

**On the Manifestation and Reproduction of
the Discordant Social Dynamics of Elitism**
a Case Study of The Canadian Airborne Regiment

**sur la manifestation et la reproduction des
dynamiques sociales discordantes d'élitisme**
une étude de cas du Régiment aéroporté du Canada

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This dissertation is dedicated to my children Carli, Allison and Cameron and my partner Kelly and my bonus daughter Madison.

And to all those who have served their country honourably in the armed forces, emergency services and any other capacity where they put their life on the line, living with being second-guessed and giving far more than they receive. Especially, to those who served with honour, integrity, courage and distinction in the Canadian Airborne Regiment over its quarter century of existence.

*It is not the critic who counts
the credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena
Whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood
Who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again
And who at the worst, if he fails
At least fails while daring greatly*

Theodore Roosevelt, 1910

Abstract

The hypothesis is that elitism, as defined in a way that recognizes the dysfunctional connotations of this concept, fosters discordant social dynamics including norms and social capital that are deleterious to any institution. Elitism is a set of behaviours and attitudes built around an individual or group engaged in self-granting and self-promoting elite status, essentially a dysfunctional way to promote and protect this status. This inquiry draws on Pierre Bourdieu's conception of habitus which offers a powerful context to explain the social dynamics of elitism. The Canadian Airborne Regiment is used as a case study to examine military elitism at an institutional level. Potential empirical indicators of elitism are identified in a review of the literature, resulting in the creation of an analytical grid that was applied to witness testimony from the public inquiry held in relation to the Regiment's deployment to Somalia in 1992. Testing and validating the analytic grid of key variables and empirical indicators of elitism confirmed three major themes along with corresponding dispositions representing deeply ingrained mindsets and practices that facilitate the manifestation and reproduction of elitism. These dispositions provide significant insight into how elitism is manifested, maintained and regulated within an institution.

Résumé

L'hypothèse est que l'élitisme, défini de manière les connotations dysfonctionnelles liées au concept, engendre des dynamiques sociales négatives, incluant des normes et un capital social délétères à n'importe quelle institution. L'élitisme est un ensemble de comportement et d'attitudes constituées autour d'une personne ou d'un groupe qui fait une autopromotion et une auto-attribution d'un statut d'élite. Par-là, essentiellement, elles protègent et font la promotion de ce statut. La présente enquête emprunte le concept d'habitus développé par Pierre Bourdieu pour expliquer le contexte car il donne un contexte significatif aux dynamiques sociales de l'élitisme. Le Régiment aéroporté canadien est utilisé comme étude de cas pour examiner l'élitisme militaire à une échelle institutionnelle. Des indicateurs empiriques potentiels sont identifiés à travers une analyse documentaire qui résulte en une grille analytique appliquée aux témoignages tenus lors de l'enquête publique sur le déploiement du Régiment en Somalie en 1992. L'évaluation et la validation des variables clefs et des indicateurs empiriques confirment trois thèmes majeurs et des dispositions correspondantes qui représentent des schèmes de pensée et des pratiques qui manifestent et reproduisent l'élitisme. Ces dispositions permettent des percées considérables sur la manière dont l'élitisme se manifeste, est maintenu et contrôlé dans une institution.

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Dr. Bernd Horn, from whom I learned you can have great affection for your Regiment and at the same time have the integrity and courage to subject it to scrutiny.

And most importantly, to my family for their love and support.

Abbreviations

AIC	Airborne Indoctrination Course
2IC	Second-in-command
BGen	Brigadier General
BOI	Military Board of Inquiry
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
Capt	Captain
CDO	Commando (1,2 or 3)
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CFAO	Canadian Forces Administrative Orders
CMAC	Court Martial Appeal Court
CMCRB	Canadian Military Colleges Review Board
CO	Commanding Officer
Col	Colonel
CANSOFCOM	Canadian Special Operations Forces Command
CARBG	Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group
Cdn AB Regt	Canadian Airborne Regiment
Cpl	Corporal
CSM	Company Sergeant Major
CSOR	Canadian Special Operations Regiment
FMC	Force Mobile Command
JAG	Judge Advocate General
LCol	Lieutenant Colonel
LGen	Lieutenant General
Maj	Major
MCpl	Master Corporal
MGen	Major General
MP	Military Police
MPUI	Military Police Unusual Incident Report
MWO	Master Warrant Officer
NDA	National Defence Act
OC	Officer Commanding
PPCLI	Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
PPN	Parallel power network
R22R	Royal 22 nd Regiment
RCR	Royal Canadian Regiment
RMC	Royal Military College of Canada
RSM	Regimental Sergeant Major
SAS	Special Air Service
Sgt	Sergeant
SOF	Special Operations Forces

Abbreviations (cont.)

SSF	Special Service Force
UN	United Nations
WO	Warrant Officer
WOS	Wall of silence

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter 1 – Literature Review/Introduction to Habitus	9
Habitus	12
Elitism from an Anthropological Perspective	20
Egalitarianism and Meritocracy	27
Elitism as Political Power and Influence	33
Formal Knowledge Based Elitism	36
Institutional Elitism	42
Discussion of Literature Review	52
Chapter 2 – Institutional Particularities of the Military	56
Militarism	56
Civil Military Relations	58
The Regimental System	61
The Canadian Airborne Regiment	64
The Hewson Report & DeFaye Board of Inquiry	66
Winslow’s Socio-cultural Inquiry	69
The Somalia Mission – Operation Deliverance	72
Aggression During Somalia Mission	74
Disbandment/Findings of the Somalia Commission	76
Military Institutions and Elite Status	77
Discussion	81
Chapter 3 – Conceptual Framework	87
Defiance to Authority	87
Oppositional/Discordant Habitus	88
Relationship to Outside World	91
Analytical Model of Elitism	95
Chapter 4 – Case Study: The Canadian Airborne Regiment	97
The Selection of Case Study Methodology.....	100
Development of an Analytical Grid	104
Defiance to Authority	108

Chapter 4 – Case Study (cont.)

Blatant Disrespect / Ignoring Rules 108
Oppositional/Discordant Habitus 114
Parallel Power Network 115
Wall of Silence 121
Relationship to Outside World 127
Myopic Habitus 127
Protecting/Favouring Own 141
The Bad Apple Syndrome 150
Perception of Elite 154
Resistance to Change & Legitimizing Myths 159
Accountability 162
Re-alignment of Analytical Grid 172
Criminal and Aberrant Behaviour 173
Elitism and Aggression During the Somalia Mission 175
Observations Regarding the Public Inquiry Process 179

Chapter 5 – Findings 182

Defiance to Authority - Disrespect / Ignoring Rules..... 183
Discordant Habitus - Parallel Power Network 185
Discordant Habitus - Wall of Silence 186
Relationship to Outside World 187
The Bad Apple Syndrome 190
The Indicators of Elitism Distilled into Dispositions..... 191
Promotional Dimension of the Social Capital of Elitism 191
Managing the Social Capital of Elitism 193
Implicit Rules of the Social Capital Expenditure 195

Chapter 6 – Conclusion 199

The Case Study of the Canadian Airborne Regiment 201
Areas for Future Research 202

Bibliography 206

Appendix A – Volumes of Somalia Transcripts Analyzed 220

List of Figures

Figure 1	
Phases of Progression – Social Legitimization of Elite Status	85
Figure 2	
Elitism and Power in the Priesthood	93
Figure 3	
Analytical Grid of Core Variables & Empirical Indicators of Elitism	105
Figure 4	
The Dispositions of Elitism Distilled from the Case Study	198

List of Tables

Table 1

Timeline of Significant Events Discussed During Testimony 107

Table 2

Timeline of Events of Oct 2-5, 1992 162

Table 3

Timeline of Testimony Leading up to Somalia Inquiry 180

The most intriguing aspect of elite status is that at first glance, the concept does not necessarily appear to be problematic from a normative standpoint, especially when evocative of excelling in one's field or in some manner being the best of the best or the most successful. For example, the elite status of professional athletes is based on empirically verifiable skill and achievement, and there are many other instances in life where individuals excel and are accorded special status based on intellect, skill, or some other impressive ability, even if it requires a more subjective assessment. Elite status must be granted and recognized by others, as such it is negotiated socially. When elite status is negotiated socially to provide some form of social privileges, it becomes a social construct with the potential to justify certain forms of power relationships with others. It is in this context that the associated notion of elitism emerges, as a power relationship justification. Power can be used in a detrimental way, and being part of an elite can be viewed as inimical when it becomes associated with elitism and more specifically when attitudes and behaviours do not correlate with skill and ability.¹ The dysfunctional connotations of elitism become more visible when power and privilege is sought by invoking being part of an elite group while its empirical reality could be construed as socially questionable.

For example the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is described by Justice Arbour as "one of the country's most prestigious organizations," yet years of reviews and ostensible culture change programmes is evidence of significant concerns related to dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours leading to misconduct.² The Arbour report was preceded by a series of investigations, including a 2015 review into sexual misconduct and harassment and a 2017 Special Staff Visit to the Royal Military College of Canada. As such, deleterious behaviour within the CAF has kept the organization in the spotlight.³ These reviews highlight misconduct and most recently make an explicit reference to elitism as well as implicit connections between elitism and the issue of how power is generated and used in the military. The report of the Canadian Military

¹ Eric Carlton, *The Few and the Many: A Typology of Elites* (New York: Routledge, 1996).

² Louise Arbour, *Report of the Independent External Comprehensive Review of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 2022), 1. In an address to the Officers' Mess of the Black Watch (RHR) of Canada on October 23, 2023 Justice Arbour revealed the government initially asked her to conduct a "culture review" but she advised that was outside her expertise.

³ Markie Deschamps, *External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 2015.) Department of National Defence, *Report on the Climate, Training, Environment, Culture and Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada – Kingston* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 2017.) The Special Staff Assistance Visit report indicates their mission was to "uncover the legitimate and accurate foundation of the reality of the existing culture" experienced by students at RMC," ii.

Colleges Review Board (CRCRB) found graduates had a “reputation for arrogance or a lack of humility.”⁴

The linkages between elitism and power, especially within institutions with more rigid authority structures such as what is found in armed forces, has received only limited attention from students of military affairs. In the case of the CAF for instance, the problem of elitism was identified during a programme review of the Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) delivered at the Royal Military College of Canada. The review was initiated in June 2024 by the Commander of the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) who indicates he was directed to address the “toxic elitism” at the Canadian Military Colleges and “mitigate against lingering elitist attitudes” of Canadian military college graduates.⁵ Yet, in the end, elitism only received perfunctory attention, the concept has yet to be explored in-depth or in a sustained manner to explain dysfunctional dynamics identified within the CAF.

It is in this context that this inquiry will explore and identify the characteristics and qualitative indicators of elitism and elite status which will be contrasted with the corresponding impact on military institutions, anticipating that the results could be extrapolated to other types of institutions. With limited research regarding the implications of elitism, it is difficult to explain military elitism holistically and analytically beyond specific case studies having a myriad of unique explanations. This is exacerbated by the fact that elitism and its cognates elite and elitist have a variety of meanings and contexts (not all of which are dysfunctional) which are often not differentiated when the concept is being discussed. To provide empirical grounding to this research on elitism, the case of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (Cdn AB Regt), leading to its disbandment in disgrace, will be used to identify attitudes, dynamics and behaviours within a military institution where elite status has long been socially associated with the Regiment and its members. Although the case study will explore elitism in the context of the Cdn AB Regt, social posturing of elite status is hypothesized as being intended to reinforce power, privilege and advantage as a phenomenon that can present itself in any institution. This inquiry into institutional elitism seeks also to bring a previously unexplored dimension to the analysis of dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours that culminated in the disbandment of the Cdn AB Regt.

In Canada, the limited academic research and writing on military elitism includes a monograph and articles on military elites authored by Horn, a military historian and former senior officer in the Regiment. Horn is also the most prolific and assiduous writer on the Cdn AB Regt and related topics, hence he is referenced more often than other authors. There are several points in the historical chronology of the Regiment that can be compared as discipline, leadership, and the ostensible elite status were examined in a Force Mobile Command (FMC) study in 1985, a post-Somalia military Board of Inquiry (BOI),

⁴ Department of National Defence, *Report of the Canadian Military Colleges Review Board* (Ottawa: King’s Printer, January 2025).

⁵ Dennis O’Reilly, Office of the Commander Canadian Defence Academy, “Commander CDA Directive Programme Review of the Regular Officer Training Plan at the Canadian Military Colleges,” April 11, 2024.

a public Commission of Inquiry as well as several substantive books.⁶ Because this dissertation will argue that elitism was the overarching causal factor behind the dysfunction within the Regiment, this necessitates exploring and evaluating various accounts that isolate leadership and discipline problems as the broad explanation. Horn is the only author to acknowledge and attempt to understand some connotation of elitism as a significant causal factor in the dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours that led to the Regiment's demise.⁷ Following the unlawful killings in Somalia and the ensuing scandal, a limited number of authors including Bercuson and Winslow explored some of the factors related to the domains of military history, defence policy and social anthropology. These approaches and the corresponding analysis and conclusions leave room for further enhancement using sociological theory and qualitative analysis.

With regards to elitism in military organizations, Horn notes that the concept of a military elite refers to a "select minority that hold special status and privilege," and asserts that a military elite is determined by "the relationship of a given group within its own institution."⁸ Horn's reference to status and privilege infers such elites possess some kind of special power when compared to others within the same institution. To understand status, power and privilege the Catholic Church is a good comparator in that it remains a powerful and influential institution within many societies, with ordained priests having the unique power that can be summarized as being the sole purveyors and interpreters of God's word, church teachings, and overall being above reproach by unordained laypersons.⁹ While some regard the priesthood as an elite brotherhood of the cloth it also has a long history of at times failing to live up to institutional and societal expectations in the form of clericalism, which begs the question of where and how things continue to go wrong. Attributing deleterious behaviours and acts to 'bad apples' and individual failings in oversight within the church provides an analysis that is incomplete and ultimately insufficient. In

⁶ C.W. Hewson. *Mobile Command Study. A Report on Disciplinary Infractions and Antisocial Behaviour Within FMC with Particular Reference to the Special Service Force and the Canadian Airborne Regiment* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 26 September 1985); De Faye, Thomas F. *Board of Inquiry Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1993); and *Dishonoured Legacy*. Significant works that explore the Canadian Airborne Regiment include: Bernd Horn *Bastard Sons: An Examination of Canada's Airborne Experience* (St. Catherines: Vanwell Publishing, 2001); David Bercuson *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the murder in Somalia* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1996); Donna Winslow *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia – A Socio-Cultural Inquiry* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997); Dan Loomis *The Somalia Affair* (Ottawa: DGL Publications, 1996).

⁷ Bernd Horn, "The Dark Side to Elites: Elitism as a Catalyst for Disobedience," *The Canadian Army Journal* 8 no. 4, 2005; *Military Elites* (Winnipeg: 17 Wing Publishing Office, 2020).

⁸ Horn, *Military Elites*, 4-5.

⁹ Vivencio O. Ballano, "Catholic Clerical Celibacy and Bourdieu's Theory of Practice: Analyzing Ecclesial Structures Supporting Mandatory Celibacy," *The International Journal of Religion and Spirituality in Society* 11, no. 1, (2021): 211-226.

a similar vein, when the Commander of the Special Service Force (SSF) announced preparations for the disbandment of the Cdn AB Regt, he made an analogous assertion that “the acts of a few individuals which led to the Regiment’s disbandment” were not a reflection of most members.¹⁰

This dissertation will contribute new knowledge and an enhanced understanding of the social dynamics of elitism. For example, a phenomenon that will be explored both in the literature and the case study has been variously referred to as the parallel chain of command and an informal, unofficial or parallel leadership structure. Numerous authors and the Somalia Commission acknowledge the existence of this phenomenon and recognize it as an oppositional or subversive social dynamic. Horn asserts that a “pool of soldiers labelled as cowboys and ill-disciplined began to collect within the Regiment,” and notes that in the mid 1980s the concept of an “unofficial chain of command” or “parallel command structure” made up primarily of junior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) at the Master Corporal rank surfaced.¹¹ The Hewson Report uses the paradoxical phrase “informal leaders” when referring to this subversive group, and a decade later in his testimony before the Somalia Commission, MGen Hewson continues to refer to this group as “informal leaders” who were not up to the challenge of their role.¹² The De Faye BOI held after the Regiment’s return from Somalia describes an “informal group” of junior-ranked soldiers who posed “a direct challenge to authority.”¹³ Horn refers to a USSCOM commander who describes a similar situation featuring “a disordered loyalty to an individual or team.”¹⁴ Siver examines the Cdn AB Regt’s deployment to Somalia and correlates aspects of junior leadership in 2 Commando (2 CDO) to an “inability to reign in a countercultural unit subculture” that she observes was virtually impenetrable.¹⁵ The numerous references to a parallel command structure and misplaced or disordered loyalty identify a concept requiring further examination as there has been no in-depth exploration of this phenomenon including how it was able to manifest and how it was socially justified by elitism.

Horn affirms the significance of a connotation of elitism as a causal factor in the Regiment’s demise when he characterizes members of the Regiment as “self-selecting, young, aggressive soldiers imbued with a sense of elitism and

¹⁰ BGen N.B. Jeffries letter dated 16Feb95, in Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 244, footnote 70.

This assertion is important, because it can be inferred Jeffries is pinpointing the unlawful killings in Somalia as the significant factor. A more panoptic assessment must appraise attitudes and behaviours from the 1980s onwards and consider all deleterious incidents leading up to Somalia.

¹¹ Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 170-71.

¹² Somalia Commission, *Dishonoured Legacy - Evidentiary Transcripts*, Vol 2, Testimony of MGen Conrad Hewson, October 3, 1995.

¹³ Somalia Commission, *Dishonoured Legacy*, 403.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 44.

¹⁵ Christi Leigh Siver, *The Dark Side of the Band of Brothers: Explaining Unit Participation in War Crimes*. (PhD diss., University of Washington, 2009). Siver does not differentiate between subculture and counterculture. The former is part of what distinguishes military units from each other, the latter features norms and values antithetical to the institution.

indestructibility.”¹⁶ He observes that disobedient behaviour within the Cdn AB Regt was rooted in “a distinct non-sanctioned airborne ethos and culture” consisting of “an elitist, macho, renegade attitude,” and goes on to note that attributing the problems within the Regiment to disobedience provides a “grossly inadequate” explanation.¹⁷ In a separate analysis Horn concludes that a “complex array of factors” coalesced to breed disobedience within the Regiment, namely “a toxic mix of elitism, favouritism, personnel issues, immaturity, poor leadership, organizational defects, Army culture, misplaced loyalties, and personalities.”¹⁸

This inquiry will be distinguished by using case study methodology to explore elitism as a causal factor to dysfunctional social dynamics and also by recognizing unique institutional particularities of the military. For example, in the socio-cultural study Winslow produced for the Somalia Commission she relies heavily on ethnography, and her results are anonymized to not divulge rank, role, or length of service of the members of the Cdn AB Regiment (she also interviewed family members), all of which are important points of differentiation and social stratification in the military context. Her analysis touches on explanations and insight from multiple domains including anthropology and psychology, all of which suggest a confluence of possible explanations and factors to consider. To this point, Winslow refers to the cloture element from Gestalt psychology, predicated on the idea that it is ultimately one drop of water that causes a glass to overflow.¹⁹ Winslow emphasizes the key issue is not the drop of water in the form of an order to abuse prisoners in Somalia, but rather all of the “accumulated material” that saturates and causes a critical mass that she likens to a ticking time bomb of cumulative stress.²⁰ Despite being a predominant analysis of the culture of the Cdn AB Regt contemporaneous to their return from Somalia, Winslow’s methodology did not fully account for the unique social structure of the military and did not consider elitism as a factor, all of which lends credence to the efficacy of this inquiry and sets it apart from previous analyses. Put another way, the identified issues, attitudes and behaviours of some members of the Cdn AB Regt were merely a symptom of deeper problems within the Regiment and perhaps beyond and provide a starting point rather than a well-grounded conclusion. What has been lacking is an exposition of the social dynamics of the Regiment that contributed to the manifestation and reproduction of elitism.

There are several definitional challenges associated with the study of elitism and its cognates elite and elitist that make this inquiry highly relevant, combined with the fact that the phenomenon is very much understudied. On a

¹⁶ Horn, *Military Elites*.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 55, 63.

¹⁸ Bernd Horn. “What Did You Expect? An Examination of Disobedience in the Former Canadian Airborne Regiment, 1968-1995. In Howard G. Coombs (ed.) *The Insubordinate and the Noncompliant. Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and Disobedience, 1920 to Present*. Toronto: Dundurn, 2007.

¹⁹ Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia*, 257-58.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

broader level there is an absence of a canonical definition of elitism in academic literature, leading to wildly varying connotations of elitism. The confluence of definitions speak to the conduct and beliefs of those deemed elite, coupled with the concepts of supremacy and entitlement. Elitism is often represented and understood as attitudes and behaviours encompassing, power, influence and expectations of privilege and advantage. Some definitions of elitism also speak to pride in skill or ability and the corresponding social position the person or group occupies. Winslow explores the culture of the Cdn AB Regt to inform the Somalia Commission of Inquiry but does not explore elitism at all. Horn touches on elitism in his initial and most exhaustive examination of Canada's entire airborne experience, but is referring to paratroopers' belief that they were elite, such as when he observes they adopted "an indulgent elitism."²¹ This is consistent with definitions of elitism such as "the attitude or behaviour of a person or group who regard themselves as belonging to an elite."²² This highlights the way the term elitism is sometimes used, implying that if there is a dark side there must also be a favourable aspect to elitism. This presents two key avenues for exploration, the issue of how elite status is socially shared including the extent to which it is objectively verifiable, and whether these attitudes and behaviours are in fact problematic and how? With elitism often presented as binary and possessing both positive and negative characteristics, it confirms the need for a definition that illuminates and clearly distinguishes any deleterious or dysfunctional aspects. When elitism is defined in terms of social posturing of elite status, the definitional problem is exacerbated by conjecture surrounding elite status. This highlights the necessity of examining who, in terms of both individuals and institutions/organizations, form this select minority as distinguished from those who self-grant this status.

Horn alludes to the problem associated with the granting or self-granting of elite status when he refers to "perceived elite status," which appears to refer to self-perceived elite status as opposed to that socially granted by those outside the institution in question.²³ The reference to the role of perception as it relates to elite status speaks to the social construction of reality as outlined in the seminal work of Berger and Luckman.²⁴ How individuals present themselves to others is influenced by previous life experiences as well as social interactions during the process of collectively creating and maintaining the social structures and beliefs that shape perceptions. Others would argue, albeit to similar ends, that because actions and behaviours are guided by social norms and expectations, reality is not a social construct whereas human behaviour is. Social structures (e.g. religion) play a role in legitimizing and preserving social order and consequently shape an individual's understanding of the world.

²¹ Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 19.

²² "Elitism," Oxford Languages, retrieved from www.languages.oup.com on September 19, 2021.

²³ Horn, *Military Elites*, 52.

²⁴ Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality: a Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Doubleday, 1966).

This dissertation will not seek to define the components of an objectively verifiable elite status, instead it is an exploration of the discordant social dynamics of elitism. What distinguishes facts from “preferences, evaluations or moral attitudes” is that objective facts such as establishing what constitutes elite status requires human agreement.²⁵ This highlights the challenges of ascertaining what constitutes a military elite. Berger and Luckman note that socialization is never complete, resulting in “competing definitions of reality” that will be further explored in terms of the social posturing inherent to elitism, defined herein as a dysfunctional construct.²⁶

The discussion so far illustrates the significance of elitism and lends support to further exploration in terms of the challenges and dysfunction elitism can cause within any institution or organization. A good research question is one that is controversial, where there is a predominance of strongly held conflicting opinions surrounding an issue or event and furthered by common misconceptions regarding key facts. The research question asks: What are the aspects of an institution’s social dynamics that allow elitism to manifest and ultimately reproduce? Further questions that arise out of this include: What are the qualitative indicators of what constitutes special powers and how are these powers accorded and exerted through elitism; what attitudes and behaviours are indicative of how elitism is justified under these special powers; and finally, how are discordant social dynamics justified through elitism?

The hypothesis is that elitism, as defined in a way that recognizes the dysfunctional connotations of this concept in terms of attitudes and behaviours shared by a group and seeking to reinforce in others the perception that such group has elite status and to ultimately reinforce the group’s power, privilege and advantages provided by such status, fosters discordant social dynamics including norms and social capital that are deleterious to the institution. Elitism is a set of behaviours and attitudes built around an individual or group engaged in self-granting and self-promoting elite status, essentially a dysfunctional way to promote and protect elite status. Conversely, elite status can be earned and will then be objectively verifiable and socially accepted. With the ability to recognize the indicators of elitism and avoid the manifestation of the associated attitudes and behaviours, it should be possible for institutions to recognize and socially justify special qualities and abilities and individuals who perform consistently and predictably in ways deemed superior to other groups without permitting elitism to manifest. A further assumption is that the Cdn AB Regt was both explicitly and implicitly accepted as being elite, including by many of those who deny that was the case. As a result of the Regiment’s status being socially acknowledged, attitudes and behaviours indicative of elitism including aggressiveness, rebelliousness, and deleterious behaviour were tolerated and/or accepted as being appropriate or to be expected or even necessary. Finally, it is hypothesized that elitism modulates power, and lack of accountability and social posturing of ability were some of the privileges and advantages gained from

²⁵ John R. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 1.

²⁶ Berger and Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 135.

elitism. Simply put, the precepts of elitism enabled some less-capable soldiers and leaders to thrive, including some senior officers responsible for the Regiment at the brigade and Army headquarters level.

Chapter 1 is the literature review, commencing with definitions of elitism and elite status. This will be followed by introducing Pierre Bourdieu's conception of habitus which offers the most useful context to explain the social dynamics of elitism. Then the literature pertaining to elitism will be examined broadly at the anthropological level followed by the concepts of egalitarianism and meritocracy to determine relevance to this inquiry's conception of elitism. The inquiry will continue to narrow with the analysis of the literature pertaining to elitism as power and influence, moving on to forms of institutional elitism including formal knowledge based elitism which is often referred to as academic elitism in that it pertains to academic institutions. Finally, the literature pertaining to corporate and institutional elitism will provide insight into the blurring or crossing of ethical, regulatory and legal boundaries by corporations and other institutions including the priesthood. Chapter 2 will survey the literature pertaining to institutional particularities of the military, including militarism, civil-military relations and the regimental system. Chapter 2 will then provide the necessary background and context of the Cdn AB Regt and culminate with the exposition of elite status within military institutions. Chapter 3 is the development of a conceptual framework resulting in the deduction of an analytical model of elitism. The analysis will culminate in the identification of key themes and holes/gaps through the review of the literature as well as promising research and conceptual avenues. Chapter 4 will introduce the Cdn AB Regt as the case study of institutional elitism, including an analytical grid and some additional context for the case study. The inquiry will then proceed to the case study of elitism within the Cdn AB Regt.²⁷ This includes applying key variables and empirical indicators to determine how elitism was justified. Applying the research questions, illuminating the attributes of elitism and testing the empirical indicators will lead to the production of an analytic framework that can be applied to any institution to assess presence and degrees of elitism. Chapter 5 will present the findings and Chapter 6 is the conclusion.

²⁷ Jacques Dubois, "Pierre Bourdieu and Literature," *SubStance* 29, no. 3 (2000) : 84-102. The author notes that Bourdieu believed theory should ideally originate from case studies that cross boundaries of academic disciplines.

Chapter 1 - Literature Review and Bourdieu's Habitus

As noted in the introduction, the notion of elitism has rarely been used to examine and understand military organizational dynamics and we must first see what has more generally been covered in the literature. The following keywords were chosen for the literature search: elitism and anthropology, tribal elitism, elitism and sociology, elite status, social posturing, social positioning, social capital, cultural capital, military elites, militarism, academic elitism, corporate elitism, Icarus syndrome/paradox, egalitarianism, meritocracy, democratic elitism, habitus, and finally Bourdieu and habitus, dispositions, social agent, cultural capital, and priesthood. What is immediately apparent from the literature is that there has been a great deal written on the concept of elitism as it applies to the societal level, i.e. democratic elitism where the focus is the interplay between elitism and democratic principles with little nexus to the examination of institutions. The most recent research on elitism pertaining to institutions focuses most of the discussion on the areas of academic and corporate elitism.

Elitism is an abstraction where a full understanding is largely dependent upon both the context and the level of analysis being applied. Because there is no canonical definition of elitism, this chapter will seek to identify within the literature the general qualities and features associated with elitism at the institutional level. A search of dictionary definitions highlights the various meanings, contexts and the duality of positive and negative connotations of the term. According to the Oxford dictionary, elitism is marked by a superior attitude or behaviour associated with an individual being classified as elite and is manifested by the elite individual's dominance of a society, organization or other entity.²⁸ As such, this definition pertains to an individual who has been deemed elite. Elitism is further defined in terms of entitlement and supremacy as "the belief that certain persons or members of certain groups deserve favoured treatment by virtue of their superiority,"²⁹ while the Cambridge Dictionary adds "the belief that some things are only for a few people who have special qualities or abilities."³⁰ The Merriam-Webster definition of elitism is also predicated on the definition of an elite individual or stratum, noting "leadership or rule by an elite" and "consciousness of being or belonging to an elite."³¹ Another definition mirrors Merriam-Webster's definition with the addition of "pride" in belonging to a group already deemed elite in that they are considered "select or favoured."³² Collins Dictionary defines elitism in terms of what it means to be elitist, and

²⁸ Oxford Languages, s.v., "Elitism," Oxford Languages, retrieved from www.languages.oup.com on September 19, 2021.

²⁹ Your Dictionary, s.v., "Elitism," retrieved from www.yourdictionary.com on October 24, 2021.

³⁰ Cambridge Dictionary, s.v., "Elitism," Cambridge Dictionary, retrieved from <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/elitism> on January 14, 2022.

³¹ Merriam-Webster, s.v., "Elitism," Merriam-Webster Dictionary, retrieved from <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/elitism> on January 14, 2022.

³² Dictionary.com, s.v., "Elitism," retrieved from <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/elitism> on January 14, 2022.

notes that such “systems, practices, or ideas favour the most powerful, rich, or talented people within a group, place or society.”³³ Finally, the Macmillan Dictionary definition speaks to individuals who already occupy a favourable position as part of an elite when it defines elitism as “the belief that a small group of people who have a lot of advantages should keep the most power and influence.”³⁴ These definitions highlight the subjectivity of some of the key terms including influence, power, and talent.

A commonality amongst all these definitions is that they are predicated on the behaviour of individuals already determined to be part of an elite. Secondly, these definitions do not explicitly recognize harmful attributes of elitism. As mentioned in the Introduction, this inquiry requires definition of elitism that encompasses the social dynamics associated with this phenomenon as opposed to any positive connotations used in other contexts. To explore elitism further, it is necessary to adopt a heuristic definition that will be applied while analyzing the literature. As such elitism will be defined as: *Attitudes and behaviors that are shared by a group and seek to reinforce in others the perception that such group has elite status, and to ultimately reinforce the group’s power, privileges and advantages provided by such status.* This speaks to the precepts of elitism at an institutional level where a group possesses some special power that provides access to privileges and advantages. This definition recognizes that reality is socially constructed and highlights how elitism is only possible with the existence of untested perceptions pertaining to elite status. To be clear, it is not the concept of elites in society or in an institution that is problematic, the focus of this dissertation is the dysfunctional implications of elitism including how it is embodied in attitudes and routines and reaffirmed as an individual interacts with others throughout social processes.

Writing on Canadian perspectives on special operations forces, Horn notes that Special Operations Forces (SOF) is “defined within the context of elitism” by Cohen, Porch, Clancy and others and references discussions on elite status.³⁵ As such, elitism is being used to represent presence or absence of elite status or elitist attitudes and behaviours, a situation that we will see is a recurring theme in the literature. Elitism is then used in a connotation that recognizes dysfunctional implications when Horn notes that when members of a Brotherhood answer “only to each other,” where a “cult of elitism” can promote “arrogance and aloofness.”³⁶ Misconduct within special operations forces units from other countries while deployed to Afghanistan is further evidence of an ongoing concern, and elitism offers a viable avenue for exploring issues plaguing the U.S. and Australia decades after the CAF served in Somalia.³⁷ Notable

³³ Collins Dictionary, s.v., “Elitism,” retrieved from <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/elitist> on January 14, 2022.

³⁴ Macmillan Dictionary, s.v., “Elitism,” retrieved from <https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/elitism> on January 14, 2022.

³⁵ Horn, “Special Operations Forces: Uncloaking an Enigma” in Horn, Bernd and Tony Balasavicius (eds.) *Casting Light on the Shadows* (Toronto: Dundurn, 2007), 23.

³⁶ Horn, *Military Elites*, 41.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 77. Horn concludes the “failure to correct misconduct and the dark side of elitism” were significant issues.

scandals where there is a propensity for elitism as a causal factor are the Australian Special Air Service (SAS) and U.S. Special Operations Command in Afghanistan.³⁸ A recent U.S. Special Operations Command review cites the familiar issues of “leadership, discipline and accountability” while also speaking to misplaced or disordered loyalty when noting that soldiers with combat experience “were held as almost an infallible standard bearer” for other members even if the standard was “negative.”³⁹ Other issues within these units that occurred decades after the Somalia incidents include an “unhealthy sense of privilege” that transforms into entitlement⁴⁰, valuing combat skills while disregarding transgressions in personal conduct, believing that the rules of the army do not apply to them, and lower ranked soldiers having more influence than officers.⁴¹ A common thread amongst the military organizations mentioned is that members hold some kind of special or extraordinary power by virtue of their skill, role or capability. As such, defining elitism in the context of attitudes and behaviours that seek to reinforce a special power, privilege, and the desire to obtain some sort of advantage offers a unique and propitious path to explore how elitism can be harmful to institutions.

Beyond dictionary definitions, if one looks at the most cited general descriptions of elitism in social sciences, several key themes emerge. Power roles are integral to every form of social organization, and for instance Mills observes that elites “occupy the strategic command posts of the social structure.”⁴² He defines the power elite as a coalition of political, economic and military leaders. Mill recognizes the influence of those working behind the scenes helping the elite, noting they “are not solitary rulers” but rather rely on advisors and consultants who he describes as “captains of their higher thought and decisions” as well as bureaucrats who occupy the “middle levels of power.”⁴³ Hardy speaks to another element of the elite prerogative, observing that the power of meaning entails the ability to define a situation to ensure that the change that is achieved is perceived as “legitimate, desirable or unavoidable.”⁴⁴ Similarly, Hallet

³⁸ Inspector General of the Australian Defence Force, *Afghanistan Inquiry Report* (Australia: Government of Australia, 2020), 2. The investigation led by Major-General Brereton into the actions of the Australian Special Air Services Regiment (SASR) identified “allegations of 39 unlawful killings by or involving ADF members” against non-combatants or individuals who were no longer combatants. Also see Horn, *Military Elites*, 69-79.

³⁹ Department of Defence, *United States Special Operations Command Comprehensive Review* (Tampa: USSCOM, 23 January 2020), 5, 34.

⁴⁰ David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “How to Fix U.S. Special Operations Forces,” *War on the Rocks*, February 25, 2020. Retrieved from <https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/how-to-fix-u-s-special-operations-forces/> on June 21, 2023.

⁴¹ Horn, *Military Elites*.

⁴² C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 4.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Cythia Hardy, “Power and Organizational Development: A Framework for Organizational Change,” *Journal of General Management* 20, no. 2 (Winter 1994): 29-41.

recognizes that the negotiated order within an institution is influenced primarily by those with the power to define the situation as opposed to finding its origin within organizational rules and authority.⁴⁵ Porter, for his part, asserts that those who hold power roles in political, economic, bureaucratic, military and ideological domains belong to an elite.⁴⁶ These elites use different techniques to direct power within their specialized systems.⁴⁷ The centrality of power relationships found within the phenomenon of elitism supports a working definition of elite status consisting of *socially shared opinions, perspectives, and preconceptions where an identifiable group is construed as performing consistently and predictably in ways deemed superior to other groups engaging in similar performance activities*. Although power relationships being at the core of elitism is a useful starting point, the complexity of such relationships requires further review of the literature.

Habitus

Pierre Bourdieu's conception of habitus will serve as a powerful conceptual and analytical tool for analyzing social interaction within institutions with a view towards understanding how elitism is manifested and justified. In terms of privilege, Bourdieu was deeply concerned that education provided distinction in the form of a "cognitive culture" that elevated him above others rather than serving as a means towards achieving an inclusive society.⁴⁸ Bourdieu's thought is well established in the literature in examinations of how elites legitimize and impose their cultural perceptions and preferences.⁴⁹ His model of elite distinction is recognized as the most influential compared to theories centering on the role of social emulation where people make a conscious and deliberate effort to reproduce elite practices and preferences. As noted by Daloz, "display" is a fundamental means by which elites present their status, using "cultural signs of superiority to signal their upper social position."⁵⁰ As such, habitus is a useful analytical tool for understanding how special powers are accorded and exerted within an institution and the conditions under which this results in elitism. Friedman and Reeves explain that in Bourdieu's model, it is not a matter of inherently being the perfect models of culture, rather elites ensure that they occupy key positions in society in order that they can impose and

⁴⁵ Tim Hallet, "Symbolic Power and Organizational Culture," *Sociological Theory* 21, no. 2 (June 2003): 128-149.

⁴⁶ John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), 207.

⁴⁷ Oxford Languages, s.v., "Elite," retrieved from www.languages.oup.com on January 11, 2023.

⁴⁸ Grenfell, *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts*, 30.

⁴⁹ Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (London: Routledge, 2010).

⁵⁰ Jean-Pascal Daloz, *The Sociology of Elite Distinction: From Theoretical to Comparative Perspectives* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 28.

legitimize their forms of cultural appreciation.⁵¹ Rather than mere deference to ostensible elites and a propensity to emulate, Bourdieu's model of elite distinction recognizes elites are able to generate consensus and acceptance regarding the intrinsic value of what he terms their elite tastes.⁵²

While human actions are sometimes thought of as being voluntaristic with individuals consciously adapting to social situations, habitus introduces the perspective where a person's upbringing leads to the acquisition of internalized dispositions, essentially preferences. Understanding the idea that cultural taste preferences are essentially built-in based on class upbringing then illuminates how a person presenting an egalitarian repertoire that protests social inequality can simultaneously project a hierarchical perspective that reinforces class distinction.⁵³ Beyond class and early upbringing, a person's habitus is shaped by their life experiences and their broader social, cultural and economic background. Bourdieu's concepts will assist in understanding the significance of various forms of social capital in terms of exerting elitism, including practices intended to have others perceive a group as elite and consequently excuse attitudes and behaviours that would not otherwise be tolerated.

Habitus has been described as "a powerful investigative tool" for explaining human practice.⁵⁴ Habitus consists of a social actor's embodied sense of the world around them and that actor's place within it, and interplays with social status and the various forms of capital. Habitus is generated by socially acquired characteristics such as expectations regarding what constitutes proper manners, good taste, and various social norms. These are referred to as dispositions, the socially acquired habits, preferences, tastes, attitudes and behavioural routines that become socially ingrained and therefore operate at the subconscious level. These daily practices of individuals and groups include mannerisms, moral intuitions, behaviours and other non-discursive knowledge that might be described as a tendency, propensity or inclination to act in a specified way. These can also be described as that which goes without saying for a specific group, leading Dubois to characterize dispositions as "the past within us."⁵⁵ Bourdieu defines dispositions to include "a predisposition, tendency, propensity or inclination" locked in through habituation to the point where they become second nature.⁵⁶ While habitus is not ultimately deterministic it does influence and make individuals more disposed to act in a certain way, providing unconscious structural constraints to the active apprehension and vision of the

⁵¹ Sam Friedman and Aaron Reeves, "From Aristocratic to Ordinary: Shifting Modes of Elite Distinction," *American Sociological Review* 85, no. 2 (2020): 323-350.

⁵² Bourdieu, *Distinction*.

⁵³ Marcel van den Haak and Nico Wilterdink, "Struggling with Distinction: How and Why People Switch Between Cultural Hierarchy and Equality," *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 22, no. 4 (2019): 416-432.

⁵⁴ Dubois, "Pierre Bourdieu and Literature," 84.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 90.

⁵⁶ Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 214.

world.⁵⁷ Dispositions are typically shared by people from similar social stratum including social class, education, profession as each class has its own set of shared social characteristics. Habitus explains how a social actor's likelihood to act in a certain way is tied to how they expect others to respond, and as such behaviour is self-regulated, albeit unconsciously. Bourdieu indicates "I can say that all of my thinking started from this point: how can behaviour be regulated without being the product of obedience to rules?"⁵⁸ Rather than a set of social rules to which we all adhere, habitus explains how social actors self-regulate using skills and social resources acquired in the form of dispositions. As such, habitus offers a compelling framework for examining elitism within an institution, especially those featuring distinct or unusual dispositions such as the military.

In addition to dispositions, there are several related concepts that must be defined to understand habitus. These include field and the various forms of capital. For Bourdieu, field refers to a social space and recognizes the importance of context when examining social interactions or social phenomenon. Field provides the context to the object of an investigation such as interactions and events. Bourdieu's concept of field has been construed as a metaphor for a battlefield or playing field, a space for taking positions. As such, examples of a field are a family, educational institution, workplace, village, an organization, and even broad categories such as an institution or a professional category like lawyers. Using the law profession as an example, it is readily apparent that fields can be highly differentiated as each has its own distinct organizing logic that is required to understand how to navigate social relations.⁵⁹ Lawyers have both implicit and explicit rules of behaviour within their field (profession) as well as their own understandings of capital ranging from where they obtained their degree to the type of law they practice to the firm where they are employed.

The concept of habitus is evocative of the expression that people are a product of their environment, especially in the context of socialization where social structures condition individuals' thinking which then influences their everyday practice. According to Bourdieu, the early inculcation during family upbringing makes habitus durable although dispositions are interchangeable, malleable, or what is often referred to as transposable as a social actor carries dispositions into new social settings. Bourdieu's conception of habitus is intended to explain the relationship between social structure and social agency and draw connections between class and culture. As such factors including group culture and an individual's personal history shape the social actions of a person. If the context being contemplated is historical, much like various connotations of critical theory Bourdieu recognizes the need to consider how knowledge was

⁵⁷ Pierre Bourdieu, "Social Space and Symbolic Power," *Sociological Theory* 7, no. 1: 14-25.

⁵⁸ Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words. Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 65.

⁵⁹ Anna Leander, "Habitus and Field" in Robert A. Denemark (ed.) *The International Studies Encyclopedia Vol V* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2007).

generated, including exploring who generated it and whose interests were being served.⁶⁰

Social status is determined by socially shared perceptions of social ordering and is often presented as hierarchical because a position must be socially granted. It then follows that subjective social status is where an individual perceives their position on the social status ladder. But not all status is hierarchical, for instance the statuses of brother or cousin don't fall on a social status ladder. This is where it is helpful to think in terms of habitus, recognizing that plural sources of influence are at play when an individual has multiple different habituses such as daughter or club or team member as well as a professional habitus related to employment or as a graduate of a particular institution. As Hillier and Rooksby observe, individuals are not confined to any single habitus, rather they adapt and move between them.⁶¹ Social status can be further broken down into two distinct categories, ascribed and that which is earned/achieved. A person is born into or assigned ascribed status, which might instinctually connote to the status associated with members of a royal family. Teenager and daughter are both ascribed statuses, which leads Linton to note that the bulk of ascribed status is based on sex, age, and family relationships.⁶² He includes any status based on biological relationship but recognizes status can vary depending upon the degree of blood relationship. Put differently, it is a matter where circumstances trump choice when it comes to ascribed status, as is the case with the status of cancer survivor. From an institutional perspective, ascribed status refers to a social position derived out of membership in a particular institution. Achieved status is based on some combination including ability, merit, performance and effort as evidenced by the professional accomplishment of doctors, lawyers, teachers, or athletes for example. As such a distinguishing feature of earned status is that it is assumed voluntarily. The interconnection between these two statuses that speaks to Bourdieu's precepts of habitus is evidenced by a person who graduates from medical school based on hard work and dedication, yet this achievement was spurred on by being born into a family able to provide financial and other necessary support, perhaps even following in a parent's footsteps making their status both achieved and ascribed. When the concept of status is separated from the individual, it has a different significance and denotes "a collection of rights and duties."⁶³ Linton explains the relationship between a status and its holder as being similar to the driver's seat of a car versus the driver, where the seat and its surrounding instruments and controls provides "ever-present potentialities for action and control," how these are exercised by the actual driver can vary widely.⁶⁴ Linton defines social role as

⁶⁰ Pierre Bourdieu, *The Social Structures of the Economy* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005).

⁶¹ Jean Hillier and Emma Rooksby (eds.), *Habitus: A Sense of Place, 2nd Edition* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2005), 14.

⁶² Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man: An Introduction* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936), 126.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 110.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

the “dynamic aspect” of a socially assigned status, in other words the behaviour performed by a person in relation to a specific social status.⁶⁵

Social capital derives from status, and consists of social connections, networks and relationships in a society. Lamont and Lareau describe cultural capital as “high status cultural signals used in cultural and social selection,” and attribute the concept to Bourdieu and Passeron.⁶⁶ Cultural capital can be economic, spiritual or social, the latter of which is most relevant to this inquiry. Although Bourdieu’s conception of cultural capital evolves over time, it generally refers to many attitudes, preferences and behaviours, informal academic standards (which are seen as class attributes of the dominant class), linguistic aptitude and its class-specific nuances such as grammar, formal knowledge and diplomas. Cultural capital requires an understanding and appreciation of meaning, essentially “incorporated cultural knowledge and know-how,”⁶⁷ a good example of which is professional jargon.⁶⁸ In *Distinction* Bourdieu examines the relationship between cultural capital and objects and practices and the acquisition of knowledge and skill that denote a person of high culture.⁶⁹ Therefore cultural class is elevated and increases tangentially with increases in cultural capital. Bourdieu argues that cultural objects and practices establish and maintain class boundaries. Using taste as an illustration, Bourdieu argues it is not something that is achieved, rather it is a product of socialization highly correlated to social class and serves to demarcate class boundaries. Cultural needs are driven primarily by upbringing and education, and secondarily to social origin.⁷⁰ For Bourdieu, cultural capital is derived from socialization into the cultural products and practices of a social class. This is an opportune time to address a dominant interpretation of Bourdieu’s reference to cultural capital in the context of high-brow status practices to the logical exclusion of technical skills and abilities. Lareau and Weininger assert there is enough ambiguity in Bourdieu’s writing to challenge a rigid interpretation of predominant interpretations of highbrow, noting that *Distinction* only provides indirect support for this interpretation.⁷¹ The point can be illustrated by considering academic credentials, which for Bourdieu represented both a technical and social competence that are mutually inclusive. Put another way by Lareau and Weininger, Bourdieu sees status and skill and by extension ability as intertwined,

⁶⁵ Ibid., 114.

⁶⁶ Michèle Lamont and Annette Lareau, “Cultural Capital: Allusions, Gaps and Glissandos in Recent Theoretical Developments,” *Sociological Theory* 6 (Fall 1988): 153.

⁶⁷ Andreas Pollman, “Bourdieu and the Quest for Intercultural Transformations,” *SAGE Open* 11 (November 2021), 2.

⁶⁸ Hillier and Rooksby, *Habitus: A Sense of Place*, 24.

⁶⁹ Bourdieu, *Distinction*.

⁷⁰ Pierre Bourdieu, *Un art moyen: essai sur les usages sociaux de la photographie* (Paris, Ed. De Minuit, 1965); P. Bourdieu and A. Darbel, *L’Amour de l’art: les musées et leur public* (Paris, Ed. De Minuit, 1965).

⁷¹ Annette Lareau and Elliot B Weininger, “Cultural Capital in Educational Research: a Critical Assessment,” *Theory and Sociology* 32 (2003): 578.

concluding that “cultural capital amounts to an irreducible amalgamation of the two.”⁷²

When cultural capital is socially acknowledged as being legitimate, Bourdieu terms it symbolic capital.⁷³ In addition to the insights from the literature review, the work of other authors will be examined as they use different contexts to explore the meaning and impact of Bourdieu’s concepts. When discussing Ballano’s examination of elitism as power and influence, we will look at clerical celibacy in the Roman Catholic Church where celibacy is identified as a prime cultural resource, while the addition of advanced ecclesial degrees completes the main cultural capital of the church’s institutional habitus. Pile provides a different example of symbolic power, or what Bourdieu would term objectified cultural capital, in the form of architecture when he refers to the IRA bombing of MI6 Headquarters in September 2000. Although there was no strategic damage, the fact that the building represented the power nucleus of an organization not even acknowledged to exist speaks to the symbolic power associated with many buildings and structures.⁷⁴ Overall, the attributes of cultural capital might be summarized as credentials, preferences and behaviours. Lamont and Lareau point out incompatibilities regarding Bourdieu’s definition of cultural capital, such as the fact that education is not specific to the dominant class culture, rather it applies to members of all classes.⁷⁵ As such, these authors propose an institutionalized definition of cultural capital as “widely shared, high status cultural signals (attitudes, preferences, formal knowledge, behaviours, goods and credentials) used for social and cultural exclusion” wherein social exclusion refers to jobs and resources and cultural exclusion refers to membership in high status groups.⁷⁶

Bourdieu and Passerson note that human agency plays a part in social capital production, because although social status and family background (including education) provide the necessary social and cultural resources, these must be actively invested to yield results. Bourdieu provides the analogy of a card game where players get dealt different cards (social and cultural capital), but the outcome is dependent on the interplay between the cards that are received and the rules for playing the game as well as the players’ skill level.⁷⁷ For Bourdieu, cultural capital is reproduced by educational institutions that reflect the experiences of the dominant class, the children of which enter school already possessing the requisite social and cultural cues. According to Bourdieu, the fact that these institutions are not socially neutral is evidenced when children from lower classes are forced to acquire the same social, linguistic and cultural cues and as such will never exercise these with the same natural (i.e. subconscious)

⁷² Ibid., 582.

⁷³ Pierre Bourdieu, “Social Space and Symbolic Power,” *Sociological Theory* 7 no. 1: 17.

⁷⁴ Steve Pile, “Spectral Cities: Where the Repressed Return and Other Short Stories,” in Hillier and Rooksby (eds.), *Habitus: A Sense of Place*, 237-38.

⁷⁵ Lamont and Lareau, “Cultural Capital,” 156.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*.

familiarity of those born into them. Social transmission of privilege is then legitimized because academic performance or achievement is attributed to enhanced ability rather than differences in cultural resources transmitted by the dominant class. Of importance to the upcoming discussion of formal knowledge based elitism, Bourdieu saw this issue as institutionalized replication of systems of social stratification rather than conscious discrimination by these institutions. Cultural capital consists of the cultural signals that are a key component for understanding habitus. Bourdieu breaks cultural capital into three distinct forms, namely embodied cultural knowledge, objects or objectified cultural capital, and institutional credentials and expertise. All forms of cultural capital are integral to social reproduction that preserves status differential between social classes. Educational institutions epitomize how cultural capital is reproduced where children from the dominant class enter school already possessing the requisite social and cultural cues.

In summary, socialization is a lifelong process where individuals orient themselves in relation to norms, expectations and values of society. Socialization provides a sense of the world during early years, and social structures condition individuals' thinking which then influences their everyday practice. Habitus consists of a social actor's embodied sense of the world and that actor's place in it. Expressed in terms of habitus, socialization entails socially acquired habits, behaviours, preferences, and dispositions that become socially ingrained and therefore operate at the subconscious level. These dispositions are durable yet malleable and transposable, which is an important recognition in terms of this study of elitism when examining inculcation into a new habitus within a different social setting. Dispositions are a tendency to act in a specified way and are typically shared by people from similar social stratum including a professional environment with its own set of shared social characteristics.

In the case of an institution, habitus offers a framework for providing a more precise explication of what might otherwise be referred to as culture or more colloquially 'the way things are done around here.' Socialization into a new institution involves inculcation into a new habitus consisting of a professional environment with its own set of shared social characteristics, essentially a social stratum. As such, habitus will provide a framework for determining and analyzing the attributes and impacts of elitism at the institutional level. An example where Bourdieu's analysis will be helpful is when we consider Bercuson's assertion that it is the attitudes and values that officer cadets already possess on entering the Canadian Armed Forces that determines the extent to which they will embrace the military ethos, more so than any socialization they receive within the military.⁷⁸ This assertion that army socialization does not actually change people illustrates the importance of exploring and ultimately challenging existing beliefs.

To understand how habitus can be applied to different institutions and settings or environments, it is helpful to look at various authors' application of Bourdieu's conception of habitus. Allen's study of visually impaired children looks at social class background and found that the habitus of middle-class

⁷⁸ Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 109.

families led them to challenge their children's exclusion from social spaces such as employment whereas working class habitus correlated to limited expectations for those families.⁷⁹ This accords with Crossley's exploration of "NIMBYism" as a form of social movement and protest and concludes that the educated middle-class is more disposed to engage within the public sphere and also better resourced to do so than working classes.⁸⁰ Specifically, the participatory know-how for protesting is a particular habitus where participants are influenced to act in a particular manner. Those habitus influences are described by Howe and Langdon as causing people to act in a particular manner based on preferences, motivations, expectations, aspirations and views.⁸¹ Nobel and Watkins suggest that the practical intuition to play tennis is rooted in habitus.⁸² Incidentally, any context or analogy of a game invokes the concepts of understanding and following the rules of the game as well as having a sense of how the game is played. Bourdieu described this as "a feel for the game."⁸³ This includes strategy, anticipating an opponent's actions, assessing strengths and weaknesses because, as Hillier and Rooksby put it succinctly, "behaviours cannot be reduced simply to theoretical rules."⁸⁴ Calhoun concurs with this theme, noting that social life requires "an active engagement in its games."⁸⁵ Our insight and understanding of the game of life or social world to which Calhoun is referring is filtered by our embodied understanding of our habitus. In other words, our perceptions and understanding of a situation determines how we act and react. Mutch analyses management styles and practices of public house managers, asserting that an active relationship between people and their social world demonstrates that habitus is generative as opposed to a determining or limiting structure.⁸⁶ The generative nature means habitus expands and evolves with new situations and experiences making it adaptive more than limiting or otherwise determinative. Mutch's findings support this assertion, noting that people adapt and change their way of doing things while reproducing habitus, in this case while reconciling technological changes in the workplace as well as adapting to an increase in female managers. Lau's study of trade unionists in China suggests habitus impacts not only assumptions and understanding but ultimately influences an individual's belief in what is possible, not unlike Allen's conclusion regarding

⁷⁹ Chris Allen, "Bourdieu's Habitus, Social Class and the Spatial World of Visually Impaired Children," *Urban Studies* 41, no. 3: 487-506.

⁸⁰ Nick Crossley, "From Reproduction to Transformation: Social Movement Fields and the Radical Habitus," *Theory, Culture and Society* 20, no. 6: 43-68.

⁸¹ Joe Howe and Colin Langdon, "Towards a Reflective Planning Theory," *Planning Theory* 1, no. 3: 209-225.

⁸² Guy Noble and Megan Watkins, "So, How did Bourdieu Learn to Play Tennis? Habitus, Consciousness and Habitation," *Cultural Studies* 17, no. 3/4 (2003): 520-538.

⁸³ Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), 66.

⁸⁴ Hillier and Rooksby (eds.), *Habitus: A Sense of Place*, 23.

⁸⁵ Craig Calhoun, "Pierre Bourdieu" in George Ritzer (ed.) *The Blackwell Companion to Major Social Theorists* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 696-730.

⁸⁶ Alistair Mutch, "Communities of Practice and Habitus: A Critique," *Organization Studies* 24, no. 3 (2003): 383-401.

expectations of families of visually impaired children. In Lau's study, trade unionists believed it was necessary to convince workers that it was important to work within the parameters of the communist party's objectives contrary to a labour union's typical focus (as well as Bourdieu's inclination) on what is best for the individual workers in terms of working conditions. From these examples we see that whether referring to a tennis player or bar manager, an individual's practice world is their habitus. This notion is important when applying habitus to institutional elitism. Beyond habitus, there are other concepts and theories to be explored in the literature, commencing with the notion that primordial societies were to some degree structured in a hierarchical manner and require further examination for indicators of elitism.

Elitism from an Anthropological Perspective

Having established a working definition of elitism and exploring habitus as a valuable concept for examining elitism, the next step is to survey the literature from the top down. For the most part, literature related to the structure of primordial societies, egalitarianism, meritocracy, and elitism as power and influence does not explore the institutional perspective or the dysfunctional implications of elitism as defined at the start of this Chapter. The field of cultural anthropology offers the broadest perspective and opens the door to further exploration of ascribed versus earned status. It is a natural starting point for the examination of literature on elitism and elite status given the structure of primordial societies often characterized by ascendancy that implies a clear hierarchy featuring the authority of elders and hereditary chiefs for example. The way hierarchy is determined within a particular society can offer insight into the presence or absence of attributes of elitism. For the attitudes and behaviour of elders and hereditary chiefs to be characterized as elitism it would have to aim to reinforce power, privileges, or advantages as contemplated in the working definition. As such this question will be explored within the anthropological literature to determine whether elitism is condoned or promoted.

The social organization of North American Indigenous cultures provides some explanatory and comparative insight, notwithstanding the reality that there is far from one homogeneous set of tribal heritage, customs and traditions, or language. Boldt and Long characterize Indigenous tribes in Canada as distinct tribal societies whether they are referred to as bands or nations and emphasize that European-influenced change has impacted tribal decision-making processes over the years.⁸⁷ They assert that instead of relying upon authority, hierarchy and a ruling entity, Indigenous tribes historically relied upon decision making by consensus and individual self-interest being inextricably intertwined with those of the tribe. Put simply, there were no hierarchical relationships as privileges and responsibilities were shared equally and "the general good and the individual

⁸⁷ Menno Boldt and J. Anthony Long, "Tribal Traditions and European-Western Political Ideologies: The Dilemma of Canada's Native Indians," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* XVH, no. 3 (September 1984): 537-553.

good were taken to be virtually identical.”⁸⁸ Boldt and Long conclude that in most Indigenous societies in North America, a tribe was a divine creation where customs and traditions were akin to religious obedience and subjugated any need for personal authority or any individual right to govern.

Despite the assertions of Boldt and Long, at first glance, the concept of Indigenous elders appears to suggest a hierarchical structure. Porter asserts interaction within these cultures which he characterizes as “primitive groups” is guided by the same small-group dynamics and leadership as a gang of boys, which he attributes to the “interplay of personalities” as opposed to a hierarchy.⁸⁹ His point is that the basic functions required for the survival of a tribe get performed even if specific roles are not assigned, although this necessarily changes as population increases and coordination and decision-making become necessary. Bolt and Long observe that elders historically lacked formal authority, and rather than having any power over band members they are revered for their knowledge of sacred customs and rituals. Chiefs earned the right to a following based on their personality or skills as a hunter or warrior, yet like elders the influence of chiefs did not translate into formal authority over tribe members. Carlton put martial criteria another way, noting that in “earlier less developed societies” status was largely accorded based upon “warrior prowess.”⁹⁰ In contrast, the privilege of personal autonomy in the form of self-direction was an aristocratic prerogative in Western or European society, while everyone enjoyed self-determination within Indigenous tribes.⁹¹

Bolt and Long liken the Indigenous conception of hierarchy and leadership to a military drummer that leads soldiers by establishing the cadence they are marching to but lacking any control or authority over whether soldiers actually march to his beat. While the source of control in the military context falls to whoever is in command of a parade, for Indigenous peoples, it is their sacred tribal customs and traditions that constitute the external authority though the mechanism of “direct participatory democracy and rule by consensus.”⁹² As such their cultural heritage is incompatible with the concept of a ruling entity or any hierarchical exercise of authority. This speaks to power and authority as important concepts in relation to elitism, at least with respect to attitudes and behaviours seeking to reinforce one’s elite status and the corresponding access to privileges and advantages. Miller outlines that a traditional view in Western society sees the locus of authority as flowing downward or vertically from an individual with power and ostensibly superior qualities to those below.⁹³ Miller’s analysis of Central Algonkians of the Great Lakes region notes there was no recognizable authority within the tribe and had been observed there was “no

⁸⁸ Ibid., 541.

⁸⁹ Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic*, 203.

⁹⁰ Eric Carlton, *Militarism: Rule Without Law* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 193.

⁹¹ Michael Dorris, “Twentieth Century Indians: The Return of the Natives,” in Raymond L. Hall (ed.) *Ethnic Autonomy, Comparative Dynamics: The Americas, Europe and the Developing World* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), 71.

⁹² Bolt and Long, 545.

⁹³ Walter B. Miller, “Two Concepts of Authority,” *American Anthropologist* 57 (1955): 271-89.

distinction or superiority among them.”⁹⁴ He notes that a lack of prestige differential between those holding different roles within the tribe precluded attitudes or behaviours indicative of reverence or any kind of submissive obedience commonly associated with ranked or hierarchical structure of groups or organizations in western society.⁹⁵

In terms of external influence on the structure of Indigenous societies, consideration must be given to the impact of changes in Canadian society including legislation and jurisprudence on the social organization of Indigenous societies. Fenton’s research is focused on the Iroquois Confederacy which includes the Six Nations near Brantford, Ontario. A pivotal change occurred with the passage of the Canada’s Indian Act in 1924, which Fenton describes as supplanting the system of hereditary chiefs with an elected council. In Fenton’s view “the symbolic justification for the traditional system of life chiefs” includes the Longhouse ritual used for both mourning their dead and prescribing the process for installing new chiefs.⁹⁶ Ultimately it is necessary to rely on oral history when exploring the traditional system of social order within the Six Nations, and Fenton submits that over time oral accounts change or erode with each telling, thereby posing an additional challenge in terms of assessing the prevalence of elitism in an Indigenous culture. He uses a multitude of terms including myth, lore, epic (as in a poem derived from oral tradition that features heroic or legendary figures), gospel, rich symbolism and historical legend to characterize what he sees as the imprecision of oral histories. Fenton refers to Levi-Strauss’s explanation of myths as assuming a single identity through the passage of time that consists “of all its versions” for “as long as it is felt to be such.”⁹⁷

Despite the importance and role of oral histories there has been significant colonial influence on Indigenous societies within Canada. Fenton documents his research on the Deganawidah origin myth of the Iroquois people imploring his people to practice the principles of righteousness, civil authority and peace” with Fenton claiming it was only formally documented in text in the late 19th century by a fellow anthropologist’s “scholarly account.”⁹⁸ He lists several other anthropologists that have written English versions of what he characterizes as attempts by Six Nations members to justify the continuance of the system of hereditary Chiefs and ultimately “to bring system to tradition.”⁹⁹ Before delving further into this it is worthy of mention that Fenton’s paternalistic approach towards understanding Indigenous issues was the type of viewpoint denounced by the Supreme Court of Canada in a 1997 ruling that allows for significant weight to be placed on oral histories when determining land claims. The court found that “Aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s.35(1) are

⁹⁴ Ibid., 272.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ William N. Fenton, “The Lore of the Longhouse: Myth, Ritual and Red Power,” *Anthropological Quarterly* 48, no. 3 (July 1975): 131.

⁹⁷ Claude Levi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* (New York: Basic Books, 1963), 217.

⁹⁸ Fenton, “Lore of the Longhouse,” 134.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

defined by reference to pre-contact practices ... those histories play a crucial role in the litigation of aboriginal rights.”¹⁰⁰ The Supreme Court’s reference to pre-contact practices acknowledges the methods used by Canada’s Indigenous peoples to document their history and traditions as well as agreements, suggesting all Indigenous issues should be analyzed and assessed in a different light and with different parameters than has occurred previously.

Cummins offers a perspective from the opposite end of the province with his focus on societal structure of the Attawapiskat Cree in what is currently known as Northern Ontario’s James Bay region. He states that Cree society is based on egalitarianism and reciprocity where the principle of *primus inter pares* or first among equals replaces hierarchy.¹⁰¹ This principle acknowledges while all Cree are equal in both rights and status, some leaders are accorded additional respect typically owing to seniority. With respect to reciprocity, Cummins asserts that there is an expectation of exchange of items amongst without necessarily expecting something in immediate return, as there is a trust that exchanges will essentially balance out and that in the end everyone will be satisfied.¹⁰² Honigmann also studied the Attawapiskat Cree, and notes that authority is very informal and serves the most utilitarian purposes rather than being the source of pleasure. For that matter, leaders lack any formal authority or ability to enforce decisions, and Honigmann notes “too great power is resented and feared” by those who are affected.¹⁰³ Essentially, leadership amounts to expert knowledge and experience in essential skills like hunting and fishing, including sharing surplus meat with others. Cummins asserts that an essential feature of an egalitarian society is where no one persons has “coercive control over others.”¹⁰⁴ He explains that the Cree concept of egalitarianism pertains not only to sharing of land for access to resources like hunting, but also to the fruits of these endeavours to the extent that a less proficient hunter will share in the bounty of other hunters.

Cummins argues that what he describes as the egalitarian approach of the Attawapiskat Cree had unfair implications when they assumed white settlers shared the same egalitarian principles. He details several government plans that would have had significant implications on the sovereignty and overall way of life for the Attawapiskat Cree, from plans for Inuit relocation to the area to an RCAF bombing range (neither of which materialized) to the relocation of the Reserve. Cummins makes several key assertions that relate to settlers’ perceptions of the Cree, the first being that lack of power on their part was not synonymous with acquiescence given that disengagement, feigned ignorance of certain government regulations and other forms of resistance were

¹⁰⁰ Supreme Court of Canada, *R vs. Delgamuukw*, (1997) 3 R.C.S., 1067. The judgement is referring to Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act 1982.

¹⁰¹ Brian Cummins, *Only God Can Own the Land: The Attawapiskat Cree, the Land and the State in the 20th Century* (Cobalt, Ontario: The Highway Book Shop, 1999), 34.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 35.

¹⁰³ John Honigmann, “The Attawapiskat Swampy Cree: An Ethnographic Reconstruction,” *Anthropological Papers of the University of Alaska* 5, no. 1 (1956): 58.

¹⁰⁴ Cummins, *Only God Can Own the Land*, 36.

commonplace.¹⁰⁵ Any reference to power in this context refers to the power the government enjoyed by virtue of federal legislation as the codification of the relationship with the Cree via Treaty 9. In a similar vein, Cummins discusses the distinction between assimilation and acculturation, arguing that the Attawapiskat Cree in many ways adjusted to the new cultural environment that included fur trading and other interactions with colonizers without abandoning their culture in the process. This does not negate the unidirectional transfer of elements of Western culture imposed on the Attawapiskat Cree, a process of enculturation where they were socialized into the settler's ways of commerce and an increasing reliance on government support as many of their traditional ways of hunting and gathering eroded. Fenton expands on the process of enculturation with his hypothesis that past forms of leadership "shine through and modify" any forms of government that are imposed upon a tribal society.¹⁰⁶ He asserts that societies that lack the Western conception of a formal government often have informal systems and sanctions that enable them to exercise social control. This does not fully acknowledge the challenge of a multiplicity of voices exacerbated by the interpolation of Indian Act councils into traditional and other systems of government. This has been apparent at various junctures throughout the course of history when Canadian governments have been required to negotiate with Indigenous peoples, as was identified by a high-ranking Canadian minister during the Oka Crisis of 1990. The standoff in Oka was complicated by a longstanding lack of consensus as to who has the authority to speak for the Mohawks of Kanesatake, with constant friction between different groups including the Longhouse, Clan Mothers, Indian Act Council, the Iroquois Confederacy, and the Mohawk Warriors. Testifying at a House of Commons committee after the crisis, Federal Minister of Indian Affairs Tom Siddon pointed out "No fewer than seven groups came forward claiming to represent the legitimate interests of the community."¹⁰⁷

Catapano suggests that a connotation of elitism amongst Indigenous peoples is a notion that has worked against them over the course of history. She discusses sovereignty and government measures aimed at assimilation, and acknowledges the Six Nations Confederacy was plagued by internecine struggles amongst their leaders resulting in a multiplicity of individuals attempting to assert their authority which is consistent with the situation described by Siddon

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 3, 136.

¹⁰⁶ Fenton, "Lore of the Longhouse," 134.

¹⁰⁷ Harry Swain, *Oka A Political Crisis and its Legacy* (Vancouver: D&M Publishing, 2010), 71; Canada, *House of Commons Debates 47* (1991), 11-12. The groups asserting themselves as the true authority at Kanesatake were the Kanesatake League for Democracy, the Committee for Change, the Mohawk Council of Kanesatake, C-31 Status Indians, the Six Nations Traditional Hereditary Chiefs and the traditional and unofficial Longhouse groups. As of the publishing of Swain's book in 2010 some 20 years after the Oka crisis, he notes Kanesatake was still "impaled on the inability of the Mohawks, elected or otherwise, to put forward a government able to speak for the people," 166.

during the Oka Crisis.¹⁰⁸ Catapano argues that the Six Nations had a historical alliance including close ties with the Crown where she describes them as “allies who helped the British in the Revolution.”¹⁰⁹ She submits that this fueled a sense of what she terms elitism that was manipulated by the British then Canadian governments and contributed towards the fall of the Confederacy. The only explication of her claim of elitism is when Catapano suggests that the hubris of Indigenous leaders may have resulted in political difficulties to the extent they partook in any measures or programs aimed at providing them “racial uplift” to bring them on par with what one government official referred to as the “white portion of the population.”¹¹⁰ Catapano appears to be referring to a notion of elitism that does not describe attitudes and behaviors seeking to reinforce one’s perception of membership to a group socially considered to have an elite status, even though the intention is to further reinforce the Six Nations peoples’ access to the perceived privileges and advantages of membership in Canada’s non-Indigenous society. Any observations pertaining to the particular time period of the early 1970s must also recognize the historical context of the time, starting with the Canadian Bill of Rights constituting the first Federal statute explicitly outlawing racial discrimination.¹¹¹ As further context, Boldt describes that era as a belated awakening of social justice that fell short of any genuine transformation of social institutions or attitudes within Canadian Society.¹¹² The year after Boldt published his thoughts on the matter, Canada’s Constitution was updated to include the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and recognition of the rights of Canada’s Indigenous peoples.¹¹³

Analyzing the ascendancy of hereditary chiefs versus the elected status of the Indian Act band council, the first question is whether it is accurate to describe the respective status of these groups as ascribed versus earned in the sense an election is required for the latter office. At the most basic level it should be acknowledged that both groups as well as others such as the Warrior Society possess some degree of influence and claim to authority with respect to governance of the band. Catapano discusses Fenton’s assessment of this factionalism within the Six Nations, describing Fenton’s analysis as being “forged by an elite with no accountability or relation to a communal ethic or

¹⁰⁸ Andrea Lucille Catapano “The Rising of the Ongwehonwe: Sovereignty, Identity and Representation on the Six Nations Reserve.” PhD Diss., Stony Brook University, 2007, 43.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 44.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. The author refers to the following source: National Archives of Canada; Indian Affairs, RG10, Volume 2283, File 56, 883, Pt. 1. Microfilm Reel C11194. Circular Letter to the Indian Superintendents and Agents in Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Manitoba and British Columbia, from the Indian Office, January 16, 1885.

¹¹¹ *Canadian Bill of Rights*, S.C. 1960, c.44, Assented to 10th August 1960.

¹¹² Menno Boldt, “Philosophy, Politics and Extralegal Action: Native Indian Leaders in Canada,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 4, no. 2 (April 1981), 217.

¹¹³ *The Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982*. Section 35 of the *Constitution Act of 1982* recognizes the rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada, a group defined to include Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada.

shared identity. His suggestions appear to reflect the paternalism and gender bias of an earlier era, where anthropologists considered themselves infinitely more qualified than Indian people themselves to understand Indigenous cultures and make decisions regarding capacity for self-determination.”¹¹⁴ McCarthy discusses the implications of failing to recognize competing power dynamics on the Six Nations, also using Fenton as an example.¹¹⁵ She outlines how Fenton, in a letter to a fellow academic, related approaching the elected band council of the Six Nations with a request to live on the reserve while conducting a study. Fenton appears annoyed by the requirement to appear before council, explain the study and ask permission to reside there during the study only to have another recognized leadership “the old chiefs” chastise him for “coming in the wrong door.”¹¹⁶ Cultural encapsulation describes the ignorance or lack of knowledge of a culture, and the failure to recognize the significance of that culture on a person’s life situation and world view. Cummins notes the prevalence of such encapsulation in terms of the Canadian government’s approach to Indigenous peoples and observes that in doing so the state “creates and codifies the constraints of their bondage.”¹¹⁷

Overall the anthropological literature pertaining to North American primordial societies provides minimal insight into the concept of elitism as defined by this inquiry in terms of dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours. With decisions predominantly made by consensus and individual and self-interest inextricably intertwined with basic subsistence, there is no evidence of attitudes or behaviours seeking to reinforce the perception of elite status or any inclination towards attempting to reinforce access to individual privileges and advantages even when considering ascribed status and tribal hierarchy. Bolt and Long’s analysis suggests an absence of self-interest, authority or any ruling hierarchy and instead noting a focus on achieving consensus and considering the best interests of the tribe instead of individual privilege. The lack of prestige differential appears to assist in suppressing the submissiveness prevalent in hierarchical structures. Boldt and Long’s explanation of Indigenous societies as being like a divine creation where customs and traditions were akin to religious obedience accounts is evidence of the subjugation of any need for personal authority or any individual right to govern amongst members of primordial societies. Miller’s analysis of the Central Algonkians of the Great Lakes region notes the absence of a recognizable authority within the tribe, a lack of prestige differential amongst tribe members leading to the conclusion there is “no distinction or superiority among them.”¹¹⁸ Cummins’ assessment that Cree society is based on egalitarianism and reciprocity is instructive, especially his explanation of the principle of *primus inter pares* or first among equals replacing

¹¹⁴ Catapano “The Rising of the Ongwehonwe,” 434.

¹¹⁵ Theresa McCarthy, *In Divided Unity: Haudenosaunee Reclamation at Grand River* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2016), 168.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. McCarthy is quoting from a 1969 letter Fenton wrote to “aspiring linguist Michael Foster” who was working on a PhD project at Six Nations.

¹¹⁷ Cummins, *Only God Can Own the Land*, 134.

¹¹⁸ Miller, “Two Concepts of Authority,” 272.

hierarchy.¹¹⁹ This principle explains any additional respect accorded to elders and other leaders as being accorded based on seniority, traditional knowledge and skill, and the overall ability to influence rather than control with authority. While the anthropological analysis of tribal governments recognized a distinct absence of any of the precepts of elitism, Fenton's approach presupposes an enhanced and at times exclusive ability to understand a society and its culture better than those who practise it. Returning to the working definition of elitism as consisting of attitudes and behaviors seeking to reinforce one's perception of membership in a group socially considered to have an elite status, ironically there are elements of elitism in how Fenton assesses Indigenous culture and traditions. The precepts of elitism that are most prominent are entitlement and qualification with respect to Fenton's status as an anthropologist and the socially shared belief among some anthropologists and other experts of the enhanced ability to understand a culture perhaps better than those who are a part of it. Returning to the analysis of the power structure of primordial societies, none of the authors allude to elitism in terms of attitudes or behaviours attempting to reinforce access to advantage or privileges amongst the Indigenous societies discussed. In terms of elite status, there is also no indication of socially shared opinions, perspectives or preconceptions where specific primordial societies or groups within societies are construed as performing consistently and predictably in ways deemed superior to other similar groups. Even special skills or abilities that relate to hunting or fishing are not distinguished any further than to expect tribe member to focus their efforts on activities to which they are best suited. Furthermore, none of the authors suggest Indigenous societies present themselves as better than the settlers who encroached on their traditional territories, even though many anthropologists acknowledge that Indigenous peoples had far superior hunting, fishing and overall survival skills and abilities required to thrive in harsh environments.

An important point that can be surmised from the literature on primordial societies is that elitism is not an unavoidable fact of life and as such is a social construct. The absence of elitism in this context suggests it is a product of societies featuring a pre-existing power imbalance, which necessitates the exploration of the concepts of egalitarianism and meritocracy.

Egalitarianism & Meritocracy

The second category to be examined involves the concepts of egalitarianism and meritocracy. These are concepts that, as they appear in much of the sociological literature, generally address generic definitions of elitism and elite status at a societal level rather than an institutional context. Egalitarianism speaks to social equality of some form such as the belief that all people should have identical rights and opportunities in life. Meritocracy posits that individual who have influence and power are selected according to demonstrated ability, while a meritocratic approach suggests that achievements are based on merit. These constructs might initially present as the antithesis of elitism. It can be

¹¹⁹ Cummins, *Only God Can Own the Land*, 34.

difficult to ascertain the part that ability plays in entry into the elite, but as Porter points out there can be little doubt that being denied proper training or education is an impediment towards achieving one's goals.¹²⁰ He notes that membership in the elites of society is controlled through imposition of formal qualifications and more generally through determinations of appropriateness consisting of membership in institutions including clubs, fraternities, and other social and religious affiliations. Porter's observation is in line with Bourdieu's conception of habitus where opportunities are provided according to social class positioning.

Egalitarianism posits a degree of entitlement that, taken to the extreme, is the suggestion that everyone should have equal or somewhat identical opportunities. With these concepts there is a tension between equality of opportunity versus equality of outcomes as there are numerous causal factors involved with the latter. For example, everyone can be granted equal access to education, at least in theory, but whether that will translate into obtaining the desired skills and employment is another matter. With meritocracy the premise is that opportunities and ultimately status are earned by those who are deserving. With elite status defined for this inquiry as *socially shared opinions, perspectives, and preconceptions where an identifiable group is construed as performing consistently and predictably in ways deemed superior to other groups engaging in similar performance activities*, it would seem logical that an assessment of meritocratic principles would be at play when this status is being socially granted. Carlton notes there are a number of criteria including economic and political upon which status is socially recognized and points out "the cult of the celebrity" results in status being accorded "where it hardly belongs."¹²¹ This is dependent on the subjective nature of how the status is assessed and socially granted and the degree to which it is objectively verifiable. For example, status being granted within one institution but perhaps not recognized by other albeit similar institutions. The concept of earned status and exploring exactly what that entails is a component of this inquiry into elitism, as well as assessing whether meritocracy provides any fruitful avenues towards isolating qualitative indicators of institutional elitism.

Henry challenges what he asserts to be the myth of egalitarianism using real-life examples from a range of social situations, programs and even television shows.¹²² One of his main premises is to present political debates as a constant tension between elitism and egalitarianism. He refers to this as the "great American dialectic" consisting of two poles where egalitarianism has been predominating.¹²³ Henry presents egalitarianism as synonymous with entitlement, the notion that everyone is alike and that the economy is a collective possession rather than a product of many individual achievements. He contrasts this with the worlds of sports and finance where achievements are readily quantifiable, and asserts that elitism is more about "intellectual distinction-

¹²⁰ Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic*, 218.

¹²¹ Carlton, *Militarism*, 193.

¹²² William A. Henry III, *In Defense of Elitism* (New York: Doubleday, 1994).

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 12.

making” than it is about money.¹²⁴ For Henry these often-scorned distinctions typically viewed as elitist include deference towards position in society, accomplishment, reverence for heritage, scientific rigour, and the common denominator “the willingness to assert, unyieldingly that one idea, contribution or attainment is better than another.”¹²⁵ Henry is advancing an aspirational argument for meritocracy whereas the egalitarian arguments typically focus on a principled critique that sees the concept of merit itself as being inherently unjust because not everyone is really getting a fair shot at life, only those who have the means and opportunity. To this point, getting into Harvard also includes being able to pay for it and not only survive but thrive within that social stratum. In the mid-1960s, Porter challenged assumptions regarding the relationship between intelligence and the social strata, going as far as to assert that there was a greater number of highly intelligent people in the lower classes than the higher classes.¹²⁶

Regarding social status, ‘the establishment’ is a term used broadly to encompass institutions and their corresponding values and attitudes by which the preferred groups or elites live. It is typically accepted as being a group exercising power and influence in a society, often characterized as being resistant to change. The term was coined in a British newspaper article in 1955, with Fairlie asserting that the establishment comprised not only political elites but also “the whole matrix of official and social relations within which power is exercised.”¹²⁷ He points out that power is exercised socially by everyone from the prime minister and archbishop to the director of the BBC. Fairlie would go on to define establishment as a term used to denote persons in power who happen to be most disliked by the very users of the term.¹²⁸ The principle of collegiality can provide insight into the concept of the establishment as an institution as it posits that it is not individual elites but rather groups of elites that typically exercise power. This is evidenced by the composition of various boards, cabinets and other forms of executive committees that are common centres of power. Weber observes that collegiality provides an increased range of unique or specialized knowledge that can be drawn upon for decision making and policy creation.¹²⁹ Collegiality also serves to reduce concentration of individual power as having a greater number of persons involved will ideally reflect a broader range of interests, affiliations, loyalties and perspectives.

Elites as defined at the societal level are those who have power to make major decisions in society, although historically as outlined by Marx it was property ownership that determined who was elite. Henry discusses how

¹²⁴ Ibid., 2.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 3.

¹²⁶ Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic*.

¹²⁷ Henry Fairlie, “Political Commentary” *The Spectator*, September 23, 1955, 5. Retrieved from <http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/23rd-september-1955/5/political-commentary> on January 21, 2023.

¹²⁸ Henry Fairlie, “The BBC” in Hugh Thomas (ed.) *The Establishment* (London: Clarkson N. Potter Inc., 1959), 202.

¹²⁹ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (eds.), (New York: The Free Press, 1964).

allegations of what he terms elitism factored in the 1992 U.S. Presidential campaign, particularly from Vice President Quayle who went on record with *The New York Times* alleged their country was split into two cultures, “the cultural elite and the rest of us.”¹³⁰ Quayle’s assertion continues the dichotomous characterization as right and wrong, a war between traditional values and the cultural elite, basic moral values versus a lack of respect for traditions and standards. Interestingly the assertion that cultural elites believe that “all lifestyles are equal” is in sharp contrast to Quayle’s criticism of abortion, homosexual parents, and sex-education and promotion of birth control at schools.¹³¹ Henry suggests Quayle’s attack on cultural elites panders to the populace that do not accept any level of intellectual or creative attainments as justifying anyone considering themselves “better than anyone else.”¹³² Henry, on the other hand is candid in his assertion that it is a simple fact that some people are better than others because they are smarter, work harder, have more education or experience, are more productive or harder to replace. He sees it analogous to how some ideas are better than others and some works of art having a more ubiquitous appeal. In almost the same breath Henry points out that ancestral culture may have deprived some of the necessary tools and opportunities to succeed then defends the historical record as sometimes being “thin because the accomplishments were too.”¹³³ Some of the questions Henry poses includes whether “victory and conquest are too elitist to be cheered” and the extent to which social injustice is causally related to differences in attainment by individuals, is elitism only repugnant when membership in a group is based on something other than “learning and achievement?”¹³⁴ Other declarations he makes against proponents of rule by elites is to equate it to bigotry unless ability is the only basis for “admission to the circle of the elite” ending by pointing out egalitarianism has advanced American society as long as it is understood that opportunity does not have to be equal for all members of society, it need only exist.¹³⁵

Meritocracy can be viewed as the antithesis of elitism in the context of earning one’s place in society in terms of social and economic rewards versus having these ascribed or otherwise awarded based wealth or privilege such as nepotism or opportunism. Meritocracy is a term coined by sociologist Michael Young in the 1950s, and although ostensibly recognizing talent, effort, achievement and hard work, to some it represents a dystopia rather than a utopia.¹³⁶ Looking back on his original analysis 50 years later Young, reiterates his conclusion that equality of opportunity legitimizes inequality which he

¹³⁰ Andrew Rosenthal, “The 1992 Campaign: Quayle Attacks a ‘Cultural Elite,’ Saying it Mocks Nation’s Values,” *The New York Times* (June 10, 1992), Section A, 1.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² Henry, *In Defense of Elitism*, 7.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 16-18.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹³⁶ Michael Young, *The Rise of the Meritocracy 1870-2033* (Middlesex: Penguin, 1961).

characterizes as “a very deep-lying contradiction in society.”¹³⁷ Although meritocracy seems like an intuitive concept, the aspirational critique questions whether society has lived up to its precepts. The recent college admissions scandal in the U.S. raises the question of whether it is the smartest who get into college or is wealth and privilege providing access that is winning out over hard work and intelligence.¹³⁸ Even if admission to institutions of higher learning is based solely on measurable accomplishment, much like the most skilled person being hired for a job it raises the question of what opportunities the successful candidates had in life including social and economic means. Along these lines Mijs and Savage characterize meritocracy as a “deeply elitist” endeavour, citing research showing that inequality in income and wealth distribution increases where meritocracy is the guiding principle in the political agenda.¹³⁹ The authors attribute this not to a coincidental association but rather it is discrimination based upon which so-called merits are rewarded. Meritocratic principles can stand against discrimination but not inequality for the simple reason that everyone will have their own idea of what constitutes having earned their place in society. The authors argue that people tend to see themselves as the product of meritocracy as opposed to acknowledging having their place assigned as a birth-right.¹⁴⁰ The question of who determines the conception of merit upon which meritocracy is predicated is the definitional challenge that plagues many theories, and according to Mijs and Savage requires an elite infrastructure to determine such a testing apparatus.¹⁴¹ The authors note the tendency for individuals to see the world through their own social strata, causing them to lose touch with those who live under circumstances different from their own and normalizing both advantages and disadvantages faced by those around them.¹⁴² Ultimately Mijs and Savage present the paradox of meritocracy as a struggle between equality of opportunity and the need to ensure a corresponding “equality of outcomes.”¹⁴³

In summary, egalitarianism speaks to social equality including the belief that all people should have similar rights and opportunities in life. Meritocracy posits that individuals who have influence and power are selected according to demonstrated ability. Consistent with Bourdieu’s habitus, Henry observes that ability stems from means and opportunity, for example where access to certain social opportunities like clubs, education or institutions paves the way to obtaining qualifications and experience necessary to be classified as having the

¹³⁷ Michael Young, “Looking Back on Meritocracy,” in G. Dench, ed., *The Rise and Rise of Meritocracy* (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 73-77.

¹³⁸ For over a decade an admissions consultant for wealthy families paid off entrance exam administrators or proctors to inflate students' test scores and bribed coaches to designate applicants as recruits for sports they sometimes didn't even play to improve their chances of acceptance. Retrieved from <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/college-admissions-scandal-sentencing-singer-1.6703571> on 28 February, 2023.

¹³⁹ Jonathan J.B. Mijs and Mike Savage, “Meritocracy, Elitism and Inequality,” *The Political Quarterly* 91, no. 2 (April-June 2020): 397.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 399.

¹⁴² Ibid., 403.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

somewhat delusive ability on which meritocracy is based. While ability is present at all ends of the social stratum, Porter takes this one step further with his assertion that in the mid-1960s there was a greater number of highly intelligent people in the lower classes than the higher classes, thus begging the question as to why that does not automatically translate into equal rights and opportunities.¹⁴⁴ Henry argues that at the most pragmatic level it has to be accepted that some ideas are better than others, more subjectively some art has a more ubiquitous appeal, and ultimately some people are better and more successful than others because they are smarter, work harder, or have more education or experience and concludes that opportunity does not have to be equal for all members of society, it need only exist.¹⁴⁵ Young argues that despite meritocracy seeming intuitively positive, it depends on how merits are awarded as equality of opportunity is “a very deep-lying contradiction in society” that legitimizes inequality when social and economic means provided by wealth and privilege win out over hard work and intelligence.¹⁴⁶ Mijs and Savage note the tendency for people to view the world through the perspective of their own socioeconomic circles, resulting in the normalization of both advantages and disadvantages faced by those around them.¹⁴⁷

The concept of egalitarianism has minimal application to the examination of institutional elitism whereas meritocracy or at least the notion of demonstrated ability may have some application toward assessing elite status. With opportunity opening the necessary doors to obtain the experience, qualifications, and credentials that lead to the point where a person can achieve demonstrated ability, there are aspects of meritocracy that have parallels to the process of evaluating and achieving elite status at the institutional level. Specifically, institutions that empower individuals to perform consistently and predictably in ways deemed superior to other groups engaged in similar performance activities also rely on opinions, perspectives and preconceptions that are recognized and socially shared. Henry’s assertion that some ideas are better than others and that success can be attributed to intelligence, hard work, education seems more easily applied to an institution if all participants are afforded equal opportunity for success. The contradiction outlined by Young, Mijs and Savage is that wealth, privilege and socioeconomic advantage and the normalization of both advantages and disadvantages is at the root of much opportunity at the societal level. The difference with an institution is that inculcation into a new habitus largely removes the socioeconomic factors associated with ability and places everyone on a level playing field. We will see this explicated further when discussing the habitus of the Roman Catholic church and the hierarchical structure that favours the ordained priesthood over church laypeople.

¹⁴⁴ Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic*.

¹⁴⁵ Henry, *In Defense of Elitism*, 19.

¹⁴⁶ Michael Young, “Looking Back on Meritocracy,” in G. Dench, ed., *The Rise and Rise of Meritocracy* (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 73-77.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 403.

Elites are defined at the societal level in terms of power, specifically those who hold the power to influence major decisions in society. This contrasts with an institutional analysis of socially shared opinions, perspectives and preconceptions where an identifiable group is construed as performing consistently and predictably in ways deemed superior to other groups engaging in similar performance activities. In other words, at the institutional level, ability and performance are key whereas at the societal level it is power and associated privileges that are the pivotal concepts when determining elite status. This distinction is important in the examination of elitism and elite status and illustrates how analyses at the societal level are less instructive towards identifying or explaining elitism or elite status at the institutional level.

Elitism as Political Power and Influence

The third category of elitism explores power and influence and focuses on the political actions of individuals perceived as being elite. As such it is the category that builds on the definition of an elite and how such status is socially granted. As explicated by Burckhardt, the reverence for men and women who form the elite is based on the conviction that “they are all that we are not.”¹⁴⁸ In the same vein, Mills states that elites direct the military and rule the state “and claim its prerogatives” as their own.¹⁴⁹ This section will explore elitism as power and influence and examine whether this extrapolates to the definition of elitism where attitudes and behaviors that are shared by a group and seek to reinforce in others’ the perception that such group has elite status, and to ultimately reinforce the group’s power, privileges and advantages provided by such status.

Field and Higley assert that the predominant social science definition of elitism refers to “factual concentrations of power and influence,” and make the distinction that this definition in no way implies that individuals in this category are any better or cleverer than anyone else.¹⁵⁰ Nonetheless, they note that desirable positions in society are almost always equated with superior status and consequently a greater share of material wealth. We can note that wealth is not a relevant factor to the working definition when assessing elite status from an institutional perspective. The authors distinguish between their conceptualization of elites and the popular usage of the term, specifying that for their purposes the elitist paradigm centres around “political actions of persons” rather than “persons allegedly distinguished by ‘superior’ personal traits or skills.”¹⁵¹ Political action consists of persons occupying strategic positions in either government or private bureaucratic organizations such as enterprise, trade unions, religious organizations, and even protest groups. The authors argue that political and social power is necessarily concentrated in the persons who occupy these strategic positions. This perspective is still helpful towards examining situations where individuals view themselves as superior insofar as their

¹⁴⁸ Jacob Burckhardt, *Force and Freedom* (New York: Pantheon, 1943), 303.

¹⁴⁹ C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 4.

¹⁵⁰ G. Lowell Field and John Higley, *Elitism* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013).

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

dominance of an institution is impacted by their belief and any corresponding attitude and actions. While acknowledging that social scientists have historically tended to advocate egalitarian positions, Field and Higley not only defend elitism but argue that political stability depends upon the existence of elites, suggesting that an explicitly elitist perspective among persons in power “generally is necessary to meet the current problems of developed and developing societies realistically and practically.”¹⁵² The authors recognize that the concept of elites can be unpalatable when approached from different moral points of view and presents a challenge in social thought due to the subjectivity involved regarding what one believes to be true which also influences what one judges to be useful knowledge.¹⁵³ The importance of perspective is again highlighted because often those in power are imbued with values including adherence to the rule of law, representative government, free markets, freedom of press as well as individual liberties such as freedom of speech and freedom of religion. Alternatively, socialist views and adherence to the welfare state paradigm are more likely to appeal to those who view themselves as disenfranchised or otherwise disaffected.

Democratic elitism appears to have limited relevance to the inquiry at hand mainly due to its focus at the societal rather than organizational level. Some of the concepts such as the definition and role of elites and the corresponding justifications offers insight into elite status. Mosca, Pareto and Michels were empirical social scientists of the 1925-1975 era who approached elitism as a moral point of view. Proponents of the democratic theory of elitism accept that elites play a role in politics and organizations and argue their existence is not antithetical to democratic principles. Field and Higley assert that to fully advocate for elitist assumptions it is necessary to counter the widely held proposition that values including “equality, liberty and freedom are universal and objective.”¹⁵⁴ Sartori examines the practice and ideal of democracy, and his central theme is that to function properly, a democracy requires both an awareness of facts (realism) and a “value pressure” on the facts (idealism.)¹⁵⁵ Sartori criticizes the lack of theoretical foundation in what were the predominant attacks on elitism at the time of his writing, notably Bachrach and Parry. There is some overlap between democratic and elite theories, where “government by the few” smacks of elitism while democracy appears much more palatable when portrayed as “government by the people.” Bachrach’s critique predicates that those distinctions are moot because, whether a society functions in a totalitarian or democratic fashion, in his view the most important political decisions must be left to “a handful of men.”¹⁵⁶ Bachrach subsequently describes this somewhat more palatably as society depending upon “the ability of the gifted to command

¹⁵² Ibid., x.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 3.

¹⁵⁵ Giovanni Sartori, “Anti-Elitism Revisited,” a draft part of *Democratic Theory*, 2nd Edition (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1978), 59.

¹⁵⁶ Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1980), 1.

the deference of the many for the well-being of all.”¹⁵⁷ Bachrach asserts that it is not the inequality of individual ability that distinguishes democratic theory from elitism, as democrats recognize the vital role that elites play.¹⁵⁸ Rather, the democrat in this context cannot accept the worth of a human being as measured by a hierarchical ordering of attributes and as such is unwilling to impose his values on all men.¹⁵⁹ Bachrach asserts that democrats value both results and process when determining public interest, which requires sound decisions arrived at with appropriate public participation while also meeting the needs of the community. Porter sums up the power struggle between elite groups as being managed by “a floating equilibrium of compromise” that keeps society integrated.¹⁶⁰ At the same time, he asserts that the ideologies and social values that kept Western societies together in the 1960s were Christianity, capitalism and nationalism.¹⁶¹ In the desire to gain and maintain power, elites invariably encroach on other sectors, such as when the efforts of the leadership of a trade union to improve their workers’ financial situation also impinges on the pecuniary interests of the economic elite. Porter claims that government bureaucracies, which he considers part of an elite, can acquire a life of their own and encroach on economic and political spheres.¹⁶² Ultimately, Porter notes that functional specialization tends to limit the interchange between elite power roles while at the same time pointing out the intersection between the military and political spheres where generals have been elected president.¹⁶³

A historical perspective of the superiority of elites is summed up by Burckhardt and Mills including the inclination to claim the prerogatives of the state as their own as they rule over society. Field and Higley supplement this view with the observation that societal elites are neither better nor cleverer than those whom they rule over, rather their status denotes that they occupy positions of power in both public and private sectors as well as various institutions. Field and Higley are using elitism in the context of being ruled by elites rather than a definition encompassing attitudes and behaviours seeking to reinforce the perception of elite status or any other form of social posturing. Bachrach continues along the same line of discussion as Field and Higley with the notion of democratic elitism, asserting that any political structure whether totalitarian or democratic still results in key decisions being left to the elite. In summary, democratic elitism and its collateral perspectives that focus on governmental and political structures and economic influences do not offer any direct avenues for the exploration of institutional elitism. Political power and influence rely on factors that have minimal applicability at the institutional level.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 2.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 3.

¹⁶⁰ Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic*, 210-11.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 212.

¹⁶² Ibid., 208.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 209. The majority of U.S. Presidents in the 1800s not only had military service but held General Officer rank. George Washington, Andrew Jackson, William Harrison, James Garfield, Andrew Johnson, Ulysses S. Grant, to name a few with Dwight D. Eisenhower being the last president to have held General Officer rank.

Formal Knowledge Based Elitism

Formal knowledge based elitism is the fourth category of elitism, commonly referred to in the literature as academic elitism. This area of elitism already incorporates many of Bourdieu's ideas, therefore the goal is to identify literature that compliments or extends beyond concepts already discussed. Formal knowledge based elitism pertains to association with any academic institution from private boarding schools to institutions of higher learning like colleges and universities as well as corresponding professional associations and regulatory bodies for professional degrees such as law and medicine. This area of elitism finds its roots in the reputation of the institution where a person is educated or employed or within a particular field or subject of study typically viewed as elite such as law or medicine. Formal knowledge based elitism also encompasses collateral issues such as academic inbreeding where a particular institution favours its own graduates as faculty, sometimes under the pretext of retaining intellectual talent. Inbreeding discourages new relationships and can inhibit change by solidifying or entrenching the existing academic habitus or culture and suppressing new perspectives and any corresponding knowledge. Formal knowledge based elitism offers promising insight into this examination of elitism given the institutional context within which it is situated.

Education plays an important role as a socializing agent, as evidenced by the impact Bourdieu's education had on his social mobility and intellectual trajectory. Bourdieu's father transcended the class origins of his father who was a farmer, becoming a *transfuge* or betrayer of his class origins because he chose to be a postmaster instead of engaging in manual labour associated with farming. Bourdieu may have viewed himself as a *double-transfuge* according to Grenfell, based on "betraying the egalitarian ideals of a socially mobile father" as Bourdieu saw education as mechanism for consolidating social separation.¹⁶⁴ Because a baccalaureate could only be obtained with lycées, Bourdieu believed the intention of a degree was to create a gap difficult for others to cross.¹⁶⁵ Grenfell concludes that Bourdieu's time in school instilled a lasting ambivalence about the "function and status of objective knowledge."¹⁶⁶ Instead of education serving as a means towards achieving an inclusive society, Grenfell asserts that Bourdieu "imbibed a cognitive culture which procured him distinction, potentially elevating him above the processes of mass democratization."¹⁶⁷ As such, Grenfell's view of formal knowledge based elitism aligns directly with the definition of attitudes and behaviours shared by a group, namely graduates of institutions of higher learning, where they collectively seek to reinforce in others the perceptions of elite status and to ultimately reinforce access to their group's

¹⁶⁴ Michael Grenfell (ed.), *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts* (Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing, 2008), 28.

¹⁶⁵ Goblot, *La barrière et le niveau* (1930) quoted in J.E. Talbott *The Politics of Educational Reform in France, 1918-1940* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), 18.

¹⁶⁶ Grenfell, *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts*, 29.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 30.

power, privileges and advantages provided by their status as graduates. At the same time, Grenfell's conclusion that Bourdieu's schooling instilled in him a lasting ambivalence regarding objective knowledge" might be better expressed as referring to whether such objective knowledge is possible or at least prevalent when obtained within the confines of the education system he was criticizing.

To understand the applicability of habitus to formal knowledge based elitism and the acquisition of cultural capital, it is helpful to examine Nobel and Watkins analysis of how elite playing and coaching skills are generated and rooted in habitus. Bourdieu's conception of habitus as a system of bodily dispositions stresses the unconscious nature of embodied practices. By raising the question of how Bourdieu would have learned to play tennis, Nobel and Watkins assert this was not inherited capital given Bourdieu's ascendancy as the son of a postman.¹⁶⁸ Applying Bourdieu's conception of habitus they conclude that he "accumulated and displayed a certain cultural and bodily capital" associated with an academic of his demographic, in other words acquired capital.¹⁶⁹ As far as Bourdieu's general assertion that 'feel of the game' is embodied cultural capital, Nobel and Watkins explicate his sports analogy by pointing out nobody starts out as a masterful player because the second nature Bourdieu is referring to must be learned through a tedious process developed over time and "through enormous application."¹⁷⁰ These authors note there are other elements missing from Bourdieu's 'feel of the game' such as "feel for the ball, the pitch."¹⁷¹ Their observation that uniforms, coaches, spectators and the "temporality of the game" all contribute towards the feel of the game are compelling, especially when they contrast an Australian champion tennis player's coaching video with Bourdieu's assertions that the body cannot be taught through theoretical discourse, thus "dismissing any discursive dimension" to sports training.¹⁷² Zagal and Mateas' explanation of game temporality, although referring to video games, is nonetheless instructive as they note that temporality accounts for part of the "dominant experiential effects of games."¹⁷³ Nobel and Watkins supplement Bourdieu's emphasis on the unconscious nature of habitus by arguing that habituation better explains the acquisition of habitus. That is, technique must be refined from iteration to become "naturalized" to the point they become automatic reactions, i.e. where conscious behaviour becomes unconscious. Light and Evans apply Bourdieu's concepts to the analysis of rugby coach development with a view towards identifying and isolating characteristics of the individual coaching habitus and how experience influences various

¹⁶⁸ Noble and Watkins, "So, How did Bourdieu Learn to Play Tennis?"

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 521.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 527.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 527-28.

¹⁷³ Jose P. Zagal and Michael Mateas, "Temporal Frames: a Unifying Framework for the Analysis of Game Temporality," prepared for Authors and Digital Games Research Association 2007 Conference. Retrieved from <https://users.soe.ucsc.edu/~michaelm/publications/zagal-digra2007.pdf> on March 2, 2023.

approaches.¹⁷⁴ Townsend and Cushion follow this by applying Bourdieu's concepts to an analysis of the social structures within elite cricket coach education.¹⁷⁵

The common assertion in generalized definitions of elitism describe it as featuring a superior attitude or behaviour demonstrated by an elite individual or group, which begs the question of who is elite. The working definition of elite status at an institutional level has been established as socially shared opinions, perspectives, and preconceptions where an identifiable group is construed as performing consistently and predictably in ways deemed superior to other groups engaging in similar performance activities. In terms of acceptance into institutions of higher learning, an individual's basis for perceived superiority may be rooted in factors including wealth, intelligence, social standing, all of which have implications on meeting admission requirements and tuition fees and ultimately their choice of which college or university they attend. Formal knowledge based elitism pertains to favoured treatment derived solely from the reputation and prestige of the institution where a degree was conferred, which for some raises the objection that institutional affiliation should be a functionally irrelevant factor when compared with behavioural competencies such as a demonstrated history of academic research and publishing. This raises the question that when a university hires faculty, is the primary goal to enhance the prestige of the institution or to improve the quality of academic research and instruction at the same time recognizing that the two may not be mutually exclusive.

While prestige can be viewed primarily in terms of an institution's general reputation, Burris explores prestige as social capital in the context of an academic caste system where schools mutually benefit from a network of association and social capital exchange.¹⁷⁶ He concludes departmental prestige is enhanced by the "self-reproducing capacity of social capital" as these departments maintain and expand their interdepartmental social networks.¹⁷⁷ Burris notes these academic status hierarchies are insulated from change by social closure and the self-reproducing capacity of social capital that can insulate these hierarchies "from the winds of social, economic and intellectual change."¹⁷⁸ Weber similarly asserts that elevated social status depends upon the reproduction of prestige hierarchies as predicated on the closure of social interaction and communication between higher and lower status groups.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁴ Richard L. Light and John Robert Evans, "Dispositions of Elite-Level Australian Rugby Coaches Toward Game Sense: Characteristics of their Coaching Habitus," *Sport, Education and Society* 18, no. 3 (2013): 407-423.

¹⁷⁵ Robert C. Townsend and Christopher Cushion, "Elite Cricket Coach Education: a Bourdieusian Analysis," *Sport, Education and Society* 22, no. 4 (2017): 528-546.

¹⁷⁶ Val Burris, "The Academic Caste System: Prestige Hierarchies in PhD Exchange Networks," *American Sociological Review* 69 (April, 2004): 239-264.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 260.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ Max Weber, "India: The Brahman and the Castes" in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.) *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 396-415.

A concern with any form of intellectual elitism is the insular connotations, that is the propensity to emulate rather than challenge the approaches, philosophies, and ideas of one's peers. Melville, Barrow and Morgan explore academic elitism from the perspective of academic inbreeding, a phenomenon where universities gravitate towards hiring their own graduates for faculty positions.¹⁸⁰ The authors focus their case study on Australian law schools by exploring the collateral effects of academic inbreeding as a form of elitism where the term denotes favouring those deemed elite. This includes the extent to which inbreeding stifles diversity and reduces innovation, which they argue is then reproduced as "elitism which then flows into the (legal) profession."¹⁸¹ Similarly, Campos examines the perceived superior quality of elite law schools, specifically Harvard and Yale, and discusses academic inbreeding and the tendency for faculty to be immobile in that they have received their initial law degree from either Harvard or Yale and have returned as faculty. Campos argues institutions should avoid the urge to "replicate themselves" so as to prevent rigidly fixed uniformity that is the antithesis of intellectual diversity.¹⁸² Melville et al. claim that another side-effect of academic inbreeding is that in-bred academics are less productive than their counterparts, at least in terms of academic research.¹⁸³ Campos points out that diversity of opinion, background and viewpoints benefits law students by providing not only relevant experience but also a real connection to the issues and circumstances applicable to the real life practice of law. Making the choice to focus on providing legal defence for individuals believed to have been wrongfully convicted requires dedication that is based largely on empathy. Lawyers who have first-hand experience with social vulnerabilities such as poverty, lack of affordable housing and mental health and substance abuse issues are better equipped and motivated towards understanding and fighting for such clients. Campos notes that in addition to a narrower set of perspectives, inbred tenure-track academics often have a more bounded skillset based on lack of exposure as practicing attorneys.¹⁸⁴ In terms of elite status, while possessing an initial law degree from Harvard or Yale commands a high degree of respect in the legal field, Campos suggests many of the law professors hired by these schools lack significant experience as practicing lawyers. The homogeneity of educational and professional backgrounds of these professors has, according to Campos, produced a "blindness of the elites" where the high cost of a degree from Harvard or Yale does not translate into a corresponding increase in salary compared to

¹⁸⁰ Angela Melville, Amy Barrow and Patrick Morgan, "Inbreeding and the Reproduction of Elitism: An Empirical Examination of Inbreeding Within Australian Legal Academia," *Legal Education Review* 30 (2020).

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁸² Paul Campos, "Legal Academia and the Blindness of the Elites," *Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy* 37, no. 1 (2014): 181.

¹⁸³ Melville et al, "Inbreeding and the Reproduction of Elitism," 2. Of significance however is that productivity is being measured in terms of research. The authors acknowledge that in-bred academics focus on activities with a high profile within their institution, such as teaching and outreach activities.

¹⁸⁴ Campos, "Legal Academia and the Blindness of the Elites," 182.

other schools.¹⁸⁵ This blindness ignores the economic reality of some 200 U.S. law schools producing 45 000 graduates annually to compete for only 5000 prospective legal jobs.¹⁸⁶

Melville et al. note a key concern with academic inbreeding in the legal academia in that law professors are “the gatekeepers of the legal profession” and inbreeding privileges elitism in the sense of favouring their own.¹⁸⁷ If we consider more than perspectives, the product of inbreeding can be practicing lawyers who lack insight into the full range of backgrounds, problems, and overall social vulnerabilities of their clients. At worse is the situation these authors attribute to elite U.S. law schools where idealistic students are re-socialized from an interest in social justice to “accept careerist norms and elitist ideologies.”¹⁸⁸ Bair and Thompson explain why academic inbreeding is necessarily self-perpetuating in terms of the subjectivity of how schools are rated and how prestige (as distinguished from quality) is determined.¹⁸⁹ These authors note that in the case of the sociology departments they analyzed, a small group of institutions tended to enhance and thus mutually reinforce their reputations by reciprocally hiring each other’s graduates.¹⁹⁰ One explanation provided is that when academic elites are rating their peers at other institutions, they are often rating their former professors or students, all of whom have a vested interest in maintaining a similar definition and understanding of who is elite.¹⁹¹ Similar to Campos’ point regarding whether elite law schools translate into higher salaries in the workforce, Bair and Thompson note that social institutions could be best understood by looking beyond its formal organization and analysing the subjective experience of the members of the group or organization and examining the influence it has on their lives. Bair and Thomas conclude that prestige is equated with power that is unequally distributed. Bair and Boor make similar observations with respect to law schools, questioning whether the highest ranked schools are truly the best law schools or is their prestige renewed because these schools “comprise an academic elite who have a vested interest in perpetuating the notion that they are academically the best?”¹⁹²

Promising concepts from the review of formal knowledge based elitism start with the continued explication of the definitional problem where elitism, although rarely defined, is generally used to refer to favouring an institution’s own graduates and/or faculty or in the context of questioning whether treatment is earned or otherwise deserved and to denote perceptions of superiority. Simply

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 182.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 186. Campos points out that elite positions in legal professions (Federal judges and partners in national law firms) are dominated by graduates of elite law schools.

¹⁸⁷ Melville et al., “Inbreeding and the Reproduction of Elitism,” 23.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Jeffrey Bair and William Thompson, “The Academic Elite in Sociology: A Reassessment of Top-Ranked Graduate Programs,” *Mid-American Review of Sociology* 10, no. 1 (1985): 37-44.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 42.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Jeffrey H. Bair and Myron Boor, “The Academic Elite in Law: Linkages Among Top-Ranked Law Schools,” *Psychological Reports* 68 (1991): 891-894.

put, formal knowledge based elitism is social posturing where faculty or graduates seek the advantages and privileges associated with their status. Institutions also benefit from this elitism when the reputation of the institution is perpetuated resulting in access to research funding and financial donorship. Self-referential values and practices and reproduction are concerns identified with formal knowledge based elitism. The corresponding dysfunctional implications with these phenomena as identified in the literature include the stifling of social and intellectual perspectives, approaches, philosophies, and ideas when there is a focus on replicating mentors or academic inbreeding when hiring faculty. When social networks are inhibited or otherwise bounded, diversity and innovation are invariably constrained. Insulation from other status groups and the propensity to emulate peers rather than challenge the status quo are potential qualitative indicators of elitism.

The common attributes of academic elitism that have been identified include the entrenchment of an existing culture, intellectual perspectives, and social networks. Furthermore, there is a question of the degree to which wealth and social standing are prerequisites to admission including the ability to pay tuition at elite schools, and whether a given school's reputation correlates with a higher quality education or research capacity. Put more succinctly, is the elite status truly justified and supported by any factors other than attitudes and behaviours of faculty and alumni seeking to reinforce and perpetuate that school's reputation? Even if the elite status of a particular school is generally accepted, is the assertion based on the school's graduates being construed as performing consistently and predictably in ways deemed superior to graduates from similar programs in other institutions? This is a key point in terms of assessing elite status. The desirability and esteem associated with certain schools and degrees might be empirically verifiable but at the same time begs the question of whether that perception is justified in terms of any quantifiable factors other than reputation alone. Examples of affirmation might include attainment of desirable jobs, further academic credentials, all the while acknowledging that it can be argued that such success is inextricably tied to social stratum and corresponding opportunities that provide access to the elite school in the first place. The self-reproducing effect of academic inbreeding impacts diversity in many respects, and results in a predilection towards replicating the existing homogeneity of social, educational and professional backgrounds. Melville et al. pit social justice against "careerist norms and elitist ideologies," warning that law students for example can be re-socialized from altruistic, social-justice orientations to more elitist aspirations (e.g. more lucrative pursuits like commercial law) thus demonstrating the far-reaching potential impacts of stifling innovation and change.¹⁹³ In terms of reinforcing access to power, privileges or advantage, those engaged in academic elitism have a vested interest in perpetuating the notion of being the best and an entrenched culture upholding the perception of superiority, even if their quantifiable performance such as research productivity and higher salaries for graduates is not predictably superior.

¹⁹³ Melville et al., "Inbreeding and the Reproduction of Elitism," 23.

Formal knowledge based elitism centres on the reputation of an institution, protecting status through reproduction. This includes inbreeding where members are immobile either within their institution or between select institutions of similar status. The concept of reproduction extends beyond these institutions and into the corresponding professions, with law professor for example acting as de facto gatekeepers for their profession. All of this corresponds to the social capital of formal knowledge based elitism, or in other words the forms of power that determine the social position of a person. These concepts are integral to the next category of elitism.

Institutional Elitism

The examination of institutional elitism will extend beyond Bourdieu's ideas and the analysis of institutions that have been explored thus far. The Roman Catholic Church will be explored further in the context of perceptions of superiority and corresponding abuse of privileges. Albeit this is one of many institutions that could be scrutinized in the context of elitism, there is literature that uses Bourdieu's framework to explore aspects evocative of elitism and as such is very instructive towards understanding how elitism manifests and is subsequently reproduced. The habitus of the church also offers fruitful avenues for exploring cultural and symbolic capital. Another distinct area for the examination of elitism is corporations. An intriguing aspect of corporate elitism that is relevant to this inquiry is where the literature identifies that many of the attitudes and behaviours that propel corporations to success prove to be the cause of the institution's downfall when taken too far.

There are several distinctions to be made between institutions and organizations. Institutions are sub-systems of the broader social system or society.¹⁹⁴ While organizations are generally physical units, institutions can be either physical or abstract such as the institution of marriage, the church or even the mass media. Institutions can be organized based on professional, academic, social or religious purposes to name a few. Corporate elitism is a category of institutional elitism that is worthy of particular focus in relation to the inquiry at hand given the institutional focus. Corporate elitism arises out of a quest for primacy such as the desire to dominate a market. It can lead to the blurring or crossing of lines in a continuum that affects the quality of the product or service and impacts industry norms related to acceptable or required behaviours and practices. The trajectory towards failure can culminate with the crossing of ethical, regulatory or legal boundaries, thus bearing comparison to this inquiry's working definition of elitism where the intent is to reinforce power, privileges and advantages provided by their corporate status.

There are several concepts and definitions applicable to studying the connection between institutional norms and elitism that need to be explored prior to examining the literature on institutional elitism. Institutional norms are established patterns of behaviour that define, control and restrict actions by functioning as agents of socialization. Norms also have a legal and regulatory

¹⁹⁴ Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic*, 201.

function, acknowledging these represent the minimum expectations that are imposed much the way a society's criminal law regulates a tolerable rather than ideal standard of behaviour for citizens. The concept of culture inevitably rears up due to its prevalence as a broad and sweeping manifestation of ways of life within an institution or other social stratum. Culture is a nebulous concept, leading Williams to refer to the term as one of the most complicated words in the English language due to its use for "important concepts in several distinct intellectual disciplines and in several distinct and incompatible systems of thought."¹⁹⁵

Schein acknowledges that culture is an abstraction but asserts that it pertains to forces that are "below the surface" in an institution which "guide and constrain the behaviour of members of a group through the shared norms that are held in the group."¹⁹⁶ This assertion is evocative of habitus with the reference to subconscious forces operating below the surface. Narrowing the focus of this inquiry into elitism from culture to norms is intended to help avoid the reification fallacy that can be associated with attempting to examine the culture of an organization. Reification is a fallacy of ambiguity, where an abstract concept like culture is treated as concrete or a physical entity, such as blaming the woes of an institution on a concept as broad as its culture which then becomes something that is broken and just needs to be fixed or replaced. The ambiguity commences with the challenge of culture having more than one meaning and being used without sufficiently specifying the intended meaning. In the anthropological context, culture typically refers to customs and rituals. Hackett Fischer includes culture, class and education in his list of words that "should never be employed without an ad-hoc definition," essentially just a simple explanation of what the word means in that particular context.¹⁹⁷ Attempting to define culture and isolating causal or contributing factors and elements is when it becomes apparent that culture is a concept that is far more enigmatic than identifying and assessing specific norms.

To William's point with respect to the difficulty in clearly defining what constitutes institutional culture, norms are helpful when exploring behaviour and expectations. Norms are rules or standards of behaviour that apply to members of a group, society or culture. A limitation arises in that there is often a lack of consensus amongst members in terms of defining norms, as expectations can vary dependent on age, ethnicity and gender for example. In Weber's analysis of forms that underlie ordered human interaction, he defines norms as rules of conduct towards which actors orient their behaviour.¹⁹⁸ Weber asserts the two aspects of ordered social interaction are norms and authority. Ordered interaction

¹⁹⁵ Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 87.

¹⁹⁶ Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership, 3rd Edition* (San Francisco: Wiley, 2004), 8.

¹⁹⁷ David Hackett Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1970), 265.

¹⁹⁸ Max Weber, *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society*, translated Edward Shils and Max Rheinstein (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), 125.

is then achieved when sufficient actors orient their behaviour towards complying with the same norms. Norms contribute to social order in that they are socially reinforced through positive or negative sanctions. As such they are learned through socialization within a group or society. A simple example such as the practice of not wearing a hat at the dinner table is an example of a norm where expectations vary inter-generationally. Analyzing institutions and their practices from the perspective of norms instead of the broader concept of culture is more conducive to home in on specific practices and expectations, but habitus offers the most powerful analytical approach for this inquiry into institutional elitism. For example, the stated norms of the Canadian Armed Forces provide overall expectations for everything from dealing with sexual misconduct to general professionalism. For this inquiry, research into the day-to-day routine, practices, attitudes, and behaviours of members of the Cdn AB Regt will reveal the norms and expectations of that institution which can then be correlated to habitus.

Recognizing that norms establish expectations for behaviour, elitism can be examined within the context of social status and socially shared beliefs. According to Anderson, all humans must be socialized to learn how to function within a given society.¹⁹⁹ Mead explains that socialization stems from the fact that people's minds and selves are social products and phenomena of the social side of their experience.²⁰⁰ Socialization is an active and ongoing learning process tied to a given society, where one learns the social rules for interacting within that society. It is a lifelong learning process that Hoy and Woolfolk describe as dealing with "the acquisition of the necessary orientations for satisfactory functioning in a role."²⁰¹ These orientations include values, norms, informal networks, and the specific skills pertaining to the society within which socialization is occurring. When we speak of a society this refers broadly to any community, institution or aggregate of people that share either customs or purpose. We can narrow examples of society from Canadian society to the Canadian Armed Forces as an institution then further isolate a specific portion of that institution like an individual regiment. Anderson notes that a society is a grouping of people "typically demonstrating a unique pattern of social relations and shared norms, values, and beliefs," which is helpful when thinking of how members of an institution interact with each other.²⁰² All of these concepts provide insight and context for Bourdieu's conception of habitus.

Bourdieu uses the term social agents to encompass individuals, groups and institutions.²⁰³ An organization is a collection of people who share a common identity and are brought together to work towards a collective goal, such as a business. An institution is dedicated towards promoting a specific cause, such as

¹⁹⁹ Karen L. Anderson, *Thinking About Sociology, Second Edition* (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2016), 222.

²⁰⁰ George Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of Social Behaviourist* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

²⁰¹ Wayne Hoy and Anita Woolfolk, "Socialization of Student Teachers," *American Educational Research Journal* 27, no. 2: 283-84.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 126.

²⁰³ Maton, "Habitus" in Michael Grenfell (ed.) *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts*, 51.

professional associations like law societies or medical associations. An institution might also be formed to promote social ideals or causes. An institution can also refer to a set of ideals such as education as a social institution, and influence a variety of aspects of society including socialization, status formation, social order and economic productivity.²⁰⁴ Moskos argues that institutions are legitimated through adherence to values and norms that are intended to transcend the self-interest of individuals.²⁰⁵ His discussion of the military as an institution versus occupation has evolved over the years to be presented less in terms of a dichotomy and will also be discussed further in the context of institutional particularities of the military in Chapter 2.

Having clarified some of the broader sociological concepts pertaining to institutions, the first institution to be examined in the context of elitism is the church where there is some illuminating literature pertaining to the attitudes and behaviours of members of the ordained priesthood. This will enhance our understanding of the elite status of priests within the Roman Catholic Church as well as assessing whether the cleric-centered governance of this church contributes to elitism. Porter asserts that the priesthood provides an example of elitism where individuals with specific status or designations stake claim over all aspects of a specific domain and become the sole purveyors of the associated standards or values. Fendler notes the tension between expertise and populism where the ordained priesthood has historically borne the exclusive responsibility of interpreting and conveying the word of God. She extrapolates this to society in general and advocates the need to be inclusive and to imagine a wide range of definitions of expertise when evaluating the extent to which educated elites are having their expertise and role as “authorized interpreters of the world” challenged by the so-called laypersons.²⁰⁶ This begs a deeper analysis of the socialization process involved with entering the priesthood, from acculturation to inculturation and acceptance of ecclesial cultural capitals including the institutional hierarchy.

Ballano applies Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field and cultural capital to examine the ecclesial structures that support mandatory celibacy within the Roman Catholic Church.²⁰⁷ He correlates mandatory celibacy with several dysfunctional implications, of which clericalism is most closely related to elitism since it involves the overextension or misuse of authority that can correspond to reinforcing power, privileges and advantages provided by membership in the priesthood. Cupich draws a direct line between clericalism and elitism where some individuals claiming elite status of the priesthood view themselves as having “special rights and privileges” entitling them to “prerogatives and

²⁰⁴ Steckley, *Elements of Sociology*, 349.

²⁰⁵ Charles Moskos, “Institutional/Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update,” *Armed Forces and Society* 12, no. 3 (Spring 1986): 377-382.

²⁰⁶ Lynn Fendler, “An Information Reformation? Research Expertise in a Populist Context,” *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 54, no. 3 (2020): 694.

²⁰⁷ Vivencio O. Ballano, “Catholic Clerical Celibacy and Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice: Analyzing Ecclesial Structures Supporting Mandatory Celibacy,” *The International Journal of Religion and Spirituality in Society* 11, Issue 1 (2021): 211-226.

exempting them from being called to account for their behaviour.”²⁰⁸ Ballano attributes clerical sexual abuse and double lives as part of the fallout from mandatory celibacy, all of which is facilitated by the ability to exercise power and privileges accorded to ordained priests.²⁰⁹ This power comes from the elite status of the ordained priesthood, a group perceived within the church as superior in terms of their special powers within the church especially the general premise that their word is accepted without question. With respect to the power imbalance that exists in situations of clericalism, the victim is aware of who is most likely to be believed if they come forward with any allegations. Ballano explains the status of clerics is predicated on the Code of Canon Law which stipulates that only those “who receive holy orders can govern the church” while congregants and other laity remain “their helpers and obedient flock.”²¹⁰ Ballano notes that ordination, formal theological degrees (a doctorate or licentiate/master’s) and clerical studies, and celibacy are “highly valued cultural capitals” within the Roman Catholic Church. As the exclusive domain of the ordained priesthood, these are the plenary powers required for ascension to the highest statuses of bishop then Pope.²¹¹ In a separate article on Catholic clerical education, Ballano advocates the need to add anthropology and social sciences to address the behavioural dimension of a priest’s work and for them to better understand the study of culture.²¹²

The concept of mandatory celibacy begs further analysis in terms of whether this constitutes a practice that is perpetuated solely to reinforce power and the perception of elite status or whether it is a valuable and necessary special ecclesial power that is sometimes abused to reinforce nefarious advantages and privileges. Mandatory celibacy is an ecclesiastical practice that has been maintained even though there is a long history of negative repercussions in terms of clericalism especially in the form of sexual abuse. Ballano’s analysis of mandatory celibacy does not mention elitism, but his exploration reveals that the corresponding advantages and privileges of elitism within the ordained clergy of the Roman Catholic Church are those that facilitate clerical sexual abuse. Ballano describes the elite status of ordained clergy both in terms of the academic and ecclesial requirements, which correlates to significant power and authority over the unordained laypersons who are excluded from admission into the hierarchical structure of the church or any decision-making. The habitus of the priesthood within the Roman Catholic Church will be examined further to elucidate key concepts including clerical socialization, institutional hierarchy and how these translate into special power that has sometimes been subject to abuse within the ordained priesthood.

²⁰⁸ Blase J. Cupich, “Clericalism: an Infection that can be Cured,” July 10, 2019, www.chicagocatholic.com/cardinal-blase-j-cupich/-/article/2019/07/10/clericalism-an-infection-that-can-be-cured

²⁰⁹ Ballano, “Catholic Clerical Celibacy,” 212.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 213.

²¹¹ Ibid., 218.

²¹² Vivencio O. Ballano, “Inculturation, Philosophy, and the Social Sciences as the Emerging Handmaid of Theology: Time to Update Catholic Clerical Education,” *The International Journal of Religion and Spirituality in Society* 11, no. 2, (2021): 1-13.

The next type of institution to be examined is corporations. Building on indicators of elitism from the priesthood, a particular focus involves looking for evidence of corporate institutions exercising their power as sole purveyors of standards and acceptable practices. Yim and Park define corporate elitism as a “collectively inflated preoccupation with organizational superiority and extra privileges,” which aligns with the working definition of elitism.²¹³ Another key definition when exploring corporate elitism pertains to organizational culture, the “norms and fundamental assumptions that the organization makes about itself, the nature of people in general and its environment.”²¹⁴ Mitroff et al. note the aforementioned are often unconscious beliefs and fundamental assumptions that are essentially a set of unwritten rules governing what constitutes acceptable or required behaviour within an organization, which is again evocative of habitus. The symptoms of corporate elitism appear to be analogous to what one would expect to see in not just the corporate world but in any organization with a culture of superiority and in some cases privilege. This includes extreme adherence to organizational norms, that is the rules of human behaviour within the organization but also with little regard for how this affects those outside the organization. For example, a hyper-focus on profits or dominating a market by being on the cutting edge of new technology, perhaps in deference to quality and functionality of the product or service that is offered. Mitroff et al. note that organizational leadership can become so overconfident in their vision and the power they wield so as to dismiss any opposition.²¹⁵ By failing to fully assess and consider alternative viewpoints or approaches, an organization can lose the opportunity to address shortcomings or deficiencies. An inwardly focused culture can also limit an organizations commitment to socially responsible practices as they cease to take information from outsiders seriously.²¹⁶ Yim and Park attribute this to two key characteristics of corporate elitism, “insulation from the outside world and excessive conformity with corporate norms.”²¹⁷

Balch and Armstrong discuss ethical marginality and corporate wrongdoing, noting that failure can occur where “a high flier flies too high, ignores advice about the appropriate bounds of behaviour, and falls to ruin.”²¹⁸ These authors cite Enron as an example of a corporate high-flier where the company’s norms consisting of fraudulent accounting practices initially

²¹³ Myungok Chris Yim and Hyun Soon Park, “The Effects of Corporate Elitism and Groupthink on Organizational Empathy in Crisis Situations,” *Public Relations Review* 47 (2021): 3.

²¹⁴ Ian Mitroff, Thierry Pauchant, Michael Finney & Chris Pearson “Do (some) Organizations Cause Their Own Crises? The Cultural Profiles of Crisis-Prone vs. Crisis-Prepared Organizations,” *Industrial Crisis Quarterly* 3 (1989): 269-283.

²¹⁵ Ian Mitroff, Thierry Pauchant, and Paul Shrivastava. “The Structure of Man-Made Organizational Crisis; Conceptual and Empirical Issues in the Development of a General Theory of Crisis Management.” *Technological Forecasting & Social Change* 33, no. 2 (April 1988): 83-107.

²¹⁶ Yim and Park, “The Effects of Corporate Elitism and Groupthink.”

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

²¹⁸ Dennis R. Balch and Robert Armstrong, “Ethical Marginality: The Icarus Syndrome and Banality of Wrongdoing.” *Journal of Business Ethics* 92 (2010): 291.

produced desirable corporate profits but ultimately led to a financial scandal. They note that the conditions that enabled the scandal are often prevalent where there is a focus on results without questioning how they are achieved and where “a sense of special mission is used to claim special status and quell skeptics.”²¹⁹ This notion of special mission and special status can be correlated to attitudes and behaviours rooted in elitism where the status is used to access the privileges and advantages including elevated salaries, stock shares, or other perks and benefits. The authors maintain that because high performance is often accomplished at the margin of acceptable behaviours and practices, the important distinction becomes whether actions are aggressively pushing a boundary, breaking old rules and “defying skeptics to overcome conventional wisdom,” or crossing the line of ethical behaviour. Balch and Armstrong recognize the iconoclastic nature of competitive, high-performance environments. To illustrate the pressure to break rules that contributes to a corporate culture of wrongdoing, they reverse an old adage to “it’s not how you play the game that counts, it’s whether you win or lose.”²²⁰ In terms of elitism, corporate high-fliers are individuals or companies that use their position as leading industry performers to claim elite status and then seek privileges and advantages, including those related to financial earnings and various forms of compensation and reward for executives, stockholders or others.

Miller, Balch and Armstrong explore the demise of highly successful corporations in the context of the story of Icarus where the paradox is that the same exceptional ability and power associated with attaining great heights was precisely what led to Icarus’s demise.²²¹ The Icarus syndrome or paradox isolates symptoms and consequences of elitist behaviour in the corporate context. The ancient Greek myth of Icarus saw the inventor Daedalus craft wax wings for himself and his son Icarus so that they could escape from the Labyrinth of King Minos. Despite prior warnings from his father, Icarus soared too high and proximity to the sun caused the wax on his wings to melt and he fell. Miller’s analysis describes the trajectory of the inevitable downfall of an institution as “success leads to specialization and exaggeration, to confidence and complacency, to dogma and ritual.”²²² The very factors or qualities that drive exceptional ability and success can also lead to individual or organizational demise if not managed carefully. Cohesion is also identified as a key characteristic in building institutional pride and fostering teamwork, but can potentially encourage myopia, homogeneity and ultimately create an “intolerant monoculture.”²²³ Miller identifies an interplay of institutional norms which he lists as “attitudes, policies, and events” that lead organizations on a trajectory

²¹⁹ Ibid., 292.

²²⁰ Ibid., 294.

²²¹ Danny Miller, “The Icarus Paradox: How Exceptional Companies Bring About Their Own Downfall,” *Business Horizons* (January-February 1992); Balch and Armstrong, “Ethical Marginality: The Icarus Syndrome.”

²²² Miller, “The Icarus Paradox,” 24.

²²³ Ibid., 31.

that can build a “deadly momentum” towards decline then failure.²²⁴ He isolates both overconfidence and the tendency to be overambitious as the characteristics that imbue a sense of what he terms elitism that can result in failure when extended too far.²²⁵ Balch, Armstrong and Miller’s contributions are all helpful towards highlighting elitist attitudes and behaviours in the corporate world that also apply equally to other types of institutions.

Balch and Armstrong offer several hypotheses regarding conditions that increase the banality of wrongdoing, all of which provide some context towards understanding conditions that enable elitism to manifest within an organization. They define corporate cocoons as having “self-referential values and ‘us against the world’ sentiment” and featuring an ethical frame of reference that is isolated or encapsulated to the point of normalizing some behaviours that could otherwise be regarded as unethical or improper by societal standards.²²⁶ Corporate cocoons may use legitimizing myths to serve as a special set of rules used to defuse ethical dissonance. The authors assert that legitimizing myths are effective because they are not subject to external scrutiny, they serve only to convince those within the cocoon that their actions are acceptable and appropriate.²²⁷ The implication for institutions is that with different values and operative principles, acts that may be acceptable in one realm could be judged as unacceptable in another. Balch and Armstrong observe that compartmentalization of these institutional norms can have a dark side even when enabling phenomena with generally desirable connotations such as group identity, esprit de corps, or competitive pride, the concern being where there is some degree of isolation from external or objective assessment and verification. They conclude that high performance institutions can be particularly vulnerable to the dysfunctional implications of ethical marginality encouraged by the banality of wrongdoing as legitimizing myths can ultimately be used to condone any chosen behaviour, approach or outcome.²²⁸

An organization’s habitus is a key element when determining susceptibility to wrongdoing, and Miller identifies themes related to the rise and fall of organizations. He notes that the momentum behind these trajectories “stems from many interrelated forces – invisible enemies that used to be powerful allies.”²²⁹ The attitudes and behaviours identified by Miller that are potential indicators of elitism include not just ignorance of certain facts but rather an intentional disregard, and a similar assertion regarding norms and standards where he suggests the root of the problem is adherence to the “wrong standards,” inferring standards objectively not in the best interests of the institution or society.²³⁰ Miller suggests that the answer is for leaders to be aware of their own biases and assumptions, essentially trading in microscopes for mirrors to better understand the lens through which they see the world. Of course, by Miller’s

²²⁴ Miller, “The Icarus Paradox.”

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Balch and Armstrong, “Ethical Marginality: The Icarus Syndrome,” 300.

²²⁷ Ibid., 299.

²²⁸ Ibid., 301.

²²⁹ Miller, *The Icarus Paradox*, 173.

²³⁰ Ibid., 174.

own line of reasoning, the issue is often not what people understand but rather how they choose to view and more importantly justify it. Reimann and Wiener also speak of corporate culture, and define it in terms of norms by noting that culture consists of the values and beliefs shared by members of an organization, which has also been expressed as the social or normative glue that holds the organization together.²³¹ Their argument follows similar lines to what has been revealed so far, presenting corporate culture as a double-edged sword if it turns elitist, a term that again is not explicitly defined.²³² These authors isolate the concerns regarding self-referential values when they note that the defining feature of an institutional culture that focuses on elitist values is when it has become so inwardly focused that being number one has become an end in itself. Reimann and Wiener note that elitist values are by nature comparative and can lead to emotions such as pride dominating rational thinking. This assessment of elitist values continues the theme of correlating elitism with positive connotations such as pride. This can be flagged as a potential indicator of elitism, where attitudes and behaviours originally manifested as positive notions such as pride reinforce the perception that the institution is leading their field whereas they are predicated on access to the power and financial advantages associated with being number one. The opposite of elitist values is presented as functional values which are those with an outward orientation performed for the people the institution serves and interacts with (e.g. suppliers and competitors), and the employees.²³³ Rather than simply focusing on being number one as an ends unto itself at whatever cost is entailed, institutions with functionally focused values concentrate on issues pertaining to product quality, service, and innovation.²³⁴

The literature reveals how the banality of wrongdoing can be correlated to a continuum of elitism where the power, privileges and advantages being sought is institutional superiority with some degree of disregard for how the results are achieved. There are several factors at play that lead to the banality of wrongdoing within an institution. Reimann and Wiener explain how an inwardly focused organizational culture focuses on being number one instead of emphasizing functional values associated with meeting the expectations of the people the organization serves. When the overarching priority is results such as profits and innovation (in the sense of leading the market at whatever cost), these goals can trump quality and functionality. Attitudes and policies combine to where the resulting events contribute to a trajectory towards failure. Miller's distinction between failing to meet standards versus adhering to the wrong standards explains how perceptions of superiority or the quest for it can be construed as a license to push or exceed accepted behaviours and practices as well as ethical, regulatory, or legal boundaries.²³⁵

²³¹ Noel M. Tichy, "Managing Change Strategically: The Technical, Political and Cultural Keys," *Organizational Dynamics* (Autumn 1982): 59-80.

²³² Bernard C. Reimann and Yoash Wiener, "Corporate Culture: Avoiding the Elitist Trap," *Business Horizons* (March-April 1988).

²³³ *Ibid.*, 38.

²³⁴ Reimann and Wiener, "Corporate Culture: Avoiding the Elitist Trap."

²³⁵ Miller, *The Icarus Paradox*, 174.

In summary, corporate elitism is characterized by a significant emphasis on institutional superiority, privileges and institutional norms that may put profits and other determinants of success ahead of other considerations that impact corporate well-being. Mitroff et al. note how this can lead to overconfidence on the part of leadership that may cause them to discount any contrary opinions or approaches. Yim and Park make similar observations, referring to an insular view and excessive adherence to corporate norms. Miller and others use the metaphor of the Icarus paradox to illustrate what can occur when high-fliers take things too far, which he argues can lead to ethical marginality and a banality of wrongdoing. Balch and Armstrong warn of a focus on results without paying attention to how these are achieved. They draw attention to phrases like pushing boundaries and overcoming conventional wisdom to show how these approaches cut two ways and can be used to justify a focus on winning rather than adherence to the rules of the game. Miller highlights characteristics of organizations that can drive success but also backfire when not managed carefully, such as his observation about adhering to standards but the wrong standards, or not being ignorant of facts but rather intentionally disregarding them. He gives the example of team cohesion as a positive characteristic, but if not managed carefully can lead to myopia and a homogeneity that stifles innovation and at worse creates “an intolerant monoculture.”²³⁶ This is in line with Balch and Armstrong’s description of corporate cocoons featuring “self-referential values and ‘us against the world’ sentiment.”²³⁷ Rienman and Wiener warn of an inward focus where being number one becomes an end in itself rather than focusing on functional values like quality and customer service. Corporate elitism can overflow into areas outside of corporations, as Porter notes that corporate elites can extend their power and influence into other institutions, for example as board members of hospitals and universities. Although he asserts that it is far less common to see church officials or university presidents in corporate boardrooms.²³⁸

There are several aspects of elitism pertaining to the church/priesthood and the corporate world that provide insight into how elitism is manifested and reproduced within these institutions. This offers several promising conceptual avenues and areas for further research, especially in terms of identifying qualitative indicators of special powers, how they are exerted, and how elitism is justified. Firstly, there is a self-referential characteristic to the excessive adherence to institutional norms in the corporate world as well exercising the privilege and power of being the sole purveyors of God’s word and will as a member of the ordained priesthood. This is closely related to the notion of institutional superiority based on elitism where the ends can be seen to justify the means, at the expense of quality, functionality and faith or trust placed in the institution by customers or alternatively adherents such as church congregants. The comparison between corporate cocoons with legitimizing myths, those who stake claim over all aspects of a domain, self-referential values and an us-versus-

²³⁶ Ibid., 31.

²³⁷ Balch and Armstrong, “Ethical Marginality: The Icarus Syndrome,” 300.

²³⁸ Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic*, 216.

everyone attitude is instructive towards understanding how elitism is justified. Whether it is a focus on high performance in terms of profits or market dominance in the corporate world or any other myopic institutional focus, many of the same precepts that define highfliers also lead to the demise of individuals and institutions when these are taken too far by blurring or crossing ethical, legal, or regulatory lines.

In terms of possessing and exerting a special power in order to bring to bear the associated privileges and advantages through elitism, the priesthood and corporate institutions share the characteristic of having specific positions and designations that accord substantial influence, decision-making powers, and control over others. In the Catholic Church, a Cardinal is formally addressed as “your eminence” in recognition of the established hierarchy. This flows downward as members of the ordained priesthood has sole authority over the unordained laypersons within the Catholic Church and translates into a significant power-imbalance where it is difficult to question any decisions or actions. Congregants are the obedient flock because the church only recognizes priests as having holy orders. Being the sole purveyor of God’s word and interpreting the voluminous lessons and messages of the bible naturally overflows into other matters of Church and personal affairs where an ordained priest has influence or authority. Status can make questioning or any form of resistance difficult or impossible, which can facilitate abuse when the ostensible elite abuse their power or privilege. The power, authority and influence of decision-makers within a corporation are similarly defined by the organizational structure of the institution, but the reverence for positions may be more functional than the deep ecclesiastical significance. In these instances, elitism is used to justify what constitutes acceptable practices, standards, behaviours, and to some degree values. If certain behaviours are prevalent and there is a lack of sanctions to preclude those behaviours, it speaks to the fact that those norms are being justified. Once established and normalized within the institution or a portion thereof, the banality of wrongdoing can set in and extend the perception of being above reproach.

Discussion of Literature Review

A review of the literature pertaining to the anthropological perspective on elitism and elite status was expected to reveal insight into special powers accorded within the hierarchies of primordial societies but this was not the case. There was no sustained indication of socially shared opinions, perspectives or preconceptions where specific primordial societies construe themselves as performing consistently and predictably in ways deemed superior to other similar groups. Not only is elitism absent within and amongst Indigenous peoples according to the literature that was examined, none of the authors suggest Indigenous societies present themselves as better than the settlers who encroached on their traditional territories. This despite the fact anthropologists acknowledge that Indigenous peoples typically had superior hunting, fishing and overall survival skills and abilities required to thrive in oftentimes harsh environments. The main gap in the anthropological literature pertains to the

reality that there is no homogeneous Indigenous culture, and it is difficult to find generalizations applicable to hundreds of different Indigenous communities and nations. The matter is further complicated in that many contemporary Indigenous communities function in a manner very similar to their surrounding Western style municipalities. Another gap is the dearth of discussion related to ascribed status within the Indigenous societies mentioned, albeit this could be a moot point given the findings related to leadership being generally utilitarian, with no desire for coercive control over members. Another potential area for further analysis pertains to elders being not only a primary source of oral history, but the question of to what extent they are the sole interpreters and purveyors of that history.

The literature pertaining to meritocracy and egalitarianism reveals that at the institutional level, ability and performance are the key factors whereas at the societal level political power and associated privileges is the pivotal concept when determining elite status. This distinction is key in the examination of elitism and elite status, as many ideas and concepts discussed at the societal level are not instructive towards identifying or explaining elitism at the institutional level. Field and Higley sum up their view of egalitarianism and meritocracy with the observation that political elites are neither better nor cleverer than those whom they rule over, rather their status denotes that they occupy positions of power in both public and private sectors as well as various institutions. Much of the discussion focuses on political structure such as democracies rather than group attitudes and behaviours within an institution. Henry observes that achievement is much more easily recognizable and quantifiable in professional sports or in the financial world where there is data available to confirm success or accomplishment, which is helpful towards understanding elite status within an institution. Henry argues it is appropriate to distinguish those who have an idea, contribution or accomplishment that is better than others, whether it be intellectual or creative in nature. Henry also concludes elitism, as understood in his usage as an adjective for elite, is only repugnant if it is based on something other than “learning and achievement.”²³⁹ Meritocracy seems intuitively fair as a concept where one must earn their place rather than have it assigned as is the case with a monarchy or in some cases a dictatorship, but the pivotal question is how merit is achieved, recognized and rewarded. Merit can be as subjective and even elusive as appreciation for art, architecture, food or wine and paradoxically may arise out of favoured treatment as exemplified by the discussion on academic elitism. Overall, this area of literature provides minimal useful conceptual avenues or promising research relevant to elitism but illuminates some of the potential attributes of elite status pertaining to institutions.

An area that merits further exploration is Fendler’s observation that elites can present themselves as “authorized interpreters of the world” who resist challenge by the so-called laypersons.²⁴⁰ This accords with Porter’s description where those with certain status or designation become sole purveyors of

²³⁹ Henry, *In Defense of Elitism*, 16-18.

²⁴⁰ Lynn Fendler, “An Information Reformation? Research Expertise in a Populist Context,” *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 54, no. 3 (2020): 694.

standards and values, which describes an environment or culture ripe for the manifestation of elitism. Ballano presents the priesthood as a concrete example in his exploration of the habitus of the Roman Catholic Church. Ballano's analysis of mandatory celibacy does not mention elitism, but his exploration reveals that the corresponding advantages and privileges of elitism are those that facilitate clerical sexual abuse. Ballano describes the elite status of ordained clergy, where membership is restricted to males possessing the academic and ecclesial requirements, which provides them with significant power and authority over the un-ordained laypersons who are excluded from admission into the hierarchical structure of the church or any decision-making. This offers promising avenues for exploration to elucidate qualitative indicators of what constitutes special powers, how these powers are accorded, and how are they exerted to facilitate clerical sexual abuse. Both those accorded elite status as well as those engaged in elitism have a vested interest in maintaining the definition of the situation as well as the opportunity to do so, which includes defining and controlling admission into their elite strata. Domains such as the priesthood control the definition of the situation by demanding that their elites be recognized as the sole purveyors for interpreting and conveying applicable standards and values and restrict the duties performed by outsiders (lay-persons).²⁴¹

Formal knowledge based elitism refers to the attitudes and practices associated with having a perceived superiority based on being connected to an elite academic institution. Inbreeding speaks to Bourdieu's concept of reproduction and is one of the potential outcomes of academic elitism where replication of existing backgrounds, experience and outlooks stifles intellectual diversity. Prestige is a form of social capital in either a network of schools or departments within a discipline and has the same self-reproducing effect that it has amongst elite law firms. Prestige that is recognized based on academic elitism may favour those who attended the same institution or former students and instructors, hence the self-reproducing effect. It follows that when elitism in law schools spills over into the day-to-day practice of law by members of the legal profession, society as a whole is impacted if practicing lawyers are significantly distanced ideologically or experientially from their clients. This could translate into lawyers gravitating towards careerism and elitism over social justice issues as one example.

Like formal knowledge based elitism, corporate elitism is a form of institutional elitism that thrives where there is an entrenchment of culture and perspective in social networks, with the same potential drawback of stifling innovation and change. Corporate elitism is distinguished in its susceptibility to ethical marginality as illustrated by the Icarus syndrome. Corporations and other organizations including military units can be influenced or at worst harmed by excessive conformation to organizational goals to the exclusion of outside influence and norms. Self-referential values correspond to an us versus them mentality where rule-breaking can spiral from ignorance of rules to deliberate disregard. Miller makes this important distinction when he points out that problem may not be a lack of standards or expectations, but rather "adherence to

²⁴¹ Ibid.

the wrong standards.”²⁴² A culture of superiority and privilege with expectations of high-performance and corresponding results can be normalized through justification, especially when insulated from outside scrutiny. The paradox of Icarus reminds us that success can result in disaster when traits like hubris or greed dominate rational thought and things are ultimately taken too far.

Myopic attitudes and behaviours that focus on superiority and accessing corresponding privileges have some degree of connection to an increased likelihood of overconfidence in one’s own vision, approach or ability to carry out certain activities or actions while insulated from the objectivity and oversight provided by those outside the institution. For corporate institutions, this could involve excluding viable alternatives and approaches including potentially desirable options such as socially responsible practices. Along similar lines, the myopic approach can include having little regard for how actions affect those outside the institution. In the priesthood, the main issue in terms of myopic vision is the extent to which a focus on the mission and reputation of the church supersedes concerns regarding the behaviour of some priests and the corresponding damage they inflict, whether it is abuse of Church funds or the congregants themselves. Phenomena that intertwine to facilitate elitism within the ordained priesthood include cleric centred governance, clericalism, and the leading of double lives. Clericalism is defined as the overextension or misuse of the authority of ordained priests. Cleric-centred governance facilitates elitism within the Church when other priests use their status, analogous to the special sense of mission discussed in corporate elitism, to reinforce their power over other members of the Church. Mandatory celibacy provides power and entry into an elite as an ecclesiastic practice that regardless of intention does serve to reinforce status. Clericalism includes not actually adhering to this vow and leading a double-life as ordained priest and abuser.

In summary, potential indicators of elitism that were identified in the literature review include the concept of authorized or sole interpreters of a domain and sole purveyors of standards, norms, values (e.g. church). With respect to the Priesthood and clerical abuse as elitism, the special powers of priests correlate to privilege and advantage where there is a focus on protecting the reputation of the church and clerics. Academic inbreeding is a form of reproduction, as it results in stifling of diversity of thought and experience at academic institutions, which then flows to the corresponding professional institutions (e.g. law school to law profession.) Corporate elitism introduces the concept of ethical marginality, tension between corporate goals (e.g. profit, market dominance), exclusion of outside influence including norms and values, inward and self-referential focus (including us vs. them mindset), normalized rule breaking (not a lack of standards but rather adherence to the wrong standards), insulation from outside scrutiny/oversight and objectivity, and a myopic outlook which can lead to overconfidence.

²⁴² Miller, *The Icarus Paradox*, 174.

Chapter 2 - Institutional Particularities of the Military

The military is a distinct form of institution, consequently there are institutional particularities that are unique to the military that require further exploration and a deeper understanding to provide useful context to this inquiry. The following concepts will augment what was revealed during the literature review. Firstly, militarism provides a backdrop to a unique habitus and associated social capital. Civil-military relations will be explored briefly insofar as it relates to oversight and accountability. The regimental system, while arguably a form of militarism, represents a distinct habitus especially when taken to an extreme as was the case with the Cdn AB Regt, and is an important notion to understand the broader context of the proposed case study. The military connotation of discipline will be explored followed by elite status in the military context to contrast earned status with that which is socially postured. Given that elitism seeks to reinforce a perception of elite status, it is important to explore objectively verifiable elite status to contrast this with elitism.

Militarism

Vagts offers the quintessential definition of militarism, noting it “presents a vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions, and thought associated with armies and wars and yet transcending true military purposes.” He distinguishes militarism from what he terms the military way which is the use of men and materials to win wars.²⁴³ Vagt’s choice of the word “transcending” as opposed to asserting militarism is discrepant with true military purposes suggests Vagts also acknowledges some potentially positive aspects of militarism but recognized that adherence to customs and related interests can be taken too far. This begs the question whether militarism can manifest itself in seemingly positive notions such as pride and esprit de corps but can then expand to encourage attitudes and behaviours antithetical to the task or objective at hand. Vagts notes the distinguishing factor of militarism is that it not only fails to contribute to objectives associated with the military way but can actually “hamper and defeat” these efforts.²⁴⁴ Militarism can be viewed as behaviour and practices not related to military skill or ability, making it an important concept in the examination elitism in the military context. The case study of military elitism in Chapter 4 will reveal the extent to which the social posturing of elite status identified in this inquiry’s definition of elitism contributes in any way to military objectives or conversely, whether practices that promote attitudes and behaviours associated with elitism can be correlated to militarism.²⁴⁵ A key aim of this chapter is to understand and critically assess aspects of the military habitus that have been perpetuated as proverbial sacred cows. Alexandra encapsulates

²⁴³ Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism, Revised Edition* (United States: Meridian, 1959), 13.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Preface.

²⁴⁵ Hubert P. Van Tuyl “Militarism, The United States, and The Cold War,” *Armed Forces and Society* (Summer 1994): 519.

the elitism component of militarism with the description of the military being “preoccupied with the trappings of military organization such as uniforms, decorations, and parades, or with the personal benefits to be gained in such organizations, such as financial rewards and prestige.”²⁴⁶ Alexandra’s characterization of militarism suggests it might facilitate the manifestation of elitism, at least to the extent these trappings represent either the social posturing of elite status or accessing privileges and advantages.²⁴⁷

Written at the cusp of World War II, Vagts conceptualization is the first scholarly examination of this phenomenon. He asserts that “militarism displays the qualities of caste and cult, authority and belief,” highlighting the ideational aspect and making this an important delineation of the components of militarism and situating it solidly within the context of this exploration of elitism.²⁴⁸ Vagts focuses on traits that do not directly serve an army’s purpose, namely the maintenance of the state as achieved by engaging in war. He notes that rather than furthering the military way, the purveyors of militarism are “narcissistic, they dream that they exist for themselves alone.”²⁴⁹ According to Vagts, militarism has a wide scope of influence, consisting of undertakings aimed to satisfy glory or reputation of a leader instead of those focused on victory in battle, noting war is the real acid test for an army and “not the good opinion it entertains of itself or wins by indoctrination or other promotional activities” which he also labels as “advertisement.”²⁵⁰ Other predominant views of militarism include Carlton, who follows Vagts regarding the preoccupation with military display as an “outward expression of militarism.”²⁵¹ Carlton describes militarism as a way of life where military values become an end in themselves.²⁵² Willems also defines militarism in terms of culture, specifically “a cluster of interrelated traits” with “boundless reverence” for symbols of military status, the cultural glorification of warriors, and the propagation of the military ways of thinking and acting.²⁵³ Vagts notes that every system of thinking which ranks “military institutions and ways above the ways of civilian life” constitutes militarism, including instances where the primacy of the military requires its acceptance as the “absolute good.”²⁵⁴ Alternatively, Alexandra describes militarism as a “pejorative term” that refers to “excessive or improper” actions and attitudes of military institutions.²⁵⁵ He notes that in “the correct amount and setting,” such actions or attitudes would be unproblematic.²⁵⁶

²⁴⁶ Andrew Alexandra, “Militarism,” *Social Theory and Practice* 19, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 217.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁸ Vagts, *Militarism*, 13.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

²⁵¹ Carlton, *Militarism*, 195.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

²⁵³ Emilio Willems, *A Way of Life and Death: Three Centuries of Prussian-German Militarism, An Anthropological Approach* (Nashville: Vanderbilt, 1986), 1, 5, 9.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 17.

²⁵⁵ Alexandra, “Militarism,” 206.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 207.

Alexandra distinguishes the military profession in terms of legal and social marks, noting that doing what a soldier does such as wearing military uniforms and doing military drill does not make a person a soldier any more than charging for legal advice makes someone a lawyer. In both cases there is education, training and a requirement to belong to the professional body, a law society or a military organization as applicable. For Vagts, militarism is a preoccupation with various forms of display from uniforms to forms of pomp and ceremony. Militarism can lead to privileges and advantages being reinforced are personal benefits that can include status, power and financial. As such, the aforementioned notions of militarism speaks directly to habitus and cultural capital. The visible trappings of militarism extend beyond uniforms and badges and unique regimental traditions, as attitudes and behaviours can constitute cultural capital when actively invested and the meaning is socially understood and acknowledged. Carlton recognizes that the rules of social groups have both formal and informal origins, with group norms being either actively inculcated or passively internalized. Expressed in terms of habitus, social groups operate at the individual and group level, shaping the attitudes and behaviours of individuals as well as the entire group.

Civil Military Relations

The discussion so far acknowledges military institutions can be justified as part of the broader social environment with militarism only becoming problematic when taken to inappropriate or excessive extremes. Professional militaries are controlled by the state through its bureaucracies and parliament. The aspect of the military that pertains to cultural behaviour and the structure and functioning of society falls within the academic domain of sociology. Ouellet explains that military sociology is divided into two branches, civil-military relations and the analysis of the military as an institution.²⁵⁷ He situates the latter branch of military sociology in the context of Janowitz's conception outlined in *The Professional Soldier*,²⁵⁸ the study of the military as "a social institution and a profession."²⁵⁹ Huntington explores civil-military relations in terms of civilian control of the military, specifically the interaction between the military and civilian authorities including politicians and bureaucrats.²⁶⁰ For Huntington, professionalism required soldiers be masters of the requisite technical military skills to manage and organize violence, while Finer advocates the need for social responsibility and what he terms "corporate loyalty to fellow-

²⁵⁷ Eric Ouellet, (ed.), *New Directions in Military Sociology* (Whitby, Canada: de Sitter Publications, 2005).

²⁵⁸ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press, 1971).

²⁵⁹ Ouellet, *New Directions in Military Sociology*, 2.

²⁶⁰ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

practitioners.”²⁶¹ In Huntington’s view, this corporate loyalty causes the officer corps to immerse themselves in technical tasks, which has the result of the officer corps leaving politics to the politicians.²⁶² Janowitz outlines what he conceives as a departure from the traditional view of the military as a calling worthy of and requiring dedication to the institution and its associated values including customs and traditions. Janowitz advocates an increased focus on professional competencies elucidated by Moskos in the institutional/occupational model.²⁶³ Exploring the implications of elitism on military institutions in particular, it is helpful to recognize a distinction made by Ouellet in terms of the starting point for an exploration of military sociology, where the military institution is viewed as the “final outcome of military life” rather than being the first step in an examination of institutional habitus.²⁶⁴

A discussion of civil-military relations is tied to this exploration of elitism for several reasons. Firstly because of the social interplay including the battle for primacy between military and civilian leaders outlined by Vagts in his discussion of militarism. Of significance, one of the implications of elitism is a myopic focus including norms and behaviours not representative of the society at large. Given that Vagts’ conception of militarism includes every system or thing which puts “military institutions and ways above the ways of civilian life,” examining civil-military relations provides context to an understanding of the role of civilian overseers as it relates to the how elitism was manifested and justified to the extent explicated by the case study of the Cdn AB Regt.²⁶⁵ Civil-military relations is about much more than supremacy, oversight, direction and control, it includes an understanding of the role of military institutions within the broader political and social environment, especially in terms of any notion of elite status and corresponding expectations of privilege or advantages derived from membership in the military.

Huntington’s notion of objective civilian control asserts that military operations should be separated from policy, which begs the question of how these concepts are defined. Huntington’s distinction between the operational imperative (defence of country) and the functional imperative (the interests of broader society) clearly delineates the dual interests that are at play. For Huntington, military officers are the professionals and therefore the experts to be deferred to. Janowitz takes a competing view that subjective control of the military required more civilian control to ensure that the military is aligned with the views of the population. For Janowitz, it is important that the expertise of military officers not be politicized, however he does not expect them to be

²⁶¹ Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), 20. Finer explains the outcome of professionalism of the officer corps as “The officers’ own responsibility becomes increasingly confined to representing the requirements of the military to the civilian authorities, giving advice to them, and, finally, when so charged, executing their decisions,” 21.

²⁶² Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*.

²⁶³ Charles Moskos, “From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization,” *Armed Forces and Society* 4, no. 1 (November 1977): 41-50.

²⁶⁴ Ouellet, *New Directions in Military Sociology*, 4.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 17.

apolitical either, just not partisan. The military as an institution is fertile ground for exploring elitism in terms of attitudes and behaviours seeking to reinforce perception of membership in a group that has, to varying degrees, been socially considered to have an elite status. In terms of reinforcing access to the privileges and advantages provided by membership in a military institution, Janowitz's model is most helpful in terms of analyzing attitudes and behaviours of those attempting to maintain or otherwise justify their perceived elite status.

Finer's discussion of civil-military relations speaks to several institutional particularities of the military. He describes the army as a "purposive instrument" where, like Vagts conception of the military way, its principal object is "to fight and win wars."²⁶⁶ He notes that this central purpose provides the "supreme justification" for the five defining features: 1) centralized command; 2) hierarchy, 3) discipline, 4) intercommunication; and 5) esprit de corps and a corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency.²⁶⁷ Finer acknowledges that esprit de corps is grounded in a sense of service to nation that is "often of the most rabid or it may be vulgar sort" that channels "all aggressive tendencies into hatred of the enemy."²⁶⁸ Finer asserts that all of these combine to make armies more highly organized than any civilian organizations.²⁶⁹ Finer makes an important distinction with his assertion that the military must serve the state, which means the government and executive of the day, as a professional army "stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state."²⁷⁰ Consider General Douglas MacArthur who has come to be a paragon of the opposite of this premise. MacArthur was selected for service in Korea by President Truman based on his WWII record that culminated as Supreme Allied Commander in Japan. In Korea MacArthur's forces were able to drive North Korean military over the 38th Parallel, but then wanted to extend the war into North Korea and even China. MacArthur's decision to defy Truman and enter North Korea and to subsequently speak out against Roosevelt's administration could not be justified by the reasoning that he was serving what he felt was the best interests of his country as he had abrogated his duty to serve the democratically elected government. MacArthur famously warned the nation of "a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of the Government rather than the country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend. No proposition could be more dangerous."²⁷¹ Vagts refers to MacArthur's protest as a "perilous interpretation of the Constitution."²⁷² Finer makes an important point in this regard, which is that it is the government not the military that determines national interests which in turn inform national security policy and decision

²⁶⁶ Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 6.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 7-8.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., 8.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., 21.

²⁷¹ Douglas MacArthur in Vagts, *Militarism*, 487.

²⁷² Vagts, *Militarism*, 487.

making.²⁷³ As a result, Finer concludes that it is not Huntington's notion of professionalism that keeps the military in check, but rather a "firm acceptance of civilian supremacy" which then attenuates MacArthur's assertion.²⁷⁴ Feaver also outlines this with his principal-agent theory where the military are the agents of the government,²⁷⁵ consistent with Huntington's assertion that a country's armed forces should be under political control with the expectation of soldiers being "a perfect instrument of obedience."²⁷⁶ Alexandra construes Huntington's description of an instrument of obedience as requiring a hierarchical organization that instills within its members "habits of deference and unquestioning obedience to authority, and loyalty to the organization."²⁷⁷ When reframed in the context of habitus, this is a reference to dispositions that structure obedience and loyalty.

The Regimental System

An understanding of the origins, characteristics and ultimately the purpose of the regimental system is helpful towards assessing the extent to which it epitomizes militarism or if it is a necessary and effectual function of the military way. The regimental system of organization is not used in the air force or navies of the world, nor is it a universal phenomenon in armies. To be clear, the regimental system along with its customs and traditions is a characteristic of the British Army which was exported to other Commonwealth militaries through colonialism. Carlton asserts that regimental affiliation provides members ideological motivation and as affiliations are gradually severed by successive governments, the result "will do nothing to encourage the esprit that was once considered critical to the warrior mentality."²⁷⁸ Of note, the regimental system is an organizational form that plays an important role in the social dynamics of elitism in militaries such as Canada's. To correlate the regimental system to habitus, each regiment can be understood to have its own unique habitus that impacts all aspects of military life, including how members perceive and react to members of other regiments. The case study of the Cdn AB Regt is anticipated to reveal and illuminate dispositions unique to members of that regiment, including non-discursive actions and behaviours related to elitism such as the

²⁷³ Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 21-23. Parenthetically, Finer also explains how Huntington's precepts of professionalism can also be used to justify military intervention into political affairs beyond defining national interest. Professionalism dictates that it is military officers alone who are competent to make operational decisions surrounding "size, organization, recruitment and equipment" of the military, and the military's reluctance to be used in quelling domestic opponents as was the case in the Curragh Incident of 1914 in Ireland where many officers were resistant to engaging in military operations against Irish unionists.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 26.

²⁷⁵ Peter Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).

²⁷⁶ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 73.

²⁷⁷ Alexandra, "Militarism," 220.

²⁷⁸ Carlton, *Militarism*, 195.

well-documented proclivity towards refusing to accord proper military respects to non-Airborne officers (i.e. saluting).

It is not difficult to locate literature extolling the benefits or asserting the indispensable nature of the regimental system. British regiments traditionally recruited from geographic areas, thus injecting another layer of uniqueness and pride on which to assert their primacy over other regiments. Bercuson points out that organizing regiments geographically also allowed them to capitalize on pre-existing cohesion of families and neighbourhoods.²⁷⁹ In contrast, Richardson describes U.S. Army units as “soulless things known by numbers and letters” instead of the self-identification to a regiment and the resulting esprit de corps he defines as an essential element of morale and “a priceless asset which costs less than most up to date weapons.”²⁸⁰ Carlton notes the loyalty cultivated by the regimental system parallels that of a nation, clan or commander and “helps anaesthetize men against battle.”²⁸¹ Finer sees esprit de corps as common beliefs and sentiments constituting a unit’s “vital spark” grounded in the notion of “service to a cause.”²⁸²

Soldiers brought up in the regimental system might be accustomed to hearing the regiment described as “the foundation of everything.”²⁸³ The regimental system sets the CAF apart from the corporate world and even the US military, although there certainly are some overlaps. The associated notion of military life is described by Finer when he justifies the need for indoctrination by separating soldiers from the rest of society, both physically by means of barracks. He notes features including uniforms and a “separate code of morals and manners from that of the civilian population.”²⁸⁴ Finer acknowledges that this makes military life very self-centered, which can lead to a contempt for civilians and their way of life as the soldiers’ “barracks becomes the world.”²⁸⁵ Horn explains that “the word regiment derives from the Latin term *regimentum*,” meaning rule, and that a key aspect to a regiment is its “relative administrative autonomy.”²⁸⁶ Horn notes that regimental culture is typified by unique regimental identity which includes not only the distinctive uniforms and insignia but also the traditions, all of which inspire “intense devotion” by building cohesion.²⁸⁷

Loomis makes a critical distinction between the industrial versus military ethos that is pertinent to an analysis of the influence of the regimental system. Loomis warns that industrial management approaches that are applied effectively in a peacetime economy “cannot be directly applied to control combat

²⁷⁹ Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 119.

²⁸⁰ Frank Richardson, *Fighting Spirit, a Study of Psychological Factors in War* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1978), 20.

²⁸¹ Carlton, *Militarism*, 194.

²⁸² Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 7.

²⁸³ Field Marshall Archibald Wavell. In Bernard Ferguson, *The Trumpet in the Hall* (London: Collins, 1970), 278.

²⁸⁴ Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 8.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Horn, *From Cold War to New Millennium*, 17.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

units in a battle” much in the same way that military command systems cannot be used to govern citizens in a democracy.²⁸⁸ Loomis credits the regimental system as the means to develop relationships and leadership to achieve a cohesive fighting unit. Bercuson asserts that regiments have a “set of values and mores created for the sole purpose of making it different from other regiments.”²⁸⁹ While the distinctive symbols and practices are the outward identifiers that make regiments unique, Loomis asserts that the essence of the regiment is the “deep human relationships.”²⁹⁰ Loomis describes the most combat-effective units as:

*those in which the social pressures generated by our mess and institutional life are blended with the military authority of our chain of command to form the right amalgam need to master the situation of the moment. Thus, the Regimental Family is a living body, which can be adapted to meet the realities of life from peace-time barracks to war-time battlefields and everything in between.*²⁹¹

Loomis is asserting that the practice of ceremony and traditions form an integral aspect of inculcating pride, cohesion, and obedience. Parades and all forms of drill and ceremonial are predicated upon fostering discipline and order. Challenging or ultimately changing traditions demonstrates the tension between militarism and the military way. Loomis rebuffs any approach that seeks to organize regiments for the primary purpose of seeking efficiencies in manpower, equipment and functionality, where the uniqueness of regiments is overlooked. Regimental pride and spirit is paramount for unit cohesion according to Loomis, and when other factors such as capability, strength and equipment are more or less equal, the outcome of a battle becomes “a function of such intangibles as will, morale and spirit.”²⁹²

In his exploration of the actions of the Scots Guards and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders while on service during The Troubles in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s, Burke observes that “soldiers were often obsessively loyal to their regiments, to the point where rivalry could get in the way of function.”²⁹³ During an interview with an Argyll officer, Burke is told that best way to overcome this rivalry was to “stick them into a conflict then they have to forget all about their differences and get on with it. And then suddenly they realize, actually everybody is pretty damn good.”²⁹⁴ Similarly, King observes that combat is “a great leveler” as soldiers who have fought together forge new group loyalties.²⁹⁵ Bercuson provides a broadly relatable comparison when he

²⁸⁸ Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 47.

²⁸⁹ Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 130.

²⁹⁰ Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 49.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*

²⁹² *Ibid.*, 51.

²⁹³ Burke, *An Army of Tribes*, 41.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 42.

²⁹⁵ Anthony King, *The Combat Soldier* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 352.

points out that measuring the effectiveness of the regimental system has the same challenges of measuring the power of prayer or the overall impact of religion.²⁹⁶ He concludes with a comment that speaks to militarism and the significance of perception when examining an institution for a habitus shaping elitism, noting that “whatever the truth about how vital the regimental system is, the soldiers believe in it.”²⁹⁷

The Canadian Airborne Regiment

The intention at this point is to provide sufficient context regarding the creation and evolution of the Cdn AB Regt so that significant institutional challenges can be understood and appreciated. A timeline of the Regiment’s history will be established, followed by discussion of two military inquiries directed at the Regiment, then an analysis of Winslow’s socio-cultural inquiry relating to the Regiment and its deployment to Somalia.

Canada first established an airborne capability in the early years of the Second World War, yet the rationale for continuing this capability was oftentimes unconvincing. The Cdn AB Regt traces its lineage including its ten battle honours and one Victoria Cross recipient to Canada’s two parachute units of WWII, The 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion and a second unit that would become the Canadian component of the combined USA/Canada First Special Service Force.²⁹⁸ Both of these units were disbanded by the end of WWII after they were no longer operationally required, but soon replaced by the Canadian Special Air Service (SAS) Company in Rivers, Manitoba.²⁹⁹ Horn refers to the SAS as “the next phase in Canadian SOF,” an important assessment in terms of how he goes on to situate the Cdn AB Regt in relation to the Canadian special operations forces (SOF) legacy. The SAS was dissolved and was followed by the Mobile Striking Force and the Defence of Canada Force, but Horn notes that neither “represented any form of special operations or SOF capability” therefore the lineage of Canada’s SOF capability “went into a hiatus.”³⁰⁰

In June 1965 Allard took over as the first officer to command FMC, the unification era iteration of the Canadian Army. It was in this capacity that he determined that a “light and rapid airborne regiment” was needed to fulfill immediate overseas intervention duties during the time it would take to deploy a full infantry brigade.³⁰¹ And so the Cdn AB Regt was born, a new regiment

²⁹⁶ Bercuson, *The Fighting Canadians*, 7.

²⁹⁷ Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 130.

²⁹⁸ Michael Mitchell, *Ducimus: The Regiments of the Canadian Infantry* (St. Hubert: Director of Infantry, 1992), 33-34.

²⁹⁹ Bernd Horn, *We Will Find a Way: The Canadian Special Operations Legacy* (Ottawa: CFB 17 Wing Publishing Office, 2018), 38. Mitchell, *Ducimus*, 34-35. The 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion existed from July 1942 to September 1945, The First Special Service Force from May 1943 to December 1944. The SAS was formed in 1946 and expanded to the Mobile Striking Force in 1948.

³⁰⁰ Horn, *We Will Find a Way*, 45.

³⁰¹ Jean V. Allard, *The Memoires of General Jean V. Allard*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), 237.

created in the wake of the removal of five regular force combat arms units with the number of infantry regiments being cut in half from six to three.³⁰² Allard went on to become Chief of the Defence Staff, providing the Cdn AB Regt with the first of many powerful and influential champions. However there were numerous deviations from Allard's original vision where the regiment "could only go into action by being parachuted" then await the arrival of conventional forces who would take over."³⁰³ Most significantly in relation to the manifestation and reproduction of elitism, Allard expected members to rotate out of the Regiment after "a maximum period of two years" in order to ensure that every Captain and Sergeant in the infantry had benefited from the experience.³⁰⁴ Equally significant, Allard explicitly states that the Cdn AB Regt was not intended adopt the characteristics of the "Victorian regimental system, since men had to be fast in, fast out" leading him to conclude that although this would result in a compromise of regimental spirit, he believed this would be "upheld" in the three parent regiments.³⁰⁵ Put another way, Allard never envisioned the Regiment as more than an establishment for providing training and experience that soldiers would bring back to benefit the parent regiments.

Initially stationed in Edmonton, the Regiment moved to Petawawa in 1977, which intersected with other significant changes in organization, structure and operations. At times the articulation of the requirement for an airborne unit was purported to be for home defense, with a recurring theme of appearance over capability that according to Horn and Bercuson would plague Canada's airborne forces into the 1990s.³⁰⁶ Rather than having raised a regiment based on an articulated, demonstrable need, the CAF would continue to work in reverse and find roles to attribute to the Cdn AB Regt to substantiate its existence. Even the famed Devil's Brigade, to which many within the Cdn AB Regt traced its roots, ceased to exist when operational requirements dictated other priorities.³⁰⁷ The Cdn AB Regt would continue to be fraught with identity issues, with military leadership and civilian bureaucracy often unclear as to the purpose or role or such a unit. Over the years, proponents of an airborne capability were at times reduced to providing nonsensical justifications for this capability in order to win over the decision makers and meet the multifarious expectations of the leadership

³⁰² Mitchell, *Ducimus: The Regiments of the Canadian Infantry*, 58. Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 71 notes "the army had five regular regiments chopped from the active lists." In addition to three infantry regiments he is referring to the removal of the Fort Garry Horse and the 4th Regiment of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery which Allard replaced with newly created francophone units the 12e Régiment blindé du Canada and the 5e Régiment d'artillerie légère du Canada.

³⁰³ Allard, *Memoires*, 237.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 238.

³⁰⁶ Horn, Bercuson and others identify this theme, but still highlight the accomplishments and reputation of the Canadian Airborne Regiment and airborne soldiers as the thoroughbreds of the army.

³⁰⁷ Granted, the First Special Service Force was a combined Canadian and American Unit that would not likely exist in peacetime. But it did not survive based on glory and distinction alone and was disbanded prior to the end of the war.

and the governments of the day. This included different combinations of peace operations, assistance in national disasters and special operations type taskings.³⁰⁸ In reality, the Regiment saw less action than most Canadian infantry units throughout its existence from 1968 to disbandment in 1995, with Horn, Bercuson and others concluding that the Cdn AB Regt lacked a strong *raison d'être*.

The Hewson Report and DeFaye Board of Inquiry

The point is not whether or not the Canadian Airborne Regiment was an elite unit. The point that we were trying to make is that if the soldier thinks that he is elite, and indeed he did, if he knows he's fit and indeed he was, he will have higher morale, more self-confidence and be more aggressive. And I'd suggest, Mr. Chairman, that for most infantry commanders, that would be seen as a desirable characteristic.

Testimony of MGen Hewson (Vol 2, 344).³⁰⁹

In his statement concerning the release of the Somalia Commission's Final Report, Justice Létourneau reiterates that the "sorry sequence of events in Somalia cannot be attributed to a "few bad apples" and instead was the result of systemic problems "occurring over long periods of time and ignored by our military leaders for just as long."³¹⁰ These conclusions will be tested during the case study but also raise key questions pertaining to the Hewson and De Faye reports. These two military inquiries provide context to establish the extent that some dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours preceded and as such set the scene for the deployment to Somalia by at least seven years.

Concerns about disciplinary infractions and anti-social behaviour within the Army in the mid-1980s led LGen Belzile to order MGen Hewson to conduct a study, with the report issued in September 1985.³¹¹ The FMC study was provoked by public attention into a murder committed in Quebec by an off-duty member of the Cdn AB Regt. The terms of the review made specific reference to the SSF and the Cdn AB Regt. Hewson reviewed military police records and compared this data with crime statistics relative to the Canadian society in

³⁰⁸ David Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*, (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1996), 171. There is some validity to this author's assertion that the use of helicopters for troop carriers made the Canadian Airborne Regiment obsolete from Day 1, although he does go on to acknowledge that helicopters are only useful on short-range missions.

³⁰⁹ Somalia Commission, *Dishonoured Legacy - Evidentiary Transcripts*, Vol 2, 344. For context in terms of his personal habitus, MGen Hewson was commissioned into the CAF as an officer in the PPCLI and was Director-General of Intelligence in 1985 when he authored the Hewson Report. At the time Hewson was testifying before the Somalia Commission and arguing the efficacy of social posturing of elite status he was Colonel of the Regiment for the PPCLI.

³¹⁰ Somalia Commission, "Statement on the Release of the Final Report by the Commission Chairman," July 2, 1997, in Loomis, *The Somalia Affair*, 753.

³¹¹ Hewson, *Mobile Command Study*.

general. He acknowledges some of the challenges with the statistical validity of any attempted comparisons, but nonetheless asserts they were able to track the pattern of acts of violence on military establishments, concluding these acts are “generally similar to that which occurs in the population at large.”³¹² Hewson determines this data corroborates “the theory which states that the armed forces are a microcosm of the society which they defend.”³¹³ There are several challenges with the information and assumptions relied upon to draw this conclusion, as well the comparison itself. Any analysis of crime statistics must recognize that only about one-third of criminal acts are reported to police.³¹⁴ Considering the level of cohesion within military units coupled with other mechanisms for addressing misconduct compared to the population at large, one might expect reporting of crime within the military should be significantly lower than the population at large. Finally, even if external validity could be established, comparing members of the military to the general population begs the question as to whether expectations should be much higher considering the selection process and training required to become a member of the profession of arms.

The Hewson report contains many untested perceptions and assertions pertaining to elite status. Hewson states that the Regiment “is not, in effect, an elite unit, it is perceived by soldiers from within and without as being elite,” but notes that wearing a distinctive uniform and undergoing different training makes a paratrooper “a self-confident and more aggressive individual.”³¹⁵ Winslow reveals that her interviews confirmed Hewson’s view, which she phrases as “soldiers on the outside perceive it as being elite” and “most soldiers” within the Regiment perceived it to be an elite unit.³¹⁶

The post-Somalia military BOI was convened to look into “leadership, discipline, operations, actions and procedures” of the CARBG other than matters pertaining to ongoing military police investigations or disciplinary/criminal proceedings and any “service offence, including a criminal code offence” not previously discovered.³¹⁷ Overall, the Board’s effectiveness was limited by

³¹² Ibid., Executive Summary, paragraph 16.

³¹³ Ibid., paragraph 18.

³¹⁴ Hugh Russell, *Transforming Community Policing. Mobilization, Engagement, and Collaboration* (Toronto: Emond, 2017), 91. Statistics Canada reports that the most common reasons provided by complainants for not reporting crime are the belief that the matter is not important enough to involve police (68%), that the police would not do anything anyways (59%), the decision to deal with the matter another way (42%), concern over the fact it that the matter is personal in nature (36%), and not wanting to involve police (35%). The survey design permitted respondents to select multiple reasons.

³¹⁵ Hewson, *Mobile Command Study*, Executive Summary, paragraph 12.

³¹⁶ Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia*, 114.

³¹⁷ Thomas DeFaye, *Board of Inquiry*, Phase I Volume XI, July 19, 1993, 2-3/10. The BOI lists eleven incidents that fell outside its purview, of which only three are referred to as “alleged” (the beating death of Shidane Arone, injuries to a Somali youth when he was run over by a CARBG vehicle, and the theft of property from a Somali national by

restrictions, for example the interpretation of the rules of engagement was out of bounds due to the nexus to the shooting of an alleged Somali thief on March 4, 1993. The report starts off by establishing the level of threat that Somali nationals posed to members of the CARBG as well as the overall operational environment, and the authors acknowledge that the level of threat declined steadily as the mission progressed.³¹⁸ The BOI discusses “operational security” and acknowledges that the term “aggressiveness” was used often in testimony pertaining to 2 CDO, but made a finding that “this term in this context means heightened alertness or readiness to react, not belligerence.”³¹⁹ Further observations relating to discipline and aggressiveness of 2 CDO are characterized as a “leadership choice” as opposed to “any lack of individual or collective discipline.”³²⁰

The report acknowledges the existence of a parallel chain of command, referring to “isolated and unresolved incidents” that point to the existence of a “rebellious group, committed perhaps to operational excellence, but wanting to do it, seemingly, on their own terms.” It goes on to describe “supervision” in 2 CDO “may have shared its loyalty between the formal leadership and the informal negative leadership at the grass roots level.”³²¹ The report discusses the dysfunctional implications of the parallel chain of command and issues surrounding the display of the Rebel flag. The report explores leadership and discipline problems leading up to the deployment and provides various excuses and explanations for why incidents went unresolved, for example the assertion “it seems likely that lack of evidence, lack of resolve and, perhaps, even fear of somehow lessening the operational effectiveness of 2 Commando.”³²²

Numerous authors have concluded that the Cdn AB Regt became a dumping ground for the three feeder Regiments. Horn acknowledges that when the leadership of the three feeder Regiments were not supporters of the Cdn AB Regt, they would “restrict the quality and number of officers posted to serve in the Airborne” and also saw the Regiment as a “home for their malcontents and trouble-makers – a sort of reform school.”³²³ The BOI acknowledges the quality of soldiers and officers was not necessarily “evenly distributed across all of the infantry units” in the CAF but comes to the contrasting conclusion that this was because self-selection to the Regiment may have led to “a greater proportion of talent” as many good soldiers were attracted to the Regiment.³²⁴

2 CDO personnel). The remainder are not characterized explicitly as allegations including the “accidental shooting” of Corporal Abel and two incidents of “attempted theft” of military stores by Somali nationals.

³¹⁸ Ibid., B-2/3.

³¹⁹ Ibid., A-19/33.

³²⁰ Ibid., C-6/8.

³²¹ Ibid., C-5/8.

³²² Ibid., C-4/8.

³²³ Horn, “What Did You Expect?”, 404. Horn notes there is “overwhelming consensus on this issue” by those who served in top leadership positions of the Cdn AB Regt. He also refers to the Hewson Report, DeFaye BOI, and Somalia Inquiry for corroboration.

³²⁴ DeFaye, *Board of Inquiry*, F-1/3.

Ultimately the BOI report offers many preconceptions, opinions, conclusions and minimizations that will be shown to be consistent with testimony at the Somalia Inquiry. This includes discussing views the board acknowledges “might be classed as white supremacist in nature,” the use of the most vulgar racial slur for a black person which is characterized repeatedly as a “nickname,” and noting these problems were confined to a “tiny minority” of members.³²⁵ Finally the BOI considered the ostensible elite status of the Regiment noting there was “broad endorsement, primarily within the Regiment itself” that it was “indeed an elite unit.”³²⁶ Winslow writes that the BOI concluded the CARBG was well-trained for peacekeeping and peacemaking, and maintains that the training for the Western Sahara was preparation for Somalia.³²⁷ Neither the BOI nor Winslow address the reality that with the high turnover rate within the Regiment, it is questionable to assert that the training for the Western Sahara carried over or benefited those who deployed to Somalia in late 1992.³²⁸

Winslow’s Socio-Cultural Inquiry

Winslow was commissioned by the Somalia Inquiry to conduct her inquiry, which includes a review of literature crossing multiple domains including anthropology, psychology and sociology. Her work is the most comprehensive next to Horn’s extensive contributions. Winslow notes the theoretical framework for her study was inspired by Devereux’s assumption that human phenomena are best explained by a combination of psychological and anthropological-sociological terms.³²⁹ She asserts the Cdn AB Regt had a unique culture, noting how its emphasis on toughness and aggression may have influenced the actions of its members during the mission. For Winslow, culture is “shared values” and “behaviour patterns” of the organization which she deems a unit in the total social system.³³⁰ She further describes culture as a social force that controls patterns of organizational behaviour and shapes members’ cognitions and perceptions of meanings and realities.³³¹ She observes that each Commando was a subculture and had its own “personality” which she ultimately describes as “closed subcultures” with different standards, rules, and “three different marching tunes” in Somalia including different policies regarding

³²⁵ Ibid., Annex I, I-5/6.

³²⁶ Ibid., Annex K, K-1/9.

³²⁷ Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia*, 267.

³²⁸ In addition to the regular postings and turnover of officers and soldiers, consider that none of the Commando OCs or the CO of the Regiment who deployed to Somalia were in their positions when that training took place.

³²⁹ Ibid., 4; George Devereux, *Ethnopschoanalysis: Psychoanalysis and Anthropology as Complementary Frames of Reference* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

³³⁰ Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia*, 91.

³³¹ Ibid.

alcohol consumption.³³² This latter observation is notable considering she quotes one interviewee as stating that “about 85% of what went on there had to do with booze.”³³³

Winslow set out to establish what she describes as the “airborne culture/identity,” ultimately a “conceptual scheme” derived from visual records/photographs and videos, personal records (including letters and firsthand accounts), literary sources comparing “similar units”, and the interviews.³³⁴ Her methodology uses participant observation and interviewing by clinical outsider (her) with key informants. This ethnographic research begins with observation (interviews) then induces generalizations. Winslow recognizes the distinctive nature of the three commandos only after it emerges as a theme. She notes that she conducted approximately fifty interviews with soldiers and families, “selected randomly and through snowball word of mouth, acknowledging she spoke to soldiers that her interviewees recommended. Her interviewees were mostly Cdn AB Regt members who had deployed to Somalia, and most interviews lasted 2-6 hours, sometimes in stages. These discussions focussed on Somalia and the aftermath, especially the disbandment of the Regiment. Winslow explains that the vocabulary was “levelled” so readers would not be able to distinguish officers from enlisted personnel, men from women, or even English from French. This approach discounts many aspects of individual and collective habitus.

Of note, Winslow’s approach is comparable to Irwin’s earlier ethnographic examination of Canadian infantry platoon commanders to which Winslow refers briefly.³³⁵ Winslow discusses soldiers retaliating against an “abusive officer,” and refers to Irwin’s account of a former Airborne Captain who was an instructor on the interviewee’s course. This officer is described as “a real jerk” ... “When he was in (Petawawa) his soldiers burned his jeep on the parade square.” Irwin recounts that another soldier describes it was a “brand new Renegade jeep there, a CJ” and soldiers “put it on the parade square... and lit the thing on fire...” In contrast to this anonymous information, the Somalia transcripts reveal details that are helpful towards understanding, confirming and contextualizing this event, especially the extent to which it exemplified defiance to authority. Witness testimony at the Inquiry reveals it was Captain Ferraby’s vehicle (which was a Toyota), the arson occurred in June of 1990, Col Houghton was CO, Airborne Routine Orders and a paraflare were used to ignite the fire, and both Colonels Houghton and Holmes testify that no culprits were ever identified.³³⁶ Another example is where Winslow quotes an interviewee stating “the Airborne had a kind of an attitude ... big arms, no brains.”³³⁷ This quote can

³³² Ibid., 141-5.

³³³ Ibid., 214.

³³⁴ Ibid., 4.

³³⁵ Anne L. Irwin, “Canadian Infantry Platoon Commanders and the Emergence of Leadership,” MA Thesis, University of Calgary, September 1993.

³³⁶ Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia*, 59.

³³⁷ Ibid., 48.

be interpreted as a comment made by someone external to the Regiment, yet the identical statement was made by Cpl Purnelle during his testimony at the Somalia Inquiry.³³⁸ The reader is left without the benefit of being able to assess if this constitutes the opinion of more than one individual.

Winslow uses the context and framework of norms and culture when she discusses phenomena that will be examined in the case study. She notes Cotton concluded the Airborne had become a “dumping ground” leading Winslow to characterize the Regiment as a reform school.³³⁹ She acknowledges the existence of the wall of silence, noting it fostered and maintained “inappropriate norms.”³⁴⁰ She describes the regimental system somewhat tautologically as a “culture within a culture” and observes the word “aggressive” was used often in interviews, especially pertaining to 2 CDO.³⁴¹ Winslow concludes that Airborne training resulted in the “investment in a warrior identity” which she acknowledges can contribute to group cohesion and other desirable attributes. She also warns that hyper-investment is problematic and can be to the “detriment of other aspects of their personality which then become subordinated to this identity.”³⁴² These observations fall short of offering any detailed insight or explanation into how this contributed to dysfunction within the Regiment.

Similarly, Winslow set out to understand what happened in Somalia, specifically the death of Shidane Arone. She acknowledges “the difficulty in identifying cumulative impact is that no one factor in and of itself may be enough to alert authorities to the danger.”³⁴³ The factors she enumerates as part of cumulative impact include ignoring rules, the order to abuse prisoners, alcohol consumption, rebel warrior “ramboism,” poor discipline, environmental and psychological stress, and poor leadership.³⁴⁴ The overall conclusion of her study is that all of these factors, when analyzed from a socio-cultural perspective, demonstrate the “roots of the death of Shidane Arone go deep into the past of the Airborne Regiment and into the heart of Airborne regimental culture.”³⁴⁵ Ultimately, Winslow concludes that “a truly elite unit with a strong sense of professionalism” would demonstrate self-discipline and ethics and would not have committed aggressive acts.³⁴⁶

There are significant points of differentiation between Winslow’s analysis and this inquiry into elitism, starting with the data. Winslow inserted herself into the post-Somalia environment of a Regiment that had already been disbanded. Her interviews are not just anonymous, they are purposefully de-

³³⁸ Somalia Inquiry, *Dishonoured Legacy - Evidentiary Transcripts*, Vol. 35, 6824.

³³⁹ Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia*, 67.

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 75.

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 78, 123.

³⁴² *Ibid.*, 85.

³⁴³ *Ibid.*, 270

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 257, 270.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 270.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 266.

identified which removes any indication of language spoken, rank and position, and whether they are a soldier or family member. This also removes all insight into the individual habitus of each participant. Winslow also confirms that her interviewees were given the opportunity to review and revise their statements. She characterizes the three commandos as distinct subcultures, but does not identify which commando interviewees belonged to, as such precluding any comparisons and distinctions. Put another way, the influence of the habitus of each commando is removed from any assessment. Since participant selection occurred largely by word of mouth, it logically follows that interviewees would refer other members of their own commando. All of this impacts any assessment of credibility (i.e. accuracy and reliability), as does the comparison of anonymous information versus testimony under oath at a public inquiry.

Most of Winslow's ethnography deals with in-theatre matters then the return from Somalia and disbandment. There is significantly less focus on the situation within the Regiment during the years leading up to the deployment to Somalia. Put in terms of ethnography and remembering the regular turnover of personnel within the Regiment, the tribe she was interviewing was very different from those in place over the years leading up to the deployment. A final point of distinction pertains to an examination of culture as compared to habitus. Winslow determined that regimental loyalty between the Airborne and parent infantry units as well as other units "could create a conflict of interest," an observation that offers minimal insight into how this contributed to any dysfunction.³⁴⁷ Conversely, if this is presented in the context of habitus, it could be observed that members of the Regiment each possessed their own individual habitus, influenced by their upbringing and their life events and experience. As such, members of each of the three commandos came to the Regiment already possessing a multitude of unique predispositions that were further influenced by the Regiment's habitus fostering elitism.

The Somalia Mission – Operation Deliverance

The initial United Nations (UN) peacekeeping intervention in Somalia was UNOSOM, but by March of 1992 the mission's mandate was not achieving the intended results. Personnel from international and regional humanitarian aid organizations were losing their lives as they attempted to assist the local population. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 746 notes that a cease-fire had still not been implemented by the warring factions, and provision and distribution of humanitarian aid was still being impeded.³⁴⁸ UNSC Resolution 767 was passed July 27, 1992 as the Council professed deep concern over the "proliferation of armed banditry throughout Somalia."³⁴⁹ The government of Canada committed the CARBG, made up primarily by members

³⁴⁷ Ibid., 120.

³⁴⁸ UNSC Resolution 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992.

³⁴⁹ UNSC Resolution 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992.

of the three Commandos from the Cdn AB Regt. Of the four potentially deployable units, the Cdn AB Regt was the only one that did not possess its own armoured vehicles (AVGPs), which had to be reallocated from other units and the necessary training undertaken in preparation for what was then still a peacekeeping mission. Meanwhile, the rapidly deteriorating situation in Somalia prompted the UN to change the mission mandate. In response to “urgent calls from Somalia for the international community to take measures to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid” and characterizing the situation as “intolerable,” UN Security Council Resolution 794 was adopted on 3 December 1992.³⁵⁰ UNITAF was a US-led coalition effort with a mandate to “use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”³⁵¹ As a result, the CARBG was no longer tasked with the peacekeeping mission for which they had trained. Horn believes the Cdn AB Regt adapted well to this last-minute change in mission, pointing out that as far as mission related tasks such as pacifying areas and performing peace-enforcement duties “they got an A+.”³⁵² UNITAF also represented a turning point in the UN’s history, as the first time a group of member states not under UN command were authorized to use force to address a humanitarian crisis during a civil war.³⁵³ This followed the US led coalition’s authorization from the Security Council to use force in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.³⁵⁴ Korea was also a US led enforcement action, however a key distinction with Korea is that it was fought as a conventional war.

UNITAF was an enforcement action that was not directed against a clearly identifiable army like that of North Korea, but rather insurgents working on behalf of the warlords. As part of the UNITAF coalition forces, The CARBG was tasked with providing a secure environment to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, which consisted of addressing the obvious signs but not the root causes. The primary focus was on prohibiting the display of weapons within Mogadishu rather than focusing on disarmament. Although there was a case to made for broader actions to address ongoing violence and disorder, the US

³⁵⁰ The resolution invoked Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which elevated the mandate from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement. Article 39 of the UN Charter empowers the Security Council to identify and address threats to peace and acts of aggression, with the goal of maintaining or restoring international peace and security. This article is the main source of power for enforcement action afforded to the Security Council under Chapter VII.

³⁵¹ UNSC Resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992. The Security Council expressed “grave alarm” at the violations of humanitarian law, “including reports of violence and threats of violence against personnel participating lawfully in impartial humanitarian relief activities; deliberate attacks on non-combatants, relief contingents and vehicles, and medical and relief facilities; and the impeding of the delivery of food and medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian population.”

³⁵² Colonel Bernd Horn, interview with Author 16 March 2018.

³⁵³ Christine Philipp “Somalia-A Very Special Case,” in *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, Volume 9, eds. A. von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum, 2005, 534.

³⁵⁴ UNSC Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990. The coalition force was under US command and did not operate under the UN flag.

Commander did not consider disarmament to be within his mandate. UNSC Resolution 794 authorized the coalition forces “to use such measures as may be necessary to ensure strict implementation of paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992)”, which was a complete embargo on the delivery of any weapons or military equipment to Somalia.³⁵⁵

Aggression During the Somalia Mission

Somali national Shidane Arone was killed by members of 2 CDO on March 15th, 1993, after being tortured in a bunker in their compound. This followed another fatal shooting eleven days earlier of Ahmed Aruush under conditions the Somalia Commission describe as “the culmination of a dubious interpretation of the Rules of Engagement given by the Commanding Officer” coupled with the observation that “many suspected that the two Somalis had been deceived, trapped and shot.”³⁵⁶ The Commission concludes Arone’s killing was “tragic and unwarranted” and ultimately “integrity and courage were superseded by personal and institutional self-interest.”³⁵⁷ There are several predominant and at the same time homogenous explanations regarding the causes of dysfunctional leadership and deleterious behaviour within the Regiment, a situation that deteriorated to a point where the Regiment was disbanded in disgrace in March 1995.³⁵⁸ Previous attention and analysis has provided important insight into problems related to leadership and discipline and the root cause of noxious acts is often attributed to the Regiment containing a few “bad apples” coupled with an overly aggressive airborne culture.³⁵⁹ The Somalia Commission notes that “it is discipline that controls aggressivity,” and points out that during pre-deployment as well as in-theatre “that state of discipline among the troops was alarmingly sub-standard – a condition that subsisted without correction.”³⁶⁰ The Commission’s report is harshly critical of military leadership, and speaks to misplaced loyalty and self-preservation when reporting officers’ testimony at the inquiry was “characterized by inconsistency, improbability, implausibility,

³⁵⁵ UNSC Resolution 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, paragraph 16.

³⁵⁶ Somalia Commission, *Dishonoured Legacy*, Volume IV, 1059.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 1145.

³⁵⁸ The Canadian government disbanded the Regiment as direct condemnation of criminal acts committed during the Regiment’s United Nations (UN) deployment in Somalia. The Prime Minister’s decision to disband the Regiment was also an immediate reaction to hazing videos that surfaced in the media as the scandal unfolded. The nexus between the surfacing of the videos and Defence Minister David Collenette’s order to disband the Regiment is detailed by Bercuson in *Significant Incident*, 240-241 and Desbarats, *Somalia Cover-up*, 3 notes the videos were the “immediate cause of the regiment’s disbandment.” The distinction between hazing and initiation rites is explored by Winslow in *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia*.

³⁵⁹ Somalia Commission, *Dishonoured Legacy*, ES1. The Commissioners note that this explanation was provided by many leaders, but when it “proved hollow” these same leaders resorted to blaming subordinates for the poor state of discipline.

³⁶⁰ Somalia Commission, *Dishonoured Legacy*, 1449, 1464.

evasiveness, selective recollection, half-truths, and plain lies.”³⁶¹ Horn characterize the Regiment as having “come to personify disobedience and a unit out of control.”³⁶² This begs the question of underlying motivations for witness’s behaviour and responses in terms of the reproduction of elitism.

Winslow’s study of the Cdn AB Regt after Somalia concludes that members of the Regiment were inherently aggressive.³⁶³ Desbarats, drawing on his personal observations as a Commissioner with the Somalia Inquiry, asserts the events in Somalia were “not an aberration, as the military leadership tried to pretend, but a symptom of corruption within the leadership itself.”³⁶⁴ The question persists as to whether the array of problems and issues were just signs or indicators of the real disease that lurked beneath the surface. Discussing aggression, the post-Somalia De Faye BOI reports it “received a considerable amount of testimony suggesting that the level of operational security” of 2 CDO “may have been too high.”³⁶⁵ The Board’s conclusion mentioned earlier equates aggressiveness with “heightened alertness or readiness to react not belligerence.” Aggression in 2 CDO continues to be characterized euphemistically by the BOI later in the report, referring to a “more outwardly alert posture.”³⁶⁶

Most other perspectives contained in the literature offer a starkly contrasting view. The Somalia Commission’s point of view on aggression centered around the assertion that Operation Deliverance required soldiers who were “well led, highly disciplined, and able to respond flexibly to a range of tasks that demanded patience, understanding and sensitivity to the plight of the Somali people. Instead they arrived in the desert trained and mentally conditioned to fight.”³⁶⁷ The Commission also made a finding that the Cdn AB Regt was vulnerable to being “used as a dumping ground for overly aggressive or otherwise problematic personnel.”³⁶⁸ They note that despite the Regiment being sensitive to “the need to establish an appropriate tone and attitude” in preparation for deployment to Somalia, “at least some components remained overly aggressive in their conduct and bearing” even during pre-deployment training.³⁶⁹ The Commission gravitated towards other contributing factors including “generally belligerent or aggressive nature of the individual” and “official tolerance of extreme behavior.”³⁷⁰ Much has been written and argued regarding the benefits and even necessity for airborne soldiers to be aggressive given the inherent nature of their operations. This assertion is a significant untested perception that will be explored throughout the testimony.

³⁶¹ Ibid., Executive Summary, ES4.

³⁶² Horn, *Military Elites*, 45.

³⁶³ Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia*.

³⁶⁴ Desbarats, *Somalia Cover-up*, 3.

³⁶⁵ De Faye *Board of Inquiry Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group*, Phase I Vol XI, A-19/33.

³⁶⁶ Ibid., K-5/9.

³⁶⁷ Somalia Commission, *Dishonoured Legacy*, ES29.

³⁶⁸ Ibid., ES25.

³⁶⁹ Ibid., ES28, ES56.

³⁷⁰ Ibid., ES40.

Disbandment / Findings of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry

After the Cdn AB Regt returned to Canada, Arone's death and other details released during the Somalia Inquiry created a growing political problem for the Regiment, and the critical and decisive point was reached on January 15, 1995 when a video aired on national television showing several members of 2 CDO uttering racial slurs and according to Horn "behaving in an unprofessional manner."³⁷¹ Three days later, another video surfaced then a third, and on January 23, 1995 the Minister of National Defence ordered the Cdn AB Regt disbanded.

A new regiment was formed in 2006, the Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR), which Bercuson describes as "an elite fighting formation."³⁷² The CAF notes that the regiment "proudly traces its roots" to the famed Devil's Brigade, the combined USA/Canada First Special Service Force (FSSF) and that it "proudly carries the Black Devils' battle honours, and the Devils' spirit lives on at CSOR."³⁷³ The current list of official lineages on the DND website outlines how battle honours of disbanded units are preserved, and indicates the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion and the 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion of WWII are perpetuated by the Cdn AB Regt.³⁷⁴ Horn includes the Cdn AB Regt in the lineage of CANSOFCOM, pointing out that the Cdn AB Regt's mandate included "special operations types of tasks."³⁷⁵ Horn notes that the widespread sentiment of the Regiment's members was captured by BGen Jim Cox who stated "in our hearts ... we equated ourselves with the SAS and the SF (Special Forces) in the U.S."³⁷⁶ Horn concludes that the Regiment "fills an important position in Canada's special operations and SOF history."³⁷⁷

The Commission of Inquiry made numerous findings pertaining to the actions and accountability of senior leaders. In some cases, these were challenged in court by the named individuals and were ordered to be stricken from the record. In its final report, the Commission of Inquiry notes that the Somalia experience generally represents "a stain on otherwise distinguished

³⁷¹ Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 228.

³⁷² Bercuson, *The Fighting Canadians*, 20.

³⁷³ Department of National Defence, "Canadian Special Operations Regiment," retrieved on May 1, 2025 from <https://web.archive.org/web/20130702150821/http://www.csor-rosc.forces.gc.ca/index-eng.asp>

³⁷⁴ Department of National Defence, "Official Linages Vol. 3, Part 1, Annex 1B." Retrieved on May 1, 2025 from <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-lineages/lineages/regiments-perpetuations.html>. The list of perpetuations is dated May 1, 2009 and the website indicates it was last modified February 16, 2018 but makes no mention of CSOR in the lineage.

³⁷⁵ Bernd Horn, *Shadow Warriors* (Toronto: Dundurn, 2016), 14.

³⁷⁶ Bernd Horn, *We Will Find a Way: The Canadian Special Operations Legacy* (Ottawa: 17 Wing Publishing Office, 2018), 53.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

careers” when it outlines its findings on failures of senior leaders.³⁷⁸ The report notes that justifications and excuses ranged from “the system performed well; it was only a few bad apples” to “there will always be errors” to “I did not know” or “I was unaware” to “it was not my responsibility” and “I trusted my subordinates.”³⁷⁹ These justifications and excuses provided insight into determining some of the variables and empirical indicators of elitism to apply to the case study research. Ultimately the commissioners conclude “what remains, in the cold light of day, are our unburnished and unembellished findings of individual misconduct and failure.”³⁸⁰

Military Institutions and Elite Status

The concept of elite status is inextricably connected to all connotations of elitism. It is important to reiterate that this inquiry into military elitism does not seek to establish whether units like the Cdn AB Regt were elite, rather the focus is on elitism and at this point highlighting the untested perceptions associated with institutionalized elite status. As discussed in the previous chapter, this inquiry makes two assumptions regarding elite status, commencing by differentiating it from elitism. Elite status is granted by the social environment within an institution. In the military context, the broader military institution means the CAF. Elitism is a set of behaviours and attitudes built around an individual or group engaged in self-granting and self-promoting an elite status, or put another way, elitism is the social posturing of elite status. Secondly, it is assumed that elite status can be earned and can be objectively verifiable and socially accepted, i.e. it is possible for institutions to recognize and socially justify special qualities and abilities in individuals who perform consistently and predictably in ways deemed superior to other comparable groups without tolerating or promoting elitism. The definition of elite status established in the literature review speaks to socially shared opinions, perspectives, and preconceptions where an identifiable group is construed as performing consistently and predictably in ways deemed superior to other groups engaging in similar performance activities.

There are several predominant works exploring matters related to elite status as it pertains to the military, but most focus on special operations forces which is a particular sub-set within the military. Parry looks at the role of elites in politics but also discusses military elites in the context of their influence on military officers, noting the hierarchical structure of the military produces “extreme status sensitivity” indicative of a low-status group, and characterizes officership as a “low-status profession.”³⁸¹ Beaumont considers several aspects of elite units from a civil-military relations standpoint, including the extent to which the prevailing ethos either reflects or contradicts that of the parent system

³⁷⁸ Somalia Commission of Inquiry, *Dishonoured Legacy Volume IV*, 953.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ Morris Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1959), 34-35.

and the extent to which such units diverge from normal control including access to special resources.³⁸² Because Beaumont is focusing on military units, he examines characteristics of elite units and practices that go hand-in-hand with performing a dangerous role, including selection process/rite of passage, higher physical and mental standards than other units, uniforms/customs/traditions that are “frequently highly synthetic” and enjoying a rare distinction within the military in “being relatively free from ordinary administration and discipline.”³⁸³

Cohen explores elite military units starting with their political origins and the views of notable civilian leaders including Churchill and Kennedy. Cohen asserts that elite units can be distinguished by the propensity to be both more military than conventional forces and at the same time more political than those military forces. In the forward to Cohen’s *Commandos and Politicians*, Huntington attributes this paradox to the way elite units “capture the interest and imagination of politicians and the public and also in the nature of the tasks which they are often called upon to perform.”³⁸⁴ Huntington asks important questions regarding how these units come to exist as well as the political and military purpose they serve, hence the nexus between this inquiry and the literature on civil-military relations. Cohen relies on Webster’s definition of elite as “a choice part” and “socially superior.”³⁸⁵ Cohen then alludes to a passage from Orwell’s *Animal Farm* that speaks to the power and privilege that invariably lays with the select elite, where the allegorical pigs that control the government proclaim that all animals are equal, but “some animals are more equal than others.”³⁸⁶ Orwell’s *de facto* corruption of the Seven Commandments implies that equality can be a relative term, much the way anything can be described in degrees such as a well-trained conventional military unit versus a special operations forces unit with a comparatively unique mandate. Although Orwell’s is clearly a flippant proclamation in a work of satire, it is a provocative concept that speaks to the incremental steps that can be taken to redefine and rationalize a concept such as precisely what constitutes an elite. More importantly, it directs attention to the examination of the conditions under which elitism is manifested. Specific to ostensibly elite military units, this entails differentiating performance that is consistently and predictably superior versus that which constitutes social posturing.

Establishing what makes a military or paramilitary unit lay claim to elite status in terms of mandate and capability or in some cases mere perception provides a basis for analyzing whether elitist attitudes or behaviours are present given the fact that elitism is characterized by social posturing that replaces actual elite status. An important criterion based on the working definition of elite status is whether a group is engaged in superior performance activities compared to

³⁸² Beaumont, *Military Elites*.

³⁸³ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

³⁸⁴ Eliot A. Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies*. Harvard Studies in International Affairs No. 40. Cambridge: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1978.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁶ George Orwell, *Animal Farm* (London: Penguin, 2008).

other similar groups. Beaumont focuses on numerous dysfunctional characteristics of elite units which he labels as elitism, although he does not provide an explicit definition of the term. This gives him the distinction of being one of the few authors who uses elitism to characterize deleterious attitudes and behaviours. After analyzing elite military units of various countries since World War I, Beaumont concludes that in many instances elite units can be characterized as “virtually encapsulated delinquency.”³⁸⁷ He prefaces the discussion by describing it as a warning sticker that needs to be placed on the medicine bottle labelled elitism. Likening the customs, habits and costumes of some elite units to guerrilla bands and street gangs, Beaumont asserts these units sometimes “assume the posture of virtual hoodlums” which he correlates to the peer group motivation of those groups. He isolates issues of aggressiveness, tribalism, counterculture, disregard for the laws of war, and an affinity for the romantic conception of an outlaw and concludes that “regression is regression, no matter how thick the disguise.”³⁸⁸ Put another way, Beaumont sees these issues as evidence that such behaviour is not beneficial or necessary for a supposedly elite unit. Aggressiveness and disregard for the laws of war are disciplinary issues, as is any conduct that relates to portraying an outlaw or rebel. Tribalism and especially countercultures are concepts that require further investigation as they relate to how elitism is manifested and justified within an institution.

To explore the general attributes of elite status and what constitutes superior performance in the military context, consider an overview of one of the most elite units in the U.S. military.³⁸⁹ In *Inside Delta Force* Command Sergeant Major Eric Haney relates his experience as one of the original members of the U.S. Army’s counter-terrorism unit.³⁹⁰ Already a U.S. Army Ranger at the time, Haney joined Delta Force when the unit was first stood up at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Haney notes that Ranger life was “downright severe,” and as a result “most men failed to complete a full two-year tour with the unit.”³⁹¹ He recounts his Delta Force selection experience in a very factual manner that reveals much about his mindset and speaks to the importance of humility.³⁹² One of the rare occasions Haney uses the term elite is when he notes that candidates for Delta

³⁸⁷ Beaumont, *Military Elites*, 192.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁹ In addition to Delta Force, there is no shortage of contenders for the characterization of elite within the U.S. military. All have slightly different mandates, including Army Green Berets, Army Rangers, Navy SEALs, Marine MARSOC (Special Operations Command), Air Force Pararescue, etc.

³⁹⁰ Eric L. Haney, *Inside Delta Force: The Story of America’s Elite Counterterrorist Unit*. (New York: Delacorte Press, 2006).

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 17. He notes that as a Ranger he spent three weeks of every month in the field, completed extended training deployments three times a year and was subject to “no-notice” exercises annually. At page 29 he recounts how 23 Rangers went into hypothermia during Ranger training while crossing the Yellow River on Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. Four men died in a situation he describes as “The Ranger cadre had crossed the fine line between hardhead and bonehead.”

³⁹² See comments of Michael Day in Horn, *Military Elites*, Introduction.

Force selection were forbidden from wearing berets representing the units they had come from, which annoyed some participants because “berets were badges of honour then, limited to elite troops who had earned them.”³⁹³ Haney recounts how prior to entering the stress-test phase of Delta Force selection, candidates were advised that anyone who failed to meet the standard would be removed and returned to their unit with a letter addressed to their commanding officer “declaring that man to be both an exemplary soldier and a credit to his unit, but not, unfortunately, selected for service with this unit at this time.”³⁹⁴ This approach denotes a lack of elitism and immanent attitudes and behaviours of social posturing, and suggests Delta Force projected themselves as being different as opposed to better than other specialized units in the U.S. military.

While danger associated with assigned tasks has been described as a key characteristic of an elite military unit, it may be equally the case for unit training. Haney describes training to respond to active shooters, commonly known as immediate rapid deployment (IRD) where small teams of responders deploy immediately in an active-threat situation (e.g. school shooter) rather than wait for a tactical team. Delta Force was training for these scenarios decades before they were deployed in frontline policing within North America.³⁹⁵ He recounts sitting in a classroom with other students unaware of what was about to transpire and hearing the command “execute” yelled out by the instructors before they entered the room. A flash-bang was deployed, and numerous live rounds were fired around the heads of the students over the course of less than three seconds as two instructors entered the room, dug their corners and covered their separate arcs of fire to address threats in every part of the room. Haney describes the room assault as being executed with a “mental factor at work” that intrigued him.³⁹⁶ When the shooting stopped, each of the targets that represented terrorists had two bullet holes in a vital spot, and Haney was dumfounded in that he thought it was “impossible” that none of the students had been hit.³⁹⁷ Haney sums up Delta Force training by noting that if they stopped their shooting training at that point they would be “amazing combat shooters – infinitely better than any other military unit I knew of,” but subsequently undertook IRD training that had just been demonstrated to or more aptly at them in order to take combat shooting to a whole other level.³⁹⁸ Selection course members then proceeded to complete the IRD training, taking turns being bystanders in the room then as assaulters, with Haney noting that it was much more difficult to be a shooter than to be the hostage with live rounds exploding within inches of his head. The former requires great skill and confidence in one’s abilities, the latter required faith in

³⁹³ Haney, *Inside Delta Force*, 26.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 64.

³⁹⁵ Tanner Aulie, “Stopping an Active Shooter,” *RCMP Gazette* 79, no. 2 retrieved on June 16, 2023 from <https://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/gazette/stopping-an-active-shooter> Subsequent to the Columbine High School shooting in 1999 where 13 people were killed, IRD/IARD techniques were developed as an alternative to securing the scene and waiting for arrival of special units like SWAT.

³⁹⁶ Haney, *Inside Delta Force*, 142.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 137.

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 142.

your teammates and for Haney it was “easier to think of being shot than of shooting a mate.”³⁹⁹ In addition to the proficiency and skill of tactics such as IRD, the end result is the mutual confidence, trust and respect the team members gained for each other in this “life or death final examination” for this training.⁴⁰⁰ Of note, Haney does not relate any instances of attitudes or behaviours of elitism that replace earned elite status.

Lewis attempts to answer the question of whether there is a place for elite units in the CAF, referring to many of the sources already mentioned.⁴⁰¹ Of significance is not so much his conclusion, but his acknowledgement that he had difficulty pinpointing a definition of elite. Lewis asserts that in 2002, the term elite was very much out of favour and appeared only once in the Canadian Army’s doctrine manual. Lewis characterizes the following excerpt as a warning that appears to speak directly to the aftermath of Somalia:

*Equally serious is the potential for a rogue form of military ethos to arise which is divorced from responsibility and focused on erroneous concepts of elitism and honour, leading in turn to ill-discipline and breakdown of professional and ethical values.*⁴⁰²

Ultimately Lewis does not establish a definition of elite, instead he follows the established trend seen in the literature and provides a list of ostensible characteristics of elite units. The very reference to an “erroneous” concept of elitism perpetuates the confusion inherent in the duality of the construct within much of the literature, again inferring there is also a positive and non-dysfunctional connotation.

Discussion

There are several key considerations from this chapter that bring in aspects unique to the military that augment the literature explored in Chapter 1. Vagts makes the key observation that militarism not only fails to contribute to objectives associated with the military way, it can also “hamper and defeat” these efforts.⁴⁰³ Elitism stands out as an exemplar of the deleterious connotation of militarism in terms of attitudes, behaviours and practices that facilitate the perception of elite status. Put another way, the social posturing behaviours of elitism correlate to what Vagts succinctly terms “advertisement.”⁴⁰⁴ Carlton’s observation that militarism is a way of life where military values become an end in themselves follows a similar line of reasoning to the discussion regarding myopic viewpoints in corporate elitism, and foreshadows the problems associated with elitism where earned elite status can be replaced by assumed

³⁹⁹ Ibid., 156.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid., 158.

⁴⁰¹ Frederick A. Lewis, *Is There a Place for Elite Forces in the Canadian Army*: (Masters Thesis U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2002).

⁴⁰² Department of National Defence, *CFP 300 Canada’s Army* (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1998), 36.

⁴⁰³ Vagts, *Militarism*, Preface.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., 16.

status and then perpetuated through reverence of customs, traditions and self-referential behaviour rather than a focus on capability.⁴⁰⁵ Similarly, Willems observation of militarism's "boundless reverence"⁴⁰⁶ for symbols of military status corresponds with Richardson's observation of clinging to tradition, ritual and dogma that combine to produce a dislike of change and a difficulty accepting new ideas.⁴⁰⁷ With the focus of elitism directed towards seeking power, privilege and advantage, there is a nexus to actions designed to promote the glory, reputation and status of a leader that led Vagts to characterize the purveyors of militarism as narcissistic.⁴⁰⁸

Alexandra also speaks to the fact that anything can be taken too far when observing that pejorative references to militarism pertain to "excessive or improper" actions and attitudes that can be mitigated and become unproblematic if constrained to "the correct amount and setting."⁴⁰⁹ This is educative insight for contemplating many of the approaches and practices to be revealed in the Inquiry testimony. Alexandra's key revelation relating to social posturing distinguishes the military profession in terms of legal and social marks, noting that doing what a soldier does such as wearing military uniforms and performing military drill does not make a person a soldier any more than charging for legal advice makes someone a lawyer.⁴¹⁰ Alexandra reinforces the requirement for an intersection between role and capability when he notes that there is training, education and experience leading to the varying degrees of professional competence associated with membership in a professional body such as the law society or a position in the armed forces. Alexandra encapsulates the elitism component of militarism with the description of a preoccupation with the cultural and symbolic capital including the personal benefits to be gained from membership in such organizations, such as financial rewards and prestige.⁴¹¹

Exploring elite status, it can be broken down broadly into earned/achieved status versus ascribed status which can be a product of circumstances rather than choice. Ascribed status is not limited to a position to which someone is appointed, being a parent or a survivor of a disease are both ascribed statuses to the extent they have been assigned. From an institutional perspective, ascribed status refers to a social position derived out of membership in a particular institution, and arguably this status can be maintained regardless of whether an individual lives up to the norms or expectations of the institution. The purpose of engaging in posturing is to convince others of something that is not true, therefore all forms of social posturing require careful examination as it pertains to elitism. Posturing contrasts with achieved status, including professional status which is based on some combination of ability, merit,

⁴⁰⁵ Carlton, *Militarism*.

⁴⁰⁶ Willems, *A Way of Life and Death: Three Centuries of Prussian-German Militarism*, 1, 5, 9.

⁴⁰⁷ Dixon, *Psychology of Military Incompetence*, 178.

⁴⁰⁸ Vagts, *Militarism*, 15.

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 207.

⁴¹⁰ Alexandra, "Militarism."

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*

performance or effort. With elitism defined in part as attitudes and behaviours that are shared by a group and seek to reinforce in others the perception that such group has elite status..., the manner and extent to which status is earned/achieved is key as opposed to being self-granted. Linton provides the analogy of the relationship between a status and it's holder being similar to the driver's seat of a car versus the actual driver, where the vehicle provides the range of potential actions and uses but how these are exercised by the actual driver can vary widely.⁴¹² With the vehicle being the socially assigned status, the behaviour performed by a person in relation to a specific social status is the dynamic aspect where skill, experience, motive and intention are some of the key variables.

The preliminary conclusions that can be drawn regarding elite status are that role and perhaps most importantly capability are key distinguishing factors. Delta Force training described by Haney produced members with a highly specialized skill level and elite counter-terrorism capability from hostage rescue to addressing extreme threats. Properly compared to their contemporaries (i.e. other military or counter-terrorism units), the superior skill and ability of Delta Force members is evident. The attributes of the most elite military units include all the following: superior skill and ability that is unique and highly specialized, extreme mental and physical demands, risk and danger in every operation including training, extreme and excessive hardship, and the requirement for a high degree of maintenance of practical skills.

Key concepts from the literature on military institutions and elite status reveal avenues requiring further exploration. The precepts of civil-military relations can be applied to the examination of elite status to help determine how elitism is manifested to replace elite status, and how and why it is supported or tolerated if Huntington is correct in his assertion that military elites appeal to both the imagination and interest of politicians. Cohen's reference to Animal Farm speaks to the incremental steps by which attitudes and behaviours can be redefined and rationalized into norms that are antithetical to an institution's best interests. Haney's account of Delta Force training serves to highlight a training program that is physically and mentally demanding, but where every component of the training has an important and necessary purpose. There is a notable absence of any indication of elitism in Haney's account, and he describes a frame of mind akin to an Olympic athlete training for excellence and distinction in their field. Most significantly in terms of identifying variables and empirical indicators of elitism, Beaumont enumerates specific attitudes and behaviours he labels as elitism, including aggressiveness, tribalism, counterculture, disregard for the laws of war, and emulating outlaws.

Much of the objection to elite status identified in the literature typically centres around the power, privileges and advantages associated with elitism, when these unearned benefits are adopted by those with assumed or institutionalized elite status. Elitism is what replaces earned elite status that is ascribed to competence and ability. Elite status must be continually earned and reinforced otherwise it will be revoked in that it will no longer be socially legitimized. Elitism consists of social posturing intended to legitimize the elite

⁴¹² Linton, *The Study of Man: An Introduction*.

status and its associated privileges. Hence elitism is a form of compensating social process or perhaps a side-effect of creating an elite status where elitism becomes a viable and ultimately necessary option towards maintaining such status. Elitism is dynamic rather than static given the nature of earned elite status that requires constant maintenance and demonstrable performance that is consistently and predictably superior to other groups engaged in similar performance activities.

Elitism is the social posturing that replaces actual elite status, as such this necessitates exploration of what constitutes elite status in accordance with the working definition. If elite status of a military unit were primarily dependent on admission standards or the length and difficulty of selection or training courses, then there would be little conjecture in acknowledging the elite status of medical, dental, and legal officers and pilots over many other occupations. One of the trades for non-commissioned members of the CAF that until recently required a college degree is the military police trade, and despite members receiving specialist pay to attract and retain members within the trade their status within the CAF is not regarded as elite.⁴¹³ While all occupations mentioned require varyingly significant degrees of training and education, none of these groups can be construed as performing consistently and predictably in ways deemed superior to other groups engaging in similar performance activities. By this definition, without denigrating the education, training and skills of military pilots and medical officers, elite status would only be justified if they could be considered elite in comparison to their respective counterparts.

Using the military police example, they lack any additional or enhanced knowledge, training or experience to set them apart from their civilian counterparts in terms of superior skill or ability. Conversely, an argument could be made that search and rescue technician (SAR Tech) is an elite trade in the military because in addition to being operational 24/7 and undergoing very specialized training, there are mental and physical demands of the job coupled with the extreme risk and danger of every training and rescue operation.⁴¹⁴ These factors combine to translate into a unique mandate and capability that cannot be met by personnel in any other occupation. In late 2021 the CAF announced significant pay increases for occupations requiring an extensive period of training and subsequent high maintenance of skills, recognizing the “unique and highly specialized duties of SAR Techs merit a greater degree of compensation that reflects the hazards and hardships inherent in their employment. Of note, pilots and CANSOFCOM members were also singled out as occupations where additional compensation was justified based on the requirement for “high

⁴¹³ Government of Canada, “Careers: Military Police,” retrieved from <https://forces.ca/en/career/military-police/#:~:text=The%20ideal%20candidate%20will%20already,the%20required%20on%2Dthe%2Djob> on July 16, 2023.

⁴¹⁴ Government of Canada, “Pay Structure for Search and Rescue Technicians and Pilots,” retrieved from <http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/services/benefits-military/pay-restructure-sar-technicians-and-pilots.page#q3> on February 2, 2022

maintenance of skills.”⁴¹⁵ SAR Techs are exposed to extreme situations and excessive demands, with the CAF describing their skills as “hard learned” and noting that they endure “extremely hazardous conditions and hardship” while performing their duties.⁴¹⁶ Accepting that many occupations require extensive periods of training, education and skill, some roles are further distinguished by conditions of extreme danger, intense physical demands, the requirement to be on call 24/7, and an overall confluence of hardship and adversity.

Based on the literature reviewed and the discussion so far, the social legitimization of elite status can be ordered into three distinct phases of progression as outlined in Figure 1.

PHASES OF PROGRESSION – SOCIAL LEGITIMIZATION OF ELITE STATUS

Earned Elite Status:

- Ascribed to competence and the delivery of high capability in a commensurate role. The status is earned based on meeting an extraordinary demand and continually maintaining (i.e. earning) otherwise this status is rescinded (socially) or must be artificially maintained through social posturing.

Assumed Elite Status:

- Taken for granted and maintained by social posturing rather than delivering any measurables associated with earned elite status. This is where elitism first appears in the phases of social legitimization, and an important nuance here is that an elite status is self-granted by those concerned and assumed (i.e. not questioned) by others external to the organization.

Institutionalized Elite Status:

- Established over time by practice or custom, where earned elite status becomes assumed elite status that is no longer earned based on any consistent and predictable superior performance. Essentially previously earned status (or some degree of earned status) becomes the basis for posturing in the present. That present-day social posturing will sometimes then be camouflaged or concealed by virtue of the previous earned status.

Figure 1.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid.

Having reviewed the historical and broader social science perspectives on elitism, it is possible to isolate the key characteristics of elite status of individuals and groups. Elite status is socially granted or ascribed and will only remain in place so long as the status is maintained and legitimated socially. Put another way, elite status is cultural capital that must be actively invested to achieve the desired impact or results. Conversely, elitism is the social posturing of elite status. Bourdieu's concept of field is an important factor pertaining to elite status given the unique organizing logic of each field with its own implicit and explicit rules and its own understanding of social and cultural capital. In terms of status, cultural capital requires a similar understanding of the meaning, in the same way professional jargon has a particular meaning within each field. Bourdieu's analogy of a card game speaks to cultural capital and reminds us that all players are dealt cards randomly, but the potential for those cards is based upon numerous factors including a feel for the game, skill, understanding and in some cases variations of the rules or expectations. Success is determined by an interplay of the cards dealt to the players and the discernment, foresight and perceptive ability of each player. This insight into cultural capital will be crucial when considering the implications of various forms of capital that come to light in the case study.

When capital is expressed in the context of power, cultural and symbolic capital are irreducible forms of power when they have been socially legitimated. Of significance is that all three phases of progression provide access to the privileges and advantages of elite status. As mentioned in the Introduction, an assumption of this inquiry is that for the most part the Cdn AB Regt was both explicitly and implicitly accepted as being elite. With regards to those previously untested perceptions as well as instances where there was a reluctance or unwillingness to accept this premise, the corresponding assertions and actions will be subjected to further scrutiny in the case study.

Chapter 3 - Conceptual Framework

The preceding chapters highlight the definitional challenges associated with exploring elitism at the institutional level and to a lesser degree illuminating the attributes of elite status. At the institutional level of analysis elitism is social posturing in the form of attitudes and behaviours that are shared by a group and seek to reinforce in others the perception that such group has elite status and to ultimately reinforce the group's power, privileges, and advantages provided by such status. The institutional dimensions of elitism require further refinement to isolate empirical indicators. For the case study, a heuristic approach will be used to confirm variables and indicators of elitism both inductively and deductively, but the review of the literature and analysis so far has isolated the following.

Defiance to Authority

This variable recognizes that discipline is maintained largely by exerting formal authority, which in an institution is represented by the hierarchy of the institutional power network. In the military, direction and priorities from civil authorities following the precepts of civil-military relations is translated into operational direction by the appointed military leadership. Consequently, when there is defiance to authority it is reasonable to attribute this to a breakdown in discipline. Discipline is a concept that is not unique to the military but can evoke militarism by virtue of being taken to another level to normalize obedience and prepare soldiers for battle. As Janowitz describes, military authority is an expression of unique military goals including combat, and is a technique of organizational control whereby the military seeks to "routinize its operating procedures to the most minute detail."⁴¹⁷ Stevenson differentiates the military as a social world where the "persuasiveness of order, authority and control is compelling," and is exaggerated by various forms of drill and ceremony that provide familiarity and routine.⁴¹⁸ Stevenson borrows from Lasswell's concept of the garrison state to argue that military officers are focused on maintaining their privilege and exert their authority over non-commissioned members by prescribing on them certain elements of habitus he refers to as "behaviours, postures, attitudes and styles."⁴¹⁹ Put another way, the distinction between officers and non-commissioned members is the basis for social control within the military including command and discipline that also distinguishes the unique habitus and dispositions of the officer corps from those of non-commissioned members.⁴²⁰ Discipline is the desired end-product of obedience to lawful authority, conformity to military norms and values, and moral decision making in the military. As such Clausewitz notes that "discipline welds the battalion

⁴¹⁷ Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment*, 83.

⁴¹⁸ Robert J. Stevenson, *Organizational Reaction to Social Deviance: The Military Case* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2010), 4.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

⁴²⁰ Richardson, *Fighting Spirit*, 90.

together.”⁴²¹ Defiance to authority and attitude towards the power network flows both ways, where the formularized defiance is followed by specific actions and behaviours. Defiance to authority is an ideational variable because it describes a habitus where dysfunction including unruly behaviour, disobedience, insolence, insubordination and ignoring rules with impunity are examples of what may be tolerated and eventually institutionalized as the by-product of a group imbued with elitism.

Oppositional / Discordant Habitus.

Every subset within a society including institutions will have its own habitus, which is continually changing and adapting to numerous factors like shifts in personnel, missions, and policies. An oppositional or discordant habitus flows from defiance of the institutional power network and institutional norms. Within the hierarchy of an institution, any group not imbued with the formal authority of the institution is appropriately described as a parallel power network as distinguished from the authorized institutional power network or organizational hierarchy. Expressed in terms of a discordant habitus, a parallel power network is more than just a variation of the dominant habitus, it features attitudes, norms and behaviours that are antithetical to the institution. Therefore, the following definition is adopted for a parallel power network (PPN): *An unofficial or unauthorised hierarchy that operates outside of an institution's established decision-making structure and exerts a dysfunctional influence on the norms and values, communication, decision-making, and accountability within the institution.*

The discussion of institutional particularities of the military in Chapter 2 illuminated many of the unique aspects of a military habitus. The concepts of subculture and counterculture require exploration to the extent they illuminate empirical indicators of a subversive habitus, including how it is manifested and maintained. This relates directly to the identified phenomenon of a parallel chain of command also known as an informal, unofficial or parallel leadership or command structure as identified in the Introduction. According to Horn, in the context of the Cdn AB Regt this group was made up primarily of junior NCOs at the Master Corporal rank.⁴²² Horn notes that MGen Pitts (Colonel of the Regiment from 1982-86) characterized the problem as “inbreeding,” which correlates to the concept of academic inbreeding as an insular practice that stifles new ideas and perspectives.⁴²³ The De Faye BOI held after the Regiment’s return from Somalia describes an “informal group” of junior-ranked soldiers and acknowledged these individuals posed “a direct challenge to authority.”⁴²⁴ The distinct habitus of such groups highlights the importance of a clear distinction between subcultures and countercultures, which becomes evident in Siver’s

⁴²¹ Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds., *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Oxford University Press, 2007), 89.

⁴²² Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 170-71.

⁴²³ *Ibid.*, 171.

⁴²⁴ DeFaye, *Board of Inquiry*, Annex D, D-1/7.

examination of the Cdn AB Regt's deployment to Somalia where she concludes that within 2 CDO there was an "inability to reign in a countercultural unit subculture" that she portrays as virtually impenetrable.⁴²⁵

Zellner uses counterculture to describe the manifestation of a habitus that is discordant to the purported institutional habitus or in other words distinguished by counter-normative implications. According to Zellner, every culture can be broken down into distinct components with institutions having both a dominant culture as well as subcultures and in some cases countercultures.⁴²⁶ Boisnier and Chatman describe orthogonal subcultures as embracing all aspects of the dominant culture, but with additional values that, although distinct, do not conflict with the dominant culture.⁴²⁷ Consider the contrasting subcultures that might typically exist in the accounting versus the marketing department of a successful business, varying from a focus on strict adherence to accepted accounting practices versus an emphasis on creativity. These orthogonal subcultures come together to embrace all aspects of the dominant culture, but have additional values that, although distinct, do not conflict with the dominant culture. While subcultures ultimately have a goal of advancing the institution's objectives, countercultures are inherently counter-normative. Subcultures may feature deviations from the organization's dominant culture, but countercultures are characterized by discordant and oppositional values.

In the military context, subcultures correlate to the differing customs and traditions of various army units, none of which are counter-normative to the purported or stated military purpose and ethos. Conversely, members of a counterculture will oppose core values and engage in practices or behaviours that are antithetical to the dominant culture or habitus, including military discipline. Boisnier and Chatman found that countercultures arise when there is disagreement with the dominant culture that causes dissenters to seek seemingly like-minded individuals who share their beliefs.⁴²⁸ This aligns with Brehm's theory of psychological reactance which suggests that oppositional behavior can be more prevalent in settings where it has been restricted, thus putting a military unit with a strong dominant habitus at greater risk of being undermined by a subversive habitus.⁴²⁹ Boisnier and Chatman suggest that countercultures can be more disruptive in an organizational environment that is unstable, which intuitively makes sense as it would seem the more resilient an organization is the more it should be able to withstand the influences of a discordant influences.

⁴²⁵ Christi Leigh Siver, *The Dark Side of the Band of Brothers: Explaining Unit Participation in War Crimes*. (PhD diss., University of Washington, 2009). Siver does not differentiate between a subculture or counterculture.

⁴²⁶ William W. Zellner, *Countercultures: A Sociological Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).

⁴²⁷ Alicia Boisnier and Jennifer Chatman, *The Role of Subcultures in Agile Organizations* (University of California: Berkeley, 2002).

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

⁴²⁹ J. Brehm *A Theory of Psychological Reactance* (New York: Academic Press, 1966); Joanne Martin and Caren Siehl "Organizational Culture and Counterculture: An Uneasy Symbiosis" *Organizational Dynamics*, 122 (1983): 52-65.

Conversely, Kahneman and Miller assert that a counterculture that openly violates dominant values can also have the effect of strengthening the core values of the organization as it draws attention to the importance and significance of the latter.⁴³⁰ Of significance, this would only hold true if the dysfunctional nature is recognized and acknowledged and action is taken to quell the counterculture.

The literature on countercultures provides insight into empirical indicators of elitism in terms of a subversive habitus and how this phenomenon is differentiated from a subculture by being discordant, oppositional and dysfunctional in comparison to the institution's stated norms and values. The significance of subcultures and countercultures aligns with the concept of primary groups, defined by Janowitz as any small social grouping guided by face-to-face relations.⁴³¹ The parallel chain of command identified by Horn, Bercuson and others warrants in-depth exploration and analysis. Although the composition of this group is not identified in the literature (at least not in terms of named individuals), every indication suggests it was a cohesive social grouping consistent with a primary group. Remembering that Horn describes an unofficial chain of command or parallel command structure as a "pool of soldiers labelled as cowboys and ill-disciplined" made up primarily of junior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) at the Master Corporal rank, this seemingly supports a description of a number of proverbial bad apples.⁴³² Of significance is that according to Janowitz primary groups do not form themselves, in this case by simply having like-minded ill-disciplined or rebellious soldiers who perhaps overstayed their time with the Regiment. Rather than having standards and goals that are self-generated, Janowitz explains that primary groups are a product of the larger military environment as well as the surrounding civilian society.⁴³³ He warns that primary groups can be counter-normative and actually impede the goals of a military institution, and only contribute to the organizational effectiveness when their norms and standards of behaviour are "articulated with the requirements of formal authority."⁴³⁴ Furthermore, Janowitz differentiates the Cold War context from responding to an acute military threat, and draws on the research of Simpson to assert that the social intimacy of soldiers can lead to the formation of what he labels "personal cliques which disrupt solidarity."⁴³⁵

In addition to the parallel power network, another approach to maintaining the precepts of elitism that requires further exploration is the implementation of a code or wall of silence. This consists of stone-walling various levels of the institutional power network or otherwise covering up wrongdoing. This variable originates from an ideationally defiant attitude or belief that the institution needs to be protected, that individual members deserve

⁴³⁰ D. Kahneman & D. Miller "Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to its Alternatives," *Psychological Review*, 93 (1986): 136-53.

⁴³¹ Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment*.

⁴³² Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 170-71.

⁴³³ Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment*, 65.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, 71. Richard L. Simpson, *Friendship Cliques in United States Air Force Wings*. Technical Report No. 3, Air Force Base Project, Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, undated.

to be protected (as a privilege or advantage to membership) or both. The wall of silence is a syndrome that arises from a habitus with a disordered or misguided loyalty in terms of ideation (e.g. loyalty to a Regiment over the profession of arms) or the wrong individuals. The disordered loyalty arises out of an allegiance to a parallel power network versus the individuals formally bestowed with decision making authority within the institution.

Relationship to Outside World

Elitism modulates power which then enables the favouring of one's own. The examinations of the priesthood and other forms of institutional elitism including formal knowledge based elitism and corporate elitism revealed several common themes. The premise of habitus is that it makes an individual more disposed to perceive and therefore react to the social world around them in a certain way. These dispositions are socially acquired, and influence everyday practice as habits, behaviours, mannerisms, preferences, motivations, aspirations, expectations, viewpoints, assumptions, and an overall understanding of one's social space within a field. Members of an institution can default to the precepts of elitism with a view towards influencing how they are perceived by the world outside their field. Characteristic and indicative of Bourdieu's sports or game analogies, a field is a place for taking positions, one that has its own rules of behaviour and organizing logic.

Myopic Habitus: The myopic habitus of ostensibly elite institutions explored in the literature review reveals several empirical indicators of elitism. First, a habitus that includes statuses where individuals are seen as sole authorized interpreters of their domain or sole purveyors of standards and values results in these individuals influencing if not wholly determining the institutional norms. This echoes Bourdieu's conception of reproduction where classes seek to reproduce their status differences, in other words replicating existing backgrounds including entrenched values, perspectives, ideologies and culture. In broader terms, the reproduction of habitus occurs naturally given the inclination and propensity for habitus to influence everyday activities. Reproduction can then lead to self-referential values and myopic practices such as a proclivity towards an oppositional us-versus-them mindset. Elitism describes the relationship between an individual or institution and the outside world, namely social posturing based in part on a myopic perception of that relationship.

Another conceptual avenue to be explored is how the status of authorized interpreter/sole purveyor of norms facilitates a special sense of mission and entitlement that justifies certain powers and corresponding actions. This can be expressed in terms of social and cultural capital specific to an institution, much like tangible artifacts. Consider the cultural capital required for membership in the Roman Catholic priesthood, with a habitus that accepts and socially justifies these requirements as necessary. Membership is restricted to those of the male gender who possess specific cultural capital identified by Ballano. Objectified cultural capital includes adherence to the precept of mandatory celibacy and possession of a theology degree which constitutes institutional credentials and

expertise. This cultural capital is required for admission into the priesthood and is reinforced by the system of cleric-centred governance that traces back to the Code of Canon Law to justify these requirements. For those with the requisite cultural capital, the habitus of the Roman Church then provides an environment where there is significant power and privilege accorded to those with ordained status, and history has demonstrated the same habitus has permitted clericalism to be ignored or tolerated in the form of a hypocritical double-life that can be difficult to challenge. The question this begs for each form and example of institutional cultural capital is whether it serves a legitimate and necessary purpose or facilitates some form of social posturing that contributes towards elitism.

Bourdieu explains that all forms of power are capital and serve to maintain and improve an individual's position in the social order as evidenced by the habitus of ordained priests within the Catholic Church.⁴³⁶ Cultural capital includes key information regarding how an institution functions, especially the unwritten rules. Bourdieu's initial focus in this regard was inequalities in the educational system, notably the amount and types of dispositions that provide an advantage to more privileged students. In Bourdieu's analogy of a card game, this is the feel for the game that contributes to their skill level allowing the player to manage the interplay of the rules with the cards they are dealt, the cards representing the social and cultural capital available to all players. The fundamental point here is that although everyone who possesses the requisite capital may appear to be on a level playing field, those who possess the necessary dispositions to excel within the field are at an advantage. Figure 2 is an illustration of the interconnectedness of power and elitism as it pertains to the ordained priesthood within the Roman Catholic Church. This of course refers specifically to those who choose to abuse their power and position of privilege. Cultural capital is acquired, then the precepts of elitism are actively invested to access the associated privileges and advantages. The outcome in this example is clericalism, the misuse of their position and authority.

⁴³⁶ David Swartz, *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1997).

ELITISM & POWER IN THE PRIESTHOOD

Acquisition of Capital: Requisite ecclesial capital is procured.

- Theological degree
- Holy orders (ordained), fit to govern church based on cleric-centred governance
- Mandatory celibacy

Elitism Exerted: Actively invested as ordained priest using associated privileges and advantages

- Protect / favour own
- Priest's word is not questioned which impacts accountability, exercise of authority over unordained laypersons who cannot participate in cleric-centred governance of church
- Reproduction of prestige hierarchies
- Sole purveyors of God's word, institutional norms, etc.

Outcome: Privileges and advantages of ordained priesthood can be abused.

- Clericalism
- Other abuse (e.g. misuse of church funds)

Figure 2.

Mandatory celibacy as discussed by Ballano is cultural capital in the sense that it is a peculiar requirement that precludes all women and a significant majority of males from admission to the priesthood. The cleric-centred governance of the church thus favors its members and maintains this requirement based on tradition and ecclesial requirements rather than any empirical evidence of efficacy. This is also in defiance of significant concerns such as clericalism and the leading of hypocritical double-lives that arguably have a direct causal link to this practice. In a similar vein, it raises the question of whether it is the power, privilege and advantage provided by membership in the ordained priesthood that facilitates clericalism in a similar manner to other institutions already discussed. The conceptual avenue to explore is the specific cultural capital required by an institution, which then begs further examination of both the ostensible purpose and the intended and unintended consequences that arise from these requirements, especially the extent to which the cultural capital facilitates elitism.

In addition to the status of authorized interpreter/sole purveyor of norms providing the special power necessary to exert elitism, favouring one's own creates an environment susceptible to ethical marginality ranging from pushing boundaries, failing to adhere to ethical/legal/regulatory or institutional standards or adhering to the wrong standards and expectations as may be the case with excessive conformation to institutional norms. Another potential fallout from a habitus predicated on authorized interpreter/sole purveyor of norms is a myopic approach that excludes any benefit of outside influence and norms that can

manifest as an overconfidence in vision, approach and ability. This can include insulation from outside scrutiny or ambivalence towards how decisions and actions affect others. Ultimately, those with the status of authorized interpreter/sole purveyor of norms are the gatekeepers not only relation to the institution's norms but also in terms of who is permitted membership within the institution.

Resistance to change is part of a myopic habitus that cuts deeper towards the heart of elitism, where there is an attempt to protect socially postured elite status by resisting change as manifested in certain choices and behaviours. The indicators highlighted in the literature on formal knowledge based elitism and other forms of institutional elitism were reproduction of prestige hierarchies and entrenched habitus. These indicators include the propensity to emulate rather than challenge approaches, philosophies, ideas and institutional norms. The tendency to be immobile is seen with academics who stay at one institution especially those who are in-bred in the sense of having done their graduate and or doctoral degrees at the same school where they are teaching, causing a degree of stagnation within the institution.

The Bad Apple Syndrome: The tendency to blame problems on the misconduct of a small minority, the infamous rotten or bad apples is the 'bad apple' syndrome. This is identified by Burke as a common excuse for inappropriate and illegal acts in Northern Ireland, like how clericalism is often dismissed instead of seeking an institutional explanation for persistent dysfunctional behaviour.⁴³⁷ This indicator refers to the tendency to default to the ostensible inevitability of having such problems and resigning to accept that as unchangeable. Since virtually every social grouping has individuals who engage in some form of aberrant or illegal behaviour, in an attempt at justification this can be presented as a statistical inevitability found in any society. A key distinction that needs to be made is that there are no admission requirements, screening, testing or similar preconditions to being a member of society at large, whereas institutions generally have standards and expectations. For instance, if having a criminal record would screen out a potential member from being accepted into the military, engaging in criminal activity after becoming a member cannot be chalked up to something that is to be expected amongst members of any social group. Acceptance of aberrant behaviour suggests the continuum for tolerating bad apples might extend from accepting to expecting and covering up such behaviour.

Perception of Elite: The literature has shown examples where being different or unique often forms the basis to transmute these differences and project them as elite status even if such status is not objectively verifiable. This indicator combines an individual's own perception with how they project their status and are subsequently perceived by others. The definition of elite status is socially shared opinions, perspectives, and preconceptions where an identifiable group is construed as performing consistently and predictably in ways deemed superior to other groups engaging in similar performance activities. Comparing

⁴³⁷ Burke, *An Army of Tribes*, 14.

how witnesses define and convey elite status will provide insight into the extent to which elitism had permeated the Regiment. In the case of the Cdn AB Regt, the variables manifest to artificially protect elite status that has not been earned or alternatively was not sustained after having previously been earned. The variables flow downwards from ideational to behavioural.

Legitimizing Myths: One method used to justify actions and behaviours is to employ legitimizing myths. These are special rules used to diffuse dissonance, an ethical frame of reference that is isolated or encapsulated to the point of normalizing behaviours that could otherwise be regarded as unethical or improper by societal or institutional standards. These legitimizing myths are effective because they are not subject to external scrutiny, they serve to convince those within the group that their actions are acceptable and can be used to condone any chosen behaviour, approach or outcome. In the corporate world the goal may be a desire for primacy at any cost with the metrics including profit and market dominance, whereas at a broader institutional level the focus might be on maintaining the perception of elite status, which can result in an ‘us versus them’ mindset. Social, cultural and symbolic capital all have a role in contributing towards perceived superiority, providing additional considerations when examining habitus. Remembering Bourdieu’s analogy of a card game, capital is likened to how players get dealt different cards (social and cultural capital), but the outcome of the game is dependent on the interplay between the cards that are received, the rules for playing the game as well as the players’ skill level and how they choose to play the game.⁴³⁸

Analytical Model of Elitism

The research methodology for the case study will be discussed in the next chapter, however at this point it is helpful to look at how grounded theory will be used to identify data for the case study. Grounded theory was developed by Glaser and Strauss and later refined by Strauss and Corbin. This entails discovering or constructing theory from data consisting of primary sources then using comparative analysis to create conceptual theory to explain a pattern of behaviour. With respect to the habitus of the Cdn AB Regt, grounded theory will be used to identify and isolate the characteristics and implications of elitism in the form of empirical indicators. This requires knowledge of the social context relevant to the subject under investigation, most of which was covered in Chapter 2. Because the data for the case study was generated through testimony at a public inquiry, that process is also a context that must be understood in terms of the effect the rules and procedures had on witness testimony. Grounded theory can be appropriate when little is known about a particular phenomenon, with the theory that is generated grounded in the data both inductively and deductively. The conceptual theory constructed from primary source transcripts from the Somalia Commission is intended to predict and explain a pattern of behaviour while providing a practical application to understand dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours associated with elitism.

⁴³⁸ Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 58.

Qualitative thematic analysis will be used to identify sociological patterns where elitism and social posturing associated with expression of being perceived as elite is discussed or otherwise identified by witnesses. Open, axial and selective coding is undertaken simultaneously with a view towards evincing the presence and characteristics of elitism. Open coding is the process followed to identify and differentiate concepts containing recognizable characteristics and key ideas related to elitism that are essentially hidden within the testimony of each witness. This includes recollections of specific events, incidents, perceptions, and actions. Concurrently, it is key to watch for potential additional concepts that relate to elitism. In this case the data analyzed in the form of testimony is bounded by factors including the questioner's knowledge and understanding of military concepts, the degree of truthfulness and overall cooperation from the witnesses, their memory and extent of involvement in a particular matter, and ultimately the quality of the questions in the sense of whether a line of questioning had the efficacy to yield a fulsome response. As such, the data runs a spectrum of clear and unambiguous to complex, cryptic and inconclusive. During the analysis, a constant process of aggregation and refinement of empirical indicators is necessary given the similarities and overlap of variables and the emergence of several overarching themes.

Chapter 4 – Case Study of The Canadian Airborne Regiment

The disciplinary problems revealed during operations, with the exception of accidental discharges and the cases under investigation, were minor in nature: a slip of the tongue, bit of cockiness, a dirty weapon, a lack of maintenance on a vehicle... With respect to accidental discharges, there is no question that they are attributable to a lack of discipline and leadership... Notwithstanding (a) more heightened posture of alert, 2 Commando did not experience, overall, a significantly greater number of accidental discharges.

DeFaye BOI, Annex C, C-6&7/8

The Cdn AB Regt was selected as a quintessential example of a dysfunctional habitus where military elitism can be hypothesized as providing the overarching causal explanation. The case study is a means to provide empirical grounding to identify attitudes, behaviours and other dynamics within a military institution where elite status has long been socially associated with the Regiment and its members. While historians, military boards and the public inquiry explored antecedent events and decisions, elitism was never comprehensively investigated as contributing to the dysfunctional habitus. The Somalia Commission's Executive Summary attributes a breakdown of discipline to several factors including entrenched "practices that fuelled rampant careerism and placed individual ambition ahead of the needs of the mission" and "subordinates were held to standards of accountability by which many of those above were not prepared to abide."⁴³⁹ These revelations speak to the precepts of elitism and the dominance of privilege and advantage over the other attributes such as honesty, loyalty, integrity and duty but elitism is a hypothesis that require rigorous testing.

The end of the Cold War and numerous challenges facing the CAF at the time constitutes important historical context for this analysis that will focus largely on the years leading up to the Regiment's deployment to Somalia. To avoid the fallacy of *nunc pro tunc* or presentism, it is necessary to defer to policies and practices in place at the time. Applying present-day values and perspectives to historical events without considering the context and conditions of the past is likely to lead to misunderstandings or misinterpretations of events and beliefs. For example, the CAF did not have explicit policies concerning racist behaviour or activities until after the Cdn AB Regt returned from Somalia.⁴⁴⁰ Alternatively, with respect to racist ideology it does not preclude the

⁴³⁹ Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *Dishonoured Legacy – Executive Summary* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), ES-1.

⁴⁴⁰ DeFaye, *Board of Inquiry*, Phase 1, Vol XII, 2-30. In a chart titled "CDS Direction on Issues Not Yet Finalized by the Board," the authors acknowledge that "Racist attitudes are totally incompatible with military ethos and with effective military service, and any behaviour or conduct which reflects such attitudes cannot be tolerated." The solution was to promulgate changes to the Canadian Forces

need to question whether there were other approaches and options available for dealing with attitudes and behaviours antithetical to the military ethos and Canadian values that are articulated in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which came into law in 1982. A comprehensive analysis includes the retrospective examination of whether there were in fact other options available during that period when leaders recognized attitudes and behaviours that they considered prejudicial to good discipline and order.

The connection between discipline and military law is another area where presentism must be avoided. The laws of Canada apply to the entire population of the country, but members of the military are subject to additional measures and to a lesser degree some additional rights.⁴⁴¹ While there is an inclination to view military law as separate from the law applying to the remainder of the population, military law is based on the same fundamental principles outlined in the Charter of Rights, notably offering military members “the same protection to an accused as our civil law.”⁴⁴² The National Defence Act (NDA) provides for summary punishment, a quick and efficient means of holding members accountable and even providing for jail time without the formality of a court martial. Madsen’s assessment is that a little over a decade after unification of the CAF and even before the introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights in 1982, many officers “blamed the military’s ills on external civilian influences.”⁴⁴³ Cotton also recognizes the CAF’s inward focus and alienation from the Canadian society at large which he characterizes as “beleaguered warrior syndrome.”⁴⁴⁴

It is generally accepted that before the Somalia affair, the CAF relied on the NDA for discipline, even in many cases where Criminal Code offences had been committed.⁴⁴⁵ Yet when videos surfaced in January 1995 depicting 2 CDO in Somalia then 1 CDO conducting a hazing or initiation, this precipitated an investigation where Horn notes that MPs were assigned to determine “what criminal or military charges, if any were warranted.”⁴⁴⁶ Recognizing that 1 CDO’s video was believed to have been filmed in the summer of 1992, and the videos did not show the level of serious events discussed in testimony including personal vehicles being burned or shots being fired through a sergeant-major’s window or pyrotechnics being thrown at MPs, it is interesting to note that MPs were specifically directed to consider criminal charges. The investigation soon had little practical relevance as a third video surfaced showing 1 CDO

Administrative Orders (CFAO) to allow for “administrative and disciplinary actions,” with a due date of 31 Dec 93.

⁴⁴¹ W.J. Lawson, Canadian Military Law, *The Canadian Bar Review* XIX, no. 3 (March, 1951): 241-255.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*, 255.

⁴⁴³ Madsen, *Another Kind of Justice*.

⁴⁴⁴ Charles A. Cotton “The Divided Army: Role Orientation Among Canada’s Peacetime Soldiers” (PhD diss., Carleton University, 1980), 297-9.

⁴⁴⁵ Even when criminal charges are laid against service members, it is pursuant to Section 130 of the NDA while specifying the Criminal Code offence that is alleged.

⁴⁴⁶ Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 229.

conducting a hazing in the summer of 1994, confirming “forbidden activities were still occurring.”⁴⁴⁷

The precepts of civil-military relations discussed in Chapter 2 require the CAF to be subordinate to civil authorities, and it follows that there will be an expected adherence to society’s interests. Madsen notes that a significant step towards this end had been taken when, by 1986, the majority of the fifty-five judges on the Court Martial Appeal Court (CMAC) were appointed from other courts and did not possess “direct military experience.”⁴⁴⁸ Another turning point for military justice occurred in February 1992 ten months before the Cdn AB Regt deployed to Somalia, when the *Généreux* decision of the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the continued necessity of a separate military system of justice.⁴⁴⁹ The court affirmed that such a system is required “to allow the Armed Forces to deal with matters that pertain directly to the discipline, efficiency, and morale of the military.”⁴⁵⁰ The CAF took that opportunity to establish a separate or at least arms-length judiciary with the Judge Advocate General (JAG). Of note, Madsen reports that the number of courts martial under the NDA had been largely declining since 1983, going from 169 that year to 97 in 1989, followed by a sharp decline to 35 by 1998.

While the *Généreux* decision affirmed the CAF’s jurisdiction over service members, Madsen notes that “although the civil Criminal Code took precedence over the charged soldiers once in Canada,” members of the Cdn AB Regt who were charged with Criminal offences allegedly committed in Somalia were nonetheless tried by military courts martial.⁴⁵¹ This enabled the CAF to maintain jurisdiction and control over the trials. Although the military judges were ostensibly operating more arms-length than ever, JAG officers were still responsible for determining the specific charges soldiers would face and whether they would be prosecuted under the Criminal Code or the Code of Service Discipline. Part of the intricacy of this situation is that even within the context of the laws and legal precedents of the trials that took place in 1994-95 (see Table 3), there are questions that can be raised as to the posturing of accountability with respect to lesser charges and the corresponding sentences. In a similar light, the fact that Kyle Brown was convicted of Manslaughter exactly one year to-the-day after the killing of Shidane Arone arguably raises the perception of the military courts hoping to send an incidental message to the public that justice had been served.

The Cdn AB Regt is ideal for a case study based on having been subjected to a public commission of inquiry where witnesses were legally compelled to answer questions, and the responses were recorded verbatim and transcribed. As with the product of any quasi-judicial process, the transcripts contain untested perceptions which will not always produce a clearer

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 230.

⁴⁴⁸ Madsen, *Another Kind of Justice*, 133-4.

⁴⁴⁹ *Regina v. Généreux*, Supreme Court of Canada (1992), S.C.R. 259, February 13, 1992, 259-338.

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵¹ Madsen, *Another Kind of Justice*, 145.

understanding of what occurred, rather it is a matter of revealing insight into the habitus of the Regiment. Analysis of witness testimony will illuminate how these individuals justify and see the world around them as they convey their opinions, recollections and perceptions. Witnesses can be expected to provide testimony that is either deliberately or subconsciously self-serving in terms of protecting themselves, other persons or the reputation of their profession or institution which in and of itself is extremely revealing. The inquiry testimony is an opportunity to delineate and understand the changing habitus of the Regiment and to consider the Regiment itself in terms of Bourdieu's conception of a field. With the military as an institution followed by the CAF both constituting overarching fields, the Cdn AB Regt also had its own organizing logic, a series of implicit and explicit rules and its own understanding of capital. As such not only was the Regiment a unique field, but so too were each of the Commandos. The inquiry testimony is ideal for identifying and scrutinizing dispositions, the socially acquired habits, preferences, and behaviours that became ingrained within members of the Regiment and operated at a largely subconscious level.

The Selection of Case Study Methodology

The case study method is ideal for this inquiry because it is causal and explanatory in nature, seeking to understand how elitism is manifested and exerted in a military institution. With respect to the Cdn AB Regt, this approach extends far beyond existing descriptive or historical analyses of the Regiment. Military elitism as hypothesized in the context of the Cdn AB Regt is a contemporary event as characterized by Yin, where case studies are preferred in that this method will present a "fluid rendition" of past and present events. In the case at hand, this means going beyond a historical inquiry into Regiment (a chapter which closed in March of 1995) and extending the inquiry to include potential impacts on current day military institutions.⁴⁵² Another distinct advantage to the case study method is that analysis of the Somalia Commission transcripts entails a "how" and "why" question concerning a real-world contemporary event. The researcher has little or no control over the data, i.e. in this case the transcripts cannot be manipulated, although interpretation of the testimony calls for a degree of subjectivity. Case study methodology requires an understanding of the social context from which the data is generated, which in this case is a combination of the public inquiry process and the context of a military institution and the Cdn AB Regt in particular.

This case is well-suited in terms of sufficiency and availability of data with the Somalia Commission of Inquiry having produced 188 volumes of evidentiary hearing transcripts for a total of approximately 38 000 pages of testimony. Having such a large volume of first-hand accounts of attitudes and behaviours increases the likelihood of uncovering and divulging the opinions and perspectives of the witnesses. In terms of data, the passage of time and the sensitive and controversial nature of the events has made direct observation impossible as well as reducing the efficacy of relying on personal interviews.

⁴⁵² Yin, *Case Study Research*, 12.

Because the commission of inquiry had the power to call and compel witnesses to testify, transcripts and other documents are in the public domain and are available for review and analysis. There are shortcomings to witness testimony, whether at a judicial inquiry or other types of court proceedings as the completeness of testimony is limited by several factors. Witnesses are restricted in the information and opinions they convey in their responses because legal counsel participating in the inquiry had specific issues for which they were seeking answers, and open-ended questions that permit a witness to give a fulsome personal perspective are rare. In many instances, it is apparent that counsel representing individual officers had specific answers they were hoping to elicit, and leading questions were crafted accordingly. As such, witnesses were often compelled to give close-ended yes or no answers or have their testimony otherwise restricted and bounded by the breadth and depth of questioning. It is important to recognize that Inquiry counsel and counsel representing authorized intervening groups and individuals have perspectives, preconceptions and interests that they are representing, as was the case with witnesses themselves.

Case study research is the mode of inquiry, with a single case study being the method of inquiry and the Cdn AB Regt the unit of inquiry or case. Elitism presents as a complex social phenomenon, and the Cdn AB Regt offers the opportunity to extract a real-world perspective and serve an explanatory function of how elitism manifests and is justified within a military institution. Using the Somalia Commission evidentiary transcripts provides the ideal data for pursuing the case study approach, inductively examining the context and meaning of the attitudes, opinions, perceptions, preconceptions, reactions, interpretations and recollections of those who testified at the Somalia Commission, with a focus on how this can illuminate the attributes and empirical indicators of elitism.⁴⁵³ The analysis follows several lines of thought. Examination of the transcripts of testimony does not seek to uncover the truth in terms of events that transpired, but rather aims to identify how witnesses subjectively saw things. This includes what they were thinking and extrapolating possible motives when witnesses attempt to minimize or conceal elitism. Sentiment analysis can capture attitudes and opinions regarding elite status and the social posturing of this status, including individuals who claimed they did not believe the Regiment was elite. When testimony appears similar, it is important to investigate what institutional forces may have been at play.

It is not only public inquiry testimony where self-interest and other forms of bias are present. Yin notes that every document or account is “written for some specific purpose and some specific audience” and must be analyzed with that in mind.⁴⁵⁴ As such Yin suggests that researchers act as vicarious observers attempting to ascertain what the authors of these documents were attempting to achieve to be “correctly critical in interpreting the contents of such evidence.”⁴⁵⁵ In the case of the Somalia Inquiry, it was apparent that some lawyers did not have a basic grasp of military rank structure and chain of

⁴⁵³ Yin, *Case Study Research*, 16.

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 116.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

command, which was only one of many factors that impacted the efficiency and efficacy of their overall examinations of witnesses.⁴⁵⁶ This was compounded by varying degrees of misunderstanding of witness's evidence coupled with the practice of asking questions designed to elicit a response favourable to their client. The latter phenomenon consists of a deliberate strategy between the witness and their counsel aimed at mitigating their client's culpability and protecting their reputation and that of the institution. This is not to suggest there is anything iniquitous with this approach, as it is legal counsel's duty to represent their client's best interests in every respect.

There are further limitations when relying on evidentiary transcripts. Yin observes that a variety of documents can be used as evidence, acknowledging that they will not always be "accurate and may not be lacking in bias," noting that even verbatim transcripts such as those from U.S. Congress "have been deliberately edited."⁴⁵⁷ Reviewing the transcripts produced by the Somalia Commission, they do not appear to have been edited for accuracy or verification as evidenced by the following examples early on in the hearings: Jean Victor Allain (p.404) instead of General Jean Victor Allard, former CDS; General Bill Ziele (p.366) instead of General Charles Belzile; commanding control (p.668) instead of command and control. These observations are important as it necessitates an additional layer of attention and insight when reading the testimony to afford the best chance of distilling the witnesses' actual evidence.

The methodological approach consisted of reviewing the relevant literature to define the complex social phenomena of elitism and articulate a research question. If elitism had a significant impact on leadership and discipline within the Cdn AB Regt, then it is likely that dispositions guiding the associated attitudes and behaviours can be identified to determine how this contributed to the deleterious acts and dysfunctional behaviour that occurred into the 1990s. Accepting that a problem cannot be properly addressed without understanding the root causes and contributing factors, identifying dysfunctional and aberrant attitudes and behaviours is simply the starting point. Consider the analogy of an airplane crash, attributing the cause to pilot error provides minimal consequential insight, but investigating the circumstances that led up to that human failure can reveal a multitude of previously unidentified variables. Being able to apply an analysis to determine empirical indicators of elitism will provide insight into how elitism was manifested and justified within the Cdn AB Regt.

For the selection of data, witness transcripts were chosen from the 188 volumes of evidentiary transcripts with the primary criteria being an anticipation that the witness would be able to provide insight into opinions, perspectives and preconceptions relating to elitism. Some witnesses were excluded such as General Boyle given his status and relationship to the government which delves more into civil-military relations and other matters which extend far beyond the context of the Cdn AB Regt. The first five volumes were included for analysis

⁴⁵⁶ Madsen maintains that lawyers were permitted to "hijack the proceedings" and their questions "often disclosed an inexcusable ignorance of military affairs and the reasons for the existence of the Armed Forces," *Another Kind of Justice*, 146.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 115.

based on the assumption they would provide important and necessary background context as the inquiry was getting underway, essentially the same line of reasoning the Inquiry staff would have used for setting the stage with these witnesses. Selection of the remaining testimony for review was based on a desire for a cross-section of witnesses who were:

1. Members of the Cdn AB Regt and the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG) who were junior NCMs (i.e. soldiers on the ground)
2. Members of the Cdn AB Regt and CARBG who held command positions as well as other officers and Sr NCOs.
3. General Officers and other witnesses (e.g. military police, personnel officers) representing the institutional viewpoint as well as having been called to account for their decisions, actions, attitudes and behaviours.

The Commissioners originally intended to structure the Inquiry in three phases: pre-deployment, in theatre, and post-deployment except the government of the day ordered the Inquiry be shut down before the testimony fully delved into the March 16th shooting of Shidane Arone during the second phase. The volumes of transcripts and corresponding witnesses whose testimony was analyzed is detailed at Appendix A. With testimony compartmentalized into the three phases, questions regarding decisions, actions and leadership in response to operational, disciplinary, and administrative problems occurring in theatre were reserved for the second phase. As such there were numerous instances where the Chairman shut down lines of questioning and directed that those questions be reserved for the in-theatre component, which further bounded the responses of witnesses. Like the DeFaye BOI, questions were generally not permitted if they pertained to incidents that were still being investigated or prosecuted in the courts (See Table 3). This precluded the Inquiry from analyzing many serious incidents, and the attitudes, preconceptions and opinions associated with those events were not subjected to scrutiny. Each volume of transcripts contains approximately 200 pages, totaling approximately 6000 pages analyzed out of 38 000. The analysis produced 304 separately coded paragraphs pertaining to elitism, of which the largest percentage (total of 66 subsets of testimony) dealt primarily with accountability. The inductive and deductive heuristic process initially produced a total of fifteen empirical indicators of elitism.

When considering the selection of witnesses in terms of anticipated testimony, it is important to distinguish between a variety of factors including rank, role, and military experience. As mentioned earlier, this is a shortcoming of Winslow's inquiry into the Cdn AB Regt, as she does not differentiate when providing quotes from interviews.⁴⁵⁸ This is apparent in WO Murphy's testimony before the Somalia Commission when he indicates he did two tours with the Regiment, and found discipline was laxer when he returned for his second tour. Murphy's testimony shows a different frame of reference when he notes that "my first tour, sir, I was one of the troops... when I came back I was a senior NCO... So my perspective is going to be different" (6800, Vol 35). Put another way, Murphy was immersed in a different habitus during each tour, and his

⁴⁵⁸ Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia*.

dispositions would have evolved over time in addition to any changes that occurred within the Regiment. In a study of deviancy, cohesion and murder comparing regiments of the British Army in Northern Ireland, Burke highlights the social capital of each regiment and is careful to distinguish rank and regimental affiliation of those he interviews.⁴⁵⁹ In the same vein, it was recognized that for this case study there was a need to distinguish between the testimony of NCMs and officers to isolate key variables such as lack of respect where the dynamics will be different between these groups. As a final point of distinction, taking rank into consideration has the collateral benefit of providing an estimate of seniority and overall military experience.

Development of an Analytical Grid

The core variables and empirical indicators of elitism consist of attitudes and behaviours intended to protect ostensible elite status in a dysfunctional way. Additionally, it was hypothesized that a set of enabling conditions may exist, with elements unique to specific institutions like the military. This was determined to not be the case, and this finding will be explained in the case study discussion. The initial six variables were ultimately reduced to three, and ten empirical indicators of elitism were identified for testing as outlined in the following analytical grid (Figure 3).

⁴⁵⁹ Burke, *An Army of Tribes*.

Analytical Grid of Core Variables & Empirical Indicators of Elitism

Defiance to Authority	Oppositional / Discordant Habitus	Relationship to Outside World
<p>Blatant disrespect for power network; disobedience, recalcitrance, insolence,</p> <p>Ignoring Rules with impunity</p>	<p>Parallel Power Network (counterculture)</p> <p>Wall of Silence Stone-walling authorities, covering up wrongdoing</p>	<p>Myopic Habitus Self-referential viewpoints, intolerant; Sole Purveyors and interpreters of institutional norms; Resistance / exclusion of outside influence; Us vs. them mindset; inward focus; Desire for primacy at any cost</p> <p>Protecting Own Insular practices that ensure homogeneity</p> <p>‘Bad Apple’ Syndrome</p> <p>Perception of Elite (Elite only because different) Perception of Superiority not objectively verifiable</p> <p>Resistance to Change Reproduction; entrenched habitus; Immobile; Emulate rather than challenge approaches, philosophies, ideas</p> <p>Legitimizing Myths (Special set of rules)</p>

Figure 3.

The literature pertaining to the Cdn AB Regt was discussed in Chapter 2, in preparation for this case study there are several factors that bear reiterating such as restructuring of the Regiment and last-minute changes to the Somalia mission from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement. These aspects provide additional and necessary context especially in terms of the continued loss of social capital. Horn notes the Regiment entered the 1990s “a very disgruntled organization” rarely deployed for its intended purpose as “the nation’s fire brigade and the designated UN stand-by force.”⁴⁶⁰ The Regiment had been stood down from planned deployments to the Oka Crisis in Quebec (Operation SALON) and a UN mission in the Western Sahara, causing much frustration amongst the soldiers who had trained for and eagerly anticipated an operational deployment.⁴⁶¹ This was also the post-cold-war era where many Canadians were anticipating a peace-dividend, a fact not lost on members of the CAF and especially those who served in specialized units that were resource-intensive and expensive to maintain. This fear was realised in June 1992, when Army HQ imposed a 20 percent reduction in strength and the Cdn AB Regt was reorganized, reducing it to a structure similar to a regular line infantry battalion.⁴⁶² In addition to operational impacts, reductions affect morale and present a significant challenge for a unit that would soon find itself preparing to deploy. For the Cdn AB Regt, the summer of 1992 saw the Regiment now commanded by a LCol for the first time, and the three commandos now had Officers Commanding (OCs) instead of COs, which Winslow recognizes as representing a “considerable loss of power and prestige.”⁴⁶³ Considering how being different was often equated with being special or elite, the Regiment was far less distinguishable from the other infantry regiments that manned the three commandos, at least in terms of structure. This theme of loss of social capital will be explored further in the testimony, especially the extent to which this fueled the manifestation of elitism.

Note that during the case study analysis, testimony is not presented chronologically, but rather is grouped according to variables and indicators of elitism. At times, multiple witnesses’ testimony is being compared in the context of an event or phenomenon (variable or indicator of elitism) or both with a view towards illuminating how elitism is manifested and reproduced. Analysis of the testimony seeks to understand what each witness believed and how they explain and justify their assertions. Their perceptions are sometimes tested against other factual details to assess possible motivations for their assertions. For example, in the first part of the analysis, Colonels Houghton and Holmes are providing their responses regarding various incidents, procedures and practices that were in

⁴⁶⁰ Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 185.

⁴⁶¹ *Information Legacy*, "Op Python Synopsis," Document Book 120, tab 3, DND 039091. The UN Operation's mandate centered around election supervision and was authorized by UNSC Resolution 690 (1991), 29 April 1991.

⁴⁶² *Somalia Commission*, Evidentiary Transcripts” vol 4, testimony of Col Holmes 10 October 1995, 643-644. Combat support and combat service support were removed from the Regiment.

⁴⁶³ Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia*, 90.

some instances outside their realm of control or that occurred when they were not in command. While it can be confusing when witnesses are making assertions that are contradicted by other opinions or facts, they are providing responses that offer insight into their assertions, recollections, perceptions and beliefs. Context and timeframe must also be considered when reviewing testimony. For example, as mentioned Morneault took command in the Summer of 1992, and was the first LCol to command the Regiment and it was the first time the Commandos were led by an Officer Commanding with substantially reduced powers compared to a CO (these positions had been previously downranked from LCol).

The following analysis seeks to identify and understand the witnesses' dispositions that form their personal habitus and ultimately a habitus shaping elitism within the Regiment. As such there is insight to be gleaned from not only how witnesses offer their recollections, opinions and perspectives but also what they choose to acknowledge. For example, whether they concede that they did not read the Hewson Report upon taking command or choose to leave out details regarding an incident, there are inferences and conclusions that can be drawn. The case study is an opportunity to expand on what the Commission of Inquiry was tasked to complete, including assessing various untested perceptions.

The following table provides a timeline of events leading up to the summer of 1992 prior to the Regiment deploying to Somalia. It also includes other significant events that are discussed during the testimony.

Table 1
Timeline of Significant Events discussed during testimony

Jun, 1990	Arson of Captain Ferraby's personal vehicle. Although some witnesses are confused between the two vehicle arsons, the MP report indicates Ferraby's vehicle was burned on the parade square using the Regiment's Routine Orders to start the fire.
U/K 1990?	Live round fired through the office window of MWO Stevens (CSM of 2 CDO) as he was sitting in his chair.
Feb, 1992	Capt Michel Rainville leads assault on Citadelle in Quebec City prior to his posting to the Cdn AB Regt. In May of that year he conducted escape and evasion training in Gagetown where he blindfolded and assaulted Canada's first female infantry officer.
Spring, 1992	Regiment is on exercise at Camp Lejeune, a U.S. Marine Corps base in Jacksonville, Florida. Senior officers' kit is slashed following discipline being imposed.
Oct 2-3, 1992	Kyrenia Club (CFB Petawawa's Junior Ranks Mess) incident that concluded with pyrotechnics being thrown at responding MPs.
Oct 2-3, 1992	Arson of Duty Sergeant's vehicle (Sgt Wyszynski) on parade square in the aftermath of the above incident.
Oct 4, 1992	Algonquin Provincial Park incident where several members of 2 CDO attended the nearby park and illegally discharged firearms and pyrotechnics.

Oct 5, 1992 Barracks search uncovered incidents of careless storage of firearms and unauthorized possession of restricted or prohibited firearms in barracks including stolen DND ammunition consisting of 181 rounds of 5.56 and 163 rounds of 7.62 ammunition and smoke grenades. Also located were two throwing stars and nunchaku sticks which are prohibited weapons under the Criminal Code and therefore also subject to sanctions under the NDA.

In-Theatre

Feb, 1993 WO Demers found in illegal possession of a seized handgun that he sent home to his wife.

Mar, 1993 Death of Somali Nationals while in theatre, March 4th and March 16th. A total of 18 incidents of negligent discharge of a firearm during the deployment to Somalia.

DEFIANCE TO AUTHORITY

Blatant Disrespect / Ignoring Rules

WO Murphy is asked what Rebel flag represented to him, responds, *"for personnel within the commando it was what all colours are, a rallying point, something to be proud of. Again, something to be different than other members of the regiment."* Murphy agrees "it could be" a challenge to authority when it was displayed after being banned (6610-12, Vol 34).

Defiance to authority includes evidence of blatant disrespect of authority, ignoring rules and pushing or crossing boundaries. This can involve hostile, non-compliant, insubordinate or rogue behavior. Violating military rules and criminal law are clear examples of ignoring rules, while the quote above speaks to disrespect and challenge of authority. Murphy's testimony highlights two key points, the acknowledgement that the element of disrespect comes from displaying the flag after it was banned, and notwithstanding the varied subjective meanings of the flag, the only relevance of the flag itself was that it was unique symbolic capital for 2 CDO. We will see from the evidence that being different was often equated with being special, better and even elite. The Cdn AB Regt had developed a reputation for holding themselves above others, which was exemplified in behaviours such as refusing to salute non-airborne officers.⁴⁶⁴ As such, the various forms of defiance to authority can be viewed as cultural capital given that this defiance was socially acknowledged with the CAF. The various forms of disrespect for authority can be viewed as cultural signals used to exert elitism and maintain the status difference between the Cdn AB Regt and other units. This follows Bourdieu's concept of reproduction where social classes, albeit typically the upper class use cultural capital to reproduce the status differences between classes.

⁴⁶⁴ Horn, *Bastard Sons*.

There is significant evidence that permeates much of the testimony showing an acceptance of dysfunctional behaviour if a reason or excuse could be made for it, even if the justification for the behaviour was not objectively reasonable. Col Holmes testifies that while on exercise at Camp Lejeune, NC "some senior NCOs had caused a fracas in one of the clubs in Camp Lejeune" so he banned them from attending any of the clubs (605, Vol 4).⁴⁶⁵ Then "as a result of that on one particular occasion that I recall one of our officers' bibby (sic) bags, which is a small tent made of Gortex that we sleep in, was slashed with a knife." Asked if he saw that as a challenge to authority replies "I didn't perceive it as such at the time. I saw it as a reaction to an order which was not very popular, to be quite truthful." Holmes' acceptance of this behaviour is further evidenced by his irresolute follow-up comment "I suppose in the context of the situation one could perceive it as being possibly a situation where they were rebelling, if you like, against authority in the regiment." Holmes acknowledges he never ascertained who was responsible (606, Vol 4), and when asked if this type of incident was "extremely unusual" he replies "yes, it was" (795, Vol 4). LCol Morneault describes how two soldiers from 2 CDO went AWOL after Holmes' alcohol ban, Major Davies charged them, they were "jailed on the spot, yes, his and his sergeant-major's bivy bags and I believe Captain Fawcett's as well were all cut" (6932, Vol 36). Note Holmes' minimalization that it was just "one of our officer's" kit that was slashed without mentioning it was a Commando OC and two other senior members of the Regiment. The terms fracas and rebelling are the first examples of the use of euphemisms demonstrating the banality of wrongdoing and the extent to which dysfunctional behaviour was tolerated rather than being addressed as extraordinary defiance.

One of the broadest examples of defiance is Morneault's impression of whether soldiers can be controlled. When asked if the BOI recommended the contents of Airborne Indoctrination Course (AIC) should be reviewed and ultimately "to suppress any informal initiation rights (sic)" as seen in the videos Morneault responds, "To suppress? Sir Soldiers are not suppressible. I don't think anyone is suppressible and soldiers will surprise you and go out on the longest and toughest exercise... If they want to get up to mischief, sir, they'll get up to mischief" (6954, Vol 36). This is a very significant comment because Morneault is explicitly acknowledging that soldiers cannot be controlled and is mischaracterizing disobedience by portraying it as tenacity and perseverance. Again, his estimation that they will get up to "mischief" is a euphemism applicable to pranks but not the attitudes and behaviours shown in the videos depicting hazing or rites of initiation. Furthermore, even though Morneault was commenting on initiation rites, he was making a broad assertion that soldiers cannot be repressed from behaving as they choose.

As mentioned by Murphy, an example of not following established rules to the point of challenging authority and disrespecting the power network is the display of the rebel flag. There is significant conjecture about the origins, various meanings, and consequently the appropriateness of the flag but the core issue is

⁴⁶⁵ DeFaye, *Board of Inquiry*, Annex D, D-3/7. The report notes there was "little indication that this matter was vigorously pursued."

the defiance that manifested after the flag was banned rather than the appropriateness or necessity of the ban. The Rebel flag can be understood as symbolic capital in the same way members of the Cdn AB Regt used other forms of defiance to authority as symbolic capital to exert elitism. There are numerous examples of the Rebel flag being a symbol that was maintained in later years to represent blatant disrespect for authority. Alternatively, the fact that it was banned had a role inducing it as a challenge to authority. When discussing discipline LGen Reay acknowledges that display of the flag was indicative of defiance to authority, stating "I think we were broadly aware of the flag and its symbol as a challenge to authority..." (9054, Vol 4).⁴⁶⁶ MGen Gaudreau testified that during his handover to Houghton, he told the incoming Regimental Commander that his policy was the flag could not be flown publicly. Houghton testified he did not believe instances of display of the flag were "challenges to authority" (2246, Vol 12).

Col Holmes states that he never made any inquiries into the history of the rebel flag and testifies the only reason he banned it was because it was divisive. Holmes notes "In particular the rebel flag I found to be totally unacceptable within the regiment. I gave a direct order that the rebel flag was not to be flown in any way, shape or form" (595-6, Vol 4). He continues "One of the reasons I banned the flag because I saw it potentially as a symbol of rebelliousness" (597, Vol 4) followed by "It was to a degree a show of disrespect to authority and as a result of that I banned the flag" (599, Vol 4). The change of command between Gaudreau and Houghton occurred during the summer of 1987 and despite both commanding officers asserting the flag was banned, a photograph in Horn's book dated summer 1987 shows paratroopers marching back from the drop zone in Petawawa and notes "2 Commando flies the Rebel Flag."⁴⁶⁷ Later during cross-examination Holmes agrees with the assertion that the flag "was not conducive to regimental cohesiveness" then provides a somewhat qualified answer "I didn't see it as a challenge to authority when I arrived in command," (715, Vol 4) leaving room for the unspoken possibility that his viewpoint subsequently changed. The most logical explanation for this seeming inconsistency also illuminates a qualitative indicator of elitism, where anything that reflects poorly on an individual or institution is minimized, ignored, or denied. Put another way, elitism is exerted by protecting the status. This is also the most logical explanation for Morneault's assertion that he wasn't aware of Holmes' policy banning the flag even when he was Deputy Commander of the Airborne (6943, Vol 46). Morneault further testifies that he does not think the Rebel flag represented a symbol of informal leadership or lack of respect for authority. To summarize the status of the Rebel flag as symbolic capital of the Cdn AB Regt, from 1985 onward the flag was banned, and this is confirmed by Gaudreau, Houghton, Holmes and Morneault who commanded the Regiment during this time frame. Yet none of the COs fully acknowledge the extent to which the flag represented symbolic capital for those engaged in defiance to

⁴⁶⁶ LGen Gordon Reay was Army Commander from 1993-1996 (including the time of his testimony) and his regimental affiliation was the PPCLI (same as 2 CDO.)

⁴⁶⁷ Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 135.

authority. Putting aside the flag's links to U.S. (confederate) history and white supremacists, the Rebel flag is purported to have been adopted by 2 CDO to represent the very image of rebels, ultimately a euphemistic term which is synonymous with agitators, subversives, and insurgents.

MWO Mills states, "I took that, first of all, it was the troops being involved in some mischief and I took it as a bit of a defiance of authority due to the fact that they were told not to fly that flag" (4270, Vol 23). Mills then agrees the flag was a symbol of rebellion. In Murphy's opening quote in this section whereby he states that the rebel flag "could be" construed as a challenge to authority when it was displayed in contravention of the ban, he is offering the viewpoint of a Senior NCO and Platoon 2IC in 2 CDO (6610-12, Vol 34). Importantly, Murphy seems to acknowledge the concept that the Commanding Officer banned it therefore any display was an overt sign of disobedience. Murphy then continues the theme of exerting elitism by protecting the Regiment's status when he claims the use of the Rebel flag was not confined to 2 CDO, claiming "You would see other units on the base other than 2 Commando that had Rebel flags in vehicles in windows and things like that" (6610, Vol 34). The Chairman responds with the seemingly unconvincing observation that it was "the first time we hear that."

To minimize the negativity surrounding the Rebel flag and in response to a point made by Commissioner Desbarats, Murphy states "The only thing I can say, sir, is I believe the majority of the disciplinary problems that happened in the commando were not due to the Rebel flag. It was due to the fact that there was alcohol involved and it just so happened the Rebel flag was present at the time" (6694, Vol 35). Murphy recognizes that disciplinary problems were not due to the Rebel flag but rather the flag was symptomatic of the discipline problems and as such reinforces the flag's place as symbolic capital for those who wanted to demonstrate their defiance or direct challenge the chain of command. In further contrast to much of the testimony, Private Kyle Brown's official portrait taken prior to deployment to Somalia puts the symbolic capital of the Cdn AB Regt on clear display and affirms the flag's status as being socially acknowledged. The photo shows Brown wearing his Special Service Force (SSF) jump smock, maroon beret and the Rebel flag as the background, these items representing some of the most significant symbolic capital of the Regiment and with respect to the Rebel Flag, 2 CDO specifically.⁴⁶⁸

Initiation rites and hazing activities were another form of cultural capital where elitism was exerted as disrespect for authority. Although initiation videos propelled the Regiment's downfall, few witnesses would acknowledge initiation rites ever occurred. More concerning is that no leader testified as to taking proactive steps to ensure initiation rites did not take place, leaving the impression that such activities were not sanctioned but nor were they prevented from occurring and were therefore condoned. Discussing whether initiation rites took

⁴⁶⁸ Peter Worthington and Kyle Brown, *Scapegoat: How the Army Betrayed Kyle Brown* (Toronto: Seal Books, 1997). Photo page before p. 211. This photo is often referred to by soldiers as their kill photo or kill shot as this is what will be released to the media and public if they are killed in action.

place in 2 CDO, WO Murphy testifies "I had suspicions, overhear troops talking about it, but when you ask them about it they would clam up." Murphy says that MWO Mills "directly and through the platoon warrants stated to the troops in 2 Commando that no initiations were to be done" (6601, Vol 35). The fact that troops were talking about it is evidence enough it was occurring. The fact that a platoon warrant officer was met with a wall of silence when he tried to find out more suggests he had difficulty holding his troops accountable. Cpl Purnell plays a significant role in confirming initiation rites took place in 1 CDO after the AIC. Purnelle notes that nobody was ever physically harmed, although certain people, under the influence of alcohol, "would push things a bit far." Every witness who testified about unofficial initiation rites claimed that the only officially accepted method of initiation was the Airborne Indoctrination Course. Purnelle says he refused to be initiated on his arrival at 1 CDO, words were exchanged, and it went no further for him. He acknowledges that it is a lot easier to integrate if you took part, stating "*Ce n'était pas en me laissant uriner dessus que ça prouvait que j'étais un meilleur soldat qu'un autre,*" peeing on himself did not make him a better soldier (6823). Purnell is asked if he assisted with initiations after '92, as a spectator, and responds that he did not take part in 1992, helped in 1994 and it was well controlled with officers and NCOs present and absolutely no problems (6827). The 1992 initiation was organized by an internal clique or core within 1 CDO that he describes as "*un petit peu par une clique intérieure, un noyau intérieur, du premier commandé.*" Purnelle says that after himself, new members were obliged to participate as a form of integration.

Another dimension of defiance to authority that was probed during testimony relates to the mix of alcohol and firearms both in garrison and in theatre in Somalia. There is a persistent theme where alcohol consumption contributed to aberrant behaviour and transgressions involving firearms. In complete contradiction to the precepts of firearms safety where all guns are treated and handled as if they are loaded, Col Holmes suggests no danger is involved when soldiers are cleaning firearms while consuming alcohol because "live ammunition is always cleared of the ranges before the soldiers returned to barracks" (721, Vol 4). RSM Jardine is asked if it's ok to hold beer and weapon at same time, and replies, "if you got two hands, yes" (20984, Vol 105). Regarding the advisability of weapons being cleaned at the same time as alcohol is being consumed, Holmes inadvertently magnifies the problem when he responds, "it is not just weapons" ... "we are talking about vehicles ... and everything else a soldier goes in the field with" (721, Vol 4). This demonstrates a theme of failing to make the connection between rules and the consequences they are intended to avert. Holmes observes that soldiers are not permitted to bring live rounds or pyrotechnics or even empty casings from a range or training exercise, but there is clear and ongoing evidence that rules were often disregarded. To assert that it logically follows that guns could be assumed to be unloaded is not reasonable, as was subsequently evidenced when Morneault assumed command and firearms, ammunition and pyrotechnics were located during the barracks search on October 5th. Furthermore, firearms training in both the military and civilian realm stresses that all guns should be treated as if they are loaded, i.e. always pointed in a safe direction, finger off trigger, etc. The

permissive atmosphere in terms of alcohol consumption at the Camp in Belet Heun combined with the requirement to have weapons available at all times was at odds with maintaining the precepts of firearms safety. The Chairman speaks to disciplinary offences and the disregard for the precepts of firearms safety when LGen Reay is being questioned, and notes, "I can understand that there would be occasionally some breach of discipline - but how come ... and this is on the record - we know that there were a number of accidental discharges, out of 18 that were prosecuted 11 were committed by senior NCOs and two by officers ..." (9329-30, Vol 47). It is unclear whether the Chairman is referring to the CARBG or the Regiment with these totals. The Chairman also asked WO Murphy about "a large number of accidental discharges of weapons" during testimony and Murphy acknowledged the persons responsible "ranged from rank levels from private up to the OC in our Commando" referring to Major Seward (6702, Vol 35).

The final indicator of defiance to authority is offences that were committed, specifically the associated attitudes and behaviours and the severity of offences rather than the number of offences. Col Holmes is asked if he was aware of "incident where a MWO Stevens was the CSM of 2 CDO and he was sitting in his office and a round went through his window?" Replies "No, I'm not aware of that incident sir" (782, Vol 4). When asked about this same incident, Morneault replies "I was aware of that incident. I didn't know the specifics of that one" (6940, Vol 36). This incident received no further attention even though discharging a firearm in the built-up area of a military base in and of itself is a serious incident, notwithstanding the inferences that can be drawn from a sergeant-major being targeted and the fact that it was again 2 CDO that was implicated. This is further indication of a banality of wrongdoing that this incident was largely ignored since Holmes did not know the details.

RSM Jardine testifies regarding the in-theatre theft and illegal possession of a handgun owned by a Somali or NGO member that WO Demers mailed home to his wife in February 1993. MPs investigated and Demers was eventually sent back to Canada in May 1993, although there is no indication whether he was charged under the Code of Service Discipline. Jardine was apparently willing to tolerate this serious misconduct, characterizing the incident as "now we are going to lose one of our leaders; a warrant officer who made an error in judgement, caused no physical harm to anyone and admitted to it" (21091). This exemplifies a common approach to aberrant and dysfunctional behaviour, where it is referred to as an isolated mistake or error in judgement, credit is given for admitting to something for which the individual was caught red-handed, and the glib observation that no physical harm was caused to anyone. This latter point can be used to mitigate or dismiss any behaviour that does not result in physical harm, which includes a substantial portion of criminal offences and anti-social behaviour.

Themes from the testimony pertaining to the variable of defiance to authority include acceptance of dysfunctional behaviour that can be traced to some event, policy, practice or decision soldiers were not happy about (e.g. being restricted with respect to alcohol consumption or being forbidden from displaying the Rebel flag). Acceptance is demonstrated through euphemisms

(including fracas, rebelling, mischief) to downplay the significance and impact, and the banality of wrongdoing extends even to serious criminal behaviour. Senior leaders like Houghton would not concede the display of the Rebel flag was defiance or disrespect. With regards to the Rebel flag, Morneault claims even though he was the Deputy Commander of the Airborne under Holmes he somehow did not know the flag was banned, but parenthetically this may have been a moot point for him because he also asserts that soldiers are not suppressible and will engage in whatever behaviour they choose. The testimony reveals that the banality of wrongdoing extended to the point Murphy testifies he had suspicions that initiations were taking place even though they were forbidden by the chain of command, yet what he characterizes as suspicion was witnessing soldiers confirming these activities were occurring. Furthermore, Cpl Purnelle's testimony confirms what was evident in the hazing/initiation videos that reached the public domain. Finally, the testimony highlights the intersection of specific rules and broader expectations regarding safety, security and well-being (e.g. cleaning guns while consuming alcohol). Apparent failure to understand the basis for rules necessarily left some leaders unable to correlate rule-breaking with potentially inevitable consequences. Both Holmes and Jardine show a combination of disregard and lack of understanding of basic precepts of firearms safety, with the extreme being Holmes' assertion that guns can be assumed to be unloaded since they are cleared when leaving the range. It is reasonable to conclude that the permissive alcohol policies and practices combined with poor weapons discipline extended from the garrison into the theatre of operations in Somalia to result in an overall lax state of discipline as evidenced by numerous negligent discharges and a soldier's death. Finally, the banality of wrongdoing where incidents of serious aberrant behaviour are tolerated, overlooked and implicitly condoned. Of note, the CSM of 2 CDO was targeted while sitting in his office, making the likely culprits someone under his command. In total, the testimony reveals that leaders within 2 CDO who were targeted for retribution during a two-year period included the Commando CO, two Captain platoon commanders, two sergeant-majors, and a duty sergeant. While these are persistently viewed or characterized as isolated incidents, this represents an identifiable pattern of defiance and dysfunction.

OPPOSITIONAL / DISCORDANT HABITUS

The empirical indicators of this variable were the parallel power network (PPN) and the wall of silence (WOS). The post-Somalia military BOI issued its report on July 19, 1993, and under the heading "discipline problems" they discuss informal leaders which sets the context for this exploration of an oppositional and discordant habitus. The report relies heavily on euphemisms, asserting "in most cases this is good, but in some cases this can have a negative influence," and acknowledges 2 CDO has been struggling with an "internal" discipline problem for several years.⁴⁶⁹ The report references "isolated and unresolved incidents" that point to the existence of a "rebellious group,

⁴⁶⁹ DeFaye, *Board of Inquiry*, C-2/8.

committed perhaps to operational excellence, but wanting to do it, seemingly, on their own terms.” It goes on to describe “supervision” in 2 CDO “may have shared its loyalty between the formal leadership and the informal negative leadership at the grass roots level.”⁴⁷⁰ The BOI had the opportunity to address the PPN, but consistently downplays all aspects including their ultimate assessment of the problem being when “high-spirited activities exceed the accepted bounds of social norms or the law.”⁴⁷¹ The strongest language acknowledges that the PPN presented a “serious challenge to formal authority” and should be “excised.” The two subsequent recommendations were first to officially recognize the contribution of CARBG members including discussion of a medal, and secondly to provide 2 CDO with proper leadership and ensure “the problem of the challenge to authority in 2 Commando is resolved.”⁴⁷²

Parallel Power Network (PPN)

Commissioner Desbarats asks BGen Beno if Morneault being relieved of command "in fact sent a signal to the rebels or the *cabale*, is another word that has been used or informal leadership or whatever it was in the regiment, that they had won and this sowed the seeds of the events that occurred in Somalia" (8264, Vol 42).

This phenomenon was defined earlier as an unofficial or unauthorised hierarchy that operates outside of an institution’s established decision-making structure and exerts a dysfunctional influence on the norms and values, communication, decision-making, and accountability within the institution. As such, the parallel power network represents an oppositional, discordant or even subversive habitus. The phrases identified in the literature and those used by witnesses in their testimony also refer to this phenomenon as an unofficial chain of command, alternate chain of command, informal chain of command, parallel command structure, informal leaders, unsanctioned informal leadership, duplication of leadership, permanent core, disordered loyalty, interpersonal linkages, informal networks, solidary groups and anti-authority subculture. Like the definitional problem with elitism, many of these phrases have positive connotations and do not adequately telegraph the dysfunctional and discordant characteristics of a subversive habitus, also defined as a counterculture. Many phrases contain euphemisms or serve as a circumlocution for oppugnant or incongruous alliances operating in opposition to the institutional power network. There are several key dynamics to the parallel power network including the extent to which the existence of the parallel power network is acknowledged by members of the Regiment and the CAF as a whole and secondly whether this phenomenon is perceived to be dysfunctional. Every detailed exploration of the Regiment as well as the Somalia Commission’s report acknowledges the

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., C-5/8.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid., D-2/7.

⁴⁷² Ibid., D-7/7.

existence of this phenomenon, although there is conjecture regarding the extent to which it was problematic.

Multiple witnesses exert elitism through the denial of any knowledge of a parallel power network, although BGen Beno initially states: "I had never heard of the expression, an informal leadership" and then two pages later testifies "I did recommend that he (Morneault) break up the informal leadership" (8095, Vol 41). Morneault is asked about "negative informal leadership" inside the regiment and replies "Not an identifiable one, sir, no" (6930, Vol 36). Despite Horn's revelation mentioned in the introduction that traces the origins of the PPN to the early to mid 1980s, MGen Hewson concedes in his testimony that his inquiry "made no specific findings" regarding informal leadership (381, Vol 2). Note that Hewson's choice of words infers his team was aware of the existence of the PPN but did not explore it any further. MGen Mackenzie asserts "No, at that time I don't remember the term nor a suggestion of such duplication of leadership within, no" (8337, Vol 43). Mackenzie's reference to "leadership" continues the theme of euphemisms as a means of exerting elitism, in this example a mindset serving to downplay members engaged in an oppositional and discordant habitus. Briefing notes to the Minister of National Defence read to BGen Beno contain a paragraph "You should be aware that one of the prime reasons behind Beno's recommendation is that he felt an informal leadership existed at the private, corporal and master corporal level of 2 Commando, a subunit of the regiment, and that Morneault couldn't cope with it" (8091, Vol 41). Beno claims this statement is incorrect and comes from the DeFaye Inquiry: "I did not feel there was. I had never heard of the expression, an informal leadership." The document goes on to state that "Brigadier-General Beno did not support the recommendation and proposed instead to move people and break up the informal leadership structure" (8093, Vol 41). Beno then comments "I did recommend that he break up the informal leadership," showing his testimony evolved from having "never heard of" an informal leadership to recognizing the dysfunctional implications and the need to eradicate this phenomenon (8095, Vol 41). In a similar vein, MWO Mills, the CSM of 2 CDO denies the existence of a PPN when asked "as far as you were concerned, there was no centre of undisciplined behaviour within 2 Commando that had risen to the level of some parallel authority or anything like that. Was there or wasn't there?" He replies "No, there wasn't, sir" (4386, Vol 23). While these are only some of the witnesses who maintain they were unaware of a parallel power network, it is noteworthy to consider their influential roles as the Area Commander, Brigade Commander, Commanding Officer of the Regiment, and CSM of 2 CDO along with the responsibility they had in the direct chain of command of the Regiment before it deployed to Somalia.

Cpl Purnelle is a former Belgian paratrooper and was a social worker in that country prior to moving to Canada and joining the CAF. He was the most junior member whose testimony was examined. As a corporal in 1 CDO, Purnelle lived in the barracks and of all witnesses was arguably in the best position to observe and in fact experience the parallel power network first-hand, keeping in mind it was said to exist primarily in 2 CDO. Purnelle testified that he was treated differently because he was opposed to certain internal rules of the

Commando “*un noyau de certaines personnes qui voulaient diriger ça à leur manière avec des valeurs qui n’étaient pas représentatives d’une éthique de soldat pour moi*”, essentially a core of people who want to run things in their own way with values I did not consider to be representative of a soldier’s ethic (6823, Vol 35). Purnell notes there was a gang mentality “*des cliques ou des bandes*” where the group had its own rules, attitude and behaviour, which paints a clear picture of a discordant habitus antithetical to the military ethos. Purnelle is asked to clarify the gang phenomenon or mentality and replies that there are individuals who like to drink, play and provides an expression that loosely translates to big arms and no brain (6824, Vol 35). He notes “*de ne pas avoir plié sur certaine de leurs règles qui sont imposées par une minorité de personnes*” [he did not comply with rules imposed by a minority], which caused him problems because he states it is “a question of values” (6826, Vol 35). A further indication that the PPN had been entrenched in the habitus of the Cdn AB Regt for years (and not confined to 2 CDO) is when Morneault is asked about “*Lac Cagoules*” (*cagoules* is French for balaclava) and responds it “had been a problem in Major Bergeron's time. I believe Col Houghton was the commander,” 1987 or 88. “It was a form of informal -- negative informal leadership was being exercised in 1 Commando barracks where the old guys would make the new guys use the back door. If they didn't like what they did, they would go around in hoods and give them the red blanket treatment at night. That kind of thing” (6938, Vol 36). Morneault’s reference to “that kind of thing” to characterize off-the-books or extra-judicial punishment sometimes referred to as a code red continues the theme of referring to deleterious behaviour euphemistically.⁴⁷³ There is also little indication that a connection was made between this behaviour and general defiance to the chain of command and military discipline.

LGen Reay acknowledges “challenges to authority, of there being a kind of alternate chain of command that caused things to occur that ultimately led to some of the difficulties with which we're so familiar” (9330, Vol 47). The roundabout acknowledgement of the PPN from the Commander of the Army is telling, especially when key members of the chain of command including the Brigade Commander refused to concede it. Morneault is asked about “informal leadership in the Canadian Airborne” and replies, “Are you putting a negative context on informal leadership” and is told yes (6930, Vol 36). While Purnelle did not seem to have any difficulty assessing which of his fellow soldiers fell into this group, Morneault asserts that Holmes previously tried to deal with this subversive habitus but met with a wall of silence and “there is no way you can force information from them.” Despite denying its existence 320 pages earlier in his testimony, Morneault continues with “I think I talked about it as a cancer more than a -- small cancer or cancerous group than a virus and it had gone underground I guess. If it was a formed group, and it had raised its ugly head again” (7259, Vol 37). Seward is asked “to get something very clear, you did not identify all or even perhaps most of the informal leaders in the bad sense of the

⁴⁷³ The phrase reached mainstream popularity or usage with the movie “A Few Good Men” starring Jack Nicholson and Tom Cruise, released the same year the Cdn AB Regt was deployed to Somalia.

term, at least in 2 Commando, is that correct" to which he answers, "That is possible, yes" (Vol 32, 6152).⁴⁷⁴ This continues the theme of not being able to identify perpetrators, yet somehow being able to assert that they only comprise a small number. Morneault's analogy to a cancer might be appropriate given that any amount of cancer is extremely serious.

There is significant evidence that the individuals who comprised the parallel power network were able to influence the removal of anyone who challenged them including leaders, as such further exerting their elitism through the subversive habitus. Regarding Captain Ferraby, Morneault acknowledges that none of the individuals involved in the arson of Ferraby's personal vehicle were ever identified, and Ferraby "was posted out of the unit prematurely I believe" (6939, Vol 36). Houghton discusses Private Harvey fearing for his life after informing on individuals who were charged with assault but does not provide any additional background on the incident. However, the key point is that the Regimental Commander saw Harvey being posted out as constituting a solution to the problem. Albeit Harvey does not hold a position within the chain of command by virtue of his rank, this follows the pattern of the parallel power network influencing the removal of individuals who challenged their subversive habitus. As further evidence of the subversive nature of the PPN, Houghton advises that Harvey was posted out of Petawawa because his safety could not be guaranteed by the chain of command and "We would have taken measures, but we did not feel it would be a particularly healthy environment and it makes it a lot easier under the circumstances to move him sideways" (8646-7, Vol 44). WO Murphy is questioned regarding the issue of members de-facto selecting their own NCOs and claims he doesn't see that as an issue. But the Chairman strikes to the heart of the matter when he points out "Well, selecting their own NCO may mean that you keep the ones you like because they are weak and you try at times also to get rid of those that you disliked because they are strong and they are really supervising you" (6698-9, Vol 35).

Morneault testifies that Mathieu defaulted to the same solution as Ferraby's when it came to Sgt Wyszynski, the Duty Sergeant on the night of the October 3 and 4 incidents. Morneault's assessment of Wyszynski being posted out of the Regiment after Morneault was relieved of command is "I believe it passed a clear message to the troops that if you want to get rid of weak sergeant and you don't -- and you want to get away with it, maintain your silence and the results they got was the sergeant was posted out and so was the CO who was pursuing the discipline issue vigorously" (6912, Vol 36). Again, by referring to

⁴⁷⁴ Important context for Seward's testimony is that it was preceded by a decision rendered during a General Court Martial on June 3, 1994 where he was convicted under Section 124 of the National Defence Act for Negligent Performance of a Military Duty and was sentenced to a Severe Reprimand. Seward testified at the Somalia Commission of Inquiry on December 19-20, 1995 and completed his testimony on January 15, 1996. An appeal of his sentence was heard a week later by the CMAC on January 22, 1996 with a decision rendered on May 27, 1996. His sentence of a severe reprimand was set aside and the CMAC substituted a sentence of imprisonment for three months and dismissal from Her Majesty's Service.

Wyszynski as a weak sergeant the implication is he brought things on himself. The Chairman confirms with Seward it was his decision to send Wyszynski back to his home regiment, Seward says it was because "I didn't think he had acted strongly enough" as regimental orderly sergeant during October incidents. Ironically, as the only leader who took any direct action that weekend the Duty Sergeant was also the only senior NCO to be punished in relation to the series of events. The Chairman talks about Wyszynski's car burning and Mills not coming to assist when called at his mess dinner. "Looking at all these facts put together, isn't there some foundation to the assertion that perhaps the soldiers were choosing their NCOs?" Seward disagrees but then implicitly acknowledges the possibility when he states, "I appreciate where you are coming from with this" (5953, Vol 31). Morneault states "If the theory is right that his car got burnt because he is a weak leader, we're allowing soldiers to choose their own leaders and then the guy who was pursuing it like a pit bull ... that's what Major Seward called me ... was also posted out and nobody knew why and nobody tried to quell the rumours that were going around the base" (7013, Vol 36). Morneault acknowledges the PPN when discussing the arson of Sgt. Wyszynski's personal vehicle, noting "I definitely believe it undermined Major Seward's leadership because those who had done it were obviously laughing in their beer. We got away with it again and they had gotten away with in for years, if it was the same gang, they had gotten away with it for years before that" (7014, Vol 36). Read in its totality, Morneault's evidence is that the PPN existed for many years.

Murphy asserts the PPN is an after-hours phenomenon, essentially a barracks-room dynamic that took place during off-duty time. Murphy says he and other Warrants "had suspicions on a couple of individuals that were having informal leadership in the barracks after hours" (6593, Vol 35). Despite being a Platoon 2IC in 2 CDO, Murphy states "The only thing that could be done or that we hoped was being done was the duty NCO on at night, if he had any problems or noticed anything would report them" (6593, Vol 35). The Duty NCO is a corporal during the week and MCpl on weekends, and being appointed Duty NCO is often punishment (extra duties), therefore counsel asks, "Does it sound right to you that to punish somebody you're going to put him in charge of discipline; correct?" Murphy subsequently puts the responsibility on all duty staff, saying he relied on duty NCOs, the Regimental Orderly Sergeant and Duty Officer "one would think that would be enough to handle any problems in the Airborne lines at night" (6602, Vol 35). When asked if it ever reached a point where informal leadership "might be interfering with the conduct of their duties, the chain of command or their obedience to higher authority" Murphy responds he can't speak for the rest of the commando but "I believe in my platoon it wasn't" (6717, Vol 35). He agrees with the suggestion it was "something that was confined to off-duty hours and if it had reached a more serious proportion, you would have pursued it more vigorously." Murphy is asked about his evidence that when he returned to the Regiment for his second tour "there were certain informal leaders and you had your suspicions who they were" (6800, Vol 35). Murphy replies, "We had no proof and no one would come forward to say: Hey, this guy is bullying me at night or tell me to do this" (6801, Vol 35). Even if one were to accept that this witness believed the parallel power network was strictly

a barracks-room phenomena, it begs the question of whether this type of influence could logically be expected to carry over into the regular workplace, especially since Murphy equates it to bullying and since it involves all the same individuals living and working together. The characterization of the PPN as an after-hours anomaly is clearly intended to remove responsibility and accountability from the chain of command, taking it a step further to where it is a situation over which they have no control even though it is occurring in a military barracks under the supervision of duty staff. Ultimately, as the platoon warrant officer Murphy did not hold any of his soldiers accountable for the after-hours behaviour he discusses.

Of the witnesses who acknowledged the existence of a parallel power network, none of them testified as to who formed the membership of this group and all made inferences that it was a small number of individuals. This continues the theme of exerting elitism by minimizing and downplaying problems. WO Murphy asserts the network consisted of “a couple of individuals” and that only the duty NCO would be able to observe this phenomenon at play. Murphy alludes the behaviour of this group is “bullying,” and by inference acknowledges the behaviour is dysfunctional when noting he had “suspicions who they were.” Murphy appears to have had no interest or ability to deal with clear examples of dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours but asserts he would act if matters became more serious. All of this begs the question of how anyone could not know which of their soldiers were part of this subversive habitus yet also assert that it is a very small number. Otherwise, it is equally possible that a large number or majority of soldiers formed part of this subversive habitus.

Questions arising from witness testimony include how leadership can be properly characterized as informal when referring to Master-Corporals, who as Section 2ICs are in a formal leadership position. In this instance leadership is referred to as negative instead of replacing it altogether with an explicative term like collusion or conspiracy that reflects the dysfunctional connotations, followed by terms like ringleader or instigator that denote a dysfunctional undertone and implications of someone who is leading a group involved in harmful or illegal activity. Significant evidence was identified to support the PPN as an empirical indicator of elitism representative of a discordant habitus. There is no indication of any positive contribution from this group that would justify the euphemistic characterizations, as such the most reasonable explanation is that this behaviour was intentionally tolerated and there was an unwillingness to hold these individual accountable. Of note, it is Cpl Purnelle who offers one of the few candid descriptions of the values discordant with a soldier’s ethic, and also recognizes that the goal of members of the PPN was to do things and ultimately have things their way.⁴⁷⁵ The PPN is tied to if not wholly responsible for the most serious incidents including the arson of two leaders’

⁴⁷⁵ Cpl Purnelle was arrested by Military Police when he left the base to testify at the Somalia Commission, and subsequently faced 9 counts under the National Defence Act (NDA). Somalia Commission, *Evidentiary Transcripts*, Vol 5, 1278. The Commission concluded Purnelle was being targeted by the CAF to suppress him from testifying.

personal vehicles, entering senior leader's tents and slashing part of their sleeping bags, and MCpl Matchee's part in the murder of Shidane Arone.

Habitus is reproduced and legitimated through social structures. Social legitimation of the disordered loyalty of the PPN manifested as immobile junior NCOs were dominant social actors able to "impose themselves with all the appearance of objective necessity."⁴⁷⁶ Habitus is constituted by an individual's ongoing social and cultural practice within a social field, in this case 2CDO, the Regiment as a whole, as well as the embodied social history of each individual. To that point, consider Matchee's established history of racist ideology and behaviour that forms part of his personal habitus. Members of an institution possess their own unique habitus, equipping individuals with different dispositions that impact how they conform to the dominant habitus of the institution, or this case to the PPN. Cpl Purnelle's testimony describes his prior experience as a Belgian paratrooper then subsequently a social worker in that country. This provided Purnelle with social and cultural capital in terms of training, experience and education, and his testimony reveals the extent to which his personal habitus was incongruent to that of the PPN. Put another way, elitism and in particular defiance to authority were not forms of cultural capital with which he had previously been habituated. Members of the parallel power network were able to impose norms and ultimately the PPN's criteria and cultural capital to determine and assert what constituted an airborne soldier. Members of the PPN employed their cultural resources including defiance to authority and physical aggression as evidenced with *Lac Cajoules* and similar phenomena.

Wall of Silence (WOS)

Col Houghton is asked about an exchange involving MCpl Ratthe as barracks-warden where Houghton asked who was responsible for an incident and the reply was "he added that he did not know and if he knew he would not tell me" (8648, Vol 44).

The wall of silence (WOS) is an indicator that describes a phenomenon most attributed to the policing profession and the perception that police officers protect each other by covering up wrongdoing. A WOS consists of suppressing information through a concerted lack of cooperation, especially information pertaining to questionable actions or anything that would be prejudicial to an organization or its reputation. A WOS creates a discordant habitus as it operates for a purpose antithetical to an organization, featuring indicators such as protecting one's own, a disordered loyalty like the PPN, and resistance to authority. In the example above, Col Houghton's testimony suggests his full acceptance and embracing of the blatant insubordination. Instead of maintaining that he does not know, Ratthe takes the WOS a step further and tells the Regimental Commander that he can't make him give up the names of his fellow soldiers. Of note, Houghton does not testify as to taking any exception to this response or responding with any disciplinary measures, as such demonstrating a

⁴⁷⁶ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 471.

tolerance if not condoning of this attitude and behaviour. This is indicative of how the PPN and the WOS flow ideationally from defiance to authority. The WOS is a concept that operates in conjunction with the subversive habitus of a parallel power network. The WOS implies complicity, cohesion and a degree of conspiracy amongst individuals and serves to assert and maintain elitism.

There is evidence that even the Brigade Commander BGen Beno had resigned himself to the inevitability of the WOS. Beno testifies that the first time he heard the term wall of silence "was during the DeFaye Inquiry. That is not a phrase which I would have used in October 1992" (8094, Vol 41). Beno obviously became familiar with the concept by the time he testified at the Somalia Inquiry, because he explains his reaction to Morneault trying to get to the bottom of the Kyrenia Club incident was "When you threaten soldiers like that you create a wall of silence. When you wade in and start doing investigations you create a wall of silence" (7905, Vol 40). Note how Beno uses the concept of an investigation as a dysphemism, implying it is intended as intimidation when it is both appropriate and necessary. Morneault testifies that when he got back from the recce in Somalia, Beno made a comment about "sweep another one under the carpet" referring to incidents he was aware of in the past as CO of RCHA and deputy commander of the base, "the reputation the regiment had built up and that all of these incidents in the past seemed to get swept under the carpet or seemed to be. You'd never get to the bottom of them" (7006, Vol 36). Morneault later testifies that he could not get members to come forward regarding the October 3&4 incidents, and says he was disappointed because "I was not used to a wall of silence" (6974, Vol 36). The De Faye BOI came to the same conclusion, calling the incidents of that weekend "a victory for the wall of silence."⁴⁷⁷ Testifying about initiation type activities taking place after-hours in 2 CDO even though forbidden by MWO Mills, WO Murphy acknowledges "I had suspicions, overhear troops talking about it, but when you ask them about it they would clam up" (6601, Vol 34). When asked if trying to find out what was going on in quarters in terms of initiations would generally be met with silence or negative response, Murphy simply replies "Yes" (6602, Vol 34).

Colonels Houghton and Holmes were back-to-back Regimental Commanders for the period spanning 1987 – 1992, and as such were ultimately responsible for condoning actions, attitudes and behaviours that contributed to the habitus within the Regiment leading up to Morneault taking command in the Summer of 1992. Holmes took over command of the Cdn AB Regt from Houghton a short time after the arson of Capt Ferraby's personal vehicle on the parade square, at which time the incident was unresolved and in fact would remain so. Holmes' perception regarding the arson was, "So when incidents of this nature happened soldiers tend to protect their own, and that's a good thing and a bad thing ..." (607, Vol 4). Holmes' view that soldiers protecting their own is in any way a "good thing" in this context is very telling, and he goes on to explain how impenetrable the WOS is when he states "it is very difficult, particularly when you have no other means other than just questioning the soldier as to what took place in a particular situation, there is no way you can force the

⁴⁷⁷ DeFaye, *Board of Inquiry*, Annex D, D-4/7.

information from them" (607, Vol 4). Holmes concedes with the suggestion from the Chairman that "bonding" amongst junior members resulted in it being difficult to charge them, and states, "Based on my experience with trying to deal with some of the problems we had within the battalion at the time, the bonding and the wall of silence was something that existed then and I would suggest exists in all units in the Canadian Army" (706, Vol 4). The term bonding and collateral descriptions continues the theme of euphemisms designed to suggest a positive connotation to a dysfunctional phenomenon. At the most basic level, a leader should be able to differentiate between bonding, cohesion, working together and sharing physical and emotional hardships and burdens to accomplish a mission versus the idiomatic "circling of the wagons" in defiance to the chain of command while protecting each other at any cost.

Even the military police who have both the duty and authority to investigate and resolve incidents were instead accepting and even understanding of the WOS. The phenomenon is further mischaracterized as positive or necessary when a senior military police investigator WO Ferguson accepts being stone-walled and describes the Airborne as a "tight" unit concluding "I suppose you could chock that up to esprit de corps or close living conditions" (880-2, Vol 5). A variation on presenting the WOS as a positive phenomenon was the testimony of Commander Jenkins of the Military Police. He implies that any negative connotations to the WOS are essentially self-correcting, stating "the point when the person goes beyond the standard that the unit accepts, they will then, if you want to use the term wall of silence, remove it and I've run into this phenomenon across the country and overseas with police investigations" (1236, Vol 6). Further to the extent that the MPs accepted and condoned the WOS as an oppositional/discordant habitus, Jenkins asserts that the WOS is a "new" phenomenon that "all police run in to," specifically where there is a "cohesive group" (1235, Vol 6). WO Ferguson states he does not believe a WOS in 2 CDO would "seriously impede" an investigation. Asked "did you perceive this as being a clear challenge to the command structure and to discipline within the unit," he replies "no." When pressed, he still won't agree with chairman that it was a challenge to authority because "I don't know if we ever established that." Ferguson's acceptance of the wall of silence is clear when he notes "In this case, if they don't tell the truth and we may know that, but we can't prove it, then it is just a thing. If the Airborne people --when we did an investigation, you do your investigation to the best of your ability and if they won't tell you, they won't tell you and there is no way we can force them to" (933, Vol 5).

Further to the opening quote from Houghton, there is additional evidence the WOS was not only tolerated but also condoned by other parts of the chain of command. Sgt Morley was acting as Cpl Powers' platoon warrant and told him to keep quiet and not implicate himself regarding Powers' role in the Kyrenia Club incident. MWO Mills says as a result "Sergeant Morley was brought in and counselled for his actions there" (4390, Vol 23). WO Murphy testifies "I also think that Sergeant Morley was inadvertently trying to protect Corporal Powers... from, for instance, any head-hunting or any rash action taken against him. This is another use of dysphemism, where "head-hunting" is really referencing accountability. When asked if Morley did the right thing, Mills responds "he

might have" although coming forward would have "taken the heat off the commando...however that was a judgement call on his side" (6632-3, Vol 34). The fact that Morley was about to be promoted to Warrant Officer (making him a platoon 2IC) is portrayed as a mitigating rather than aggravating factor, a combination of protecting Morley and the institution. Seward describes Morley's actions as "a significant error in judgement" that resulted in "some lengthy conversations about Sergeant Morley" (5974, Vol 31). Seward concludes "the advice and counsel that he had given to Corporal Powers, although was an error in judgement, I don't think it indicated a severe or significant character flaw in Sergeant Morley" who was on verge of being promoted to Warrant Officer (5975, Vol 31). When pressed, Seward calls it "a significant value judgement" then "it was an error in judgement, it was not an error in character" (5975, Vol 31). Seward says Morley was told such conduct from a warrant officer "would not be readily accepted" (5975, Vol 31), and that this came close but did not cross the line to disobedience of an order. Note the parallels between Morley and Demers discussed previously in relation to defiance to authority for shipping the stolen handgun home to his wife. In both cases leadership downplayed their behaviour even though they held the second most senior NCO position within the Commando. Both Seward and Mills use the term judgement as a euphemism and excuse for failing to exercise leadership or accountability. Finally, Morley is described as giving "advice and counsel" instead of referencing it as collusion.

While not referring to any specific incident in his testimony pertaining to the WOS, Holmes provides excuses for not rooting out problems when encountering a WOS, testifying he is averse to engaging in a "witch hunt." He suggests "If the information is not forthcoming, if the investigation comes to a halt and obviously you're aware of the situation, you likely put particular emphasis on the areas where you suspect something, but to, I say punish the group so to speak in term of the restricted activities or whatever.... could be counterproductive." He continues "a perceived witch hunt that has no basis... could create morale and loyalty problems within the unit" (781, Vol 4). This highlights a laissez-faire approach to accountability where the Regimental Commander is almost a helpless bystander to the problems and his primary concern is how soldiers were going to perceive and react to any attempts to hold them accountable. While the use of euphemisms has been an underlying theme in a significant portion of all testimony, the term witch-hunt is another dysphemism intended to imply negative connotations for what should properly be construed as following-up and holding people accountable. Put another way, Holmes mischaracterizes an investigation as a witch-hunt then implies there is a disjunction between that dysphemism and a commander's duty to hold individuals accountable. Beno's earlier reference to threatening soldiers and wading in and doing investigations were similar forms of dysphemism to make excuses for not performing actions that entail holding soldiers accountable. The group punishment approach aside, when an investigation has stalled and the parties responsible have not been identified, that is clearly counterproductive to the habitus including morale and loyalty. When Holmes talks about likely putting "particular emphasis on the areas where you suspect something" he is continuing

a theme of euphemistically and hypothetically speaking about a problem instead of dealing with actual issues or allegations.

Several themes emerge from the WOS as an empirical indicator of elitism. The WOS flows from ideational defiance to authority and manifests as a behavioural phenomenon in the form of insubordination. There is a clear distinction to be made between failing to proactively come forward to report wrongdoing versus the insubordination of the barracks warden to the Regimental Commander when asked for information that was Ratthe's duty to provide. Returning to the theme of denying or attempting to suppress anything with adverse implications on the Regiment, most witnesses refused to acknowledge the existence of this phenomenon despite it being a very common expression. Morneault implicitly acknowledges the WOS when he refers to how soldiers would "clam up" when pressed about initiation activities that were forbidden. When the phenomenon was exposed during questioning, a significant number of witnesses view the WOS as unavoidable, something to be expected and therefore essentially insurmountable. Similar to the PPN being referred to as leadership, there is an identifiable theme in the witness testimony whereby the WOS is legitimated or excused in a positive context, with the focus directed to connotations of loyalty, cohesion, bonding and esprit de corps. Testimony confirms that similar to the PPN, the WOS was a more powerful force at play in terms of habitus than the formal chain of command. Holmes discusses the arson of Ferraby's personal vehicle on the Airborne parade square where the source of ignition was a copy of the Regiment's Routine Orders (issued under the authority of his predecessor Houghton). Yet he characterizes the cover-up as soldiers protecting their own and testifies that he considers this response both "a good thing and a bad thing" which he goes on to discuss in the context of bonding (607, Vol 4). While bonding is clearly a euphemism for the behaviour behind the WOS, it is difficult to objectively determine from his testimony whether Holmes is minimizing or simply fails to recognize the connotations of defiance, disrespect and insubordination that pertain to the WOS. MWO Mills' testimony is illuminating, because while 2 CDO's sergeant-major and chief disciplinarian indicates he counselled Sergeant Morley for participating in the WOS by telling Cpl Powers not to come forward about the Kyrenia Club incident, Mills dilutes this by asserting it was a "judgement call" (6632-3, Vol 34). Mills then concedes Morley "might have done the right thing" and offers his interpretation that it was not an "error in character" on Morley's part. Taken in its totality, Mills' testimony demonstrates that ideationally he was not opposed to Morley perpetuating the WOS, as such Mills condones the behaviour when he attempts to reduce it to decisions and timing rather than recognizing it as insubordination. While bonding was used as a euphemism for the WOS and continues the underlying theme in a significant portion of all testimony, the term witch-hunt adds to the previous use of dysphemisms (investigation, threatening, head-hunting) intended to imply negative connotations for what should properly be construed as following-up and holding people accountable.

With respect to the Military Police approach to the lack of cooperation when confronted with the WOS, Jenkins either overlooks or is unaware that any lack of cooperation can be overcome by various investigative techniques and

approaches when applied by a trained and experienced investigator. He also fails to make an important distinction between an accused person's Charter right to not self-incriminate, a witnesses' right to not want to talk to police, versus soldiers who are witnesses but also subject to the Code of Service discipline and can be ordered to cooperate with superiors. Jenkins most pertinent assertion showing an acceptance of the WOS is his assurance that a group will essentially regulate itself by "removing" the WOS when they see fit. The obvious problem with this assertion is that a counterculture or subversive habitus has discordant norms from the institution, and any action taken by its members will entail applying its own norms and values rather than those that are officially sanctioned. Ultimately, in Jenkin's scenario the group engaging in the antithetical behaviour is being permitted to set the standard rather than the institution and the formal leadership.

A WOS is an idiom for the lack of cooperation when attempts are made to ascertain something. In the Cdn AB Regt, this type of stonewalling was identified as prevalent at least as far back as 1985. The Somalia Commission acknowledges that during the course of several investigations into incidents involving the Cdn AB Regt and occurring during the pre-deployment period, "military police met a wall of silence that seriously impeded their investigations."⁴⁷⁸ Pervasiveness of the WOS is evident when Morley protected Powers and CSM Mills testifies Morley may have done the right thing and characterizes it as judgement call while specifying this did not reflect a lack of character on Morley's part. This variable is also ideational in that it originates in an attitude or belief that the institution needs to be protected and by extension individual members deserve to be protected (as a privilege or advantage to membership) or both.

The WOS is a syndrome that arises from a habitus with a disordered or misguided loyalty in terms of ideation (e.g. loyalty to a Regiment over the profession of arms) or to the wrong people (e.g. parallel power network). The use of euphemisms as seen with other indicators is sustained, in the case of the WOS it is equated to loyalty and bonding as was evident in Col Holmes' testimony, who of note also asserted the phenomenon was prevalent throughout the CAF. This provides valuable insight into the extent this indicator of elitism was tolerated and condoned. Murphy talks of soldiers "clamming up" and accepts this as a natural reaction. Most witnesses portrayed the WOS as terminal, the implication being that no further action can or should be taken. Commander Jenkins of the Military Police attempts to normalize the phenomenon of a WOS asserting it is faced by civilian police. This further sustains the theme of a dysfunctional behaviour being normal because it ostensibly happens in regular society. Jenkins makes the incongruent assertion that the WOS is self-correcting, and group norms will not allow it to be taken too far, which is puzzling given that the testimony was in 1995 when the dysfunctional and aberrant behaviour was well known and clearly not self-regulating.

⁴⁷⁸ Somalia Commission, *Dishonoured Legacy*, Volume 5, 1271.

RELATIONSHIP TO OUTSIDE WORLD

Commissioner Desbarats points out that a theme in MGen Gaudreau's testimony that there were no problems in the Airborne that were any different than any other part of the CAF, "the reason that worries me is because if we should discover in fact that there were some serious problems in the Airborne Regiment, then going by what you say, we would be justified in assuming these are in fact typical right across the military structure in Canada." Gaudreau agrees with this point, then Desbarats notes that Gaudreau claims problems came up from time to time, but were fixed by him, which begs the question "if this is true, the question arises, what are we doing here today?" Gaudreau responds, "Good question, Mr. Commissioner" (561, Vol 3).

Elitism is a relationship to the outside world in terms of asserting and preserving elite status, which includes protecting the reputation of the institution as well as individual members. This can be viewed on a continuum of myopic and self-referential habitus, from favouring their own with preferential treatment in general to overtly covering up deleterious acts, insulating themselves from scrutiny with the wall of silence, and using euphemisms and dysphemisms to downplay dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours. In the military context it is important to consider whether former members especially senior officers with prior Airborne service have a myopic view of the Regiment, seeing it in an overtly positive light, based on loyalty, personal experience, affection, and other social and psychological dynamics. Exploration of perceived elite status does not seek to validate whether such status is objectively verifiable. Rather the goal is to examine how elitism is justified, concealed, or rebuffed. This involves the same indicators seen in academic elitism, such as insulation from the winds of change, replicating and perpetuating the status quo thereby resulting in a limiting of the skillset and diversity of knowledge, approaches and perspectives. Favoured treatment includes indications that "normal" institutional rules and expectations do not apply. Elitism modulates power therefore it is also a means to enhance the prestige of an institution and thereby reinforce one's own elitism as a current or former member through the reproduction of prestige hierarchies.

Myopic Habitus

MGen Gaudreau discusses the context of the 1990s and soldiers with disciplinary problems, "it was not that long ago that there were not that many regimental sergeant majors in the army who made it to that rank without going to jail for a few days" (550, Vol 3).

MGen Gaudreau was a former Regimental Commander of the Cdn AB Regt and one of the most senior Army officers in the CAF at the time he provided the above testimony that speaks to an acceptance for mindset and behaviours that

lead to a soldier being jailed.⁴⁷⁹ This indicator of elitism encompasses a variety of concepts including self-referential viewpoints, an intolerant and inward-focused habitus, resistance to outside influence, a desire for primacy at any cost, and indications that members see themselves as sole purveyors and interpreters of institutional norms and knowledge. Considering he was testifying during the post-Somalia timeframe, Gaudreau's veneration of the experience of going to jail is suggestive of a degree of insulation from the norms and values of much of the outside world. At the same time, it is important context to acknowledge that soldiers were routinely charged and could be jailed for short periods of time for minor infractions.

A twist to Gaudreau's perception that a jail time can be part of the rite of passage of a soldier or even a badge of honour (i.e. symbolic capital) is RSM Jardine's understanding of the correlation between a conviction and a discipline problem. When he is asked "Just because somebody has not been charged and convicted of an offence, does that mean that he is still a soldier without discipline problems? Jardine replies "That's true. To me he hasn't got a problem" (20872, Vol 104). The RSM is asserting that it takes a conviction to prove one of his soldiers has a discipline problem. This is followed by question "So somebody has to exhibit such a pattern of behaviour that he is going to be charged before he has a discipline problem?" to which Jardine responds, "To me that would be correct" (20872, Vol 104). Jardine's perfunctory involvement in addressing disciplinary issues in 2 CDO was limited to talking to Mills to ensure "that his troops were conducting themselves in a soldierly manner and that the problems that arose in October were put behind them" (20877, Vol 104). This is also a key indicator that shows a mindset of overlooking problems by putting them in the past. Instead of addressing problems, this 'water under the bridge' approach involves suppressing the experience, leaving it in the past and trying not to let it affect the current situation.

Elitism is fostered by minimizing, failing to acknowledge, or condoning aspects of a dysfunctional habitus as evidenced by Gaudreau and Jardine's perspective on discipline problems and records of misconduct. With respect to acknowledging and addressing discipline problems, Col Houghton testifies "We sort of had an unspoken code certainly amongst the infantry battalions is that we would not exchange our problem people, that we would keep them and deal with them ourselves" (8630, Vol 44). In contrast, the Commission of Inquiry ultimately made a finding that the Cdn AB Regt was vulnerable to being "used as a dumping ground for overly aggressive or otherwise problematic personnel."⁴⁸⁰ Contrary to previously mentioned evidence from Horn that this situation was commonly acknowledged by Regimental leadership (both senior officers and senior NCOs), Gaudreau states "I take great exception to situations that the Airborne Regiment was considered to be a reform school by the parent regiments or that they purposely sent problem cases there" (551, Vol 3).

⁴⁷⁹ Gaudreau commanded 1 CDO in Edmonton as a Major in 1974. He was the Regimental Commander from 1985-87 during the aftermath of the Hewson Report and retired in 1995 as Deputy Commander of Land Forces.

⁴⁸⁰ Somalia Commission of Inquiry, *Dishonoured Legacy*, ES25.

Gaudreau asserts that by 1985 (remembering this period is the direct aftermath of the Hewson Report) many senior members of feeder regiments had previously served in the Airborne, "they now had a voice in sending people to the Airborne Regiment. So I believe it would be unfair to say that the decision to send lesser caliber troops to the Airborne Regiment was done in a purposeful manner" (554, Vol 3). Of note Gaudreau is not denying this occurred, he is just suggesting it may not have been intentional. Similarly CSM Mills of 2 CDO asserts the Regiment was not a "dumping ground," but then contradicts himself when he states "there's always a couple of bad apples that get placed in there" because sometimes it's a "numbers game where they don't have the people to or the people that deserve to be posted there" and they still have to fill the position (6592, Vol 23). Hewson maintains that unsuitable soldiers "escaped the additional screening process" when posted directly to the Cdn AB Regt instead of serving in home unit battalions first (343, Vol 2). Hewson is speaking to the fact that soldiers would normally be posted to their parent regiment and ostensibly undergo additional screening prior to be posted into the Cdn AB Regt. However, there was a dearth of testimony offered that explained what that additional screening process entailed or that it was effective towards ensuring a position within the Cdn AB Regt was earned and coveted. As is the case with all testimony at the Somalia Inquiry, insight can be gleaned from how witnesses explain and justify certain events and actions, what they choose to leave out, and their untested assertions and perceptions.

LGen Foster is asked by BGen Beno's counsel if he shared the opinion suggesting "the infantry regiments were sluffing off below-average officers to the Airborne Regiment at any time" and replies "Certainly not in the terms you have put it." He then qualifies it with "from my time it was not a problem. The people I had performed their missions for me adequately" (459-60, Vol 3). Note this continues the persistent theme of a witness qualifying the answer with the claim that it did not occur, or it was not a significant problem when they were in charge. Cpl Purnelle is very direct and refers to the practice of parent regiments posting less-desirable individuals to the Cdn AB Regt as "shovelling your problems into your neighbour's yard" (6835, Vol 35).⁴⁸¹ MGen Mackenzie acknowledges "there have been periods during the life of the Airborne Regiment where certain regiments have not been as thorough as they might be and haven't necessarily been sending their best... Regrettably, and embarrassingly for me, it would appear the Patricia's were going through a low point at this point back in 91/92 and not necessarily sending their very best to the Airborne Regiment" (8660-1, Vol 43). Holmes notes that in his discussions on this topic, the RSM of the PPCLI acknowledged "they didn't necessarily send their best to the Canadian Airborne Regiment and once they were there they didn't necessarily want them back" (613, Vol 4).

Gaudreau and Houghton's testimony shows a persistent underlying theme of denying any disciplinary issues and then attempting to downplay one of the most serious incidents, the arson of Captain Ferraby's personal vehicle.

⁴⁸¹ *"se débarrasser de leurs problèmes qu'ils avaient dans leur unité, donc de pelleter leurs problèmes dans la cour du voisin."*

Remembering the chronology of disciplinary incidents, these built up to a point where in 1985 the Brigade Commander requested an investigation that resulted in the Hewson Report. As such problems had already percolated and arguably boiled over before Gaudreau took command of the Regiment in 1985. Despite the conclusions of the Hewson Report, Gaudreau was adamant the Regiment was not a dumping ground for soldiers with disciplinary problems. Houghton took over command in 1987, and his recollection is that over the next three years the only significant disciplinary incident "happened in June of my final year of command with the burning of an officer's vehicle at a parade square. Other than that, all of the disciplinary matters that I experienced were very much Very similar to disciplinary issues that I have seen throughout my career" (2238, Vol 12).⁴⁸²

Houghton concedes he considered the arson incident significant because it was an officer's car and the location was the parade square, but does not mention the use of Airborne Routine Orders to start the fire and does not come to the same conclusion as the MP report that the fire was deliberately set (2239, Vol 12). When it is pointed out that routine orders were used, he replies "That's fine. I mean, I take no issue with that, but I would not draw any specific conclusion simply based on this initial (MP) report" (2240, Vol 12). When asked, "Did you come across any information which would suggest that this was a direct challenge to command?" he replies, "No, I did not" (2242, Vol 12). When Houghton is recalled later on in the Somalia Inquiry he discusses the incident further, stating, "It was never concluded as to exactly whether or not a crime was done, I certainly suspect that there was, and that was an issue which I felt badly about because I handed that to my successor as being unresolved and I have stated that before for the record" (8631, Vol 44). Despite the fire being ignited with a copy of the Regiment's Routine Order issued under his authority and signature, Houghton refuses to acknowledge this was a challenge to his authority and continues to be irresolute regarding it being an obvious arson.

The Hewson Report details evidence of serious discipline problems during the years leading up to and including 1985. Gaudreau and Houghton's testimony paints a picture from 1985-1990 where the two Regimental Commanders experienced nothing remarkable or out of place in terms of discipline other than the arson of Captain Ferraby's personal vehicle. It follows that downplaying and persistent denial of problems even in the face of clear evidence are indicators of a myopic habitus. LCol Morneault testifies he believed the burning of Sgt Wyszynski's vehicle following the Kyrenia Club incident was the same as if it had been his own car, and concedes "Yes, they challenged my authority directly" (7453, Vol 38). Of note, two other significant incidents occurred during this time frame (exact dates are not specified) that received minimal or no attention during testimony from these key witnesses. As noted in Table 1, a bullet was fired through the window of CSM Steven's office in the Airborne lines. In a similar vein, Horn cites a confidential interview regarding

⁴⁸² Houghton commanded 2 CDO in Edmonton in the early years of the Cdn AB Regt when it was comprised of members of all infantry regiments including the three that had just been disbanded. He became Regimental Commander from 1987-90.

an incident where an officer's office was "booby-trapped" with an artillery simulator that had been wrapped with nails to disperse them like fragments when it exploded.⁴⁸³

The conduct of some members of 2 CDO on the weekend of October 3 and 4, 1992 will be discussed further in the context of accountability. However, many of the opinions and reactions elicited during testimony pertaining to that weekend reveal further indicators of a myopic habitus. BGen Beno's testimony shows a tolerance for misconduct and criminal behaviour, with extensive use of euphemisms to downplay the seriousness and contribute to a myopic habitus where these activities are viewed as normal. When asked if the Kyrenia Club incident is a challenge to lower-level leadership or LCol Morneau, Beno responds "The gathering of soldiers at the Kyrenia Club and letting off steam and popping off whatever numbers, let's say two smoke grenades and two thunderflashes and the paraflare is not a threat to anyone's leadership" (7907, Vol 40). In contrast, MGen Mackenzie asserts "the issue of the throwing of thunderflashes in the direction of MPs sets that aside and makes it a serious issue ...". When asked if it was more serious in his view than the Algonquin Park incident he replies, "That is correct" (8588, Vol 43). Beno's euphemistic reference to "letting off steam" provides insight into the extent to which he tolerated and downplayed antithetical behaviour. The stolen military pyrotechnics that were thrown towards MPs cannot appropriately be described as "popping off" these items. Beno's conclusion that this did not present a challenge to the Regiment's leadership is not objectively reasonable. MP WO Ferguson minimizes criminal behaviour in his testimony when he is asked about the evening of October 3rd when a call came in from Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources officers regarding pyrotechnics and firearms being shot off in Algonquin Provincial Park. Ferguson asserts soldiers went into park to "I believe that they went out there to drink beer and expended these pyrotechnics and shoot some rounds off too, I believe." He acknowledges that Private Brocklebank had a 9mm pistol and, "no, he didn't have authority to carry it." Cpl Matchee had .22 rifle. They also had smoke grenades, thunderflashes, and a box of shotgun shells. Then on Oct 19th Private Cooper was found to have a Ruger P-85 pistol hidden under his mattress which was only a service offence for having it in his quarters according to Ferguson. The Chairman arrives at the crux of the matter when he asks Ferguson "But as a soldier, what does all of this tell you in terms of discipline?" Ferguson concedes "... yes, it would appear to be a disciplinary problem" (940, Vol 5).

As an extension of tolerance, minimizing and denial of conduct, attitudes and behaviour that reflected poorly on the Regiment, some witnesses offered alternate but implausible explanations as to what occurred. When Seward is examined by his own counsel regarding the burning of Sgt. Wyszynski's car, he states he thought it was a "bizarre incident" that could have been deliberate, or the vehicle could have spontaneously burst into flames. Seward then observes "nothing was ever proved one way or another" (5876, Vol 31). WO Murphy continues the theme of making specious claims when he suggests "there was four

⁴⁸³ Horn, "What Did You Expect," footnote 16.

or five car burnings within the city area" referring to "Petawawa, Pembroke" that summer to which counsel responds incredulously "you didn't hold that seriously, did you?" (6621, Vol 34). Seward as OC of 2 CDO and Murphy as a Platoon WO were two senior members of the commando that was the centre of most of the discipline problems and the best they could offer was conjecture in the face of significant evidence of serious criminal behaviour by some of their soldiers. MGen Mackenzie states "In the case of the burning of the car, no evidence whatsoever to link it specifically to 2 Commando or the Airborne regiment, but strong suspicion, strong suspicion" (8388, Vol 43). Mackenzie may have been relying on the findings of the BOI with this response, as the Board concluded "regardless of the weight of suspicion" it could not be determined that 2 CDO personnel were even "primarily" involved in the incidents in question.⁴⁸⁴

Following a theme of failing to acknowledge or otherwise tolerating and condoning problems, racism was another ideology for which there was a tolerance if the associated attitudes and behaviours were not overt. It is important to preface this portion of the analysis by reiterating that the CAF did not have an explicit policy on racism up to and including the deployment to Somalia. However changes had been made to the CFAOs by the time officers testified at the Somalia Inquiry, so it is relevant to note when witnesses fail to acknowledge or discuss those changes to contextualize their responses. It also begs the question of whether racist behaviour was viewed as prejudicial to good discipline and order without requiring an explicit policy preventing it. By way of comparison, consider the action that was taken when some Airborne soldiers created the para-nomads, a branch of the Hell's Angels motorcycle club. Horn notes that members drove around CFB Petawawa wearing their colours (typically sleeveless jackets with patches and symbols) and BGen Douglas's attempts to stop this "were largely frustrated," partially because the CO of 1 CDO at the time was insistent this was their right.⁴⁸⁵ This case study also contains numerous references to commanders banning the Rebel flag and restricting or banning alcohol including in personal quarters (Airborne barracks) without having an explicit policy to rely on. In those circumstances these bans were initiated and justified based on problematic behaviour and the need to maintain good discipline and order.

Houghton claims that he never observed any racism during his lengthy military career, "I do not believe in my military experience, certainly up to until 1990, that I saw any of that kind of public stuff. Now, what people may have harboured in their own minds is their own business" (8862, Vol 44). This is another example of carefully chosen hedge-words like "public stuff" that avoid fully answering the question of witnessing racism. The way Houghton has answered the question, it leaves open to interpretation whether he may have observed this in private either on or off-duty, with the definition of private being potentially very broad, possibly including the officers' mess, base housing, etc. Seward's testimony when questioned about right-wing extremism shows he understands it does not reflect Canadian values but claims he cannot state he is

⁴⁸⁴ DeFaye, *Board of Inquiry*, Annex F, F-3/3.

⁴⁸⁵ Horn, "What Did You Expect," Footnote 15.

against soldiers espousing these views because although he is personally against it, he recognizes "some individuals have biases." When asked if his obligation as an officer is to "stop this kind of thing from going on" he responds "My obligation as an officer would be definitely to ensure it's not promulgated" (6084, Vol 32). This falls short of condemning extremist attitudes and behaviours, and leaves it open to the interpretation that this is a tacit condoning of right-wing extremism. The mindset of Houghton and Seward that someone is entitled to hold any viewpoint shows a potential tolerance of racist, misogynistic, and other antithetical attitudes and mindsets. Failing to recognize that this would flow over to a person's professional life falls into the spectrum from disingenuous to equivocal and possibly deceptive. This is especially so in the context of a senior commander with a lengthy and involved career asserting that he never saw or heard of such a thing in the military. This lacks even an air of plausibility and goes to credibility when someone cannot acknowledge any level of dysfunction within their organization because they are focused on protecting their own.

Further indication of tolerance for antithetical attitudes and behaviours including racism is demonstrated when WO Murphy acknowledges he heard racial slurs used, but always "in a jestful (sic) manner" (6686, Vol 35). Asked later in his testimony if he ever referred to Private Brown as a "lazy Indian" he responds "not to my recollection" (6766, Vol 35). He confirms that Matchee, Sinclair and Brown were the three "natives" in his platoon in late 1992. When pressed agrees he might have referred to Brown with those words "out of frustration" (6766, Vol 35). Murphy says that after seeing a newspaper article on McKay and his white supremacist tattoos, he brought McKay in and interviewed him. McKay admitted he did belong to a white supremacist group while posted in Manitoba but quit the group and "no longer carried the views of the White Supremacist groups" (6682-3, Vol 35). This occurred in summer of '92 only months before the Kyrenia Club incident. Murphy believed McKay "due to the fact the year before his roommate was Master Corporal Paris who was black and they got along and there didn't seem to be any friction between the two of them" (6683, Vol 35). Murphy's assertion follows contract theory to a degree, suggesting it is ignorance and lack of familiarity that feeds hostility and racism, and the personal contact of living together would soften any hostile dispositions (since it is not up for debate that McKay harboured such feelings, Murphy was convinced he changed.) However Jackman and Crane point out that social intimacy does not necessarily correlate to acceptance, as racism is more about defending privilege than animosity.⁴⁸⁶ One only needs to look at the concept of gender inequality to see that being close or even intimate to someone does not translate to equality.⁴⁸⁷ When Murphy is cross-examined as to why he spoke to McKay about the photograph in the newspaper, it becomes clear he was most concerned about protecting McKay. Murphy replies, "I was concerned for his welfare and for his career and I knew if I had seen it more than likely others

⁴⁸⁶ Jackman, Mary R., and Marie Crane. 1986. "'Some of My Best Friends Are Black...': Interracial Friendship and Whites' Racial Attitudes." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 50, no. 4: 459-86.

⁴⁸⁷ Hacker, Helen M. "Women as a Minority Group", *Social Forces* 30 (1951), 60-69.

higher up the chain of command would have seen it as well" (6683, Vol 35). The primary concern is protecting McKay and by extension the Regiment, and Murphy does not acknowledge any responsibility or obligation to inform his chain of command.

When Seward is questioned regarding his approach to dealing with extremist beliefs, his ideation is clear, "If it's brought to my attention or if I see or discover overt racism, yes, I'm obligated to act on that and take corrective action... It's not my responsibility to go probing into an individual's belief systems and I think that's what we talked about earlier. I don't go in and be morality cop to find out what various individuals believe on any given subject" (6081, Vol 32). By the time he testified at the Inquiry, Murphy was aware that McKay's overtly racist attitudes and behaviours were public knowledge and he would have had knowledge of Matchee's involvement in the murder of Shidane Arone so as to realise that racism was an aggravating factor in that incident. All of which provides important insight and context into the degree to which Murphy was willing to overlook and even defend antithetical attitudes and behaviours in his soldiers. Note that even though there was no explicit contravention of policy at the time, both Murphy and Seward acknowledge that racist views are problematic and claim they recognized the need to take some form of action, but only if the problem was overt.

Commander Jenkins' testimony provides insight into a broader myopic mindset within the CAF when he notes the threshold for SIU to launch an investigation was lowered in 1993 as a direct result of external pressure. Jenkins states, "we would launch an investigation for a lesser (sic) degree of concern in the Spring of '93 following in the wake of all of the public concern with respect to allegations of racism in the Canadian Forces" (2650, Vol 14). When Jenkins is asked about a report commencing with "recent media queries have been directed towards the SIU in Edmonton," he confirms the impetus for each of these reports was the media (2670, Vol 14). This demonstrates an exclusion of outside influence on the habitus until the institution (in this instance the CAF as a whole) has been unsuccessful at ignoring or suppressing the information. With the closed and self-referential habitus of the Regiment insulated from outside society and to a degree insulated from the habitus of the rest of the CAF, this may have contributed towards some leaders applying the same norms to insulate themselves from scrutiny and accountability. To this point, MGen Mackenzie addressed the Commission at the conclusion of his testimony and states, "It has affected me to my core over the last couple of months to see my colleagues, some of my colleagues in uniform here sniping at each other sometimes in pursuit of self-survival rather than the truth" (8597, Vol 43).

A stark example of an intolerant and inward-focused habitus was in the form of a question rather than witness evidence. Commander Jenkins is asked about a "Mark Lepine Memorial Dinner" that took place in Petawawa in December 1991 and responds that he is not aware of this event or "that 14 rounds were discharged from a gun similar to the gun that was used by Lepine" (2548,

Vol 14).⁴⁸⁸ When questioned Jenkins is unable to recall who Lepine is despite the École Polytechnique massacre having taken place in 1989, but he is reminded by Mr. Landry during cross examination (2548, Vol 14). In response to a follow-up question from Commissioner Desbarats whether "at that time any way there was nothing incompatible with being a member of the Canadian Forces and being, say, a member of the Ku Klux Klan" Jenkins' response provides critical insight into the context of the CAF's habitus during that time period when he indicates, "Not based on the policy at the time" (2578, Vol 14). Although Jenkins' answer is hedged in the reference to CAF policy in place at the time, it is also relevant to note that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms forms part of the Constitution Act, which has primacy over every other law in Canada. Regardless of whether membership in a racist organization was explicitly addressed in CAF policy, it is clearly inconsistent with the Charter of Rights or any iteration of military ethos. The focus on policy versus acknowledging the ideology is antithetical and prejudicial to good order and discipline is an excuse to tolerate or ignore this behaviour. Jenkins' failure to acknowledge these connections is further illuminated when he testifies that he believes not all right-wing extremists are racist, stating "I still think it's possible to have a right-wing extremist ideology but not to be racist" (2588, Vol 14). His belief that right wing extremist ideology can be separated from racism is not supported by literature, which generally identifies the characteristics of right-wing extremism as including a fixation on conspiracy and race with a belief in white supremacy.⁴⁸⁹

Another means of exerting elitism that was revealed in testimony involves witnesses delineating between dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours and work performance, protecting their own by asserting it did not affect job performance, like how the PPN was asserted to be a barracks room or after-hours phenomenon. In these examples, the thought process appears to be that the attitudes, behaviours or incidents do not impact the soldier's performance or duties. Commander Jenkins discusses a CAF member who was investigated for "holding a position in the hierarchy of the National Socialist White People's Party" and says it is "clear in my mind that he was involved" back in 1991. But the Commander is no longer concerned because according to the member's CO he is "a good performer and he has done nothing in recent years of concern." Most concerning is that Jenkins is assuaged by the revelation there was "no indication of him being involved in anything while on base" (2570, Vol 14). This insight from a senior member of the military police indicates a significant lack of discernment into the deleterious nature of right-wing extremism and demonstrates the extent to which dysfunctional behaviour and attitudes were tolerated or ignored. To acknowledge that such ideology existed in the year prior to deployment to Somalia but is somehow tempered and mitigated by him being a good performer and not "being involved in anything

⁴⁸⁸ The number of rounds allegedly discharged corresponds to the number of women who were murdered during that shooting.

⁴⁸⁹ History of Right Wing Extremism, retrieved on May 19, 2024 from <https://www.gale.com/primary-sources/political-extremism-and-radicalism/collections/history-of-right-wing-extremism#products>

while on base” indicates a dysfunctional mindset that was tolerated and condoned during this period. This approach is an extension of treating the PPN as a barracks-room phenomenon, where the leadership does not feel compelled to address anything unless it is overtly flaunted or is directly connected to training.

Another theme that illustrates a myopic habitus was the Regimental leadership’s permissive attitude and approach to alcohol consumption as essentially a right and a necessity, a mindset that also permeated other areas of the CAF at the time. It is acknowledged that the CAF had a much more relaxed alcohol policy at the time of the events in question, although this changed after the Somalia Inquiry. Simply put, alcohol consumption was a predominant norm. Having said that, there are numerous examples within the testimony where alcohol and the Rebel flag were banned following incidents, again demonstrating that some leaders followed through on the need to take decisive action when they deemed it necessary even if there was no corresponding explicit policy.

A sense of entitlement regarding alcohol persisted despite objective evidence and opinions of leaders who acknowledged, sometimes reluctantly, that alcohol contributed to discipline problems. This despite the incidents discussed previously in the context of defiance to authority. Col Holmes testified that Americans were not permitted to consume alcohol while on training exercises. When the Cdn AB Regt was at Camp Lejeune in early 1992, Holmes had to seek special permission for his soldiers to be permitted to consume alcohol after incidents of fighting. Holmes chose to banish his soldiers from Camp Lejeune to another location so they would be able to consume alcohol, leading Commissioner Desbarats to ask, "that means that the Canadian soldiers were considered to be so uncivilized and uncontrollable that they couldn't be trusted to circulate in the American Base?" Holmes arranged for them to go to a satellite camp "to consume alcohol on a more controlled basis" (609, Vol 4). Put another way, Holmes went out of his way to move the Regiment to another location so his soldiers could consume alcohol even though that was contrary to the approach taken by his U.S. counterparts. The failure to fully acknowledge the role of alcohol continued with the DeFaye BOI’s report which indicates that although evidence was “scant” there appeared to be a connection between insubordination and “heavy use of alcohol.”⁴⁹⁰ This observation cuts both ways, acknowledging that alcohol use was a problem, referring to heavy use, then presenting it as an explanation or excuse for insubordinate behaviour. This illustrates that even in the face of the American’s policy and despite disciplinary incidents arising from alcohol consumption (including the slashing of bivy bags of senior members during the exercise), the chosen solution was to take extraordinary measures to ensure members would still be able to consume alcohol. Ironically, the phrase “on a more controlled basis” means the exact opposite in that soldiers could behave as they were accustomed, and nobody would complain because they had removed themselves to an outlying area.

BGen Beno agrees with the question "it was your view that, firstly, Colonel Holmes ran a fairly tight ship and indeed there was very few discipline

⁴⁹⁰ DeFaye, *Board of Inquiry*, Annex C, C-4/8.

problems during his command of the regiment?" Beno is quoted as stating to the BOI "The unit was virtually free of significant disciplinary problems through the fall with two exceptions which occurred on the night of 2/3 October" (8046-47, Vol 41). Yet MWO Mills testifies that when Holmes was still Regimental Commander Mills wanted to make the alcohol policy more restrictive because of numerous incidents of damage etc. occurring in the barracks. Mills says he asked RSM Jardine if he could ban alcohol in 2 CDO lines but Holmes denied the request (4275, Vol 23). Note this occurred before the arrival of Morneault and the subsequent incidents. In May 92 Mills convinced the CO of 2 CDO Major Davies to ban alcohol, which remained in place until Aug 92 when Morneault arrived and removed it even though Mills felt it was having a positive effect. Mills' understanding of the reasoning was that Morneault wanted "to treat the men as men and not children" (4277, Vol 23). WO Murphy's recollection is that alcohol was banned in 2 CDO barracks in Spring 1992 "due to a party that was held and some furniture was broken up" (6604-5, Vol 34). The timing of the ban is important as it foreshadows issues within 2 CDO well in advance of Morneault's arrival. Counsel notes, "after that incident alcohol was banned in the barracks in private living quarters?" and Murphy responds "yes." Murphy then recalls the ban was lifted sometime later, he does not recall when, then "It was banned for a period of time after the car burning incident" and again in the Fall before deployment (6606, Vol 34). Asked if in his opinion alcohol contributed to the October incidents, Murphy responds "yes" (6607, Vol 34). While the alcohol ban was an example of direct action being taken in response to a disciplinary incident, there was no testimony provided regarding the parameters for lifting the ban each time. The alcohol ban may have been intended as a form of group punishment, but the root causes of the problem do not appear to have been addressed prior to lifting the ban.

A myopic habitus relates to the relationship to the outside world, and BGen Beno's perception reveals that it can also involve blaming the outside world. Beno is asked about a document he authored 04May93, six weeks after the murder in Somalia. In "The Way Ahead" Beno states "The troops in Petawawa live in a fishbowl. With limited entertainment and few female companions in the area, certain types of anti-social behaviour take place and are readily identified" (7981, Vol 41). Note that Beno does not say the problems are addressed, just identified. Beno follows this with "there is no city around to absorb the off-duty activities of soldiers" (7982, Vol 41). Paradoxically, he acknowledges under questioning that there is more opportunity for "some type of entertainment or blowing off steam in Canada than there would be in Somalia" (7982, Vol 41). This line of thinking represents an inward focus that replicates some of the conclusions of the Hewson Report by blaming the society outside the gates of the base for not providing social opportunities and companionship. Mills testifies "I wasn't concerned (troublemakers) wouldn't follow orders in theatre and I wasn't concerned that they would get any mischief over there like they were back in garrison during their own time" (4330, Vol 23). Although he does not perpetuate that same reasoning as Beno and the Hewson report, he infers there is something about the environment at Petawawa where soldiers had the time and opportunity to get themselves in trouble.

Another identifiable theme pertaining to indicators of a self-referential and myopic habitus emerged as sustained efforts to minimize, tolerate and overlook dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours including service offences. WO Murphy testifies he viewed possession of pyrotechnics at the Kyrenia Club as "a minor service offence" (4294, Vol 23). Murphy says throwing a thunderflash or artillery simulator at person is only problematic "if it's within five feet it's serious -- it could be serious" (4295, Vol 34). He later refers to the pyrotechnics as "they were illegally at that party sir. They shouldn't have been there at all, let alone throwing them at anybody" (4359, Vol 34). Of note Murphy refers to the fact that the pyrotechnics should not have been at the club, and although it is likely he chose that phrasing subconsciously, it focuses the blame on the pyrotechnics and distances responsibility from the individual(s) who brought them to the Kyrenia Club. This is a subtle but often deliberate choice of language when someone is attempting to divert or minimize responsibility and downplay the seriousness of actions.⁴⁹¹

There are additional examples in the testimony where euphemisms are used to exert elitism. As well, Military Police members often failed to recognize which acts constitute Criminal Code offences coupled with a preference to keep matters in-house by treating transgressions as service offences. In terms of context of the time, it was typical to deal with matters under the NDA, but this does not excuse MPs from having an adequate understanding of the Criminal Code. Of note, MGen Gaudreau had previously served under BGen Stewart in the SSF from 1983-85 and helped draft the letter that raised the concerns that led to the Hewson Inquiry. Gaudreau then became Regimental Commander of the Airborne from 1985-87 and would have been acutely aware of discipline problems in the Regiment (534, Vol 3). Ten years later in front of the Somalia Commission, Gaudreau adopts a more subdued stance, suggesting "what was perceived as a problem, described in the Hewson Report in some detail, was a problem that was Forces wide, but the Hewson Report, of course, looked at the Army in particular" (535, Vol 3). What is pertinent regarding Gaudreau's assertion the problem was forces-wide is that this is an attempt to explain and justify problems by suggesting they are common, unremarkable and consistent with prevailing norms within the CAF. This also serves to obfuscate and divert attention from issues within the SSF and Cdn AB Regt.

A murder was committed by an off-duty airborne soldier in Fort Coulonge in July 1985 shortly after Gaudreau took command, and he downplays the incident somewhat as one of his soldiers "got involved in a brawl in a drinking establishment and killed someone with a machete. I would describe that as the straw that broke the camel's back" (537, Vol 3). While the Hewson Report ostensibly demonstrated that the CAF was acknowledging behavioural problems and taking appropriate action, the totality of the testimony reveals that some subsequent Regimental Commanders did not even bother reading the report. Col Holmes concedes he underestimated the discipline problems in 2 CDO, given

⁴⁹¹ There is significant conjecture regarding what pyrotechnics were set off that night. Bercuson asserts it was two thunderflashes, two smoke grenades and a paraflare. *Significant Incident*, 224.

what occurred in Somalia "I think that's probably a fair assessment, underestimation of the disciplinary problems in Two Commando" (693, Vol 4). The proclivity towards leaving problems in the past is evident when Holmes is asked if he read Hewson Report and responds, "Commissioner, I have not read the Hewson Report" (637, Vol 4). This also helps explain Hewson's observation to the Commission "I know of no specific action that resulted from our study" (361, Vol 2).

In summary, Gaudreau's testimony extolling sergeant-majors who served time in jail has inferences of tough, old-school or school-of-hard-knocks type reverence. Indicators of a myopic habitus include a lack of tolerance and understanding and a propensity to view things pertaining to the Regiment in isolation and not within the context or perspective of the outside world. In a slight twist to Gaudreau's mindset, Jardine asserts any behaviours that do not result in a conviction cannot be considered a disciplinary problem, essentially setting a conviction as an unnecessarily high threshold for what constitutes problem behaviour. Most witness testimony was incongruous with the historical record in terms of the Regiment having become a dumping ground for the feeder regiments to get rid of their problems. LGen Foster confirms this occurred from time to time.⁴⁹² Along the same lines MWO Mills says the issue was confined to a few bad apples while MGen Mackenzie acknowledge this in the face of the conduct of some 2 CDO soldiers in 1991-92 and expresses that he was embarrassed by some of the members sent by the PPCLI. Attitudes and behaviours suggesting a tolerance for racist ideology were evident in the testimony, with both Houghton and Seward making it clear that even members of the CAF are entitled to these views if they keep it to themselves. WO Murphy testifies that in his opinion any racist language was done jokingly, and even concludes that McKay with his neo-Nazi associations could not be racist because he previously roomed with a black soldier. Commander Jenkins of the SIU testifies not all right-wing extremists are racist and that there was no specific CAF policy at the time that precluded membership in racist organizations.

Testimony regarding alcohol consumption continues the theme that some of the Regiment's policies and practices were overly permissive, and commanders went out of their way to ensure alcohol was treated as an entitlement. Holmes refused MWO Mills' request to ban alcohol in 2 CDO lines, and while Major Davies instituted the ban for a short period it was lifted by LCol Morneault when he arrived in the summer of 1992. The alcohol-fueled events of October 3 and 4 at the Kyrenia Club and Algonquin Park followed. Both the Hewson Report and Beno's testimony perpetuate the notion that the social environment or "fishbowl" of Petawawa contributed to soldiers' attitudes and behaviours, but these perceptions are untested. In fact, the opposite proved true when that garrison behaviour was carried over to exercises at Camp Lejeune in the U.S. then continued in theatre in Somalia. Conversely, some authors suggest that military units are generally more professional in garrison than when

⁴⁹² LGen Foster was Regimental Commander 1978-80.

deployed in theatre.⁴⁹³ Prophetically, Beno acknowledges that there are more social opportunities in Petawawa than Somalia, while Mills was convinced that any lack of social opportunities would become a moot point in Somalia because soldiers would not have enough free time to get up to “mischief.” However, the concept of free time is not a factor in many disciplinary incidents, for example the significant incidence of negligent discharges by members of the CARBG in Somalia. Finally, the tolerance for misconduct within the Regiment extended to the possession of stolen military pyrotechnics that were used at the Kyrenia club, which MGen Mackenzie characterized as serious yet MWO Mills viewed as a minor service offence. Furthermore, the MPs indicated they had no interest in pursuing the removal of these items from the range or wherever they were stolen. This offers a plausible explanation for the irresolute approach to disciplining those responsible if the underlying belief was that the transgressions were trivial. A myopic habitus can replicate and perpetuate dysfunction and consequently elitism, which necessarily involves some degree of favouring and protecting one’s own. Many of these factors underpin the viewpoint that something is only a problem when the public becomes aware of it.

Every member of an institution possesses multiple habituses that operate at the individual and collective level, as such shaping their attitudes and behaviours and making personal ideation and actions inseparable from the resulting habitus within the institution. A key distinguishing aspect of a myopic habitus is the self-referential nature of dispositions, the tendency to act a certain way and the unconscious inclination to interpret things with a perspective that has been locked in through habituation. There are sustained examples in the testimony of punishment for disciplinary infractions being viewed as a rite of passage or badge of honour and the acceptance and condonation of dysfunctional behaviour including racism. A component of a myopic habitus illuminated in the testimony was where deleterious attitudes, mindsets or behaviours were dismissed if they could be correlated to off-duty activity. There is evidence that immobile members were in large part responsible for sustaining a dysfunctional habitus which created the impression the unit was a dumping ground. Witness testimony contains repeated reference to alcohol use in conjunction with dysfunctional behaviour, yet the reaction from the chain of command shows an entitled approach where alcohol was viewed as a right or prerogative irrespective of the consequences. Paradoxically, the effects of a myopic habitus resulted in Hewson, Beno and others blaming the outside world (e.g. the local Petawawa community) for not providing adequate social opportunities, yet it is subsequently acknowledged that social opportunities are further reduced when troops are deployed. Consequentially, observations regarding lack of explicit policy prohibiting deleterious attitudes or behaviours (including racism and alcohol consumption) inimical to good order and discipline constitutes the expenditure and depletion of social capital when excuses no longer hold up.

⁴⁹³ L.N. Rosen, Knudson, K. H., & Fancher, P. (2003). “Cohesion and the Culture of Hypermasculinity in U.S. Army Units.” *Armed Forces & Society*, 29(3), 325-351.

Protecting/Favouring Own

When Col Holmes is asked how many summary trials result in findings of guilt, he responds "in the majority of cases where you proceed to trial, and normally there is an indication of guilt otherwise it wouldn't proceed to trial. So it is hard to say what the percentage would be. Certainly I would suggest in the vast majority of cases the party is usually found guilty" (699, Vol 4).

Elitism modulates power which then enables the favouring of one's own and ultimately protecting individuals and the institution. The examinations of the priesthood and other forms of institutional elitism including formal knowledge based and corporate based elitism reveals several consistent themes. The main premise of habitus is that it makes an individual more disposed to perceive and therefore react to the social world around them in a certain way. In terms of protecting one's own, it is necessary to determine what socially acquired dispositions (i.e. habits, behaviours, mannerisms, preferences, motivations, aspirations, expectations, viewpoints, assumptions) pertain to practices that insulate an institution from outside scrutiny. The Cdn AB Regt is a field as described by Bourdieu, a place for taking positions with its own rules of behaviour (both implicit and explicit) and organizing logic. As a field, it is also important to identify the social, cultural and symbolic capital of the Regiment, building on the recognition so far that defiance to authority in general was a significant form of symbolic capital as was the Rebel flag and the practice of committing serious criminal acts against persons in authority (arson of personal vehicles, entering a tent and slashing property with a knife, discharging firearms and pyrotechnics).

At first glance, the military justice system might seem like an unlikely means for the military to protect its own, especially given the stated purpose as cited in the Supreme Court of Canada decision *Regina v. Généreux*, which confirms the need for the CAF to have a system for meting out justice effectively and efficiently in order to maintain discipline.⁴⁹⁴ The *Généreux* decision acknowledges that soldiers are treated differently than civilians, including frequently facing more severe punishment than a civilian would in similar circumstances. When this assertion is put to test exploring the relationship between discipline and the summary trial process within the Cdn AB Regt, there is overwhelming evidence the NDA was also used to go through the motions of holding individuals accountable by minimizing the repercussions with low fines or even acquittals. This speaks to the precept that justice must not only be done

⁴⁹⁴ *Regina v. Généreux*, Supreme Court of Canada (1992), S.C.R. 259. The court notes that "To maintain the armed forces in a state of readiness, the military must be able to enforce internal discipline effectively and efficiently. Breach of military discipline must be dealt with speedily and, frequently punished more severely than would be the case if a civilian engaged in such conduct."

but must also be seen to be done.⁴⁹⁵ The summary trials held within the Regiment require analysis in terms of whether the outcomes lend the impression that justice was done.

The summary trial process referred to by Holmes in the opening quote to this section is part of the military justice system that fell under intense scrutiny from Justice Arbour during her review that was noted in the Introduction. Holmes is stating that trials are held when someone appears to be guilty, therefore a guilty verdict is the outcome in most cases. Holmes also concludes from reviewing summary trial statistics for regular force infantry battalions including the Airborne that "the Canadian Airborne Regiment was not any different in terms of disciplinary problems and the (sic) other line battalions in the Canadian Army" (704, Vol 4) which continues a theme from the Hewson report. Similarly, LCol Morneault's testimony provides an interpretation of summary trials that provides a nexus to a myopic habitus as well as some of the concerns raised in Arbour's review. Morneault speaks to a list of names given to him by MPs that contains identified troublemakers including Matchee, Powers, and McKay and testifies that he would have tried everyone at his level as Commanding Officer "and as I intimated before, I have a strong feeling I would have found them all guilty, sir" (7177-8, Vol 37). Although Morneault alludes he would have acted decisively including likely finding these individuals guilty, there is no evidence Morneault commenced the steps to hold these specific individuals accountable prior to his removal as CO. In fact, all evidence suggests he did not know who was responsible and was relying on someone to come forward until Cpl Powers eventually answered that call. Since elitism is exerted by protecting one's own, this includes Morneault's personal reputation that he was attempting to defend following his removal as CO. Morneault relates that only one from the above list that he might have taken to Somalia was Powers because he "acted like a man" by coming forward, "and once I had thrown him in jail for a while and he came back out, I may well have taken him into theatre" (7178, Vol 37).

The key point suggested here is that a myopic habitus can cut both ways, protecting individuals but also subjecting them to a judicial process far less objective than the civilian world where there is an independent trier of fact who reserves judgment until hearing all the circumstances of a case and considering submissions from both prosecution and defence. Alternatively, Morneault's approach can be viewed as a means of protecting the institution by suppressing knowledge of these incidents as well as protecting members by ensuring the matter is dealt with quietly and minimal punishment is dispensed (the maximum penalty mentioned in the testimony that was reviewed was a fine of \$200 and that was in relation to Powers' involvement in the Kyrenia Club incident.) The negligible penalties also serve to protect the institution by minimizing and

⁴⁹⁵ Lord Hewart, Lord Chief Justice of England in *Rex v. Sussex Justices* (1924), 1KB 256. The actual quote from Lord Hewart's ruling is "it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done."

downplaying the severity of any discipline problems while at the same time lending the impression that action is being taken.

As revealed in the testimony pertaining to defiance to authority, the Rebel flag was a form of symbolic capital for members of 2 CDO. The fact that the flag was banned significantly increased its value as currency of elitism, elevating its display to a blatant form of disrespect for authority which 2 CDO members then used to exert elitism. MWO Mills testifies about a summary trial that afforded an opportunity for the chain of command to address the defiance to authority, noting that in October 1992 he was told by "a duty officer" of individuals driving around parade square displaying the Rebel flag. Mills says he charged them, and the charge was dismissed at a summary trial because the officer "wasn't sure whether they were holding it or it was attached to the vehicle." The accused individual testified that flag was tied to the vehicle (4320, Vol 23), as such fully admitting to his part in displaying the banned flag. This incident described by Mills was one of the rare occasions when a culprit was identified, yet there was a deliberate refusal and failure to hold him accountable for his actions. For anyone unfamiliar with legal processes including relevant facts in issue and burden of proof, the disparity in terms of how the flag was displayed is inconsequential unless the trier of fact had a concern with credibility. With the accused's own admission that he flew the flag, it was irrelevant whether it was held or attached to the vehicle. The officer presiding over the summary trial simply chose this as an excuse to find the accused not guilty, thereby protecting the member and sending another clear message regarding a lack of consequences for failing to follow orders. More importantly, this is an example where the institutional power network prioritized protecting a member over enforcing their own rules.

In keeping with the predominant CAF mindset of the day, Mills asserts discipline matters should be handled by the military system rather than the criminal courts, characterizing his view as "the military should handle their own dirty laundry" (4388, Vol 23). Mills' viewpoint accords with WO Ferguson's assertions on handling matters in house, which ultimately protects the institution and individuals by not airing dirty laundry in public which is the complete meaning behind that idiom. Even when the Regiment dispensed its version of justice, there was a prevalent view that convictions should not be held against the individual as evidenced by Morneault's assertion he would likely have taken Powers to Somalia after putting him in jail. Major Seward rejects the suggestion that a soldier's disciplinary record should be relevant when looking at whether any soldiers should have been left behind when the Regiment deployed to Somalia. Seward's view that the matter is closed after a summary trial determines the punishment does not reflect the reality or purpose of service records. At the same time this reveals that there were no real or lasting repercussions even in the rare instances when dysfunctional behaviour was addressed through disciplinary measures. Put another way, this further illuminates the mindset of putting problems and events in the past and forgetting about them. This is also a good example where background and context of witness testimony is important, as Seward was found by the Commission of Inquiry to have failed as a leader. Furthermore, when Seward provided this testimony, he had already been

convicted of NDA 129 and been given a severe reprimand and was only a week away from facing the CMAC where he was aware the Crown was seeking to increase his punishment. Seward's focus is tolerance/protecting own when he notes the list of personnel to potentially leave behind includes anyone who "had any incident regarding military discipline" and does not agree with Chairman's point "But isn't that a good indicator of a potential problem?" (6103, Vol 32). Seward maintains once a summary trial is complete, the matter is "over and done with" and presents Cpl Powers as a sort of retrospective justification because in the end Powers did not cause any issues in Somalia. Seward concludes, "If I was to accept that list presented to me back in Canada I would have lost a very capable and effective soldier" (6104, Vol 32). The Chairman then asks if there is not evidence that rather than taking responsibility Powers came forward to protect others to which Seward replies, "I don't believe that" (6104, Vol 32).

The military police are an integral component of the military justice system, responsible for investigating criminal allegations against CAF members and laying appropriate charges. However, WO Ferguson paints a picture of where the CAF's overarching goal was to handle problems in-house. When he is questioned about not laying a public mischief charge for obstruction of military police investigations, he answers "With the military police, we are peace officers, but we generally don't --- there is no requirement to use our peace officer power.⁴⁹⁶ We have power under the National Defence Act ... Like I say, if it can be handled in the military it is handled within the military" (974, Vol 5). Ferguson states he does not think the Algonquin Park incident or the related events were appropriate for laying Criminal Code charges (986, Vol 5). In relation to the throwing of a pyrotechnic at MPs responding to a disturbance at the Kyrenia Club, Powers came forward a week after and admitted to throwing the pyrotechnic. Despite this, Ferguson signed off on his report closing the investigation without charges even though he had failed to determine where the pyrotechnics came from. He testified he was not interested in the offence of false declaration at end of exercise (i.e. holding Powers accountable for theft and/or illegally possessing the pyrotechnics), (899-908, Vol 5). A note from the CAF Provost Marshal reaffirms the seriousness of the incident and states that "the improper possession and use of pyrotechnics is very serious and an MPUI should have been submitted" (953, Vol 5). There is a clear line of logic that connects Cpl Powers' actions to the subsequent display of the Rebel flag that night, the burning of the Duty Sergeant's vehicle, the Algonquin Park incidents the next night and finally the discovery of weapons, ammunition and pyrotechnics during the Monday barracks search. Furthermore, a common denominator is the parallel power network and the wall of silence that served to frustrate attempts to have culpable members come forward and ultimately determine who was responsible.

Another example of military police protecting soldiers either intentionally or inadvertently (i.e. subconsciously) is WO Ferguson's complete mischaracterization and application of Canadian criminal law. When discussing

⁴⁹⁶ Public Mischief would not be the correct charge in any event, the Canadian Criminal Code offence they are discussing constitutes Obstructing a Peace Officer which entails a significantly different set of facts in issue than Public Mischief.

Airborne members refusing to cooperate with MPs or saying their WO or superior told them not to take a polygraph or come in for an interview, he states "there is no obligation under the law not to lie, or we could not force him to come here --or come to our section to interview him unless we had grounds to arrest him and physically bring him there" (926, Vol 5). In fact, while no citizen can be compelled to incriminate themselves as they are protected from doing so under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, when a person does choose to speak to the police it is a criminal offence to obstruct a peace officer by providing false or misleading information. In any event many of these soldiers were witnesses as has been previously discussed, and as such the right to not incriminate themselves is moot and they should have been ordered to cooperate with the investigation. Ferguson also claims that suspects generally do not cooperate with police (966, Vol 5), which begs the question of how police are regularly able to obtain confessions from suspects (including offences such as murder) or have suspects commit to alibis that can subsequently be disproven.⁴⁹⁷

Another incident of weapons/firearms possession in the barracks did not prevent the Regimental Commander from offering a glowing assessment of the involved soldier. Col Houghton testified regarding the discovery of weapons in the Airborne barracks in Fall 89 and February 90. Houghton refers to "the statement of one Private Bass that there were enough weapons in the barracks for the purpose of starting a war and, secondly, that the weapons were being kept and the need for them was in case of the day when the food crisis may come to the world" (8603-4, Vol 44). Houghton notes there were 18 rifles and shotguns and three pistols in total, "all of the weapons were legal weapons and the pistols, although being restricted weapons, were in fact all certified," presumably meaning all weapons were legal in terms of firearms licensing (8604, Vol 44). There were two throwing stars and pair of "nunchaku sticks" which he acknowledges are prohibited, also DND ammo, smoke grenades, 181 rounds of 5.56 and 163 rounds of 7.72. Private Bass was fined \$200 for his part, officers determined his comments about being able to start a war were him being "smart" to the MPs. In his testimony, Houghton is very supportive of Bass, stating "We knew this young man to be a very bright young man, very bright. He loved the military, but he also tended to be a little bit smart at times and in this case that's exactly what happened." Asked again later by another lawyer if he saw Bass's statement as a "red flag," Houghton responds "I did not. However his commanding officer did" referring to the CO of 3 CDO (8854, Vol 44).⁴⁹⁸

⁴⁹⁷ Consider the example of former Colonel Russell Williams (then Commanding Officer of CFB 8 Wing Trenton) who came in voluntarily for a police interview concerning the disappearance of Jessica Lloyd and ultimately confessed to Ontario Provincial Police, implicating himself in two murders and other serious offences.

⁴⁹⁸ James Ogle and Darnell Bass, *What Manner of Man: Darnell Bass and the Canadian Airborne Regiment* (Renfrew: General Store Publishing House, 2006). At the time of Houghton's testimony Bass was serving in the Golan Heights as a MCpl with the Royal Canadian Regiment. After disbandment of the Cdn AB Regt and while

There is a sustained theme of leaders at all levels asserting there were no problems during their tenure. LGen Foster came back to command the SSF in 1986, reviewed the Hewson Report and "found nothing in those reviews of mine that alarmed me to say we are not doing this and we are not making the corrections" (415, Vol 3). When Col Houghton is read several pages of testimony where Col Holmes asserts the Airborne needed to be brought back together again when Holmes took over: "I would not agree with that. I think the regiment I handed it (sic) over to him was in fact together" (2266, Vol 12). Houghton's viewpoint is consistent with assertions from most officers, there may have been minor problems when they took over their commands but generally, they left the Regiment in better shape than they found it. No senior officers or senior NCOs testified to significant problems related to attitudes and behaviours or the corresponding level of discipline at any point in the years leading up to and including the deployment to Somalia. Finally, MGen Mackenzie is asked about his testimony of some members of the CARBG not achieving the standards hoped for as Canadians and if that was an understatement. Mackenzie acknowledges his role in protecting his fellow soldiers when he responds:

"Yeah, that's word smithy (sic), and due to loyalty to the profession. Maybe you're absolutely right, too much of an understatement. It was disgraceful, it was disgusting, with all due respect to our national image which had sullied, it was a disgrace to our profession and it will take us a long time to get over it" (8467-8, Vol 43).

When leaders failed to follow up and take necessary action when soldiers engaged in insular behaviour it was a condonation of the wall of silence. Ferguson concedes the Airborne "protected each other more" (880-2, Vol 5) and speaks of at least two incidents of an Airborne platoon WOs telling members to keep quiet, 2 CDO and 3 CDO (987, Vol 5). After the arson of Sgt. Wyszynski's vehicle, Ferguson testifies his fellow MPs did not make the connection between that act and Wyszynski trying to carry out his duties and exert his authority as Duty Sergeant the night before. Like the implausible explanations offered by Seward and Murphy when discussing the arson in relation to a myopic habitus, Ferguson offers the unconvincing claim that there were other theories besides arson but says he cannot recall what these were.

The relationship between an elitist faction within an institution and the outside world requires the institution to protect its reputation even if that comes at significant cost. Because elitism involves reinforcing untested perceptions, making excuses and explanations becomes necessary and easily extends to the implausible and assertions that are simply false. This appears to be the case with arguably the most problematic officer (along with Seward) that joined the Regiment prior to deploying to Somalia. Morneault describes Captain Michel Rainville as "He came to us highly recommended... until we found out about ...

still employed as a Senior NCO in the CAF, Bass committed an armed robbery in Calgary on March 19, 1997. Bass himself is clear in his book that this was tied to him being disillusioned over the disbandment of the Cdn AB Regt two years earlier.

Some of the baggage he was carrying from previous jobs, I didn't see any problem with his competence" (6907-8, Vol 36). Morneault explains that baggage refers to how Rainville "had gone overboard in an exercise in Gagetown in treatment of prisoners and had gone overboard in an exercise in the Citadelle" (6908, Vol 36). When asked to clarify the term overboard, he describes it as "a lack of judgement in that he was given a mission by his commanding officer in the Citadelle to breach the security of the Citadelle and he did, but I believe he used civilian weapons ... He or his men put the civilian weapons to the heads of the guards, but they accomplished the aim. They had the vault opened by scared duty personnel and they had all the weapons out and once they accomplished their aim they phoned the Colonel up and said we accomplished our aim." Morneault says Rainville "needed to be told that was a lack of judgement and to sort himself out" (6909, Vol 36). The term overboard and referring to serious criminal incidents as baggage represents the sustained theme of using euphemisms as does characterizing these actions as a lack of judgement as opposed to an issue with attitude and behaviours resulting in misconduct. The expectation Rainville should and would "sort himself out" casts light upon another repeating theme of problems or individuals self-correcting as well as the theme of putting misconduct in the past including disciplinary problems. Of note, the prelude to the discussion about Rainville is Morneault's assertion that he came "highly recommended," and begs the question how an officer who engaged in two similar incidents of rogue misconduct could come recommended unless it is viewed as further evidence that the Regiment had indeed become a dumping ground for such individuals.⁴⁹⁹

With respect to protecting their personal reputation as well as that of the Regiment, a consistent theme from various commanders is that they left the Regiment in good shape when they moved on, and any that acknowledge problems upon taking command claim they addressed issues appropriately. Consider witnesses such as LGen Foster testifying several years after significant issues have come to light through the historical events and testimony of others, where it is noteworthy that Foster's answer does not contain any retrospective analysis of the removal of LCol Morneault. This is a consistent theme throughout most witness testimony, where the absence of reflection or some degree of introspection regarding past events severely inhibits the ability to change and grow.

A key mechanism for protecting members is to keep problems "in house" even if they are of a serious nature that could or should involve criminal charges. Part of the assessment of the insular nature of a habitus is to objectively examine whether punishment is meted out equally and if it is proportional to the offence. A fundamental right and basic tenet of procedural justice is that offences

⁴⁹⁹ The civilian justice system eventually held Rainville responsible for his actions years later, sentencing him to 20 months imprisonment (to be served as house arrest.) Retrieved on 01 January 2024 from <https://www.tvanouvelles.ca/2001/08/10/lex-militaire-michel-rainville-condamne-a-20-mois-de-prison-a-purger-dans-la-collectivite>

must be tried in a manner that is fair, impartial and independent. Col Holmes offers a starkly contrasting perspective to being innocent until proven guilty when he notes that summary trials usually result in a finding of guilt because “normally there is an indication of guilt otherwise it wouldn’t proceed to trial” (699, Vol 4). Hence the tongue-in-cheek yet prophetic expression “Sergeant-Major march the guilty party in” at the start of such trials. Already having one’s mind made up is consistent with limited approaches and perspectives to a problem. On the surface this may appear to prejudice military members, yet every indication in the testimony and evidence before the commission showed that most military trials whether a summary trial or court martial resulted in minimal sentences. As such, the approach addressing problems in house allows an institution to protect its members and the reputation of the institution. Considering Cpl Powers was the only individual identified for involvement in the events at the Kyrenia Club which most witnesses acknowledge was a very serious incident, it was an opportunity to send a clear message. Powers was in illegal possession of stolen military pyrotechnics and would have had to violate a serious rule at the end of a training exercise by making a false declaration that he was not in possession of any such item. He then took these items to the club that night for what could only be a nefarious purpose, and assaulted MPs by throwing the pyrotechnics at them or in their direction thereby committing numerous Criminal Code and service offences.⁵⁰⁰ Accepting punishment was not asserted as an integral part of taking responsibility, instead the approach was to reward Powers for eventually coming forward.

A myopic and self-referential habitus facilitates protecting one’s own as illuminated in combined testimony regarding events spanning a period of at least seven years from 1985-92. The testimony reveals a strong inclination to safeguard and insulate the reputation by denying or minimizing problems and incidents through euphemisms, as seen with references to the arson of Ferraby’s vehicle and events associated with the October 1992 incidents. Beno, Gaudreau and Houghton persistently deny problems, and witnesses including Seward and Murphy assert implausible and illogical explanations for arson. Notwithstanding the context of the duty sergeant’s car being burned after he intervened at the Kyrenia Club, there were assertions of vehicles spontaneously combusting and alluding to a string of vehicle fires throughout the local municipality. Houghton’s testimony regarding the discovery of weapons during barracks searches suggests he was focused on respecting soldier’s privacy rights, but clearly prioritizes those concerns over discipline as evidenced by his minimization of weapons and ammunition that were found and his defence and excuses for Private Bass. Similarly, the testimony providing excuses for Rainville’s ill-conceived activities prior to being posted into the Regiment demonstrates how even indisputable problem individuals including Rainville, Bass, McKay, Matchee

⁵⁰⁰ Notwithstanding the CAF’s practice of relying on the NDA to maintain discipline, the seriousness of these incidents is highlighted wherein the facts in issue are made out for numerous Criminal Code offences. These include Assault with a Weapon, Possession of a Weapon for a Purpose Dangerous to Public Peace, Assaulting a Peace Officer, Obstructing a Peace Officer, and Theft Under \$5000.

and Powers were still stubbornly and persistently defended. Because all of the indicators of elitism are intertwined, the previous observations about the military justice system along with questions of who is ultimately prosecuted and variations as to sentencing all speak to protecting and favouring one's own as a means of exerting elitism.

A recurring theme flowing from testimony relating to criminal behaviour is the tendency to divert most of the responsibility for identifying and addressing disciplinary incidents to the MPs, illuminating an insular practice of the Cdn AB Regt and CAF at the time. The testimony reveals the persistent and overarching approach to handling criminal offences consisted of failing to recognize or failing to apply the provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada by handling matters in house. Notable examples of Criminal offences that could have been dealt with under S. 130 NDA include Obstructing a Peace Officer, firearms offences relating to possession and storage, offences related to prohibited weapons, and Criminal Negligence and Careless Use of Firearms. Failing to apply these standards creates a habitus where these behaviours are tolerated and normalized, thus representing a missed opportunity to establish a level of discipline and compliance with expectations rather than excusing such behaviour and repeatedly downplaying the significance or seriousness. Previously discussed evidence of disordered loyalty and protecting one's own accords with the Somalia Commission's conclusion that many MPs and their superiors "appear to confuse loyalty to the military with loyalty to their officers, their chain of command, and the public reputation of the military."⁵⁰¹ This adds another layer to the way the military justice system served to keep problems in house and in the case of summary trials in particular, regulate the punishment and minimize the impact to the reputation of the unit both within the CAF and with respect to the outside world. Ultimately the military justice system has the potential to be more draconian than other public service legislation, which parenthetically allows it to be used to protect individuals and the institution. Code of Service Discipline offences carry the possibility of detention or imprisonment, thereby triggering Charter of Rights protection and a higher burden of proof. The Somalia Commission identifies that much of the behaviour associated with disciplinary infractions could be handled as administrative offences similar to the standards of other federal employment legislation (e.g. the RCMP Act) in which case soldiers could be ordered to cooperate including providing statements.⁵⁰² The reluctance to use appropriate processes and power creates a situation where the ability to mete out harsh punishment for service offences paradoxically helps protect the institution and insulate it from outside scrutiny.

⁵⁰¹ Somalia Commission, *Dishonoured Legacy*, Volume 5, 1285.

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*, 1288.

The Bad Apple Syndrome

One of the more insightful questions that also came with a revealing response was posed by the Chairman when he inquired if it could be that soldiers were good when they came to Regiment "but they rotted in the barrel?" MGen Gaudreau replies "not at all, not at all" then concedes "*bonne question quand-meme*" (540, Vol 3).

The bad apple syndrome refers to a proverbial rotten apple that can spoil the rest of the barrel. The direct analogy is "someone who creates or causes trouble for others specifically, a member of a group whose behaviour negatively affects the remainder of the group."⁵⁰³ With respect to acknowledging this problem, Gaudreau's response of "good question anyway" is an idiom typically indicative either of a difficult answer to pinpoint or that he is embarrassed by the answer. Of note, Gaudreau gave the same response 21 pages later in his testimony when Commissioner Desbarats notes that Gaudreau claims problems came up from time to time, but were fixed by him, prompting Desbarats to ask, "if this is true ... what are we doing here today?" (561, Vol 3).

This is identified as a syndrome because it is a characteristic combination of opinion and behaviour. Interestingly, the common perception of this metaphor focuses on the fact that the rotten apple is the cause of the problem and has spoiled a barrel of otherwise good apples, whereas the proverb alludes to the outcome where all the apples in the barrel are in fact bad, regardless of the cause. To the Chairman's point, by focusing on the ostensible origin of the problem it diverts attention from the more pervasive issue that includes the role of the chain of command in terms of accountability for troublesome individuals. Testimony pertaining to the bad apple syndrome follows a theme identified previously with the PPN indicator where aberrant and dysfunctional behaviour is attributed to unknown individuals or a group while at the same time asserting the number of problem individuals is inconsequential.

Gaudreau testifies there were a "number of undesirables_serving in the Airborne Regiment.... can happen to any unit if the screening system fails to identify these people as they're serving" (538, Vol 3). Gaudreau asserts the problem was resolved when the Commander "did the right things, identified these culprits and ridded the regiment of the bad apples that were creating the problems" (539, Vol 3). Gaudreau testifies that when he was Deputy Commander of the Army "and this whole Somalia affair started" he was "personally involved in putting in place some directions that would ensure that not too many bad apples, if you wish, can sneak through the system" (568, Vol 3). Gaudreau states that every unit at any point in time in history "also suffered the presence of a few undesirables," but does not offer any specific details of who he is referring to or what the problems were (539, Vol 3). MGen Mackenzie in his address to the

⁵⁰³ Merriam-Webster, s.v., "Rotten Apple", retrieved from <https://www.merriam-webster.com/wordplay/one-bad-apple-spoil-the-barrel-metaphor-phrase> on February 15, 2023.

Commission after completing his testimony states, "These transitory aberrations of a few individuals that have brought such disgusting and unacceptable acts is now pretty well fused in our national conscious (sic), and even the alleged perpetrator of the most despicable of the acts cannot be tried." Mackenzie is likely speaking of the individuals involved in the murder in Somalia but could be speaking of everyone involved in each of the serious incidents leading up to that event (8594, Vol 43). Summed up, the Deputy Commander of the Canadian Army is testifying that the screening system failed and therefore is to blame, problem individuals were excised, he made sure there were not too many (which he blames again on the system) then observes the problem of bad apples is the same everywhere. A triple-minimalization is the phrase "transitory aberrations of a few" used by Mackenzie, which literally means these problems involved a small number of individuals, were not permanent and were atypical even though evidence shows discipline had been a serious issue for years.

BGen Beno references the bad apple syndrome when he acknowledges Morneau made it clear to him he felt his authority was being undermined from within the Regiment, which Beno articulates as "he considered that there was a threat to his leadership within the Airborne Regiment, but he also in virtually the same breath indicated there might be one or two bad apples" (7888, Vol 40). Morneau confirms his testimony at the BOI in relation to his belief that 2 CDO was responsible for the Kyrenia Club incident "there were one or two bad apples. One did come forward, Corporal Powers" (7438, Vol 38). Morneau goes on to identify the size of the group involved in the Kyrenia Club incident as being fifteen, yet he only isolates one or two of those as being problem individuals. Another perspective would be to view all fifteen (or more) individuals as being complicit to this ill-disciplined event that culminated with a dangerous situation involving a pyrotechnic. This led to a cover-up/wall of silence, clearly illustrating why this justification frustrates accountability. As discussed under the wall of silence, to characterize Cpl Powers as a bad apple responsible for this incident then bring him to Somalia anyways demonstrates this syndrome is an excuse and justification for bad behaviour. Alternatively, blaming problems on unknown/unidentifiable persons is an example of counterfactual thinking where possible alternatives are created to provide an explanation that is counter to the facts or contrary to what occurred.

MWO Mills perpetuates the perception that there was a small number of problem individuals, stating there were "five or six or seven" troublemakers in 2 CDO (4322, Vol 23). Commander Jenkins also lends support to this assertion when he is asked if he considered Petawawa an "undisciplined base" in light of incidents including a "vehicle being fire bombed." Jenkins responds "No, I would say that you had a number of undisciplined individuals or small groups of individuals; I wouldn't characterize it as an undisciplined base" (2585, Vol 14). Here the focus is again on asserting it is only a small number of individuals who are a problem, thus reinforcing the suggestion that it is unavoidable and ultimately an isolated and one-off situation when a problem occurs. As a senior officer in the Military Police, an insightful follow-up question for Commander Jenkins would have been to ask if he had any knowledge or experience with what he might characterize as an undisciplined base. Given the ten-year span of events

commencing with BGen Stewart's concerns, the Hewson Report then leading up to the time of Jenkin's testimony, it's hard to imagine what more it would take to characterize a base as undisciplined or to at least qualify the answer by stating that some units within the SSF were undisciplined. Jenkins is one of the few witnesses to extend the bad apple syndrome beyond a few or 5-7 individuals, in this instance alluding to "small groups of individuals." The reference to groups may support the phenomenon of a parallel chain of command, but also continues the theme of downplaying the magnitude of problems when in fact nobody can ascertain the actual constitute number of each of these groups.

The Chairman points out Brocklebank defeated the investigation into the Algonquin Park incidents by "taking the rap," and Mills responds that he had been unable to prove that (4328, Vol 23). Mills provides an alternate excuse or justification for taking Powers despite his involvement as a significant instigator in the Kyrenia Club incident noting Powers had to be taken because he was platoon signaller and "was mission essential" after doing 4-5 months training for that role (4329, Vol 23). Seward confirms Mills told him about the 5-6 bad apples, he was unable to recall any of the names during his testimony, and when asked "did you do anything about those five or six?" he replies "No, I did not" (5969, Vol 31). This was followed by the question "So when Master Warrant Officer Mills used the word 'bad apples' this was your understanding, that these were the kind of people who were just rambunctious young men who could get into trouble on R&R?" Seward responds "Correct" (5972, Vol 31). Note how this question is set up to invoke both the use of euphemisms and the reference to all conduct occurring outside duty time and therefore somehow less consequential.

Seward testifies that prior to the deployment to Somalia LCol Mathieu said to him "Tony, I understand you have a few bad apples" (6064, Vol 32). Seward acknowledges the Commanding Officer was counting on him and his CSM to find out who these people were as they were not deserving of deploying to Somalia. Seward later agrees with Mathieu's lawyer that since some soldiers were left behind Mathieu should have been satisfied that all the bad apples had been dealt with (6152, Vol 32). Alternatively, given the unprecedented context of Mathieu's predecessor being relieved of his command prior to deployment, it is reasonable to expect Mathieu would have required a detailed explanation of existing problems and what steps, if any, had been taken to address these rather than assuming anything. Morneault's idea to send 2 CDO into the field until someone confessed to the Kyrenia Club incident was characterized by Beno as "you're punishing the group when you suspect there might be one or two add (sic) apples... until they start coming forward with the names of their peers, that is not acceptable..." (7904, Vol 4). Beno defers to the bad apple excuse when he confirms he would not allow Morneault to leave 2 CDO behind and take another unit to Somalia because "I was not about to tear the brigade apart. Because at that stage he was telling me that he perhaps had one or two bad apples and if he's trying to get them to come forward with a threat, I'm not about to allow him to make that threat... may well mean dismembering a fair part of the brigade because of one or two bad apples which he described to me on that day" (7903, Vol 40).

The reference to bad apples, undesirables or troublemakers is consistently used by witnesses to suggest that problems were limited to a very small minority of individuals, like testimony regarding the parallel power network. However, this raises the same questions and concerns as the parallel power network, where if you do not know who is responsible it is not possible to know that it is actually a small number of individuals. Without ever identifying the individuals responsible for the altercation and out of control situation at the Kyrenia Club, Morneault nonetheless asserts “one of two bad apples” were responsible. MWO Mills indicates he had “five or six or seven troublemakers” in 2 CDO, while Seward testifies that Mills told him they had “5-6 bad apples” however Seward could not recall any of their names. This is extremely telling as Seward was the OC and ultimately responsible and accountable for most of the problem individuals and could not even answer this question retrospectively. Seward’s lawyer leads his responses with a question about bad apples being “just rambunctious young men who could get into trouble on R&R”, thereby maintaining the previously identified theme of referring to problems euphemistically and as after-hours or barracks phenomenon to distance the chain of command from responsibility.

The bad apple syndrome conveniently ignores several important factors such as who the person is, when they became a problem, how this was able to occur, and how they impacted the habitus of the Regiment. The bad apple syndrome is employed throughout testimony as a euphemism that puts all blame on the actions and behaviours of the innominate individual(s) while removing responsibility from the leaders who are supposed to be accountable for the discipline and welfare of the organization. This syndrome serves to protect the reputation of the institution by inferring these individuals are not representative of the group. Invoking this syndrome also ignores or explains away the effect or repercussions such individuals have on the overall habitus of the organization, the proverbial rotting of the rest of the barrel.

The evidence shows that the references to the ubiquitous bad apples served as a euphemism to downplay the dysfunctional and deleterious actions of individuals engaged in elitism in several distinct ways. First it serves to detract attention from dysfunctional behaviours by attributing all unresolved problems/situations to a small number of unidentified individuals. It is also a substitute for references to undisciplined or otherwise undesirable individuals, also referred to as troublemakers and rambunctious young men who get into mischief on R&R. Note how the latter euphemisms imply that deleterious behaviour occurs after hours and on their own time, as such constituting an oblique suggestion that all associated behaviour falls outside the responsibility of the chain of command. The most significant and effective aspect of the bad apple syndrome is that it anonymizes individuals and facilitates minimization of their actions, effectively making it a counterfactual by expressing something that is not accurate and thus impossible to prove or disprove. The bad apple syndrome offers a perfunctory excuse for problems, blaming a small minority of unknown individuals without ever identifying the troublemakers and holding them accountable.

Perception of Elite

LCol Morneault testifies, "I think elitism is exuded and not flaunted. So you are only elite if you prove you're better or more capable than the rest" (6899, Vol 36).

This indicator combines an individual's perception with how they project their status and are subsequently perceived by the outside world. The definition of elite status is socially shared opinions, perspectives, and preconceptions where an identifiable group is construed as performing consistently and predictably in ways deemed superior to other groups engaging in similar performance activities. Comparing how witnesses identify and explain elite status and contrasting it with their actions and behaviour revealed through their testimony provides insight into the extent to which elitism had manifested within the Regiment. Many of the recollections and opinions that are provided by witnesses are untested perceptions, it is simply witnesses telling the Inquiry commissioners what they believe including assumptions, impressions and reflections. Conversely, testifying provides the opportunity to exert elitism by minimizing, concealing and ultimately shielding the Regiment from scrutiny.

Most witnesses who testified specifically with regards to elite status asserted the Cdn AB Regt was in fact not an elite unit, notably Col Houghton, LGen Foster, and LCol Morneault all of whom were Regimental Commanders or in Morneault's case the down-ranked equivalent of Commanding Officer. Foster sums up the essence of humility succinctly, essentially describing it as the antithesis of elitism, "I remember well the first two or three sentences where I described for them where they were not elite troops, and that I did not believe in elite troops, and whatever it was that we had to do we would do and advertise by our performance. If we were good, we would let other people tell us we were good" (402, Vol 3). However, such descriptions from witnesses must be compared with the actions, attitudes and perspectives contained in their testimony which is not always consistent with what they are asserting.

It is important to explore how the Regiment was perceived by those on the outside, which includes the rest of the CAF. Early in the Inquiry the assertion of institutionalized elite status is validated by Commissioner Desbarats when he reveals his preconception of the Regiment being elite. Desbarats speaks to "a long standing recurrent problem of trying to find something for this highly-trained, specialized regiment to do" (442, Vol 3). Perpetuation of the ostensible elite status of the Regiment was still prevalent in Desbarats' questions four and a half months into the inquiry. When Col Houghton is testifying on February 12, 1996 Desbarats states "There has been a lot of debate about this. This is the elite regiment, this is the regiment that is on instant standby for posting overseas, it is in a very special position." Houghton replies "I am on the record many times, if you don't mind by saying it was not an elite unit. It was not elite and I don't particularly care for that word. It's a unit that was highly trained in a variety of tasks and it was a special place in that soldiers came from all over the place, not just the three infantry regiments, but from 22 different classifications that had on a volunteer basis to serve for three or four years in a different environment"

(8645-6, Vol 44). When Houghton is asked "what would an elite regiment be then in your definition?" he replies "I have no idea. I think elite is a word fabricated by the media" (8833, Vol 44). Pressed further about special units, he says that the SSF was special, then is asked "for a special unit whether it be the Airborne or another regiment, discipline should be at a very high level; wouldn't you agree?" In what can only be construed as an attempt at obfuscation and avoidance, Houghton first asks for the lawyer's definition of discipline, then responds that he would "expect a higher level of personal discipline in the Airborne Regiment" than The RCR for example, but mainly because "soldiers and officers were by and large experienced" (8834, Vol 44). This of course does not explain the numerous assertions that the Regiment had become to some extent a dumping ground for soldiers the parent regiments wanted to get rid of.

In his closing address to the Commission, Houghton states "I would like to point out that I served as a member of the Airborne Regiment for five years and was associated with the regiment literally from 1968 until it went off the books last year... It was truly a national unit and it is very unique. It is not elite, as I mentioned earlier, but it's very special and I think that was one of the reasons it was special" (8909, Vol 44). In contrast to Houghton, Morneault's evidence could be better characterized as him testifying that the Airborne was not necessarily elite. When discussing why he chose a career with the Airborne, Morneault is asked if he feels the Regiment was elite and replies somewhat equivocally, "Depends on what you mean by elite. If it's that they were above everybody, no. Does it mean they're cohesive, light, well-trained, probably more physically fit, yes" (6898, Vol 36). Most assertions that the Regiment was highly trained in a variety of tasks speak to a standard that should be expected of any occupation or trade, and the fact that members were volunteers from different units, trades and parts of the country does not distinguish them in any significant way from other members of the CAF. Houghton's expectation of a higher level of personal discipline within the Cdn AB Regt as compared to a line infantry regiment does not appear to have been realised, and in any event a regiment full of individuals with higher personal discipline would logically translate into a more disciplined regiment. Finally, his suggestion that elite is a word fabricated by the media may have been a reference to the press coverage of the day, but his request for a legal definition of discipline comes across as evasive and a means of deflecting the question. While the concept of a military elite is ill-defined and generally poorly understood, any senior members of the Army should be capable of providing their perspective.

Since being different and special were equated with being elite, it was important for members of the Regiment to accentuate any differences. LCol Morneault confirms "The Airborne's term for non-Airborne units is legs" (7182, Vol 37), which was commonly known to mean "lacking enough guts" or a reference to the infantry walking instead of jumping. There are also numerous references to aggression, which is almost always presented as a necessary and desirable attribute. There is a clear connection between elitism and aggression, hostility, and belligerence where aggression is a component of social posturing like forms of bravado intended to impress or intimidate, which corresponds with defiance to authority.

Early on in this inquiry it was recognized that rank and experience are some of the key variables when considering the testimony of witnesses, as well as being a means of explicating their individual habitus. Cpl Purnelle, the former Belgian para-commando who joined the CAF testifies that he found garrison life with the R22R very boring and poorly organized. He volunteered for the Cdn AB Regt with expectations of serving with superior soldiers in every respect. He states that his research steered him towards the Regiment because of the elite status⁵⁰⁴ (6820, Vol 35). He acknowledges the grass is not always greener, and “we try to find traces of elitism and realize it is an elite that is very poorly maintained”⁵⁰⁵ (6820, Vol 35). Purnelle notes there was a loss of motivation and discipline throughout the Regiment after the cancellation of the deployment to the Western Sahara (6833, Vol 35). Instead during the summer of '92 members of the Airborne trained reservists which Purnelle characterizes as “clean pots for the militia” which he notes was hard on morale (6833, Vol 35). Purnelle already testified that based on his experience the Regiment was not elite and describes incidents and examples of elitism. It is likely he was being somewhat facetious with those comments. He goes on to note, “So, you find an elite soldier facing a reserve army that you must train. Everything changed when Somalia was announced.”⁵⁰⁶ Purnelle describes some airborne soldiers as young guys, punching their card, lacking in all sorts of skills, having something to brag about in the Mess, all of which illuminates many of the characteristics of elitism.

Purnelle’s opinion of the Regiment as a dumping ground is insightful because he was living and working with other junior members on a day-to-day basis, and it is evident from testimony that most officers and senior NCOs did not concern themselves with what was going on after-hours or in the barracks. Of note Purnelle was from 1 CDO where he describes indicators of elitism even though it was not telegraphed as being a problem commando until the hazing videos emerged in the press. In terms of actual performance in Somalia, Purnelle notes that a lot of information was missing when they deployed to Somalia and training was not adapted to the conditions of the country. They did not have desert warfare expertise, which was evident when he mentions bringing arctic sleeping bags (inner and outer) and wool sweaters to the desert because that was disseminated in their kit list. He says he was always in doubt about the mission because they lacked clear and precise orders and logistical support was a huge problem, leading him to conclude, “no, we were not prepared” (6837, Vol 35).

Most testimony confirmed, sometimes implicitly, that the Regiment had the same capability as any of the line infantry regiments save for the ability to parachute into operations. Of note, no witnesses testified as to how the parachuting capability specifically enhanced or was essential to any of the operations the Regiment was part of during its twenty-seven-year existence. To this point, LGen Foster is asked if the Airborne “because of its enhanced training,

⁵⁰⁴ “*élitisme, d’être un soldat beaucoup plus supérieur à d’autres à tout niveau.*”

⁵⁰⁵ “*on essaie de retrouver des traces d’élitisme et on se rend compte sur place que c’est une élite qui est très mal entretenue.*”

⁵⁰⁶ “*Alors, vous trouvez soldat d’élite devant face à une armée de réserve qui vous devez entraîner*” (6833, Vol 35).

perhaps, more aggressive troops, as one has said" would be unsuitable for UN duty, and replies, "no, these are the same soldiers" that served with line infantry regiments" (431, Vol 3). Col Holmes asserts the Regiment was capable of undertaking "chapter 6 or chapter 7 operations depending on the mandate" of a UN operation (764, Vol 4). The reference to chapters of the United Nations charter distinguishes between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and virtually every unit has been suitable for either type of deployment. Commissioner Desbarats appears to pick up on this point and asks LGen Foster about the deployment of regiments in the 70s and 80s, "it seemed to me that there wasn't anything in this list that actually required the kind of specific characteristics that you've described for the Airborne." Foster points out the Airborne was a "quick reaction force" for the 1976 Olympics and involved in "cordon and search operations" during FLQ crisis." At the same time Foster concedes, "generally speaking I'm not in disagreement with your observation as such" (442, Vol 3). MGen Gaudreau provides insight into the Cdn AB Regt's deployment to Cyprus with the UN in 1974, noting half the Regiment was on tour and the other half deployed in a week (they were on leave) to augment after the invasion by 37 000 Turkish troops. Gaudreau notes, "I doubt very much if we could repeat the operation now that the Airborne Regiment is gone. That nature of unit in my mind made it ideally suited for peacekeeping operations that could turn into a shooting war on short notice" (547, Vol 3). Neither Foster nor any other witness explains how being able to deploy on short notice was anything more than an operational expectation that could have been placed on any regiment. Gaudreau's statement demonstrates the importance of historical context considering he expressed this sentiment during testimony in October 1995. His assertion is largely contradicted considering how, by the time of his testimony, Canadian troops had served in Bosnia and Croatia (including Medak Pocket) with Kosovo and Afghanistan on the horizon.

MGen Hewson's perception of the Regiment speaks directly to the social posturing precept of elitism and the emphasis on aggression with he states, "the point is not whether or not the Canadian Airborne Regiment was an elite unit. The point that we were trying to make is that if the soldier thinks that he is elite, and indeed he did, if he knows he's fit and indeed he was, he will have higher morale, more self-confidence and be more aggressive (344, Vol 2). Hewson, who led the 1985 *Mobile Command Study: A Report on Disciplinary Infractions and Antisocial Behaviour Within FMC With Particular Reference to the Special Service Force and the Canadian Airborne Regiment*, continues with, "I'd suggest, Mr. Chairman, that for most infantry commanders, that would be seen as a desirable characteristic" (344 Vol 2). Hewson also acknowledges an implication of this social posturing is, "the volunteer nature, the type of training and the perception of being elite, that the soldiers there required perhaps slightly more mature leadership than is needed in other infantry units" (356, Vol 2). Interestingly, Hewson is explicitly acknowledging soldiers engaging in elitism and that aggression was encouraged, ultimately requiring a higher degree of leadership and supervision. MGen Gaudreau, who handed over the Regiment to Col Houghton in 1987 also believed it was important to instill in airborne soldiers the belief that they were elite. When asked about the airborne mystique,

he responds "There is definitely an airborne mystique. There is also a mystique in fighter pilots, there is also a mystique in barristers, there is also a mystique in medical doctors and beware of the profession that does not have some kind of a mystique." Gaudreau then makes the observation that "there is a lot of talk about eliticism (sic)" and that for leaders "it is your duty if you expect to win to convince your troops that they were the elite" (559, Vol 3). There is a clear distinction between making sure soldiers met a certain standard versus focussing on persuading them that they were at that level.

Further to the recurring theme of elitism where being different is equated with being special and by extension elite, WO Murphy acknowledges that the Rebel flag represented "something to be different than other members of the regiment," which is evidence that being different was a form of social capital (6610-12, Vol 34). Another example of this self-referential attitude and representative of a form of cultural capital is the repeated reference to Airborne soldiers being triple volunteers, intended to highlight the fact that they all volunteered for service in the CAF, then left their line infantry regiments for a posting to the Regiment and to jump out of airplanes. Col Holmes discusses aggression and volunteering for the Airborne Regiment, "It's not every soldier that want to do that and because of that they tend to be a little more aggressive, in some cases considerably more aggressive, I might suggest, but certainly there is a lot of aggressive soldiers in normal line battalions" (664, Vol 4). The theme of equating being different with being elite is countered by Holmes' acknowledgement that the Airborne was the same as other infantry regiments except "jumping out of an airplane was a unique capability, the soldiers may have been a bit more aggressive" (688, Vol 4). Witnesses were not asked to explain their conception of aggression, which would have been helpful considering it can run on a continuum of behaviour from confrontational and belligerent to hostile or violent. Considering the propensity for euphemisms and Holmes' concession regarding aggression, it is reasonable to interpret from his statement that the Airborne was more aggressive. This aligns with Hewson's assertion mentioned earlier, "if the soldier thinks that he is elite, and indeed he did, if he knows he's fit and indeed he was, he will have higher morale, more self-confidence and be more aggressive" (344, Vol 2). The term "gung-ho" is employed as a euphemism for aggression and Houghton is questioned about the Airborne's "gung-ho attitude" and "view they have of themselves as elite or special." When asked if that is the attitude he observed, he responds, "No, I did not. I found it in certain circumstances, but as a general... No, I would not say that for the regiment at large. Certainly, there were examples of it" (2251, Vol 12).

A commonality amongst witnesses who testified was the assertion the Regiment was not elite, but few could provide a measurable definition of what constitutes elite. The spectrum of opinions varied from the observation that if you were truly elite others would be able to come to that conclusion on their own which was contrasted with the assertion that the term elite was manufactured by the media. The Regiment was initially selected for a peacekeeping role in Somalia (which transitioned to peace enforcement at the last minute) for which the Inquiry was told any infantry regiment would have been suitable. Ultimately,

the testimony reveals sustained examples of elitism which is itself evidence the Regiment was not elite. As such, this supports the definition of elite status as socially shared opinions, perspectives, and preconceptions where an identifiable group is construed as performing consistently and predictably in ways deemed superior to other groups engaged in similar performance activities. In relation to this definition, it is noteworthy that none of the testimony revealed a capability or operational tempo that could be deemed superior to other infantry units. Conversely there was discussion of performance and discipline (e.g. negligent discharges reflect both) that would be difficult for any CO to reconcile with the concept of a professional soldier engaged in an elite or non-elite role, for example a line infantry regiment.

In summary, many members of the Cdn AB Regt saw themselves as elite or at least wanted to be elite, especially when assertions made during testimony are compared with their behaviours and actions. Several senior officers testified they wanted soldiers to believe this, and although Purnelle is one of the few junior members whose testimony was reviewed, he confirms this was the perception that was encouraged. Houghton and Morneault testified the Regiment was not elite, although Houghton also asserts unconvincingly that this is a word invented by the media. Some witnesses including Hewson not only condoned elitism but saw a benefit in the social posturing of elite status. Holmes notes if a soldier is qualified for a rank in line infantry unit, then "they are qualified to do the job in the Canadian Airborne Regiment." Holmes provides a candid assessment of the Regiment's capabilities when he clarifies that the only difference is they jumped out of airplanes, and "once we got on the ground, from my perspective, the job was exactly the same as any other mounted or dismounted infantry battalion in the Canadian order of battle" (614, Vol 4). Hewson defends the precepts of elitism and acknowledges soldiers engaged in corresponding attitudes and behaviours are also more aggressive and require more mature leadership, which infers enhanced supervision to mitigate against transgressions. When considering perceptions of elite status, it is important to focus on how such status is asserted and postured but is not properly executed or maintained in an objectively verifiable sense. Purnelle expresses this succinctly when he testifies about attempting to find traces of objectively verifiable superior performance and ability, and it became apparent that the Regiment was in his words "an elite that is very poorly maintained" (6820, Vol 35).

Resistance to Change & Legitimizing Myths

MGen Hewson testifies "I know of no specific action that resulted from our study" (361, Vol 2), followed by "because of the composition of the boards of inquiry there was not an inclination to find people at higher ranks responsible because clearly that would not be a career-enhancing finding" (368, Vol 2).

Legitimizing myths serve as a special set of rules used to defuse ethical dissonance and other misgivings and portray actions as acceptable even if they would be judged otherwise in a different realm or context. Ultimately,

legitimizing myths can be used to compartmentalize institutional norms and condone any behaviour, approach or outcome. The previously examined bad apple syndrome is a predominant example where the myth is that an institution or organization must accept the existence of such individuals as unavoidable. Blaming the broader social setting like the supposed isolation of CFB Petawawa as seen in testimony relating to other indicators and serves the same function. In some instances the approach or behaviour is normalized and the suggestion is that the outcome is inevitable, thus alleviating the organization of any responsibility. Excusing attitudes and behaviour of ostensibly elite troops is another example and is on par with a 'boys will be boys' outlook, and although the testimony revealed few overt examples of this it often appeared implicit.

There was minimal testimony that was unique specifically to the indicators of resistance to change and legitimizing myths. Having said that, the general themes from myopic habitus, protecting/favouring own, the bad apple syndrome and the attitudes, reactions, recollections and interpretations behind perception of elite are all indicative of a habitus that is insular and not open to change. Hewson acknowledges a lack of follow-up pertaining to his recommendations which is indicative of resistance to change, and subsequently concedes "perhaps accountability did not go far enough up the chain" (369, Vol 2). While his comment does not appear to refer specifically to the 1985 study of the SSF (over which he presided) and therefore not unique to the Cdn AB Regt, it helps explain reproduction within the Regiment. Hewson's testimony is indicative of an entrenched habitus, reproduction of prestige hierarchies and a preference to emulate rather than challenge approaches, practices, philosophies, and ideas. His study of "disciplinary infractions and antisocial behavior" within the army and specifically the SSF and the Cdn AB Regt appears to have been largely ignored, with key witnesses confirming they had not read the report.⁵⁰⁷ Furthermore, no witnesses refer to the report in the context of mentioning any direct action that was taken based on the issues brought up in the report. In fact, numerous witnesses testify to an overall state of affairs that leaves the impression the Hewson Report was at the very least not socially accepted as being valid and at worst was viewed as unsubstantiated or dismissed as irrelevant.

Although no members of the PPN were explicitly identified, a sustained theme in the literature as well as in the Inquiry testimony suggests the group consisted primarily of immobile members who preferred to stay with the Regiment rather than return to their parent regiments. Captain Walsh (Training Officer for the Cdn AB Regt) suggests the annual turnover of personnel within the Airborne was 25% of other ranks and "between 30 and 40 percent of officers" (2288, Vol 13). Col Holmes notes that he and the RSM discussed the number of years Corporals typically served, surmising some "had possibly been with the regiment for too long... some had been in the regiment for seven, eight, nine years, and allow some fresh blood to come in and at the same time allow these fellows an opportunity to progress in their careers" (612-3, Vol 4). Keeping in mind Holmes was Regimental Commander immediately prior to Morneault taking over, issues he identifies had not been addressed by the time of the

⁵⁰⁷ Hewson, "Mobile Command Study."

handover. With reference to when the Regiment restructured to battalion formation and was reduced by 150 personnel, Holmes is asked if he took the opportunity to "get rid of these longer serving people that you have suggested might be rotated more frequently." He replies, "I don't know whether that specifically occurred or not, sir." Holmes notes that one sergeant stayed with the Airborne 25 years, "the more junior the rank, the more apt they were to stay for a longer period of time" as you generally had to return to your parent regiment for career progression (614, Vol 4). This observation is pertinent, given that the PPN was made up of precisely the demographic Holmes describes as being immobile. Morneault discusses turnover of personnel that occurred in the summer of 1992, consisting of 53% of officers which he describes as normal considering they serve two years. For WOs it was one third, "theoretically they only have to volunteer for two years at a time. Our rules were a maximum of four with the odd exception. So we tried to keep senior NCOs to a limit of four years" (7033, Vol 36). The testimony regarding time limits imposed on postings to the Regiment suggests a legitimizing myth intended to project the impression that the Regiment was aware of issues associated with immobile members and these were being addressed. Yet the practices within the Regiment show this was not a rule (or at least not a rule that was followed) as stated by Morneault but rather an attempt to cover up the issue of immobile members who contributed to a habitus that permitted the PPN to manifest and reproduce. The Chairman asks if officers only staying two years was a problem, "coming in just to get promotion" and "trying to be low profile and not attract any attention and then move on with their career? That seems to be the trends" (7033-4, Vol 36). Morneault asserts that statement only applies to "one-one hundredth or .5 of a hundredth of the people who ever served in the Airborne Regiment, sir. I don't know anybody that came in to tick off or to punch his clock. I don't think I know anybody that's ever done that" (7034, Vol 36). The Chairman responds, "I think the events bear what I'm saying - leaving the problems behind for others to solve, the philosophy being that these others coming in would do exactly the same" (7036, Vol 36).

Hewson repeats legitimizing myths that provide institutional excuses for aberrant behaviour consistent with his report from almost ten years earlier, including blaming deficiencies in screening, abnormally high taskings, and the ostensibly unbalanced social-cultural milieu in Petawawa. He also provides administrative explanations and excuses, suggesting that prior to Jan 1985 only the most serious crimes were reported to NDHQ. Also consistent with justifications provided in his earlier study, Hewson notes the military had a lower frequency of violent behaviour than the population at large, but a "relatively higher frequency of sexual offences" (338 Vol 2). Considering society at large comprises everyone including prisoners serving life sentences, this begs the question of whether an institution like the military constitutes a meaningful comparator.⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰⁸ Public Safety Canada, "Measuring the Extent of Crime." Periodic, specialized surveys estimate approximately 40% of crimes go unreported to police. Retrieved on

While there is a logical connection between the inward focus and resistance to outside influence that is indicative of a myopic habitus, resistance to change did not emerge in isolation as a unique indicator of elitism in the testimony. An explanation is that resistance to change is inextricably linked to most of the higher order indicators. There was minimal evidence of legitimizing myths, possibly because these are typically used to justify actions and behaviours. Paradoxically there was little evidence where members of the Cdn AB Regt were required to explain, justify or were otherwise held accountable for attitudes and behaviours associated with elitism.

Table 2
Incidents of October 2-5, 1992

Oct 2-3:	Party at Petawawa Junior Ranks Mess (Kyrenia Club) becomes out of control and pyrotechnics are thrown at responding MPs. The Duty Sergeant's personal vehicle was burned on the parade square later that evening as retaliation for him trying to gain control of the party and calling the MPs. A vehicle was driven around the parade square later that evening displaying the banned Rebel flag.
Oct 4 th :	Numerous members of 2 CDO take firearms, ammunition and pyrotechnics to nearby Algonquin Provincial Park and shoot them off to dispose of them prior to anticipated barracks search. This activity is combined with alcohol consumption, and a park enforcement officer records license plates to identify involved individuals.
Oct 5 th :	Barracks search of Airborne Lines, numerous weapons and ammunition seized.

Accountability

WO Murphy testifies "I believe that the initial incident of the Kyrenia Club was a party that got out of hand and was handled improperly which led to the other incidents quite possibly." Murphy blames the Duty NCO rather than the involved parties although he acknowledges "I don't know the specifics" but "as I've seen it, if an NCO asserts himself, he will get things done" (6616, Vol 34).

Ironically, Murphy is correct in his assertion but his assessment of what should have happened and how the incident could have possibly been mitigated applies to all the leadership of the Regiment. Ultimately Sgt Wyszynski faced retaliation precisely because he attempted to exert his authority as Duty Sergeant.

April 20, 2024 from <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/msrng-xtnt/indexen.aspx#:~:text=Questions%20on%20criminal%20victimization%20form,%20unreported%20to%20the%20police.>

Lack of accountability emerged as the most significant and consequential higher order variable that permeated the Somalia Inquiry testimony. For example, in most instances where there were indicators of another variable such as the PPN or WOS, there was an overarching failure to exercise accountability. Excuses permeated the testimony where individuals failed to acknowledge their responsibility or be accountable for their actions or failure to act.

To concentrate on this variable, this section will emphasize testimony pertaining to the events of the weekend of October 2-5, 1992 as demonstrative of the different ways in which a habitus existed where accountability was avoided and, in some cases, not properly understood. Since the RSM is directly accountable to the CO for discipline within a regiment, the role of the RSM will be explored along with the related testimony of RSM Jardine. Accountability is an ideational concept where its absence produces a permissive environment where elitism and other dysfunctional attitudes and behaviour can thrive because of ineffective oversight. The quote in the opening to this section is revealing because Murphy was the platoon warrant officer in charge of many of the individuals responsible for dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours, yet he puts all blame on Sgt Wyszynski for not controlling the men. A more encompassing perspective would be that some of these members had influenced a habitus that resisted authority and control by the chain of command, hence the subsequent burning of Wyszynski's car. It could also be argued that since MWO Mills did not come out and exert his authority when Wyszynski called him for assistance, this left the duty NCO as the scapegoat for these incidents.

To set the context for a lack of accountability in the Regiment, both the post-Somalia BOI and BGen Beno's immediate commander MGen Mackenzie acknowledge the disciplinary problems within 2 CDO. Beno is read a conclusion of the DeFaye BOI "that discipline was somehow flawed within 2 Commando. The Board believes this is related to the fact that the Canadian Airborne Regiment deployed with a known serious disciplinary problem within 2 Commando only partially resolved" (8135-6, Vol 42). Of note, the BOI is not clear as to how the problem was even partially resolved. Beno says he does not agree with the BOI's conclusion because "at the time I was assured that the discipline problems were being dealt with" (8136, Vol 42). Beno is in fact acknowledging discipline problems but attempting to remove himself from responsibility by saying he had been assured issues were being dealt with. MGen Mackenzie testifies "Gen Beno was clearly upset that this would appear to be a manifestation of a disciplinary problem within the Airborne" (8320, Vol 42). Beno is blaming subordinates for not dealing with disciplinary problems even though he was fully apprised and furthermore had overruled many of LCol Morneault's attempts to address some of the issues. Beno is also failing to apply any degree of retrospection which would conclude the BOI's findings were reasonable. When the Chairman asks Beno, "Would you have responsibility if there were serious disciplinary problems unresolved," Beno replies "I would have responsibility for declaring the regiment operational, yes" (8137-8, Vol 42). This qualified answer implies Beno believes he is only responsible only for the decision to declare the Cdn AB Regt operationally ready for Somalia but not

accountable for taking the steps to ensure the Regiment was free of significant issues, which is part of being operationally ready.

The circumstances and pattern surrounding the arson of Wyszynski's personal vehicle is virtually identical to the burning of Captain Ferraby's vehicle in June 1990, indicating these acts of retaliation represent and perpetuate a specific form of cultural capital in terms of defiance to authority. In both cases there is suggestion a military pyrotechnic was used as the source of ignition, both occurred at the airborne lines, and in both instances the acts were retaliation against a member of the chain of command who had exerted their authority. Col Houghton testifies that Ferraby's vehicle was burned in June 1990 (8877, Vol 44). Col Holmes took over the Regiment from Houghton in the summer of 1990 and testifies "I was aware of the incident that happened in June of that year with the burning of an officer's car, but other than that there were no specific disciplinary problems that I recall that were brought to my attention, and I don't think at that particular point there were any major disciplinary problems that were of note other than that particular one" (593, Vol 4). Holmes goes on to summarize "the only thing I learned about the incident was the fact that it occurred and the situation had been resolved" (593, Vol 4). The arson is being referred to as though it were an isolated incident as opposed to taking the perspective that there had been an identical incident in the past and there would have to be a significant dysfunctional undercurrent at play for this to occur again. The Commissioner points out the arson was not actually resolved "in that there was no indication as to who was responsible for the burning of the car," to which Holmes replies somewhat indifferently by stating, "correct." All testimony affirms that culprits were never identified, which aligns with the concept of banality of wrongdoing, where neither the incident nor the failure to hold anyone accountable stand out as remarkable. Holmes had clearly put the incident in the past although those responsible for challenging the authority of the institutional power network had not been identified or punished.

A persistent theme that emerges in the testimony as an excuse for commanders is to defer to the military police. Col Holmes puts responsibility on the military police to investigate, noting that in cases where there are insufficient grounds for a charge it is "red flag" for commanders "and to not necessarily be vigilant to the point where it is harassment, but obviously to ensure the individuals concerned are kept an eye on." Note the use of the term harassment as a dysphemism for holding soldiers accountable. For commanders to rely on a police investigation to determine what is going on in their unit is problematic, as evidenced by the testimony of WO Ferguson of the MPs. When questioned about the "Toyota Landrover being intentionally burned in the parade yard" (Ferraby's vehicle), Ferguson initially claims it was not proven to be intentional because it was classified as "damage by fire." It is then pointed out to him that the MP report states, "the fire appeared to have been intentionally set by unknown persons by igniting a copy of Airborne Routine Orders which had been placed on the floor of the vehicle and the vehicle had also been vandalized." After interviewing five people the report is marked "suspended" on 27Jun90 which means the investigation has concluded but remains unsolved. Ferguson acknowledges he has never seen a car burned on a parade square before or since

(889, Vol 5). A similar mindset is evident when Ferguson is questioned about the incident at the Kyrenia Club, and despite Cpl Powers coming forward and admitting to throwing the pyrotechnics, Ferguson signed off on the report to close it. Ferguson confirms he had no indication where the pyrotechnics came from and was not interested in investigating the possible offence of false declaration at the end of an exercise (899-908, Vol 5). This also follows the theme of leaders not taking action that would address the connection between the theft of pyrotechnics and the subsequent use of these items to challenge authority and exert elitism with impunity. The most logical conclusion for the tolerance of ill-disciplined behaviour and the minimal appetite for enforcing the law is a habitus where this behaviour was viewed as the inevitable and even desirable by-product of aggressive paratroopers. It also begs the question of whether the MPs treated personnel from other units on the base in a similar fashion or were they intimidated by the Airborne soldiers.

CSM Mills acknowledges that the Duty Sergeant (Wyszynski) called him around 1900 hours and told him the troops were getting out of control at the Kyrenia club and asked him to leave his mess dinner and come over to assist (4291, Vol 23). Mills refused, and claims he was not aware that the troops didn't respect Wyszynski, and that he had suspicions about who burned Wyszynski's car but could not prove it (4297). This begs the question of what kind of incident would have to be occurring to be deemed serious enough for Mills to disrupt his evening and leave the Mess Dinner? Another important question that does not get explored is the obvious inference that Wyszynski called Mills because they are both 2 CDO and it was specifically their Commando that was out of control. Part of the answer is evident considering Cpl Powers from 2 CDO eventually came forward. With regards to assertions throughout testimony that Ferraby and Wyszynski were targeted because they weren't respected, the inference is that it was their own fault because they did something to deserve the retaliation. If one considers the habitus of the Regiment and specifically 2 CDO and the extent to which defiance to authority was cultural capital, the key factor is not respect but whether an officer or NCO posed a threat to the habitus of the elitist faction within the Regiment.

LCol Morneault testifies that preliminary information regarding the cause and origin of the arson to Wyszynski's personal vehicle suggested "it was very likely that it was a white phosphorous smoke grenade but that couldn't be confirmed until we got the forensics" (7469, Vol 38). Ultimately Morneault's approach was to sit back and wait for the answer to come to him, as he indicates, "I was waiting on MP reports, I was waiting on forensic reports and I was awaiting on somebody to come and own up and say he did it" (7478, Vol 38). BGen Beno testifies that a Military Police investigation "is in parallel with other action that the new commanding officer should feel free to take. In other words, if you're suggesting that it should have been left entirely to the military police to resolve, I would not agree" (9158-9, Vol 46). At best the forensic report would confirm the source of ignition was a military pyrotechnic, which would not assist in identifying a suspect. Morneault was simply waiting for someone to come forward, which cannot be characterized as taking any form action. There is also no indication he attempted to follow-up on the fact that one of his soldiers

was in illegal possession of pyrotechnics after Powers came forward with that admission.

In a rare instance where a witness offered evidence demonstrating or proposing decisive action to address a problem, MGen Mackenzie offers his opinion to the Commission regarding what he considered an appropriate response to the events of the October 2-5 weekend. When Mackenzie is asked whether the burning of the car stood out to him as being a very serious incident he replies "You're darned right it did.... an obvious breakdown in discipline when you have pyrotechnics being let off" (8320, Vol 42). Asked what he would have done if he had known at the time about all the incidents, Mackenzie says "Without trying to be flippant and smart here, I would have phoned the Brigade Commander and told him to lock the gate and not let anyone out until I got there and then deal with it. It might even have result (sic) in the unit not going (to Somalia)... no matter what the consequences" (8592, Vol 43). "The situation that he had lends itself to grabbing his Regimental Sergeant Major, that's Colonel Morneault's regimental sergeant major, and walking over and getting the sergeant major of 2 Commando and gathering the senior NCOs in the sergeants mess and locking the door and indicating to them what the bloody problems are, getting back from them what the problems are - I understand that some of them are even scared to deal with some of the problems - and start taking action to resolve the issues" (8323-4, Vol 42). Regarding the arson of the car "I would have mentioned there was no culprits and *we* (emphasis added) had not been successful in determining who it was that did it" (8527, Vol 43). By including himself and Beno as not getting to the bottom of what occurred, Mackenzie sets himself apart from most officers by recognizing his command responsibility. Of additional significance is Mackenzie's acknowledgement that 2 CDO was responsible (54 pagers earlier in his testimony he only acknowledged "strong suspicion" that 2 CDO was implicated), and his reference to some of its senior NCOs being scared to deal with problems, which appears to translate into them fearing their soldiers.

MGen Gaudreau speaks to the importance of the RSM's role when he testifies "the quality of discipline rests on the shoulders" of the RSM down to MCpls "because they are the ones who have the most intimate feel for the soldier of the unit. They should be the first one to discover a problem for two reasons. One, because they are closer to the men; and secondly, they tend to stay longer in the units" (562, Vol 3). Gaudreau's assertions accurately represent the relationship and responsibility regarding NCOs and their soldiers, but he fails to acknowledge that ultimate responsibility for everything falls on the commander. Referring to his 1985-87 tenure as Regimental Commander, Gaudreau then concedes NCOs and NCMs in his and BGen Stewart's (then Brigade Commander) perspective "were starting to neglect their duties a little bit" (583, Vol 3). This is at best an understatement given the events precipitating Stewart's request for the Hewson inquiry. It also follows that if incidents or circumstances come to light that lead to the conclusion that NCOs are neglecting their duties, then officers are as well because they are ultimately responsible.

In sharp contrast to what has been outlined as the role of an RSM, Jardine testifies that LCol Mathieu would have told him if he had any concerns about

discipline, even the Chairman appears to find this puzzling and responds, "wouldn't it be your job to tell him, rather than for him to tell you?" Jardine's reply demonstrates a combination of deflection and failure to acknowledge his responsibility for maintaining proper discipline, "My concerns weren't of discipline at this time." He states his focus was on leadership and "I made it quite clear to Colonel Mathieu when he came in about the leadership of 2 Commando, that it wasn't working" (20883, Vol 105). Jardine does not seem to recognize the connection between discipline and leadership, claiming, "to me they're two different things" (20886, Vol 105). Asked what concerns he had about Major Seward, Jardine replies, "Not being able to control the aggression of his soldiers" (20886, Vol 105). Of note, blaming Seward is intended to absolve Jardine of culpability as he has no direct authority over the OC of a Commando.

Jardine's testimony implies he has no proactive responsibility for day-to-day discipline as it is "only if there is an infraction to the policy that's in place does it become my concern" (20947, Vol 105). Jardine joined the military in 1956 and agrees he was chief advisor to the CO with respect to deportment, discipline etc. but is quick to add, "but I wasn't alone in doing this" (20858, Vol 105). Jardine was the senior NCO in theatre, and with 36 years' service likely the longest serving member. Regarding what appeared in the hazing videos Desbarats asks if he was appalled that occurred under his leadership. Jardine responds, "Not -- I didn't look at it as it was directly under my leadership. Discipline and leadership, once you're deployed in a field operation of the nature we were in the discipline and leadership is basically at first level to do with the section commander, then the platoon warrant, 2ICs, then the platoon commander and so on up within the commando... It's impossible for an RSM to be in all of those positions at any given time and to supervise, that is not my job" (20997-8, Vol 105). Jardine is not only suggesting everyone except him is responsible, but that accountability flows from the bottom upwards. He then asserts that all an RSM can respond to is known problems like a high incidence of drinking and driving. Desbarats points out it starts from the top but Jardine does not agree, says there is self-discipline then discipline "laid down by the system itself" (20999, Vol 105). Asked by Desbarats if the leadership of 2 CDO was not responsible for tolerating certain conditions, Jardine replies, "I guess if we know about it, yes" (21002, Vol 105). Asked directly by Desbarats if he felt any sense of responsibility for what occurred in the video they are discussing, Jardine replies, "no, I did not" (21003, Vol 105).

Commissioner Desbarats sets the stage for the 2 CDO CSM's testimony when he asks MWO Mills "In terms of disciplinary problems in 2 Commando, you're really the point man; aren't you, you're the one that has to deal with them?" Desbarats clearly has an understanding that the Commando sergeant major is responsible to the OC for all aspects of discipline. Mills was one of three Commando sergeant major's reporting to Jardine, and Mills' conception of accountability is similar to Jardine's. Mills replies, "I'm the one who does the investigation for any disciplinary problems and then I, through my investigation, determine whether or not the individual should be charged or not, sir" (4360, Vol 23). Mills says he inherited the disciplinary problems, which he euphemistically describes as "playing these mischief type practices during their own hours after

duties", adding he can't know or monitor what they are doing on their own time. "If they want to go out and get in trouble and they get caught and then they'll be charged and punished for it, sir" (4361, Vol 23). Of significance, Mills is speaking to dealing with incidents after the fact and is not acknowledging his responsibility to take proactive steps to maintain good order and discipline.

Somalia can be thought of as the final crisis moment for the Cdn AB Regt and rather than being seized as an opportunity to demonstrate ostensibly elite performance, the institutional dynamics of elitism became more pronounced under the pressures of the deployment. Elitism is a relationship with the outside world, how the institution sees itself (and its members) and how they project themselves to the outside world versus how they are perceived by those on the outside. This is where the inquiry testimony provides a unique insight into the individual habitus of each witness as well as snapshots of the changing habitus of the Regiment and its commandos during various time frames. Inquiry testimony reveals characteristics of each witness's habitus and their embodied experiences. This analysis of the Inquiry testimony did not primarily seek to explore whether the opinions and perspectives that emerged were an objective reality. Rather the goal was to explore individual and collective habitus to illuminate how elitism was manifested and reproduced. The case study validates the definition of elitism as attitudes and behaviors that are shared by a group and seek to reinforce in others the perception that such group has elite status, and to ultimately reinforce the group's power, privileges and advantages provided by such status. This definition speaks to precepts of elitism at an institutional level where a group possesses some special power that provides access to privileges and advantages. Most importantly, this definition acknowledges the dysfunctional implications of the immanent untested perceptions associated with the social posturing of elite status.

It is clear from the testimony that the Cdn AB Regt had a distinct habitus compared to the rest of the CAF and represents a distinct field by virtue of its organizational structure (up until 1992), its parachuting capability, and the fact that each commando was fed from a different parent regiment. Habitus consists of socially acquired habits, behaviours and preferences known as dispositions. These become second-nature after being socially ingrained and locked in through habituation. As such, various factors influenced the common collective habitus of the Regiment, including the move from Edmonton to Petawawa in 1977, when there was an assertive commanding officer, and the influence of a subversive or discordant habitus like the PPN. Furthermore, each of the three commandos were fed by parent regiments that represented different geographical areas of the country and in the case of the R22R language as well, all of which impacts habitus. The evidence points towards much of the dysfunction within the Cdn AB Regt being concentrated in 2 CDO, confirming that this commando had a habitus that was recognizably different from the others. In terms of social and cultural capital, the early 1990s saw the commando COs downranked from LCol to Major then subsequently becoming OCs, there was no longer a Regimental Commander and, in the summer of 1992, Morneault became the first CO with the rank of LCol. The Cdn AB Regt now had the same structure as any of the infantry regiments. Considering how many witnesses equated being different

with being elite, this was likely the most significant degradation of social capital for the Regiment leading up to its departure for Somalia.

A sustained theme emerges from the testimony where the empirical indicators of elitism that have been validated through the case study all contribute to the erosion of accountability. Accountability can be a challenge for any institution, and Carlton acknowledges that institutional bureaucracies “can lead to a complete diffusion of responsibility.”⁵⁰⁹ The testimony reveals that a preoccupation with accessing privileges and advantages including power and prestige detracted from the state of discipline within the Regiment. Instead of a habitus predicated upon objectively verifiable performance, a considerable amount of time and energy was focused on elitist attitudes and behaviours rooted in defiance to authority with a view towards maintaining and protecting a socially postured status. Elite status, including that which is contrived through elitism is a privilege or advantage, or put another way, valuable cultural capital. The components of posturing are the desire to impress or mislead, which is inherently inconsistent with the precepts of accountability. The antithesis of accountability is the inability to justify actions or decisions and failure to hold people responsible for these. The case study confirms that the variables pertaining to elitism combine to create a permissive environment for dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours through diminished accountability.

The diminished accountability associated with elitism is further exacerbated through various forms of defiance to authority that form the primary social and cultural capital of the Regiment. The Rebel flag, which can be considered objectified cultural capital by Bourdieu’s definition, was merely a visible and outward symbol of this defiance. Acts of disrespect, retaliation, and forcing out members who challenged the PPN and its adherents were the primary cultural capital for the Regiment because over time these became socially legitimated throughout the CAF. Put another way, it was widely recognized and understood that the Airborne was or at least thought they were better than everyone else, as exemplified through the outward defiance of not saluting non-airborne officers. More importantly, transgressions of discipline were accepted, tolerated and persistently excused thus creating the permissive environment for dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours.

The portion of the case study pertaining to accountability focused on the events of the weekend of October 2-5, 1992 and reveals not only a significant lack of accountability but evidence of deliberate and sustained efforts to cover-up deleterious behaviour. There is a fine line between failing to recognize an issue and attempting to cover it up, as evidenced by Col Holmes’ testimony regarding the arson of Captain Ferraby’s personal vehicle two years prior. Remembering that this act was emblazoned by the fact that it occurred on the parade square and a copy of Col Houghton’s regimental routine orders were used to ignite the fire, Holmes still refers to the incident as being resolved then when challenged by the Commissioner agrees it wasn’t by answering somewhat indifferently with “correct.” This exemplifies elitism, with proponents emboldened to tolerate and overtly deny, dismiss, or conceal problems. When

⁵⁰⁹ Carlton, *Militarism*, 63.

backed into a corner the operant strategy is to minimize (often through euphemism) or obfuscate (e.g. with dysphemism) and/or claim to be unaware or not responsible. Another common strategy was to ostensibly transfer accountability to MPs, putting the onus on them to determine what happened and who was responsible, essentially making them scapegoats for incidents being unresolved. Aside from how this approach runs contrary to the ideation of accountability, it is ineffectual to rely solely upon a police investigative process to solve disciplinary incidents within a military unit when there are other options that can be used concurrently or in lieu. Ultimately, it is like Cpl Purnelle's analogy when parent regiments sent their undesirable soldiers to the Cdn AB Regt, they were dumping their garbage in their neighbour's yard.

MGen Gaudreau acknowledges that when he was Regimental Commander from 1985-87, NCOs were "starting to neglect their duties a little bit" (583, Vol 3). This statement is also problematic starting with the fact that if such a sweeping statement about NCOs is accurate, the officers and ultimately the CO have failed to hold the NCOs accountable. Put in context, the statement is even more revealing because Gaudreau took command of the Regiment as the Hewson report was issued. The point being, he is significantly downplaying the lack of accountability of NCOs because disciplinary infractions had escalated over the preceding few years and peaked with Hewson's study. In essence, Hewson's report was largely ignored and the Regiment moved on, putting all the events and corresponding criticism in the past. Commissioner Desbarats points out to Hewson that BGen Stewart's memo on allowing standards to slip has "a very prophetic ring to it and it seems to contrast with your overall findings... that there is no cause for alarm or requirement for precipitive (sic) action" (363-4, Vol 2). The most obvious conclusion is that the review focused on providing excuses and explanations rather than acknowledging and addressing problems. Commissioner Desbarats' observation is in and of itself prophetic, as a consistent theme is the acceptance of antithetical behaviour with a mindset that there was no cause for alarm and no action or change was necessary. Finally, instead of acknowledging the state of discipline at the time, Gaudreau minimizes problems and as such exerts elitism by attempting to protect the reputation of the Regiment. This contrasts sharply with MGen Mackenzie's testimony, where he is the only witness to outline swift and direct action that should have been taken, albeit he testifies that did not transpire because he was not fully aware of the extent problems.

The attitude, mindset, and misconceptions of the Regiment's RSM provide significant insight into how elitism was justified in the Cdn AB Regt leading up to and during the deployment to Somalia. The status and role of an RSM requires brief exploration before looking at RSM Jardine's part in accountability. Jardine was the senior NCO in the Regiment, answering directly to the Commanding Officer. Bercuson describes the role of an RSM as keeping "a grip on the other NCOs and a close watch on the ranks" as well as monitoring "discipline and morale" throughout the Regiment.⁵¹⁰ After describing an efficient and happy regiment, Bercuson quotes Col Fraser (Regimental Commander 1975-

⁵¹⁰ Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 62-3.

77) as noting that if a Regiment is “sloppy and sullen, it had a poor commanding officer, adjutant and RSM. It was really that simple.”⁵¹¹ Following Fraser’s assertion, Bercuson notes that Morneault did not identify the perpetrators of the incidents related to the Kyrenia Club, and that he received little help from “the man who might have straightened matters out, the RSM, Chief Warrant Officer Bud Jardine.”⁵¹² Bercuson’s description of the RSM’s role is pertinent to the analysis of his testimony and bears repeating in full.

*From time immemorial, the RSM has been responsible for the discipline and conduct of the troops. He reports directly to the battalion CO. If he is effective, if he upholds the tradition that accompanies the position, he knows what is going on in the ranks, or he soon finds out. If he does not know, it can only be because he has lost touch with the NCOs who are supposed to report to him. If he cannot find out, it is because he has lost their respect and, consequently, his ability to do his job. That appears to be the case with Jardine.*⁵¹³

The RSM’s testimony provides significant insight into his ideation of accountability, which can be summed up with his combined assertions that everyone is responsible for doing their job and because he can’t be everywhere, he is not personally answerable for their actions, inaction, or behaviour. The most insightful revelation from his testimony is how Jardine believes it was up to the Commanding Officer to tell the RSM if there were any disciplinary concerns he wanted addressed, the inverse of how discipline is supposed to function. The RSM absolves himself of any responsibility for 2 CDO, placing all the blame on the commando’s OC. There was no evidence of the RSM demonstrating the leadership ethos that he is responsible for everything his subordinates do or fail to do, and furthermore he obfuscates the concepts of leadership and discipline, viewing them as somehow unconnected. The topic of negligent discharges illustrates that the inability to connect rules and discipline to the prevention of unwanted and avoidable consequences started at the top of the NCO ranks. Implying that the death of Corporal Abel was unavoidable by characterizing it as an accident suggests there was nothing different that anyone could have done. This follows the sustained theme of accepting dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours and overcoming the same by exerting elitism and telling soldiers to act more soldierly as a solution.⁵¹⁴ Ultimately, the RSM reveals his lack of understanding of accountability by asserting that he is only responsible for that which occurred “directly” under his leadership, which somehow does not encompass the actions of any of his subordinates.

⁵¹¹ Ibid., 63.

⁵¹² Ibid., 224.

⁵¹³ Ibid.

⁵¹⁴ R v. Smith, 5 CMAR 312, April 10, 1995. Cpl Michael David Abel was killed on May 3, 1993. Private Anthony David Smith was convicted of Negligent Performance of Duty under the NDA, and his sentence of four months in custody was upheld by the CMAC, ruling it was a “serious lapse of duty.”

Re-alignment of Analytical Grid

During the analysis of testimony, the heuristic and combined inductive/deductive approach revealed, as should be expected, that several variables and indicators were similar or otherwise redundant. The most significant of these entailed the pattern of criminal and aberrant behaviour, which had the highest frequency of occurrence amongst the initial variables. When all variables and indicators were considered holistically, it was apparent that instances of criminal behaviour, disciplinary infractions and other aberrant behaviour flowed from other variables and empirical indicators of elitism rendering this behaviour generalizable as a product of elitism. This is evidence of a habitus that tolerated and condoned dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours which were then reproduced most often through the social capital of defiance to authority.

As well, it was initially hypothesized that a set of enabling conditions could be identified where regimental senates, former Airborne officers and members of the Airborne brotherhood exerted influence that helped maintain elitism, both within the Regiment and for their personal benefit as it pertained to their own record of service with the Cdn AB Regt. The Somalia Commission recognized that each regiment had a regimental senate, guard, godfathers, or in the case of the R22R *la régie* that acts in an oversight and advisory capacity. These regimental councils are comprised of senior ranking members who maintain mostly informal responsibility and influence regarding the overall welfare of the regiment, including key promotions. Not all such allegiances are dysfunctional, and there is a clear distinction to be drawn between such oversight and loyalty versus favouritism. These groups are made up of serving and former senior officers tasked with the responsibility of looking after the best interests and “long term well-being” of the Regiment, and are overseen by a regimental godfather.⁵¹⁵ While it is clear from the evidence that regimental senates and former officers had interest and influence over Regimental affairs, there was no compelling or sustained evidence of actions or behaviours where they favoured the Cdn AB Regt or influenced the social dynamics of the Regiment. In fact, quite the opposite was the case whereby there were significant opportunities for former Airborne officers, especially those with ties to the PPCLI, to intervene over the disciplinary problems that had manifested within 2 CDO. Ironically, the only evidence of this having occurred was Major Seward discussing how he was called to Ottawa to speak to the PPCLI Regimental Guard.⁵¹⁶ While the *laissez-faire* approach of the regimental guards towards their respective commandos

⁵¹⁵ Dishonoured Legacy, Volume I, 164.

⁵¹⁶ Somalia Commission, *Dishonoured Legacy - Evidentiary Transcripts*, Vol 31, 5966. Seward testifies he was called to Ottawa by the Regimental Godfather Gen Pitts and Col Gray in November 1992 just prior to 2 CDOs deployment to Somalia. Seward states Pitts “had heard or had been hearing rumours about problems at CFB Petawawa and with 2 Commando and he wanted myself to get a grip on it.” Seward testifies he does not know exactly what they were referring to, whether it was the October incidents or broader.

could be construed as an unwillingness or inability (with respect to the established chain of command) to interfere and exert influence, it can be equally explained as a means of exerting elitism by largely ignoring dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours especially in the case of 2 CDO. This is an extension of the allegiance and devotion of members of an institution as evidenced by Mackenzie's acknowledgement of his loyalty to the profession at arms. Overall, it was difficult to establish any examples of direct influence of the regimental guards over the habitus of the Cdn AB Regt, other than acknowledging that former members who testified before the Commission consistently asserted that the Regiment had a necessary role and capability throughout its existence. The consideration of enabling conditions is nonetheless important as it stands to reason that other institutions might have a series of such conditions that facilitate elitism by creating a habitus where the empirical indicators of elitism are justified and reproduced.

Criminal and Aberrant Behaviour

Criminal and aberrant behaviour were initially identified as indicators of the defiance to authority variable. Aberrant behaviour involves a departure from accepted standards, violating or otherwise antithetical to institutional norms. As such it is fundamentally counter normative and at odds with institutional rules or expectations. In some contexts, aberrant behaviour has connotations of being performed in secret or otherwise veiled or disguised for reasons of self-interest as is the case with the wall of silence. Aberrant behaviour is distinguished from criminal behaviour in that the latter pertains to laws that have been established to define and regulate prohibited behaviour within society to comply with societal norms. Merton's theory of anomie provides insight into the focus on aberrant behaviour in that it describes a situation where norms have lost their validity in terms of behavioural expectations.⁵¹⁷ Put another way, in this case the standards and rules governing behaviour within the CAF to some degree ceased to have validity. While it is difficult to predict compliance with social norms like criminal laws (in fact we can predict a degree of non-compliance depending on the prevalence of certain conditions), it would seem reasonable to predict and expect a higher degree of compliance within an organization such as the CAF where there are preconditions to admission to an institution structured on norms of obedience.

In contemplating how military law relates to broader Canadian laws such as the Criminal Code, consider Fiddell's observation that "It is unhealthy, in a democratic society, for the military justice system to exist as unknown territory to the civilian bench and bar."⁵¹⁸ It is generally acknowledged that the CAF has become more aligned with Canadian society since the Somalia affair, although some of the Inquiry testimony as well as the Hewson and DeFaye reports were

⁵¹⁷ Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," *American Sociological Review* 3, no. 5 (October 1938): 672-682.

⁵¹⁸ Eugene R. Fiddell, "The National Institute of Military Justice: A Status Report," *Naval Institute Proceedings*, 124 (August 1998): 77.

quick to compare the Cdn AB Regt to society at large, especially when asserting certain antisocial behaviour within the Regiment was not statistically significant.⁵¹⁹ Keeping in mind his report was released in 1985, Hewson asserts at that time the CAF was a “microcosm of society.”⁵²⁰ As a prelude to further discussion on discipline, there is ample evidence that the CAF tended to rely on the NDA and the Code of Service Discipline to regulate misconduct and aberrant behaviour, even that which constituted an offence under the Criminal Code of Canada. This approach allows for the timely and efficient maintenance of discipline and order, but it also affords the opportunity to keep matters in-house and moderate punishment with a view towards protecting individuals and the institution.

With regards to the circumstances that would warrant elevating CAF disciplinary matters into the criminal realm, in a discussion of sexual assault complaints by female members in the late 1990s, Madsen notes it was generally left to complainants to report “misbehavior” to superior officers.⁵²¹ He explains “the military justice system became involved only when the threshold of physical coercion, on which a criminal charge could be based, was crossed.”⁵²² Madsen then asserts that COs preferred to ignore problems or “settle them quietly within the unit” unless there was a pattern of multiple incidents or victims.⁵²³ While Madsen is speaking to the late 1990s, his comments acknowledge that even in the post-Somalia era the CAF preferred to keep serious matters in-house and there was a propensity to only use Criminal law as a last resort. He then asserts that if disciplinary problems within the CAF during that era were placed on a continuum, minor service offences would be at one end, cases involving “sexual harassment and abuse” in the middle, and the “mistreatment” of Somali prisoners would be on the most serious end of the spectrum.⁵²⁴

It is apparent from the testimony that criminal and aberrant behaviour flows from defiance to authority and relationship to the outside world, leading to the manifestation of an oppositional and discordant habitus featuring aberrant and, in some cases, illegal behaviour. This follows the same pattern of elitism facilitating clericalism, where ordained priests who engage in this aberrant behaviour use their special status within the church to their own malicious ends. As previously discussed, elitism serves as a means of modulating power, and abuse of power or privilege is a way of using an institution for one’s own benefit. The combination of ecclesial (including mandatory celibacy) and academic requirements for admission to the ordained priesthood provides significant power and authority over the unordained lay-members, who as Ballano observes

⁵¹⁹ Hewson Inquiry, *Executive Summary*, paragraph 16. Hewson notes that acts of violence on military establishments were “generally similar to that which occurs in the population at large” and asserts this data corroborates “the theory which states that the armed forces are a microcosm of the society which they defend.”

⁵²⁰ *Ibid.*, para 18.

⁵²¹ Madsen, *Another Kind of Justice*, 153

⁵²² *Ibid.*

⁵²³ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁴ *Ibid.*

are excluded from the hierarchical structure of the church.⁵²⁵ Balch and Armstrong isolate special status and a special sense of mission as enabling corporate elitism and facilitating corporate wrongdoing, which can lead to iconoclastic behaviour.⁵²⁶ Ultimately it is the conditions that permit elitism to manifest that are of interest, and criminal and aberrant behaviour are just some of the by-products of elitism as well as being evidence of a socially discordant habitus.

There are several factors to be considered regarding the use of witness testimony as the data for the case study. It is helpful that witnesses were under oath and that the Inquiry had the power to compel them to testify. A drawback was that witnesses were permitted to discuss matters and hear each other's evidence even before providing their own testimony (contrary to the exclusion of witnesses in criminal trials). Furthermore, all witnesses had the opportunity to exercise a significant degree of retrospective analysis pertaining to the events that had already played out and the corresponding facts that had come to light, culminating in the disbandment of the Regiment in March 1995. When considering the testimony of the witnesses, it is important to acknowledge they were not operating in isolation from a significant amount of publicly reported information, facts and perspectives. Put another way, witnesses had years to inform themselves and reflect upon what they had learned. The post-Somalia BOI had made relatively quick work of conducting its inquiry and issuing findings in July 1993, although numerous military police investigations were still ongoing. Some witnesses were asked questions about the BOI's findings or indicated in their testimony that they were aware of some of the contents of the report.

Elitism and Aggression/Hypermascularity

Aggression features prominently in the testimony, which begs an overview of hypermasculinity as a social construct linked to gender. Hypermasculinity is described by Klein as a choice made to be able to engage with others.⁵²⁷ Tompkins provides a foundation for understanding hypermasculinity with his research on the macho man, which in addition to a component on sexual attitudes consists of a male persona characterized by violence and a need for danger.⁵²⁸ Rosen et al. describe hypermasculinity in male-only peer groups as including "expressions of extreme, exaggerated, or stereotypic masculine attributes and behaviours" and note a substantial body of literature that supports a correlation between hypermasculinity and bonding in

⁵²⁵ Ballano, "Inculturation, Philosophy, and the Social Sciences as the Emerging Handmaid of Theology."

⁵²⁶ Balch and Armstrong, "Ethical Marginality: The Icarus Syndrome."

⁵²⁷ Lloyd Klein, "Hypermasculinity" in Claire Rensetti and Jeffrey Edleson (eds.) *Encyclopedia of Interpersonal Violence* (Thousands Oakes: SAGE, 2008).

⁵²⁸ Silvan S. Tomkins, "Script Theory: Differential Magnification of Effects" in H.E. Howe Jr. and R.A. Dienstbier (Eds.) *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation* (Vol 26) (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979).

male only groups.⁵²⁹ O'Malley contends that hypermasculinity "serves as an excuse and rationale for subordinating women," but her analysis applies equally to any context where violence and aggression have been socially constructed as a part of the habitus, which correlates to much of the evidence pertaining to the Cdn AB Regt.⁵³⁰ Corprew et al. conducted a study of college aged males that supports the assertion that a habitus of hypermasculinity bolstered by influential members can combine to where aggression and violence are viewed as both natural and ideal for a male, often leading to misogynistic attitudes and behaviours.⁵³¹ Miller contends that hypermasculinity and aggression is prevalent in the military and is sometimes perceived as a positive characteristic, an observation that is similar to how attributes of elitism can be misconstrued as a positive phenomenon.⁵³²

The extent to which hypermasculinity permeated the habitus of the Cdn AB Regt and was part of the social capital that maintained elitism within the Regiment was on display during numerous videos that proved to be the final nail in the Regiment's coffin. While it has been argued that those events were not formally sanctioned or alternatively were banned, in one video of 1 CDO a male can be clearly seen wearing combat dress displaying the rank of major. McCollom discusses initiation rites as he espouses the "airborne mystique," and refers to a 1959 study by Aronson and Mills concluding severe initiation rites result in participants perceiving the group as being more attractive.⁵³³ The study is based on Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance which postulates that undergoing a painful experience to become a member of a group causes cognitive dissonance, and in response to a pressure to reduce that dissonance members will distort their cognition of the event by overestimating the attractiveness of the group they have joined. Cooper describes Festinger's theory as "one of the most enduring and successful" of social psychology and notes the motivation to seek the reduction of the state of dissonance has "drive-like

⁵²⁹ Leora Rosen, Kathryn Knudsen, and Peggy Fancher "Cohesion and the Culture of Hypermasculinity in U.S. Army Units", *Armed Forces and Society* 29 (2003): 326.

⁵³⁰ Meghan O'Malley, "All is Not Fair in Love and War: An Exploration of the Military Masculinity Myth," *DePaul Journal of Women, Gender and Law* 5, no. 1 (Fall 2015): 6.

⁵³¹ Charles S. Corprew, Jamaal Matthews, Avery Mitchell "Men at the Crossroads: A Profile Analysis of Hypermasculinity in Emerging Adulthood", *Journal of Men's Studies* 22: 105-121.

⁵³² Christopher Miller, "Evaluating the Social Conditions Encouraging Hypermasculinity that Lead to Joining and Engaging in Terrorist Groups," *International Journal of Terrorism and Political Hot Spots* 12, no. 2-3: 241.

⁵³³ J.K. McCollom, "The Airborne Mystique," *Military Review* Volume LVI, no. 11 (November 1976), also contained in Annex S-3 to the Hewson Report. Elliot Aronson & Judson Mills. "The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group," *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 59, no. 2 (1959): 177-181. The term "airborne mystique" speaks to the social capital of elitism and the posturing of elite status. While widely asserted and despite McCollom's assertions, the concept is an untested perception.

properties.”⁵³⁴ The term drive reflects the notion that it is not a preference but rather a necessity, much the same way hunger and thirst drive people to meet those needs. One can appreciate McCollom’s reference to Aronson and Mill’s study in that it seemingly provides tacit approval of severe rites of passage and validates the efficacy of this means of building cohesion. However, the ostensibly severe initiation that served as the independent variable in Aronson and Mill’s study consisted of female college students being subjected to reading embarrassing material as a precondition to joining the group. Considering this study was done in 1957, it is important to consider the relative unpleasantness of that experience within the social context of the day. The Cdn AB Regt’s formally sanctioned initiation consisted of the AIC, and it is safe to presume that most graduates of the AIC would take some exception to having the physically and mentally arduous aspects being compared to research which measures the effects of being exposed to sexual themed words and profanity in a controlled environment.⁵³⁵ However the overall predictions regarding dissonance generally hold true, where people are drawn to that which they endure hardships to achieve, and the more they suffer, the more positive their feelings for it.⁵³⁶

McCollom’s refers to narcissism as a positive construct, and Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD) is outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual as having two relative levels being more overt/grandiose and the covert/vulnerable.⁵³⁷ The phallic form of NPD referenced by McCollom is another term for the grandiose level.⁵³⁸ Since McCollom asserts the importance of this characteristic in a military setting, it is helpful to further examine some of the criteria and symptoms related to a diagnosis of NPD. Recognizing that NPD manifests itself along a continuum and as such will vary with the individual, some key indicators of the grandiose type includes entitlement, arrogance, attention-seeking, being self-absorbed and preoccupied with their image, believing they are special and should associate with similar people, and being attracted to high-profile and/or leadership positions.⁵³⁹ Researchers have attempted to narrow down the various sub-types. Kohut and Wolf delineated sub-types based on interpersonal relationships, with one being “mirror-hungry individuals who tend to display themselves in front of others.”⁵⁴⁰ Millon subsequently identifies “an elitist type that tends towards self-promotion and has

⁵³⁴ Joel Cooper “Cognitive Dissonance: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going,” *International Review of Social Psychology* 32, no. 1 (2019): 1.

⁵³⁵ Aronson & Mills, 18. The methodology relied upon an “embarrassment test” as the severe conditions, and the test consisted of the subject reading 12 obscene words and two vivid descriptions of sexual activity that had been extracted from contemporary novels of the day.

⁵³⁶ Ibid.

⁵³⁷ American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-5*, 2013.

⁵³⁸ Kenneth N. Levy, “Subtypes, Dimensions, Levels and Mental States in Narcissism and Narcissistic Personality Disorder. *Journal of Clinical Psychology: In Session* 68, no. 8 (2012): 887.

⁵³⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁰ H. Kohut & E.S. Wolf, “The disorders of the self and their treatment: An outline,” *The International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 59(4), (1978): 413–425.

an inflated self-concept.”⁵⁴¹ Wink concluded a 20-year longitudinal study in 1992 where he notes that grandiose narcissists were the only category to show “little change at 43 years of age relative to 21 years of age,” and also reported “an attitude of dislike toward their mothers with concurrent pride in their fathers,” hence the phallic reference.⁵⁴² Writing on the psychology of military incompetence, Dixon asserts that military organizations indirectly further military incompetence by “attracting, selecting and promoting a minority of people with particular defects of intellect and personality.”⁵⁴³ All of this raises the question whether McCollom may have underestimated the darker side to some of the characteristics of NPD.

Although the literature specific to Canadian and U.S. paratroopers does not provide any direct nexus between rituals/rites of passage and how these may directly benefit aspects paratrooper training, these rituals may have a direct connection to the effectiveness of military parachuting. Aran examines the three phases of military parachuting in the Israeli army, exploring the purpose of post-jump rituals that are designed to re-integrate paratroopers into group cohesion. Describing military parachute instructors somewhat whimsically as “social-control agents,” Aran explains their actions are intended to shift paratroopers from the independence, arrogance, and rebellious dispositions they have just experienced during the “egocentric withdrawal” of the jump.⁵⁴⁴ The Israeli army’s post-jump rituals are designed to reinforce group over individual supremacy, and feature strict discipline along with hard and tedious assignments that require extreme effort “and even deliberate degradation.”⁵⁴⁵ Aran compares the post-jump period to the situation of soldiers returning from leave, where in order to reintroduce them to the hard routine of army life they are subjected to “deliberate humiliation, excessive use of punitive measures, and imposition of many detailed, unnecessary, and annoying rules.”⁵⁴⁶ Aran concludes that there is a “striking resemblance between the jump experience and rites of passage,” and asserts that both jumping and initiation rites are a test where successful completion propels the participant into an elite group.⁵⁴⁷

There are parallels between these rites of passage and rituals that Garfinkle terms status degradation ceremonies, which are “any communicative work between persons, whereby the public identity of an actor is transformed into something looked on as lower in the local scheme of social types.”⁵⁴⁸ Degradation ceremonies rely upon moral indignation, which is the “ritual destruction of the person denounced” and is achieved through public

⁵⁴¹ Levy, “Subtypes, Dimensions. Levels and Mental States in Narcissism and Narcissistic Personality Disorder.”

⁵⁴² Ibid.

⁵⁴³ Dixon, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*, 169.

⁵⁴⁴ Gideon Aran, “Parachuting,” *American Journal of Sociology* 80 (July 1974): 142.

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid., 143.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid., 150.

⁵⁴⁸ Harold Garfinkel “Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies,” *American Journal of Sociology* 61 (March, 1956): 420-29.

denunciation.⁵⁴⁹ The analogies provided by Garfinkel include the example of someone who is convicted of murder, who is not merely changed by the label of murderer but is in fact reconstituted into that negative entity. Put more harshly, the features of that person as a peaceful citizen are reversed by the denounced person, who now has “the features of a mad-dog murderer” being placed outside the legitimate social order.⁵⁵⁰ Garfinkel singles out the court system as having a monopoly over degradation ceremonies, referring to judges and lawyers as “our professional degraders in the law courts.”⁵⁵¹

Observations Regarding the Public Inquiry Process

With context being key to any analysis, many hearings and trials commenced prior to the Somalia Commission initiating public hearings in May 1995. Each of these investigations and trials exposed varying degrees of facts, assertions, and attempts to minimize and conceal wrongdoing. In terms of the variable of protecting one’s own, it is noteworthy that in several instances, military courts martial failed to deliver appropriate punishment, as evidenced by the CMAC increasing penalties for Boland and Seward. Boland was sentenced to 90 days custody at his court martial, and the sentence was increased exponentially to one year of custody on appeal.⁵⁵² The CMAC found Seward’s sentence of a severe reprimand was “clearly unreasonable,” and substituted a sentence of 90 days custody and dismissal from Her Majesty’s service.⁵⁵³

There is significant explicative value to the observation that witnesses often appeared unprejudiced and uninfluenced by these court findings and outcomes, as evidenced by instances where they held steadfast to their sustained opinions and perceptions. This was the case even when their position was tenuous considering the facts and findings that had been discussed during the court proceedings outlined in Table 3. As evidenced during the analysis of testimony, it was rare for witnesses to apply a retrospective analysis or insight, even with a caveat of having the benefit of shining the harsh light of hindsight. This speaks to the power of habitus as an analytical tool, confirming how deeply ingrained and embodied dispositions can be, often overriding any retrospection or interest in understanding or acknowledging certain decisions and events. The reproduction of these dispositions persisted throughout the testimony, confirming the extent to which the Regiment’s habitus was guided by embodied social structures operating at the individual and collective level.

⁵⁴⁹ Ibid., 421.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid., 424.

⁵⁵² R v. Boland, 5 CMAR 316, judgement rendered on May 16, 1995. Note that the CMAC acknowledged that “public policy demands firm deterrence,” and that a sentence of 18 months custody was appropriate but the court took into account that Boland had already served 90 days.

⁵⁵³ R v. Seward, 5 CMAR 435, judgement rendered on May 27, 1996.

Table 3
Timeline of Public Testimony Leading up to Somalia Inquiry

July 1993	DeFaye BOI issues its findings approximately three months after being convened. The Board is not permitted to examine any incidents where military police investigations were ongoing.
March 16, 1994	Private Kyle Brown is convicted of Manslaughter and torture at his Court Martial.
April 1994	Sgt Gretskey is acquitted and MCpl Matchee is found not fit to stand trial after hanging himself. Sgt Boland is convicted of negligent performance of duty and sentenced to 90 days custody. Private Smith is sentenced to four months custody for the shooting death of Cpl Abel.
June 1994	Maj Seward is convicted and sentenced to a severe reprimand. He was subsequently imprisoned for three months on appeal to the CMAC, and he was ordered dismissed from Her Majesty's service. He was denied leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada in December 1996.
June 1994	Trial of LCol Mathieu, CO of Cdn AB Regt, he is found not guilty of negligent performance of a military duty. In November, 1995 CMAC orders a new trial because JAG instructed the court to apply a subjective test rather than objective as required by law.
October 1994	Trial of Private Brocklebank, he is acquitted and the Court Martials Appeal Court dismisses the prosecution's appeal.
January – March 1995	Court Martial of Captain Sox, he is convicted and sentenced to a Severe Reprimand and reduced in rank to Lieutenant. Decision upheld by CMAC in July 1996 with the court noting the sentence was "not clearly unreasonable." ⁵⁵⁴
March 1995	Cdn AB Regt Disbanded
May 1995	Sgt Mark Boland's conviction for negligence is upheld and sentence is increased from 90 days to one year in custody.

⁵⁵⁴ R v. Sox, 5 CMAR 460, judgement rendered on July 4, 1996.

This case study confirms the analytical value of Bourdieu's concept of habitus and the related concepts of field and capital. Subjected to the powerful explanatory power and potential of Bourdieu's concepts, identifiable schemes of perception, thought and action emerge that help explicate how elitism was manifested and reproduced within the Regiment. The witness testimony at the Somalia Inquiry provides significant insight into the dispositions of the various witness, as such illuminating their personal habitus and to varying degrees the habitus of the respective fields including the CAF, the profession of arms, the Cdn AB Regt, and the individual Commandos. The testimony reveals opinions, perceptions, preconceptions, interpretations, reactions, and recollections. These reflect the internalized and second-nature dispositions that illuminate the socially shared perceptions of social ordering within the various fields. Through repeated exposure to the norms and practices within the Regiment, the witnesses were socialized into a habitus fostering elitism, their perceptions, attitudes and behaviours shaped with the objective of reinforcing in others the perception of their elite status.

The identified variables and empirical indicators of elitism outlined in Figure 3 have been confirmed/sustained through the case study analysis. Both an individual and collective habitus shaping elitism can be seen to have operated both overtly and below the surface, guiding choices and actions as illuminated throughout the witness testimony, ultimately reproducing the habitus. Collectively, people adapt and reconcile, ultimately becoming habituated to the dispositions of an institution. When elitism is considered in the context of a perceptual scheme of dispositions, it is apparent that members of the Regiment learned, shared, and bolstered preferences that sought to reinforce in others the perception of elite status. The witness testimony reveals social norms, practices and an understanding of capital related to elitism that are socially acquired dispositions that shaped attitudes and behaviours of individuals and the entire Regiment as a social group. Isolating and enumerating these specific dispositions in the next chapter will provide unique insight into the manifestation and reproduction of elitism.

Chapter 5 – Findings

He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side, if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion... Nor is it enough that he should hear the opinions of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. He must be able to hear them from persons who believe them...he must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form.

John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*

This inquiry has confirmed the significant analytical and explanatory power of Pierre Bourdieu's habitus and related concepts as it pertains to gaining insight and understanding into the manifestation and reproduction of elitism. The transcripts of witness testimony from the Somalia Commission provided the opportunity encouraged by Mill, to hear assertions directly from those who believed them. Of the empirical indicators of elitism that were applied during the analysis of the testimony, the most instructive in terms of understanding elitism emanate from a dysfunctional habitus, namely the wall of silence and the parallel power network. The bad apple syndrome is also a crucial concept in terms of comprehending an institution's relationship to the outside world. It was a commonly asserted albeit specious explanation for almost every specific instance of deleterious behaviour. As such these indicators will be explicated further to demonstrate the extent to which they are generalizable to other institutions in an analysis of elitism.

As a result of having validated the three variables and nine empirical indicators of elitism in the case study, clearly identifiable themes emerge that are recognized and expressed as dispositions shaping a habitus of elitism. These dispositions are unconscious schemes of perception that form part of an analytical framework useful for further isolating norms and expectations pertaining to elitism. Identifying these dispositions helps elucidate a habitus where there is the tendency to act a certain way in terms of fostering elitism. These are predispositions and a propensity or inculcation that is locked in through habituation, becoming second nature and as such influencing attitudes and ultimately behaviours within an institution. The case study reveals that a habitus that shapes and fosters elitism does so by engaging the outside world through social posturing instead of meeting the social requirements for being objectively perceived as legitimate. The core social dynamics of elitism consist of using power relationships to seek and reinforce privileges and advantages and favour one's own. Given the self-serving focus, those who choose to abuse power and exert elitism ultimately abrogate their duties and responsibilities to an institution and consequently, over time, undermine the protection of any objectively verifiable elite status that may have existed. The maintenance of elitism then requires protection from the outside world through dysfunctional means, such as the aberrant attitudes and behaviours of elitism. Ultimately, elitism can be thought of as a parallel track to objectively verifiable elite status.

A key point to understand is how the social capital of elitism is constituted, including how it is gained and lost. Before introducing the themes and corresponding dispositions that have been isolated from the variables and empirical indicators of elitism, the central characteristics of the three variables and associated empirical indicators of elitism extracted from the case study will be summarized to elucidate the extent to which they provide observable and measurable insight into the manifestation and reproduction of elitism.

Defiance to Authority – Blatant Disrespect / Ignoring Rules

Defiance to authority is an ideational variable that manifests as attitudes and behaviours indicative of a deliberate refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of individuals or a collective socially invested with decisional power for an institution. As such, all other variables either flow from defiance to authority or are bolstered by the associated dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours. In the case study, violating institutional norms and criminal law and disregarding direction from those socially invested with decisional power emerged as predominant examples, which speaks to both disrespect and challenge of authority. This disrespect and disregard for authority and rules, however, does not occur in a socio-cultural void. It is conditioned by the concrete and empirical context of how social capital is constituted in a particular milieu. Defiance to authority is a variable of elitism that is constitutive of unique social capital of a habitus that shapes elitism. Social capital includes social networks and relationships indicative of one's position within the hierarchy of a respective institution, and defiance to authority is a powerful form of capital that can be used to reinforce the social posturing inherent in elitism and thus shape individual and collective trajectories. Every field has its own orthodoxy or organizing logic that includes a specific understanding of social capital like the intimidation aspect of defiance to authority. This includes the social connections, networks and relationships, and requires an understanding of the meaning (much like an understanding of professional jargon) to be considered cultural capital. Once defiance is socially recognized and equated with special or elite status, it is legitimized as symbolic capital.⁵⁵⁵ As such, defiance to authority is a significant form of capital in terms of reproducing elitism.

All forms of capital must be actively invested to yield results, like Bourdieu's "feel for the game" where, in the example of a card game, it is the interplay between the cards that are dealt to a player, their skill level and the rules of the game. Bourdieu's analogy can be amplified by the observation that there are many different card games, including variations on the number of cards used, the purpose of the game (e.g. gambling versus magic tricks or solitaire) and modifications in the rules known only to those with the social capital specific to that particular game. This analogy can then be extrapolated to any social situation

⁵⁵⁵ Pierre Bourdieu, *Forms of Capital: General Sociology, Volume 3. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1983-84* (Cambridge: Polity, 2021), 163-167. Bourdieu characterizes cultural capital as a "gift" obtained by "hidden transmission" because it is antecedent to formal education, and it is not explicitly learned, inherited or endowed.

and the corresponding need for an understanding of the requisite capital. Metaphorically, social capital can be construed as being divided into “currency” which will be accepted in certain milieus, but not in others. In terms of social capital, defiance in and of itself can constitute social capital of elitism. Tolerance or acceptance of disrespect towards an institution’s formal power network has obvious deleterious implications, but elitism justifies the denial or downplaying the recalcitrant attitudes and behaviours. Put another way, the precepts of elitism can facilitate the accumulation of social capital by signaling a refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of people and institutional constructs socially invested with decisional power. In this sense, elitism can be construed as a counterculture given the dysfunctional implications and social dynamics that are antithetical to institutional norms.

Bourdieu makes a somewhat perfunctory attempt at breaking down the military habitus when he explains a disciplined military habitus is the combination of institutional rules and “the disposition inculcated by being trained to obey this rule.”⁵⁵⁶ He asserts that soldiers must function like machines to the extent where there is no opportunity to reflect on orders, all direction must be followed instantly and without discussion. Bourdieu identifies military discipline as a disposition requiring an ingrained expectation of immediate and unquestioning obedience which he terms “the disciplined habitus of the good soldier” where soldiers must be conditioned to respond in situations that are “as hostile as possible to obedience.”⁵⁵⁷ This focus on obedience as the predominant social capital of the military implies that obedience can be invested within the social environment of the military to access opportunities, social support, trust and other desired results. This is simply no longer the case in most contemporary militaries. While unquestioning obedience was a focus in World War I and earlier, social capital is currently accumulated within military institutions by exercising leadership, including demonstrating initiative, decision-making skills, communication, and the ability to influence others. However, this inquiry demonstrates that leadership can operate in a dysfunctional manner in a habitus shaped by elitism, where the focus is on engaging the outside world through social posturing and disingenuous actions and assertions intended to give the appearance of accountability. For example, ostensibly adjusting or making fixes to an aspect of an institution without changing anything they do not wish to change. The Hewson Inquiry and DeFaye BOI serve as examples, where some problems are acknowledged but the focus is on euphemisms, justifications and excuses as the social capital intended to reinforce elitism. Elitism is exerted with a view towards convincing others that appropriate action is being taken, projecting an image that can in good faith be believed by others although no substantive changes are being made.

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid., 271-2.

Discordant Habitus – Parallel Power Network

As with any oppositional habitus, a parallel power network has unique dispositions, including rules, attitudes and behaviours that shape a discordant habitus antithetical to institutional norms. The struggle to acquire and maximize various forms of capital within a field pits those who hold the dominant positions against those in subordinate positions (prior to the manifestation of this phenomenon) relative to the formal institutional power network. Schwartz explains that within this struggle there are those who control the “definition and distribution of capital” versus those on the other side of the struggle who seek to “usurp the advantages.”⁵⁵⁸ As the discordant habitus of the parallel power network takes root and usurps the authority of the formal institutional power network, those engaged in this elitist faction exert control over the definition of capital as observed by Schwartz, ultimately resulting in a disordered loyalty and the corresponding dysfunctional implications.

The parallel power network is an indicator of elitism that correlates to the insular practice of academic inbreeding, where immobile individuals who control the definition of social capital can stifle new ideas, thought and perspective. A parallel power network broadens and extends the precepts of academic inbreeding by being inherently anti-authority and dysfunctional. The other key dynamic to the parallel power network is the extent to which its existence is acknowledged or conversely suppressed by members of the institution. The choice of language when referring to this elitist sub-group is revealing when, much like the definitional problem with elitism, descriptions have positive connotations that do not adequately telegraph the dysfunctional and discordant characteristics of a subversive habitus. Phrases that contain euphemisms or serve as a circumlocution for oppugnant behaviour and incongruous alliances operating in opposition to the institutional power network illuminate dispositions that reproduce elitism. Hence, the discordant habitus and its associated social capital production are built on the premise of diverging from accepted norms. It is in this context that a parallel power network becomes a social necessity to protect, enforce and implicitly reaffirm the preponderance of these divergent norms.

There is an interplay between the parallel power network and other indicators, including where elitism is exerted through the denial of any knowledge of this phenomenon to protect the reputation of the institution and specific members. Consistent with every aspect of elitism, dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours of the parallel power network are often minimized through euphemisms and dysphemisms. Another dysfunctional dynamic is where individuals who comprise a parallel power network use intimidation and other forms of influence to ensure the removal of anyone who challenges them, including superiors, as such further exerting their elitism through the subversive habitus. The result is the potential to select their own leaders and co-workers, essentially keeping those they can control and eliminating anyone who they

⁵⁵⁸ David Swartz, *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 124.

dislike because they challenge the parallel power network by outperforming or holding its members accountable.

An institution may avoid dealing with a parallel power network and consequently exert elitism by dismissing it as a social phenomenon occurring outside the workplace, as defined by the physical location or activities taking place outside regular working hours. This is intended to distance or remove knowledge, responsibility and accountability from the institutional power network, treating the parallel power network as a phenomenon over which they have no influence, control or authority. Finally, following the previously identified paradox of not knowing who is involved in this elitist faction but nonetheless asserting it is a small group of persons, the institutional power network can minimize the phenomenon by suggesting it is very much an anomaly, i.e. the behaviour of a few bad apples. Perpetrators may remain unidentified or ostensibly unidentifiable, yet members of the institution, and particularly those individuals socially invested with decision making authority will assert that the parallel power network only comprises a small and inconsequential number of individuals. The parallel power network emerges as an indicator that confirms how the precepts of elitism can be used to protect discordant and dysfunctional individuals and groups. Building on the social capital of defiance to individuals or the collective socially invested with decisional authority and power, these individuals can essentially infect the broader institution. This is achieved when the portion of the institution constituting the elitist faction challenges the legitimacy of the broader institution to the point where the institution at large has the perception that it has few options other than to tolerate, minimize and hide the pockets of discordant habitus. In a way, this confirms the notion that a bad apple can indeed spoil the entire barrel.

Discordant Habitus – Wall of Silence

The other significant indicator that fosters a discordant habitus that shapes elitism is the wall of silence. This is typically a group behaviour that seeks to suppress information through a concerted lack of cooperation, especially information pertaining to questionable actions or anything that would be prejudicial to an institution or its reputation. Also known as stonewalling, a wall of silence operates wholly for a purpose antithetical to institutional norms, featuring indicators such as protecting one's own by covering up wrongdoing, a disordered loyalty as seen with the parallel power network, and resistance and defiance to individuals or the collective socially invested with decisional power. The use of terms like bonding and collateral descriptions to describe a wall of silence continues the theme of euphemisms designed to suggest positive connotations to an entirely dysfunctional phenomenon. Tolerance of blatant insubordination, intimidation and insolent behavior or attempts to suggest positive connotations for the disordered loyalty including characterizing dysfunctional behaviour in the context of esprit de corps and cohesion correlates to a habitus where a wall of silence has become entrenched. Like the manifestation of the parallel power network where it is mischaracterized as leadership, the institution by and large has arrived at a point where there is a

perception that it has limited options other than to tolerate, minimize and hide evidence of the discordant habitus. This is indicative of how the parallel power network and the wall of silence flow ideationally from defiance to authority, and the wall of silence thrives within the subversive habitus of a parallel power network. The wall of silence involves complicity and a degree of conspiracy amongst a group of individuals and serves to assert and maintain elitism through the social capital of defiance to authority. As with other indicators, euphemisms and dysphemisms feature heavily in minimizing and providing excuses for failing to act, as does the claim that individuals cannot be forced to comply with efforts to overcome the wall of silence. The belief that individuals have a right not to cooperate with the institutional power network gives rise to a form of dysphemism for any process or investigation that would seek to determine the truth and hold individuals accountable for their actions. Ultimately a wall of silence is an overt challenge to an institution's power network. With respect to denying or attempting to suppress anything with adverse implications, there can be evidence of a refusal to even acknowledge the existence of this phenomenon despite it being a very common expression used in different but similar connotations. Like the parallel power network, the wall of silence can be a more powerful force than the formal power network in terms of exerting elitism to influence and shape the habitus of the elitist faction within the institution.

Relationship to the Outside World

Elitism is only socially meaningful through its relationship to the outside world, and the manifestation and reproduction of elitism necessitates asserting and preserving the perception of elite status, which includes protecting the reputation of the institution as well as individual members. Furthermore, the accumulation of social capital by those engaged in a habitus shaping elitism reinforces the capacity to protect these members from delegitimization forces that come from the outside world. This can be viewed on a continuum of myopic and self-referential attitudes and behaviours of elitism, from favouring their own with preferential treatment to covering up deleterious acts, insulating themselves from scrutiny by engaging the wall of silence, and using all available means to downplay or conceal evidence of dysfunction. Other dynamics for protecting and reproducing elitism include insulation from the winds of change, replicating and perpetuating the status quo thereby resulting in a limiting of the skillset and diversity of knowledge, approaches and perspectives. Favoured treatment will often include instances where broader and formal institutional norms are not followed. Elitism modulates power therefore it is also a means to enhance the prestige of any elitist faction within an institution, thereby reinforcing individual elitism as a current or former member and consequently reproducing prestige hierarchies.

A myopic habitus encompasses a variety of aspects including self-referential viewpoints, an intolerant and inward-focused habitus, resistance to outside influence, a desire to be perceived as elite at any cost, and indicators highlighted in the context of the parallel power network where members see themselves as sole purveyors and interpreters of institutional knowledge, norms

and practices. A myopic habitus is suggestive of insulation from some of the norms and values of the outside world, which enables a key theme of overlooking problems by putting them in the past. Putting an unresolved incident, situation or problem in the past involves suppressing the experience without taking any corrective action. Similarly, a persistent underlying theme of refusing to acknowledge or downplaying disciplinary issues, challenges to authority and serious incidents demonstrates that elitism is fostered by minimizing, failing to acknowledge, or condoning aspects of a dysfunctional habitus. It follows that downplaying and persistent denial of problems even in the face of clear evidence are indicators of a myopic habitus. A tolerance for misconduct and aberrant or criminal behaviour can be demonstrated using euphemisms or dysphemisms to downplay the seriousness and contribute to a myopic habitus where these activities are accepted as normal through the banality of wrongdoing.

Offering alternate but implausible or nonsensical explanations for dysfunctional behaviour is an extension of the theme of tolerating, minimizing and denying anything that reflects poorly on the elitist faction within an institution. With a closed and self-referential habitus insulated from outside society and to a degree from the habitus of the broader institution, the institutional power network will acquire dispositions that lead them to apply the same norms to insulate themselves from scrutiny and accountability. Consider the permissive attitude and approach to alcohol consumption within the Cdn AB Regt or any similar practice or behaviour, where it is viewed as essentially an entitlement or necessity even when there is objective evidence that it contributed to significant dysfunction within the institution. Ultimately, anything that reflects poorly on an individual, a sub-group within an institution, or the institution at large is subject to being minimized, ignored, or denied because acknowledging the dysfunction telegraphs the absence of elite status.

Personal attitudes and beliefs such as racist or extremist ideology and corresponding behaviours that are antithetical to the institution cannot be separated from professional life. Failing to recognize or acknowledge that this ideology would flow over to an individual's professional habitus falls into the spectrum from disingenuous to equivocal or deceptive. Attempting to delineate between dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours and work performance is an insular practice ultimately aimed at protecting one's own by asserting it did not affect their job performance and as such is irrelevant or even inconsequential. A plausible explanation for the irresolute approach to disciplining intransigent members may be an underlying belief that the transgressions are trivial. However, in the end it is related to social capital production, where such capital is gained by a deliberate refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of individuals or the collective that are socially invested with decisional power. Although racist views and extremist ideologies are held by certain individuals, sociologically they also play a role in the institutional dynamics of elitism.

A myopic habitus can replicate dysfunction and perpetuate elitism, which necessarily involves some degree of favouring and protecting one's own. This often entails a viewpoint that something is only a problem when the public becomes aware of it. The maintenance and reproduction of elitism requires favouring and protecting one's own and condoning the associated attitudes and

behaviours. The relationship between an elitist faction and the outside world requires the institution to protect its reputation even if that comes at significant cost. Because elitism is about reinforcing untested perceptions, making excuses and explanations becomes necessary and easily extends to the implausible or simply false. For institutions and professions that are essentially self-regulating, the internal disciplinary processes can paradoxically serve as a means of protecting the elitist faction and the broader institution by suppressing knowledge of these incidents as well as protecting members by ensuring minimal punishment is dispensed. Numerous institutions and regulatory bodies have their own disciplinary processes including the military, doctors, nurses, lawyers, judges, teachers, and police.

Forbidden acts, behaviour and symbols can become a form of capital, and the fact that it is banned increases its value as a currency of elitism, elevating the corresponding display or enactment to a blatant form of disrespect for authority which is then used to further exert elitism. An institutional power network has numerous motivations to prioritize protecting members over enforcing their own rules. With respect to protecting their personal reputation as well as that of the institution, a key mechanism for protecting members is to keep problems “in house” even if they are of a serious nature that could involve criminal charges. Rather than punish, the case study reveals examples where the focus turned to rewarding a perpetrator for coming forward, even though accepting punishment is an integral part of taking responsibility. This is essentially taking the easy way out, the path of least resistance notwithstanding it does not contribute to maintaining discipline and order. An institution’s power network has an interest in asserting there were no problems during their tenure, there may have been minor problems when they first took charge but invariably, they left the institution in better shape than they found it. When leaders fail to follow up or take further action when members engage in this dysfunctional behaviour, it is a condonation of indicators such as the parallel power network and wall of silence. Ultimately it lacks an air of plausibility and goes to credibility when someone cannot acknowledge any level of dysfunction within their organization because they are focused on protecting their own.

While elitism can be exerted by suppressing the associated dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours from outside scrutiny, it is important to recognize that with some of the incidents discussed there could have been action or resolutions taken that did not come up in testimony. This could be because a witness was unaware or the line of questioning did not elicit those details. Having said that, there were numerous examples where witnesses took the opportunity to set the record straight (at least in their mind) by asserting their perspective or recollection. As well, the analysis of testimony included all Regimental Commanders spanning 1985-92, recognizing these are key witnesses who should be reasonably expected to be apprised of all serious events and the associated outcomes during or in relation to their command. Like all testimony, a witness may not recall a particular detail or may choose to withhold the information or otherwise avoid speaking about it.

The Bad Apple Syndrome

A syndrome is a characteristic combination of opinion and behaviour, and the bad apple syndrome stands out as representing a significant disposition that contributed to the reproduction of a habitus shaping elitism. With aberrant and dysfunctional behaviour attributed to unknown individuals or a group while at the same time asserting the problem individuals are few, this syndrome enables the dysfunctional behaviour to be downplayed even though nobody can ascertain the constitute number of persons or groups that are responsible. A euphemistic reference to bad apples, undesirables or troublemakers is intended to suggest problems are limited to a small minority of individuals, like testimony regarding the parallel power network, begging the same question if you do not know who is responsible it cannot logically be asserted that it is a small number of individuals. Ultimately, the bad apple syndrome is invoked as an excuse and justification for dysfunctional behaviour and serves to detract attention from the institution at large. Blaming problems on unknown or unidentifiable persons is an example of counterfactual thinking where possible alternatives are created to provide an explanation that is counter to the facts or contrary to what occurred. Ultimately, the bad apple syndrome is a justification and excuse used by the institutional power network to project to the outside world that they have addressed problems while simultaneously downplaying the significance by attributing the same to a negligible number of individuals. Once again, this dynamic plays an important role in preserving social capital production built around a deliberate refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of individuals or the collective socially invested with decisional power.

The interplay between the bad apple syndrome and other indicators of elitism is evident to the extent this justification is invoked to conveniently ignore several important factors including who the person is, when their behaviour became a problem, how this was able to occur, and how the dysfunctional individual was able to survive or thrive within the habitus of the institution. The bad apple is a euphemism that puts all responsibility on the actions and behaviours of the anonymous individual(s) while removing responsibility from the leaders who are supposed to be accountable for discipline and welfare of the institution. This syndrome also protects the reputation of the elitist faction by inferring the problem individuals and their behaviour are not representative of the group. It also ignores or explains away the effect or repercussions these bad apples have on the overall habitus of the institution, the proverbial rotting of the rest of the barrel.

This inquiry into elitism has addressed the definitional challenges associated with the varied understandings and perceptions of elitism, and the fact that any undesirable connotations in literature typically pertain to ideational concepts (e.g. disdain for social or political elites) rather than dysfunctional implications. Defining elitism as attitudes and behaviors that are shared by a group and seeking to reinforce in others the perception that such group has elite status, and to ultimately reinforce the group's power, privileges and advantages provided by such status has proven accurate and effectual in the context of social posturing. There is a cycle of mutual influence between power and elitism, with

power being necessary to exert and reproduce elitism. Power is required to protect and favour one's own to access the privileges and advantages of the socially postured status. At the same time elitism modulates power, as power and status within the elitist faction of an institution both constitute the social capital of elitism. As indicated in Figure 1, elitism is the social posturing of elite status which then becomes valuable social capital as a power resource. All the findings pertaining to the empirical indicators of elitism illuminate unique dispositions that contribute to a habitus shaping elitism.

The Indicators of Elitism Distilled into Dispositions

The case study confirms that elitism presents as a complex social phenomenon, and that extracting a real-world perspective from witness testimony serves a significant explanatory function as to how elitism manifests and is justified within a military institution. By suspending judgement and conducting a heuristic examination of the context and meaning of the attitudes, opinions, perceptions, preconceptions, reactions, interpretations and recollections of those who testified at the Somalia Commission, the analysis focused on determining the witnesses' subjective beliefs and how they saw and interacted with the social world around them. At the same time the goal was to understand their behaviour and actions to illuminate the attributes and empirical indicators of elitism. With dispositions influencing habitus by functioning as schemes of perception that influence thought, action and practice, this structures how witnesses see the world and consequently influences their actions. Dispositions are acquired through a lifetime of experience and socialization, with repeated exposure to social norms and practices leading to them becoming ingrained and as such operating subconsciously. In the military, these dispositions will derive from a confluence of habituses, both personal as well as different aspects of the institution such as the CAF as a whole or the unique habitus of the officer corps or a specific regiment, service, branch, etc.

The following three themes and corresponding dispositions gleaned from the case study represent how elitism is manifested and reproduced and how the cultural capital of elitism is produced and depleted. The identified dispositions represent deeply ingrained practices that offer both a presage and explication of the manifestation of elitism within an institution.

Promotional Dimension of the Social Capital of Elitism

This theme speaks to how the social capital of elitism is advertised, negotiated or bargained for within an institution. Because a habitus shaping elitism engages the outside world through social posturing, there is a common underlying disingenuity behind these dispositions.

Mischaracterize Elitism as Desirable: This manifests as a sustained, relentless and ultimately obdurate effort to suppress the negative connotations of the attitudes and behaviours of elitism. It represents an ingrained perception that aberrant behaviour is acceptable by focusing on any ostensibly positive aspect

and thereby normalizing such behavior. This misrepresentation of the dysfunctional social dynamics is itself social capital that is exchanged for legitimacy. Ultimately, any example of predominantly dysfunctional behavior may have some desirable component to it. For example, a prison riot could be well-planned and meticulously executed, but prison officials would not likely characterize the riot in a positive light. Consequently, the skill set of instigators of dysfunctional behaviour cannot be characterized as “informal leadership” because leadership is about influencing people and serving as a positive example for others to emulate. Even the concept of negative leadership does not refer to an antithetical purpose, but rather it speaks to generally undesirable methods such as micro-managing or being overly autocratic. The parallel power network and wall of silence are the indicators most likely to be mischaracterized as having positive connotations.

Euphemism / Dysphemism: This disposition continues the theme of minimizing evidence of dysfunction and builds on the predisposition to mischaracterize indicators and attributes of elitism as desirable. The euphemism emerges as a learned and second nature means for describing dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours with the objective of downplaying or ultimately dismissing that which is deleterious. Examples include characterizing undesirable behaviour as a fracas, rebelling, or letting off steam and describing the stonewalling behaviour of a wall of silence as cohesion, bonding or team spirit as opposed to recognizing it as collusion. Referring to someone exercising their judgement can be used as a euphemism to dismiss an absence of leadership or accountability, essentially validating any decision or course of action because it was a judgement call. Euphemisms can be substantially veiled, such as an indication of respect for the school of hard knocks which can be an idiomatic reference to military jail. A dysphemism is the opposite of a euphemism and also mischaracterizes a situation, for example excusing inaction by suggesting that holding people accountable is tantamount to a witch-hunt or making a reference to threatening members when a leader is warning of repercussions for behaviour. As a disposition, the euphemism/dysphemism is a predominant example of one which is acquired and practiced over time as a manner of speech that serves to suppress evidence of elitism.

Condone Elitism: This builds on the first two dispositions and consists of an internalized propensity to tolerate, minimize and ultimately conceal evidence of elitism. This can manifest as a refusal to acknowledge clear patterns of behaviour, for example characterizing problems as isolated incidents. This disposition serves to structure and control how the elitist faction is seen or perceived by the outside world. This includes a mindset that the institution must be protected at any cost, including suppressing evidence of wrongdoing.

Managing the Social Capital of Elitism

This theme deals with how the social capital of elitism is produced within an institution. These dispositions are essentially the inner dynamics of how the institution presents, in other words the public facing image that is carefully curated to gain and maintain external legitimacy. Analogous to the mantra “the first rule of fight club is you don’t talk about fight club,” elitism is not acknowledged or discussed which effectively precludes any form of judgement or accountability. For those who benefit from the elitist context, this mitigates or reduces the opportunity for external challenges regarding legitimacy. This speaks to other variables pertaining to elitism, where secrecy is a form of social capital of defiance that builds and reinforces trust within the discordant habitus and avoids outside interference or influence.

Recalcitrance: This can be a sustained collective mindset consisting of an obstinately uncooperative attitude asserted socially in the form of disorderly and dysfunctional behaviour towards both institutional authorities as well as those external to the institution. Recalcitrance includes attitudes and behaviours on a spectrum from refractory, disorderly and disobedient to noncompliant and uncontrollable. The defiance can also pertain to rules and regulations and is a key component of the social capital production in such a context. As a disposition, recalcitrance is a mindset that normal rules and expectations do not apply. Expressed in terms of power, defiance is a relational concept exercised by one party and must be socially recognized and accepted by others to be tolerated and to be effective. As this disposition becomes firmly ingrained, it becomes easier to avoid any form of accountability because various forms of recalcitrance have been legitimated as social capital within the elitist faction and the institution at large. Recalcitrant individuals are largely accepted as being unmanageable and are ultimately viewed as being entitled to behave in this manner.

Sweep Under the Rug: This disposition is a scheme of perception that makes it permissible to ignore and put problems in the past regardless of the fact they are not resolved (those responsible were never held accountable). There is no consideration or regard for the likelihood that the problem will resurface. It is justified by a mindset that there is no responsibility or accountability necessary for something that can be pushed aside or brushed off. Sweeping something under the rug is evocative of the wall of silence and other similar aphorisms such as plastering over or consigning something to the margins, therefore the corresponding disposition features a scheme of perception, thought or action with implications of downplaying, overlooking, concealing, suppressing or otherwise ignoring something unfavourable or deleterious to an institution’s reputation. Ultimately, sweeping under the rug sends a signal that whatever is at stake is seen to be hindering the production of the social capital of elitism, and the very fact of acting in such a way also produces social capital coherent within the elitist context. In other words, this is a mutually reinforcing double effect of a countercultural practice.

Posturing of Punishment: This disposition is illusory as it represents an attempt to deceive to the outside world into believing that a problem has been dealt with and those within the elitist faction that are at fault have been held accountable. In the instances where a problem is ostensibly dealt with through disciplinary processes, internalized norms and expectations result in minimal punishment being meted out to protect both the individual and the reputation of institution. This ties in with other dispositions that contribute to a habitus where problems are concealed. Despite the disingenuous nature of the punishment or action taken, this disposition is intended to portray a specious appearance of accountability. Paradoxically, it can be extrapolated to situations where punishment is concentrated on individuals who threaten the protection of the habitus shaping elitism, like the outspoken Cpl Purnelle who was arrested by military police on his way to testify before the Somalia Commission.⁵⁵⁹ Ultimately, instances where there is a posturing of punishment represent missed opportunities for accountability and addressing dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours at their roots. Additionally, in the unique military context the case study reveals an underlying and persistent failure to understand criminal law which precluded military members from being held accountable based on the practices of the military police and the institution at large. Alternatively, there were many examples where the chain of command abdicated responsibility to the military police to investigate and hold members accountable. This is in stark contrast to the Génereux ruling from the Supreme Court of Canada, where the court suggests military members are more accountable than civilians by virtue of being subject to military and civilian law simultaneously.

Implicit Rules of Social Capital Expenditure in an Elitist Context

These dispositions pertain to the depletion of the social capital of elitism once self-granted elite status that is rooted in social posturing has been uncovered and revealed to the outside world. The following dispositions reflect some of the most common circumstances under which this occurs, and illuminates that when social capital expenditure significantly exceeds its production due to a high degree of exposure to the outside world, the elitist dynamic runs the risk of being dismantled. The Somalia Commission was one such example, and despite efforts by witnesses expending social capital profusely, the result was a dearth, and in some cases a total bankruptcy in terms of the social requirements for being objectively perceived as legitimate.

Workplace-Centred Focus: This disposition is characterized by a mindset that anything occurring outside working hours or outside the physical workplace can be dismissed as unrelated and irrelevant to the institution. As such it serves as a means of justifying the downplaying of any concern. This disposition refers to perceptual schemes that deliberately overlook and ignore the fact that a person's individual habitus is brought to the workplace and consequently impacts the collective habitus. As a scheme of perception and action, this disposition is

⁵⁵⁹ Somalia Commission, *Dishonoured Legacy*, Vol 5, 1278.

analogous to an unconscious bias that is internalized but invariably has a deleterious impact on the institutional habitus. This is tangentially related to another perceptual scheme that involves downplaying any incidents that do not result in a charge and conviction, essentially raising the bar where deleterious behaviour must be elevated to that level before being considered problematic.

The First Rule of Elitism: This disposition accords with the inherently disingenuous characteristics of elitism where the focus is on untested perceptions and how the elitist faction within the institution is perceived by the outside world. The precepts of elitism only become a concern when exposed to the outside world. The motivation and impetus is protecting the institution and its elitist faction from criticism, scrutiny or anything that could cause reputational damage or disrupt the elitist context. Closely related to the disposition of sweeping under the rug, it becomes ingrained as an institutional norm when public outcry or backlash is required to precipitate acknowledging and addressing the issue.

A Failure to Connect: This disposition represents the unconscious acceptance that rules or procedures will not always be followed, but no connection is made to the repercussions of non-compliance including disaster or tragedy. When any form of unintended or undesirable outcome occurs, it is treated in isolation with no critical reflection as to how the resulting harm could have been avoided. Put another way, there is a deliberate disregard of the nexus between rules and subsequent consequences. This can result in a change written in blood unnecessarily precipitated by the failure to comply with established rules and procedures. This continues the meta-theme of lack of accountability. This disposition is analogous to failing to acknowledge drinking and driving as a primary causal factor in the death of innocent citizens and instead characterizing each incident as an unfortunate but unavoidable accident. Another example especially pertinent to the military is firearms safety or firearms discipline. Within many police and military institutions there has been a shift away from characterizing a careless discharge of a firearm as an accidental discharge, rather the current accepted term is negligent discharge. Although this is a legal distinction in terms of criminal intent (*mens rea* versus negligence), it is indicative of a shift towards personal and institutional responsibility and accountability for attitudes and behaviours and the corresponding consequences.

Entitled but Dispensable: This is an iteration of the previous theme with the distinction that there is a sense of entitlement as it relates to alcohol consumption, or any similar practice/behaviour combined with a permissive approach from the institution regardless of the consequences. Alcohol entitlement can arise as a prerogative in a variety of institutions from the military to institutions of higher learning. The testimony at the Somalia Inquiry revealed alcohol consumption was a common denominator and as such a contributing factor almost every significant event, yet the outcome and consequence of the permissive approach was typically treated as ineluctable.

Implausible Justification: This disposition follows the propensity to protect the elitist faction within an institution by denying problems, but ultimately emphasizes the precepts of elitism by providing highly improbable and unconvincing assertions. Put another way, far-fetched explanations and justifications come across as defensive and magnify the likelihood that there is substance to the matter at hand.

Symbols and Artifacts: This disposition pertains to the variable of defiance to authority where the focus is invariably on the incorrect form of capital. A symbol or other artifact representing a challenge to authority is blamed as the source of dysfunction when it is merely a sign or symptom of the underlying defiance and disrespect being shown to the individuals or collective socially invested with decisional power. While the symbol or artifact in question may represent embodied cultural capital (e.g. the Rebel flag, initiation rites), elitism is manifested and reproduced by displaying or using it despite having been banned. As such, it is the act of breaking rules with impunity and showing disrespect for authority that should be recognized as the dominant form of social capital.

The Fractional Syndrome: This is a tenacious disposition that generates as a means of simultaneously minimizing the magnitude of a problem and avoiding dealing with it. As such it underpins the bad apple syndrome. As a perceptual scheme, this disposition represents a highly effective means to excuse any deleterious behaviour or incidents by asserting the source of dysfunction is confined to a small minority of individuals, inferring there are no issues with the remaining individuals. Paradoxically, this disposition simultaneously asserts and acknowledges the individuals involved are unidentified/unknown or that they may be unidentifiable, as such insulating them from accountability. This disposition justifies overlooking even the most serious of incidents and dismissing them as an aberration.

Given the underlying theme of defiance to authority in many of these dispositions, it begs the question of the extent to which individuals engaging in elitist conduct are predisposed to recalcitrant attitudes and behaviours. Bourdieu discusses the relationship between positions and dispositions, which is helpful when effectuating these thirteen identified dispositions of elitism. He contemplates whether positions within a field choose people best suited to occupy them or whether individuals choose their positions with consideration for their desire to express their dispositions including their preferences and talent. There is a structural homology that Bourdieu acknowledges which is dependent upon the varying interests of distinct or unique groups. He describes a struggle between the position and dispositions evocative of the parallel power network where the result is either that the dispositions prevail and “the post is restructured in function of the incumbent’s dispositions,” or the position prevails, and the incumbent’s dispositions are transformed accordingly.⁵⁶⁰

⁵⁶⁰ Bourdieu, *Habitus and Field*, 73-74.

Bourdieu also delineates between hard positions and soft positions in a social space and his description is worthy of repeating in full:

*The people who import non-conformist positions into a hard position will therefore have a strong likelihood of being weaker than the position and being beaten by it, whereas people who import unorthodox and discordant positions into a soft position have a good chance of being able to mould (sic) the position to suit their dispositions. This explains, among other things, that people with certain dispositions are attracted more by a soft position than a hard position.*⁵⁶¹

With every institution constituting a unique field and having its own iteration of capital, the currency required to succeed is what Bourdieu describes as simply “what works in that field” and “what you need in order to really belong.”⁵⁶² Bourdieu provides the example of a lawyer practicing one type of law but would have difficulty converting that capital into that which is “perceived, recognized and acknowledged” in another area of law.⁵⁶³ Relating this to the case study, it begs the question of whether the Cdn AB Regt was a field with soft positions that to some degree attracted individuals with a proclivity towards dysfunctional dispositions.⁵⁶⁴

The case study of the Cdn AB Regt provides empirical grounding for the hypothesis that elitism, as defined in a way that recognizes the dysfunctional connotations of this concept, fosters discordant social dynamics including norms and social capital that are deleterious to the institution. This discourse casts light on how elitism manifests and is reproduced, including the overall effects and consequences. Furthermore, identifying a set of mutable and transposable dispositions elucidates the manifestation of institutional elitism and the corresponding enmity an elitist faction will have towards the purported institutional habitus consisting of the officially sanctioned norms, ethos, etc. Put another way; by analyzing opinions, perceptions, preconceptions, interpretations, reactions, and attitudes and identifying corresponding dispositions it is possible to understand the unconscious forces from which behaviours, actions, practices and decisions flow. Rather than reify organizational culture as the source of the dysfunctional implications of elitism, it is possible to isolate aspects of habitus that drive the attitudes and behaviours of elitism, including language and communication styles, leisure activities (i.e. after-hours or off-duty activities, practices and behaviours) and broadly speaking all forms of preferences that provide members of an institution their sense of place and value within that field.

⁵⁶¹ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, Chapter 6.

⁵⁶² Bourdieu, *Forms of Capital*, 156.

⁵⁶³ *Ibid.*, 158-161.

⁵⁶⁴ Bourdieu, *Habitus and Field*, 74.

The Dispositions of Elitism Distilled from the Case Study

Dispositions are socially ingrained and operate at a subconscious level as habits, preferences, tastes, attitudes and behavioural routines, mannerisms, moral intuitions, motivations, aspirations, expectations, viewpoints, assumptions and other non-discursive knowledge. Dispositions are a propensity, tendency, preference or inclination to act in a specified way, inculcations that influence everyday practice and are locked in through habituation, becoming second nature and as such influencing attitudes and behaviours. Dispositions guide an overall understanding of one's social space within a field.

Promotional Dimension of the Social Capital of Elitism	Managing the Social Capital of Elitism	Implicit Rules of Social Capital Expenditure in an Elitist Context
<p>Mischaracterize Elitism as Desirable</p> <p>Euphemism / Dysphemism</p> <p>Condone Elitism</p>	<p>Recalcitrance</p> <p>Sweep Under the Rug</p> <p>Posturing of Punishment</p>	<p>Workplace Centred Focus</p> <p>The First Rule of Elitism</p> <p>A Failure to Connect</p> <p>Entitled but Dispensable</p> <p>Implausible Justification</p> <p>Symbols & Artifacts</p> <p>The Fractional Syndrome</p>

Figure 4.

Chapter 6 – Conclusion

The function of sociology, as of every science, is to reveal that which is hidden.

Pierre Bourdieu, 1998

This inquiry derives from a recognition of the paradox of elitism where it is sometimes construed as the actions or attitudes of the elite, which can pinpoint that which some find objectionable in society but is not helpful towards isolating deleterious attitudes and behaviours in an institutional context. Elitism has been defined as attitudes and behaviours shared by a group and seeking to reinforce in others the perception that such group has elite status and to ultimately reinforce the group's power, privilege and advantages provided by such status. The case study confirms that elitism, as defined in this way that recognizes the dysfunctional connotations, fosters discordant social dynamics including norms and social capital that are deleterious to the institution at large. In the context of a discordant habitus, elitism is a set of behaviours and attitudes built around an individual or group engaged in self-granting and self-promoting elite status, essentially a dysfunctional way to advance and protect elite status often disguised as representations of temerity and hubris. This exploration of institutional elitism set out to illuminate the variables and qualitative indicators of this phenomenon.

The explicative power of habitus provides the opportunity for greater insight into the manifestation and reproduction of elitism within an institution than explorations of culture that are generally limited to identifying and analyzing social norms. Because norms are the informal and somewhat unspoken rules of behaviour of a social group, they are typically overt expectations, even if they are inculcated or ingrained from an early age as is often the case with manners for example. There are also outlier behaviours for which norms may not account, given that norms represent the typical or median behavioural expectations of a social group. Explorations of culture are often prone to reification, which Hermens and Kempen describe as a process where “people turn names into things” and leads to endowing cultures “with the qualities of internally homogeneous and externally distinctive objects.”⁵⁶⁵ The bad apple syndrome is emblematic of reification, prone to being dismissed in the same way specific incidents are mischaracterized and minimized as isolated or one-of-a-kind events without delving deeper into the social dynamics that contributed to the extant dysfunctional situation. Simply put, culture becomes a bogeyman that can be blamed and scapegoated without ever determining the root cause of the problem. With respect to the Cdn AB Regt, even when specific cultural issues are distilled by Horn including a “distinct non-sanctioned airborne ethos and culture” consisting of an “elitist, macho, renegade attitude,” identification and dissection of these dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours does not fully explain how the underlying unauthorized and discordant habitus was able to manifest

⁵⁶⁵ H.J.M Hermans and H.J.C. Kempen, “Moving Cultures: The Perilous Problems of Cultural Dichotomies in a Globalizing Society,” *American Psychologist* 54: 1113.

and thrive.⁵⁶⁶ Put another way, pinpointing what occurred and who was responsible does not necessarily explain how and why the phenomenon occurred and was subsequently reproduced.

Bourdieu's habitus offers a framework to pinpoint the unconscious structuring systems that guide the manifestation and reproduction of elitism, whereas the concept of an institutional culture often fails to acknowledge or capture elements of individual habitus that influence behaviour of an elitist faction within an institution or field. An individual habitus will invariably exert pressure on the unique organizing logic of a field, which can otherwise be thought of as a spatial metaphor for the various social actors competing for social capital. An individual's position within a field derives from the interplay between their personal habitus and the type and amount of capital they can mobilize within that field. This subsequently determines social standing and opportunities. Taking into consideration the parallel power network and wall of silence, these two indicators contribute to a dysfunctional habitus by way of various ideological assumptions as to how social capital is legitimized, ultimately giving rise to an anti-authority agenda. Dispositions are more powerful than norms in that they provide an explicative framework for identifying and explaining the underlying forces behind dysfunctional and discordant social dynamics. Cultural reproduction then occurs as various practices including inequalities and dysfunctional mindsets and behaviours are legitimated, continually reinforcing existing hierarchies and power dynamics.

The evidence and findings presented have important implications towards understanding a habitus shaping elitism, including how the variables and indicators of elitism logically relate to each other and how they can subsume and become higher-order indicators. Identifying the dispositions of elitism reveals a powerful framework for understanding how the social capital of elitism is produced and lost and how a habitus that shapes elitism is manifested and maintained through reproduction. Dispositions provide insight into commonality amongst attitudes and behaviours of elitism and patterns that relate logically. The parallel power network and wall of silence emerge as phenomena that can present a more powerful force and influence than the established decision-making structure and the individuals or collective socially invested with decisional power. These phenomena are propelled by a disordered sense of loyalty underscored by nefarious or odious intention, with dysfunctional characteristics including defiant or insubordinate attitudes and behaviours. A habitus shaping elitism features dispositions inclined to suppress detrimental or unfavourable aspects or events by downplaying, failing or refusing to acknowledge, ignoring or concealing the precepts of elitism. Dispositions of elitism reinforce the apocryphal perception that any dysfunction that comes to light is merely an aberration and may be presented as inevitable, especially when compared to society at large. Finally, the dispositions combine to demonstrate a patterned individual and institutional approach where the precepts of elitism serve as a habituated explanation, excuse, defence, rationalization, mitigation,

⁵⁶⁶ Horn, *Military Elites*, 55.

extenuation, justification and ultimately vindication with respect to the problematic or controversial attitude, behaviour, phenomenon or event.

The Case Study of The Canadian Airborne Regiment

Previous scrutiny of the Cdn AB Regt from the public inquiry explored problems related to leadership, discipline, staffing and whether the Regiment had a viable mandate and role throughout its 25-year existence.⁵⁶⁷ The Somalia Commission concludes that “it is discipline that controls aggressivity,” and points out that the overall state of discipline during pre-deployment as well as in-theatre “was alarmingly sub-standard – a condition that subsisted without correction.”⁵⁶⁸ While this conclusion is an objective assessment of the state of affairs, it offers little explanation at the macro level in terms of how an institution went so far off track and fails to recognize the role and impact of elitism. Drawing on the example provided earlier, it is tantamount to classifying an airplane crash as pilot error without delving into how that critical error was able to manifest within a system of rigorous checks and balances. Only the identification of explicit and unambiguous dispositions serves to pinpoint the schemes of perception and action that reinforce and legitimize elitism with counter-normative social structures and power dynamics like the parallel power network. The focus on extracting these ingrained schemes of perception, thought and action from witness testimony largely precluded witnesses from expurgating evidence of elitism. This is because the analysis did not seek to determine an objective reality regarding the explanations and events but rather to evince the dispositions that guided witnesses’ choices, beliefs and actions both during the events being analyzed and throughout the course of their testimony. Socialization processes are deeply ingrained, and habitus becomes embodied throughout a social agent’s everyday practice, all of which was apparent as these internalized norms, values and practices emerged from witness testimony.

With the focus on understanding how elitism is manifested and reproduced in a military institution, this dissertation offers a starkly contrasting explanation for the protracted period of dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours that spanned the latter portion of the Cdn AB Regt’s existence. The Somalia Commission’s report is harshly critical of military leadership and speaks to misplaced loyalty and self-preservation when describing many officers’ testimony at the inquiry as “characterized by inconsistency, improbability, implausibility, evasiveness, selective recollection, half-truths, and plain lies.”⁵⁶⁹ Parenthetically, this finding highlights a failure in leadership and accountability, but does not explain this behaviour beyond general inferences of being motivated by self-preservation. Horn sums up Canada’s military and political leadership as

⁵⁶⁷ Somalia Commission, *Dishonoured Legacy*, ES1. The Commissioners note that the explanation of a few bad apples was provided by many leaders, but when it “proved hollow” these same leaders resorted to blaming subordinates for the poor state of discipline.

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 1449, 1464.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, Executive Summary, S-4.

having concluded that the disobedience plaguing the Regiment was an “inherent, and inescapable” characteristic of any airborne organization, a rationalization he succinctly characterizes as “grossly inadequate.”⁵⁷⁰ Rather than isolate the specific expectations of the field to understand how and why certain behaviour was coherent with that habitus, these prevailing opinions expose the entire Regiment to history’s rebuke.

This discourse elucidates a habitus shaping elitism inculcated within the context of a military institution, a field with unique expectations and comprised of individuals who followed a tendency observed by Bourdieu where individuals choose a position most apt to suit their personal dispositions.⁵⁷¹ Officially, a military institution has a rigid, hierarchical social structure, but when the habitus is subjected to scrutiny, the shrouded or concealed social dynamics of elitism can be exposed. Elitism permits individuals or an elitist faction to influence their social positioning outside the formal power network in a dysfunctional way by taking advantage of discordant social dynamics like a parallel power network and wall of silence, while at the same time enjoying the protection of a set of dispositions that occur concurrently and have identifiable and repeated characteristics intended to protect the elitist faction from delegitimization forces while reproducing the discordant habitus. A habitus that fosters elitism has a unique orthodoxy where there is an ongoing reinforcement of attitudes and behaviours consistent with similar experiences within the field and an adherence to the field’s dysfunctional and deleterious regulative principles that Bourdieu termed logic of practice or more simply the rules of the game. The testimony analysed during the case study reveals the internecine implications of elitism.

Areas for Future Research

Given the Canadian military context of this case study of elitism, an area for future research is the recurrent and seemingly immutable explorations of CAF culture change. Sexual misconduct is one example and is only possible within an environment conducive to abuses of power. This begs the question of whether there is a macro, but more diffuse, problem of elitism in the CAF. The Commander of the CDA acknowledged in April 2024 that he was directed to reduce (as opposed to eliminate) “toxic elitism” at the Canadian military colleges and to “mitigate against lingering elitist attitudes” of graduates of these institutions, with the proposed antidote being the reinforcement of “humility as an important part of the CAF ethos and our culture evolution.”⁵⁷² In general terms, Canada’s military has historically undergone periods where it enjoyed a very good worldwide reputation, however budgetary and procurement implications have resulted in a reality that is quite different.⁵⁷³ Low budgets,

⁵⁷⁰ Horn, *Military Elites*, 63.

⁵⁷¹ Bourdieu, *Habitus and Field*.

⁵⁷² O’Reilly, *Commander’s CDA Directive*, 7/10.

⁵⁷³ Department of National Defence, *2023-24 Departmental Results Report* (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 2024), 3. The report indicates, amongst other issues “shortages in

aging equipment, limited time for training, and extensive bureaucratic oversight have combined to create a less effective or capable military organization. As a result, there is a need to prop up the reputation, which in turn leads to the dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours linked to elitism. An inchoate area of research is the extent to which elitism creates an environment that is more conducive to abuses of power.

Given that elitism is the social posturing of elite status, determining the attributes of an objectively verifiable elite status could help further elucidate the inimical characteristics of elitism. Much of the existing research into institutional elite status pertains to the military, and focuses on role, level of hazard/danger, size of the unit and whether it is comprised of volunteers, selection criteria, and capabilities that differentiate them from conventional forces (e.g. weapons, equipment, rapidly deployable). This inquiry's definition of elite status contemplates socially shared opinions, perspectives, and preconceptions where an identifiable group is construed as performing consistently and predictably in ways deemed superior to other groups engaging in similar performance activities. Discerning the objectively verifiable attributes of elite status as it relates to performance would provide a stark contrast to the attributes, dynamics and behaviours of elitism and serve as a presage to the manifestation and reproduction of elitism.

Another potential exploration closely related to elitism is the concept of stolen valour, where individuals make false representations regarding military service by wearing uniforms, medals, decorations or insignia along with a variety of corresponding claims. With respect to this social posturing, the motive can consist of privileges and advantages like elitism, including status and prestige, financial benefits (government benefits or benevolence accorded to veterans), and leniency in courts in relation to other offences. Weisz observes that the false posturing of military service is a behaviour that has endured for centuries given that "an honourable military career can be quite a valuable commodity."⁵⁷⁴ There is a significant gap in the literature that warrants further exploration of how and why stolen valour continues to manifest.

Finally, the theory of elitism derived from this case study could be tested against distinct or contrastive evidence that was not used to derive this theory, i.e. another military institution or a different type of institution. For example, exploring how a parallel power network manifests and is reinforced within an institution with a habitus that is distinct from that of the Cdn AB Regt like a university, or a business. Recalling the discussion on clericalism within the Roman Catholic Church and the correlation between clericalism and elitism,

personnel, equipment and materiel" and a "downward trend" in serviceability of the fleets attributed to "years of underfunding" and an "aging and increasingly obsolete fleet." With a total budget of 38.47 billion dollars in FY 2023-24, one of the four key areas of focus is identified as "culture evolution." The CAF laments that a 2017 Defence Ministerial commitment to provide a quick reaction force of a mere 200 peacekeepers (formerly a key role for the Cdn AB Regt) "is increasingly unlikely to be fulfilled," 21.

⁵⁷⁴ E.R. Weisz, "Stolen Valour: The Legal Story Behind Impersonating Military Personnel," *Armed Forces and Society* 50, no. 4 (2024): 1088.

individuals claiming elite status can be viewed as having special rights and privileges that insulate them from accountability.⁵⁷⁵ This highlights the unique aspect of any role that is generally perceived as being beyond reproach and thus opportune for abuse. Professions including the medical and legal fields are ripe for the scrutiny applied in this case study, with various fields that could be isolated such as recognizing the differences between a law society versus a specific law firm or a law faculty at a university. Similarly, policing as a profession or a specific department or unit could be a potentially fruitful field for analysis. Considering the various institutional particularities, additional unique themes and dispositions would be identified given the distinct habitus of these fields.

Several analytic generalizations can be made from this inquiry. Elitism is never a positive construct because it consists of dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours of an elitist faction that are ultimately antithetical to the institution in general. As mentioned, the theoretical propositions and findings of this inquiry are generalizable to other organizations and institutions outside of the military context including police, the priesthood, and academia where there is a seemingly ineluctable nexus between power and privilege. Applying the explicative concepts identified in this inquiry could serve a sometimes iconoclastic purpose of attenuating the identified dispositions of elitism within a range of institutions. As such, the findings from the case study of the Cdn AB Regt extend far beyond military institutions with the possibility of being applied to virtually any institutional social grouping where dysfunctional attitudes and behaviours have been identified and there is a desire to delve deeper to explore whether elitism is a factor.

This inquiry highlights the extent to which elitism and accountability are mutually exclusive, and the case study elucidates the sharply contrasting social capital. This is an important distinction in terms of causation, as it would be difficult for elitism to manifest or thrive in a habitus where individuals fulfil their obligations and take responsibility for their actions. A habitus predisposed towards accountability is efficacious of humility and socially shared opinions and perspectives of consistent and predictable performance, which ultimately presents as the antithesis of elitism as well as a means to obviate its discordant social dynamics. Earned elite status is based on demonstrable performance that is objectively verifiable, is negotiated socially and becomes a social construct correlated to skill and ability with the potential to justify certain forms of power relationships with others. Elitism, on the other hand, is not a binary construct, it is always dysfunctional because ultimately it is never productive for someone to exaggerate their significance, skills or accomplishments to give the impression that their abilities and achievements surpass others.

⁵⁷⁵ Cupich, “Clericalism: an Infection that can be Cured.”

When considering the efficacy and potency of this exploration of elitism, Mill expounds the benefit of contemplating all perspectives and warns of the danger of failing to consider contrasting viewpoints.

If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.

John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*

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Appendix A - Volumes of Somalia Inquiry Transcripts that were Analyzed

Pre-deployment phase of Inquiry:

Vol 2 (03Oct95)	LCol Glenn Nordick, MGen Conrad William Hewson
Vol 3 (05Oct 95)	LGen Kent Foster, MGen Robert Gaudreau
Vol 4 (10Oct95)	Colonel Walt Holmes
Vol 5 (11Oct95)	WO Scott Ferguson
Vol 6 (12Oct95)	Commander Paul Jenkins
Vol 11 (30Oct95)	Capt Kenneth McMillan, Col Jan Arp
Vol 12 (31Oct95)	Col Jan Arp, Col Michael Houghton
Vol 13 (01Nov95)	Capt Jerome Walsh
Vol 14 (02Nov95)	Commander Paul Jenkins
Vol 15 (14Nov95)	Maj Ralph Priestman, Col John Joly
Vol 23 (29Nov95)	MWO Bradley Ross Mills
Vol 31 (20Dec95)	Major Anthony Seward
Vol 32 (15Jan96)	Major Anthony Seward
Vol 34 (17Jan96)	WO Robert Murphy
Vol 35 (18Jan96)	WO Robert Murphy, Cpl Michel Purnelle
Vol 36 (22Jan96)	LCol Paul Morneault
Vol 37 (23Jan96)	LCol Paul Morneault
Vol 38 (24Jan96)	LCol Paul Morneault
Vol 40 (29Jan96)	BGen Ernest Beno
Vol 41 (30Jan96)	BGen Ernest Beno
Vol 42 (31Jan1996)	MGen Lewis Mackenzie

Volumes of Inquiry Transcripts that were Analyzed (cont.)

Vol 43 (01Feb96) MGen Lewis Mackenzie

Vol 44 (12Feb96) Col Michael Houghton

Vol 45 (13Feb96) Col Michael Houghton

Vol 46 (14Feb96) LGen Gordon Reay

Vol 47 (15Feb96) LGen Gordon Reay, LGen James Gervais

In-theatre phase of Inquiry:

Vol 104 (18Sep96) MWO Rui Amaral

Vol 105 (19 Sep 96) MWO Rui Amaral, RSM Clarence Jardine

Vol 106 (20 Sep 96) RSM Clarence Jardine

Post-deployment phase of Inquiry: Inquiry shut down by government before this occurred.