analyze frames that the media coverage of terrorism tends to employ in reporting terrorism. This analysis facilitates my contention that the way that the media covers terrorism suggests some equivalence between terrorists and states in the context of the international system. Fourth, I propose that states have created their own asserted worst enemy in terrorists based on analyzing how public figures’ statements suggest that (perceived) state *conduct* implicitly defines terrorism. All told, these four claims together suggest that the media coverage of terrorism negatively affects international (state) legitimacy. By framing terrorism as necessarily manifesting in direct, diametric opposition to the state’s authority, media coverage of terrorism questions the state’s legitimacy. In the next chapter, I extend and demonstrate the relevance and import of the results presented in both this chapter (Chapter 7) and Chapter 6. This involves drawing policy-relevant conclusions from the interplay between the media coverage of terrorism and (state) legitimacy, and furthermore, suggesting policy recommendations that can contribute to global efforts to combat the threat posed by terrorism’s effect on international (state) legitimacy.

Chapter 8 – Existing Policies and Guidelines for Journalists

As I establish in Chapter 5, extant scholarship on the purported connection between terrorism and the mass media (or media coverage) tends either to be premised on the notion of an inherent symbiosis between terrorists and the media, or to focus on answering the question of whether the media is partially “‘culpable’” for terrorists’ actions, or “’vulnerable’ – in effect, a victim itself of the manipulation of terrorists” that does not itself bear responsibility for the damage terrorism wreaks on society at large.[[502]](#footnote-502) I diverge from these themes by providing a comprehensive analysis of the integral role that media coverage plays in determining and exacerbating the threat that terrorism poses to the international system. Up until this point (the penultimate chapter of this dissertation), I seek to establish that there is a negative correlation between the media coverage of terrorism and international (state) legitimacy. This is facilitated by both the quantitative (in Chapter 6) and mixed methods analyses (in Chapter 7), which I use to suggest both *whether* and *how* the media coverage of terrorism might exert the proposed detrimental impact on international (state) legitimacy. These analyses culminate with my contention (in Chapter 7) that states and terrorists compete for the same type of authority, and moreover, that media coverage of terrorism might negatively affect international (state) legitimacy due to its implicit framing of terrorism as directly opposing state authority. In order to interpret and apply this conclusion in a meaningful, policy-relevant manner, I must also examine existing policies related to how the media depicts terrorism and terrorists. Using policy analysis to extend the conclusions that I reach in Chapters 6 and 7 is integral to my ultimate aim in conceiving of and conducting the research presented in this dissertation, because considering the effects – the successes and failures – of existing policy is the only effective way to ensure that my research has real-world implications. Put simply, determining what works and what does not work in policies that have already been implemented is the best way for me to ensure that the research I present in this dissertation can be used to improve (current) journalistic and state practices pertaining to terrorism.

To facilitate my research’s policy applicability, I structure this chapter in the following manner. I begin with an overview of notable extant guidelines related to the production of journalism about terrorism. In particular, my review emphasizes guidelines that are endorsed by significant international actors. For example, countries (the United States), regional organizations (the Council of Europe) and international organizations (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization – UNESCO). Then, I discuss news agency style guides, and the role that they play in the news production process. Here, I identify the dearth of policy scholarship pertaining to terrorism that mentions style guides in any meaningful way. Furthermore, I identify and explain insights about the role of style guides (particularly style guides produced by reputable English-language international news agencies) play in informing news production offered in extant journalism and sociolinguistic scholarship. Finally, I compare and contrast the guidelines pertaining to terrorism in each of the style guides produced by the Associated Press (AP), Agence France-Presse (AFP) and Reuters both to one another, and to the coverage of terrorism produced by each publication in the sampling frame examined in this dissertation (January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2018, inclusive).

Existing Policy Relating to the Media Coverage of Terrorism

The idea (presented in Chapter 7) that either media or terrorists are the only relevant actors to consider in the context of the media coverage of terrorism is reflected by the limited existing policies aiming to mitigate and minimize terrorism’s use of violence as a communication technique. Based on this incorrect view of media as the lone amplifiers of terrorism, some intergovernmental organizations have weighed in with suggestions as to how journalists can facilitate ethical and factual media coverage of terrorism. Of particular note in this regard is UNESCO’s 2017 handbook of advice to journalists that aims “to raise awareness, of… challenges [associated with mitigating media coverage’s tendency to “play… into the interests of fearmongers”] and better support journalists reporting [on terrorism].”[[503]](#footnote-503) In terms of specific policy suggestions, the handbook’s “Ground Rules” chapter stresses the necessity of both fact-checking and clearly delineating the sourcing of information (so as to suggest how implicit bias might have occurred) in media coverage of terrorism. Further, the handbook clearly asserts that it is of utmost importance for journalists to consult and reference information from “many, varied sources… whether they are institutions, universities or civil society” while at the same time advocating for the exercise of caution in choosing both which experts to consult and determining how to frame their qualifications.[[504]](#footnote-504) The UNESCO handbook also discusses potential issues relating to framing and “semantic propaganda,” advising against employing express moral evaluations of terrorism by “speaking of it as ‘an axis of evil’, ‘barbarity’ or ‘abjection’.”[[505]](#footnote-505)The handbook further argues that “the media must use caution when they take up words coined either by terrorists or authorities.”[[506]](#footnote-506) However, although the UNESCO handbook does address media bias and framing to some extent, it places an overwhelming emphasis on best practices relating to journalist safety. In addition, the authors of the publication prioritize citing media and communication studies scholarship and in doing so, largely fail to integrate insights from International Relations, political science, and security studies literature on terrorism.[[507]](#footnote-507) The handbook only addresses specific newswire and news organization reporting practices in the context of the debate about publishing visual content depicting victims of terrorism. In doing so, it notably fails to reference the journalistic style guides adhered to by major news producers like Reuters, the AP and AFP. Indeed, the phrase “style guide” is mentioned only once in the handbook’s 110 pages.[[508]](#footnote-508)

Notwithstanding the contributions of the UNESCO handbook, coping with terrorism’s manifestation as “essentially violence for effect” is, for the most part, managed on an individualized country or regional basis that involves suggesting guidelines to journalists so as to facilitate responsible reporting practices.[[509]](#footnote-509) This is reflected in the UNESCO handbook, which notes, “the right and duty to inform in the name of public interest do not exonerate the media from respecting a certain number of laws… in force in [countries] where [the media] sends their reporters.”[[510]](#footnote-510) This is also noted in a 2005 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe draft recommendation, which mentions “continuing “cultural” differences in dealing with the media when it comes to terrorism.”[[511]](#footnote-511) In this context, “cultural differences” indicate that a majority of European (Western) countries “prefer a liberal approach to the freedom of expression and information” that prioritizes “the freedom of journalists” over “the potential risk that media reporting might cause to individual citizens” because “by limiting freedom of expression, terrorists would have indirectly realised a major aim, namely to change the political system and make it more oppressive.”[[512]](#footnote-512) (Notwithstanding, the draft recommendation does acknowledge that “some countries… still subscribe to a more restrictive policy, [as t]hey want to avoid any risk of promotion of terrorist activities through media reporting.” More often than not, such policies restrict or “block… journalists’ access to sites where a violent attack takes place.”)[[513]](#footnote-513) Similarly, J.M. Berger advocated for minimal restriction in civilian posting of content relating to terrorist activities in testimony to the United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs.[[514]](#footnote-514) Although his remarks did not explicitly address the conduct of media outlets specific to the reporting process, Berger’s perspective aligns with that of the Council of Europe. This is particularly true of his affirmation that “we do not wish to create precedents and authorities that would empower tyrants and repressive movements with tools to silence legitimate dissent.”[[515]](#footnote-515) Correspondingly, states and regional organizations tend to view potential policy solutions to the issues posed by media coverage of terrorism in a way that, if presented on a ‘clash’ continuum (like those used in Chapter 3), errs towards preserving the underlying principles of freedom of the press at one ‘end’, and is permissive of more significant media censorship on its other ‘end.’ This is, perhaps, a reason underlying the dearth of literature – scholarly or otherwise – proposing meaningful policy recommendations to combat the issues associated with the media coverage of terrorism.

International News Agency Style Guides on Terrorism

Although the abovementioned policy recommendations aim to combat the issues associated with media coverage of terrorism, they are deficient, falling short of addressing what should be the crux of the issue from the state’s perspective: media coverage of terrorism’s erosion of international (state) legitimacy. As well, even though these policy recommendations do not contradict my Chapter 7 argument that the way bias and framing manifest in media coverage of terrorism is responsible for its ultimate effect on international (state) legitimacy, they do not meaningfully take into account existing style guides adhered to by the news media. Indeed, one of the major shortcomings of existing scholarship is that it fails, for the most part, to mention journalistic style guides at all in deconstructing and analyzing the news production process.[[516]](#footnote-516) As codified sets of standards and guidelines for journalists, style guides play an important role in ensuring the factual accuracy, stylistic consistency and ethical production of news published by a specific media outlet. Style guides are often discussed in pedagogical studies that focus on journalism education, as they are key in teaching trainee journalists to conform to professional expectations.[[517]](#footnote-517) Deborah Cameron notes that style guides serve a dual purpose from a sociolinguistic perspective, providing for “general consistency of journalistic style,” on the one hand, and “particular consistency of institutional voice,” on the other.[[518]](#footnote-518) To that end, style guides set out standards and best practices for journalists to follow in generating news content. While they generally prescribe rules for grammar, punctuation, capitalization, abbreviations and other aspects of writing style, they may also provide guidance relating to issues like journalistic ethics, the redistribution of user generated content, and the creation of audio-visual news content.

A style guide’s role in enabling consistency of a “distinctive institutional voice” across the output of a particular news producer is especially vital for the operations of international news agencies.[[519]](#footnote-519) This is because the success of newswires like AFP, the AP and Reuters rely, at least to some degree, on their perceived credibility and professionalism. Indeed, the reputations of these international news agencies are such that their decisions on style tend to inform the decisions of smaller organizations, many of whom adopt the larger organizations’ style guides in relation to their own news production.[[520]](#footnote-520) As Michael Munnik asserts, “the advice journalists receive from [style guides published by these significant international media producers] shapes the language of news reports, conditioning the national lexicon.”[[521]](#footnote-521)

In order to make substantive and meaningful policy recommendations relating to the media coverage of terrorism, it is imperative to deconstruct and analyze the AFP, AP and Reuters style guides with particular attention to their content (or lack of content) about terrorism. In official publications and internal communiques, AFP cautions journalists against using the term ‘terrorism’ in a way that could stigmatize or generalize entire communities or religions. Unlike AP and Reuters, AFP explicitly conceptualizes terrorism as “the use or threat of use, of violence by an individual, group, or state organization to pursue political, religious or ideological objectives.”[[522]](#footnote-522) This understanding expands on the definition of terrorism employed in the International Press Telecommunications Council (IPTC) Subject Codes and Media Topics taxonomy. The IPTC “creates and maintains sets of concepts – called a controlled vocabulary or a taxonomy – to be assigned… to news objects… [in order to allow] for consisting coding of news… across news providers and over the course of time.”[[523]](#footnote-523) Used by “the world’s largest news agencies, such as Agence France-Presse, Associated Press and Reuters” to describe different subjects and topics in news content, IPTC taxonomies assign “every news-item… to one of 17 categories, each comprising 117 ‘elements’.”[[524]](#footnote-524) In the context of the IPTC Subject Codes, ‘terrorism’ (“violence against people to create fear in order to achieve political or ideological objectives”) is situated within the “crime” subdivision of the overarching “crime, law and justice” categorization, while ‘act of terror’ (“act of violence, often deadly, designed to raise fear and anxiety in a population”) is classified under “unrest, conflicts and war.”[[525]](#footnote-525) The current IPTC Media Topic NewsCodes also place ‘terrorism’ in the “crime” section of “crime, law and justice,” but somewhat differently, contextualize ‘act of terror’ under “conflict, war and peace.”[[526]](#footnote-526) Moreover, the Media Topic NewsCodes subdivide ‘act of terror’ into “bombings” and “bioterrorism,” which is defined as “attacks using biological agents intended to raise the level of fear within a population.”[[527]](#footnote-527)

By contrast with AFP, Reuters fails to explicitly define terrorism. Notwithstanding, Reuters’ “news editorial guidelines oppose… the use of the term ‘terrorist’ except in sources quotes from others.”[[528]](#footnote-528) The Reuters style guide also stipulates that journalists should not refer to specific events as terrorism, or use the word ‘terrorist’ “without attribution to qualify specific individuals, groups, or events,” and references terrorism’s status as an emotive word with particular emotional resonance that must “be used with special care in the interests of neutrality and accuracy.”[[529]](#footnote-529) Additionally, a post-9/11 addition specifies that while the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ should be retained when directly quoting a source, they should not be used as single words in quotation marks. To that end, the guide specifies that journalists should “use a fuller quote if necessary.”[[530]](#footnote-530)

Distinct from both Reuters and AFP, the AP style guide does not address terrorism at all. Despite containing entries for 13 different groups that have been branded ‘terrorist organizations’ by various state governments and 5 definitions that directly relate to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the word “terrorist” appears only once throughout the entirety of the 628-page style guide.[[531]](#footnote-531) Like the Reuters style guide, the AP style guide also contains descriptive terms of a pejorative nature that are widely used in connection with terrorism (like guerilla, fundamentalist, radical, jihadist, Islamist). AP does not specifically use the phrase “emotive words,” but offers guidance on the use of these words. For example, the AP style guide specifies that ‘jihadist’, ‘jihadi’ and ‘Islamist’ are “non-preferred terms.”[[532]](#footnote-532) Furthermore, it recommends that reporters strive to use clear, neutral language. This exhortation from the AP corresponds with Reuters’ refrain that journalists should “try to use more neutral or more specific words that describe what happened factually.”[[533]](#footnote-533) The AP style guide also expands on AFP’s more generalized caution regarding the use of the words ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’, reiterating the principles of accurate and impartial reporting. AP asks journalists to use clear and concise language that accurately conveys the facts without injecting their own opinions or emotions. AP further extends this emphasis on language and word choice by providing specific guidance on use of terminology relating to race, gender, sexual orientation and identity to avoid perpetuating harmful stereotypes and to promote inclusivity.

The Effect of Style Guides on Terrorism’s Depiction in Media Coverage

There is a direct correlation between the contents of a media outlet’s style guide and the different types of bias and framing that manifest in the media coverage of terrorism. Put simply, what a media agency chooses to include (or not include) in its style guide corresponds with the way that the media coverage generated by that agency depicts terrorism. This becomes readily apparent when the elements of the AFP, AP and Reuters style guides that I highlight above are taken into consideration in conjunction with Chapter 7’s conclusions about how terrorism is framed in media coverage. The terms “terror attack”, “terrorist attack” and “terrorist” are more likely to be used in media coverage produced by AFP, while the terms “terrorism” and “extremist” tend to arise in coverage produced by AP, and the phrase “act of terror” is most often used in Reuters’ reporting about terrorism. The Reuters style guide expressly prohibits both “refer[ring] to specific events as terrorism,” and “us[ing] the word terrorist without attribution to qualify specific individuals, groups or events.” Moreover, the Reuters style guide also instructs its journalists to avoid using the terms “terror”, “terror attack” and “terror cell.”[[534]](#footnote-534) Notably, “act of terror” – the phrase most often used in Reuters’ media coverage of terrorism – is *not* mentioned at any point in these reporting guidelines. Likewise, “terrorism” and “extremist” – the terms that tend to arise in AP’s coverage of terrorism – are not mentioned at any point in the 628-pages of the AP style guide.[[535]](#footnote-535) Of the three news agencies analyzed here, AFP, the agency that is most heavily reliant on IPTC definitions, is more likely to employ terms that do not have assigned definitions within the IPTC NewsCodes scheme. The IPTC explicitly defines the terms “terrorism”, “act of terror” and “bioterrorism”, making no mention of “terror attack”, “terrorist attack” or “terrorist.”[[536]](#footnote-536)

Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 7, media coverage of terrorism tends to frame terrorism in terms of good vs. evil (Frame A), and democracy vs. terrorism (Frame D). AP media bulletins comprise 38.64% of all of the media bulletins in my sampling frame that employ Frame A, while Reuters journalists generated 57.68% of bulletins in my sampling frame that describe terrorism in relation to Frame D. (For comparison’s sake, 36.36% of media bulletins employing Frame A were published by AFP, while only 25% were produced by Reuters. AFP generated 20.33% of the media bulletins that employ Frame D, while AP generated the remaining 19.92%.) Both frames (Frame A – good vs. evil and Frame D – democracy vs. terrorism) overwhelmingly manifest in the media coverage of terrorism as a result of direct quotations from public figures’ statements about terrorism.[[537]](#footnote-537) Notably, Reuters – the news agency most likely to employ Frame D – specifies that journalists should only refer to specific events as terrorism, and specific individuals and groups as terrorists if they are “quoting someone in direct speech.”[[538]](#footnote-538) By contrast, AP and AFP media bulletins tend to be less reliant on direct quotations. The AP style guide, in particular, specifies that journalists should only “use direct quotes only when a paraphrase doesn’t work better,” even asserting that, in most cases, paraphrasing is more effective than directly quoting a source. [[539]](#footnote-539) AFP, meanwhile, states that journalists “can use a partial quote or paraphrase if necessary” and further, that journalists “should give complete quotes and limit partial quotes.”[[540]](#footnote-540) Both AP and AFP policy relating to the use of quotations in news coverage thus aligns with their style guides’ instructions. Specifically, the media bulletins that these organizations follow their style guides’ moderate (in comparison with Reuters) stance on employing both emotive terminology without attribution to a source and emotive terms in general.

Emotive terms play an even more integral role in how good vs. evil framing manifests in the context of media coverage relating to terrorism. As discussed in Chapter 7, casting terrorism as ‘evil’ contextualizes it as antithetical to the ‘right way’ – so implicitly, basic so-called Western values. This taps into a strong emotional response that encourages action against what is portrayed as an existential threat. Thus, such descriptions of terrorism implicitly try to counterweight the ‘evil’ constituted by terrorism by proffering a remedy proposal (condemning terrorist acts).[[541]](#footnote-541) On a more subtle note, framing terrorism as ‘evil’ alludes to a firm conception of journalism as ‘good’ by virtue of its inherent relation to social justice and human rights in the context of democracies. This view of journalism accords with the AP style guide, again thematically premised on adherence to ethical journalistic practices, placing particular emphasis on ensuring that journalists promote societal inclusivity and avoid perpetuating harmful stereotypes.[[542]](#footnote-542) Moreover, the AP style guide does not provide a prescription relating to its journalists’ use of ‘evil’ as a descriptor. Indeed, the AP style guide treats ‘evil’ the same way that it treats ‘terrorism’ – it neglects to establish a definition of the term and, indeed, fails to explicitly mention it at any point. For these reasons, it makes sense that AP is the news agency relevant to my sampling frame that produces the most media bulletins that frame terrorism as ‘evil.’ Similar to AP, AFP – the news agency that produces a slightly lesser, although still comparable amount of media bulletins that frame terrorism in terms of good vs. evil – fails to dictate what constitutes acceptable (or conversely, unacceptable) journalistic use of the term ‘evil.’ This, in conjunction with AFP’s tolerance for paraphrasing in place of directly quoting sources, provides some explanation as to AFP journalists’ willingness to frame terrorism as ‘evil’ in their media coverage of terrorism.

Conclusion

Media bulletins that frame terrorism in the ways that I have outlined in this dissertation likely play a significant role in facilitating the negative correlation between terrorism and international (state) legitimacy. However, given this chapter’s analysis of the journalistic guidance that prominent international news agencies include (or fail to include) in their style guides, concluding that the news media and the terrorists are the *sole* actors that facilitate terrorism’s erosion of the state’s institutional legitimacy is a disingenuous oversimplification. As I discuss in the preceding chapter (Chapter 7), significant culpability for the prominence and importance ascribed to terrorists can actually be attributed to *states* by virtue of the way public figures discuss terrorists as adversaries. To successfully mitigate the effects that media coverage of terrorism has on international (state) legitimacy, then, it is essential for two different types of policy recommendations be implemented concurrently: recommendations for media producers, and recommendations for states. To that end, in the final chapter of this dissertation (the next chapter – Chapter 9) I extend the insights gained through this chapter’s comparative analysis of the AP, AFP and Reuters style guides to develop and suggest policy recommendations for media producers and states regarding the manner in which media coverage of terrorism negatively affects state legitimacy.

Chapter 9 – Conclusion

“Call him Voldemort, Harry. Always use the proper name for things. Fear of a name increases fear of the thing itself.”

* Albus Dumbledore, Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone

Throughout the *Harry Potter* series, the wizarding world’s fear of Lord Voldemort – the series’ main antagonist – is exemplified by characters’ avoidance of referring to him by his name. By the beginning of *Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s* Stone, this culture of fear is so pervasive within the wizarding world that the euphemisms “You-Know-Who” and “He-Who-Must-Not-Be-Named” are commonly understood to refer to Voldemort.

Near the end of *Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone*, Albus Dumbledore explicitly diverges from this norm, instructing Harry Potter “call him Voldemort, Harry.”[[543]](#footnote-543) Dumbledore justifies this by explaining that one must “always use the proper name for things,” because “fear of a name increases fear of the thing itself.”[[544]](#footnote-544) By maintaining that avoiding acknowledging something by name can make it seem scarier than it actually is, Dumbledore acknowledges that the widespread use of euphemisms is reflective of the power that Voldemort holds over the wizarding world at large. Moreover, the idea that “fear of a name increases fear of the thing itself” suggests that understanding and confronting – *naming* – our fears directly is key to overcoming them.

Dumbledore’s assertion that one must “always use the proper name for things” is directly relevant to the subject matter that I address in this dissertation. More specifically, it constitutes a response to scholars that argue *against* using the word ‘terrorism’ to label instances of violence (or threatened violence) given the pejorative and normatively-loaded nature of the term, as well as its lack of analytical “precision, objectivity and certainty.”[[545]](#footnote-545) The type of focus on terrorism’s ontological nature that is exemplified by arguments about the academic propriety of the ‘terrorist’ label hinders public understandings of what terrorism actually *is*. The (particularly unhelpful) query, “will we not know terrorism when we see it?” aside, the ambiguity associated with terrorism (and therefore, with the risk that it might pose to the public) provides for depictions of terrorism that implicitly constitute it a disproportionately significant threat that in no way reflects reality.[[546]](#footnote-546) The scholarly and policy literatures’ collective failure to define terrorism has led to the general public implicitly premising its feelings about terrorism based on how terrorism is framed in media coverage. This is problematic because, as I establish in this dissertation, media coverage tends to frame terrorism in a way that reflects the state’s conception of terrorism as necessarily and inherently threatening its legitimacy (and therefore, its continued primacy in the international system). While what ultimately makes terrorism ‘scary’ to states is that its perpetration necessarily involves a sub-state actor’s demonstrated (or threatened) use of force that undermines international (state) legitimacy, it is actually the uncertainty – more specifically, the unspecified extranormality – implied by the ‘terrorism’ label that has such “rhetorical impact that ought not to be underestimated” on the general public.[[547]](#footnote-547) Avoiding the use – or explicit definition – of a specific term can thus lead to a lack of overall understanding of the issue that it connotes, allowing it to perpetuate and creating a culture of fear that can be greater “than fear of the thing itself.”[[548]](#footnote-548)

In this dissertation, I discuss the manner in which terrorism ‘succeeds’, originally hypothesizing that media coverage of terrorism facilitates terrorism’s ‘success’ by eroding the legitimacy of the state as *the* actor of note in international relations.[[549]](#footnote-549) While a universally accepted definition of terrorism has yet to be established, I emphasize state priorities in conceptualizing terrorism in a policy-relevant manner because states are widely considered the primary noteworthy actors in international relations. This fact grounds my proposal that the integral feature of terrorism is not the means by which it is perpetrated, the modes of violence that it employs, its indiscriminate fear-inducing nature, or the motivations underlying its perception. Instead, the crucial factor implicit in any conceptualization of state-seeking terrorism is the sub-state actor’s demonstrated use or threatened use of force that undermines international (state) legitimacy. Accordingly, I conceive of media coverage of terrorism as the *mode* of post-modern warfare that connects terrorism as its *means* with the *ends* of delegitimizing the state as an institution. This framework contextualizes the results of the empirical research that I present, which suggest that while the perpetration of terrorism in and of itself does not have a measurable effect on international (state) legitimacy, increased *media coverage of terrorism* correlates with decreased state legitimacy. I suggest that any detrimental effect that the media coverage of terrorism might exert on international (state) legitimacy occurs because media coverage of terrorism tends to frame terrorism as opposing state authority, in turn calling into question state legitimacy. Moreover, I contend that *states* are the actors responsible for the prominence that enables terrorism to have this effect, meaning that states themselves have constructed terrorists effectively as their own worst enemy.

In short, my conclusion suggests state actors are ultimately responsible for the attention that media coverage showers on terrorist actors. The conclusion challenges earlier ideas about the media as either “‘culpable,’ instrumental to terrorism,” or “‘vulnerable’ – in effect a victim itself of the manipulation by terrorists… [and] not directly responsible for their deeds.”[[550]](#footnote-550) Rather than associating the media coverage of terrorism as inherently tied to a “symbiotic relationship” between terrorists and the media, I contend that it is the media’s coverage of public figures’ rhetoric about terrorism that has a significant detrimental effect on international (state) legitimacy.[[551]](#footnote-551) This re-situates the relationship between terrorism and the media. By conceptualizing *states* as essential to amplifying terrorist violence that is crucial to terrorism, this study diverges from and corrects earlier scholarship’s focus on *either* the media *or* the terrorists as the noteworthy actors in discussions about media coverage of terrorism.

In order to build on these conclusions, and moreover, to further enrich this dissertation’s contributions to scholarship, it is necessary to connect the insights I detail above with their suggested practical applications. For that reason, this chapter (Chapter 9) focuses on demonstrating the practical relevance and (potential) impact of my research by developing principles to inform any policy recommendations established with the objective of mitigating the factors that I suggest are responsible for the negative correlation between the media coverage of terrorism and international (state) legitimacy. Accounting for my Chapter 7 contention that significant culpability for media coverage’s disproportionate focus on terrorism can actually be attributed to *states* because of the actions of public figures, the principles I propose in this chapter target the actions (and thus, the resulting output) of two distinct actors: the international news media, and states.

Principles to Inform Media-Centric Policy Recommendations

There are two different categories of media-centric policy recommendation that flow from the research described in this dissertation. First, journalists need to be properly trained to understand the implications associated with the use and framing of the term terrorism in news coverage. Second, journalists need to face greater accountability and operate with greater transparency in relation to their coverage of (and, in particular, their use of the term) terrorism.

I agree with Michael Munnik that “[m]ore thorough guidance would help improve the quality and accuracy of [journalists’] representations” of terrorism.[[552]](#footnote-552) It is thus essential that the international media work to standardize the way that news agency style guides advise journalists to report on terrorists and terrorism. As I establish in this dissertation, there are significant discrepancies regarding how terrorism is depicted in the media bulletins disseminated by major news agencies, and this ultimately has a significant impact on the way international media coverage frames terrorism because “traditional media remain crucial stakeholders [whose]… information and analysis… remains… the foundation for a large portion of public opinion.”[[553]](#footnote-553) For that reason, international news media should work in conjunction with policy-makers and academics where possible to eliminate these discrepancies by creating a primer on media framing specific to terrorism that addresses the differences between terrorism and other types of violence. In particular, it is necessary to establish that as a typology of violent conflict, terrorism necessarily places states in opposition to terrorists. While existing journalistic guidance seemingly acknowledges the necessity of “offer[ing] conflicting points of view… [to ensure that news does not only represent] one position,” reiterating that the media “dislike the idea of being hand-in-glove with authority” and that journalists should “be careful not to automatically adopt the viewpoint of the authorities,” these sources fail to acknowledge that by only speaking to states, the media *does*, in fact, choose a side in the conflict.[[554]](#footnote-554)

While this type of cooperation between governments and the press may seem exceedingly idealistic, there is regional precedent supporting its potential viability. Namely, the Shefayyim Conference held by the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in 1997, which facilitated a discussion between media personnel and (private and public-sector) counterterrorism experts that produced an eleven-principle proposal to “try and find a balance between… [a] journalist’s professional obligation [to guarantee the public’s “right to know”] and his civic duty.”[[555]](#footnote-555) Per Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn, a journalist’s “civic duty” involves facilitating the public’s “right not to know… the victim’s right to privacy; the right of the public not to be exposed to the personal and intimate details of terror victims through media coverage that infringes upon their dignity; [and] the right of the public to uphold the state’s security secrets that preserve their safety.”[[556]](#footnote-556) Notably, there is still widespread adherence to the recommendations produced at the 1997 Shefayyim Conference among Israeli media outlets. The feasibility of improving journalistic depictions of terrorism based on my abovementioned recommendation is also bolstered by the results of a 2017 study that improved the accuracy of the Australian media’s coverage of Muslims by helping journalists improve their knowledge about core tenets of Islam.[[557]](#footnote-557) This study’s success in improving journalistic coverage of Muslims further attests to the potential efficacy of the policies that I propose on the basis of the conclusions of my research: that terrorism ‘succeeds’ because media coverage of terrorism erodes international (state) legitimacy through the implicit challenges that its perpetration poses to the primacy of states as actors in international relations.

The impetus for my recommendation that the media collaborate with policy-makers to standardize style-guide instructions notwithstanding, the idea that media are inherently biased towards the ‘state’ side of the conflict between terrorists and states is also apparent in the journalistic tendency to repeatedly cite the same quotations from public figures in coverage of a specific terrorist incident over a short period of time. As Nick Davies asserts, “media… are under… pressure to produce copy at speed.”[[558]](#footnote-558) Notwithstanding, while “‘[i]n the fullness of time’ is not a luxury permitted to newsmen,” the international news media need to take a stand on both plagiarism in news coverage and journalistic cannibalism of pre-existing articles in order to ensure that coverage of terrorist incidents is as unbiased as possible.[[559]](#footnote-559) Indeed, isolating my sampling frame for the purposes of this research necessitated eliminating hundreds of articles with a greater than 90% similarity to other articles that met my criteria for inclusion in my sample to prevent duplicative analysis.[[560]](#footnote-560) Supporting the prevalence of this practice, media and communications scholarship repeatedly cites Reuters journalist Edward Behr’s recollection that “… in London Agence France-Presse correspondents rewrote Reuters copy as fast as they could, and the finished copy ended up as part of the AFP news-service. In Paris, we shamelessly rewrote Agence France-Presse copy serving it up as Reuters fare.”[[561]](#footnote-561)

Principles to Inform State-Based Policy Recommendations

Similar to how recommendations for the international news media centre on standardizing journalistic practices, state-centric policy recommendations offered here focus on ensuring the consistency of state messaging about terrorism. A significant proportion of the framing of terrorism detrimental to international (state) legitimacy arises from journalists’ citation of direct quotations taken from public figures’ statements about terrorism. The problem associated with these quotations is that they often express a position about terrorism that is at odds with that which is implicitly present in the state’s legislation relating to terrorism. Rectifying this problem necessitates standardizing both *what is said* in statements that are made in the aftermath of terrorist incidents, and *who* gets to make these statements. It is thus integral that an understanding be established amongst state officials that talking to the media (especially in an official capacity) constitutes making a statement on behalf of the state, even if this is not one’s underlying intention.

In relation to the *content* of statements about terrorism, states need to educate public figures on the wider implications of the way that they implicitly frame terrorists and terrorism in seemingly innocuous statements to the press. In particular, states need to inculcate in public figures an understanding that word choice and sentence construction can serve to confer authority on a specific actor (so, either the state or the terrorists). In streamlining the way terrorism is framed in statements to the media, individual states must also establish explicit guidelines for such statements that comport with their legislative definitions of terrorism. Official statements on terrorism need to emphasize state action to mitigate terrorism. State-sanctioned communications about terrorism should frame the interaction between states and terrorists in terms of distinct remedy proposals (ideally, ones that the state has already taken steps to implement), rather than moral evaluations.[[562]](#footnote-562) Framing terrorism in terms of its moral evaluation is problematic from a state perspective because focusing on ‘evil’ that has already manifested implies that states (the ‘good-guys’) have already failed to stop the terrorists (the ‘evil-doers’) from ‘winning.’

Conclusion

The research I describe in this dissertation contributes to terrorism scholarship by fundamentally reimagining the relationship between terrorists and journalists by placing *states* at the center of the interplay between terrorism and the international news media. Accordingly, I argue that *state actors* play a critical role in determining the way that terrorism – the use of violence as a communication technique – is depicted in media coverage. Moreover, these same states are at least partially responsible for facilitating media coverage of terrorism’s ability to erode international (state) legitimacy. So, in effect, states are ultimately responsible for creating their own legitimacy problem. Put another way, it is not terrorist attacks themselves that delegitimize the state as an institution. Nor is it the mere fact of news coverage of those attacks. Rather, it is disorganized and irresponsible comments by state actors, reported on and disseminated by news organizations, that negatively impact international (state) legitimacy. This, above all else, supports my central argument in this dissertation: that media reporting on public figures’ rhetoric about terrorism is the deciding factor that facilitates terrorism’s ability to succeed. This means that states are ultimately the actor *most responsible* for terrorism’s ability to ‘succeed,’ and have thus not only created their own adversaries but handed those adversaries the tools necessary to call into question their authority – and therefore their primacy – in the context of the international system. Moreover, my findings make it apparent that to effectively manage the detrimental effects associated with the negative correlation between the media coverage of terrorism and international (state) legitimacy, the state should focus on *what it can control*. States should ensure that they have a clear, usable definition for terrorism. Further, states should take measures to ensure that public figures’ and government officials’ public communication about terrorism remains consistent with the state’s definition of terrorism. This is especially important when public figures and government officials are making public statements in the aftermath of a terrorist incident. To that end, states should make sure that public figures and government officials are well-briefed on getting communications about terrorism right so that what they say publicly remains consistent with and thereby supports the state’s definition of terrorism.

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Appendices

Appendix A – Redacted Correspondence with Staff at the Reuters Archive in London, and the AP Archive in New York

Correspondence with Staff at the Reuters Archive (March 30, 2020 – April 7, 2020)

**From:** Eliana Glogauer <glogauer.eliana@gmail.com>   
**Sent:** 30 March 2020 02:09  
**To:** Cutler, David <D.Cutler@thomsonreuters.com>  
**Subject:** Request: Access to Archive

Dear Mr. Cutler,

I am a Ph.D. candidate in War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada. My dissertation analyzes how terrorism succeeds by suggesting that media coverage and framing of terrorism has an effect on state legitimacy.

In order to complete my dissertation research, I am looking to access the Reuters Archive in order to run keyword searches on print articles published between 1969 and 2017. Specifically, I am looking to ascertain how many articles and news bulletins relating to terrorism and terrorist activity were published for every year of my study, as well as how many articles and news bulletins were published in total for every year of my study.

How can I facilitate the type of access to your archives that I would need in order to gain access to this data, given the restrictions associated with COVID-19?

Thank you, and looking forward to hearing from you.

Best regards,

Eliana Glogauer

Ph.D. Candidate (abd.) | Étudiante de 3e Cycle  
War Studies Programme | Études de la Guerre  
Royal Military College of Canada |  
Collège Militaire Royale du Canada

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Tel | Tél (work): +1 (647) 205-2670

Figure A1- 1: March 30, 2020 Email to Reuters Archival Staff

On Tue, Mar 31, 2020 at 6:32 AM Cutler, David <D.Cutler@thomsonreuters.com> wrote:

Dear Ms Glogauer

Thanks for your mail. Sadly, the Archive is normally closed access and as a result you would have to visit. However, in these days and certainly for the moment this is impossible. If you can visit, are you able to delay coming to see us? We are in lockdown here!

However, you may be able to carry out some of the research yourself.

Does your university library have access to the Dow Jones Factiva database? If so then that database has all Reuters stories and news bulletins going back to 1987. Sadly, previous to that, only the Archive has them, on a variety of media but mostly microfilm! If you do get to use the database, firstly I should say that you will need to add Reuters News as a source.

Secondly, I should specify that Reuters tended to use the words terrorist and terrorism perhaps differently from others.

If you cannot find access to the database, then perhaps let me know and I can see if I can help remotely.

I will look forward to hearing back.

With kind regards

David Cutler

Reuters Archives

5 Canada Square

London E14 5AQ

Tel: 0044 (0) 207 542 7610

Email: d.cutler@thomsonreuters.com

Figure A1- 2: March 31, 2020 Email Response from Reuters Archivist

**From:** Eliana Glogauer <glogauer.eliana@gmail.com>   
**Sent:** 05 April 2020 18:54  
**To:** Cutler, David <D.Cutler@thomsonreuters.com>  
**Subject:** Re: Request: Access to Archive

Dear David,

Thanks so much for getting back to me so quickly! We are also on lockdown here - it has significantly impacted my research, as I'm sure you can imagine.

I will definitely add Reuters Media as a source for my dissertation - should I gain access to the relevant material, that was always something that I was planning to do. Do you, perchance, have access to an editorial guide that might help me understand how Reuters tends to use the terms "terrorist" and "terrorism"?

As well, I've done some looking into things, and unfortunately, the Royal Military College does not have access to the Factiva database. To that end, any suggestions that you might have that would help me access the relevant articles are greatly appreciated!

Best regards,

Eliana Glogauer

Figure A1- 3: April 5, 2020 Email Response to Reuters Archivist

On Tue, Apr 7, 2020 at 9:26 AM Cutler, David <D.Cutler@thomsonreuters.com> wrote:

Dear Eliana

Thanks for your mail.

Sadly, I do not have access at the moment to the style guidelines and all may have changed anyway.

Is there not a university library or public library that you use that may also subscribe to the Factiva database. My thinking was that you may find examples of usage just by searching on the relevant words.

In the meantime, let me have a look and I will get back to you later this week or early next.

With kind regards,

David

Figure A1- 4: April 7, 2020 Email Response from Reuters Archivist

Correspondence with Staff at the AP Archive (March 30, 2020 and April 7, 2020)

On Sun, Mar 29, 2020 at 7:04 PM Eliana Glogauer <glogauer.eliana@gmail.com> wrote:

To Whom It May Concern,

I am a Ph.D. candidate in War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada. My dissertation analyzes how terrorism succeeds by suggesting that media coverage and framing of terrorism has an effect on state legitimacy.

In order to complete my dissertation research, I am looking to access your print article archives in order to run keyword searches on articles published between 1969 and 2017. Specifically, I am looking to ascertain how many articles and news bulletins relating to terrorism and terrorist activity were published for every year of my study, as well as how many articles and news bulletins were published in total for every year of my study.

How can I facilitate the type of access to your archives that I would need in order to gain access to this data, given the restrictions associated with COVID-19?

Thank you, and looking forward to hearing from you.

Best regards,

Eliana Glogauer

Ph.D. Candidate (abd.) | Étudiante de 3e Cycle  
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Collège Militaire Royale du Canada

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Figure A1- 5: March 29, 2020 Email to Associated Press Archival Staff

From: **Pitaro, Francesca** <FPitaro@ap.org>  
Date: Thu., Apr. 2, 2020, 4:19 p.m.  
Subject: AP Research Request  
To: Eliana Glogauer <[eliana.glogauer@rmc-cmr.ca](mailto:eliana.glogauer@rmc-cmr.ca)>  
Cc: Komor, Valerie <[VKomor@ap.org](mailto:VKomor@ap.org)>

Dear Ms. Glogauer,

AP Archive has forwarded your request to the AP Corporate Archives. Unfortunately, we don’t have the staff to undertake extensive research projects.

Although there is no one repository for AP stories for the years 1969-2017, you can search for AP stories from a variety of sources which are listed in the attachment to this email.

Nexis would be a the most efficient place to start. I would suggest checking with your university library to see if it’s available there. Nexis is not available to individual subscribers.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Regards,

Francesca

**Francesca Pitaro**

Archivist  
AP Corporate Archives

fpitaro@ap.org  
[www.ap.org](http://www.ap.org/)

Figure A1- 6: April 2, 2020 Email Response from Archivist at the Associated Press Corporate Archives (New York).

Email Attachment: AP Stories Search\_2019.docx



**How to Search for Associated Press Copy/Stories**

The following sites contain AP news stories and many can be accessed through public, college or university libraries that subscribe to these services. Some sites may charge for services.

Genealogybank.com – AP stories as published in AP member papers, with a focus on the small to medium-size newspapers that took the AP service.

Newsbank.com

Newspaperarchive.com – AP stories as published in AP member papers.

Newspapers.com – AP stories as published in AP member papers

Chronicling America (Library of Congress) – AP stories as published in member papers, 1789-1963. (Free)

<https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/>

**For stories and archival material:**

Gale/Cengage: “Associated Press Collections Online,” including wire copy, bureau records and in-house publications spanning 1848 to 2010; approximately 2,000,000 pages of original sources. Only available where the service has been purchased.

Ancestry.com – Associated Press Collections -- Selected news stories, 1937-1976; 1982-1985. Available as an individual subscription.

ProQuest Historical Newspapers – AP stories as published in AP member papers. Check to see which papers your library has chosen to take as part of this service. Generally, you will only be able to search in the big papers, like the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Boston Globe, the Los Angeles Times, which did not exclusively take the AP service. Only available where the service has been purchased.

ProQuest History Vault – Associated Press Saigon Bureau Records, Cape Canaveral Bureau Records and John F. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy Assassination wires. Only available where service has been purchased.

Nexis.com – news bulletins and stories dating back to 1977 --

The Associated Press Corporate Archives  
2019

Figure A1- 7: Attachment Included with April 2, 2020 Email Response from Archivist at the Associated Press Corporate Archives (New York)

Appendix B – Full Dictionary of Bias Indicators Derived from Luo, Card, and Jurafsky’s 2020 Research

I use WordStat’s lemmatization pre-processing feature in connection with both the news bulletins that comprise my sampling frame and the dictionaries categorized in Table A2- 1 and Table A2- 2, below, before commencing my analysis. Lemmatization considers a language’s full vocabulary to apply a morphological analysis to words, with the objective of removing inflectional endings to return the *lemma:* the base form (also referred to as the dictionary form) of a word. Here, it is important to note that WordStat provides for a user’s ability to manually review and edit (include or exclude specific cases or selections of text) both in the context of the lemmatization process, and in terms of any content analysis conducted in connection with the texts that comprise their specific sampling frame.

I employ Luo, Jurafsky, and Card’s categorization of five affirming devices, and six doubting devices to identify positive and negative bias in connection with two targets: terrorism/terrorists, and the state/state institutions.[[563]](#footnote-563) In this context, positive bias manifests as its target’s depiction as being of vital importance to both setting, and resolving key issues on, the public agenda. Correspondingly, negative bias portrays its target in a way that detracts from its publicly perceived relevance. To that end, Table A2- 1 categorizes positive bias indicators as factive and semi-factive verbs, high commitment verbs, high commitment adjectives, hyping adjectives, and consensus of evidence adjectives. Table A2- 2 categorizes negative bias indicators as neg-factive verbs, low commitment verbs, low commitment modifiers, argumentative verbs, undermining adjectives, and lack of consensus adjectives.

Positive Bias Indicators

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Table A2- : Positive Bias Indicators Derived from Luo, Card, and Jurafsky's 2020 Research on Media Bias in Mainstream News Coverage of Global Warming

Negative Bias Indicators


****

Table A2- : Negative Bias Indicators Derived from Luo, Card, and Jurafsky's 2020 Research on Media Bias in Mainstream News Coverage of Global Warming

Appendix C – List of Search Terms and Strings Used to Identify Bias in the Media Coverage of Terrorism




Table A3- : Keywords Used to Identify Bias 'Targets' in the Media Coverage of Terrorism




Table A3- : Sub-Categorization of Positive and Negative Bias in Terms of Luo, Card and Jurafsky’s “Affirming Devices” and “Doubting Devices”




Table A3- : Search Strings Used to Identify Positive Bias in Connection with Terrorism/Terrorists in the Media Coverage of Terrorism




Table A3- : Search Strings Used to Identify Negative Bias in Connection with Terrorism/Terrorists in the Media Coverage of Terrorism




Table A3- : Search Strings Used to Identify Positive Bias in Connection with the State/State Institutions in the Media Coverage of Terrorism




Table A3- : Search Strings Used to Identify Negative Bias in Connection with the State/State Institutions in the Media Coverage of Terrorism

Appendix D – Comparing Definitions of Terrorism: 1988 Schmid and Jongman vs. 2004 Weinberg et. al.

In 1988, Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman endeavored to produce the “best known work on th[e] problem[s associated with] defin[ing terrorism]” by collating an academic consensus definition that merges distinguishing features of terrorism.[[564]](#footnote-564) A list of distinct features inherent to terrorism is derived by analyzing responses to a 1985 questionnaire that were submitted by 109 terrorism experts of international renown. Schmid and Jongman’s research then distills the features of terrorism identified in the survey responses into twenty-two distinct definitional elements. This leads to Schmid and Jongman’s identification of the definitional elements inherent to conceptualizing terrorism as indicated in Table A4-1, below.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Definitional Element No. | Description of Definitional Element |
| 1 | Use of force, violence |
| 2 | Political |
| 3 | Threat |
| 4 | Method of combat, or strategy |
| 5 | Groups, movements |
| 6 | Victim-target differentiation |
| 7 | Civilians, non-combatants |
| 8 | Fear, terror |
| 9 | Publicity |
| 10 | Intimidation |
| 11 | Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action |
| 12 | Innocence of victims |
| 13 | Covert |
| 14 | Coercion, extortion |
| 15 | Criminal |
| 16 | Psychological effects, anticipated reactions |
| 17 | Symbolism |
| 18 | Third party demands |
| 19 | Unpredictability |
| 20 | Arbitrariness |
| 21 | Extranormality in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints |
| 22 | Repetitiveness |

Table A4- : Twenty-Two (22) Definitional Elements of Terrorism, As Identified by Schmid and Jongman in 1988.

The sixteen definitional elements with the highest frequencies of recurrence are then used to construct specific understanding of terrorism as:

… an [1] anxiety-inspiring method of repeated [2] violent action, employed by (semi-) [3] clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for [4] idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The [5] immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen [6] randomly (targets of opportunity), or [7] selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. [8] Threat- and violence-based [9] communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to [10] manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a [11] *target of terror*, a [12] *target of demands*, or a [13] *target of attention*, depending on whether [14] intimidation, [15] coercion, or [16] propaganda is primarily sought.[[565]](#footnote-565)

2004 research produced by Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler confirms continued relevance of the elements identified by Schmid and Jongman’s 1988 research. Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler update these definitional elements’ frequencies of recurrence in the context of 73 scholarly definitions of terrorism drawn from 55 articles in three separate academic journals: Studies in Terrorism and Political Violence, Terrorism, and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.[[566]](#footnote-566) Figure A4-1, below, illustrates the similarities and differences evident when the results of Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler’s 2004 study are compared to Schmid and Jongman’s original 1988 research.

Figure A4-1: The Recurrence Frequencies of Twenty-Two (22) Definitional Elements of Terrorism, As Calculated by 1988 Schmid and Jongman and 2004 Weinberg et. al. Studies.

Corresponding with Fig. A4-1, above, Table A4-2, below, lists the specific recurrence frequencies that each study associates with these 22 definitional elements.




Table A4- 2: The Recurrence Frequencies of Twenty-Two (22) Definitional Elements of Terrorism, As Calculated by 1988 Schmid and Jongman and 2004 Weinberg et. al. Studies.

Ultimately, the conclusions of Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler’s 2004 study suggest the continued relevance of Schmid and Jongman’s specification as to the necessity that any definition of terrorism specify

its (1) involving violence, the use of force; (2) the political reason(s) underlying its perpetration, and (3) its emphasis on inculcating fear and terror

as the three most frequent word categories identified by both studies. To that end, when the results of the two studies are compared, the resulting lists of definitional elements, ranked from highest to lowest frequency of recurrence, are as depicted in Table A4-3, below.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Description of Definitional Element | 2004 Ranking | Description of Definitional Element |
| 1 | Use of force, violence | **1** | Use of force, violence |
| 2 | Political | **2** | Political |
| 3 | Fear, terror | **3** | Threat |
| 4 | Threat | **4** | Method of combat, or strategy |
| 5 | Psychological effects, anticipated reactions | **5** | Groups, movements |
| 6 | Victim-target differentiation | **6** | Victim-target differentiation |
| 7 | Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action | **7** | Civilians, non-combatants |
| 8 | Method of combat, or strategy | **8** | Fear, terror |
| 9 | Extranormality in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints | **9** | Publicity |
| 10 | Coercion, extortion | **10** | Intimidation |
| 11 | Publicity | **11** | Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action |
| 12 | Arbitrariness | **12** | Innocence of victims |
| 13 | Civilians, non-combatants | **13** | Covert |
| 14 | Intimidation | **14** | Coercion, extortion |
| 15 | Innocence of victims | **15** | Criminal |
| 16 | Groups, movements | **16** | Psychological effects, anticipated reactions |
| 17 | Symbolism | **17** | Symbolism |
| 18 | Unpredictability | **18** | Third party demands |
| 19 | Covert | **19** | Unpredictability |
| 20 | Repetitiveness | **20** | Arbitrariness |
| 21 | Criminal | **21** | Extranormality in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints |
| 22 | Third party demands | **22** | Repetitiveness |

Table A4-3: Description of Twenty-Two (22) Definitional Elements of Terrorism, Numbered in Relation to

Recurrence Frequency Analysis.

Appendix E – Recurrence Frequencies of the 28 Definitional Elements Implicit to International Policy Definitions of Terrorism

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Definitional Element No. | Definitional Element |
| 1 | Use of force, violence |
| 2 | Destruction of/damage to property; Sabotage |
| 3 | Destruction of/damage to environment; Destruction of/damage to natural resources |
| 4 | Homicide; Physical injury |
| 5 | Fear; Terror; Anxiety |
| 6 | Intimidation |
| 7 | Threatening |
| 8 | Extranormal |
| 9 | Coercion; Extortion |
| 10 | Random; Arbitrary; Indiscriminate |
| 11 | Group; Association; Collective; Organization |
| 12 | Preparation; Premeditation; Planning; Organizing |
| 13 | Conceal; Covert |
| 14 | Intention; Deliberate action |
| 15 | Influence the taking of action, of lack thereof; Influence decision making |
| 16 | Political |
| 17 | Religious |
| 18 | Ideological |
| 19 | Promotion; Propaganda |
| 20 | Incitement; Provocation |
| 21 | Criminal; Unlawful |
| 22 | Symbolism |
| 23 | Security |
| 24 | Sovereignty; Territorial integrity; National integrity |
| 25 | Economic; Financial |
| 26 | State; National |
| 27 | Public; General population |
| 28 | Civilians; Non-combatants |

Table A5- : Description of Twenty-Eight (28) Definitional Elements Implicit to International Policy Definitions of Terrorism, Numerically Organized in Terms of Relation to ‘Means,’ ‘Mode,’ ‘Target,’ and ‘Objective’ of Terrorist Activity (See Appendix F)

Figure A5- 1: Recurrence Frequencies of Twenty-Eight (28) Definitional Elements Calculated for 192 International Policy Definitions of Terrorism

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| No. | Definitional Element | Recurrence Frequency  (Glogauer, 2023) |
| 1 | Use of force, violence | 27% |
| 2 | Destruction of/damage to property; Sabotage | 68% |
| 3 | Destruction of/damage to environment; Destruction of/damage to natural resources | 32% |
| 4 | Homicide; Physical injury | 78% |
| 5 | Fear; Terror; Anxiety | 42% |
| 6 | Intimidation | 61% |
| 7 | Threatening | 53% |
| 8 | Extranormal | 66% |
| 9 | Coercion; Extortion | 21% |
| 10 | Random; Arbitrary; Indiscriminate | 3% |
| 11 | Group; Association; Collective; Organization | 47% |
| 12 | Preparation; Premeditation; Planning; Organizing | 31% |
| 13 | Conceal; Covert | 5% |
| 14 | Intention; Deliberate action | 74% |
| 15 | Influence the taking of action, of lack thereof; Influence decision making | 66% |
| 16 | Political | 47% |
| 17 | Religious | 22% |
| 18 | Ideological | 18% |
| 19 | Promotion; Propaganda | 19% |
| 20 | Incitement; Provocation | 26% |
| 21 | Criminal; Unlawful | 55% |
| 22 | Symbolism | 3% |
| 23 | Security | 37% |
| 24 | Sovereignty; Territorial integrity; National integrity | 8% |
| 25 | Economic; Financial | 31% |
| 26 | State; National | 68% |
| 27 | Public; General population | 90% |
| 28 | Civilians; Non-combatants | 14% |

Table A5- 2: Recurrence Frequencies of Twenty-Eight (28) Definitional Elements Calculated for 192 International Policy Definitions of Terrorism

Appendix F – Visual Depiction of the Overlapping Classification of the 28 Identified Definitional Elements of Terrorism


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Figure A6- 1: Venn Diagram Visually Depicting How Twenty-Eight (28) Definitional Elements of Terrorism Manifest in the Context of Perpetrated Terrorist Activity

All definitional elements are labelled according to their numeric identifier set out in Appendix B.

Appendix G – Comparison of Thirty-Four (34) State Practice Definitions of Terrorism with their Counterparts in States’ Domestic Legislation

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Original Element Code | Definitional Element Code | Definitional Element Description |
| A | **1** | Use of force, violence |
| - | **2** | Destruction of property, damage to property |
| - | **3** | Destruction of the environment/natural resources, damage to the environment/natural resources |
| - | **4** | Physical injury, death, homicide |
| H | **5** | Fear, terror |
| J | **6** | Intimidation |
| C | **7** | Threat |
| U | **8** | Extranormality in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints |
| N | **9** | Coercion, extortion |
| T | **10(a)** | Arbitrariness |
| S | **10(b)** | Unpredictability |
| E | **11** | Groups, movements |
| K | **12** | Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action |
| M | **13** | Covert |
| - | **14** | Intent, intentional, deliberate |
| R | **15** | Third party demands |
| B | **16** | Political |
| - | **17** | Religious |
| - | **18** | Ideological |
| I | **19** | Publicity |
| - | **20** | Incitement |
| O | **21** | Criminal |
| Q | **22** | Symbolism |
| - | **23** | Security |
| - | **24** | Sovereignty |
| - | **25** | Economy, economic repercussions |
| - | **26** | State as a target |
| G | **27** | Civilians, non-combatants |
| L | **28** | Innocence of victims |
| D | **D** | Method of combat, or strategy |
| F | **F** | Victim-target differentiation |
| P | **P** | Psychological effects, anticipated reactions |
| V | **V** | Repetitiveness |

Table A7- : Amalgamated Legend of Definitional Element Codes



Table A7- 2: Thirty-Four (34) Definitions of Terrorism Implicit to State Conduct Deconstructed on the Basis of the Twenty-Eight (28) Definitional Elements of Terrorism



Table A7- 3: Definitional Elements Employed in Official Country Statements Deconstructed by Case, by Country

**LEGEND**

**Red Text** – statement made by a former governmental/diplomatic official or a political opposition leader (not factored into analysis)

**Yellow Highlight** – total count of definitional elements (row/horizontal), OR total count as to how many country statements employ that specific word element (column/vertical)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Definitional Element  No. | Recurrence Frequency in Legislative Policy Definition | Recurrence Frequency in State Conduct Definition | Recurrence Frequency in Relation to the Overlap between Policy and State Conduct Definition |
| 1 | 27% | 2.94% | 2.94% |
| 2 | 68% | 2.94% | 2.94% |
| 3 | 32% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 4 | 78% | 23.53% | 17.65% |
| 5 | 42% | 5.88% | 2.94% |
| 6 | 61% | 2..94% | 0.00% |
| 7 | 53% | 11.76% | 8.82% |
| 8 | 66% | 47.06% | 26.47% |
| 9 | 21% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 10 | 3% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 11 | 47% | 5.88% | 2.94% |
| 12 | 31% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 13 | 5% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 14 | 74% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 15 | 66% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 16 | 47% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 17 | 22% | 5.88% | 2.94% |
| 18 | 18% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 19 | 19% | 11.76% | 0.00% |
| 20 | 26% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 21 | 55% | 17.65% | 11.76% |
| 22 | 3% | 5.88% | 0.00% |
| 23 | 37% | 11.76% | 5.88% |
| 24 | 8% | 0.00% | 0.00% |
| 25 | 31% | 2.94% | 2.94% |
| 26 | 68% | 35.29% | 26.47% |
| 27 | 90% | 41.18% | 35.29% |
| 28 | 14% | 8.82% | 2.94% |

Table A7- : Summary Comparison of Definitional Element Recurrence Frequencies Across State Conduct and Legislative Policy Definitions of Terrorism

Appendix H – Examples of Positive and Negative Bias Indicators in 2,776-Article Sampling Frame (Media Coverage of Terrorism)

Positive Bias Indicators (Affirming Devices)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Factive/Semi-Factive Verbs** | Acknowledge | Concede | Demonstrate | Find |
| Forget | Learn | Realise | Realize |
| Remember | See | Show | Uncover |
| Understand |  |  |  |
| **High-Commitment Verbs** | Affirm | Agree | Conclude | Confirm |
| Verify |  |  |  |
| **High-Commitment Adjectives** | Definitive |  |  |  |
| **Hyping Adjectives** | Breakthrough | Evidence | Expert | Fact |
| Famous | Important | Key | Landmark |
| Leading | Major | Noted | Recent |
| Significant | Strong | Top | Truth |
| Unequivocal |  |  |  |
| **Consensus of Evidence Adjectives** | Dozen | Multiple | Numerous | Substantial |

Table A8- : List of Specific Words Operationalized as Positive Bias Indicators, Sorted by Type

Factive and Semi-Factive Verbs

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Word/Phrase** | **Example** |
| Acknowledge | “Economists acknowledge Ethiopia has done more than most in ensuring remote areas benefit from growth and in turning around the fortunes of what was almost a failed state three decades ago after years of “Red Terror” communist purges and famine.” |
| Concede | “It does not only concern sports but all the big events and the whole society. You cannot concede victory to the terrorists. We must be united and firm, especially with the Olympic Games.” |
| Demonstrate | “Speaking in London after attending a meeting of G20 leaders in Turkey where security issues dominated, Cameron said Britain would demonstrate the same resolve in the fight against terrorism as it showed against Nazi Germany in World War Two.” |
| Forget | “… were able to neutralize this terrorist. I won’t forget the look of this policewoman who intercepted the killer.” |
| Learn | “Back in 2002, we learn Marzin (Joe Cole) was an undercover informant who had infiltrated a terrorist cell possibly connected to the mosque – an “in” that made him virtually untouchable where the Bureau was concerned.” |
| Realise | “… At first I thought the truck didn’t realise the road had been made pedestrian for the celebration. But when I saw people on the ground I started realising it could be a terror attack,” she told Reuters.”  “Russia should establish more contacts with all Islamic groups and their leaders, who have started to realise the danger of the expanding threat of international terrorism…” |
| Realize | “Security experts say many Brazilian officials do not realize just how big a stage the Olympics is for anyone seeking to sow terror, either through an attack on game venues, infrastructure nearby or the athletes and 500,000 tourists expected to attend.” |
| Remember | “Remember that the terrorists’ goal is to let fear win…” |
| See | “… Last week’s Paris killings have raised fears about the 2016 Olympic Games in Brazil, a country with so little history with terrorism that the president has discounted the chance of an attack and legislators have resisted bills to make it a crime. Western governments are worried about the safety of their athletes at the games because they do not see Brazilian authorities, comfortable with the country’s historical standing as a non-aligned, multi-cultural and enemy-free state, taking the risk of a terrorist attack seriously.” |
| Show | “Recent attacks in Paris, Ankara and elsewhere show the world is facing a collective security threat and world leaders meeting in Turkey will send a strong message on the fight against terrorism…” |
| Uncover | “… to have the insight they need to uncover” terror plots.” |
| Understand | “We’ve got to do more to understand that this is a war against these terrorist groups, the radical jihadist groups.” |

Table A8- : Examples of Factive and Semi-Factive Verb Positive Bias Indicators in Context, Taken From 2,776 Article Sampling Frame (Media Coverage of Terrorism)

High-Commitment Verbs

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Word/Phrase** | **Example** |
| Affirm | “The foreign ministry said the murder of Barakat and the Sinai attacks “affirm the presence of organised terrorist…” |
| Agree | “… Hollande and Obama in telephone talks agree to strengthen bilateral cooperation against terrorism.” |
| Conclude | “Surveillance video obtained by the AP is among evidence that leads authorities to conclude two terrorists directly…” |
| Confirm | “I would firstly like to confirm these arrests are not linked to the Paris terrorist incidents…” |
| Verify | “… making it impossible to check for terrorist connections or criminal histories, to verify their backgrounds…” |

Table A8- : Examples of High-Commitment Verb Positive Bias Indicators in Context, Taken From 2,776 Article Sampling Frame (Media Coverage of Terrorism)

High Commitment Adjectives

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Word/Phrase** | **Example** |
| Definitive | “American and French officials say there is still no definitive evidence to back up their presumption that the terrorists who massacred 129 people in Paris used new, difficult-to-crack encryption technologies to organize the plot.” |

Table A8- : Example of High Commitment Adjective Positive Bias Indicator in Context, Taken From 2,776 Article Sampling Frame (Media Coverage of Terrorism)

Hyping Adjectives

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Word/Phrase** | **Example** |
| Breakthrough | “… considered terrorists have dampened hopes for a breakthrough.” |
| Evidence | “There’s evidence that they’re being used by terrorists to communicate,” he wrote.” |
| Expert | “Li Wei, a terrorism expert at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, a think-tank backed by the secretive Ministry of State Security, wrote in the official China Daily that it was “urgent” that China should increase cooperation, such as joint drills, with Western countries.” |
| Fact | “… that we would hide the ball for political purposes when a week later we all said in fact there was a terrorist attack…” |
| Famous | ““Measure it by whether there was genuine discussion about things that really do divide us, including the future of Assad, which is what we should be getting on to, as well as these famous lists, the lists of who counts as a terrorist and the list of who counts as an opposition group,” they added.” |
| Important | “… important reason to accept small infringements on liberty to prevent terrorist mass murder is because the political…” |
| Key | ““The terrorist risk, ever since we presented our candidacy, has been considered a key risk,” said Lambert.” |
| Landmark | “Italy is looking for five terror suspects after a tip-off from the FBI about possible jihadist attacks on landmark sites…” |
| Leading | “… terrorism is one of the leading threats to world security.”  ““This deal appears to provide the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism with billions of dollars in exchange for cosmetic concessions that neither fully freeze nor significantly roll back its nuclear infrastructure,” he said.” |
| Major | “Turkey, which said it had foiled a potentially, major terror attack in Istanbul on the same day as the Paris attacks,…” |
| Recent | “The recent terrorist attacks in Paris have shocked peace-loving people in all countries around the world.” |
| Significant | “Brazil hasn’t had to deal with a significant threat of terrorist attacks.” |
| Strong | “Beyond a strong security response, Merkel said: “We as citizens will also give a clear answer” to terrorists.” |
| Top | “The poll found rising concern about terrorism. Of those polled, 17 percent listed terrorism as their top concern – a rise from 9 percent when asked in October. Terrorism tied with the economy as the top issue.” |
| Truth | “Erdan has called for similar curbs on far-right Jewish groups for anti-Arab hate speech. “We don’t distinguish between Jewish terrorism and Arab terrorism, but the truth needs to be told: there is Jewish terrorism but in terms of size and numbers it is not at the same extent,” he said.” |
| Unequivocal | “… our strong unequivocal condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations committed by whomever…” |

Table A8- : Examples of Hyping Adjective Positive Bias Indicators in Context, Taken From 2,776 Article Sampling Frame (Media Coverage of Terrorism)

Consensus of Evidence Adjectives

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Word/Phrase** | **Example** |
| Dozen | “… after several dozen people were killed in a series of unprecedented terrorist attacks.” |
| Multiple | “Hollande said the multiple attacks across Paris were “an act of war… committed by a terrorist army, Daesh, against…”” |
| Numerous | “The Philippines has faced numerous terrorist attacks, including a 2004 bombing that ignited an inferno and killed…” |
| Substantial | ““Pakistan army has made substantial sacrifices to protect the nation against the menace of terrorism and such cowardly acts by terrorists cannot deter the morale of our armed forces,” Sharif said in a statement.” |

Table A8- : Examples of High Commitment Adjective Positive Bias Indicators in Context, Taken From 2,776 Article Sampling Frame (Media Coverage of Terrorism)

Negative Bias Indicators (Doubting Devices)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| **Neg-Factive Verbs** | Allege | Assume |  |  |
| **Low-Commitment Verbs** | Debate | Dispute | Doubt |  |
| **Low-Commitment Modifiers** | Alleged | Assumption | Extremist | So Called |
| So-Called |  |  |  |
| **Argumentative Verbs** | Argue | Assert | Convince | Declare |
| Maintain |  |  |  |
| **Undermining Adjectives** | Bad | Debunked | Fake | False |
| Flawed | Mistaken | Presumptive | Problematic |
| Suspect | Wrong |  |  |
| **Lack of Consensus Adjectives** | Contested | Debated |  |  |

Table A8- : List of Specific Words Operationalized as Negative Bias Indicators, Sorted by Type

Neg-Factive Verbs

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Word/Phrase** | **Example** |
| Allege | “Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps said on Wednesday it had smashed a terrorist cell in a western region where authorities allege groups have been recruiting for Islamic State.” |
| Assume | ““How serious are they (Russia) about defeating terrorism, as opposed to bolstering Assad’s position at the center? How are we to assume that they are going to do better if they work with the Americans?” Ford told Reuters.” |

Table A8- : Examples of Neg-Factive Verb Negative Bias Indicators in Context, Taken From 2,776 Article Sampling Frame (Media Coverage of Terrorism)

Low-Commitment Verbs

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Word/Phrase** | **Example** |
| Debate | ““It can be that a terrorist was infiltrated there (through the refugee route). It can be that this trail was laid on purpose by the IS to influence the refugee debate,” German Interior Minister Thomas De Maiziere told German television.” |
| Dispute | “The dispute, which erupted in June, revolves around allegations by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt that Qatar supports terrorism, a charge Doha denies.” |
| Doubt | “… Brazil has never been a target of international terrorism, so I doubt that it will become a major factor…” |

Table A8- : Examples of Low-Commitment Verb Negative Bias Indicators in Context, Taken From 2,776 Article Sampling Frame (Media Coverage of Terrorism)

Low-Commitment Modifiers

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Word/Phrase** | **Example** |
| Alleged | “… be some further alleged provocation that would be cited by future terrorists,” he added, saying that the level of…” |
| Assumption | “… operating under the assumption that the plan[e] was downed by “terrorist activity.”” |
| Extremist | “… their efforts to prevent and supress terrorist acts”” committed by IS and other extremist groups linked to Al-Qaeda.”  “…He said some countries had argued that “any group which is – which comes from an Islamist background – are terrorists. And we don’t accept that… To consider them extremist, I think, this is a big mistake and it’s a danger.”” |
| So Called | “This is the first direct hit on music that we’ve had in this so called war on terror or whatever it’s called,” Bono told…” |

Table A8- : Examples of Low-Commitment Modifier Negative Bias Indicators in Context, Taken From 2,776 Article Sampling Frame (Media Coverage of Terrorism)

Argumentative Verbs

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Word/Phrase** | **Example** |
| Argue | “Some will argue that it makes no difference whether the passport is fake, and what matters most is that a terrorist possibly used the so-called “migrant trail” to enter EU territory… But this argument ignores the fact that other Paris attackers managed to get from Europe to Syria and back without registering as refugees.” |
| Assert | ““As we condemn these shameful, terrorist acts that normally target the unarmed and the innocent, we assert that the criminal few… behind these acts represent no one but themselves, for no religion, ethics or values accept this,” he added.” |
| Convince | “Prime Minister David Cameron said he wanted Britain to also carry out air strikes in Syria but still needed to convince more lawmakers to back such action, while German chancellor Angela Merkel said the fight against terrorism could not be won by military force alone.” |
| Declare | “In the immediate aftermath of an incident which initial reports said killed upwards of 70 people, officials declined to formally declare the attack as terrorist assault pending further news. But several French media said the anti-terrorist investigation department had been put on the case.” |

Table A8- : Examples of Argumentative Verb Negative Bias Indicators in Context, Taken From 2,776 Article Sampling Frame (Media Coverage of Terrorism)

Undermining Adjectives

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Word/Phrase** | **Example** |
| Bad | “… He said allowing terrorists to restrict our freedom is “almost as bad as a terrorist attack.”” ““Terrorism has no nationality or religion. All Terrorism is bad,…” |
| Debunked | “… in 2001, they again debunked the idea that American soil is immune from the terrorism faced abroad.” |
| Fake | “… the fake Syrian passport is a godsend for those who want to stop the flood of Syrian refugeed. Who can quarrel with national security? Who would dare guarantee that no refugee, ever, will perpetrate a terrorist act?” |
| False | ““There are indications it is a false trail,” he said, adding that “it still cannot be ruled out that a terrorist headed for…”” |
| Flawed | ““The flawed policies pursued by Western countries and especially France as regards what is happening in our region… contributed to the spread of terrorism,” Assad was quoted as saying on Syrian state media.” |
| Mistaken | ““… mistaken policies… have contributed to the spread of terrorism.”” |
| Problematic | “Secretary of State John Kerry said that of 785,000 refugees accepted since 2001, only 12 “were found to perhaps be problematic with respect to potential terror.”” |
| Suspect | “…suspect had “obvious terrorist intentions.”” |
| Wrong | “Ursula von der Leyen said Sunday that linking Europe’s migrant crisis to the threat of terrorism would be wrong.” |

Table A8- : Examples of Undermining Adjective Negative Bias Indicators in Context, Taken From 2,776 Article Sampling Frame (Media Coverage of Terrorism)

Lack of Consensus Adjectives

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Word/Phrase** | **Example** |
| Contested | “Contested in some quarters, air passenger profiling is gaining ground among watchdogs as a defence against terror…” |
| Debated | “But the crisis of Syrian refugees is testing American politicians, given the choice between yielding to fears of importing terrorists or honoring the traditional U.S. welcoming role. Candidates have debated all year what to do about 11 million illegal immigrants already in the United States.” |

Table A8- : Examples of Lack of Consensus Adjective Negative Bias Indicators in Context, Taken From 2,776 Article Sampling Frame (Media Coverage of Terrorism)

1. *Breaking News.* “Terrorist Attack on United States,” anchored by Carol Lin and Vince Cellini, aired September 11, 2001, on CNN. https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/bn/date/2001-09-11/segment/01. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Matthew J. Morgan, *The Impact of 9/11 on Politics and War: The Day that Changed Everything?* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 222. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See “Historical Trends: Terrorism,” *Gallup*, 2022. Available at https://news.gallup.com/poll/4909/Terrorism-United-States.aspx. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See Chapter 7, “*How* Does the Media Coverage of Terrorism Affect (State) Legitimacy?” for a comparison of the specific statistics of deaths caused by terrorism from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2018 to all deaths that occurred during the same time period. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The WVS, ongoing since 1981, is conducted in waves of approximately five years. The survey itself consists of a fully standardized questionnaire developed and deployed by social scientists in countries around the world. In each country, the sample consists of a minimum of 1,000 surveys and is considered nationally representative of the population 18 years and older. The most recent (seventh) wave of the WVS involves data collected from 48 countries and territories throughout a time period spanning mid-2017 to early 2020. The sixth wave of the WVS, which I also reference here, consists of data from 59 different countries and territories that was gathered between 2010 and 2014. More details about the fieldwork and sampling associated with the WVS, as well as downloadable WVS datasets, can be found at https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The methodology used to calculate these aggregate fear percentages is borrowed from Amélie Godefroidt and Arnim Langer, “How Fear Drives Us Apart: Explaining the Relationship between Fear and Social Trust,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32, no. 7 (2020): 1482-1505. (Godefroidt and Langer use WVS survey data to suggest that social trust is damaged more by fear in anticipation of future terrorist attacks than it is by the effects of past terrorist attacks.) [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Harvey Sapolsky, Eugene Gholz and Caitlin Talmadge, *US Defence Politics: The Origins of Security Policy. 3rd edition.* (New York: Routledge, 2017): 205. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Sapolsky et. al., *US Defence Politics*, 210. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambigous Symbol,” *Political Science Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (1952):481-502. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Sapolsky et. al., *US Defence Politics*, 2010; Wolfers, “’National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,” 481-502; Richard Jackson, “Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies,” *European Political Science* 6, no. 3 (2007): 244-251. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (New York City: McGraw-Hill, 1964): 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Gabriel Weimann, “The Theater of Terror: Effects of Press Coverage,” *Journal of Communication* 33, no. 1 (1983): 38-45; Joshua Meyrowitz, “Television and Interpersonal Behavior: Codes of Perception and Response.” InGary Gumpert and Robert S. Cathcart (eds.), *Inter/Media: Interpersonal Communication in a Media World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Stephen W. Littlejohn and Karen A. Foss, *Theories of Human Communication.* 10th edition. (Salem: Waveland Press, 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Max Weber, Tony Waters (trans.) and Dagmar Waters (ed.), *Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society.* (New York: Palgrave Books, 2015): 129-198. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. See Harmonie Toros, “’We Don’t Negotiate with Terrorists!’: Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts,” *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 4 (2008):407-426. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. I distinguish between the academic discipline of International Relations and actual practices of international relations. To that end, the treatment of the term as a proper noun (i.e. this study’s use of both the capitalized version of the term and the acronym “IR”) should be taken as reference to the academic discipline. In contrast, the use of the term as an abstract concept (i.e. without the first letter of each word capitalized) should be taken to refer to the practice of international relations in the context of the international political arena. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. For further elaboration on my reasons for using these specific databases to access the primary source English-language media bulletins central to my analysis, see Chapter 2, “Chapter 6’s Quantitative Research Design”. (Information relevant to database choice can be found in Footnotes 11 and 12). For the rationale underlying my decision to use data from the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland, see Chapter 2, “Justification for Sampling Frame”. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Mohammed Abu Sayed Toyon, “Explanatory Sequential Design of Mixed Methods Research: Phases and Challenges,” *International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science* 10, no. 5 (2021): 254. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).

    It is important to note that quantitative correlation does not imply causation, which would represent a questionable cause logical fallacy (*cum hoc ergo propter hoc*). The correlation method of experiments can establish covariation (that variables change together in a systematic, directional manner) and the magnitude of relations (the extent to which the variables either negatively covary or positively covary). In contrast, determining causation (the claim that the change in “X” caused the change in “Y”) necessitates the fulfillment of three conditions. Firstly, as the predictor, “X” must precede “Y” (the outcome). Secondly, there must be a strong and significant correlation between the two variables. Finally, there can be no alternative explanation for the causal effect asserted. See David J. Sheskin, *Handbook of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical Procedures* (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1997): 1471-1474. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Lijphart develops his comparative method based in part on his distinction between a-theoretical, interpretive, hypothesis-generating, theory-confirming, theory-informing, and deviant case analyses. Moreover, he claims that case studies contribute to testing hypotheses and building theory, thus constituting them implicit components of the comparative method. See Arend Lijphart, “The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-1985,” *American Political Science Review* 84, no. 1 (1990): 481-496. (Adam Przeworski, and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York: John Wiley, 1970); Bernhard Ebbinghaus, “When Less is More: Selection Problems in Large-N and Small-N Cross-National Comparisons.” In Karl-Siegbert Rehberg and Deutshce Gesellschaft für Soziologie (DGS) (eds.), *Soziale Ungleichheit, kulturelle Unterschiede: Verhandlungen des 32. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in München. Teilbd. 1 und 2*. Frankfurt, Campus Verl., 2006; David Collier, “The Comparative Method.” In Ada W. Finifter (ed.), *Political Science: The State of the Discipline II*. (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1993): 105-119.) [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). *Global Terrorism Database Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables.* (College Park: University of Maryland, 2015): 9-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. “Message from the Global Terrorism Database Manager.” August 2018. START.UMD.edu. 2017. Accessed at https://www.start.umd.edu/news/message-global-terrorism-database-manager. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. My decision to limit my analysis to the English-language news coverage of terrorism is informed by scholarly assertions that “English/American is the main lingua franca of global news-lish.” See Michael Palmer, “‘PRESS on the appropriate button in the reader’s mind’: News Agencies Cover ‘Terrorism.’” *Global Media and Communication* 7, no. 3: 257. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Daniel Masters and Patricia Hoen, “State Legitimacy and Terrorism,” *Democracy and Security* 8, no. 4 (2012): 337-357. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. The dependent variable is the variable that the study is trying to explain, which is assumed to depend on or be caused by the independent variable(s). Independent variables exist separately from and are presumed to cause some manner of change in the dependent variable. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Since the 2007-2008 reverse merger of the Reuters and Thomson companies, this organization has been referred to as Thomson-Reuters. Notwithstanding, I use “Reuters” in referring to its role as an international news agency because “for branding and commercial purposes, the trade name ‘Reuters’ has greater visibility and refers to the news-agency arm of a ‘Thomson-Reuters’ company that has many other activities and assets related to professional news, information and data services.” See Michael Palmer and Jérémie Nicey, “Social Media and the Freedom of the Press: A Long-term Perspective from within International News Agencies (AFP, Reuters).” *Journal for Communication Studies* 5, no. 1 (2012): 111. (The relevant information is found in Footnote 1.)

    The scholarly literature views news sources’ ‘credibility’ as intrinsically related to their relationship, or lack thereof, with the public sector in this regard. This is supported by the interaction between three ideas established within the scholarly literature. First, agenda-setting theory, which purports that the media’s agenda can become the public agenda under certain circumstances that are implicitly correlated with public perceptions of legitimate power as affecting authority (See Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, “The Agenda Setting Function of the Press.” In Doris A. Graber (ed.), *Media Power in Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1984). Second, structural-functional theory as related to media effects, which asserts that the social functions of media confer status to issues and establish them within the hierarchy created by the public agenda and establishes monopolization, canalization, and supplementation as pre-conditions for a strong effect (Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton, “Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Social Action.” In Wilbur Schramm and Donald F. Roberts (eds.), *The Processes and Effects of Mass Communication* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971); Philip Kotler and Gerald Zaltman, “Social Marketing: An Approach to Planned Social Change,” *Journal of Marketing* 35, no. 3 (1971): 3-12). Finally, the interconnected notions that legitimacy is connected to the public perception of an institution ( See Mark C. Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches,” *Academy of Management Review* 20, no. 3 (1995): 571-610; Carlos Rodríguez Pérez, “News Framing and Media Legitimacy: An Exploratory Study of the Media Coverage of the Refugee Crisis in the European Union,” *Communication & Society* 30, no. 3 (2017): 169-184)), that the three-levels integral to constructing the legitimacy of media sources are legitimacy of access, legitimacy of presence, and legitimacy of journalists, and, finally, that legitimacy is an inherent asset of the public sector (See Jane Mansbridge, James Bohman, Simone Chambers, David Estlund, Andreas Føllesdal, Archon Fung, Cristina Lafont, Bernard Manin and José Luismarti, "The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy," *Raisons politiques* 2 (2011): 47-82; Suchman, “Managing Legitimacy,” 571-610; Rodríguez Pérez, “News Framing and Media Legitimacy,” 169-184). To that end, the calculation of is specifically limited to official media sources produced by national media outlets for the purposes of the MVA based on the suggestion that the more traditional national media outlets are perceived as more credible sources for news. (See Spiro Kiousis, “Public Trust or Mistrust? Perceptions of Media Credibility in the Information Age,” *Mass Communication and Society* 4, no. 4 (2001): 381-403; Miriam J. Metzger, Andrew J. Flanagin, Keren Eyal, Daisy R. Lemus and Robert M. Mccann, “Credibility for the 21st Century: Integrating Perspectives on Source, Message, and Media Credibility in the Contemporary Media Environment,” *Annals of the International Communication Association* 27, no. 1 (2003): 293-335; Alberto Ardèvol-Abreu and Homero Gil de Zúñiga, “Effects of Editorial Media Bias Perception and Media Trust on the Use of Traditional, Citizen, and Social Media News,” *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 94, no. 3 (2016): 703-724; Yacong Yuan, “Soft Power of International News Media: American Audiences’ Perceptions of China’s Country Image Mediated by Trust in News. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland (2017). Retrieved from https://drum.lib.umd.edu/handle/1903/19797.) [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. The FSI maintained by the Fund for Peace quantifies “state legitimacy” for the purposes of its annual report. The measure produced is an independent scale variable on a 1.0 to 10.0 metric, which is based on factors relating to government effectiveness and international perceptions thereof in accordance with the previously specified definition of ‘legitimacy’ as a form of social contract deriving from consent that is conceptualized by this study. Moreover, the discussion of legitimacy that I undertake in Chapter 4 supports this use of the FSI’s state legitimacy indicator to quantify international (state) legitimacy on an abstract level. Summarily, the legitimacy of an actor, entity, or regime manifests due to an overwhelming public perception of its rightfulness. (In this sense, legitimacy constitutes the notion that the state’s governance is legal, justifiable, and significantly, that its subordinates *consent* to its governance.) The legitimacy of the FSI’s state legitimacy measure thus derives not from its successful measurement of state legitimacy, but from its demonstrated recognition as the ‘best’ existing measurement of state legitimacy (used in the context of both academia and policy-making). [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Based on email correspondence with staff at the Reuters Archives in the United Kingdom, the primary source English-language media bulletins used to calculate are only accessible through the Dow Jones Factiva Service (DJFS). The DJFS is a global news database that aggregates content from 32 000 media sources based in 159 different states dating back to 1970. Keyword searches allow source data to be parsed on the basis of whether the data in question contains a specific key word (commonly referred to as a ‘search term’); See Appendix A for a redacted copy of my correspondence with the Reuters staff. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. The media bulletins used in the calculation of both and are accessible through LexisNexis’ NexisUni database (formerly LexisNexis Academic). NexisUni is an electronic database that hosts a comprehensive archive of public record documents, including full-text newspapers, and media bulletins from select international news agencies, business and legal publications, and journal articles dating back to 1970. At this point in time the Royal Military College does not grant its students access to the online, primary source databases that host the media bulletins that I need to access for the purposes of the analysis conducted in this dissertation. For this reason, I utilized my prior institution’s access to NexusUni – which includes complete collections of English-language AP and AFP media bulletins dating back to 1990 – to collect the relevant primary sources. See Jeffrey A. Knapp, “Nexis Uni.” *The Charleston Advisor* 19, no. 3 (2018): 31-34. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Conceiving of values greater than 0.2 as indicating the presence of a noteworthy correlation between ranked variables is consistent with the standard guidelines for the interpretation of Spearman correlations. See Susan Prion and Katie Anne Haerling, “Making Sense of Methods and Measurement: Spearman-Rho Ranked-Ordered Coefficient,” *Clinical Simulation in Nursing* 10, no. 10 (2014): 535-536. (To substantiate that this metric is routinely used outside of research relating to nursing and healthcare, see Malekeng Sylvester Selala, Aidan Senzanje and Khumbulani Dhavu, “Requirements for Sustainable Operation and Maintenance of Rural Small-Scale Water Infrastructure in Limpopo Province, South Africa,” *Water SA* 45, no. 2 (2019): 294.) [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. The coefficient of determination () represents the percentage of the variance in the dependent variable that can be explained by changes in the independent variable, where all variables are associated with the same simple linear regression. See Sheskin, *Handbook of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical Procedures*, 1228-1231. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Note that I do not focus on the values because there are different schools of thought regarding the validity of as a measure of a statistical model’s goodness of fit. These differing opinions exist because a high can occur either in the presence of misspecification of the functional form of a relationship, or due to outlier data that distorts the true relationship between the variables. See R. Arboretti Giancristofaro and L. Salmaso, “Model Performance Analysis and Model Validation in Logistic Regression,” *Statistica* 63 (2003): 375-396. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. A control variable is a variable that is not of primary interest to the research in question but is measured to infer relationships between the main variables that the research seeks to analyze. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Masters and Hoen, “State Legitimacy and Terrorism,” 348. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Masters and Hoen operationally define *durability* as “the measure of the years that the current [political] regime has held power,” conceptualizing it as inversely correlated with terrorist activity. They use *ethnic fragmentation* to account for the total level of ethnic heterogeneity in a given country, calculated on the basis of the Ethnic Heterogeneity Index (EHI) and understood to positively correlate with domestic terrorist activity. See Masters and Hoen. “State Legitimacy and Terrorism,” 349-350. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Krisztina Kis-Katos, Helge Liebert, and Günther G. Schultz, “On the Origin of Domestic and International Terrorism,” *European Journal of Political Economy* 27 (2011): 517-536, as cited in Masters and Hoen. “State Legitimacy and Terrorism,” 349. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Global Terrorism Database Codebook: Inclusion criteria and variables. (College Park: University of Maryland, 2015): 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Jianbo Gao, Peng Fang and Feiyan Liu, “Empirical Scaling Law Connecting Persistence and Severity of Global Terrorism,” *Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications*, *482*, 74–86.

    See Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan, Heather V. Fogg and Jeffrey Scott, “Building a Global Terrorism Database,” Federally Funded Grant Report Produced at the University of Maryland (2006) for an in-depth evaluation of the data collected by the GTD. This report also includes a comparison between GTD data and the other commonly referenced open-source datasets on terrorist activity (including, but not limited to, the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) project and the database maintained by the RAND corporation). [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. In order to control for endogeneity, the *history of terrorism* control variable is lagged by an interval of one day (mirroring the calculation of media coverage of terrorism as the independent variable associated with this study). All other control variables (both capability variables, income, population) are constant, based on annual measurements from the sources indicated. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. “Operationalizing this study’s *capability* variable in this manner also assumes that I nominally define capability in the material sense of the term, and – to some extent – that I view Joseph Nye Jr’s understanding of hard power as necessarily foundational to how capability manifests in the practice of international relations. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Power and Interdependence* (4th ed.)(Boston, MA: Longman, 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. I identify the following high coverage dates: 16 April 2013, 14 November 2015, 16 November 2015, 17 November 2015, 18 November 2015, 19 November 2015, 15 July 2016. Correspondingly, I also identify the following low coverage dates: 15 September 2013, 10 November 2013, 24 November 2013, 1 December 2013, 2 February 2014, 5 July 2014, 12 October 2014, 2 November 2014, 4 July 2015, 30 April 2016, 28 May 2016, 29 May 2016, 5 August 2017, 30 September 2017, 28 October 2017, 2 December 2017, 3 December 2017, 16 December 2017, 6 January 2018, 7 January 2018, 5 May 2018, 20 May 2018, 27 May 2018, 7 July 2018, 19 August 2018, 16 September 2018, 6 October 2018, 21 October 2018, 3 November 2018, 17 November 2018, 18 November 2018, 2 December 2018, 8 December 2018, and 9 December 2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. The *mean* refers to the average of the scores provided in a dataset. *Standard deviation ()* indicates the average amount that a set of numerical values deviates from their mean. *-score* describes the extent to which a specific piece of data in a dataset differs from the mean of that same dataset. Significantly, in any distribution (dataset), approximately 95% of the values (individual pieces of data) will fall within 2 s of its mean. (This corresponds to a -score of between 1.0 and 5.0.) Before calculating these statistics, I determined that these ratios are normally distributed using the standard, graphical method to assess normality. (So, I plotted the variable data on a histogram and compared it to a normal (Gaussian) approximation curve.) [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. QDAMiner compares individual segments of text to determine the percentage of content that is shared between individual cases, assigning retrieved text segments a score that ranges from 0 (when the compared items share no features, and can thus be considered completely unique) to 1 (indicating that two features are identical to one another). See Provalis Research, “QDA Miner 6 User’s Guide.” Provalis Research, 2020. https://q9j3s8w6.rocketcdn.me/Documents/QDAMiner6.pdf (accessed March 25, 2023). [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. WordStat determines co-occurrence frequencies by calculating the Jaccard similarity coefficient associated with each type of bias in comparison with each of the other types of bias individually. (In order to compare the different types of bias, each is conceptualized as an individual dataset.) The Jaccard coefficient constitutes a numerical representation of a similarity comparison calculated as the size of the intersection between the two datasets (so, the number of elements included in *both* Dataset A and Dataset B), divided by the size of the union of the two datasets (all of the elements included in *either* Dataset A *or* Dataset B). The value of a Jaccard coefficient can range from 0 (which indicates that there are elements common to the two datasets being compared) to 1 (which indicates that the two datasets are identical). See Suphakit Niwattanakul, Jatsada Singthongchai, Ekkachai Naenudorn, and Supachanun Wanapu, "Using of Jaccard Coefficient for Keywords Similarity." *Proceedings of the International Multiconference of Engineers and Computer Scientists* 1, no. 6 (2013): 380-384. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. For the purposes of conducting keyword searches of the NexisUni and Dow Jones Factiva Service to identify media bulletins produced by the Associated Press, Agence France Presse, and Thomson-Reuters during the relevant time period, I ran searches for the string “terror\*.” Placing a wildcat symbol (“\*”) at the end of the string returns results that involve all words beginning with the string “terror.” This search thus returns results not only for obviously relevant keywords like “terrorism”, “terrorist”, and “terrorists,” but also “terrorize,” “terrorise,” “terrorizes,” terrorises,” “terrorist attack,” terrorist attacks”, “terror attack,” and “terror attacks.” [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Yiwei Luo, Dallas Card, and Dan Jurafsky, “Detecting Stance in Media on Global Warming.” *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2020*: 3296-3315. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Luo, Card, and Jurafsky, “Detecting Stance in Media on Global Warming,” 3301. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Luo, Card, and Jurafsky, “Detecting Stance in Media on Global Warming,” 3301. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Luo, Card, and Jurafsky, “Detecting Stance in Media on Global Warming,” 3301. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Luo, Card, and Jurafsky, “Detecting Stance in Media on Global Warming,” 3301. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Luo, Card, and Jurafsky, “Detecting Stance in Media on Global Warming,” 3301. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. See Appendix E for the full dictionary of bias indicators I derive from Luo, Card, and Jurafsky’s research. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. See Footnote 23 on the preceding page. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. For the purposes of conducting keyword searches of the NexisUni and Dow Jones Factiva Service to identify media bulletins produced by the Associated Press, Agence France Presse, and Thomson-Reuters during the relevant time period, I ran searches for the string “country OR countries OR state OR states OR government OR governments OR nation OR nations OR national.” I also ran a separate search with the names and demonyms of all 193 United Nations member states. (See Appendix F for the full list of search terms.) The results of both of these searches are included in the data used for the qualitative analysis and subsequent comparative analysis of media coverage in Chapter 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Focused case analysis is a research strategy, undertaken with a specific research objective in mind and appropriately related theoretical focus, that involves an empirical investigation of a particular phenomenon within its real-world context by using multiple sources of evidence. See George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. As discussed in Chapter 3, the term terrorism is pejoratively and normatively loaded, analytically imprecise, historically indistinct, and legally vague and overbroad. See Christopher J. Finlay, “How to Do Things with the Word ‘Terrorist,’” *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 4 (October 2009): 751-774. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Jörg Matthes, “What’s in a Frame? A Content Analysis of Media Framing Studies in the World’s Leading Communication Journals,” *J&MC Quarterly* 86, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 349. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. See Lazarsfeld & Merton, “Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Social Action,” 457-473; Kotler & Zaltman, “Social Marketing,” 3-12. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Gail T. Fairhurst and Robert A. Star, *The Art of Framing* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996); Holli A. Semetko and Patti M. Valkenburg, “Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television Shows.” *Journal of Communication* 50 (2000): 93-109. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (New York City: McGraw-Hill, 1964): 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Shanto Iyengar, *Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods.” *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 2 (1999): 229. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology.* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1976). Moreover, Heidegger conceptualized “deconstruction” as the delineating, explanation and contextualization of the categories and concepts that tradition has imposed on specific words and terms, and the history behind them. See Martin Heidegger and David Farrell Krell (trans.), *Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964)* (London: Routledge Classics, 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Norman Fairclough, “Discourse and Text: Linguistic and Intertextual Analysis within Discourse Analysis.” *Discourse & Society* 3, no. 2 (1992): 193-217. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Thomas Reid understands the existence of “social acts” as necessitating not only “understanding and will but also ‘intercourse with some other intelligent being’” (C.A.J. Coady, “Reid on Testimony.” In Melvin Dalgarno and Eric Matthews (eds.), “The Philosophy of Thomas Reid.” *Philosophical Studies Series* 42 (Dordrecht: Springer, 1989).; Thomas Reid, *Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind [Essays on the Active Powers of Man* (1788)]. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969)). J.L. Austin introduced the concept of illocutionary acts to linguistics, as acts the idea of which is best described as “by saying something, we *do* something” (J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962)). J.R. Searle goes on to refine Austin’s definition of “speech acts,” arguing that speech acts are constituted by the rules of language (John R. Searle, *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969)). To that end, Austin and Searle collectively lay the foundation for Ole Wæver’s claim that “security is a speech act” (Ole Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization.” In Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995): 46-86), which ultimately facilitates Wæver, Barry Buzan, and Jaap de Wilde’s definition of ‘securitization’ to suggest that security and the process of securitizing issues be understood as self-referential acts, performed entirely through spoken word (Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998)). This represents the suggestion that issues become security issues not because they are inherently threats, but because they are conceived of as such due to words spoken. The concept of “securitization” can thus be understood as the declaration of the ‘referent object’ as existentially threatened, to a point that necessitates some degree of the suspension of normal political functions (Thierry Balzacq, *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve* (London: Routledge, 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Michael Gold-Biss, “The Discourse on Terrorism: Political Violence and the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism,” Ph.D. diss., The American University(1992): 108. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. See Christopher J. Finlay, “How to Do Things with the Word ‘Terrorist,’” *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 4 (October 2009): 751-774 for a comprehensive overview of the existing literature that specifically addresses this subject matter. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Nicholas J. Perry, “The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of too Many Grails,” *Journal of Legislation* 30, no. 2 (May 1, 2004): 249-274; Sam Jackson, “Non-normative Political Extremism: Reclaiming a Concept’s Analytical Utility,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2016): 1-16; Conor Cruise O’Brien, *Herod: Reflections on Political Violence* (London: Hutchison, 1978). [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. A select sampling of this literature includes (but is not limited to) the following publications: Alex P. Schmid, A.J. Jongman and Michael Stohl, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co., 1988); Jack P. Gibbs, “Conceptualization of Terrorism,” *American Sociological Review* 54, no. 3 (1989): 329-340; Alex P. Schmid, “Terrorism and Democracy,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4, Issue 4 (1992): 14-25; Louise Richardson, “Terrorists as Transnational Actors,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 11, no. 4 (1999): 209-219; Andrew Byrnes, “Apocalyptic Visions and the Law: The Legacy of September 11,” Professional Address at the ANU Law School for the Faculty’s ‘Inaugural and Valedictory Lecture Series. (May 30, 2002); Walter Laqueur, *A History of Terrorism* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction: 2001); Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2006); Boaz Ganor, *The Counter- Terrorism Puzzle* (Herzliya: Transaction Publishers, 2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle*,7. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Alex P. Schmid, “The Definition of Terrorism.” In Alex P. Schmid (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011): 39.

    The problems associated with a failure to operationally define specific terms for the purposes of academic research stem from the critical role that definitions play in limiting the specific actions and activities under examination. To that end, explicitly defining specific terms serves to bring precision and clarity to otherwise contestable subjects. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Jeffrey D. Simon, *The Terrorist Trap* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994). [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. M.J. Peterson, “Using the General Assembly.” In Jane Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss, eds. *Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11.* (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004): 178. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/10 (17 July 1998), available from <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n98/241/85/pdf/n9824185.pdf?OpenElement>. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. For a more in-depth discussion about the lack of an internationally accepted definition of terrorism, see Marcello Di Filippo, “The definition(s) of terrorism in international law.” In Ben Saul, *Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism.* (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020) and Alexandra V. Orlova and James W. Moore, “”Umbrellas” or “Building Blocks”?: Defining International Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime in International Law.” *Houston Journal of International Law*, 27, No. 2 (2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Schmid, Jongman & Stohl, *Political Terrorism,* 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 780. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Bruce Jenkins, “The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems.” Presented at the 1978 meeting of The Institute of Management Sciences and Operations Research Society of America in New York, NY on May 3, 1978. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 43. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Richard Little, “Ideology and Change.” In Barry Buzan and R.J. Jones (eds.), *Change and the Study of International Relations* (London: Pinter,1981): 30-39; Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991): 6; Steve Smith, “The Contested Concept of Security.” In Ken Booth (ed.), Critical Security Studies and World Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005).

    Gallie conceives of an essentially contested concept as a term so normatively loaded that no amount of debate or evidence will lead to agreement on its “correct or standard use.” As such, his original 1956 article predicates the use of this classification on seven prerequisite conditions: the first five of these are primarily descriptive in nature, and the final two serve to explicitly differentiate “essentially contested concept[s]” from “radically confused” concepts.” First: the concept must be “appraisive, in the sense that it signifies or accredits some kind of valued achievement.” To that end, using an essentially contested concept must suggest a tacit value judgement. Second: the concept must have an “internally complex character.” That is, to be considered “essentially contested,” a concept must comprise multiple separate components that interact with one another in their separate capacities as elements of a whole. This interaction must ultimately constitute the concept’s character in order for it to be labeled “essentially contested.” Third: any explanation of the concept’s worth must necessitate references to both the individual, and the collective contributions of its components. Fourth: the achievement that the concept connotes must not be able to be predicted or prescribed. Fifth: in order for a concept to be classified “essentially contested,” parties that dispute one another’s use of the concept in question must acknowledge and appreciate its “contested-ness.” Sixth: to claim the ‘essentially contested’ label, a concept must have been derived from an exemplar whose authority is claimed on the basis of all of the disputing parties’ acknowledgement of its authority. Finally, Gallie’s seventh and last criterion argues that it must be plausible that the ‘contested-ness’ of the concept in question enables the original exemplar’s achievement to be best sustained or developed. (W.B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 56 (1956): 167-198.) [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Terrorism scholars like J.A.S. Wild claim that there is philosophical utility to approach exemplified by Gallie’s “essentially contested concepts” as “the rejection of all forms of universalism,” the ‘essentially contested concept’ classification only serves to provide for the emergence of competing conceptions that are ultimately “equally inadequate as final explanatory frameworks… [because] they use universalist rhetoric to protect provincial practices.” Wild’s point mirrors similar claims made by scholars like John N. Gray and Christine Swanton in opposition to literature that describes the term ‘security’ as an ‘essentially contested concept.’ In the context of the security debate, however, some scholars advocate for a “weaker variant of the essential contestedness hypothesis” that allows for differentiation between its “more and less problematic conceptualizations.” Specifically, Swanton justifies this position by arguing that “stronger variants” of the ‘essential contestedness’ position seemingly invalidate any in-depth conceptual analysis.

    (David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” *Review of International Studies* 23 (1997):10-12; Christine Swanton, “On the ‘Essential Contestedness’ of Political Concepts,” *Ethics* 95 (1985): 811-827; John N. Gray, “On the Contestability of Social and Political Concepts,” *Political Theory* 5 (1977): 331-348.)

    David A. Baldwin describes the interaction between Swanton and Gray’s observations of “essentially contested concepts” and concludes that there are both “stronger variants” and “weaker variants” of Gallie’s “essentially contested concepts” classification. (Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” 10-12) [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” 10-12; Swanton, “On the ‘Essential Contestedness’ of Political Concepts,” 811-827; Gray, “On the Contestability of Social and Political Concepts,” 331-348. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Harvey Boulay. “Essentially Contested Concepts and the Teaching of Political Science.” *Teaching Political* Science, Volume 4, Issue 4 (1977): 425. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Swanton, “On the ‘Essential Contestedness’ of Political Concepts,” 811-827. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. This example is inspired by a 2019 article in *The Athletic*, in which Sean McIndoe argued against viewing the Stanley Cup Final as the tournament that reveals the identity of the best NHL team in a given year. McIndoe’s article was written in the context of the upset in the first round of the 2019 Stanley Cup Playoffs, which saw the team that tied for the most regular season wins in NHL history in the 2018-2019 season (the Tampa Bay Lightning) lose to the team that it had beaten by a combined margin of 17-3 in the three regular season meetings between the two teams (the Columbus Blue Jackets).

    (Sean McIndoe, “Down Goes Brown: The 2019 playoffs are total chaos. Is that good? It depends on your door,” *The Athletic* (April 22, 2019).) [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. McIndoe. “Down Goes Brown.” [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. McIndoe. “Down Goes Brown.” [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. McIndoe. “Down Goes Brown.” [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Jessie Blackbourn, Fergal F. Davis and Natasha C. Taylor, “Academic Consensus and Legislative Definitions of Terrorism: Applying Schmid and Jongman,” *Statute Law Review* 34, Issue 3 (October 1, 2013): 239–261. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Blackbourn, David & Taylor, “Academic Consensus and Legislative Definitions of Terrorism,” 239-261. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Weinberg, Pedahzur & Hirsch-Hoefler, “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism,” 780. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Alex Schmid, “Terrorism – The Definitional Problem,” *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 2, No. 36 (2004): 382. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler, “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism,” 777-794. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. The significance of the 50 percent frequency of recurrence lower limit that a definitional element must display to be included in the *de minimis* definition suggested herein is its signifying that the element in question is present in at least half of the definitions of terrorism surveyed in each study. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. The 1988 Schmid and Jongman study also identifies [3] fear, terror (rank as per Schmid & Jongman, 1988) as having a greater than 50 percent frequency of recurrence. I have chosen to omit this definitional element from the proposed *de minimis* definition of terrorism implicit to the scholarly literature due to the significant discrepancy between Schmid and Jongman’s calculation of this element’s recurrence frequency at fifty-one (51) percent, and Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler’s 2004 calculation of this element’s recurrence frequency at twenty-two (22) percent. It should be noted that this discrepancy is well outside the margin of error identified by either study. (See Appendix D for the detailed breakdown and comparison of the results of the 1988 Schmid and Jongman study and the 2004 Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler study.) [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. While I use the definitions of terrorism present in states’ domestic legislation to derive my de minimis definition of terrorism, I am not a legal scholar. As such, my dissertation is premised on the policy debate (not law and policy). [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. See Footnote 15 (Chapter 1, Page 9) for clarification as to my use of the term International Relations (or IR) to refer to the academic discipline, and ‘international relations’ to describe real-world conduct and policies. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. All of the United Nations member states’ domestic terrorism legislation was taken into account in conceiving of the proposed *de minimis* definition of terrorism, with the sole exception of the Republic of Nauru. The Republic of Nauru does explicitly account for terrorism as an offence, and to that end, specifies a definition of terrorism in its 2004 Counter Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime Act. Unfortunately, the Government of the Republic of Nauru’s online repository of legislation has been experiencing server problems since 2019, and as of the competition of this research, the complete text of the Act has not been successfully located. (As well, the government of the Republic of Nauru failed to respond to any request for the full text of the Act.) [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. See Appendix E for a breakdown as to the recurrence frequencies of each of the identified definitional elements. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Note that the numbers in [square brackets] that precede each definitional element in this list represent the elements’ initial coding in the context of this study. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. See Appendix F for a visual depiction of the overlapping classification of the identified definitional elements, in relation to the categories of ‘means,’ ‘mode,’ ‘target,’ and ‘objective’ of terrorist activity perpetrated. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. This dissertation understands and frames post-modern warfare as a macro-level process that necessarily affects the evolving character of the international system and the conduct of international relations. Specific instances of terrorist activity can also be understood as having a situation (or conflict)-specific, micro-level ‘means’ and ‘ends.’ As such, conceiving of terrorism as involving its own ‘means’, ‘mode’ and objective (‘ends’) does not contradict this chapter’s framing of terrorism itself as the ‘means’ of post-modern warfare. See Michael Sheehan, “The Evolution of Modern Warfare.” In John Baylis, James J. Wirtz and Colin S. Gray (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World.* (6th edition). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019): 36-52. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Edward Said, “American Intellectuals and Middle East Politics,” (Interview). In Bruce Robbins (ed.), *Intellectuals: Aesthetics, Politics, Academics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990): 140. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Anthony Richards, *Conceptualizing Terrorism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. One prominent, Canadian example of the clear difference between the policy definition of terrorism, and other types of de minimis definitions of terrorism that I establish in this dissertation is in the Crown’s refusal to lay a terrorism charge on the perpetrator of the 2018 Toronto van attack. For a more fulsome discussion of this, see Chapter 7, “Assessing the *De Minimis* Media Coverage Definition of Terrorism in Relation to the *De Minimis* Policy Definition of Terrorism.” [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Thomas G. Weiss and Anoulak Kittikhoun, “Theory vs. Practice: A Symposium,” *International Studies Review* 13, no. 1 (2011): 1-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Michel Girard, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Keith Webb, *Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy Making: National Perspectives on Academics and Professionals in International Relations* (London: Pinter, 1994); Joseph Lepgold and Miroslav Nincic, *Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Weiss and Kittikhoun, “Theory vs. Practice,” 1-5; Bettina Trueb, “Teaching Students to Write for ‘Real Life’: Policy Paper Writing in the Classroom,” *PS:* *Political Science & Politics* 46 (2013): 137. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. There is a broad literature addressing the notion of theory vs. practice in the context of International Relations that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Both Weiss and Kittikhoun’s special issue of *International Studies Review* on Theory vs. Practice and Lepgold and Nincic’s *Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance* provide good basic overviews of the discussion on this topic. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. Weinberg, Pedahzur & Hirsch-Hoefler, “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism,” 777-794. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Michel Foucault understands power as inherently relational: as the influence that an action exerts on other actions. Similarly, Steven Lukes “define[s] the concept of power by saying that A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests.” (Lukes, *Power,* 37)

     (Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1977-78.* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (2nd ed.). (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).) [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. Constructivism understands the nature of the state as governed by James March and Johan P. Olsen’s proposal for the “logic of appropriateness”: heavily mediated by social norms, and innately affected by perceptions of its interaction and relationships with other actors. Moreover, constructivist scholars like Alexander Wendt argue that state identities are shaped and transformed within the international system, an ongoing and reciprocal process that is based on the principle that individuals act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meaning that they read into said objects. Given its ontological opposition to the establishment of objective definitions, Peter Katzenstein asserts that constructivism emphasizes “varying identities and beliefs” as underpinning state actions, motivations and decision-making processes, claiming that, within international relations, interests are constructed through a process of social interaction. Further, he argues that international regimes acquire their own dynamic over time; this process of social change engenders self-reflections, which, in turn, inspires political actions that are shaped by collectively-held norms. Notions of power in international relations are also fundamentally ideational; Emmanuel Adler, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink emphasize the constitution of international relations as based on primarily social “facts,” which are “facts” only by social emergence, suggesting the importance of generating a historical and sociological understanding of how power is constructed through international relations. (James March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1989); Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425; Peter Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Emmanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 3 (1997): 319-363; Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 391–416). [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. Colin Wight, “Theorising Terrorism: The State, Structure, and History,” *International Relations* 23, no. 1 (2009): 99; Ayşe Zarakol, “What Makes Terrorism Modern? Terrorism, Legitimacy, and the International System,” *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 5 (2011): 2312. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. Zarakol, “What Makes Terrorism Modern?”, 2318.

     Zarakol’s claim that the Westphalian state “displaced… religious, localised and personal [authority]” is in accordance with arguments made by the subset of interdisciplinary scholarship that Scott Abramson terms the “bellicist theories of state formation” (Zarakol, “What Makes Terrorism Modern?”, 2316). Abramson amalgamates aspects of political philosophy, historical sociology and IR to suggest that warfare established the conditions necessary to allow for the emergence of the modern state. As such, both a Darwinian logic of competition and survival of the fittest, and Weber’s definition of the state as “the human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” undergird the bellicist theories of state formation literature. Notably, Richard Bean’s argument that there is a correlation between early European state formation and changes in the frequency and modes of warfare, and Charles Tilly’s claim that “states make war and wars make states” fall under the auspices of this literature. (Scott Abramson, “The Economic Origins of the Territorial State,” *International Organization* 71, no. 1 (2017): 97-130; Richard Bean, “War and the Birth of the Nation State,” *The Journal of Economic History* 33, no. 1 (1973): 203-221; Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 900-1992* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1992). [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as an act committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” (See United Nations General Assembly, *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (December 9, 1948), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ac0.html.)

     While the 1998 Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanityas *delicta juris gentium* (the most serious crimes of concern to the international community), failure to reach international consensus on “generally acceptable” definitions of other offenses of similar magnitude prevented their being accounted for as offenses in their own right. (United Nations General Assembly, *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010)* (July 17, 1998), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html; Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/10 (July 17, 1998), available at http://www.documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/241/85/PDF/N9824185.pdf?OpenElement.)

     See also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Frequently Asked Questions on International Law Aspects of Countering Terrorism* (2009), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/FAQ/English.pdf. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. Richards, *Conceptualizing Terrorism*, 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. See Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 513-553 for an overview of three core theoretical assumptions that undergird the basic propositions of the liberal paradigm associated with the academic discipline of International Relations. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. It is noteworthy that ideology (definitional element 18) is not a factor in my abovementioned *de minimis* policy definition of terrorism. That definition is not a reflection of mine nor anyone else’s personal opinion as to how terrorism *should* be defined. Instead, that definition reflects those components of terrorism that the majority of states decided were important enough to include in the definitions of terrorism they established. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. There are also several differences between the GTD definition of terrorism and the *de minimis* policy definition of terrorism proposed in this dissertation. First and foremost, the GTD definition fails to provide for the *de minimis* policy definition’s stipulation that any action or threatened action that constitutes terrorist activity be “intentional” on the part of its perpetrator(s) (definitional element [14]). As well, the GTD incorporates four (4) additional definitional elements, three (3) of which relate to the nature of the overall objective of terrorist activity: “political” (definitional element [16]), “economic” (definitional element [25]), “religious” (definitional element [17]). The GTD definition also specifies that the criminal action constituted by terrorist activity constitute “force and violence” (definitional element [1]). [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. The coherence between the GTD definition of terrorism and the definition of terrorism that I establish in this chapter is ultimately critical because it enables my use of the GTD dataset, which has achieved widespread acknowledgement as “the most comprehensive database on terrorist events around the world from 1970 [onwards].” (See Jianbo Gao, Peng Fang and Feiyan Liu, “Empirical Scaling Law Connecting Persistence and Severity of Global Terrorism,” *Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications*, *482*, 74–86 for an in-depth evaluation of the data collected by the GTD.)

     For a comparison between GTD data and the other commonly referenced open-source datasets on terrorist activity (including, but not limited to, the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) project and the database maintained by the RAND corporation), see Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan, Heather V. Fogg and Jeffrey Scott, “Building a Global Terrorism Database.” Federally Funded Grant Report Produced at the University of Maryland (2006). [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. See Footnote 15 (Chapter 1, Page 9) for clarification as to my use of the term International Relations (or IR) to refer to the academic discipline, and ‘international relations’ to describe real-world conduct and policies. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. Max Weber, Tony Waters (trans.) and Dagmar Waters (ed.), *Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society.* (New York: Palgrave Books, 2015): 129-198. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 391-416; Peter Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 1-72; Emmanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 3 (2013): 319-363; Sarina Theys, “Constructivism.” In Stephen McGlinchey, Rosie Walters and Christian Scheinpflug (eds.), *International Relations Theory.* (Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing, 2017): 36-41. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. David Held and Anthony McGrew, “The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction.” In David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.), *The Global Transformations Reader* (2nd ed.) (London: Polity Press, 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Weber, *Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society*, 129-198; Brian Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Manfred B. Steger, *Globalization: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. I use the term constituents to refer to actors that are subject to the authority of the regime (or institution) in question. The modern state as an institution does not have subordinates. At least, not in sense that one traditionally conceives of the word ‘subordinate’ to refer to a person that is under the control or authority of another in the context of some organization or system. Legitimacy is a “symbolic representation of the collective evaluation of an institution, as evidenced to both observers and participants perhaps most convincingly by the flow of resources.” (Ralph C. Hybels, “On legitimacy, legitimation, and organizations: a critical review and integrative theoretical model.” *Academy of Management,* Special Issue: Best Papers Proceedings (1995): 243) To that end, the consent component of the state’s international legitimacy is predicated on specific actors’ support (tacit or explicit) for its continued primacy in international politics. My use of the term constituents is also a reference to the verbiage used in the organization science literature, which conceives of legitimacy as garnered from an organization’s constituents’ and stakeholders’ support (in both a tangible, practical sense – so, through the provision of material resources – and a more nebulous theoretical sense – the “generalized perception or assumption that [its]… actions… are socially desirable, proper or appropriate”). (Mark C. Suchman, “Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches.” *Academy of Management Review* 20, no. 3: 574.) This allusion to organization science scholarship on legitimacy is particularly appropriate because my conception of international (state) legitimacy comes from an organizational perspective, in that it is predicated on the idea that the contemporary international political system is a “(modern) ordering activity” (Jef Husymans, “Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier,” *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 2 (1998): 242). See also Blake E. Ashforth and Barrie W. Gibbs, “The Double-Edge of Organizational Legitimation.” *Organization Science* 1, no. 2 (May 1990): 177-194; David Sarpong and Clayton Davies, “Managerial organizing practices and legitimacy seeking in social enterprises.” *Social Enterprise Journal* 10, no. 1 (2014): 21-37. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. Subsequent IR frameworks expand the understanding as to the types of actors, actions and interactions that constitute international relations. English School IR theory (sometimes referred to as “liberal realism”) amalgamates classical realist and liberal perspectives, premising itself on the claim that the international system, while anarchical in structure, forms a “society of states” wherein interests play integral roles in shaping international politics. Most importantly, the English School conceives of its “triad,” consisting of a realist “international system,” a rationalist “international society,” and a revolutionist “world society” as three distinct but interconnected spheres that operate simultaneously to constitute international relations. In this way, the English School expands the classical realist and liberal conceptions of the material capabilities of states as constituting the center of the international system, providing for the roles played by ideas, norms, and interests to be taken into account. Constructivist IR theory further extends the roles of the factors identified by the English School, reframing the manner in which they interact with states with the claim that interests and norms are constructed and constituted on the basis of social interaction. As such, constructivist scholarship constitutes international relations as based on primarily social “facts”, which are “facts” only by social emergence, suggesting a historical and sociological understanding of how power is constructed through international relations. Thus, constructivism conceives of states and other international regimes as ideational constructs, predicated on factors like identity, belief, and social norms and dynamics that constitute an understanding of the reciprocally transformative nature of relationship between social and ideational forces and international relations.

     See Jens Steffek, “Legitimacy in International Relations: From State Compliance to Citizen Consensus.” In Achim Hurrelman, Steffen Schneider and Jens Steffek (eds.), *Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics. Transformations of the State* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 175-192; Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997): 513-553; Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977): 3-229; Barry Buzan, *From International Society to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Michael Sheehan, “The Evolution of Modern Warfare.” In John Baylis, James J. Wirtz and Colin S. Gray (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World.* (6th edition). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019): 36-52; Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*, 1-73; Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground,” 319-363; Finnemore & Sikkink, “Taking Stock,” 391-416. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. Steffek, “Legitimacy in International Relations,” 175-192; Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 513-553; Anne Marie Slaughter, “International Relations, Principal Theories.” In Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Accessed February 15, 2020, from https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e722?rskey=cImTQ0&result=1&prd=MPIL. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. Jef Husymans, “Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier,” *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 2 (1998): 242. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. James Anderson, “The Shifting Stage of Politics: New Medieval and Postmodern Territorialities?”, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, no. 14 (2) (April 1996): 133-153; Roland Axtmann, *Liberal Democracy into the Twenty First Century: Globalization, Integration and the Nation-State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996). [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations asserts, “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” (U.N. Charter [1945] art. 2, 7.) [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. G. John Ikenberry, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2011): 56-68. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. S. Harrison Thomson, *Europe in Renaissance and Reformation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963): 814; George Pages, David Maland (trans.) and John Hooper (trans.), *The Thirty Years’ War.* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970): 250; Bull, The Anarchical Society, 27-38; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.* (New York: Free Press, 1967): 299; John G. Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity.* (New York: Routledge, 1998): 188; Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994; 178-179, 191-192.

     For a detailed overview of the IR literature that assumes the 1648 Peace of Westphalia to constitute the beginning of the international system, see Andreas Osinder, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” *International Organization* 55, no. 2 (2001):251-287. Notably, Osinder characterizes “the standard view” of the Thirty Years’ War as “a struggle between… the “universalist” actors: the emperor and the Spanish King… [who asserted their right… to control Christendom in its entirety… [and] the “particularist” actors… Denmark, the Dutch Republic, France and Sweden… [who] rejected imperial lordship… upholding instead the right of all states to…full independence (“sovereignty”).” (Osinder, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” 252). [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Geoffrey Parker. *The Thirty Years’ War,* 2nd ed*.* (New York: Routledge, 1997): 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. Quentin Outram. “The Demographic Impact of Early Modern Warfare.” *Social Science History* 26, no. 2 (2002): 245-272. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. Scholars such as Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr allege that Westphalia served as the “decisive final step towards eliminating the Emperor’s universal pretensions.” As such, the principle “rex est imperator in regno suo” further concretized the Golden Bull of 1356’s codification of “electoral procedure that made it clear that the pope played in role in selecting the Emperor.” (Maximilian I’s formal endorsement of this notion by adding the word “elected” to his title in 1506 notwithstanding.) Moreover, the 1486 expansion of the title “Holy Roman Empire” to “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” had already expanded on the Golden Bull by “particularizing… and separating [the Empire] from the universality of the Church.” See Derek Croxton, “The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty,” *The International History Review* 21, no. 3 (1999): 572-573; Bruce Martin Russett, David Todd Kinsella, and Harvey Starr, *World Politics: The Menu for Choice* (San Francisco: Wadsworth Publishing, 1981): 47. As cited in Croxton, “The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty,” 573. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. This “right of reformation” was originally granted to German estates through the 1555 Peace of Augsburg. Notwithstanding, Westphalia qualified this right by expanding it to include that “all subjects were guaranteed not only the right to emigrate, but also to freedom of conscience, to worship in neighboring territories, and to send their children abroad to school or educate them at home.” See “Treaty of Münster.” In Clive Parry (ed.), *Consolidated Treaty Series, 1648-9* (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications 1969): 148-149; 228-30; Fritz Dickman, *Der Westfälische Frieden (*Münster: Aschendorff, 1959): 460-463. Croxton, 575. As cited in Croxton, “The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty,” 575. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. Ronald Asche suggests that the Treaty of Münster granted independence to the Swiss and the Dutch and thus served as “the decisive moment in the separation of the United Provinces from the [Holy Roman] Empire.” Scholars also point to the territorial transfers stipulated in the peace of Westphalia as facilitating the recognition of sovereignty, citing the prominent use of the Latin term *supremum dominium* (commonly translated as “sovereignty”) as playing a role in establishing a “new and more sharply defined notion of sovereignty.” Similarly, Justin Rosenberg, Stephen D. Krasner and Janice E. Thomson support the notion that the peace of Westphalia began “an overt process of reflexive territorial ordering of the state-system” in the “alternation of war and diplomacy.” Guido Braun, “Les traductions françaises des traités de Westphalie de 1648 à la fin de l’Ancien Régime,” *XVIIe Siècle,* cxc (1995): 111-113. As cited in Croxton, “The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty,” 577; Justin Rosenberg, “A Non-Realist Theory of Sovereignty? Giddens’ “The Nation-State and Violence,”” *Millennium*, xix (1990): 253; Stephen D. Krasner and Janice E. Thomson, “Global Transactions and Consolidation of Sovereignty.” In Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds.), *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989): 198. See also Nicholas Onuf, “Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History,” *Alternatives* xvi (1991): 435-437.

     See also Axtmann, *Liberal Democracy into the Twenty First Century*, 115-143; Thomson, *Europe in Renaissance and Reformation*, 814.; Pages, *The Thirty Years' War*, 250. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. See previous footnote (Footnote 128) for a more detailed overview of the development of the modern state from the Westphalian consensus. See also Roland Robertson, “After Nostalgia? Wilful Nostalgia and the Phases of Globalization” in Bryan Turner (ed.), *Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity* (London: Sage, 1990): 45-61; Weber, *Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society*, 129-198. [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. # Steger, *Globalization*, 37-55. Moreover, the understanding that the Peace of Westphalia facilitated the sharing of political authority immediately succeeding the Thirty Years’ War by serving as the first formal, codified legitimization of the theory of sovereignty, which “claim[s] the supremacy of the govern[ing authority]… over the people, resources, and ultimately, over all other authorities within the territory it control[s]” is pervasive in classical realist and liberal IR scholarship.

     [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. Rationalism provides the basis for much of classical IR theory, accounting for change and variation by analyzing shifts in the distribution of material capabilities. As such, rationalists assert that actors take specific actions and inactions directly as a result of pre-existing assumptions and structures. Conversely, reflectivist IR theories understand “intersubjective meanings” of international institutional activity to be of critical importance to international relations. Thus, reflectivist scholars like Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie argue that understanding *how* individuals understand and perceive institutional norms and rules, as well as overarching societal discourse, is as critical to analyzing norms as measuring the effect that invoking norms has on behavior and behavioral trends. See Ian Hurd, “Constructivism.” In eds. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Friedrich Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie, “The State of the Art, or the Art of the State,” *International Organization* 40 (1986): 765. [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. Mark Shirk, “Pirates, Anarchists, and Terrorists: Violence and the Boundaries of Sovereign Authority,” Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland (2014): 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. Constructivist IR scholarship constitutes interests and identities continually evolving, reciprocally-influencing processes that cannot be understood as exogenous variables outside of state control that are immune to transformation. See Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground,” 319-363; Finnemore & Sikkink, “Taking Stock,” 391-416. [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-78* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 10-11, as cited in Mark Shirk, “Pirates, Anarchists, and Terrorists: Violence and the Boundaries of Sovereign Authority,” Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland(2014): 39; Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996):26, as cited in Ayşe Zarakol, “What Makes Terrorism Modern? Terrorism, Legitimacy, and the International System,” *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 5 (2011): 2313. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 10-11; Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State*, 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. Husymans, “Security!”, 242. [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. The *anarchy problematique* is the name that Richard Ashley gives to scholarly conceptions of international relations as characterized by the absence of “a supreme sovereign authority.” (Richard Devetak, “Postmodernism.” In Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True (eds.), *Theories of International Relations.* (3rd edition) (New York City: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005): 171; Daniel F. Wajner, ““Battling” for Legitimacy: Analyzing Performative Contests in the Gaza Flotilla Paradigmatic Case,” *International Studies Quarterly* 63 (July 2019): 1037).)

     See Slaughter, “International Relations,” 1-7 for a more comprehensive overview of the role that anarchy plays in IR theory. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. Husymans, “Security!”, 242; Devetak, “Postmodernism,” 171. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. Richard K. Ashley, “Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique,” *Millenium* 17, no. 2 (1988): 257. [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. Devetak, “Postmodernism,” 171. [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. Ashley, “Untying the Sovereign State,” 257. As cited in Devetak, “Postmodernism,” 171. [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. Richard K. Ashley, “The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics,” *Alternatives* 12, no. 4 (1987): 403-434. As cited in in Devetak, “Postmodernism,” 171; Richard K. Ashley, “Imposing International Purpose: Notes on a Problematic of Governance.” In Ernst Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (eds.) *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s.* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989): 251-290. As cited in in Devetak, “Postmodernism,” 171. [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. Joanna Rozycka-Tran, Pawel Boski and Bogdan Wojciszke define zero-sum thinking as “a general belief system about the antagonistic nature of social relations, shared by people in a society or culture and based on the implicit assumption that a finite amount of goods exists in the world, in which one person's winning makes others the losers, and vice versa ... a relatively permanent and general conviction that social relations are like a zero-sum game. People who share this conviction believe that success, especially economic success, is possible only at the expense of other people's failures.” See Joanna Rozycka-Tran, Pawel Boski, and Bogdan Wojciszke, “Belief in a Zero-Sum Game as a Social Axiom: A 37-Nation Study,” *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 46, no. 4 (2015): 525–548. [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. Daniel F. Wajner, ““Battling” for Legitimacy: Analyzing Performative Contests in the Gaza Flotilla Paradigmatic Case,” *International Studies Quarterly* 63 (July 2019): 1036. [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. Craig Matheson, “Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy,” *The British Journal of Sociology* 38, no. 2 (1987): 199. [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. See Shane P. Mulligan, “The Uses of Legitimacy in International Relations,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 34, no. 2 (2006): 349-375 for an overview of the argument that the definition of legitimacy remains contested and nebulous. (See also Alex Jeffrey, Fiona McConnell and Alice Wilson, “Understanding Legitimacy: Perspectives from Anomalous Geopolitical Spaces,” *Geoforum* 66(2015): 177-183.) [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. This chapter does not explicitly engage with many of the conceptions of legitimacy established in the political theory literature. This is not an oversight on my part. Claims that political theory exposes unstated assumptions that undergird our thinking about politics notwithstanding, political theory is only relevant to this dissertation insofar as it i*mplicitly* informs real-world policy decision-making. Put bluntly, this chapter is *not* a political theory literature review. For an in-depth overview of the political theory scholarship on legitimacy, see Amanda R. Greene, *Legitimacy and Democracy: A Platonic Defense of Voluntary Rule.* Ph.D. diss., Stanford University (2014). See also Nathan P. Adams, “Institutional Legitimacy,” *Journal of Political Philosophy* 26, no. 1 (2018): 84-102. [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
158. Craig Matheson, “Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy,” *The British Journal of Sociology* 38, no. 2 (1987): 199. See Shane P. Mulligan, “The Uses of Legitimacy in International Relations,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 34, no. 2 (2006): 349-375 for an overview of the argument that the definition of legitimacy remains contested and nebulous. (See also Alex Jeffrey, Fiona McConnell and Alice Wilson, “Understanding Legitimacy: Perspectives from Anomalous Geopolitical Spaces,” *Geoforum* 66(2015): 177-183.) [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
159. Matheson, “Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy,” 209-210.

     In *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (1949), Max Weber argues that “belief” in the validity of the law is an essential characteristic of legal legitimacy. See Donald H. Hermann, “Max Weber and the Concept of Legitimacy in Contemporary Jurisprudence,” *DePaul Law* Review 33, no. 1 (1983): 27. (The relevant information is found in Footnote 101.)

     This idea of a pervasive belief in the rightness of the rules being imposed in the context of the command-obedience model is paralleled in international law. Moreover, Weber’s assertion that it is possible to “infer that a *value* judgement… concerning… validity… had been made by observing the empirical *fact* of general compliance” is specifically demonstrated in international legal doctrine (Hermann, “Max Weber and the Concept of Legitimacy in Contemporary Jurisprudence,” 9). For example, Article 7 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States establishes that “the recognition of a state may be express or tacit… [tacit recognition] results from any act which implies the intention of recognizing the new state.” (*Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.* 1933. [online] Montevideo: International Law Students Association. Available at: <https://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdf> [accessed April 25, 2022]) [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
160. Mark C. Suchman. “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches.” *Academy of Management Review* 20, no. 3 (1995): 571-610. [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
161. Ian Clark. “International Legitimacy.” In Ian Clark. *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 12.

     The scholarly consensus as to the role played by any or all of these three elements’ in defining legitimacy is consolidated in David Beetham’s proposal for a tripartite understanding of legitimacy. To that end, Beetham constitutes legitimacy an attempted justification of an actor or an entity’s power that endeavors to demonstrate the consent of the actor or entity’s (relevant) subordinates, as well as performatively demonstrate the legality of the actions taken by the actor and what they purport to represent. (David Beetham. *The Legitimation of Power.* (Houndsmill, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Education, 1991)) [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
162. Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*, 15-16. [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
163. David Beetham. *The Legitimation of Power.* (Houndsmill, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan

     Education, 1991): 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
164. Aoife McCullough. “The Legitimacy of States and Armed Non-State Actors.” *University of Birmingham,* 2015: 4.

     (Retrieved 28 June 2017 from http://www.gsdrc.org/wp- content/uploads/2015/08/Legitimacy.pdf) [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
165. Other scholarship also substantiates Beetham’s argument for justification as key to defining legitimacy. In implicitly tying consent to ideology, Margaret Levi also argues that legitimacy is dependent on consent, which she understands to be a form of “quasi-voluntary compliance.” Levi also supports the idea of justification as a necessary definitional element, tying it to conceptions of legitimacy through its classification of normative (state) behaviour as “non-rational.” She conceives of justification as “conformity to ideas, norms and values, based on a “common framework of belief between the dominant and the subordinate in a power relationship.” (Margaret Levi. *Of Rule and Revenue.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988)). Mark Suchman implicitly invokes Levi’s conception of justification in defining legitimacy. He conceives of legitimacy as the “generalized perception of assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions. (Mark C. Suchman. “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches.” *Academy of Management Review* 20, no. 3 (1995): 571-610.) [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
166. Rodney S. Barker, *Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentation of Rulers and Subjects.* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001): 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
167. Uriel Abulof, “‘Can’t Buy Me Legitimacy’: The Elusive Stability of Mideast Rentier Regimes,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 20 (2017): 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
168. Ian Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007): 7; Christian Reus-Smit, “International Crises of Legitimacy,” *International Politics* 44, no. 2 (2007): 157-174. [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
169. Slaughter, “International Relations: Principal Theories,” 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
170. Stacie E. Goddard and Ronald R. Krebs, “Constructivism and the Logic of Legitimation.” In Patrick James, Mariano E Bertucci, and Jarrod Hayes (eds.), *Constructivism Reconsidered: Past, Present, and Future.* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018): 78. [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
171. Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” 381; Martha Lizabeth Phelps, “Doppelgangers of the State: Private Security and Transferable Legitimacy,” *Politics & Policy* 42, no. 6 (2014): 824-849. [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
172. Reflectivist IR theories understand “intersubjective meanings” of international institutional activity to be of critical importance to international relations. In contrast, rationalist IR theories account for change and variation by analyzing shifts in the distribution of material capabilities (Joseph S. Nye Jr.’s “hard power”). See Footnote 130 (Chapter 4, “Terrorism, the State, and International Legitimacy” (Page 67)) (Footnote 20 on Page 8 in this single-chapter draft). [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
173. See Footnote 130 (Chapter 4, “Terrorism, the State, and International Legitimacy” (Page 67)) (Footnote 20 on Page 8 in this single-chapter draft) for further elaboration on the differences between rationalism and reflectivism. [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
174. Kenneth A. Bollen and Richard Lennox, “Conventional Wisdom on Measurement: A Structural Equation Perspective.” *Psychological Bulletin* 110 (1991): 305-314. Also see Richard P. Bagozzi and Claes Fornell, “Theoretical Concepts, Measurements, and Meaning.” In Claes Fornell (ed.), *A Second Generation of Multivariate Analysis, Vol. 1* (New York: Praeger, 1982); Hubert M. Blalock, *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964); Hubert M. Blalock, *Causal Models in the Social Sciences* (Chicago: Aldine, 1971). [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
175. Bollen and Lennox, “Conventional Wisdom on Measurement”, 305-314. [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
176. Bruce Gilley, “The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries.” *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (2006): 504. [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
177. Bollen and Lennox, “Conventional Wisdom on Measurement”, 305-314. [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
178. Gilley, “The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy”, 504. [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
179. D. Betsy McCoach, Robert K. Gable and John P. Madura, “Defining, Measuring and Scaling Effective Constructs.” In *Instrument Development in the Affective Domain* (New York: Springer, 2013): 33-90. [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
180. A notable example of this is the measure of “state legitimacy” that the Fund for Peace uses in its annual Fragile States Index (FSI) reports. The FSI’s “state legitimacy” measure is an independent scale variable on a 1.0 to 10.0 metric, which amalgamates factors relating to government effectiveness and international perceptions thereof. These factors include (but are not limited to) election integrity, levels of confidence in state institutions and processes, the nature of political transitions, corruption, persecution of opposition groups, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, armed insurgencies, and political violence. The Fund for Peace. "Fragile States Index Dataset." Accessed May 1, 2024. <https://fragilestatesindex.org/download/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
181. Ashley, “Untying the Sovereign State,” 257. [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
182. IR scholarship conceives of international relations as characterized by anarchy, which is understood to mean the absence of “a supreme sovereign authority.” (Wajner, ““Battling” for Legitimacy,” 1037). See Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Relations: Principal Theories.” In Rudiger Wolfrum (ed.), *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law* (Oxford University Press, 2011): 1-7 for a more fulsome explanation of the role that anarchy plays in IR theory. [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
183. Ian Clark. “Introduction.” in Ian Clark. *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 1-32. [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
184. Bull, The Anarchical Society, 3-229. [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
185. The English School “triad” provides for an understanding of international politics by conceptualizing international relations within three distinct spheres that operate simultaneously. The first of these, a realist “international system,” deals with the macro- side of the interactions between states. “International system” draws on the work of Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò Machiavelli, in that it assumes the anarchic nature of the international community and focuses on power politics as the main form of interaction between states (which it understands as the main units of analysis in international politics). The second sphere comprising the English School “triad” is a rationalist “international society” that establishes shared interest and identity amongst states as an international norm. “International society” expands on Hedley Bull’s “The Anarchical Society” (1977), in that it conceives of the purpose of international relations as relating to the establishment and maintenance of common norms, rules and institutions. The third and final sphere of the English School “triad” is a revolutionist “world society” that takes individuals, non-state organizations and the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities. “World society” draws on Immanuel Kant’s work in conceiving of the purpose of international relations as facilitating the transcendence of the state system. See Buzan, *From International Society to World Society?*, 6-26.; Sheehan, “The Evolution of Modern Warfare,” 36-52. [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
186. Clark, “International Legitimacy,” 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
187. Clark. “Introduction,” 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
188. Clark, “Introduction,” 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
189. Clark, “Introduction,” 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
190. Suchman, "Managing Legitimacy," 571-610; Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*, 15-16. [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
191. Zarakol, “What Makes Terrorism Modern?”, 2320; Shirk, "Pirates, Anarchists, and Terrorists.” [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
192. Zarakol, “What Makes Terrorism Modern?”, 2316. [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
193. Zarakol, “What Makes Terrorism Modern?”, 2315. [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
194. Zarakol, “What Makes Terrorism Modern?”, 2329. [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
195. Zarakol, “What Makes Terrorism Modern?”, 2329-2330. [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
196. Zarakol, “What Makes Terrorism Modern?”, 2315-16; 2326. [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
197. Zarakol, “What Makes Terrorism Modern?”, 2326. [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
198. Zarakol, “What Makes Terrorism Modern?”, 2334. [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
199. Zarakol, “What Makes Terrorism Modern?”, 2316. For an example of this, see Zarakol’s article. [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
200. Zarakol, “What Makes Terrorism Modern?”, 2315-16; 2326. [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
201. Husymans, "Security!", 226-255; Ayşe Zarakol, “Ontological (In)Security and State Denial of Historical Crimes: Turkey and Japan,” *International Relations* 24, no.1 (2010): 3-23; Zarakol, "What Makes Terrorism Modern?", 2311-2336; Shirk, "Pirates, Anarchists, and Terrorists."d [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
202. The notion of the public “rests on an imaginary uniformity and consensus” where “a matter of common interest unites a population of individuals.” As such, “the term public is normative, in that it helps shape inclusive social identities.” Habermas conceives of the public sphere: “one singular, overarching and unified public… predicated on consensus and the bracketing of difference” that occupies a material and/or virtual space. To that end, “the public… differentiated into mutually exclusive sub-sets, exists in an abstract sense.” See John Fellenor, Julie Barnett, Clive Potter, Julie Urquhart, J.D. Mumford, and C.P. Quine, “’Real Without Being Concrete: The Ontology of Public Concern and Its Significance for the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF),’” *Journal of Risk Research* 23, no. 1: 20-34. [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
203. The idea that international legitimacy is a zero-sum contest between states and other (non-state) international actors derives from the critical constructivist view that the (modern) state’s international legitimacy was established at the expense of other traditionally accepted forms of authority. See Chapter 4, “Terrorism, the State, and International Legitimacy,” (Pages 15-19). See also Stacie E. Goddard and Ronald R. Krebs, “Constructivism and the Logic of Legitimation.” In Patrick James, Mariano E Bertucci, and Jarrod Hayes (eds.), *Constructivism Reconsidered: Past, Present, and Future.* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018): 67-85. [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
204. Phil MacGregor. “International News Agencies: Global Eyes that Never Blink.” In Karen Fowler-Watt and Stuart Allen, *Journalism: New Challenges* (Bournemouth: Centre for Journalism and Communication Research, 2013): 35-62) [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
205. This has resulted in what Constance Bantman terms “a lasting and highly detrimental equation between anarchism and terrorism [that has led] to the… criminalisation and depoliticization [of the anarchist movement that has resulted in]… intense repression.” See Constance Bantman, “The Era of Propaganda by the Deed.” In Carl Levy and Matthew S. Adams (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Anarchism* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019): 371-387. [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
206. Kristy Kate Campion, “Under the Shadows of Swords: Propaganda of the Deed in the History of Terrorism.” Ph.D. diss. James Cook University (2015): 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
207. Even though notions of “propaganda of the deed” initially became a subject of discussion within the anarchist community in the 1850s, it was not until 1877 that the term was formally coined by French socialist Paul Brousse. (Campion, “Under the Shadows of Swords,” 17; Colson, “Propaganda and the Deed,” 167; Mark Shirk, “The Universal Eye: Anarchist “Propaganda of the Deed” and Development of the Modern Surveillance State,” *International Studies Quarterly* 63, (2019): 337.) [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
208. Caroline Cahm, *Kropotkin and the Rise of Revolutionary Socialism, 1872-1886* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 76; Paul J. Smith, *The Terrorism Ahead: Confronting Transnational Violence in the Twenty-First Century* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2015): 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
209. Cahm, *Kropotkin*, 76. [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
210. Bantman, “The Era of Propaganda by the Deed,” 373.

     Malatesta and Cafiero’s “propaganda of the deed” does not explicitly advocate for violence. This is evident in their assertion “the insurrectional fact, destined to affirm socialist principles by deeds, is the most effective means of propaganda and the only one which, without tricking and corrupting the masses, can penetrate the deepest social layers and draw the living forces of humanity into the struggle.” Notwithstanding their lack of call to violence, Malatesta and Cafiero do express an understanding that revolution *is* a logical possible outcome of their conception of “propaganda of the deed.” To that end, while Malatesta and Cafiero may conceptualize all “propaganda of the deed” as direct action, they do not conceive of all direct action as “propaganda of the deed.”

     See Dan Colson, “Propaganda and the Deed: Anarchism, Violence, and the Representational Impulse,” *American* Studies 55, no. 4 (2017): 167. [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
211. Arthur H. Garrison, “Defining Terrorism: Philosophy of the Bomb, Propaganda by Deed and Change Through Fear and Violence,” *Criminal Justice Studies: A Critical Journal of Crime, Law and Society* 17, no. 3 (2004): 265. [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
212. Bantman, “The Era of Propaganda by the Deed,” 373. [↑](#footnote-ref-212)
213. Marie Fleming, “Propaganda by the Deed.” In Yonah Alexander and Kenneth Myers (eds.), *Terrorism in Europe (RLE: Terrorism & Insurgency)* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015): 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-213)
214. Mikhail Bakunin, “Letters to a Frenchman on the Present Crisis”. In Sam Dolgoff (ed., trans.), *Bakunin on Anarchy* (New York City: Vintage Books, 1971). [↑](#footnote-ref-214)
215. Zeev Ivianski, “Source of Inspiration for Revolutionary Terrorism – The Bakunin-Nechayev Alliance,” *Conflict Quarterly* 8 (1988): 49-68. [↑](#footnote-ref-215)
216. *Narodnaya Volya* has been hailed by scholars like Ze’ev Iviansky, Margaret Scanlan, and Bruce Hoffman as the first terrorist organization, but it is important to note that it was not an anarchist organization. As Richard Bach Jensen points out, *Narodnaya Volya* “was authoritarian and hierarchical and intended to create a popular dictatorship after toppling the Czar. Most anarchists rejected authoritarian political structures, even if devised by themselves, and after the revolution favored turning power over to autonomous local groups and organizations.” (Richard Bach Jensen, “Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite: Anarchist Terrorism in Nineteenth Century Europe,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 1 (2004): 129.) See also Ze’ev Iviansky, “Individual Terror: Concept and Typology,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 12, no. 1 (1977): 43-63; Margaret Scanlan, *Plotting Terror: Novelists and Terrorists in Contemporary Fiction* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001): 182; Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*. (New York City: Columbia University Press, 2006). [↑](#footnote-ref-216)
217. David Rapoport, *Waves of Global Terrorism From 1879 to Present* (New York City: Columbia University Press: 2022): 65-110. [↑](#footnote-ref-217)
218. Jean Maitron, *Ravachol et les anarchistes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1992): 12. As cited in Bantman, “The Era of Propaganda by the Deed,” 375. [↑](#footnote-ref-218)
219. Fleming, “Propaganda by the Deed,” 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
220. Fleming, “Propaganda by the Deed,” 17; Bantman, “The Era of Propaganda by the Deed,” 373. [↑](#footnote-ref-220)
221. Bantman, “The Era of Propaganda by the Deed,” 374. [↑](#footnote-ref-221)
222. Bantman, “The Era of Propaganda by the Deed,” 374. [↑](#footnote-ref-222)
223. Max Nettlau, “Attentats.” In Sébastian Faure, L’*Encyclopédia anarchiste* (Paris: Editions de la Librairie Internationale, 1934). As cited in Bantman, “The Era of Propaganda by the Deed,” 374. [↑](#footnote-ref-223)
224. Andrew Carlson, *Anarchism in Germany, 1: The Early Movement* (Metuchen: Scarecrow Press, 1972): 203-310; and Jensen, “Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite,” 130. As cited in Benjamin Wray Pottruff, “The Anarchist Peril: Industrial Violence and the Propaganda of Fear in Turn of the Century America, 1886-1908.” Ph.D. diss. University of Toronto (2015): 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-224)
225. Jean Maitron, *Histoire du Mouvement Anarchiste en France: 1880-1914* (Paris: Société Universitaire d’Edition et de Librarie, 1951): 205; Annemarie Springer, “Terrorism and Anarchy: Late 19th-century Images of a Political Phenomenon in France,” *Art Journal* 38, no. 4 (1979): 261-266; Fleming, “Propaganda by the Deed,” 1-23; Edward J. Erickson, “Punishing the Mad Bomber: Questions of Moral Responsibility in the Trials of French Anarchist Terrorists, 1886–1897,” *French History* 22, no. 1 (2008): 51-73. [↑](#footnote-ref-225)
226. Some scholars (like those cited here) attribute the Haymarket bombing to anarchists. Such attribution poses a problem similar to the issues brought about by the use of the descriptor ‘terrorist’ as a pejorative (I explicitly address this point in Chapter 3). Similar to this use of the ‘terrorism’ label, scholarship that arbitrarily applies the label ‘anarchist’ can lack any meaningful historical context or distinction. As such, attribution of the Haymarket bombings to a specific class of perpetrator can vary from source to source. For sources that assume the Haymarket bombings were perpetrated by anarchists, see Theodore Peterson, *Magazines in the Twentieth Century* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964): 6-7; Anthony Smith, *The Newspaper: An International History* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1979): 152-160; Menahem Blondheim, *News Over the Wires: The Telegraph and the Flow of Public Information in America, 1844-1897* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994). [↑](#footnote-ref-226)
227. Jensen, “Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite,” 125. [↑](#footnote-ref-227)
228. Fleming, “Propaganda by the Deed,” 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-228)
229. Jensen, “Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite,” 125. [↑](#footnote-ref-229)
230. Jensen, *The Battle Against Anarchist Terrorism*, 31 [↑](#footnote-ref-230)
231. Shirk, “The Universal Eye,” 334. [↑](#footnote-ref-231)
232. Shirk, “The Universal Eye,” 334. Here, I use “scare quotes” to express skepticism as to this use of the term anarchist as a descriptive label. (Refer back to Footnote 209 (Chapter 5, “Propaganda of the Deed” (Page 91)) for a more fulsome explanation that justifies my view on a similar point.) [↑](#footnote-ref-232)
233. Richard Bach Jensen, *The Battle Against Anarchist Terrorism: An International History 1878-1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-233)
234. Jensen, *The Battle Against Anarchist Terrorism*, 31; Shirk, “The Universal Eye,” 338; Ruth Kinna, *Early Writings on Terrorism (Vol. 4)* (London: Routledge, 2006): 360. As cited in Shirk, “The Universal Eye,” 338. [↑](#footnote-ref-234)
235. Bantman, “The Era of Propaganda by the Deed,” 372. [↑](#footnote-ref-235)
236. Bantman, “The Era of Propaganda by the Deed,” 378. [↑](#footnote-ref-236)
237. David K. Lyons, *Analyzing the Effectives of Al Qaeda’s Online Influence Operations by Means of Propaganda Theory* (El Paso: Texas Western Press of the University of Texas at El Paso, 2013): 62. [↑](#footnote-ref-237)
238. Arthur H. Garrison, “Defining Terrorism: Philosophy of the Bomb, Propaganda by Deed and Change Through Fear and Violence,” *Criminal Justice Studies* 17, no. 3 (2004): 259-279. [↑](#footnote-ref-238)
239. Neville Bolt, “Propaganda of the Deed and the Irish Republican Brotherhood,” *The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal* 153, no. 1 (2008): 48-54. [↑](#footnote-ref-239)
240. Randall Law, *Terrorism: A History* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009); Matt Carr, “Cloaks, Daggers and Dynamite,” *History Today* 57, no. 12 (2007): 29-31; Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (eds.), *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda* (Berkely: University of California Press, 2007): 33-40. [↑](#footnote-ref-240)
241. Ariel Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 5, no. 4 (1993): 213-251. [↑](#footnote-ref-241)
242. James H. Billington, *Fire in the Minds of Men* (London: Temple Smith, 1980); Fleming, “Propaganda by the Deed,” 1-23; Walter Lacqueur, *The Age of Terrorism* (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1987): 410. [↑](#footnote-ref-242)
243. Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism*, 70-71. [↑](#footnote-ref-243)
244. Carr, “Cloaks, Daggers, and Dynamite,” 29-31; Campion, “Under the Shadows of Swords,” 43; Chaliand & Blin, *The History of Terrorism*, 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-244)
245. Law, *Terrorism*, 86. [↑](#footnote-ref-245)
246. Campion, “Under the Shadows of Swords,” 39. [↑](#footnote-ref-246)
247. Campion, “Under the Shadows of Swords,” 39. [↑](#footnote-ref-247)
248. Nicholas J. O’Shaunessy and Paul R. Blaines, “Selling Terror: The Symbolization and Positioning of Jihad,” *Marketing Theory* 9, no. 2 (2009): 227-241. [↑](#footnote-ref-248)
249. Judith Suissa, “Education and Non-domination: Reflections from the Radical Tradition,” *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 38, no. 4 (2019): 359-375. [↑](#footnote-ref-249)
250. Bantman, “The Era of Propaganda by the Deed,” 374. [↑](#footnote-ref-250)
251. Jensen, *The Battle Against Anarchist Terrorism*, 31 [↑](#footnote-ref-251)
252. Suissa, “Education and Non-domination,” 359-375. [↑](#footnote-ref-252)
253. Bantman, “The Era of Propaganda by the Deed,” 372. [↑](#footnote-ref-253)
254. Bantman, “The Era of Propaganda by the Deed,” 382. [↑](#footnote-ref-254)
255. John M. Merriman, *The Dynamite Club: How a Bombing in Fin-de-Siècle Paris Ignited the Age of Modern Terror* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016): 63. [↑](#footnote-ref-255)
256. Paul Wilkinson, “The Media and Terrorism: A Reassessment,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 2 (1997): 51. For further analysis of the relationship between the media coverage of terrorist activity, see Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982); Richard Clutterbuck, *The Media and Political Violence* (London: Macmillan, 1981); Abraham Miller (ed.), *Terror, the Media and the Law* (Dobbs Ferry: Transaction, 1982). [↑](#footnote-ref-256)
257. Michel Wieviorka and David Gordon White (trans.), *The Making of Terrorism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993): 42.

     Between 1968 and 1970, PFLP terrorists perpetrated the armed hijackings of seven commercial flights. Notably, these hijackings included flights that did not constitute Israeli targets (Pan Am flight 93, from Brussels to New York via Amsterdam; Swiss Air flight 100, from Zurich, Switzerland to New York; British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) flight 775, from Bahrain to Beirut, Lebanon). This series of attacks included the three flights diverted to Dawson’s Field in Zerqa, Jordan (Trans World Airlines flight 741, Swissair flight 100, and British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) flight 775). The PFLP ultimately detonated explosives onboard the three aircrafts, destroying them in front of international news media, after the successful evacuation of all passengers on September 12, 1970. The Dawson’s Field incident is cited as an underlying reason for the clashes between Jordanian forces and Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in the context of the 1970 Jordanian Civil War. See Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Jordan* (New York City: I.B. Tauris, 1998). [↑](#footnote-ref-257)
258. Wieviorka, *The Making of Terrorism*, 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-258)
259. Brigitte Lebens Nacos, *Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the World Trade Center Bombing* (New York City: Columbia University Press, 1994): 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-259)
260. Nacos, *Terrorism and the Media*, 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-260)
261. Nacos, *Terrorism and the Media*, 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-261)
262. Wieviorka, *The Making of Terrorism*, 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-262)
263. Wieviorka, *The Making of Terrorism*, 43-45. [↑](#footnote-ref-263)
264. Boaz Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle* (Herzliya: Transaction Publishers, 2005): 229-246.

     I cite this scholarly view due to its relevance to Wieviorka’s underlying argument. Please note that in doing so, it is not my intention to discount the profound impact that public opinion *can* have on a population’s relationship with those in power politically. To wit, I do not underestimate the long-term effects that public opinion might have on the existence of the state in its current iteration. [↑](#footnote-ref-264)
265. Wilkinson, “The Media and Terrorism,” 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-265)
266. Wilkinson, “The Media and Terrorism,” 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-266)
267. Wilkinson, “The Media and Terrorism,” 52. [↑](#footnote-ref-267)
268. Nacos, *Terrorism and the Media*, 31-32. [↑](#footnote-ref-268)
269. Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle*, 229-234. [↑](#footnote-ref-269)
270. Nacos, *Terrorism and the Media*, 14. [↑](#footnote-ref-270)
271. Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle*, 229-232. [↑](#footnote-ref-271)
272. Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn, *The Theatre of Terror: The Mass Media and International Terrorism* (New York City: Longman Publishing, 1994); Brigitte L. Nacos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon and Robert Y. Shapiro, *Selling Fear: Counterterrorism, the Media, and Public Opinion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Mahmoud Eid, *Exchanging Terrorism Oxygen for Media Airwaves: The Age of Terroredia* (Hershey: Information Science Reference, 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-272)
273. Brian Michael Jenkins, “The Psychological Implications of Media-Covered Terrorism,” *RAND Corporation* (1981): 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-273)
274. Weimann and Winn, *The Theatre of Terror*, 277.

     Weimann and Winn examine media reporting (and conversely, the lack thereof) in connection with 6,714 terrorist attacks that occurred between 1968 and 1986, correlating the volume of this coverage with subsequent terrorist incidents of the same type. (This analysis is facilitated by data compiled by the Rand Corporation, which classifies international terrorist attacks in terms of their operational mode, geographic location, timing, target type, and the occupation and nationality of their victims.) This quantitative analysis leads Weimann and Winn to argue that terrorist attacks are staged to attract media attention, with the objective of changing international attitudes, perceptions, and political agendas, and ultimately political agendas. [↑](#footnote-ref-274)
275. Brigitte L. Nacos, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism: Mainstream and Digital Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism* *(3rd ed.)* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2016): 14. [↑](#footnote-ref-275)
276. Matthew J. Morgan notes “Aum Shinrikyo demonstrated its comparatively more threatening potential in its sarin attack in the Tokyo subway… [they] do not follow rules of engagement in their operations but they do absorb the lessons to be learned from successful acts of violence.” Matthew J. Morgan, “The Origins of the New Terrorism.” *The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters* 34, no. 1 (2004): 33. For a more in-depth discussion of Aum Shinrikyo and the “new” terrorism thesis, see Robert J. Lifton, *Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence, and the New Global Terrorism* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1999). [↑](#footnote-ref-276)
277. Anthony Giddens, “The Future of World Society: The New Terrorism.” Lecture. *London School of Economics*. (November 10, 2004). Text available at Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO). [↑](#footnote-ref-277)
278. Steven Simon lists the Irish Republican Army, the *Brigate Rosse* (Red Brigades) in Italy, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization as examples of “old” terrorism – or, as he terms them, “conventional” terrorist groups. (Steven Simon, “The New Terrorism: Securing the Nation Against a Messianic Foe.” *The Brookings Review* 21, no 1 (2003): 18.) See also J. Bowyer Bell, *The IRA, 1968-2000: An Analysis of a Secret Army*. (1st ed.) (London: Routledge, 2000).  [↑](#footnote-ref-278)
279. Martha Crenshaw, “The American Debate over ‘New’ vs. ‘Old’ Terrorism.” Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois (2007): 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-279)
280. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 95. [↑](#footnote-ref-280)
281. Crenshaw, “The American Debate over ‘New’ vs. ‘Old’ Terrorism”, 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-281)
282. Crenshaw, “The American Debate over ‘New’ vs. ‘Old’ Terrorism,” 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-282)
283. Religious authorities that are considered mainstream in the international context do not tend to sanction the violence perpetrated by terrorists and terrorist organizations in the name of religion. (The notable exception to this is Ayatollah Khamenei, name position and country, United States have labeled a state sponsor of terrorism. See Daniel Byman, “Understanding, and Misunderstanding, State Sponsorship of Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (2020): 1-19.) Chief among the problems associated with the “new terrorism” thesis is the veiled Islamophobia that it presents as accepted fact in the context of mainstream scholarship. While such Islamophobia manifests in a variety of different ways, the most seemingly benign of which involves “the assertion of a unitary identity for all Muslims.” In effect, this metaphorically paints the entirety of the international community’s Muslim population with the same brush, taking a single perspective as summary for “how a billion Muslims…relate to the contemporary world, to each other [and] to the non-Muslim world.” (Halliday, “‘Islamophobia’ Reconsidered,” 894). In this way, conceptions of “new terrorism” further the “demonized, pathologized perception[s] of Muslims” that take their roots from racist ideology (Kundnani, “Book Reviews,” 45). My citation of scholarship that (either intentionally or inadvertently) furthers these harmful claims in relation to my overview of the existing literature on the relationship between terrorism and the media *should in no way be understood as my endorsement* of either the harmful assumptions that necessarily underly their conclusions, or of those conclusions themselves. (See Fred Halliday, “’Islamophobia’ Reconsidered,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22, no. 5 (1999): 892-902; Arun Kundnani, “Book Reviews: The Muslims are Coming!”: Islamophobia, Extremism and the Domestic War on Terror,” *Research in Teacher Education* 4, no. 2 (2014): 45-48.) [↑](#footnote-ref-283)
284. Crenshaw, “The American Debate over ‘New’ vs. ‘Old’ Terrorism,” 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-284)
285. Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, “The Terror,” *Survival* 43, no. 4 (2001): 5-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-285)
286. Walter Lacqueur, *No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century* (New York City: Continuum, 2003): 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-286)
287. Walter Lacqueur, “Left, Right, and Beyond: The Changing Face of Terror.” In James F. Hoge, Jr. and Gideon Rose, *How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War* (New York City: Public Affairs Press, 2001): 80. [↑](#footnote-ref-287)
288. Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism Trends and Prospects.” In Ian. O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, and Brian Jenkins, *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999): 9.

     Notwithstanding, Martha Crenshaw notes that Hoffman is sometimes ambivalent about the notion of “new terrorism” and should therefore not be considered a fierce proponent of the thesis. See Crenshaw, “The American Debate over ‘New’ vs. ‘Old’ Terrorism,” 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-288)
289. Martha Crenshaw, “”New” versus “Old” Terrorism.” *Palestine-Israel Journal* 10, no. 1 (2003): 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-289)
290. Crenshaw, “”New” versus “Old” Terrorism”, 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-290)
291. Lifton, *Destroying the World to Save It*, 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-291)
292. Martha Crenshaw, “The American Debate over ‘New’ vs. ‘Old’ Terrorism,” 1-34. [↑](#footnote-ref-292)
293. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 95; Crenshaw, “The American Debate over ‘New’ vs. ‘Old’ Terrorism,” 4; 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-293)
294. Crenshaw, “The American Debate over ‘New’ vs. ‘Old’ Terrorism,” 7; 10-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-294)
295. Crenshaw, “The American Debate over ‘New’ vs. ‘Old’ Terrorism,” 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-295)
296. Gideon Rose, “It Could Happen Here: Facing the New Terrorism,” *Foreign Affairs* (March-April 1999): 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-296)
297. Rose, “It Could Happen Here,” 117. [↑](#footnote-ref-297)
298. David L. Paletz and John Boiney, “Researchers’ Perspectives.” In David L. Paletz and Alex P. Schmid (eds.), *Terrorism and the Media*. (Newbury Park: Sage Publications Inc., 1992): 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-298)
299. Kevin G. Barnhurst, “The Literature of Terrorism.” In A. Odasuo Alali and Kenoye Kelvin Eke (eds.), *Media Coverage of Terrorism: Methods of Diffusion*. (Newbury Park: Sage Publications Inc., 1991): 115-119. [↑](#footnote-ref-299)
300. Alex P. Schmid, “Terrorism and the Media: The Ethics of Publicity,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1, no. 4 (1989): 553; Yonah Alexander, “Terrorism, the Media and the Police,” *Journal of International Affairs* 32, no. 1 (1978): 105 [↑](#footnote-ref-300)
301. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, “Media Coverage of Terror: Troubling Episodes and Suggested Guidelines,” *Canadian Journal of Communication* 30 (2005): 386. [↑](#footnote-ref-301)
302. Cristina Archetti, “Terrorism, Communication and the Media.” In Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Gordon Clubb and Simon Mabon (eds.), *Terrorism and Political Violence* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2015): 138. [↑](#footnote-ref-302)
303. See the concept of von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) rationality in Expected Utility Theory (EUT). John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern demonstrate that an actor can be said to exhibit rational behavior if its preferences (what it wants to achieve) meet four specific conditions: completeness, transitivity, continuity, and (probabilistic) independence. In this context, “completeness” refers to the actor having a well-defined notion of its preferences. “Transitivity,” then, is the idea that these preferences can be compared in ranked sequence. “Continuity” argues that there exists a set of preferences that necessarily comprises all considerations that can fall within its defined purview, in consideration of the size and/or nature of the disparity between different possible preferences. Finally, “probabilistic independence” means that the set of preferences preserves the same ordering, regardless of the introduction of new preferences into consideration of the set. See John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953).

     Its extensive use in foreign policy analysis notwithstanding, EUT is applicable to analyses of the relationship between terrorism and the media when the media is conceived of in accordance with Marxist paradigms. This is because Marxist critiques of the media hold that media have two ‘centers of gravity:’ the state, and the accumulation of capital. Based on von Neumann and Morgenstern’s four considerations outlined above, these two foci constitute “rational preferences” that allow for the applicability of EUT. [↑](#footnote-ref-303)
304. The idea that a rational actor is necessarily a unitary actor borrows from certain International Relations scholars’ assertions that the state cannot be considered a rational actor because “the nature of state decision-making is not unitary and therefore not necessarily rational.” See Andrew Moravcsik, “Liberal International Relations Theory: A Social Scientific Assessment.” Published by the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (2001). [↑](#footnote-ref-304)
305. For example, Harold Lasswell’s “hypodermic needle” model of communication. In his 1927 *Propaganda Technique (or Techniques in the World War*, Lasswell theorized that mass media has powerful and direct effects on audiences, similar to a bullet piercing its target or a hypodermic needle injecting its contents directly into the body. According to this theory, the media has the ability to directly shape the thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors of individuals without their active engagement or critical thinking. In contrast, contemporary theories of media effects, such as cultivation theory, agenda-setting theory, and uses and gratifications theory, recognize that media influence is multifaceted and contingent upon a range of factors. These theories highlight the importance of considering audience characteristics, media content, and social context in understanding the effects of media on individuals and society. (See Archetti, “Terrorism, Communication and the Media,” 139.) [↑](#footnote-ref-305)
306. Harold Dwight Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (London: K. Paul, 1927); Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton, “Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Action.” In Wilbur Schramm and Donald F. Roberts (eds.), *The Processes and Effects of Mass Communication* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971): 457-473.; Philip Kotler and Gerald Zaltman, “Social Marketing: An Approach to Planned Social Change,” *Journal of Marketing* 35, no. 3 (July 1971): 3-12; Edwin Emery, *The Press and America: An Interpretative History of the Mass Media* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972); Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, “The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion,” *Journal of Communication* 24, no. 1 (1974): 43-51; W. Lance Bennet and David L. Paletz, *Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Brian McNair, *Cultural Chaos: Journalism and Power in a Globalised World* (London: Routledge, 2006); Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin, *War and Media* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-306)
307. Wilkinson, “The Media and Terrorism,” 54. [↑](#footnote-ref-307)
308. L. John Martin, “The Media’s Role in International Terrorism,” *Terrorism* 8, no. 2 (1985): 127-146. As cited in Sonise Lumbaca and David H. Gray, “The Media as an Enabler for Acts of Terrorism,” *Global Security* Studies 2, no. 1 (2011): 50. [↑](#footnote-ref-308)
309. Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (New York City: McGraw-Hill, 1964): 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-309)
310. McLuhan, *Understanding Media*, 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-310)
311. Lazarsfeld and Merton, “Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Action,” 457-473. [↑](#footnote-ref-311)
312. Lazarsfeld and Merton, “Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Action,” 457-473. [↑](#footnote-ref-312)
313. Lazarsfeld and Merton, “Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Action,” 457-473. [↑](#footnote-ref-313)
314. Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36, no. 2 (1972): 176-187. Media framing theory (which I address later on in this chapter) is also relevant in this sense. [↑](#footnote-ref-314)
315. See Chapter 3, “Terrorism and Post-Modern Warfare” for a more detailed deconstruction of the typology of terrorism as post-modern warfare that I use in this dissertation. [↑](#footnote-ref-315)
316. Boaz Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle* (Herzliya: Transaction Publishers, 2005): 229-246. [↑](#footnote-ref-316)
317. Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle,* 229-246. For an overview of the process through which public opinion affects policy decision-making, see Jeff Manza, Fay Lomax Cook and Benjamin I. Page (eds.), *Navigating Public Opinion: Polls, Policy, and the Future of American Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 17-124. [↑](#footnote-ref-317)
318. Refer back to Footnote 15 in Chapter 1 (Page 9) for clarification as to my use of the term International Relations (or IR) to refer to the academic discipline, and ‘international relations’ to describe real-world conduct and policies. [↑](#footnote-ref-318)
319. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” *The American Political Science Review* 56, no. 4 (1962): 948. [↑](#footnote-ref-319)
320. McCombs and Shaw, “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media.” As cited in Spiro Kiousis, Cristina Popescu, and Michael Mitrook, “Understanding Influence on Corporate Reputation: An Examination of Public Relations Efforts, Media Coverage, Public Opinion, and Financial Performance from an Agenda-Building and Agenda-Setting Perspective,” *Journal of Public Relations Research* 19, no. 2 (2007): 149. [↑](#footnote-ref-320)
321. The idea that the media has the power to change the political ecosystem is congruent with Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz’s “two faces of power.” In their classical argument, Bachrach and Baratz argue that biases are inherent to the structure of the political system, ultimately determining the issues that are acceptable for debate and discussion. Accordingly, they conceptualize the “faces” of power as “participation in decision-making of concrete issues” on the one hand, and a “restrictive face of power” that holds the objective of maintaining the status quo, on the other. In this context, Bachrach and Baratz conceive of the “mobilization of bias” as “the dominant values and the political myths, rituals, and institutions which tend to favor the vested interests of one or more groups, relative to others.” See Bachrach and Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” 950. [↑](#footnote-ref-321)
322. Gillian Youngs, “Media and Mediation in the ‘War on Terror’: Issues and Challenges,” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 2, no. 1 (2009): 99. [↑](#footnote-ref-322)
323. Youngs, “Media and Mediation in the ‘War on Terror’,” 99. [↑](#footnote-ref-323)
324. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (eds.), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (New York City: International Publishers, 1975): 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-324)
325. Frantz Fanon and Charles Lam Markmann (trans.), *Black Skin, White Masks* (London: Pluto Press, 1986).

     See also Michael W. Sonnleitner, “Of Logic and Liberation: Frantz Fanon on Terrorism,” *Journal of Black* Studies 17, no. 3 (1987): 287-304; Fahimeh Dehbashi, “The Phenomenology of Terrorism: The Conditional Counterviolence as a Relational Phenomenon,” Advance. Preprint. Accessed at https://doi.org/10.31124/advance.11626002.v1. [↑](#footnote-ref-325)
326. Frantz Fanon and Charles Lam Markmann (trans.), *Black Skin, White Masks* (London: Pluto Press, 1986). [↑](#footnote-ref-326)
327. Evaggelia Pitoura, Panayiotis Tsaparas, Giorgos Flouris, Irini Fundulaki, Panagiotis Papadakos, Serge Abiteboul, and Gerhard Weikum “On Measuring Bias in Online Information.” *Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Special Interest Group on Management of Data (SIGMOD)* *Record* 46, no. 4 (2018): 16-21. [↑](#footnote-ref-327)
328. Killian J. McCarthy and Wilfred Dolfsma, “Neutral Media? Evidence of Media Bias and Its Economic Impact,” *Review of Social Economy* 72, no. 1 (2014): 42-54.

     Substantiating this perceived necessity that journalists remain objective in their reporting, three major surveys of journalists conducted periodically during the twentieth century found that the majority of journalists characterize themselves as “neutral.” Extant scholarship also asserts that “neutral journalists” are necessarily “politically and ideologically independent,” and, to that end, that “in providing information to the public, “neutral journalists should not aim to influence behavior.” See David Hugh Weaver and G. Cleveland Wilhoit, *The American Journalist in the 1990s: U.S. News People at the End of an Era* (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1996). For classic works that establish journalistic neutrality as essential, see Harold Dwight Lasswell, “The Structure and Function of Communication in Society.” In Wilbur Schramm (ed.), *Mass Communications* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1949): 102-115; Wilbur Schramm, “The Nature of News.” In Wilbur Schramm (ed.), *Mass Communications* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1949): 288-303; G. Tuchman, “Objectivity as a Strategic Ritual: An Examination of Newsmen’s Notions of Objectivity,” *American Journal of Sociology* 77 (1977): 660-679. [↑](#footnote-ref-328)
329. McCarthy and Dolfsma, “Neutral Media?”, 42. [↑](#footnote-ref-329)
330. Kiousis et. al, “Understanding Influence on Corporate Reputation,” 150. [↑](#footnote-ref-330)
331. Alden Williams. “Unbiased Study of Television News Bias,” *Journal of Communication* 25, no. 4 (1975): 190-199. [↑](#footnote-ref-331)
332. Felix Hamborg, Karsten Donnay and Bela Gipp, “Automated Identification of Media Bias in News Articles: An Interdisciplinary Literature Review,” *International Journal on Digital Libraries* (November 2018): 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-332)
333. Hamborg, Donnay and Gipp, “Automated Identification of Media Bias in News Articles,” 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-333)
334. Thomas P. Mackey, *Metaliterate Learning for the Post-Truth World* (Chicago: Neal-Schuman Publishers, 2019): 87.

     For discussion of additional scholarship on other forms of media bias, see Dave D’Alessio and Mike Allen. “Media Bias in Presidential Elections: A Meta-Analysis,” *Journal of Communication* 50, vol. 4 (2000): 133-156. [↑](#footnote-ref-334)
335. Youngs, “Media and Mediation in the ‘War on Terror’,” 99. [↑](#footnote-ref-335)
336. Sendhil Mullainathan and Andrei Shliefer, “Media Bias.” In *National Bureau of Economic Research,* vol. 9295 (2002): 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-336)
337. Mullainathan and Shliefer, “Media Bias,” 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-337)
338. Mullainathan and Shliefer, “Media Bias,” 127. [↑](#footnote-ref-338)
339. Marta Recasens, Cristian Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil, and Dan Jurafsky, “Linguistic Models for Analyzing and Detecting Biased Language,” *Proceedings of the 51st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics*. (2013): 1652. [↑](#footnote-ref-339)
340. Recasens et. al., “Linguistic Models for Analyzing and Detecting Biased Language,” 1653. [↑](#footnote-ref-340)
341. Adam Simon and Michael Xenos, “Media Framing and Effective Public Deliberation,” *Political Communication* 17 (2000): 365. [↑](#footnote-ref-341)
342. Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis* (New York City: Harper & Row, 1974): 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-342)
343. Goffman, *Frame Analysis*, 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-343)
344. Marvin Minsky, “A Framework for Representing Knowledge.” In P.H. Winston (ed.), *The Psychology of Computer Vision* (New York City: McGraw Hill, 1975): 211-277. As cited in Simon and Xenos, *Media Framing and Effective Public Deliberation*, 366. [↑](#footnote-ref-344)
345. Robert M. Entman. “Framing: Toward Classification of a Fractured Paradigm.” *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 2 (1993): 51-58. [↑](#footnote-ref-345)
346. Entman, “Framing,” 51-58. [↑](#footnote-ref-346)
347. See Jörg Matthes, “What’s in a Frame? Content Analysis of Media Framing Studies in the World’s Leading Communication Journals, 1990-2005,” *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 86, no. 2 (2009): 350. [↑](#footnote-ref-347)
348. Gail T. Fairhurst and Robert A. Starr, *The Art of Framing* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996); Holli A. Semetko and Patti M. Valkenburg, “Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television Shows,” *Journal of* Communication 50 (2000): 93-109. [↑](#footnote-ref-348)
349. Shanto Iyengar, *Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). [↑](#footnote-ref-349)
350. Gabriel Weimann, “The Theater of Terror: Effects of Press Coverage,” *Journal of Communication* 33, no. 1 (1983): 38-45; Stephen W. Littlejohn and Karen A. Foss, *Theories of Human Communication* (10th ed.) (Salem: Waveland Press, 2010); Joshua Myerowitz, “Television and Interpersonal Behavior: Codes of Perception and Response.” in Gary Gumpert and Robert S. Cathcart (eds.) *Inter/Media: Interpersonal Communication in a Media World* (New York City: Oxford University Press, 1986). [↑](#footnote-ref-350)
351. L. Paul Husselbee and Larry Elliot, “Looking Beyond Hate: How National and Regional Newspapers Framed Hate Crimes in Jasper, Texas, and Laramie, Wyoming,” *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 79, no. 4 (2002): 833-852. [↑](#footnote-ref-351)
352. See Chapter 2, “Methodology.” [↑](#footnote-ref-352)
353. See Mary-Lou Galician and Norris D. Vestre, “Effects of ‘Good News’ and ‘Bad News’ on Newscast Image and Community Image,” *Journalism Quarterly* 64 (1987): 399-405; 525. As cited in Husselbee and Elliot, “Looking Beyond Hate,” 840. [↑](#footnote-ref-353)
354. Boykoff and Roberts, “Media Coverage of Climate Change,” 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-354)
355. Hamborg, Donnay and Gipp’s conceptualization of the news production process derives from Souneil Park, Seungwoo Kang, Sangyou Chung and Junehwa Song. “NewsCube: Delivering Multiple Aspects of News to Mitigate Media Bias.” In *Proceedings of CHI’09, SIGCHI Congerence on Human Factors Computer System* (2009): 443-453. Hamborg, Donnay and Gipp correlate between the stages in Park et. al.’s news production process and the forms of media bias described in Brent H. Baker, Tim Graham and Steve Kaminsky, *How to Identify, Expose and Correct Liberal Media Bias* (Alexandria: Media Research Center, 1994). [↑](#footnote-ref-355)
356. Hamborg, Donnay and Gipp, “Automated Identification of Media Bias in News Articles,” 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-356)
357. Hamborg, Donnay and Gipp, “Automated Identification of Media Bias in News Articles,” 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-357)
358. D’Alessio and Allen, “Media Bias in Presidential Elections,” 133-156. [↑](#footnote-ref-358)
359. D’Alessio and Allen, “Media Bias in Presidential Elections,” 133-156. [↑](#footnote-ref-359)
360. Paul Frijters and Malathi R. Velamuri, “Is the Internet Bad News? The Online News Era and the Market for High Quality News,” *Review of Network Economics* 9, no. 2 (2009): 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-360)
361. Frijters and Velamuri, “Is the Internet Bad News?” 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-361)
362. See Bill Kovach and Tim Rosenstiel, *Warp Speed: America in the Age of Mixed Media* (New York City: Century Foundation Press, 1999).

     The immediacy of the digital age requires the fast publishing of up-to-date news stories, which has caused many media sources to value speed over authenticity and reliability. As Henry Jenkins asserts, “Mainstream reporters increasingly scan blogs in search of leads for stories that will then be reported more widely through broadcast media” (Jenkins, “The Cultural Logic of Media Convergence,” 35). This comes as a result of the increased demand for up-to-date twenty-four-hour news coverage. Another variation of this prioritization of speed over authenticity and reliability comes as certain news sites ‘update their’ stories “by adding new information at the top of the articles and moving blocks of text, images, and quotes from story to story,” in an effort to make it look like they have access to newer and more current information than they actually do (Redden and Witschge, “A New News Order?,” 173). Moreover, “the focus on speed and the idea of constant live news updates created the need for a continuous uploading and updating of stories, which, due to lack of resources (and lack of actual new information), leads to the incremental updating and reusing of material” (Redden and Witschge, “A New News Order?”, 173). Speed adds credibility to scholarly claims that the rise of digital media has put added pressure on journalists to come up with new and innovative stories, while decreasing the amount of time with which they have to write and research said stories before publication. Thus, while to some degree newsrooms have always been necessarily immediately responsive to developing news stories, the new “world of instantaneous and 24-hour media coverage” has brought about new challenges related to content production (Youngs, “Media and Mediation in the ‘War on Terror’,” 96). While communication has always “consist[ed] of [both] ‘what’ is being communicated and ‘how’ it is being communicated,” there is more incentive for journalists to editorialize and commentate on the basic facts that comprise the news to create the perception that new information has been generated (Youngs, “Media and Mediation in the ‘War on Terror’,” 99). (Henry Jenkins, “The Cultural Logic of Media Convergence,” *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 7, no. 1 (2004): 33-43; Joanna Redden and Tamara Witschge, “A New News Order? Online News Content Examined. In Natalie Fenton (ed.), *New Media, Old News: Journalism and Democracy in the Digital Age* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 2010): 171-186; Youngs, “Media and Mediation in the ‘War on Terror’,” 95-102.) [↑](#footnote-ref-362)
363. Deborah Cameron, *Verbal Hygiene* (London: Routledge, 1996): 56-57. [↑](#footnote-ref-363)
364. Cameron, *Verbal Hygiene,* 57. [↑](#footnote-ref-364)
365. Michael B. Munnik, “What Style Guides Tell Secular Journalists about Muslims and Islam.” *Journal of Religion, Media and Digital Culture* (2023): 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-365)
366. Jane Johnston and Susan Forde, “‘Not Wrong for Long’: The Role and Penetration of News Wire Agencies in the 24/7 Landscape,” *Global Media Journal-Australian Edition* 3, no. 2 (2009): 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-366)
367. Chris Paterson, “News Agency Dominance in International News on the Internet,” *Papers in International and Global Communication* (Centre for International Communications Research, No 01/06). Retrieved from http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/cicr/exhibits/42/cicrpaterson.pdf: 19.

     Due to the limited nature of academic scholarship on news agencies, a United Kingdom-based study conducted by Chris Patterson is often cited as the “primary authority on news agency content.” See Johnston and Forde, “‘Not Wrong for Long,’” 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-367)
368. Paterson, “News Agency Dominance in International News on the Internet,” 19; Chris Paterson, *The International Television News Agencies: The World from London* (New York City: Peter Lang, 2011).

     Although somewhat dated, Paterson’s 2006 study is consistently cited in the English-language scholarly literature as the “primary authority on news agency content,” likely given the limited nature of scholarship on the prevalence of news agency content. (Johnston and Forde, “Not Wrong for Long,” 3; also see MacGregor. “International News Agencies,” 35-62). However, recent studies conducted outside of mainstream academia also substantiate the continued veracity of Paterson’s conclusions. See Terje Maloy (trans.), “The Propaganda Multiplier: How Global News Agencies and Western Media Report on Geopolitics,” (Swiss Propaganda Research, 2016) for an overview of more recent research conducted by German scholars that reaches similar conclusions to those of Paterson’s 2006 study. [↑](#footnote-ref-368)
369. MacGregor, “International News Agencies,” 35-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-369)
370. Munnik, “What Style Guides Tell Secular Journalists about Muslims and Islam,” 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-370)
371. Oluseyi Adegbola, Sherice Gearhart and Janice Cho, “Reporting Bias in Coverage of Iran Protests by Global News Agencies.” *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 27, no. 1 (2020):145. [↑](#footnote-ref-371)
372. Michael Palmer and Jérémie Nicey, “Social Media and the Freedom of the Press: A Long-term Perspective from within International News Agencies (AFP, *Reuters*).” *Journal for Communication Studies* 5, no. 1 (2012): 114; See Chapter 8, “What Do International News Agency Style Guides Say About Terrorism?” (Pages 181-186) for further discussion on style guides. [↑](#footnote-ref-372)
373. MacGregor, “International News Agencies,” 35-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-373)
374. See Chapter 2, “Justification for Sampling Frame” (Pages 13-15). [↑](#footnote-ref-374)
375. Max Weber and Rodney Livingstone (trans.), *The Vocation Lecture* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-375)
376. Oded Löwenheim and Brent J. Steele, “Institutions of Violence, Great Power Authority, and the War on Terror.” *International Political Science Review* 31, no. 1 (January 2010): 23-39; Ayşe Zarakol, “What Makes Terrorism Modern? Terrorism, Legitimacy, and the International System.” *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 5 (2011): 2311-2366; Mark Shirk, “How Does Violence Threaten the State? Four Narratives on Piracy.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 29, no. 4 (2017): 656-673. [↑](#footnote-ref-376)
377. Weber, *The Vocation Lecture.* [↑](#footnote-ref-377)
378. Gabriel Weimann, “The Theater of Terror: Effects of Press Coverage.” *Journal of Communication* 33, no. 1 (1983): 38-45; Joshua Meyrowitz, “Television and Interpersonal Behavior: Codes of Perception and Response.” In Gary Gumpert and Robert S. Cathcart(eds.), *Inter/Media: Interpersonal Communication in a Media World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Stephen W. Littlejohn and Karen A. Foss, *Theories of Human Communication* (10th ed.) (Salem: Waveland Press, 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-378)
379. See the following sections of Chapter 4: “Legitimacy”, “What is (State) Legitimacy?”, and especially, “Domestic vs. International (State) Legitimacy.” [↑](#footnote-ref-379)
380. See Chapter 3, “Terrorism and Post-Modern Warfare” (Pages 53-55). [↑](#footnote-ref-380)
381. Jef Husymans, “Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier.” *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 2 (1998): 226-255; Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). [↑](#footnote-ref-381)
382. The dependent variable is the variable that the study is trying to explain, which is assumed to depend on or be caused by the independent variable(s). Independent variables exist separately from and are presumed to cause some manner of change in the dependent variable. [↑](#footnote-ref-382)
383. Felix Hamborg, Karsten Donnay and Bela Gipp, “Automated Identification of Media Bias in News Articles: An Interdisciplinary Literature Review.” *International Journal on Digital Libraries* (November 2018): 391-415. [↑](#footnote-ref-383)
384. Phil MacGregor, “International News Agencies: Global Eyes that Never Blink.” In Karen Fowler-Watt and Stuart Allen, *Journalism: New Challenges* (Bournemouth: Centre for Journalism and Communication Research, 2013): 35-62. [↑](#footnote-ref-384)
385. Jane Johnston and Susan Forde, “‘Not Wrong for Long’: The Role and Penetration of News Wire Agencies in the 24/7 Landscape.” *Global Media Journal-Australian Edition* 3, no. 2 (2009): 3; Chris Paterson, “News Agency Dominance in International News on the Internet.” *Papers in International and Global Communication* (Centre for International Communications Research, No 01/06). Retrieved from <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/cicr/exhibits/42/cicrpaterson.pdf>: 19; Chris Paterson, *The International Television News Agencies: The World from London* (New York: Peter Lang, 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-385)
386. See Chapter 2, “Methodology”, for further explanation on the choice of time period used in this research’s analysis of whether and how media coverage of terrorism affects international (state) legitimacy. [↑](#footnote-ref-386)
387. Ian Clark, “Introduction.” in Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-387)
388. Ian Clark, “International Legitimacy.” In Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-388)
389. See Chapter 4, “Domestic vs. International (State) Legitimacy.” [↑](#footnote-ref-389)
390. “What Is the Rule of Law?” World Justice Project. Accessed February 15, 2024. <https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-us/overview/what-rule-law>; Mark David Agrast, Juan Carlos Botero, Joel Martinez, Alejandro Ponce, and Christine S. Pratt. *WJP Rule of Law Project 2012-2013.* Washington D.C.: The World Justice Project; Agrast et. al. *WJP Rule of Law Project 2013-2014.* Washington D.C.: The World Justice Project; Agrast et. al. *WJP Rule of Law Project 2014-2015.* Washington D.C.: The World Justice Project; Agrast et. al. *WJP Rule of Law Project 2015-2016.* Washington D.C.: The World Justice Project; Agrast et. al. *WJP Rule of Law Project 2016-2017.* Washington D.C.: The World Justice Project; Agrast et. al. *WJP Rule of Law Project 2017-2018.* Washington D.C.: The World Justice Project. [↑](#footnote-ref-390)
391. I define *legality* as “the recognition of the validity of rules (that the legitimate entity supports or endeavours to impose on its constituents.” See Chapter 4, “What is (State) Legitimacy?” [↑](#footnote-ref-391)
392. Beetham’s conception of legality constitutes it the recognition of the validity of rules that the legitimate entity supports or endeavors to impose on its subordinates.” Beetham conceives of justification as the “generalized perception of the assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” (David Beetham. *The Legitimation of Power.* (Houndsmill, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Education, 1991).) See Chapter 4 for an elaborated explanation of Beetham’s tripartite understanding of legitimacy. [↑](#footnote-ref-392)
393. Clark, “Introduction,” 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-393)
394. Clark, “International Legitimacy,” 12.

     Scholarly consensus as to the role played by any or all of these three elements’ in defining legitimacy is consolidated in David Beetham’s proposal for a tripartite understanding of legitimacy. Beetham constitutes legitimacy an attempted justification of an actor or an entity’s power that endeavors to demonstrate the consent of the actor or entity’s (relevant) subordinates, as well as performatively demonstrate the legality of the actions taken by the actor and what they purport to represent. (Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power.*) [↑](#footnote-ref-394)
395. See Chapter 4, “Legitimacy.” [↑](#footnote-ref-395)
396. The United Nations comprises six main organs: the Secretariat, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Security Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Trusteeship Council. Within the structure of the United Nations, the General Assembly serves as its main deliberative body as well as the sole oversight mechanism over other United Nations bodies. Accordingly, Articles 10-16 (inclusive) of Chapter IV of the Charter of the United Nations mandate the General Assembly with “discuss[ing] any questions or any matters within the… Charter [of the United Nations] or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the… Charter,” as well as considering “principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments,” making recommendations for “promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification.” As well, the General Assembly is the only United Nations organ with universal membership (provided for in Article 9 of Chapter IV of the Charter of the United Nations), wherein each member state is guaranteed a seat and a corresponding vote in sessions of the General Assembly. The General Assembly convenes in furtherance of its mandate on an annual basis, although special and emergency sessions may be called in specific circumstances.

     The General Assembly’s main committees include the Disarmament and International Security committee, the Economic and Financial committee, the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural committee, the Special Political and Decolonization committee, the Administrative and Budgetary committee, and the Legal committee. These six committees, along with the General committee and the Credentials committee, are tasked with forwarding draft resolutions to the annual meetings of the General Assembly so that they can be voted on by the United Nations’ membership in its entirety. For further elaboration on the procedures and operations of the United Nations apparatus as a whole, see Linda M. Fasulo, *An Insider’s Guide to the United Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-396)
397. Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan, Heather V. Fogg and Jeffrey Scott, “Building a Global Terrorism Database.” Federally Funded Grant Report Produced at the University of Maryland (2006). [↑](#footnote-ref-397)
398. See [United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2022).World Population Prospects 2022: Data Sources.](https://population.un.org/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2022_Data_Sources.pdf) [(UN DESA/POP/2022/DC/NO. 9).](https://population.un.org/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2022_Data_Sources.pdf) [↑](#footnote-ref-398)
399. Max Weber, Tony Waters (trans.) and Dagmar Waters (ed.), *Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society.* (New York: Palgrave Books, 2015): 129-198. [↑](#footnote-ref-399)
400. Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. (Surrey: Thomson Press (1) Ltd, 1983): 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-400)
401. Fred Vultee, “Securitization: A New Approach to the Framing of the ‘War on Terror.’” *Journalism Practice* 4, no. 1 (January 22, 2010): 33-47. [↑](#footnote-ref-401)
402. A well-known example of this is the enactment of the 2001 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism – the USA Patriot Act – in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. See Harvey M. Sapolsky, Eugene Gholz and Caitlin Talmadge, *US Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy.* 3rd edition. (London: Routledge, 2017): 160-165. [↑](#footnote-ref-402)
403. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998). [↑](#footnote-ref-403)
404. See Chapter 3, “Terrorism and Post-Modern Warfare” (Pages 53-55). [↑](#footnote-ref-404)
405. See “Chapter 5, The Media and Political Communication” (Pages 108-111). [↑](#footnote-ref-405)
406. Refer back to Footnote 15 (Chapter 1, Page 9) for clarification as to my use of the term International Relations (or IR) to refer to the academic discipline, and ‘international relations’ to describe real-world conduct and policies. [↑](#footnote-ref-406)
407. See Chapter 5 “Propaganda of the Deed” (Pages 87-96). [↑](#footnote-ref-407)
408. I take Schmid and Jongman’s 1988 identification of 22 “distinguishing features of terrorism,” based on 109 responses to a 1985 survey of “terrorism experts,” as my point of departure in identifying these 28 definitional elements. Alex P. Schmid, A.J. Jongman and Michael Stohl, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co., 1988): 28. See Chapter 3, “A *De Minimis* Scholarly Definition of Terrorism.” [↑](#footnote-ref-408)
409. See Chapter 3, “Conceiving of a *De Minimis* Policy Definition of Terrorism” (Pages 45-53). [↑](#footnote-ref-409)
410. To be clear, I did not undertake any formal significance testing here. In this context, “significance threshold” mentioned refers to the 50-percent cut-off that I determine for word element inclusion in the *de minimis* definition of terrorism that I establish in Chapter 3 See Chapter 3, “A *De Minimis* Scholarly Definition of Terrorism” (Pages 43-45). [↑](#footnote-ref-410)
411. This classification accords with my understanding of terrorism as post-modern warfare. See Chapter 3, “A *De Minimis* Scholarly Definition of Terrorism.” Also see Appendix F for a visual depiction of how these elements overlap and intersect with one another as one or more of the “means”, “mode”, “target”, and “objective” of terrorism. [↑](#footnote-ref-411)
412. “An effective framework for packaging and presenting news amid the clutter of the modern media,” public drama is ”simplistic and story-driven… offer[ing] a collection of compelling images and characters.” According to Brian Monahan, public drama is necessarily comprised of three core elements: media attention, media treatment, and audience investment. See Brian A. Monahan, *The Shock of the News: Media Coverage and the Making of 9/11.* (New York: New York University Press, 2010): 39-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-412)
413. More than 40 United Nations member states have legal systems based in a common law legal tradition. So, countries that are either common law or mixed law jurisdictions, per the official Federation of Law Societies of Canada (FLSC) classification. See “List of Common Law Jurisdictions.” Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 2021. <https://nca.legal/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/NCA-Jurisdictions-Policies-Oct-2021.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-413)
414. Antonio Cassese. *Cassese’s International Criminal Law* (3rd ed.). (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 63-66. [↑](#footnote-ref-414)
415. Frances M. Kamm,*Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007): 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-415)
416. See Chapter 3, “Terrorism and Post-Modern Warfare” (Pages 53-55), and Chapter 5, “The Symbiosis Between Terrorism and the Mass Media” (Pages 96-107). [↑](#footnote-ref-416)
417. Terrorism constitutes itself a threat to the constituents of the state – the general public – challenging perceptions of the state’s ability (as the *legitimate* governing power) to protect its subordinates in its sovereign territory. Max Weber, Tony Waters (trans.) and Dagmar Waters (ed.), *Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society.* (New York: Palgrave Books, 2015): 129-198. See also Chapter 4, “Conclusion” (Pages 82-84). [↑](#footnote-ref-417)
418. The total duration of the incident spanned eight minutes – from 1:24pm to 1:32pm. (Security camera footage from a business one city block south of Finch Avenue – where the incident started – suggests that the attack began at 1:24pm. Police sources state that Minassian was arrested at 1:32pm.) [↑](#footnote-ref-418)
419. Natasha Fatah (@NatashaFatah), “#BREAKING Witness to truck ramming into pedestrians tells local Toronto TV station that the driver looked wide-eyed, angry and Middle Eastern,” Twitter, April 23, 2018, <https://twitter.com/NatashaFatah/status/988486858031222785>. [↑](#footnote-ref-419)
420. Chris Tomlinson, “Fatalities as white van hits pedestrians in Toronto, driver described as “angry and Middle Eastern.” *Breitbart*, April 23, 2018, <https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2018/04/23/multiple-injuries-white-van-hits-pedestrians-near-major-toronto-transport-hub/>.

     Please note that the original title of the article that I referenced in the text was changed, following widespread criticism online. Notwithstanding, a screenshot of the original article title can be found at the following URL: [https://img.buzzfeed.com/buzzfeed-static/static/2018-04/24/11/asset/buzzfeed-prod-web-06/sub-buzz-23712-1524583205-9.png?downsize=1600:\*&output-format=auto&output-quality=auto](https://img.buzzfeed.com/buzzfeed-static/static/2018-04/24/11/asset/buzzfeed-prod-web-06/sub-buzz-23712-1524583205-9.png?downsize=1600:*&output-format=auto&output-quality=auto). [↑](#footnote-ref-420)
421. Mike Drolet (@MDroletGlobalTV), “Van used in alleged Toronto terror incident,” Twitter, April 23, 2018, <https://t.co/H85APoDgRL>. [↑](#footnote-ref-421)
422. Nick Westoll and Jessica Patton, “Alek Minassian suspected driver in Toronto van attack that killed 10, injured 14.” *Global News*, April 23, 2018, <https://globalnews.ca/news/4161785/pedestrians-hit-white-van-toronto/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-422)
423. Maclean’s. “Toronto Police Chief on van Attack: ‘The Officer Did a Fantastic Job.’” *Macleans.ca*, April 23, 2018, <https://macleans.ca/news/canada/toronto-police-chief-on-van-attack-the-officer-did-a-fantastic-job>. [↑](#footnote-ref-423)
424. Monahan, *The Shock of the News*, 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-424)
425. Monahan, *The Shock of the News*, 36-37. [↑](#footnote-ref-425)
426. “Statement on Incident in Toronto.” New York City Police Department. Accessed April 16, 2024. <https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/s0423/statement-incident-toronto>. [↑](#footnote-ref-426)
427. *Criminal Code*, RSC 1985, c C-46 s 83.01 [↑](#footnote-ref-427)
428. [Jack L. Rozdilsky](https://theconversation.com/profiles/jack-l-rozdilsky-469071) and Edward Snowden, “**Toronto van attack: Guilty verdict, but Canada still needs to tackle ideological violence**,” *The Conversation*, March 4, 2021, <https://theconversation.com/toronto-van-attack-guilty-verdict-but-canada-still-needs-to-tackle-ideological-violence-156452>. [↑](#footnote-ref-428)
429. *Anti-Terrorism Act*, SC 2001, c 41 [↑](#footnote-ref-429)
430. Nick Westoll, “17-year-old charged with 1st-degree murder after stabbing at Toronto massage parlour,” *Global News*, February 25, 2020, <https://globalnews.ca/news/6595156/ashley-noell-arzaga-murder-charges-laid/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-430)
431. Nick Boisvert, “Homicide at Toronto massage parlour was an act of incel terrorism, police say,” *Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC),* May 19, 2020, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/incel-terrorism-massage-parlour-1.5575689>. [↑](#footnote-ref-431)
432. # The Canadian Press, “Man guilty of incel-inspired terror attack on Toronto spa apologizes to victims,” *Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC),* October 12, 2021, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/toronto-incel-spa-attack-court-1.6994063>.

     [↑](#footnote-ref-432)
433. [Jack L. Rozdilsky](https://theconversation.com/profiles/jack-l-rozdilsky-469071) and Edward Snowden, “**Toronto van attack: Guilty verdict, but Canada still needs to tackle ideological violence,**” *The Conversation*, March 4, 2021, [https://theconversation.com/toronto-van-attack-guilty-verdict-but-canada-still-needs-to-tackle-ideological-violence-156452.](https://theconversation.com/toronto-van-attack-guilty-verdict-but-canada-still-needs-to-tackle-ideological-violence-156452.Again) [↑](#footnote-ref-433)
434. Nikhilesh Dholakia and Ian Reyes, “Media, markets and violence.” *Journal of Marketing Management*, 34 (2018): 1035. Also see Brad Evans and Henry A. Giroux, *Disposable Futures.* (San Francisco, CA: City Lights Books, 2015); Ian G.R. Shaw, “Playing war.” Social & Cultural Geography, 11, no. 8 (2010), 789–803. [↑](#footnote-ref-434)
435. See Chapter 4, “Legitimacy” (Pages 70-82, specifically Page 70-74). [↑](#footnote-ref-435)
436. *Legality* refers to the recognition of the validity of rules (that the legitimate entity supports or endeavors to impose on its subordinates).  *Justification,* refers to the “generalized perception of the assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions. *Consent* refers to subordinate (constituent) actions that indicate its acceptance of the dominant’s “right to rule.” (In other words, “the extent to which [constituents’ acceptance of its governors’ “right to rule” is] confirmed in practices demonstrating compliance.”) (Craig Matheson, “Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy,” *The British Journal of Sociology* 38, no. 2 (1987): 209-210; Mark C. Suchman. “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches.” *Academy of Management Review* 20, no. 3 (1995): 571-610; Ian Clark. “International Legitimacy.” In Ian Clark. *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007): 12; David Beetham. *The Legitimation of Power.* (Houndsmill, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Education, 1991): 15-16.); See Chapter 4, “Legitimacy” (Pages 70-82). [↑](#footnote-ref-436)
437. See Ayşe Zarakol, “What Makes Terrorism Modern? Terrorism, Legitimacy, and the International System.” *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 5 (2011): 2311-2336. [↑](#footnote-ref-437)
438. Roland Robertson, “After Nostalgia? Wilful Nostalgia and the Phases of Globalization” in Bryan Turner (ed.), *Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity* (London: Sage, 1990): 45-61; Weber, *Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society*, 129-198. [↑](#footnote-ref-438)
439. Yiwei Luo, Dallas Card, and Dan Jurafsky, “Detecting Stance in Media on Global Warming.” *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2020*: 3296-3315. Also see Appendix E for the full dictionary of bias indicators I derive from Luo, Card, and Jurafsky’s research. [↑](#footnote-ref-439)
440. Recasens et. al. conceive of epistemological bias as “involving propositions that are either commonly agreed to be true or commonly agreed to be false and that are subtly presupposed, entailed, asserted or hedged in the text.” Factive and semi-factive verbs (and conversely, neg-factive verbs), entailments, hedges, and terms that focus on the quality or quantity of evidence are indicative of epistemological bias. In this context, hedges are “the expression of “tentativeness and possibility” in communication, or, to put it another way, language corresponding to “the writer withholding full commitment to statements.” (Marta Recasens, Cristian Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil, and Dan Jurafsky, “Linguistic Models for Analyzing and Detecting Biased Language.” *Proceedings of the 51st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics* (2013): 1652; Ken Hyland, *Hedging in Scientific Research Articles.* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Pub. Co., 1998): 3; Eunsol Choi, Chenhao Tan, Lillian Lee, Cristian Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil and Jennifer Spindel, “Hedge Detection as a Lens on Framing in the GMO Debates: A Position Paper.” *Proceedings of the Workshop on Extra-Propositional Aspects of Meaning in Computational Linguistics* (2012): 71) [↑](#footnote-ref-440)
441. Recasens et. al, “Linguistic Models for Analyzing and Detecting Biased Language,” 1653. [↑](#footnote-ref-441)
442. As noted above, factive and semi-factive verbs (which “denote… a relation to the truth of a proposition”), entailments, hedges, and terms that focus on the quality or quantity of evidence are indicative of Recasens et. al’s epistemological bias. In this context, high commitment adjectives can be indicative of entailments within a text – “relation[s] between… pair[s of propositions]… such that the truth of the second [proposition]… necessarily follows from the truth of the other.” (Recasens et. al, “Linguistic Models for Analyzing and Detecting Biased Language,” 1652; Roberts Colonna Dahlman and Joost van de Weijer, “Cognitive Factive Verbs Across Languages.” *Language Sciences* 90, no. 4 (2022): 101458; David Crystal, *A Dictionary of Language and Linguistics*. (New York: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1985): 109; Huda Hadi Khalil, “Entailment in Meaning.” *Al Turath University College Journal* (2002): 1.) [↑](#footnote-ref-442)
443. Marc J. Lerchenmueller, Olav Sorenson and Anupam B. Jena, “Research: How Women Undersell Their Work.” *Harvard Business Review* (December 2019): 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-443)
444. For fulsome explanation about the methodology that I use to identify bias and the specific list of searches used to that effect, see Appendix B. [↑](#footnote-ref-444)
445. Per Table 7-1, 73.1% of the articles in my sampling frame involve positive bias towards terrorism, while 78.1% of the articles in my sampling frame involve positive bias towards the state. [↑](#footnote-ref-445)
446. Collectively, these three types of negative bias indicators (low commitment verbs, low commitment modifiers, and undermining adjectives) are present in 96.6% of the articles in my sampling frame that involve negative bias towards terrorism, and 94.3% of the articles in my sampling frame that involve negative bias towards the state. (See Table 7-1, above.) [↑](#footnote-ref-446)
447. A subset of Recasens et. al’s hedging typology, low commitment modifiers manifest as adjectives and adverbs that provide additional description to a claim, in order to make its meaning more specific. In the context of hedging, low commitment modifiers are “used to reduce one’s commitment to the truth of a proposition,” constitute “the expression of “tentativeness and possibility” in communication. (Recasens et. al, “Linguistic Models for Analyzing and Detecting Biased Language,” 1652; Hyland, *Hedging in Scientific Research Articles*, 3; Choi et. al, “Hedge Detection as a Lens on Framing in the GMO Debates,” 71; also see Footnote 386, above (Chapter 7, “States and Terrorists Compete for the Same Authority” (Page 149-150)). [↑](#footnote-ref-447)
448. A second subset of Recasens et. al’s hedging typology (see Footnote 386, above Chapter 7, “States and Terrorists Compete for the Same Authority” (Page 149-150)), low commitment verbs constitute language corresponding to “the writer withholding full commitment to statements.” Hyland, *Hedging in Scientific Research Articles*, 3; Choi et. al, “Hedge Detection as a Lens on Framing in the GMO Debates,” 71.) [↑](#footnote-ref-448)
449. Undermining adjectives, as conceived of by Recasens et. al, are a type of subjective intensifier – “[an] adjective… or adverb… that add[s] (subjective) force to the meaning of a phrase or proposition.” In this context, undermining adjectives can be construed as the opposite of hyping adjectives (see Chapter 7, “States and Terrorists Compete for the Same Authority” (Page 149-150), above) as they damage the credibility of the claim with which they are associated with. (Recasens et. al, “Linguistic Models for Analyzing and Detecting Biased Language,” 1652-1653; Lerchenmueller et. al, “Research: How Women Undersell Their Work,” 3; Yiwei Luo, Dallas Card, and Dan Jurafsky, “Detecting Stance in Media on Global Warming.” *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2020*: 3296-3315.) [↑](#footnote-ref-449)
450. See Appendix H for examples of how each of the different subtypes of the positive and negative bias indicators discussed here manifest in the context of the 2,776-article sampling frame that constitutes media coverage of terrorism for the analysis discussed in this chapter. [↑](#footnote-ref-450)
451. I conceive of international legitimacy as predicated on the state possessing legality, justification, and consent. In other words, as an international institution the state can be considered more legitimate when the public perceives it to have increased its adherence to the rule of law, its actions adherence to accepted international norms, and its constituents’ level of support for its governance. See Chapter 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-451)
452. Robert M. Entman. “Framing: Toward a Classification of a Fractured Paradigm.” *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 2 (1993): 51-58. [↑](#footnote-ref-452)
453. Significantly, Syed Qadri notes that “While a particular frame does not need to satisfy each of [the function and focus] dimensions – nor are the different lenses impervious to overlap – Entman’s matrix demonstrates the selections made by framers to describe, analyze, evaluate and deal with an issue, event or actor.” (See Syed Nasser Qadri, “Framing Terrorism and Migration in the USA: The Role of the Media in Securitization Processes.” *Ph.D. diss.*, University of Glasgow (2019): 38-39.) [↑](#footnote-ref-453)
454. Qadri, “Framing Terrorism and Migration in the USA,” 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-454)
455. Qadri, “Framing Terrorism and Migration in the USA,” 38-39. [↑](#footnote-ref-455)
456. Entman, “Framing”, 51-58; Also see Chapter 5, “Media Bias and Framing” (Pages 111-117). [↑](#footnote-ref-456)
457. Robert M. Entman. *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004): 24-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-457)
458. Entman, *Projections of Power*, 24; Qadri, “Framing Terrorism and Migration in the USA,” 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-458)
459. Content Analysis is a method of generating meaning from text that involves “a summarizing, quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the scientific method [to enumerate media] frames as they naturally occur.” (Robert Philip Weber. *Basic Content Analysis*. (California: SAGE, 1990): 19; Kimberly A. Neuendorf, “Content Analysis: A Contrast and Complement to Discourse Analysis.” *Qualitative Methods* 2, no. 1 (2004): 33.) [↑](#footnote-ref-459)
460. This narrower sampling frame comprises 2,276 unique media bulletins – accounting for 1.2% of the coverage of terrorism produced in the time frame constituted by the larger sampling frame. Moreover, these 2,276 articles comprise 2.1% of the unique media bulletins produced on these 42 dates. This is roughly equivalent to the ratio of media coverage of terrorism to all media bulletins produced by these three international newswires for the entirety of the seven-year time period that comprises the larger sampling frame (2.2%).

     (See Chapter 2, “Quantitative Methodology (Statistical Analysis)” (Pages 24-29) for a detailed overview of the methodology used to identify high coverage and low coverage dates within the larger sampling frame.) [↑](#footnote-ref-460)
461. I manually verified each search result generated by WordStat. Moreover, I also compared the frame recurrence frequencies calculated on the basis of the WordStat results with the frequency that each frame recurred in the context of the smaller 836 media bulletin sample that was entirely hand-coded. See Chapter 2, “Qualitative Methodology” (Pages 30-32). [↑](#footnote-ref-461)
462. After Frames A and D, Frame B ((international) unity) recurs with the next highest frequency, recurring in just over a third (33.5%) of the articles that comprise the sampling frame. See Table 7-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-462)
463. A vehicular attack occurred in Nice, France on July 14, when a 19-tonne truck was deliberately driven into crowds of people celebrating Bastille Day. This attack resulted in 85 fatalities and 308 injuries. The perpetrator, French Tunisian Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel, who has since been identified as an ISIL operative of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), was killed at the scene following an exchange of gunfire with law enforcement officials. (Alissa J. Rubin, Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura and Aurelien Breeden, “Brothers Among 3 Brussels Suicide Attackers; Another Assailant is Sought.” *New York Times.* March 23, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/world/europe/brussels-attack.html (accessed March 17, 2023).) [↑](#footnote-ref-463)
464. On the evening of November 13, 2015, ISIL orchestrated a wave of eight attacks throughout Paris that caused 129 fatalities and wounded 352 additional individuals. These attacks made use of weaponry such as *Avtomat Kalashnikova modernizirovanny (*AKM) assault rifles, hand grenades, and Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP) suicide belts. Three teams of three perpetrators were responsible for conducting the wave of attacks, for a total of nine terrorists. Seven perpetrators were killed at the scene of the attacks, while the remaining two were killed by a police raid in Saint-Denis that occurred two days later. The perpetrators of the attacks have since been connected to ISIL’s Brussels cell. (Sybille de la Hamaide and Mark John (ed.), “Timeline of Paris Attacks According to Public Prosecutor.” *Reuters.* November 14, 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-shooting-timeline-idUSKCN0T31BS20151114 (accessed March 17, 2023); Joe Mozingo, Richard A. Serrano, Henry Chu and Michael Finnegan, “As Paris reels, investigators piece together the attackers' stories.” *Los Angeles Times.* November 14, 2015. https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-paris-attacks-20151114-story.html (accessed March 17, 2023).) [↑](#footnote-ref-464)
465. Renée Jeffery, “Evil and the Problem of Responsibility.” *Confronting Evil in International Relations: Ethical Reponses to Problems of Moral Agency* (2008): 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-465)
466. Jeffery, “Evil and the Problem of Responsibility,” 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-466)
467. Jeffery, “Evil and the Problem of Responsibility,” 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-467)
468. Recall that in Chapter 3, I conceive of the clash underlying an issue as necessarily associated with the implicit question(s) that its competing proposed definitions are trying to answer. To that end, clash constitutes a means that forces us to face definitional irreconcilabilities. See Chapter 3, “The Analytical Utility of “Essentially Contested Concepts”: Conceptual Clash” (Pages 41-43). [↑](#footnote-ref-468)
469. David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (1992): 611-639; Robert D. Benford, “Master frame.” In David A. Snow, Donatella della Porta, Bert Klandermans and Doug McAdam (eds.), *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements* (Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2013). Available online at https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470674871.wbespm126. [↑](#footnote-ref-469)
470. Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993): 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-470)
471. Michael Sheehan characterizes “total warfare” as a stage in the overall evolution of warfare that was brought about by World War I. Defined as per German General Erich Ludendorf, “total warfare” constitutes the total mobilization of military, economic and human resources of the state with the objective of affecting the unconditional surrender of the state’s perceived enemy. The accompanying mentality exemplified by the idiom ‘kick them when they are down’ resulted in the punitive conditions imposed by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles that ultimately caused the ‘total warfare’ of the Second World War. See Michael Sheehan, “The Evolution of Modern Warfare.” In John Baylis, James Witrz and Colin Gray (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (4th ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 42-65.) [↑](#footnote-ref-471)
472. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-472)
473. The United States’ reliance on containment strategies in its foreign policy towards the USSR dominated the first phase of the Cold War, which spanned 1945 to 1962. The near-miss constituted by the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis then changed the United States’ priorities, which shifted from stopping the spread of communism to preventing the outbreak of nuclear war. This manifested as the détente period that characterized the second phase of the Cold War, which lasted from 1962 to 1990. See John W. Young and John Kent, “The Origins and Development of the Cold War.” In John W. Young and John Kent. *International Relations Since 1945.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004): 19-51. [↑](#footnote-ref-473)
474. Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-474)
475. Andrew Mumford, “Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict.” *The RUSI Journal* 158, no. 2 (2013): 40. [↑](#footnote-ref-475)
476. Von Hippel, *Democracy by Force*, 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-476)
477. Von Hippel, *Democracy by Force*, 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-477)
478. Coined by H.G. Wells, the phrase “war to end all wars” is generally used to refer to World War I, due to its manifestation as the first instance of ‘total warfare’: the total mobilization of military, economic and human resources of the state with the objective of securing the unconditional surrender of the state’s perceived enemy. (H.G. Wells, *The War That Will End War.* (New York: Duffield and Co., 1914); also see Sheehan, “The Evolution of Modern Warfare,” 36-52.) [↑](#footnote-ref-478)
479. See Chapter 4, “Statehood” (Pages 62-70). [↑](#footnote-ref-479)
480. The term “violent non-state actor” was coined by the United States Armed Forces in 2002 for use in publications relating to military strategy to refer to terrorist entities. It has been used to refer to “formal institutions… [with discernible] patterns of activity, authority relationships and membership… [that employ] conspiracy violence” in an attempt to affect its goals relating to political change (William Casebeer and Maj. Troy Thomas. “Deterring Violent Non-State Actors in the New Millennium.” *Strategic Insight* 1, no. 10 (December 2002): Retrieved on February 15, 2020, from https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=1422.). The most recent definition of VNSA, by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in 2015, conceives of VNSAs as “organized group[s] with a basic structure of command operating outside state control that uses force to achieve its political or allegedly political objectives” (The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, “Armed Non-State Actors: Current Trends and Future Challenges,” (Geneva: DCAF, 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-480)
481. First articulated by the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report, ‘human security’ is the idea that the international community has a responsibility to prioritize individual human beings’ freedom from fear and want based on seven essential dimensions. In 1997, Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams expanded on this basic premise within the IR scholarship, amalgamating contributions from the Copenhagen School, critical security studies, and gender studies. Critical security studies provided the initial impetus for the redefinition of ‘security’ with its challenging of the state as its referent object. The Copenhagen School then built on this idea through two distinct contributions. The first is the role that Barry Buzan’s sectoral analysis of security plays, in conjunction with Arnold Wolfers’ definition of security as “the absence of threats to acquired values,” in establishing the notion of security’s association with non-military topic areas. The second is Ole Waever’s treatment of security issues as speech-acts (‘securitization’). Gender studies then joins the discourse, suggesting that as an academic discipline, International Relations (IR) shift away from focusing solely on state actors. The ‘human security’ debate within IR academia thus conceives of a mutual relationship between gender and security. This has extended conceptions of security from the state to the individual and downplayed the traditionally military focus associated with the notion of security. (United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994 – New Dimensions of Human Security* (March 16, 1994), available at http://www.hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr\_1994\_en\_complete\_nostats.pdf; Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1991); Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,” *Political Science Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (1952): 485; Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1998)) [↑](#footnote-ref-481)
482. Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), *Theories of International Relations* (5th ed.) (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 241. [↑](#footnote-ref-482)
483. See Footnote 424, above. (Chapter 7, “Media Coverage of Terrorism Places States and Terrorists on the Same Level” (Page 164)). [↑](#footnote-ref-483)
484. The assumption that is specifically relevant here is the idea that the nature of state decision-making is not unitary, and therefore not necessarily rational. See Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997): 513-553. [↑](#footnote-ref-484)
485. See Tony Shaw, and Denise J. Youngblood, “Cold War Sport, Film, and Propaganda: A Comparative Analysis of the Superpowers.” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 19, no. 1 (2017): 160-192.) [↑](#footnote-ref-485)
486. W. Scott Lucas, “Beyond Diplomacy: Propaganda and the History of the Cold War.” In Gary D. Rawnsley (ed.), *Cold-War Propaganda in the 1950s.* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999):11-30. [↑](#footnote-ref-486)
487. See Richard Stites, “Heaven and Hell: Soviet Propaganda Constructs the World.” In Rawnsley, *Cold-War Propaganda in the 1950s*, 85-104, and Michael Nelson, *War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War.* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997). [↑](#footnote-ref-487)
488. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Frequently Asked Questions on International Law Aspects of Countering Terrorism* (2009), available from unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/FAQ/English.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-488)
489. Gillian Youngs, “Media and Mediation in the ‘War on Terror’: Issues and Challenges,” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 2, no. 1 (2009): 99. See Chapter 5, “The Media and Political Communication” (Pages 108-111). [↑](#footnote-ref-489)
490. Notable examples of this type of scholarship include Mary Kaldor’s New Wars Theory, and Frank Hoffman’s conception of hybrid wars. Kaldor argues that the increase in globalization experienced in the years leading up to the turn of the century created a new type of organized violence that world leaders do not understand. (This begets her inauguration of the term “new wars”: conflicts that increasingly rely on tactics associated with asymmetrical warfare, amalgamate resources from both within and outside state borders, and ultimately center on identity politics rather than ideology or territory.) Frank Hoffman makes similar arguments in advancing his conceptualization of “hybrid wars”: conflicts “conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors [that incorporate] … a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.” (Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars* (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 1999): 2; Frank Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007): 14.) [↑](#footnote-ref-490)
491. See Chapter 5, “The Symbiosis between Terrorism and the Mass Media” (Pages 96-107). [↑](#footnote-ref-491)
492. I identify definitional element 19 as presenting with a recurrence frequency of 66% in the context of the media coverage of terrorism that comprises my sampling frame. See “Terrorism Manifests in Opposition to State Authority” (Pages 144-148), above. [↑](#footnote-ref-492)
493. Robert O. Keohane argues that “reneging on commitments has consequences for [a state’s] reputation only when a limiting set of conditions is met.” To that end, he quotes Philip Heymann, noting that “[A]ny violation must be known; it must be known by a party whose reactions to the violation are important to the violator; and the expected costs of violation to the violator must exceed the benefits of giving in to the conflicting temptation.” Philip B. Heymann, “The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules,” *Harvard Law Review* 86, no. 797 (1973): 822-823, cited in Robert O. Keohane, “International relations and international law: two optics.” In Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World* (London: Routledge, 2002): 117-131. [↑](#footnote-ref-493)
494. Here, I lower the inclusion threshold from 50 percent to 20 percent because no definitional elements are present in more than 50 percent of the public figures’ statements analyzed. [↑](#footnote-ref-494)
495. Analysis of the overlap between the way that state policy definition of terrorism and the manner that state officials’ statements implicitly define terrorism results in the elimination of Element [4] - *physical injury; homicide; death of a victim*, which recurs with a frequency of 24% in the context of the statements analyzed, when the question of their overlap with the definitions of terrorism put forward in the relevant countries’ legislation is not taken into account. [↑](#footnote-ref-495)
496. See Appendix G for an in-depth comparison of 34 countries’ state practice definitions of terrorism with their counterparts in states’ domestic legislation. [↑](#footnote-ref-496)
497. This means that my original *de minimis* policy definition of terrorism, which included 10 definitional elements on the basis of a 50-percent inclusion threshold, expands to include 21 definitional elements for the purposes of this analysis. [↑](#footnote-ref-497)
498. These 18 elements are definitional elements [4] – *physical injury; homicide; death of a victim*; [14] – *intention; the deliberate, purposive taking of action*; [2] – *destruction of, or damage to property*; [15] – *influence decision-makers’ taking of action, or a failure to take action*; [6] – *intimidation*; [21] – *criminal; unlawful*; [7] – *threat*; [11] – *groups, associations, movements*; [16] – *political*; [5] – *fear, terror*; [23] – *security*; [3] – *damage of, or destruction to the environment*; [12] – *premeditated , planned, organized action*; [25] – *sovereignty*; [1] – *use of force, violence*; [20] – *incitement*; [17] – *religious*; [9] – *coercion, extortion*. [↑](#footnote-ref-498)
499. These 13 elements are definitional elements [2] – *destruction of, or damage to property*; [19] – *publicity, propaganda*; [4] – *physical injury; homicide; death of a victim*; [14] – *intention; the deliberate, purposive taking of action*; [7] – *threat*; [25] – *sovereignty*; [10] – *arbitrariness, unpredictability*; [22] – *symbolism*; [20] – *incitement*; [6] – *intimidation*; [12] – *premeditated , planned, organized action*; [16] – *political*; [18] – *ideological*. [↑](#footnote-ref-499)
500. Kevin G. Barnhurst, “The Literature of Terrorism.” In A. Odasuo Alali and Kenoye Kelvin Eke (eds.), *Media Coverage of Terrorism: Methods of Diffusion*. (Newbury Park: Sage Publications Inc., 1991): 115-119; See Chapter 5, “The Symbiosis between Terrorism and the Mass Media” (Pages 96-107). [↑](#footnote-ref-500)
501. David L. Paletz and John Boiney, “Researchers’ Perspectives.” In David L. Paletz and Alex P. Schmid (eds.), *Terrorism and the Media*. (Newbury Park: Sage Publications Inc., 1992): 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-501)
502. Kevin G. Barnhurst, “The Literature of Terrorism.” In A. Odasuo Alali and Kenoye Kelvin Eke (eds.), *Media Coverage of Terrorism: Methods of Diffusion* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications Inc., 1991): 115-119. [↑](#footnote-ref-502)
503. Jean-Paul Marthoz and Mirta Lourenço (ed.), *Terrorism and the Media: A Handbook for Journalists* (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 2017): 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-503)
504. Marthoz and Lourenço, *Terrorism and the Media*, 46-48. [↑](#footnote-ref-504)
505. Marthoz and Lourenço, *Terrorism and the Media*, 54-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-505)
506. Marthoz and Lourenço, *Terrorism and the Media*, 54. [↑](#footnote-ref-506)
507. This is exceptionally evident in the handbook’s list of “Essential reading on terrorism and media.” Of the eighteen books listed, only two are published by a university-affiliated publisher. Moreover, all but three of the authors listed are journalists, or affiliated with organizations that focus on journalism and the production of media coverage. See Marthoz and Lourenço, *Terrorism and the Media*, 109-110. [↑](#footnote-ref-507)
508. Marthoz mentions the Al Jazeera style guide in the context of the debate about journalist use of the term ‘jihad’ in framing terrorism. See Marthoz and Lourenço, *Terrorism and the Media*, 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-508)
509. Yonah Alexander, “Terrorism and the Media: Some Considerations.”In Lewis M. Alexander (ed.), *Terrorism: Theory and Practice.* (London: Routledge, 1979): 159-174. [↑](#footnote-ref-509)
510. Marthoz and Lourenço, *Terrorism and the Media,* 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-510)
511. Josef Jařab, “Draft Recommendation: Media and Terrorism.” *Report to the Committee on Culture, Science and Education*. May 20 2005. http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=10914&lang=EN (accessed March 22, 2023). [↑](#footnote-ref-511)
512. Jařab, “Draft Recommendation: Media and Terrorism.” [↑](#footnote-ref-512)
513. Jařab, “Draft Recommendation: Media and Terrorism.” [↑](#footnote-ref-513)
514. J.M. Berger, “The Evolution of Terrorist Propaganda: The Paris Attack and Social Media.” *Testimony Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs.* January 27, 2015. https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-evolution-of-terrorist-propaganda-the-paris-attack-and-social-media/ (accessed March 22, 2023). [↑](#footnote-ref-514)
515. Berger, “The Evolution of Terrorist Propaganda: The Paris Attack and Social Media.” [↑](#footnote-ref-515)
516. Michael B. Munnik, “What Style Guides Tell Secular Journalists about Muslims and Islam.” *Journal of Religion, Media and Digital Culture* (2023): 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-516)
517. Munnik, “What Style Guides Tell Secular Journalists about Muslims and Islam,” 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-517)
518. Deborah Cameron, *Verbal Hygiene* (London: Routledge, 1996): 60. As cited in Munnik, “What Style Guides Tell Secular Journalists about Muslims and Islam,” 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-518)
519. Cameron, *Verbal Hygeine,* 60. [↑](#footnote-ref-519)
520. Munnik, “What Style Guides Tell Secular Journalists about Muslims and Islam,” 6; Fred Vultee, “‘Fatwa on the Bunny’: News Language and the Creation of Meaning About the Middle East.” *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 30, no. 4 (2006): 452-461. [↑](#footnote-ref-520)
521. Munnik, “What Style Guides Tell Secular Journalists about Muslims and Islam,” 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-521)
522. See Agence France-Presse, *Abécédaire de l'AFP.* (Paris: Victoires Editions, 2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-522)
523. International Press Telecommunications Council, “NewsCodes: Controlled Vocabularies for the Media,” IPTC, September 21, 2002. https://iptc.org/standards/newscodes/. [↑](#footnote-ref-523)
524. International Press Telecommunications Council, “NewsCodes.”; Michael B. Palmer, “News Technology: All Together?; On the News Front – “Yes” and “No”.” In Michael B. Palmer, *International News Agencies: A History.* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019): 232. [↑](#footnote-ref-524)
525. The IPTC Subject Codes define ‘crime, law and justice’ as “[t]he establishment and/or statement of the rules of behaviour in society, the enforcement of these rules, breaches of the rules, the punishment of offenders and the organisations and bodies involved in these activities.” The IPTC defines ‘unrest, conflicts and war’ as “[a]cts of socially or politically motivated protest and/or violence.” Moreover, the IPTC Subject Codes situate ‘bioterrorism,’ originally defined as “[u]se of biological agent to raise the level of fear within a population, whether deaths occur or not”, under ‘guerilla activity (“[a]nti-government actions by clandestine groups using hit-and-run techniques or sabotage, kidnapping and the like”), which is a different subdivision of the ‘unrest, conflicts and war’ categorization. Please note that since 2010, the IPTC has advocated for the use of Media Topic NewsCodes to replace its original Subject Codes. (See International Press Telecommunications Council, “NewsCodes.”) International Press Telecommunications Council, “NewsCodes Concept: Terrorism,” IPTC, July 10, 2012. http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/subjectcode/02001010; International Press Telecommunications Council, “NewsCodes Concept: Crime, Law and Justice,” IPTC, December 15, 2010. http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/subjectcode/02000000; International Press Telecommunications Council, “NewsCodes Concept: Act of Terror,” IPTC, December 15, 2010. http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/subjectcode/160010000; International Press Telecommunications Council, “NewsCodes Concept: Unrest, Conflicts and War,” IPTC, December 15, 2010. http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/subjectcode/16000000; International Press Telecommunications Council, “NewsCodes Concept: Bioterrorism,” IPTC, July 10, 2012. http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/subjectcode/16005001; International Press Telecommunications Council, “NewsCodes Concept: Guerilla Activity,” IPTC, July 10, 2012. http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/subjectcode/16005000. [↑](#footnote-ref-525)
526. The IPTC conceives of ‘conflict, war and peace’ as “[a]cts of socially or politically motivated protest or violence, military activities, geopolitical conflicts, as well as resolution efforts.” International Press Telecommunications Council, “NewsCodes Concept: Conflict, War and Peace,” IPTC, February 18, 2021. http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/mediatopic/16000000. [↑](#footnote-ref-526)
527. The International Press Telecommunications Council, “NewsCodes Concept: Bioterrorism,” IPTC, February 18, 2021. http://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/mediatopic/16005001. [↑](#footnote-ref-527)
528. Michael Palmer, “‘PRESS on the appropriate button in the reader’s mind’: News agencies cover terrorism.” *Global Media and Communication* 7, no. 3 (2011): 258. [↑](#footnote-ref-528)
529. Reuters, “The Reuters Style Guide.” *Handbook of Journalism.* Canary Wharf: Reuters News Agency, 2008. Thomson-Reuters Corporation. http://handbook.reuters.com/index.php. (Accessed June 22 2020). [↑](#footnote-ref-529)
530. Reuters, “The Reuters Style Guide.” [↑](#footnote-ref-530)
531. The AP style guide contains entries for no less than 13 terrorist organizations: al-Qaida, Abu Sayyaf, Al-Shabbab, Boko Haram, Fatah, Hamas, the Haqqani network, Hezbollah, the Irish Republican Army/Provisional Irish Republican Army/Sinn Fein, the Islamic State group, Jemaah Islamiyah, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and the Taliban. Moreover, the guide also contains an entry for Osama bin Laden, and five entries that specifically relate to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States: One World Trade Center; World Trade Center; Sept. 11, Sept. 11 Memorial; 9/11; and Twin Towers. Notwithstanding, the only explicit mention of terrorism occurs in the context of the style guide entry for “9/11” reads “For the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 9/11 is acceptable in all references.” Associated Press, *The Associated Press Stylebook (53rd ed.).* (New York: Basic Books, 2018): 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-531)
532. Associated Press, *The Associated Press Stylebook,* 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-532)
533. Associated Press, *The Associated Press Stylebook*, 158; 387-388; Reuters, “The Reuters Style Guide.” [↑](#footnote-ref-533)
534. Reuters, “The Reuters Style Guide.” [↑](#footnote-ref-534)
535. As mentioned above, the AP style guide does mention pejorative descriptive terms including guerilla, fundamentalist, radical, jihadist and Islamist, even going as far as to designate select words “non-preferred terms.” See Associated Press, *The Associated Press Stylebook*, 580. [↑](#footnote-ref-535)
536. See The International Press Telecommunications Council, “NewsCodes Scheme (Controlled Vocabulary),” IPTC. https://cv.iptc.org/newscodes/mediatopic/ (accessed March 25, 2023). [↑](#footnote-ref-536)
537. See Table 7-4 (Chapter 7, “Media Coverage of Terrorism Places States and Terrorists on the Same Level.”) [↑](#footnote-ref-537)
538. Reuters, “The Reuters Style Guide.” [↑](#footnote-ref-538)
539. Associated Press, *The Associated Press Stylebook*, 524. [↑](#footnote-ref-539)
540. Agence France-Presse, “AFP Editorial Standards and Best Practices,” AFP, June 22, 2016. https://www.afp.com/sites/default/files/\_afp\_ethic\_mars\_2023.pdf (accessed March 25, 2023). [↑](#footnote-ref-540)
541. See Chapter 7, “Media Coverage of Terrorism Places States and Terrorists on the Same Level” (Pages 154-167). [↑](#footnote-ref-541)
542. Associated Press, *The Associated Press Stylebook* 509-522. [↑](#footnote-ref-542)
543. J.K. Rowling*, Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone* (London: Bloomsbury, 1997): 240. [↑](#footnote-ref-543)
544. Rowling, *Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone*, 240. [↑](#footnote-ref-544)
545. Richard Jackson, “Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies,” *European Political Science* 6, no. 3 (2007): 244-251. [↑](#footnote-ref-545)
546. Boaz Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle* (Herzliya: Transaction Publishers, 2005): 1-16. [↑](#footnote-ref-546)
547. Fiona de Londras, “Terrorism as an international crime,” in William A Schabas and Nadia Bernaz (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law* (London: Routledge, 2010): 168. [↑](#footnote-ref-547)
548. Rowling, *Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone*, 240. [↑](#footnote-ref-548)
549. Refer back to Footnote 15 (Chapter 1, Page 9) for clarification as to my use of the term International Relations (or IR) to refer to the academic discipline, and ‘international relations’ to describe real-world conduct and policies. [↑](#footnote-ref-549)
550. Kevin G. Barnhurst, “The Literature of Terrorism.” In A. Odasuo Alali and Kenoye Kelvin Eke (eds.), *Media Coverage of Terrorism: Methods of Diffusion*. (Newbury Park: Sage Publications Inc., 1991): 115-119. [↑](#footnote-ref-550)
551. Paul Wilkinson, “The Media and Terrorism: A Reassessment,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 2 (1997): 51. For further analysis of the relationship between the media coverage of terrorist activity, see Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982); Richard Clutterbuck, *The Media and Political Violence* (London: Macmillan, 1981); Abraham Miller (ed.), *Terror, the Media and the Law* (Dobbs Ferry: Transaction, 1982). [↑](#footnote-ref-551)
552. Munnik, “What Style Guides Tell Secular Journalists about Muslims and Islam,” 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-552)
553. Marthoz and Lourenço, *Terrorism and the Media*, 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-553)
554. Agence France-Presse, “AFP Editorial Standards and Best Practices,” 9; Marthoz and Lourenço, *Terrorism and the Media*, 66; 87. [↑](#footnote-ref-554)
555. Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle*, 237. [↑](#footnote-ref-555)
556. Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn, *The Theatre of Terror: The Mass Media and International Terrorism* (New York: Longman Publishing/Addison-Wesley, 1993): 295; Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle*, 238. [↑](#footnote-ref-556)
557. Jacqui Ewart, Kate O’Donnell and April Chrzanowski, “What a Difference Training Can Make: Impacts of Targeted Training on Journalists, Journalism Educators and Journalism Students’ Knowledge of Islam and Muslims.” *Journalism* 19, no. 6 (2017): 762-781. [↑](#footnote-ref-557)
558. Nick Davies, *Flat Earth News.* (London: Chatto and Windus, 2008): 101-105. [↑](#footnote-ref-558)
559. Michael Palmer and Jérémie Nicey, “Social Media and the Freedom of the Press: A Long-term Perspective from within International News Agencies (AFP, Reuters).” *Journal for Communication Studies* 5, no. 1 (2012): 112; Palmer, “‘PRESS on the appropriate button in the reader’s mind’”, 258. [↑](#footnote-ref-559)
560. See Chapter 2, “Identifying Bias” (Pages 26-29). [↑](#footnote-ref-560)
561. Edward Behr, *Anyone Here Been Raped and Speaks English?* (London: New English Library Ltd., 1985): 103. [↑](#footnote-ref-561)
562. See Chapter 7, “Media Coverage of Terrorism Places States and Terrorists on the Same Level” (Pages 154-167). [↑](#footnote-ref-562)
563. Yiwei Luo, Dallas Card, and Dan Jurafsky, “Detecting Stance in Media on Global Warming.” *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2020*: 3296-3315. [↑](#footnote-ref-563)
564. Alex P. Schmid, Albert Jongman and Michael Stohl. *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature.* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988). [↑](#footnote-ref-564)
565. Alex P. Schmid. “Terrorism – The Definitional Problem.” *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 2, no. 26 (2004): 382. [↑](#footnote-ref-565)
566. Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler. “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 4 (2004): 777-794. [↑](#footnote-ref-566)